sunshinekathy
09-10-2008, 12:33 PM
VIDEO: Santa Barbara Computer Security Group Shows How to Hack Voting Machines and Defeat Post-Election Audits
Evaluating the Security of Electronic Voting Systems - Are your votes really counted?
http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~seclab/projects/voting/
The films produced by The Computer Security Group at the University of California at Santa Barbara show how easily U.S. voting machines can be used to fraudulently manipulate votes *in a way that no election official would notice or be able to detect - even with valid post-election audits*.
The UC Santa Barbara students shows how the paper roll ballot records can be also easily be fraudulently manipulated to match the fraudulent electronic tallies and thus the fraudulent election results are *not* detectable by any post-election manual audit.
The Santa Barbara students have discovered and showed how to implement two all-new methods of fraudulently manipulating touchscreen e-ballot votes in ways that no valid post-election audit can detect by the method of "Fake Fleeing Voter" and "After the Fact Vote".
These Santa Barbara Security Group videos are well-worth watching for anyone that believes that touchscreen e-ballot voting machines are OK as long as they have a voter-verifiable paper ballot record.
While the computer voting machine used to demonstrate these concepts is manufactured by Sequoia, the same four methods of fraudulently manipulating vote counts in ways that no manual post-election audit could detect and no election official would notice, can be accomplished on *any* touchscreen e-ballot (DRE) voting machine.
Carefully watch this video to understand fully why e-ballot touchscreen voting is not secure, not auditable for vote fraud, and not trustworthy.
Evaluating the Security of Electronic Voting Systems - Are your votes really counted?
http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~seclab/projects/voting/
A cost-effective Solution to give confidence that election outcomes are determined by voters is Optical scan systems that use voter-marked paper ballots, public oversight over all aspects of elections including ballot security and ballot reconciliation, and independent, scientific post-election auditing.
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How to Audit Election Outcome Accuracy
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/VoteCountAuditBillRequest.pdf
History of Confidence Election Auditing Development & Overview of Election Auditing Fundamentals
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/History-of-Election-Auditing-Development.pdf
Voters Have Reason to Worry
http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf
Evaluating the Security of Electronic Voting Systems - Are your votes really counted?
http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~seclab/projects/voting/
The films produced by The Computer Security Group at the University of California at Santa Barbara show how easily U.S. voting machines can be used to fraudulently manipulate votes *in a way that no election official would notice or be able to detect - even with valid post-election audits*.
The UC Santa Barbara students shows how the paper roll ballot records can be also easily be fraudulently manipulated to match the fraudulent electronic tallies and thus the fraudulent election results are *not* detectable by any post-election manual audit.
The Santa Barbara students have discovered and showed how to implement two all-new methods of fraudulently manipulating touchscreen e-ballot votes in ways that no valid post-election audit can detect by the method of "Fake Fleeing Voter" and "After the Fact Vote".
These Santa Barbara Security Group videos are well-worth watching for anyone that believes that touchscreen e-ballot voting machines are OK as long as they have a voter-verifiable paper ballot record.
While the computer voting machine used to demonstrate these concepts is manufactured by Sequoia, the same four methods of fraudulently manipulating vote counts in ways that no manual post-election audit could detect and no election official would notice, can be accomplished on *any* touchscreen e-ballot (DRE) voting machine.
Carefully watch this video to understand fully why e-ballot touchscreen voting is not secure, not auditable for vote fraud, and not trustworthy.
Evaluating the Security of Electronic Voting Systems - Are your votes really counted?
http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~seclab/projects/voting/
A cost-effective Solution to give confidence that election outcomes are determined by voters is Optical scan systems that use voter-marked paper ballots, public oversight over all aspects of elections including ballot security and ballot reconciliation, and independent, scientific post-election auditing.
--
How to Audit Election Outcome Accuracy
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/VoteCountAuditBillRequest.pdf
History of Confidence Election Auditing Development & Overview of Election Auditing Fundamentals
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/History-of-Election-Auditing-Development.pdf
Voters Have Reason to Worry
http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf