Recently Simon Blackburn, the well known British philosopher, reviewed "Knowing Right from Wrong," the new book by Kieran Setiya, in the TLS ["Taliban and Plato" TLS July 19, 2013]. The essay deals with Setiya's attempt to defend ethical realism (objective moral knowledge is possible) which Blackburn rejects in favor of ethical pragmatism (useful moral knowledge is possible). I think neither of these positions are tenable and the best way to approach ethics is from a Marxist perspective.
Blackburn begins with Plato's position in the Republic: the Good can only be understood by those intellectually elite philosophers who rule Plato's ideal state in the interests of the people. After their basic studies and military training the elite undergo ten years of mathematical training followed by five years of philosophy and begin to take part in ruling at the age of 55. This puts ethical knowledge out of the way of most people who must take on faith that their rulers have actually attained such knowledge.
We need something a little more accessible, Blackburn thinks, and the virtue ethics of Aristotle based on common sense, empiricism and "scientific" method provided a practical alternative to Plato's views in the Republic (the Republic does not exhaust Plato's views on this subject.)
Setiya"s book deals with, and Blackburn quotes him, "a tension between two things: the need to explain our reliability so that the truth of our beliefs can be no accident, and the need to leave room for communities that are not at all reliable."
Blackburn tells us that for Plato knowledge was different from true belief-- you might have a true belief that you picked up by accident, or a guess, but this does not qualify as knowledge. Plato demands a "logos" for knowledge claims, "meaning," Blackburn says, "something like reason, justification or some kind of method -- and reliability seems a good yardstick for soundness." But how do we test for "reliability?"
Here is the problem. Blackburn, for example, believes (1) in equal educational opportunities for men and women and (2) this is a reliable belief (i.e., true) based on "cultural and historical forces" operant on Blackburn. Using the Afghan Taliban as a foil, Blackburn says they deny (1) and therefore (2) as well. "We need," he says, "a view from outside: an independent stamp of the reliability of our progress."
Where to find it? An appeal to Reason won't work. Just to claim we are "reasonable" and the Taliban are not is not an independent outside view. What move does Setiya make that could uphold Blackburn's belief as reliable? He makes an appeal to "human nature." Setiya says "how human beings by nature live is not the measure of how they should." He uses the term "life form" for "human nature" and thinks, according to Blackburn, "in a proper environment, free from neglect or hunger or abuse" their true life form will emerge "and then they naturally gravitate towards the moral truth." This implies an objective moral truth out there (or in us) waiting for the proper environment.
Blackburn seems to contradict himself by saying this view is not meant to be "universally true" but more like natural history statements such as "dogs bark" or "finches lay eggs in the spring" which certainly seem to be, in the proper environment, "universally true." Blackburn says: "So, the idea is that as a species, in the kind of circumstance in which we naturally live, we tend to believe what is morally and ethically true." But this is just asserting the. conclusion, there is no argument here. The Taliban could say "Fine, where we naturally live women should not have equal educational opportunities as they have different roles to play in society and this is morally and ethically true." Blackburn's belief is not upheld. But, I think the Taliban would reject the relativism implied here and think their attitude toward education is universally true.
Blackburn sees problems with Setiya's position. When we look at history and other societies we see all sorts of, to us, strange and wicked goings on. Bertrand Russell put it this way: "When we study in the works of anthropologists the moral precepts which men have considered binding in different times and places we find the most bewildering variety" [Styles in Ethics, 1924].
Blackburn says this leads to "a contemporary form of moral skepticism, which argues that a capacity for ethical truth would have given no selective advantage to anybody, so that it would be a miracle if it came to predominate as a trait of our species." But this is nonsense as it assumes that the skeptic knows what ethical truth is and that nobody ever got a selective advantage from this knowledge-- neither of which the skeptic is in a reliable position to claim to know.
Setiya seeks to avoid moral skepticism, according to Blackburn, by adopting a position he calls NATURAL CONSTRUCTIVISM and defines as follows: "for a trait to be a virtue is for creatures of one's life form to believe that it is a virtue." This will not do at all. The Taliban, creature's of our life form, believe it to be a virtue to deny equal educational opportunities to females (they may even feel it a virtue to throw acid in young girl's faces or shoot them for going to school) but really, should we think it is a virtue just because they have these beliefs. Mind you, Setiya wants to avoid both skepticism and RELATIVISM.
Well, we don't think it a virtue because our values differ from those of the Taliban and we share the same life form ( we are the same species with the same nature). But this begs the question. Blackburn has accepted female education due to the operant conditions of his culture and the Taliban reject it due to theirs. How do we escape relativism?
Setiya seems to be aware that you can't just define virtue the way he has done but he does so because he has "a certain faith in human nature." This implies the Taliban are wrong because they don't live the way our species (life form) is naturally programmed to live so, unlike us, they have not arrived at the proper ethical and moral conclusions. If you didn't already agree with the conclusion, you would never accept this argument-- if argument it be rather than just assertion.
Setiya warns us, says Blackwell, that his argument is the only way to defend moral knowledge or to have justified moral beliefs. It is "natural constructivism" based on reason and a universal human nature or, as Blackwell puts it, we may end up with "a soggy relativism" with one "truth" for the Taliban and another for those of us sharing Blackburn's operant conditioning.
Blackburn doesn't like this outcome, it "seems intolerable." He wants some justification for female educational equality, and it seems, for also thinking ill of the Taliban. If Setiya's moral realism won't work (i.e., no objective rules) he recommends a form of moral pragmatism. Blackburn's morals are more suited to our culture and useful and we (readers of the TLS and members of the culture that produced it) would shudder to live under the Taliban system-- so we definitely are going to favor female educational equality and, in fact, maintain it is the morally right thing.
Blackburn is modest, though, and admits there is a slight possibility he is wrong about this-- but this is only a theoretical possibility. He even admits he doesn't have "the dialectical weaponry with which to topple the Taliban" and that he remains under the morality that the operant conditioning of his culture has created. He has hopes that the Taliban will change because their culture is "not hermetically sealed from ours" (the expected change appears to be one way), there will be "dissident voices" and "stirrings of modernity" and half the population "has the burning desire to change." Cultural conditioning doesn't seem to take place among Taliban females. Can it be possible that Pashtun women are completely alienated from their men folk and none of them accept the traditional culture of their people?
Blackburn tells us the difference between realism ad pragmatism is that realism is interested in metaphysical problems regarding the nature of the "truths" of morality and seeks reliable claims as to this nature, while pragmatism does not believe this to be possible and there is no "foundation outside our ethics for our ethics to stand on."
What would a Marxist position be on these issues. I would propose a synthesis of ethical realism (there are objective ethical principals that should be followed if you want to create a particular type of society just as there are mathematical and physical laws you must follow if you want to fly to the Moon) and these laws also have a pragmatic dimension. Marxists do not believe in abstract metaphysical entities not rooted in the material world. They do not look for universal ethical principles applicable to all times and places.
The main motivating force of Marxism is to empower the working class, abolish capitalist exploitation of working people by the appropriation of the surplus value they create, and establish socialism and a world without one class or group of humans living off the exploitation of another. So there is a foundation to our ethics outside of our ethics which it can stand on. Whatever actions objectively further the interests of working people, which are determined by an objective scientific analysis of the social, political and economic forces in a given society, are morally and ethically correct. This is a materialist ethics based on forces objectively at work in a given historical period and has nothing to do with an idea such as "to be a virtue it is only necessary for members of your life form to believe it is a virtue" or a virtue is what readers of the TLS would think useful.
The class struggle is an objective fact of life and the sociological and economic laws that produce it are independent of the subjective desires or will of the people involved. Understanding these laws, such as the law of value, is possible and actions can be initiated in the real world to overcome this struggle and end it and the ethics and morals involved in this struggle rest on an objective materialist foundation independent of the human subject. This view point I think is much more realistic than that of either Setiya or Blackburn.



More... (http://politicalaffairs.net/marxism-the-taliban-and-plato-by-thomas-riggins/)

The main motivating force of Marxism is to empower the working class, abolish capitalist exploitation of working people by the appropriation of the surplus value they create, and establish socialism and a world without one class or group of humans living off the exploitation of another. So there is a foundation to our ethics outside of our ethics which it can stand on. Whatever actions objectively further the interests of working people, which are determined by an objective scientific analysis of the social, political and economic forces in a given society, are morally and ethically correct. This is a materialist ethics based on forces objectively at work in a given historical period and has nothing to do with an idea such as "to be a virtue it is only necessary for members of your life form to believe it is a virtue" or a virtue is what readers of the TLS would think useful.

The class struggle is an objective fact of life and the sociological and economic laws that produce it are independent of the subjective desires or will of the people involved. Understanding these laws, such as the law of value, is possible and actions can be initiated in the real world to overcome this struggle and end it and the ethics and morals involved in this struggle rest on an objective materialist foundation independent of the human subject. This view point I think is much more realistic than that of either Setiya or Blackburn.

There is much that is wrong in this statement. I am not sure that I am going to be able to adequately express this, but I will try. The first sentence makes little sense to me; it may be that I just don't know what "Marxism" is, but this statement does not strike me as true. It seems to me that the "driving force of Marxism" is the clear, scientific understanding of current societal, historic, conditions and the drive to move society toward more human/humane organizational structures. Marxists do not want to "empower the working class", they want the working class to recognize its power and act in consciousness of that power and unity. The working class will end capitalism, will stop the exploitation of human beings, will end the class struggle by abolishing classes - or it won't, Marxists can't make it happen, only the working class can. Morality and ethics (two different things and not interchangeable) are based upon the historical development of society and, of course, that is based upon class conflict. The great quotation might have said, "The ruling morality and ethics of any society are the morality and ethics of the ruling class." It is just that simple. Morality and ethics evolve, historically, based upon the push and shove of material development and class structure. You can't cite "historical materialism" and then say, "The class struggle is an objective fact of life and the sociological and economic laws that produce it are independent of the subjective desires or will of the people involved." At least, I don't see how you can.

There is much that is wrong in this statement. I am not sure that I am going to be able to adequately express this, but I will try. The first sentence makes little sense to me; it may be that I just don't know what "Marxism" is, but this statement does not strike me as true. It seems to me that the "driving force of Marxism" is the clear, scientific understanding of current societal, historic, conditions and the drive to move society toward more human/humane organizational structures. Marxists do not want to "empower the working class", they want the working class to recognize its power and act in consciousness of that power and unity. The working class will end capitalism, will stop the exploitation of human beings, will end the class struggle by abolishing classes - or it won't, Marxists can't make it happen, only the working class can. Morality and ethics (two different things and not interchangeable) are based upon the historical development of society and, of course, that is based upon class conflict. The great quotation might have said, "The ruling morality and ethics of any society are the morality and ethics of the ruling class." It is just that simple. Morality and ethics evolve, historically, based upon the push and shove of material development and class structure. You can't cite "historical materialism" and then say, "The class struggle is an objective fact of life and the sociological and economic laws that produce it are independent of the subjective desires or will of the people involved." At least, I don't see how you can.

You are right about this, both in your direct criticism and your general quesiness on this subject. It skirts that invisible line:

Once Marxism is consciously adopted, it becomes a material force... therefore the subjective is objectively realized and ideas become material reality... so, in this way, materialism itself is self-negating and all we need do is will competing ideas into existence.

Oh, wait...

(Roll over, Gramsci)

You are right about this, both in your direct criticism and your general quesiness on this subject. It skirts that invisible line:

Once Marxism is consciously adopted, it becomes a material force... therefore the subjective is objectively realized and ideas become material reality... so, in this way, materialism itself is self-negating and all we need do is will competing ideas into existence.

Oh, wait...

(Roll over, Gramsci)

I have been trying to read-up a little on Gramsci; it has been difficult (I have also been reading - again, for the first time) Lenin's WITBD). I know that Gramsci was a titan of anti-fascism and an early socialist in a time and place where and when that was dangerous and difficult (when isn't it?), but his "takes" on current events are just stupefying. His is a peculiar kind of materialism - you might call it idealistic materialism? It is all full of spirit and will and passion. I haven't gotten very far into his writings from prison, so things may improve.

Gramsci says in an article The Revolution Against "Capital" that the Bolsheviks reject Marx, and embrace


the continuation of idealist Italian and German thought, and that in Marx had been corrupted by the emptiness of positivism and naturalism. In this kind of thinking the main determinant of history is not lifeless economics, but man; societies made up of men, men who have something in common, who get along together, and because of this (civility) they develop a collective social will. They understand economic matters, they evaluate them and adjust them according to their will, until it is this which becomes the driving force of the economy, that which shapes objective reality and lives and moves; it takes on the characteristics of a scolding hot sheet of metal, which can be sculpted in any way they so choose.

This isn't Marxism and it strikes me as barely socialist. Maybe Owenism?

You are right about this, both in your direct criticism and your general quesiness on this subject. It skirts that invisible line:

Once Marxism is consciously adopted, it becomes a material force... therefore the subjective is objectively realized and ideas become material reality... so, in this way, materialism itself is self-negating and all we need do is will competing ideas into existence.

Oh, wait...

(Roll over, Gramsci)

This logic seems to be the stepping off point for most commentators to reveal that they are actually Kahlil Gibran. There is arriving in my departure and departing in my arrival. And Love, Love, Love (Lennon was a ripoff artist).

Makes sense on another level too. Only thing Alain Badiou ever said that interested me was his claim that philosophy withdrew itself in deference to the poem (he cites Nietzsche and Heidigger and..oddly..Rimbaud, the latter of whom he bizarrely endorses -- and I do mean *bizarrely*)

For him I butcher a phrase and say 'Ju est un asshole'

I have been trying to read-up a little on Gramsci; it has been difficult (I have also been reading - again, for the first time) Lenin's WITBD). I know that Gramsci was a titan of anti-fascism and an early socialist in a time and place where and when that was dangerous and difficult (when isn't it?), but his "takes" on current events are just stupefying. His is a peculiar kind of materialism - you might call it idealistic materialism? It is all full of spirit and will and passion. I haven't gotten very far into his writings from prison, so things may improve.

Gramsci says in an article The Revolution Against "Capital" that the Bolsheviks reject Marx, and embrace



This isn't Marxism and it strikes me as barely socialist. Maybe Owenism?

Funny you should mention Owen. I argued that he echoed Saint Simon once (and in retrospect, maybe the Jacobins).

He is a complicated guy. He was a hero, as you write. He also walks the line of materialism too closely for my comfort. The disconcerting thing about him is that his views are important both to revisionism (the PCI being the obvious example) and to "anti-revisionism". In particular, the broad generalization of Lenin's famous phrase about the existence of the party becoming an objective force owes much more to Gramsci than to V.I. Lenin. Lukas' famous retraction, as well as people as hard-spirited as our friend Nikos adopt both the Gramsci conclusion and the overly broad understanding of positivism which Gramsci attributes to a "corrupted" Marx.

I know some very smart people who never tire of telling me how subtle and important Gramsci is. I never got it so I kept my mouth shut. On the other hand, I always suspected them of thinking that they were thus improving on a corrupt Marx (perhaps at the hands of the ever narrow Freddy).

It seems to me that the class basis of these views is easier to see in the present then it was in the 1920s and 1930s. These ideas would not be entirely alien at an OWS camp.

Now, is that because the middle-class is proletarian at root or is it because the middle-class is the most petty bourgeoisified section of the proletariat?

Now, is that because the middle-class is proletarian at root or is it because the middle-class is the most petty bourgeoisified section of the proletariat?

You know, at first glance, this question might look like it is asking the same question in different ways, but it isn't. I am going to mull on that for a bit...

Lukas' famous retraction, as well as people as hard-spirited as our friend Nikos adopt both the Gramsci conclusion and the overly broad understanding of positivism which Gramsci attributes to a "corrupted" Marx.

I think I follow this but would you mind expanding on it a bit? Its a bit arcane but it involves Lukacs renouncing his work History and Class Consciousness -- a work which was something of a stand-in for Lenin and Trotsky who were kinda busy at the time (1917).

The key issue revolves around the idea that the proletariat are the true "subject" of history (direct parallel to Spirit in Hegel) and, further, that the proletariat is a creative subject which through its practice also makes itself into the object of history.

Lukacs' retraction, in his own words:


the proletariat seen as the identical subject-object of the real history of mankind is no materialist consummation that overcomes the contradictions of idealism. It is rather an attempt to out-Hegel Hegel.

Or a more heady quote


I can still remember even today the overwhelming effect produced in me by Marx's statement that objectivity was the primary material attribute of all things and relations. This links up with the idea already mentioned that objectification is a natural means by which humanity masters the world and as such it can be either positive or negative. By contrast, alienation is a special variant of that activity that becomes operative in definite social conditions. This completely shattered the theoretical foundations of what had been the particular achievement of HCC.

The central disagreement with Engels comes over the domain of applicability for the dialectic. Lukacs of HCC insists that it is only history and not nature (going so far as to say that Nature is a social construct).

From this we enter a debate of "reification" a concept that Marx did not employ (although Anax told me once that Marx did use the word)

I think I follow this but would you mind expanding on it a bit? Its a bit arcane but it involves Lukacs renouncing his work History and Class Consciousness -- a work which was something of a stand-in for Lenin and Trotsky who were kinda busy at the time (1917).

The key issue revolves around the idea that the proletariat are the true "subject" of history (direct parallel to Spirit in Hegel) and, further, that the proletariat is a creative subject which through its practice also makes itself into the object of history.

Lukacs' retraction, in his own words:


the proletariat seen as the identical subject-object of the real history of mankind is no materialist consummation that overcomes the contradictions of idealism. It is rather an attempt to out-Hegel Hegel.

Yeah, I think going over this a bit would be helpful. I was never able to grasp this issue. The proletariat is a product of the society, which is formed around the mode of production. The proletariat is the "crown of history" only in the sense that the proletariat has the power to end class conflict and class conflict is the subject matter of all history. I think Gramsci and maybe Lukacs, too (I am not very well read in Lukacs), is trying to force some kind of spirituality or metaphysics into materialism. That just don't work...

I know some very smart people who never tire of telling me how subtle and important Gramsci is. I never got it so I kept my mouth shut. On the other hand, I always suspected them of thinking that they were thus improving on a corrupt Marx (perhaps at the hands of the ever narrow Freddy).

I know some of these guys too and, yes, they are razor sharp (but yes, I have my lingering suspicions of them as well). As it has been explained to me, while Lenin (and Trotsky) broke with the fatalism of the SI, they never took the time (or, better, HAD the time) to examine the matter philosophically as Gramsci did.

Here fatalism is used interchangeably by Gramsci with 'mechanism' for the most part. The gist of "fatalism" is that if one takes the Laws of History to be absolute then Marxism has already told us that the proletariat will supercede the capitalist class and abolish class society. It is inexorable and basically allows one to script the (however far flung) future.

Gramsci counters:


In reality one can ‘scientifically’ foresee only the struggle, but not the concrete moments of the struggle, which cannot but be the results of opposing forces in continuous movement, which are never reducible to fixed quantities since within them quantity is continually becoming quality. In reality one can ‘foresee’ to the extent that one acts, to the extent that one applies a voluntary effort and therefore contributes concretely to creating the result ‘foreseen’. Prediction reveals itself not as a scientific act of knowledge, but as the abstract expression of the effort made, the practical way of creating a collective will.

Gramsci faults Lenin for a failure to reflect on the matter and ultimately shrugging the issue off by saying "Sure, in the long run that might be true but we concentrate on the here and now".

Gramsci also took great umbrage at 'economic determinism' (especially that of Bukharin) which he characterized as sheer superstition. Economic Determinism is intertwined with Fatalism without being the exact same thing -- fatalism resting more on a literal interpretation of Marx's phrase referring to capitalism creating its own gravediggers.

Their ultimate evidence to support Gramsci is the persistent of Western capitalism far beyond any resilience that early Marxist's afforded it.

I have never quite understood the problem some folks have with fatalism. There seems to be some kind of visceral reaction, negative to the very idea. Everything is governed by the law of cause and effect - I know that at the quantum level most scientists will say, "Well, maybe not." But our lack of understanding, or grasp, of cause and effect may be more at play there. Be that as it may. The reason we know that cause and effect is the law is because we can look back on any historical period or any episodes in our own lives and can see it clearly. The problem arises in our inability to encompass all causes and all effects in the now, as they occur; and, so, our inability to predict what might happen in the future. It has nothing to do with the efficacy of cause and effect, it has only to do with our capacity to account for it all.

People go absolutely weak at the knee if you suggest that free will might not be what we have all been taught that it is (and all appear to hope that it is). Gramsci in some of his early writing takes exception to the backbone of Marxism - "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." Saying that this is too dry and cold and inhuman. This aversion to fatalism stikes me as springing from the same source...maybe egoism? Just thinking out loud.

I read a very interesting paper on psychology which reserved the possibility that psychology is so inconsistent with neuroscience that in future our current ideas -- better to say, current bourgeoisie ideas -- may simply no longer apply. They will simply be outmoded (a comparison was drawn to phlogiston).

I am no defender but I'm not sure it is totally fair to cherry pick Gramsci's early papers btw

PS I'm pretty sure if Gramsci were around to read what you just wrote, it would drive him back to the grave

I know some of these guys too and, yes, they are razor sharp (but yes, I have my lingering suspicions of them as well). As it has been explained to me, while Lenin (and Trotsky) broke with the fatalism of the SI, they never took the time (or, better, HAD the time) to examine the matter philosophically as Gramsci did.

Here fatalism is used interchangeably by Gramsci with 'mechanism' for the most part. The gist of "fatalism" is that if one takes the Laws of History to be absolute then Marxism has already told us that the proletariat will supercede the capitalist class and abolish class society. It is inexorable and basically allows one to script the (however far flung) future.

Gramsci counters:



Gramsci faults Lenin for a failure to reflect on the matter and ultimately shrugging the issue off by saying "Sure, in the long run that might be true but we concentrate on the here and now".

Gramsci also took great umbrage at 'economic determinism' (especially that of Bukharin) which he characterized as sheer superstition. Economic Determinism is intertwined with Fatalism without being the exact same thing -- fatalism resting more on a literal interpretation of Marx's phrase referring to capitalism creating its own gravediggers.

Their ultimate evidence to support Gramsci is the persistent of Western capitalism far beyond any resilience that early Marxist's afforded it.

Gramsci is kinda right in his quote (except the prediction thing) but so what? It is a question of domain: politics versus the underlying economic foundation. In this regard, how far off were the early Marxists really? 20 years? 50? 100? The translation ain't direct and nobody ever thought it was.

I can't help thinking this is partly Dhal's "egoism" at work. There is a lot of actual history that has passed since, from imperialism to world war to revolution to the anti-colonial struggles to another world war, etc. Do we really not have enough actual history to explain what has occurred?

I can't for the life of me find any fookin' room for crude determinism or mistakes or subtle points which lack all practical evidence.

Just as we cannot predict exactly what is going to happen... because to Dhal's point, we cannot encapsulate all that is going on about us in real-time... in the same way, what has already occurred is the clear result of 'cause and effect' or somethin'.

Gramsci negates himself in the end, not because the difference between form and substance isn't real, but because form folds back into substance sooner or later. The idea that substance waits for form to reach its own independent critical mass turns materialism on its head.

This whole deal was encompassed in my 'debate' with Nikos on positivism (the other side of 'fatalism') etc., including the discussion of Lucas. Unfortunately, the debate advanced too fast to shed much light.

It quickly becomes an issue of personal loyalty, doncha know?

I have never quite understood the problem some folks have with fatalism. There seems to be some kind of visceral reaction, negative to the very idea. Everything is governed by the law of cause and effect - I know that at the quantum level most scientists will say, "Well, maybe not." But our lack of understanding, or grasp, of cause and effect may be more at play there. Be that as it may. The reason we know that cause and effect is the law is because we can look back on any historical period or any episodes in our own lives and can see it clearly. The problem arises in our inability to encompass all causes and all effects in the now, as they occur; and, so, our inability to predict what might happen in the future. It has nothing to do with the efficacy of cause and effect, it has only to do with our capacity to account for it all.

People go absolutely weak at the knee if you suggest that free will might not be what we have all been taught that it is (and all appear to hope that it is). Gramsci in some of his early writing takes exception to the backbone of Marxism - "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." Saying that this is too dry and cold and inhuman. This aversion to fatalism stikes me as springing from the same source...maybe egoism? Just thinking out loud.

Egoism, certainly. But, it is also isolated egoism... thus the class question.

Personally, I'm all for getting popcorn and the folding chairs and waiting for the inevitable overthrow... BUT, the fuckers won't let me!

Gramsci is kinda right in his quote (except the prediction thing) but so what? It is a question of domain: politics versus the underlying economic foundation. In this regard, how far off were the early Marxists really? 20 years? 50? 100? The translation ain't direct and nobody ever thought it was.

I can't help thinking this is partly Dhal's "egoism" at work. There is a lot of actual history that has passed since, from imperialism to world war to revolution to the anti-colonial struggles to another world war, etc. Do we really not have enough actual history to explain what has occurred?

I can't for the life of me find any fookin' room for crude determinism or mistakes or subtle points which lack all practical evidence.

Just as we cannot predict exactly what is going to happen... because to Dhal's point, we cannot encapsulate all that is going on about us in real-time... in the same way, what has already occurred is the clear result of 'cause and effect' or somethin'.

Gramsci negates himself in the end, not because the difference between form and substance isn't real, but because form folds back into substance sooner or later. The idea that substance waits for form to reach its own independent critical mass turns materialism on its head.

This whole deal was encompassed in my 'debate' with Nikos on positivism (the other side of 'fatalism') etc., including the discussion of Lucas. Unfortunately, the debate advanced too fast to shed much light.

It quickly becomes an issue of personal loyalty, doncha know?

To be honest, most of the critiques I've bothered to look over that seem like they would naturally appropriate Gramsci tend to just as easily skip him as not since now they can go straight to "the source" which is any writing of Marx's like the Grundrisse or a Preface that they can contort to be "what Marx actually meant,(even if he didn't know it)" in contrast to what he actually says in Capital (and of course, they only need to refute Vol I since II & III aren't "official").

I can't for the life of me find any fookin' room for crude determinism or mistakes or subtle points which lack all practical evidence.

That is my stance as well, except I really don't care if its "crude" or "deterministic" or not. I think the stuff I laid out above more or less exhausts Lukacs and Gramsci and thereby exposes what thin gruel one has to sup on to board the train with them.


This whole deal was encompassed in my 'debate' with Nikos on positivism (the other side of 'fatalism') etc., including the discussion of Lucas. Unfortunately, the debate advanced too fast to shed much light.

I remember one crazy post from him that seemed totally out of character and had me scratching my head for a long while until I "got it". Things that make you go 'huh'.

That is my stance as well, except I really don't care if its "crude" or "deterministic" or not. I think the stuff I laid out above more or less exhausts Lukacs and Gramsci and thereby exposes what thin gruel one has to sup on to board the train with them.



I remember one crazy post from him that seemed totally out of character and had me scratching my head for a long while until I "got it". Things that make you go 'huh'.

I never actually "got it" in regards to that exchange between Nikos and Anaxarchos. I scratched my head and am still scratching. Materialism, to me, is the final arbiter of any of these "debates". That is why Gramsci hits a wall with me. I am not belittling him in any way, I am just not with him...

I never actually "got it" in regards to that exchange between Nikos and Anaxarchos. I scratched my head and am still scratching. Materialism, to me, is the final arbiter of any of these "debates". That is why Gramsci hits a wall with me. I am not belittling him in any way, I am just not with him...

I'm with you on that

I never actually "got it" in regards to that exchange between Nikos and Anaxarchos. I scratched my head and am still scratching. Materialism, to me, is the final arbiter of any of these "debates". That is why Gramsci hits a wall with me. I am not belittling him in any way, I am just not with him...

Our debate was simple (although it surprised me how quickly it came up from the formal subject of our discussion): Are "Marxists" (meaning me) obligated to support joining and "reforming" the local Communist Party, no matter what the character of that Party might be at any particular moment?

At the heart of it is the assertion that the "Party" is identical with proletarian self-consciousness after its initial appearance and also that Party-building (and Party-"reforming" when necessary) then becomes identical with revolutionary practice (i.e. "party of a new type).

There are some gray areas as to who decides which "party" is legit and what a "party" really is...

This debate is entirely relevant to what is discussed in this thread (believe it or not).

This debate is entirely relevant to what is discussed in this thread (believe it or not).

I agree that it is relevant, but isn't it a bit hard to untangle considering how vastly different the context is?

I agree that it is relevant, but isn't it a bit hard to untangle considering how vastly different the context is?

Yes.

Yes.

I set myself up for that, didn't I?

I think I see how it pieces together but if I try to talk my through it I'm just going to be thinking outloud. fit