choppedliver
08-10-2010, 11:00 PM
I'm really bad about catching pm's, sometimes miss them for days. Anyway a friendly DU poster sent me this , couldn't find the post that precipitated it so I don't recall exactly why he might have sent it. Just thought I'd share it, kind of interesting to compare with today's propaganda:
To Preserve Peace, Let’s Show Russians How Strong We Are
By Prescott Bush
U.S. Senator from Connecticut;
member of the Senate Armed Services Committee
The Reader’s Digest
July 1959 pp. 25-30
MAN’S GREATEST danger, it is said, is ignorance. In a very real sense, the Soviet Union’s ignorance of our military strength may be the source of her gravest peril—and ours. Kaiser Wilhelm started World War I because he miscalculated Allied power. Hitler, mistakenly thinking he could blitz the world, launched World War II. Kruschev today lacks firsthand knowledge of our country; he may be given what others think he would like to hear—rather than an objective report on our actual military strength. Although it seems impossible that any sane person could start a war, we would be wise to take no chances.
Why not invite the Soviet high command to the United States for a conducted tour of our military might? We are bringing Russians to see our farms and factories, our scientific laboratories and research centers; we exchange dancers and musicians. Why not have their military leaders over for the most beneficial look of all? Our expressed policy, the aim and purpose of our entire defense system, is to deter the Kremlin from starting a war. What better way to deter than to show?
What we could show is nothing more nor less than the greatest military might ever assembled in the history of the world. If the Soviet high command could see what we have, they should be of our mind—that for them to start war today would be an act of insanity.
We could start in a Pentagon briefing room. There, with maps, globes, films and sound-projection equipment to help illustrate our points, we could give them a good hard look at the distribution of American power. Then we could fly the group to Mountain Home Air Force Base in Montana, where bombers of the Strategic Air Command are on 24-hour alert, many ready to take off within 15 minutes. We could see an awe-inspiring line of B-47’s, any one of which can, in a single mission, deliver explosive power equivalent to that of all the bombs dropped by all sides in World War II. We could invite the commander of the Soviet air force to ride in one of these planes, and see it refueled in the air, thus quietly demonstrating that, while most Soviet bombers would have to fly one-way missions, ours can strike any target in the world and return nonstop.
Then we could give our guests a ride in the new B-52’s which, for many long-range missions, require no refueling at all. Tremendous flexible wings hold thousands of gallons of fuel for eight jet engines that carry the plane at nearly the speed of sound—to any target in the world. The crew could seek out a target no bigger than a water tower and “hit” it on the nose.
The sobering fact, already familiar to the Russians, is that bases for SAC use now practically circle the Northern Hemisphere. They are on the alert in many places, including Japan, Okinawa, Guam, the United States, Canada, Alaska, Greenland, England, Spain and North Africa, forming a trap with many triggers. An attack against any one of these bases would touch off the massed might of the others to destroy the war-making capacity of any nation attempting all-out aggression upon this country of the rest of the free world.
The demonstration at SAC should effectively dismiss from Soviet minds any speculation about the possibility of their gaining an advantage from all-out war any time soon. But we must face the fact that in a few years the Russians may be able to zero in our SAC bases with ballistic missiles. To drive this temptation out of their minds, we could show them other deterrents.
First, we could take a ride in one of our atomic-powered submarines. These can slither at startling speeds clear around the world without surfacing. The Soviet naval experts could observe the Nautilus’s sonar pick up the sound of destroyers many miles distant, while her own turbines are detectable for only a few thousand yards. We’d show them that hunting these submarines to destroy them before they attack is like looking for a needle in a haystack; repeatedly in maneuvers they elude aircraft and, though submerged, outrun surface ships.
Then we could show our guests the U.S.S. Observation Island, a freighter which the Navy has converted into a testing ground for Polaris, the new atomic-armed ballistic missile fired from under water. Before the Soviet Union can have dependable intercontinental missiles in quantity, we will have Polaris ready. It meets virtually every test for the perfect deterrent: it is designed to reach almost any target in the Communist area, is highly immune to all forms of enemy attack, including ballistic missiles. No power on earth can prevent our nuclear subs from ringing Russia with a silent and deadly deterrent force.
Thus it should be obvious, as Gen. Nathan F. Twining, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has made clear, that with SAC we are strong enough now to deter an all-out attack, and that our deterrent power will be strengthened by the addition of Polaris in the near future.
While convincing our visitors of the insanity of all-out war, we could also show them the futility of starting limited war. To do this, we could usher them into twin-jet attack bombers, fly them off the Florida coast to the aircraft carrier Independence. They would land right on the deck, coming from 135 miles an hour to a full stop in three or four seconds. Such a carrier, of course, is escorted by the destroyers, cruisers and submarines of its task force. Few persons who have never actually set foot on one of these traveling armored cities have any conception of their versatility, striking power and mobility.
We would explain that the mission of our 14 carriers is to destroy targets from which an enemy can launch weapons dangerous to our Navy—such as submarine bases and airfields. Also, at the beginning of a nuclear war, they would help SAC pulverize other military targets. Four carriers in the Atlantic, eight in the Pacific and two in the Mediterranean, equipped with planes able to fly atomic bombs 1500 miles, can reach virtually any target.
Then we could demonstrate for the Soviet military leaders how our amphibious forces operate. In a mock exercise of rushing assistance to a third country under sudden attack, we would send out groups of Marines, delivered by helicopter and dispersed over a wide area, and followed up by more Marines making beach landings. One Soviet observer could land with them and be with the forward troops. He would see how this global Marine force uses close air support from carriers instead of artillery; the rocket-powered Bull Pup, a tactical missile that can be steered to hit precisely on enemy bunkers: and dozens of other ultra-modern techniques. Other observers on board ship would see how fast a carrier launches its striking power. Attack planes, more than half a hundred of them, catapult across the deck, one very few seconds, far faster than planes take off from land.
At the same time the Soviet experts would see some of the most deadly vehicles ever invented—for instance, fighter planes with air-to-air missiles. One of these missiles, called the Sidewinder, is attracted by heat; fired toward a jet plane, it is drawn as if by a magnet right up the fiery tail, where it explodes. Another, the Sparrow III, homes on the reflected signal picked up by radar, traveling as directly as if along a searchlight beam. We would have drone jets shot towar
d us from other ships and turn such swift and deadly weapons loose on them. One defending plane, equipped with air-to-air missiles, can outperform a squadron of World War II fighters.
After a day spent on the Independence, and with the Marines ashore, and after a similar look at our ground forces in action, it should be clear to the Soviet military men that in practically any place where aggression occurs we can strike selectively from the air, keep the sea lanes open and land forces promptly. In short, they would know that we, together with our free-world allies, have a spear to counter limited attacks as well as a shield with which to ward off all-out war.
New we come to the multibillion-dollar question—how do we stand with the Soviets in the ballistic-missile race? A tour of our installations at Canaveral and elsewhere should convince the visiting experts that we are just about neck and neck. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are expected to have the first few operational ICBM’s read to fire by the end of this year.
As for the “missile gap” which has been the subject of recent debate, Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy explains: “This phrase can be applied only when the number of ICBM’s which the United States actually plans to produce is compared to the number that is estimated the Soviets could produce. We, of course, must be prepared with a sufficient retaliatory force to deter the Russians if their actual production should come up to their potential. But this does not mean that we should simply match them, ICBM for ICBM. In the opinion of our military experts our combination of heavy-weapons delivery systems—aircraft and missile—is more of a deterrent to any attack on us than the all-out production of early-model ICBM’s would be.”
Thus, our Defense Department has refused to enter into a panicky production race that could only burden us with soon-to-be-outmoded experimental weapons. We are concentrating instead on perfecting the most advanced ICBM’s as quickly as possible to maintain our superior mixed retaliatory force. The ten billion dollars which we have invested since 1954 to this end is already paying off in three ICBM’s which are exceeding our most optimistic expectations: Atlas, to join SAC this year as a ready weapon, Titan and Minuteman—in addition to Polaris. Lesser-ranged IRBM’s are already in the hands of our allies.
Another benefit to be gained from the proposed visit of Soviet experts would be an increased appreciation on our own part of U.S. military power. The average American just doesn’t realize how strong we are. You hear some persons say that we may soon be a second-class power. By following the Russians from place to place through the press, we would stir up a healthy and more realistic evaluation of American versus Soviet strength.
One way to appreciate our superiority is to ask ourselves whether we would trade places with the Russians—give them our war-making capability and take theirs. If we did, what would be the situation confronting us?
To begin with, we would be faced with something like four to five times more intercontinental jet bombers and a greater number of medium bombers, all with much greater refueling capacity. These nuclear-armed planes and their supporting tankers would be based at a series of installations encircling us like pincers—Venezuela, Central America, Puerto Rico, Bermuda, Alaska and Hawaii. Manning this force would be the most highly trained and experienced crews in the world, capable of delivering inconceivable explosive power with pin-point accuracy.
Half a dozen or more Soviet aircraft carriers, each with a half a hundred nuclear-bomb-carrying planes, would be off our East and west coasts. Powerful naval task forces would deploy at will only a few hundred miles from our shores. Nuclear-powered submarines would operate with them, while we had none.
A quarter of a millions Red-army troops, equipped with the latest weapons, including nuclear missiles, would be in Canada and Mexico, facing the American border. They would be allied with powerful forces from other countries in the Western Hemisphere.
In addition to this military power encircling us, we would be faced with overwhelming economic strength, if we traded places with the Soviet Union. This would be the economic picture:
Almost all our population would be concentrated east of the Mississippi River; the West would be a sparsely settled frontier, with our government offering bonuses to people willing to settle there. Only one railway line would push across the continent. Much of the country could not be reached by road. Half of the labor force would be farmers, producing barely enough for domestic consumption. Our steel-producing capacity would be reduced by three fifths.
We would be compelled to get along with less than one third the electricity, petroleum products and hydroelectric power we have now. We would be forced to cut production of mineral fertilizers, aluminum and bulldozers by more than half. We would have to tear up 14 out of every 15 miles of paved highway and more than two out of every three miles of mainline railroad track. We would be without 19 of every 20 automobiles and trucks. Comparable losses would be sustained in other sectors of the economy.
Would you trade places with the Russians?
It’s fortunate for them that we want only peace with justice. Our entire record attests to that. We have no history of aggression, profess no desire for world domination, as do the Communists. Only by their continued menace have we been forced to take these measures for defense.
I ASK, “Why don’t we show the Russians many of these defense measures?” What I would not show them is any self-satisfaction on our part about the future, any slowing-up of plans to produce the new weapons which must inevitably take the place of the old ones. I believe we are in a continuing struggle to keep on top in this business of declaring war. I think that the Russians are never to be underrated. I also believe that the Communists are master bluffers that they seek to put us off by arrogant threats to Berlin and to the peace of the far Pacific, and, while our people are preoccupied with these threats, they may try to take over Iraq as the Chinese Reds have conquered Tibet.
We dare not be complacent. But we need not, on the other hand, be frightened. At present, ours is the more powerful military force the stronger alliance, the more advantageous strategic position, the more productive economy. And there is no reason why we should not continue to lead the Soviet Union in the years ahead.
SOURCE: READER’S DIGEST JUNE 1959
By Prescott Bush
U.S. Senator from Connecticut;
member of the Senate Armed Services Committee
The Reader’s Digest
July 1959 pp. 25-30
To Preserve Peace, Let’s Show Russians How Strong We Are
By Prescott Bush
U.S. Senator from Connecticut;
member of the Senate Armed Services Committee
The Reader’s Digest
July 1959 pp. 25-30
MAN’S GREATEST danger, it is said, is ignorance. In a very real sense, the Soviet Union’s ignorance of our military strength may be the source of her gravest peril—and ours. Kaiser Wilhelm started World War I because he miscalculated Allied power. Hitler, mistakenly thinking he could blitz the world, launched World War II. Kruschev today lacks firsthand knowledge of our country; he may be given what others think he would like to hear—rather than an objective report on our actual military strength. Although it seems impossible that any sane person could start a war, we would be wise to take no chances.
Why not invite the Soviet high command to the United States for a conducted tour of our military might? We are bringing Russians to see our farms and factories, our scientific laboratories and research centers; we exchange dancers and musicians. Why not have their military leaders over for the most beneficial look of all? Our expressed policy, the aim and purpose of our entire defense system, is to deter the Kremlin from starting a war. What better way to deter than to show?
What we could show is nothing more nor less than the greatest military might ever assembled in the history of the world. If the Soviet high command could see what we have, they should be of our mind—that for them to start war today would be an act of insanity.
We could start in a Pentagon briefing room. There, with maps, globes, films and sound-projection equipment to help illustrate our points, we could give them a good hard look at the distribution of American power. Then we could fly the group to Mountain Home Air Force Base in Montana, where bombers of the Strategic Air Command are on 24-hour alert, many ready to take off within 15 minutes. We could see an awe-inspiring line of B-47’s, any one of which can, in a single mission, deliver explosive power equivalent to that of all the bombs dropped by all sides in World War II. We could invite the commander of the Soviet air force to ride in one of these planes, and see it refueled in the air, thus quietly demonstrating that, while most Soviet bombers would have to fly one-way missions, ours can strike any target in the world and return nonstop.
Then we could give our guests a ride in the new B-52’s which, for many long-range missions, require no refueling at all. Tremendous flexible wings hold thousands of gallons of fuel for eight jet engines that carry the plane at nearly the speed of sound—to any target in the world. The crew could seek out a target no bigger than a water tower and “hit” it on the nose.
The sobering fact, already familiar to the Russians, is that bases for SAC use now practically circle the Northern Hemisphere. They are on the alert in many places, including Japan, Okinawa, Guam, the United States, Canada, Alaska, Greenland, England, Spain and North Africa, forming a trap with many triggers. An attack against any one of these bases would touch off the massed might of the others to destroy the war-making capacity of any nation attempting all-out aggression upon this country of the rest of the free world.
The demonstration at SAC should effectively dismiss from Soviet minds any speculation about the possibility of their gaining an advantage from all-out war any time soon. But we must face the fact that in a few years the Russians may be able to zero in our SAC bases with ballistic missiles. To drive this temptation out of their minds, we could show them other deterrents.
First, we could take a ride in one of our atomic-powered submarines. These can slither at startling speeds clear around the world without surfacing. The Soviet naval experts could observe the Nautilus’s sonar pick up the sound of destroyers many miles distant, while her own turbines are detectable for only a few thousand yards. We’d show them that hunting these submarines to destroy them before they attack is like looking for a needle in a haystack; repeatedly in maneuvers they elude aircraft and, though submerged, outrun surface ships.
Then we could show our guests the U.S.S. Observation Island, a freighter which the Navy has converted into a testing ground for Polaris, the new atomic-armed ballistic missile fired from under water. Before the Soviet Union can have dependable intercontinental missiles in quantity, we will have Polaris ready. It meets virtually every test for the perfect deterrent: it is designed to reach almost any target in the Communist area, is highly immune to all forms of enemy attack, including ballistic missiles. No power on earth can prevent our nuclear subs from ringing Russia with a silent and deadly deterrent force.
Thus it should be obvious, as Gen. Nathan F. Twining, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has made clear, that with SAC we are strong enough now to deter an all-out attack, and that our deterrent power will be strengthened by the addition of Polaris in the near future.
While convincing our visitors of the insanity of all-out war, we could also show them the futility of starting limited war. To do this, we could usher them into twin-jet attack bombers, fly them off the Florida coast to the aircraft carrier Independence. They would land right on the deck, coming from 135 miles an hour to a full stop in three or four seconds. Such a carrier, of course, is escorted by the destroyers, cruisers and submarines of its task force. Few persons who have never actually set foot on one of these traveling armored cities have any conception of their versatility, striking power and mobility.
We would explain that the mission of our 14 carriers is to destroy targets from which an enemy can launch weapons dangerous to our Navy—such as submarine bases and airfields. Also, at the beginning of a nuclear war, they would help SAC pulverize other military targets. Four carriers in the Atlantic, eight in the Pacific and two in the Mediterranean, equipped with planes able to fly atomic bombs 1500 miles, can reach virtually any target.
Then we could demonstrate for the Soviet military leaders how our amphibious forces operate. In a mock exercise of rushing assistance to a third country under sudden attack, we would send out groups of Marines, delivered by helicopter and dispersed over a wide area, and followed up by more Marines making beach landings. One Soviet observer could land with them and be with the forward troops. He would see how this global Marine force uses close air support from carriers instead of artillery; the rocket-powered Bull Pup, a tactical missile that can be steered to hit precisely on enemy bunkers: and dozens of other ultra-modern techniques. Other observers on board ship would see how fast a carrier launches its striking power. Attack planes, more than half a hundred of them, catapult across the deck, one very few seconds, far faster than planes take off from land.
At the same time the Soviet experts would see some of the most deadly vehicles ever invented—for instance, fighter planes with air-to-air missiles. One of these missiles, called the Sidewinder, is attracted by heat; fired toward a jet plane, it is drawn as if by a magnet right up the fiery tail, where it explodes. Another, the Sparrow III, homes on the reflected signal picked up by radar, traveling as directly as if along a searchlight beam. We would have drone jets shot towar
d us from other ships and turn such swift and deadly weapons loose on them. One defending plane, equipped with air-to-air missiles, can outperform a squadron of World War II fighters.
After a day spent on the Independence, and with the Marines ashore, and after a similar look at our ground forces in action, it should be clear to the Soviet military men that in practically any place where aggression occurs we can strike selectively from the air, keep the sea lanes open and land forces promptly. In short, they would know that we, together with our free-world allies, have a spear to counter limited attacks as well as a shield with which to ward off all-out war.
New we come to the multibillion-dollar question—how do we stand with the Soviets in the ballistic-missile race? A tour of our installations at Canaveral and elsewhere should convince the visiting experts that we are just about neck and neck. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are expected to have the first few operational ICBM’s read to fire by the end of this year.
As for the “missile gap” which has been the subject of recent debate, Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy explains: “This phrase can be applied only when the number of ICBM’s which the United States actually plans to produce is compared to the number that is estimated the Soviets could produce. We, of course, must be prepared with a sufficient retaliatory force to deter the Russians if their actual production should come up to their potential. But this does not mean that we should simply match them, ICBM for ICBM. In the opinion of our military experts our combination of heavy-weapons delivery systems—aircraft and missile—is more of a deterrent to any attack on us than the all-out production of early-model ICBM’s would be.”
Thus, our Defense Department has refused to enter into a panicky production race that could only burden us with soon-to-be-outmoded experimental weapons. We are concentrating instead on perfecting the most advanced ICBM’s as quickly as possible to maintain our superior mixed retaliatory force. The ten billion dollars which we have invested since 1954 to this end is already paying off in three ICBM’s which are exceeding our most optimistic expectations: Atlas, to join SAC this year as a ready weapon, Titan and Minuteman—in addition to Polaris. Lesser-ranged IRBM’s are already in the hands of our allies.
Another benefit to be gained from the proposed visit of Soviet experts would be an increased appreciation on our own part of U.S. military power. The average American just doesn’t realize how strong we are. You hear some persons say that we may soon be a second-class power. By following the Russians from place to place through the press, we would stir up a healthy and more realistic evaluation of American versus Soviet strength.
One way to appreciate our superiority is to ask ourselves whether we would trade places with the Russians—give them our war-making capability and take theirs. If we did, what would be the situation confronting us?
To begin with, we would be faced with something like four to five times more intercontinental jet bombers and a greater number of medium bombers, all with much greater refueling capacity. These nuclear-armed planes and their supporting tankers would be based at a series of installations encircling us like pincers—Venezuela, Central America, Puerto Rico, Bermuda, Alaska and Hawaii. Manning this force would be the most highly trained and experienced crews in the world, capable of delivering inconceivable explosive power with pin-point accuracy.
Half a dozen or more Soviet aircraft carriers, each with a half a hundred nuclear-bomb-carrying planes, would be off our East and west coasts. Powerful naval task forces would deploy at will only a few hundred miles from our shores. Nuclear-powered submarines would operate with them, while we had none.
A quarter of a millions Red-army troops, equipped with the latest weapons, including nuclear missiles, would be in Canada and Mexico, facing the American border. They would be allied with powerful forces from other countries in the Western Hemisphere.
In addition to this military power encircling us, we would be faced with overwhelming economic strength, if we traded places with the Soviet Union. This would be the economic picture:
Almost all our population would be concentrated east of the Mississippi River; the West would be a sparsely settled frontier, with our government offering bonuses to people willing to settle there. Only one railway line would push across the continent. Much of the country could not be reached by road. Half of the labor force would be farmers, producing barely enough for domestic consumption. Our steel-producing capacity would be reduced by three fifths.
We would be compelled to get along with less than one third the electricity, petroleum products and hydroelectric power we have now. We would be forced to cut production of mineral fertilizers, aluminum and bulldozers by more than half. We would have to tear up 14 out of every 15 miles of paved highway and more than two out of every three miles of mainline railroad track. We would be without 19 of every 20 automobiles and trucks. Comparable losses would be sustained in other sectors of the economy.
Would you trade places with the Russians?
It’s fortunate for them that we want only peace with justice. Our entire record attests to that. We have no history of aggression, profess no desire for world domination, as do the Communists. Only by their continued menace have we been forced to take these measures for defense.
I ASK, “Why don’t we show the Russians many of these defense measures?” What I would not show them is any self-satisfaction on our part about the future, any slowing-up of plans to produce the new weapons which must inevitably take the place of the old ones. I believe we are in a continuing struggle to keep on top in this business of declaring war. I think that the Russians are never to be underrated. I also believe that the Communists are master bluffers that they seek to put us off by arrogant threats to Berlin and to the peace of the far Pacific, and, while our people are preoccupied with these threats, they may try to take over Iraq as the Chinese Reds have conquered Tibet.
We dare not be complacent. But we need not, on the other hand, be frightened. At present, ours is the more powerful military force the stronger alliance, the more advantageous strategic position, the more productive economy. And there is no reason why we should not continue to lead the Soviet Union in the years ahead.
SOURCE: READER’S DIGEST JUNE 1959
By Prescott Bush
U.S. Senator from Connecticut;
member of the Senate Armed Services Committee
The Reader’s Digest
July 1959 pp. 25-30