blindpig
01-23-2016, 12:41 PM
The consequences of Stalin's death, Malenkov and prospects
colonelcassad
January 23 18:07
https://gazeta.eot.su/sites/default/files/articles/23/dinamo.jpg
CIA experts on the consequences of the death of Stalin, Malenkov and prospects
10 March 1953 CIA analysts prepared a report "Possible consequences of Stalin's death, Malenkov and estimation of chances to lead the USSR". This report is not published on the website of the CIA, but it was published the minutes of its discussions by experts on 18-19 March 1953 With the transfer of the document and suggest you read. In Russian is published for the first time. Marks [censorship] means that before publication on the website of the CIA relevant piece of text has been painted over. SE-39, which is referred to in the text - the same report, "The possible consequences of the death of Stalin, Malenkov and estimation of chances to lead the USSR", which discusses analysts.
Recall that at the time of the death of Stalin, Georgy Malenkov (1901-1988) served as Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers has been Stalin. After Stalin's death March 5, 1953 Malenkov became chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and held this position until February 8, 1955. After Khrushchev's report at the plenum of the Central Committee adopted a resolution "On Comrade Malenkov," in which he was accused of "populism", and also criticized for "lack of business and political qualities necessary to perform the duties of the head of the Soviet government." Malenkov did not resist. He spoke of repentance and it was demoted to Minister of power. In the summer of 1957, the Presidium of the Central Committee at the next group of malcontents led by Malenkov, Khrushchev tried to shift (for this decision was filed seven votes in favor, four against). However Khrushchev, who had by that time considerable power and political resources, gave himself to beat: the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, almost always implicitly endorses the decision of "senior comrades", this time overturned the verdict of the Presidency and the rebels proclaimed "anti-party group". Khrushchev won the final victory, Malenkov was removed from all his posts and sent to the steppes of Kazakhstan losing control of the power plant to the USSR.
http://statehistory.ru/img_lib2/2016/01/1453242282_f1b3.jpg
April 24, 1953
MEMORANDUM TO DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Meeting of consultants [censorship]
1. In support of our conversation in the afternoon, following a meeting of Consultants [censored] will be held on Wednesday and Thursday, May 6 and 7. Most members of our group [censorship]
2. On Wednesday, we will discuss the tactics adopted by the Council of "peace", and possible reaction to this tactics of the non-Communist world. Against this background, consultants examine the minutes of the previous meeting, a copy of which is attached, [censored]
3. I very much hope that you can attend. We can arrange transport and to solve the problem with a place in the hotel. [Censorship]
====
CONFIDENTIAL
information protection
approved for publication 21.09.2006: CIA-RDP80B01676R004000050088-9
SECRET PROTECTED INFORMATION
Central Intelligence Agency
BUREAU OF NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS
March 26, 1953
Mr. CAREER MEMORANDUM number 336
TOPIC: DISCUSSION AT THE MEETING OF 18 AND 19 MARCH 1953 CONSULTANTS [censorship] instrument SE-39, "POTENTIAL DEATH OF STALIN AND EVALUATION OF CHANCES Malenkov HEAD of the USSR (March 10, 1953)."
CHAIRMAN MEETING OF CONSULTANTS
[censorship]
Consultants Committee of national assessments
[censored]
Committee national assessments
[censorship]
The Office national assessments
[censorship]
====
discussion at the meeting on 18 and 19 March 1953, a consultant [censorship] instrument SE-39, "POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES Stalin's death and estimation of chances Malenkov HEAD USSR (March 10, 1953) "
I. SUMMARY
1. The discussion was focused on the issue of the transfer of power in the Soviet Union, and in particular, on whether there will be a lot of power, concentrated by Stalin personally, handed his successor or successors, and what is the risk of such transmission. Most consultants inclined to believe that, in the process of solving the problems associated with the transfer of power is likely to weaken the Soviet system. In this regard, the majority departed from the point of view that, in general, has set out the Office of National Assessments. This point of view was the fact that the transfer of power is likely to be implemented without reducing the effectiveness of continuity of leadership and the Soviet state.
2. In general, as a result of discussions were formed two points of view:
a. Most experts, with varying degrees of conviction, argued on the basis of historical analogy, that the transfer of power can cause upheaval in the state system of the Soviets. They imagine the structure of power in the Soviet Union as highly associated with personality. According to them, lack the greatness of Stalin Malenkov, and he is surrounded by ambitious and fearless people who, if they can, will qualify for what appears to be its exclusive position. These consultants also believe that a man like Malenkov, who was in the shadow of Stalin, can have quality and disadvantages that may make it difficult to obtain his power belonged to Stalin. However, the consultants of the group came to the conclusion that, despite the danger that, in their view, threatened the Soviet system, the transfer of power can still pass without harm to the system.
B. The opposite point of view, based on an analysis of the Soviet system, is that the prospect of disruption or destruction of the Soviet system in the transition of power is negligible or non-existent. Hold this view consultants said that historical precedents are not relevant because there is no historical example of such a monitoring system, which was established at the Soviets. Elements of control, they said, permeate all institutions of power in society, so that even if on the upper level and there will be a personal struggle for power, it will be temporary and will not affect the stability of the entire system.
II. MAIN ARGUMENTS
A. The position of most
3. [censored] began with a categorical statement that any concept of solidarity or respect of corporate among the people in the group senior management was "complete nonsense." The relationship among these people during Stalin's rule were marked by extreme tension, intrigues and subtle ferocity. In this situation, there was a huge possibility of latent violence.
4. Moreover, in recent months there were signs of increasing stress that point to strengthen undercover struggle. We can assume that Malenkov was not the one who chose Stalin in the last weeks of his life. Also, it is possible that Stalin had been dead for some time, and that the fight took place after his death. The abolition of the Politburo at the XIX Congress was "epoch-making step," which Stalin did not bear personal responsibility. Drinking Molotov Malenkov in the funeral oration different from that of Beria. This may mean, as a confrontation between those two Molotov, and that they could not remove it because of his supporters in the party. The sudden strengthening of the provisions of the Army, both prior to and after Stalin's death, suggesting that Malenkov could drive the intrigue with the army, in order to gain its support. This confirms the return of Zhukov as his previous removal was a personal act of Stalin. [Censored] I came to the conclusion that "whatever the government apparatus at this time, a single entity, it is not."
5. [Censored] I asked whether the "doctors' case" with its implicit attack on Beria, staged Union Stalin and Molotov against Malenkov and Beria. Then he suggested that could take place political disagreement honey two factions in which Stalin and Molotov were "cautious" and Malenkov and Beria - "tending forward" side.
6. [censored] said that the unions mentioned above persons have been quite possible, although causing them political aspects were unclear. He felt that in the beginning of 1952 in the Soviet hierarchy formed a divergence of views about how the Soviet Union should react to events in the West, particularly the United States and re-re the possibility of West Germany. One group believed that all these changes are so significant that the Soviet Union should take an immediate decision on whether to fight or negotiate with the preferred second course was. Another group assumed that the events in the West do not carry such a threat, and that the USSR could afford to wait for developments. [Censored] I saw two signs, reinforcing his idea of a struggle between these two views. First of all - it emerged he had while visiting Moscow last summer, a clear sense of what in certain circles make determined efforts to prevent him from meeting with Stalin and Molotov. He suggested that this was due to the issue of the need for negotiations with the USSR, the United States. Other evidence is the discovery of their change of Soviet policy in Germany. He took the view that the March note (known as "Stalin Note") reflects the temporary victory of the camp "negotiators" and the following notes are canceled suggestions implied in the March note. Stalin's article seems to have clarified this issue, at least temporarily, because it was said that the events in the West do not create a threat and that war is not inevitable, and therefore implied no need for negotiations. She put the policy of the Council to pose "no concessions, no negotiations."
7. After that [censored] summed up the position of [censored], as follows: (a) there is evidence of the struggle lasted for a while among the heirs of Stalin, and evidence that this struggle has not ended with the death of Stalin; (b) as this struggle involved a difference of views on policy towards the West; (c) The current power structure is a compromise, which, given the nature of the relationship between the Communist leaders are unlikely to save.
8. [censored] has accepted these findings and added new observations. He said that much will depend on whether the West to resist the Soviet leaders as a result of their opposition to the need for important political decisions. If you have a confrontation with the West, the Soviets existing internal relations will undergo a heavy load. The differences in the top management may affect the satellite states and the communist parties of other countries, whose leaders will not respond to the power of Malenkov as Stalin reacted to the authorities, resulting in considerable pressure will be subjected to the unity of the communist movement.
9. [censored] asked whether the initiative will combine Western leadership of the Soviets, because historically, foreign threat has always influenced the disunited leadership. [censored] replied that the steps of the West (the United States) do not bear any threat. According to him, that Germany was potentially a problem, he that soweth discord among the leaders of the Soviets, and that he was confident that the new proposals concerning the West of Germany will only reinforce these differences.
V. The position of minorities
10. In support of the view that that transfer of power will be hardly a shock to the Soviet system, [censored] proposed a different version of what occurred in the Soviet Union, as well as a different view of the nature of the system of government of the Soviets. He was confident that Stalin paid enough attention to the problem of succession of power, and that he put in the position of successor to the Malenkov government in order to minimize risk. The last real fight for the right of inheritance of power took place just between Malenkov and Zhdanov, Malenkov and won it. He was closely involved in the work of the Secretariat, at least for 14 years. This is a key position because it meant control over personnel in the army with the rank of colonel up over higher Party organizations at the district level and above managers, from company directors and above. All personal movement controlled the last Congress.
11. [censored] agreed [censored] that "doctors' case" was a blow to Beria, but the publication of the proceedings of the case meant that the struggle for power have faded away, and was not in full swing. Replacing Abakumov Ignatiev, has become a key sector in the movement of personal responsibility Beria showed that the sector was punished by Beria, but Beria himself personally. Slander, directed at the state security bodies in the message of "the Doctors" was a way to inform the Party that Beria stepped into the struggle for power. [Censored] he said that it is possible that Beria and Malenkov relations were established last spring, and that references to outstanding generals as victims of "Doctors' Plot was an attempt to convey a message of support for the armed forces of Malenkov. [censorship] is not regarded as an important event the abolition of the Politburo and its replacement by the Extended Bureau adopted at the XIX Congress. Presidency contains all three elements that have always formed the upper echelon of power: the leading personality in the Politburo, then a group of younger people who are in positions with great administrative responsibility and, finally, the regional satraps. The important thing here was that Stalin wanted to have one dominant successor, and create personal connections that allow to pass into the hands of Malenkov the levers of power.
12. This version has attracted a number of questions from consultants, leaning to the view expressed [censored]. In answering these questions, [censored] has clarified its position:
a. Asked to explain the inadvertent homage cast during the funeral of Stalin and the apparent rapid weakening of the myth of Stalin, [censored] I said that Malenkov is likely to react to feelings of party members that Stalin's personality cult was too strong. (In this regard, [censored] he noted that for the last year or so in the press began to appear "strange gaps" about the treatment of Stalin. He suggested that Stalin "sated" combination of Malenkov, Beria and was absorbed by the struggle with them. According to him it is important that Beria moved immediately after the death of Stalin.)
b. Asked to explain undermined if Stalin's article in the newspaper "Bolshevik" position Malenkov, [censored] said that he believes that this article represents a line of Malenkov in relation to Europe, ie, that the West is not a threat, and that the Soviet Union has time to maneuver (Malenkov speech at the Congress of the CPSU). [censored] explained why an article was published in the newspaper "Bolshevik", suggesting that Stalin had planned to present it to Congress as a report, but due to ill health, he could not do it. The purpose of his brief appearance was a blessing policies, and ensuring the adoption of the report of Malenkov. (Here [censored] and others have suggested the hypothesis that at the opening of the Congress, Stalin could already be dead, and the Congress made it a double.)
13. [Censored] he said that, in his opinion, in the interpretation of [censored], there are two significant drawbacks. It does not explain, firstly, related to Beria to Stalin's death, and unexpected strengthening of its position after the death of Stalin, and, secondly, the abolition of the Presidium of the Political Bureau and the formation of the Congress, followed by reduction of the first after the death of Stalin. [censored] added that he is confident in the absence of real power from the Presidency because he was too big. He pointed to the theses presented by Khrushchev at the congress, which indicated that staff will work with the Secretariat to conduct it, rather than the Presidency. This means that the Bureau was purely formal authority, and that before the death of Stalin, Molotov was not in a position to influence the management personnel.
14. [Censored] I asked if he could believe that a man so single-mindedly fought for power, as did Stalin, would appoint a successor. Picture orderly transfer of power is simply not consistent with the spirit of the situation, and is not consistent with the history of revolutions. [Censored] I replied that he should take into account the factor of deteriorating health of Stalin for a long period of time, since Stalin, probably long realized that he would have to withdraw at any time from the government.
15. [Censored] he said that, in general, he agreed with the theses [censored], but does not think that the interpretation of [censored] contains contradictions. He said that Stalin's choice was undoubtedly Malenkov, but it is unlikely that Stalin, in fact, finally handed over power. "Doctors' Plot and the cancellation decisions of the Congress after Stalin's death indicate that the successor has not been appointed, that Malenkov was forced to seize power, and in fact did it. Although power was Malenkov, there is a possibility that those who felt threatened, could unite against him. For these people personal power was much more important than political disagreements. Malenkov, of course, felt the need to create a temporary alliance with other members of the supreme power, but later he would have wanted to get rid of them. If Beria and Molotov showed the slightest signs of disloyalty, the blood would have flowed. Consequently, there was a potentially explosive situation, although the challenge Malenkov, not united against him alone nobody could. [censored] reminded of Lenin's remark that Russia's peculiar "gigantically swift transition from wild violence to the most delicate deceit." Personally, [censored] I suggested that the chances of Malenkov to consolidate power were great, as Malenkov was in a better position than Stalin after Lenin's death, due to the fact that at that time had to manage the system, which has yet to be created.
16. [censorship] asked how justifiable comparison with the 1924 year due to the increased size of the Soviet Empire, the complexity of the system and the load generated by the efforts of the forced administration planned economy. Is not it possible that with such a tightly bound structure of the delay can be fatal, and therefore, could not it be that the person still plays an important role? [Censored] he said that since 1924 there has been a significant development of the administrative system and make it increasingly self-sustaining. She survived the shock of the great purges no signs of decay. Control over key posts of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU has reduced the need for personal intervention.
17. [Censored] he stated that he was convinced that modern totalitarianism inevitably develops into a personal dictatorship. Stalin more and more like Hitler. For the population as a whole, around the person of Malenkov could be created a myth that would have allowed him relatively easy to establish themselves in the role of Stalin. For people at average levels in the apparatus of power that was the real issue: they are likely to have been injured in connection with the death of Stalin, and only gradually can begin to ask ourselves whether it is possible to replace this great personality. But at the top level, the tension was certainly terrible. It was impossible to predict whether they will solve the situation by force or by political maneuvering. The increasing complexity of the problems of the empire - the relationship with Mao and the satellite countries - makes the new connection is much more difficult.
18. [censored] said that the key question is whether any struggle at the highest level of power lead to a conflict of institutions of power, that is, whether to resort to the help of the army or secret police any leader seeking support for violence. However, he does not believe in the possibility that due to the pervasive nature of control in all the instruments of power. According to the files of the Secretariat, led by Malenkov long this system. [censorship] is confident that he still controls the government and, therefore, the collision of government institutions are unlikely.
19. [Censored] he said that should not be underestimated aspect of the individual in the management of the system, because it requires constant attention. He was convinced that Stalin maintained his power through the deliberate preservation of instability and tension. In the last years of his life he lost power so as to maintain the required continuous attention. As a result, in the organization of the state and the Party developed groups. And if Malenkov forced to compromise with the solidarity of the institutions of power, he lost.
20. [Censored] he said that Malenkov had actually succeeded Stalin's power, but the real question is, will he be able to govern the country with the same skill as it did Stalin himself. For judging abilities Malenkov there is sufficient evidence.
III. OTHER MATTERS
21. Consultants proposed to modify the document SE-39 in the following respects:
a. [Censored] he said that he does not like the categorical statement in paragraph 3 of the people in the USSR "is unlikely to take an active part", if the power struggles will break out. He proposed to change the wording, at least for "People in the Soviet Union is unlikely to take an active part in the early stages of the struggle for power".
B. Overall, among the consultants it had a tendency to believe that Stalin's death to a greater extent than is approved in the SE-39 can lead to a weakening of control over the Soviets satellite countries and communist parties in the countries on the members of the unit. However, [censored] in this matter did not agree with the majority opinion. A similar controversy was caused by the question of whether there are prospects for increasing the influence of Tito in the satellite countries and other Communist parties. The frequency of [censored] was inclined to believe that the influence of Tito should increase.
C. Although none of the counselors did not have expressed serious objections to the assessment in the SE-39 possible influence of the effects of the death of Stalin in the Soviet-Chinese relations, [censored] believes that it is important to stress factors other than those specified in the document. He argued that if the large changes in the relationship is not expected, it is mainly associated with (a) the fact that the two countries have common interests in the Korean War, and (b) China is a long time will depend on the industrial aid to the USSR and that Russian may want to use this dependence to maintain an effective influence. Without questioning, and discussing common position in paragraph (a), [censored] he said that, in his opinion, Russia will not be able to provide China with a significant industrial assistance, and that the penetration of Russian in China, and their influence there, is much weaker, than is commonly believed.
http://statehistory.ru/5493/Eksperty...akh-Malenkova/ - zinc
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colonelcassad
January 23 18:07
https://gazeta.eot.su/sites/default/files/articles/23/dinamo.jpg
CIA experts on the consequences of the death of Stalin, Malenkov and prospects
10 March 1953 CIA analysts prepared a report "Possible consequences of Stalin's death, Malenkov and estimation of chances to lead the USSR". This report is not published on the website of the CIA, but it was published the minutes of its discussions by experts on 18-19 March 1953 With the transfer of the document and suggest you read. In Russian is published for the first time. Marks [censorship] means that before publication on the website of the CIA relevant piece of text has been painted over. SE-39, which is referred to in the text - the same report, "The possible consequences of the death of Stalin, Malenkov and estimation of chances to lead the USSR", which discusses analysts.
Recall that at the time of the death of Stalin, Georgy Malenkov (1901-1988) served as Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers has been Stalin. After Stalin's death March 5, 1953 Malenkov became chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and held this position until February 8, 1955. After Khrushchev's report at the plenum of the Central Committee adopted a resolution "On Comrade Malenkov," in which he was accused of "populism", and also criticized for "lack of business and political qualities necessary to perform the duties of the head of the Soviet government." Malenkov did not resist. He spoke of repentance and it was demoted to Minister of power. In the summer of 1957, the Presidium of the Central Committee at the next group of malcontents led by Malenkov, Khrushchev tried to shift (for this decision was filed seven votes in favor, four against). However Khrushchev, who had by that time considerable power and political resources, gave himself to beat: the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, almost always implicitly endorses the decision of "senior comrades", this time overturned the verdict of the Presidency and the rebels proclaimed "anti-party group". Khrushchev won the final victory, Malenkov was removed from all his posts and sent to the steppes of Kazakhstan losing control of the power plant to the USSR.
http://statehistory.ru/img_lib2/2016/01/1453242282_f1b3.jpg
April 24, 1953
MEMORANDUM TO DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Meeting of consultants [censorship]
1. In support of our conversation in the afternoon, following a meeting of Consultants [censored] will be held on Wednesday and Thursday, May 6 and 7. Most members of our group [censorship]
2. On Wednesday, we will discuss the tactics adopted by the Council of "peace", and possible reaction to this tactics of the non-Communist world. Against this background, consultants examine the minutes of the previous meeting, a copy of which is attached, [censored]
3. I very much hope that you can attend. We can arrange transport and to solve the problem with a place in the hotel. [Censorship]
====
CONFIDENTIAL
information protection
approved for publication 21.09.2006: CIA-RDP80B01676R004000050088-9
SECRET PROTECTED INFORMATION
Central Intelligence Agency
BUREAU OF NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS
March 26, 1953
Mr. CAREER MEMORANDUM number 336
TOPIC: DISCUSSION AT THE MEETING OF 18 AND 19 MARCH 1953 CONSULTANTS [censorship] instrument SE-39, "POTENTIAL DEATH OF STALIN AND EVALUATION OF CHANCES Malenkov HEAD of the USSR (March 10, 1953)."
CHAIRMAN MEETING OF CONSULTANTS
[censorship]
Consultants Committee of national assessments
[censored]
Committee national assessments
[censorship]
The Office national assessments
[censorship]
====
discussion at the meeting on 18 and 19 March 1953, a consultant [censorship] instrument SE-39, "POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES Stalin's death and estimation of chances Malenkov HEAD USSR (March 10, 1953) "
I. SUMMARY
1. The discussion was focused on the issue of the transfer of power in the Soviet Union, and in particular, on whether there will be a lot of power, concentrated by Stalin personally, handed his successor or successors, and what is the risk of such transmission. Most consultants inclined to believe that, in the process of solving the problems associated with the transfer of power is likely to weaken the Soviet system. In this regard, the majority departed from the point of view that, in general, has set out the Office of National Assessments. This point of view was the fact that the transfer of power is likely to be implemented without reducing the effectiveness of continuity of leadership and the Soviet state.
2. In general, as a result of discussions were formed two points of view:
a. Most experts, with varying degrees of conviction, argued on the basis of historical analogy, that the transfer of power can cause upheaval in the state system of the Soviets. They imagine the structure of power in the Soviet Union as highly associated with personality. According to them, lack the greatness of Stalin Malenkov, and he is surrounded by ambitious and fearless people who, if they can, will qualify for what appears to be its exclusive position. These consultants also believe that a man like Malenkov, who was in the shadow of Stalin, can have quality and disadvantages that may make it difficult to obtain his power belonged to Stalin. However, the consultants of the group came to the conclusion that, despite the danger that, in their view, threatened the Soviet system, the transfer of power can still pass without harm to the system.
B. The opposite point of view, based on an analysis of the Soviet system, is that the prospect of disruption or destruction of the Soviet system in the transition of power is negligible or non-existent. Hold this view consultants said that historical precedents are not relevant because there is no historical example of such a monitoring system, which was established at the Soviets. Elements of control, they said, permeate all institutions of power in society, so that even if on the upper level and there will be a personal struggle for power, it will be temporary and will not affect the stability of the entire system.
II. MAIN ARGUMENTS
A. The position of most
3. [censored] began with a categorical statement that any concept of solidarity or respect of corporate among the people in the group senior management was "complete nonsense." The relationship among these people during Stalin's rule were marked by extreme tension, intrigues and subtle ferocity. In this situation, there was a huge possibility of latent violence.
4. Moreover, in recent months there were signs of increasing stress that point to strengthen undercover struggle. We can assume that Malenkov was not the one who chose Stalin in the last weeks of his life. Also, it is possible that Stalin had been dead for some time, and that the fight took place after his death. The abolition of the Politburo at the XIX Congress was "epoch-making step," which Stalin did not bear personal responsibility. Drinking Molotov Malenkov in the funeral oration different from that of Beria. This may mean, as a confrontation between those two Molotov, and that they could not remove it because of his supporters in the party. The sudden strengthening of the provisions of the Army, both prior to and after Stalin's death, suggesting that Malenkov could drive the intrigue with the army, in order to gain its support. This confirms the return of Zhukov as his previous removal was a personal act of Stalin. [Censored] I came to the conclusion that "whatever the government apparatus at this time, a single entity, it is not."
5. [Censored] I asked whether the "doctors' case" with its implicit attack on Beria, staged Union Stalin and Molotov against Malenkov and Beria. Then he suggested that could take place political disagreement honey two factions in which Stalin and Molotov were "cautious" and Malenkov and Beria - "tending forward" side.
6. [censored] said that the unions mentioned above persons have been quite possible, although causing them political aspects were unclear. He felt that in the beginning of 1952 in the Soviet hierarchy formed a divergence of views about how the Soviet Union should react to events in the West, particularly the United States and re-re the possibility of West Germany. One group believed that all these changes are so significant that the Soviet Union should take an immediate decision on whether to fight or negotiate with the preferred second course was. Another group assumed that the events in the West do not carry such a threat, and that the USSR could afford to wait for developments. [Censored] I saw two signs, reinforcing his idea of a struggle between these two views. First of all - it emerged he had while visiting Moscow last summer, a clear sense of what in certain circles make determined efforts to prevent him from meeting with Stalin and Molotov. He suggested that this was due to the issue of the need for negotiations with the USSR, the United States. Other evidence is the discovery of their change of Soviet policy in Germany. He took the view that the March note (known as "Stalin Note") reflects the temporary victory of the camp "negotiators" and the following notes are canceled suggestions implied in the March note. Stalin's article seems to have clarified this issue, at least temporarily, because it was said that the events in the West do not create a threat and that war is not inevitable, and therefore implied no need for negotiations. She put the policy of the Council to pose "no concessions, no negotiations."
7. After that [censored] summed up the position of [censored], as follows: (a) there is evidence of the struggle lasted for a while among the heirs of Stalin, and evidence that this struggle has not ended with the death of Stalin; (b) as this struggle involved a difference of views on policy towards the West; (c) The current power structure is a compromise, which, given the nature of the relationship between the Communist leaders are unlikely to save.
8. [censored] has accepted these findings and added new observations. He said that much will depend on whether the West to resist the Soviet leaders as a result of their opposition to the need for important political decisions. If you have a confrontation with the West, the Soviets existing internal relations will undergo a heavy load. The differences in the top management may affect the satellite states and the communist parties of other countries, whose leaders will not respond to the power of Malenkov as Stalin reacted to the authorities, resulting in considerable pressure will be subjected to the unity of the communist movement.
9. [censored] asked whether the initiative will combine Western leadership of the Soviets, because historically, foreign threat has always influenced the disunited leadership. [censored] replied that the steps of the West (the United States) do not bear any threat. According to him, that Germany was potentially a problem, he that soweth discord among the leaders of the Soviets, and that he was confident that the new proposals concerning the West of Germany will only reinforce these differences.
V. The position of minorities
10. In support of the view that that transfer of power will be hardly a shock to the Soviet system, [censored] proposed a different version of what occurred in the Soviet Union, as well as a different view of the nature of the system of government of the Soviets. He was confident that Stalin paid enough attention to the problem of succession of power, and that he put in the position of successor to the Malenkov government in order to minimize risk. The last real fight for the right of inheritance of power took place just between Malenkov and Zhdanov, Malenkov and won it. He was closely involved in the work of the Secretariat, at least for 14 years. This is a key position because it meant control over personnel in the army with the rank of colonel up over higher Party organizations at the district level and above managers, from company directors and above. All personal movement controlled the last Congress.
11. [censored] agreed [censored] that "doctors' case" was a blow to Beria, but the publication of the proceedings of the case meant that the struggle for power have faded away, and was not in full swing. Replacing Abakumov Ignatiev, has become a key sector in the movement of personal responsibility Beria showed that the sector was punished by Beria, but Beria himself personally. Slander, directed at the state security bodies in the message of "the Doctors" was a way to inform the Party that Beria stepped into the struggle for power. [Censored] he said that it is possible that Beria and Malenkov relations were established last spring, and that references to outstanding generals as victims of "Doctors' Plot was an attempt to convey a message of support for the armed forces of Malenkov. [censorship] is not regarded as an important event the abolition of the Politburo and its replacement by the Extended Bureau adopted at the XIX Congress. Presidency contains all three elements that have always formed the upper echelon of power: the leading personality in the Politburo, then a group of younger people who are in positions with great administrative responsibility and, finally, the regional satraps. The important thing here was that Stalin wanted to have one dominant successor, and create personal connections that allow to pass into the hands of Malenkov the levers of power.
12. This version has attracted a number of questions from consultants, leaning to the view expressed [censored]. In answering these questions, [censored] has clarified its position:
a. Asked to explain the inadvertent homage cast during the funeral of Stalin and the apparent rapid weakening of the myth of Stalin, [censored] I said that Malenkov is likely to react to feelings of party members that Stalin's personality cult was too strong. (In this regard, [censored] he noted that for the last year or so in the press began to appear "strange gaps" about the treatment of Stalin. He suggested that Stalin "sated" combination of Malenkov, Beria and was absorbed by the struggle with them. According to him it is important that Beria moved immediately after the death of Stalin.)
b. Asked to explain undermined if Stalin's article in the newspaper "Bolshevik" position Malenkov, [censored] said that he believes that this article represents a line of Malenkov in relation to Europe, ie, that the West is not a threat, and that the Soviet Union has time to maneuver (Malenkov speech at the Congress of the CPSU). [censored] explained why an article was published in the newspaper "Bolshevik", suggesting that Stalin had planned to present it to Congress as a report, but due to ill health, he could not do it. The purpose of his brief appearance was a blessing policies, and ensuring the adoption of the report of Malenkov. (Here [censored] and others have suggested the hypothesis that at the opening of the Congress, Stalin could already be dead, and the Congress made it a double.)
13. [Censored] he said that, in his opinion, in the interpretation of [censored], there are two significant drawbacks. It does not explain, firstly, related to Beria to Stalin's death, and unexpected strengthening of its position after the death of Stalin, and, secondly, the abolition of the Presidium of the Political Bureau and the formation of the Congress, followed by reduction of the first after the death of Stalin. [censored] added that he is confident in the absence of real power from the Presidency because he was too big. He pointed to the theses presented by Khrushchev at the congress, which indicated that staff will work with the Secretariat to conduct it, rather than the Presidency. This means that the Bureau was purely formal authority, and that before the death of Stalin, Molotov was not in a position to influence the management personnel.
14. [Censored] I asked if he could believe that a man so single-mindedly fought for power, as did Stalin, would appoint a successor. Picture orderly transfer of power is simply not consistent with the spirit of the situation, and is not consistent with the history of revolutions. [Censored] I replied that he should take into account the factor of deteriorating health of Stalin for a long period of time, since Stalin, probably long realized that he would have to withdraw at any time from the government.
15. [Censored] he said that, in general, he agreed with the theses [censored], but does not think that the interpretation of [censored] contains contradictions. He said that Stalin's choice was undoubtedly Malenkov, but it is unlikely that Stalin, in fact, finally handed over power. "Doctors' Plot and the cancellation decisions of the Congress after Stalin's death indicate that the successor has not been appointed, that Malenkov was forced to seize power, and in fact did it. Although power was Malenkov, there is a possibility that those who felt threatened, could unite against him. For these people personal power was much more important than political disagreements. Malenkov, of course, felt the need to create a temporary alliance with other members of the supreme power, but later he would have wanted to get rid of them. If Beria and Molotov showed the slightest signs of disloyalty, the blood would have flowed. Consequently, there was a potentially explosive situation, although the challenge Malenkov, not united against him alone nobody could. [censored] reminded of Lenin's remark that Russia's peculiar "gigantically swift transition from wild violence to the most delicate deceit." Personally, [censored] I suggested that the chances of Malenkov to consolidate power were great, as Malenkov was in a better position than Stalin after Lenin's death, due to the fact that at that time had to manage the system, which has yet to be created.
16. [censorship] asked how justifiable comparison with the 1924 year due to the increased size of the Soviet Empire, the complexity of the system and the load generated by the efforts of the forced administration planned economy. Is not it possible that with such a tightly bound structure of the delay can be fatal, and therefore, could not it be that the person still plays an important role? [Censored] he said that since 1924 there has been a significant development of the administrative system and make it increasingly self-sustaining. She survived the shock of the great purges no signs of decay. Control over key posts of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU has reduced the need for personal intervention.
17. [Censored] he stated that he was convinced that modern totalitarianism inevitably develops into a personal dictatorship. Stalin more and more like Hitler. For the population as a whole, around the person of Malenkov could be created a myth that would have allowed him relatively easy to establish themselves in the role of Stalin. For people at average levels in the apparatus of power that was the real issue: they are likely to have been injured in connection with the death of Stalin, and only gradually can begin to ask ourselves whether it is possible to replace this great personality. But at the top level, the tension was certainly terrible. It was impossible to predict whether they will solve the situation by force or by political maneuvering. The increasing complexity of the problems of the empire - the relationship with Mao and the satellite countries - makes the new connection is much more difficult.
18. [censored] said that the key question is whether any struggle at the highest level of power lead to a conflict of institutions of power, that is, whether to resort to the help of the army or secret police any leader seeking support for violence. However, he does not believe in the possibility that due to the pervasive nature of control in all the instruments of power. According to the files of the Secretariat, led by Malenkov long this system. [censorship] is confident that he still controls the government and, therefore, the collision of government institutions are unlikely.
19. [Censored] he said that should not be underestimated aspect of the individual in the management of the system, because it requires constant attention. He was convinced that Stalin maintained his power through the deliberate preservation of instability and tension. In the last years of his life he lost power so as to maintain the required continuous attention. As a result, in the organization of the state and the Party developed groups. And if Malenkov forced to compromise with the solidarity of the institutions of power, he lost.
20. [Censored] he said that Malenkov had actually succeeded Stalin's power, but the real question is, will he be able to govern the country with the same skill as it did Stalin himself. For judging abilities Malenkov there is sufficient evidence.
III. OTHER MATTERS
21. Consultants proposed to modify the document SE-39 in the following respects:
a. [Censored] he said that he does not like the categorical statement in paragraph 3 of the people in the USSR "is unlikely to take an active part", if the power struggles will break out. He proposed to change the wording, at least for "People in the Soviet Union is unlikely to take an active part in the early stages of the struggle for power".
B. Overall, among the consultants it had a tendency to believe that Stalin's death to a greater extent than is approved in the SE-39 can lead to a weakening of control over the Soviets satellite countries and communist parties in the countries on the members of the unit. However, [censored] in this matter did not agree with the majority opinion. A similar controversy was caused by the question of whether there are prospects for increasing the influence of Tito in the satellite countries and other Communist parties. The frequency of [censored] was inclined to believe that the influence of Tito should increase.
C. Although none of the counselors did not have expressed serious objections to the assessment in the SE-39 possible influence of the effects of the death of Stalin in the Soviet-Chinese relations, [censored] believes that it is important to stress factors other than those specified in the document. He argued that if the large changes in the relationship is not expected, it is mainly associated with (a) the fact that the two countries have common interests in the Korean War, and (b) China is a long time will depend on the industrial aid to the USSR and that Russian may want to use this dependence to maintain an effective influence. Without questioning, and discussing common position in paragraph (a), [censored] he said that, in his opinion, Russia will not be able to provide China with a significant industrial assistance, and that the penetration of Russian in China, and their influence there, is much weaker, than is commonly believed.
http://statehistory.ru/5493/Eksperty...akh-Malenkova/ - zinc
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