TruthIsAll
08-21-2010, 05:03 PM
A Transparent Open Source PC/ Internet Voting System
Richard Charnin (TruthIsAll)
Aug. 23, 2010
http://richardcharnin.com/TransparentVotingSystem.htm
Our current voting system is a mess. Elections are stolen while politicians and the corporate media remain silent. Unverifiable computers miscount millions of votes eight years after HAVA. Nothing is done even though news reports of voting system “glitches” come in every day.
To suggest that technology cannot guarantee 100% accurate election result fails to distinguish between systems designed to rig elections and those designed to properly count votes. The question should be asked: what is the risk of election fraud in a secure, transparent system compared to the unverifiable systems designed for fraud that are now in place? In a truly transparent system, the probability of vote miscounts is at the vanishing point. In the current system, it is 100%.
The technology to develop secure voting systems is available. To compare a voting system designed with nearly fool-proof security to current voting systems is a false analogy. All voting systems that cannot be verified by paper ballots are designed to be hacked at the voting machine and central tabulator.
In a transparent voting system, voters, election officials and politicians would be able to check their ballots against the posted precinct and tabulated results. This can only be achieved in a system which provides the facility for transparent access to all vote counts. And that is why the Internet is a necessary component of the system. Without online access, there is no way for a voter to check that his or her vote was properly recorded and counted. Without full transparency from precinct to tabulator, elections will continue to be rigged.
Touch screen (DRE) voting machines and mechanical levers do not utilize paper ballots and are extremely vulnerable to fraud locally and at the central tabulator. But even a paper ballot system is vulnerable to miscounts unless there is a robust, mandated audit. There is none. And that illustrates the problem in a nutshell. Florida forbids any recount of its optically scanned ballots. One can only conclude that the local and federal politicians don't want secure voting systems.
In 2003, Diebold and ES&S voting machines and central tabulators were proven to be vulnerable to software and hardware hacks. But they were never designed to be secure. The machines were programmed using closed source code that could make one plus one equal three. No one could ever know if the voting machines read the votes correctly or if the central tabulator counted them correctly. Without paper ballots, votes cast on touch screens could be switched locally or at the central tabulator and no one would ever know. Votes cast using optical scanners can be switched on the tabulators and no one would ever know - unless the ballots were hand-counted. Paper ballots are an absolute requirement for any system. Hand-counting at the precinct would appear to be the only solution. But there is another.
With proper controls, a fully transparent voting system can be developed using public source code running on standard, non-proprietary hardware. Votes would be entered at the precinct on standard personal computers (not proprietary DREs) and/or optical scanners posted periodically or at the precinct and uploaded to the Internet for Open Source tabulation and review by anyone with a PC. Each voter is given a ballot with a unique ID code. Discrepancies between the votes posted at the precinct and the tabulators would be noticed by election officials and voters who log on to precinct vote sites and check their recorded vote.
A system prototype could be developed using standard personal computers, reliable software and the Internet for tabulation and verification. It should have been developed soon after the 2000 selection, but a technically challenged Congress went right along with HAVA and gave Diebold and ES&S full control. As a result, millions of votes have been miscounted. If politicians wanted fair elections, they would have done something about it by now. Thousands of existing applications are much more complex than vote tabulation.
Only Oregon and Washington provide voting accessibility (with vote by mail) and transparency (with mandated hand-counts of optically scanned paper ballots). Oregon implemented their system in 1998 and recently Washington did also. The ballots can either be mailed or delivered in person. The possibility of vote miscounting is virtually eliminated by mandated random hand-counts that are a necessary deterrent to election fraud. A statistical analysis of Oregon’s voting history compared to the other battleground states provides strong evidence that vote-by-mail has been a success. Although ballots are read by optical scanners and tabulated by computers, the machine counts are checked by hand-counts in randomly selected precincts.
http://richardcharnin.com/OregonVotingSystem.htm
Key Features of a PC Data Entry/Internet Vote Tabulation System
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=203&topic_id=505612&mesg_id=505612
Each state has its own election website(s) which contain the voting data records for every precinct.
Precinct:
- The voter is given a paper ballot with a unique pre-printed Precinct ID Code
- The voter keeps a copy of his ballot
- The votes are entered on a PC or fed through an Optical Scanner using Open Source (non-proprietary) data entry software
- A Precinct Vote Summary sorted by Voter ID is periodically posted at the precinct
- All voter ballots are kept in a lock box
Internet:
- The Precinct Vote Summary is uploaded periodically to the Internet using secure data communications software
- The Internet Precinct Summary is a copy of the Precinct Summary
- The Internet Vote Tabulator calculates the total vote for each district and county
Voter PC
- Each voter can view the Internet Precinct Summary on his own PC by entering his ID
- Each voter can view and/or download the Precinct Summary for any precinct
- Each voter can view and/or download the total vote for any precinct or county
Discrepancies
- Any discrepancies between the Internet Precinct Summary and the final votes posted at the precinct will be quickly noted
- If the Internet tabulators are hacked, the data will be discrepant from corresponding precinct ballots and posted summaries
- If the Precinct data files are hacked, the Internet Precinct Summary will be discrepant from voter paper ballots
Key points
- Data entry, tabulation and networking software are non-proprietary or standard
- Voting machines are standardized PCs and Optical Scanners
- Voters keep a copy of their ballot
- Voting records downloaded by precinct, district or county
- Precinct postings and voter ballots would reveal data entry errors
- Internet Tabulator miscounts would be traced to precincts when they are matched against precinct data files, postings and voter ballots.
Open Source
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source
Open-source software (OSS) is computer software that is available in source code form for which the source code and certain other rights normally reserved for copyright holders are provided under a software license that permits users to study, change, and improve the software. Open source licenses often meet the requirements of the Open Source Definition. Some open source software is available within the public domain. Open source software is very often developed in a public, collaborative manner.
Open source software (OSS) projects are built and maintained by a network of volunteer programmers. Prime examples of open source products are the Apache HTTP Server, the e-commerce platform osCommerce and the Internet browser Mozilla Firefox. One of the most successful open source products is the GNU/Linux operating system, an open source Unix-like operating system.[15]
State Precinct Internet Database
Total Dem Rep Ind
140 72 58 10
51.43% 41.43% 7.14%
Precinct 1 Precinct 2 Precinct 3
Total Dem Rep Ind Total Dem Rep Ind Total Dem Rep Ind
30 12 15 3 60 31 24 5 50 29 19 2
Voter ID Voter ID Voter ID
100001 0 1 0 200001 1 0 0 300001 1 0 0
100002 0 1 0 200002 0 1 0 300002 1 0 0
100003 1 0 0 200003 0 1 0 300003 1 0 0
100004 0 1 0 200004 0 1 0 300004 1 0 0
100005 0 1 0 200005 1 0 0 300005 1 0 0
100006 1 0 0 200006 0 1 0 300006 0 1 0
100007 1 0 0 200007 1 0 0 300007 1 0 0
100008 0 1 0 200008 1 0 0 300008 1 0 0
100009 1 0 0 200009 1 0 0 300009 1 0 0
100010 0 1 0 200010 0 0 1 300010 1 0 0
100011 0 1 0 200011 1 0 0 300011 1 0 0
100012 1 0 0 200012 0 1 0 300012 0 1 0
100013 0 1 0 200013 0 1 0 300013 0 1 0
100014 1 0 0 200014 1 0 0 300014 1 0 0
100015 0 1 0 200015 0 0 1 300015 1 0 0
100016 1 0 0 200016 1 0 0 300016 0 1 0
100017 1 0 0 200017 1 0 0 300017 0 1 0
100018 0 1 0 200018 0 1 0 300018 1 0 0
100019 0 1 0 200019 0 1 0 300019 1 0 0
100020 0 0 1 200020 0 1 0 300020 0 0 1
100021 0 1 0 200021 1 0 0 300021 0 1 0
100022 1 0 0 200022 0 1 0 300022 1 0 0
100023 1 0 0 200023 0 1 0 300023 1 0 0
100024 0 1 0 200024 0 1 0 300024 0 1 0
100025 0 1 0 200025 1 0 0 300025 1 0 0
100026 1 0 0 200026 1 0 0 300026 0 0 1
100027 0 1 0 200027 0 1 0 300027 0 1 0
100028 0 0 1 200028 0 1 0 300028 0 1 0
100029 1 0 0 200029 0 1 0 300029 1 0 0
100030 0 0 1 200030 1 0 0 300030 0 1 0
200031 1 0 0 300031 1 0 0
200032 1 0 0 300032 1 0 0
200033 0 0 1 300033 1 0 0
200034 0 1 0 300034 0 1 0
200035 1 0 0 300035 0 1 0
200036 1 0 0 300036 1 0 0
200037 1 0 0 300037 0 1 0
200038 1 0 0 300038 0 1 0
200039 0 1 0 300039 1 0 0
200040 1 0 0 300040 0 1 0
200041 1 0 0 300041 1 0 0
200042 1 0 0 300042 1 0 0
200043 0 1 0 300043 1 0 0
200044 1 0 0 300044 0 1 0
200045 0 0 1 300045 0 1 0
200046 0 1 0 300046 0 1 0
200047 0 1 0 300047 1 0 0
200048 1 0 0 300048 1 0 0
200049 1 0 0 300049 1 0 0
200050 1 0 0 300050 0 1 0
200051 1 0 0
200052 0 1 0
200053 1 0 0
200054 0 1 0
200055 1 0 0
200056 1 0 0
200057 1 0 0
200058 0 1 0
200059 0 1 0
200060 0 0 1
[/code]
Richard Charnin (TruthIsAll)
Aug. 23, 2010
http://richardcharnin.com/TransparentVotingSystem.htm
Our current voting system is a mess. Elections are stolen while politicians and the corporate media remain silent. Unverifiable computers miscount millions of votes eight years after HAVA. Nothing is done even though news reports of voting system “glitches” come in every day.
To suggest that technology cannot guarantee 100% accurate election result fails to distinguish between systems designed to rig elections and those designed to properly count votes. The question should be asked: what is the risk of election fraud in a secure, transparent system compared to the unverifiable systems designed for fraud that are now in place? In a truly transparent system, the probability of vote miscounts is at the vanishing point. In the current system, it is 100%.
The technology to develop secure voting systems is available. To compare a voting system designed with nearly fool-proof security to current voting systems is a false analogy. All voting systems that cannot be verified by paper ballots are designed to be hacked at the voting machine and central tabulator.
In a transparent voting system, voters, election officials and politicians would be able to check their ballots against the posted precinct and tabulated results. This can only be achieved in a system which provides the facility for transparent access to all vote counts. And that is why the Internet is a necessary component of the system. Without online access, there is no way for a voter to check that his or her vote was properly recorded and counted. Without full transparency from precinct to tabulator, elections will continue to be rigged.
Touch screen (DRE) voting machines and mechanical levers do not utilize paper ballots and are extremely vulnerable to fraud locally and at the central tabulator. But even a paper ballot system is vulnerable to miscounts unless there is a robust, mandated audit. There is none. And that illustrates the problem in a nutshell. Florida forbids any recount of its optically scanned ballots. One can only conclude that the local and federal politicians don't want secure voting systems.
In 2003, Diebold and ES&S voting machines and central tabulators were proven to be vulnerable to software and hardware hacks. But they were never designed to be secure. The machines were programmed using closed source code that could make one plus one equal three. No one could ever know if the voting machines read the votes correctly or if the central tabulator counted them correctly. Without paper ballots, votes cast on touch screens could be switched locally or at the central tabulator and no one would ever know. Votes cast using optical scanners can be switched on the tabulators and no one would ever know - unless the ballots were hand-counted. Paper ballots are an absolute requirement for any system. Hand-counting at the precinct would appear to be the only solution. But there is another.
With proper controls, a fully transparent voting system can be developed using public source code running on standard, non-proprietary hardware. Votes would be entered at the precinct on standard personal computers (not proprietary DREs) and/or optical scanners posted periodically or at the precinct and uploaded to the Internet for Open Source tabulation and review by anyone with a PC. Each voter is given a ballot with a unique ID code. Discrepancies between the votes posted at the precinct and the tabulators would be noticed by election officials and voters who log on to precinct vote sites and check their recorded vote.
A system prototype could be developed using standard personal computers, reliable software and the Internet for tabulation and verification. It should have been developed soon after the 2000 selection, but a technically challenged Congress went right along with HAVA and gave Diebold and ES&S full control. As a result, millions of votes have been miscounted. If politicians wanted fair elections, they would have done something about it by now. Thousands of existing applications are much more complex than vote tabulation.
Only Oregon and Washington provide voting accessibility (with vote by mail) and transparency (with mandated hand-counts of optically scanned paper ballots). Oregon implemented their system in 1998 and recently Washington did also. The ballots can either be mailed or delivered in person. The possibility of vote miscounting is virtually eliminated by mandated random hand-counts that are a necessary deterrent to election fraud. A statistical analysis of Oregon’s voting history compared to the other battleground states provides strong evidence that vote-by-mail has been a success. Although ballots are read by optical scanners and tabulated by computers, the machine counts are checked by hand-counts in randomly selected precincts.
http://richardcharnin.com/OregonVotingSystem.htm
Key Features of a PC Data Entry/Internet Vote Tabulation System
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=203&topic_id=505612&mesg_id=505612
Each state has its own election website(s) which contain the voting data records for every precinct.
Precinct:
- The voter is given a paper ballot with a unique pre-printed Precinct ID Code
- The voter keeps a copy of his ballot
- The votes are entered on a PC or fed through an Optical Scanner using Open Source (non-proprietary) data entry software
- A Precinct Vote Summary sorted by Voter ID is periodically posted at the precinct
- All voter ballots are kept in a lock box
Internet:
- The Precinct Vote Summary is uploaded periodically to the Internet using secure data communications software
- The Internet Precinct Summary is a copy of the Precinct Summary
- The Internet Vote Tabulator calculates the total vote for each district and county
Voter PC
- Each voter can view the Internet Precinct Summary on his own PC by entering his ID
- Each voter can view and/or download the Precinct Summary for any precinct
- Each voter can view and/or download the total vote for any precinct or county
Discrepancies
- Any discrepancies between the Internet Precinct Summary and the final votes posted at the precinct will be quickly noted
- If the Internet tabulators are hacked, the data will be discrepant from corresponding precinct ballots and posted summaries
- If the Precinct data files are hacked, the Internet Precinct Summary will be discrepant from voter paper ballots
Key points
- Data entry, tabulation and networking software are non-proprietary or standard
- Voting machines are standardized PCs and Optical Scanners
- Voters keep a copy of their ballot
- Voting records downloaded by precinct, district or county
- Precinct postings and voter ballots would reveal data entry errors
- Internet Tabulator miscounts would be traced to precincts when they are matched against precinct data files, postings and voter ballots.
Open Source
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source
Open-source software (OSS) is computer software that is available in source code form for which the source code and certain other rights normally reserved for copyright holders are provided under a software license that permits users to study, change, and improve the software. Open source licenses often meet the requirements of the Open Source Definition. Some open source software is available within the public domain. Open source software is very often developed in a public, collaborative manner.
Open source software (OSS) projects are built and maintained by a network of volunteer programmers. Prime examples of open source products are the Apache HTTP Server, the e-commerce platform osCommerce and the Internet browser Mozilla Firefox. One of the most successful open source products is the GNU/Linux operating system, an open source Unix-like operating system.[15]
State Precinct Internet Database
Total Dem Rep Ind
140 72 58 10
51.43% 41.43% 7.14%
Precinct 1 Precinct 2 Precinct 3
Total Dem Rep Ind Total Dem Rep Ind Total Dem Rep Ind
30 12 15 3 60 31 24 5 50 29 19 2
Voter ID Voter ID Voter ID
100001 0 1 0 200001 1 0 0 300001 1 0 0
100002 0 1 0 200002 0 1 0 300002 1 0 0
100003 1 0 0 200003 0 1 0 300003 1 0 0
100004 0 1 0 200004 0 1 0 300004 1 0 0
100005 0 1 0 200005 1 0 0 300005 1 0 0
100006 1 0 0 200006 0 1 0 300006 0 1 0
100007 1 0 0 200007 1 0 0 300007 1 0 0
100008 0 1 0 200008 1 0 0 300008 1 0 0
100009 1 0 0 200009 1 0 0 300009 1 0 0
100010 0 1 0 200010 0 0 1 300010 1 0 0
100011 0 1 0 200011 1 0 0 300011 1 0 0
100012 1 0 0 200012 0 1 0 300012 0 1 0
100013 0 1 0 200013 0 1 0 300013 0 1 0
100014 1 0 0 200014 1 0 0 300014 1 0 0
100015 0 1 0 200015 0 0 1 300015 1 0 0
100016 1 0 0 200016 1 0 0 300016 0 1 0
100017 1 0 0 200017 1 0 0 300017 0 1 0
100018 0 1 0 200018 0 1 0 300018 1 0 0
100019 0 1 0 200019 0 1 0 300019 1 0 0
100020 0 0 1 200020 0 1 0 300020 0 0 1
100021 0 1 0 200021 1 0 0 300021 0 1 0
100022 1 0 0 200022 0 1 0 300022 1 0 0
100023 1 0 0 200023 0 1 0 300023 1 0 0
100024 0 1 0 200024 0 1 0 300024 0 1 0
100025 0 1 0 200025 1 0 0 300025 1 0 0
100026 1 0 0 200026 1 0 0 300026 0 0 1
100027 0 1 0 200027 0 1 0 300027 0 1 0
100028 0 0 1 200028 0 1 0 300028 0 1 0
100029 1 0 0 200029 0 1 0 300029 1 0 0
100030 0 0 1 200030 1 0 0 300030 0 1 0
200031 1 0 0 300031 1 0 0
200032 1 0 0 300032 1 0 0
200033 0 0 1 300033 1 0 0
200034 0 1 0 300034 0 1 0
200035 1 0 0 300035 0 1 0
200036 1 0 0 300036 1 0 0
200037 1 0 0 300037 0 1 0
200038 1 0 0 300038 0 1 0
200039 0 1 0 300039 1 0 0
200040 1 0 0 300040 0 1 0
200041 1 0 0 300041 1 0 0
200042 1 0 0 300042 1 0 0
200043 0 1 0 300043 1 0 0
200044 1 0 0 300044 0 1 0
200045 0 0 1 300045 0 1 0
200046 0 1 0 300046 0 1 0
200047 0 1 0 300047 1 0 0
200048 1 0 0 300048 1 0 0
200049 1 0 0 300049 1 0 0
200050 1 0 0 300050 0 1 0
200051 1 0 0
200052 0 1 0
200053 1 0 0
200054 0 1 0
200055 1 0 0
200056 1 0 0
200057 1 0 0
200058 0 1 0
200059 0 1 0
200060 0 0 1
[/code]