Three things to keep in mind about the US before and after January 20
Diego Sequera
Jan 18, 2025 , 6:05 pm .
A new era in the US, between hegemonic decline and awareness of the end (Photo: New York Times)
The new cycle will begin on January 20. For obvious reasons, the US presidential elections have a global impact.
And unlike what we have seen in the past two decades, the phenomenon represented by the return of Donald Trump shows that his first term was not, contrary to many, an accident in history, a minor short circuit in the system.
On the contrary, it seems that this status belongs to the Biden administration. The new stage will consolidate old trends and inaugurate others at a planetary level. And at a systemic level.
Make America Great Again is a slogan that irrevocably contains the consciousness of the end, and as such the GPS coordinates will be reorganized. There will be plenty of material to cut.
These are three lines visible from the beginning.
Liberal Apocalypse
It is a change of era. The "end of history" has come to an end. Because the post-war order, the world after 1945, has also come to an end.
Donald Trump's return to the White House represents a new tectonic shift that crowns the collapse of the liberal consensus that has defined the worldview of the transatlantic power system in recent decades.
More than two months have passed since Donald Trump's election victory, with just days left before his inauguration, and the commotion continues. And the 47th president is still doing it.
It is known that history is not a straight line, but signs and events were accumulating to announce the breakdown of the vision and programmatic implementation of the establishment in power (the aftermath of Covid-19, the resounding withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Ukrainian misfortune, and the streaming genocide in Gaza), but, again, they did not want to see it.
The expert and managerial class, with their predictive models, patterns of behavioral analysis, and their group convictions, not only did not want to see it, but they dismissed the signs of concrete discomfort of the population (discarded as backward, racist, reactionary, etc.), leading them to the forceful, and majority, electoral challenge on November 6, 2024.
The challenge gives Trump an unquestionable mandate, with the Republican Party now controlling the majority in governorships and both chambers of the legislative branch, in addition to the legitimacy of the electoral and popular votes.
The legitimacy that did not deprive him of the number of extra-political obstacles that range from a chain of lawfare actions to two assassination attempts.
From the perspective outside the walls and from outside (ours), the general rejection of the hyperliberal catechism (to use the term of the philosopher John Gray), or woke, or hyper-identitarian within the walls, corresponds to the certification of the weakness of the international order based on rules.
The "cancelled" reality, however, the overwhelming abundance of signs and evidence that attacked the establishment in force until November 6 did not prevent the anxieties and concerns of the majority of the American electorate (including the fetishized "minorities") from being any less real: migration, wages and inflation.
No matter how deeply rooted the conviction was that Biden and company (and before that Obama and Bush Jr.) were the unstoppable advance of the most finished and unrenounceable model of organization and governance: the incessant march towards the perfection of the end of history. But the circle of convinced people outside formal politics is increasingly smaller.
There were already signs of this in the heavy and direct world of money. It was made manifest in the disintegrations of the consensus at Davos 2024, and was confirmed by the historical standard-bearer of the discourse of orthodox and deregulated globalization, The Economist, when it dedicated a bitter special series to the end of globalization, the end of neoliberalism as it had been understood until now.
This was ruled in May of last year:
"Three major scourges are undermining globalization: the proliferation of punitive economic measures of various kinds, the sudden vogue for industrial policies, and the decay of global institutions."
Naturally, this did not lead to a desired (for some) revolutionary situation from below, but to the clash between oligarchies, the emergence of a counter-elite that will now come to replace and redraw the contours of power with its ways of manifesting itself.
Even though many things seem familiar to us, this film has not yet been released. We have not seen it. And what we are left with, while waiting for what happens after January 20, are the (crazy) signs.
Everything mentioned here is a summary of readings and observations made by friends. None of the ideas are my own.
The strange configuration of the replacement power
As some have pointed out, there is a peculiar non-correlation between a rise in the mobilization of society and a concrete institutional reflection.
Protests on university campuses against genocide or increased voter turnout in presidential elections do not correspond to "civic engagement" at all institutional levels.
Despite the relative rise in political mobilization on the streets, of which the student and street protests against the genocide in Gaza last year can be an example, they operate at the same time that membership in unions, parties, and even churches has declined.
A curious "recalcitrant hybrid" between these two divergent tendencies that, according to Anton Jäger, is combined with an "epidemic of loneliness" that is a metastasis of the pandemic itself.
It would seem acceptable to understand them as new symptoms of the general atomization in society which, of course, results in an even greater gap between society and formal politics.
The contribution (by necessary action and by unexpected omission) of the "mimetic dwarfs" of dissolution liberalism, to use Emmanuel Todd's expression, of the Democratic Party with its rosary of specialists, experts, data operators may have a good part of the credit, although this also obeys a more dramatic structural symptomatology.
The Biden-Harris moment seems to have been the peak of overextension.
For Todd, the schematic and systematic disaffiliation of American society (and of the broader West) is what has led, through the denial of reality, to the nihilism that today places society on the one hand, and power itself on the other.
With all this, the change of era operates as a replacement between the elite of the end of history and the bag of cats to come.
Probably the best approach to clearing up the ideological mystery is offered by Gray himself:
"Absurdities abound in the wake of Trump's victory. The sinking elites fear the imposition of a sinister right-wing worldview, but Trumpian ideology is an imperfect hybrid. The unfettered market is celebrated as an engine of innovation, but the process of creative destruction praised by Joseph Schumpeter and Friedrich Hayek must operate in an economy protected from foreign competition for tariffs. Libertarian individualism and techno-futurism cohabit with Christian fundamentalism. An isolationist yearning jostles with a willingness to intervene wherever American interests might be at stake, cold realism with a cult of American greatness that echoes the neoconservative vision. Nothing is settled or fixed."
"There may be a vacuum in the centre," Gray continues, "but there has been a decisive shift of power in the United States." But this is a competition between oligarchies.
This replacement dynamic falls within Peter Turchin's variables.
Elite overproduction, internal competition and impoverishment of social conditions as driving forces that can lead to major transformations.
In this context, the replacement of an elite by an emerging counter-elite is disguised as a simulation of social struggle.
Trump, Turchin recalls, was the catalyst for these movements, but the objective focus on the character made it easier to overlook no less dramatic movements in the configuration of the Republican Party itself.
In this way, the crazy variables listed by Gray, the Elon Musk-type tech-bros and MAGA nationalism, coexist. In parallel with a notable internal transformation within the Republicans.
The Democratic abandonment of the base that has characterized it in recent history has meant that this "place" is now occupied by its antagonist, focused on the working class, the dignity of work and the threat of decline resulting from globalization and deindustrialization led by the liberal consensus (which does not differ on the underlying issues between W. Bush and Obama).
And Marco Rubio is one of its main exponents.
Thus, the shock and awe of the very early nomination and cabinet appointment process, which to some resembles a coalition government, offers a portrait to which must be added, from those mentioned so far, the Democratic defectors, such as Tulsi Gabbard and Robert Kennedy.
But even before President 47 takes office, his limits have become apparent in at least two areas: the Twitter civil war over the defense or opposition of H-1B visas and the debate over the budget in the Senate. The truth is that despite still holding power, the traditional faction of the Republican Party is gradually becoming a minority.
But this enumeration of short circuits does not conjure up, despite certain campaign promises, that the new administration, better organized, more learned and with greater loyalties, is not also composed of warring factions full of hawks (hen-hawks, to use the convention).
What changes is the main objective.
Imperialism of decline
The problem with focusing too much on the trees and blurring what makes the forest is that it seems to confer an irrational and volatile logic to what Trump has concocted in the period between his electoral victory and the run-up to the inauguration.
Canada, Panama, Greenland, the tariff war, Mexico, West Asia and, above all, the People's Republic of China, disconnected from anything conceived beyond the Donald, gives it a disjointed and somewhat insane aura.
But, as has been his custom (and one of his strange virtues), he reads aloud the fine print of the imperial contract and breaks with the omertà of the shared vision of the United States as a benign empire, promoter of freedoms, democracy and the prevailing common sense.
Clearly, he doesn't care, which is an innovation. The empire has needs, no matter how legitimizing it is presented.
Does the transition from a "Wilsonian" imperialism with a supposedly virtuous and uplifting purpose, spreading democracy or automatically superior values, to a "Rooseveltian" one, matter to me nothing or no one but my objectives?
While the establishment of the last two decades has anchored itself in a univocal vision of the exceptional, infallible and excellent state of its affairs, the emerging vision that antagonizes it and that now comes to power has taken on the problem of decline by conceiving the empire under the threat of emerging powers, especially China.
Beyond the re-elected president, other actors offer a more organized vision of the same. In particular, Marco Rubio.
While in the new cabinet some actors have a radically flat, violent and predictable vision (Waltz, Rattcliffe, Stefanik), others are contradictory (Kennedy, Gabbard) and a third lot inserted within the (unstable) MAGA mold (Musk, Noem), Rubio entails the evolution of a line with exponents who have dedicated themselves to thinking about the Republican Party based on the current state of things assumed to be decadent.
In very general terms, this vision is based on the premise that liberal globalization (the end of history) with radical deregulation, the free movement of souls and goods, together with the system of politically correct signals based on a simulation of identity sovereignty, has been correlated with deindustrialization, delocalization, the dissolution of the family and the impoverishment of working conditions (the dignity of work) and social conditions in general.
Rubio explicitly stated in 2023 that the Republican Party "must become a multiethnic, working-class coalition willing to fight for the country, ushering in a new American century."
His reflection towards the world has also been shaped and constantly expressed in his legislative work. Enough to infer the main lines of that vision.
Reindustrialization implies
repatriation of capital,
relocation of industry within the hemisphere (more on this later),
the development of local industry in strategic areas where China has a comparative advantage to mitigate the effects of supply chain shocks,
supervision of corporations that do not participate in onshoring,
self-sufficiency of all essential primary resources,
scrutiny of the working conditions of goods produced elsewhere and
disconnection with China by economically, legally and militarily walling off the Western Hemisphere.
With this in mind, perhaps, one could begin to extrapolate his vision for Latin America.
More clues on the latter were offered by Rubio himself in an article in the National Interest in April of last year under the title "Building a pro-US future in our hemisphere."
In it, Rubio already suggests a sort of roadmap, always based on his specific and particular vision of the world: beyond seeing "with concern" the different "crises" on the continent (predictably, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, Haiti and migration to the north) he considers the general panorama as "brilliant", and it will only seem contradictory to those who do not see the "points" that, according to him, shine,
In particular, Rubio sees a "new generation of potentially pro-American leaders in the Western Hemisphere."
Based on visits he made in 2024 to Argentina, Paraguay and El Salvador, he refers, of course, to the rise of the new and dissimilar, ideologically indigestible and disparate leaders who govern there.
"Noboa, Bukele, Milei, Peña, and add to this list Luis Abinader in the Dominican Republic, Dina Boluarte in Peru, Irfaan Ali in Guyana, and Rodrigo Cháves in Costa Rica. These names hardly make our headlines, but they are in charge of more than 120 million people and more than a trillion dollars in GDP. And they are willing to strengthen their partnership with the United States."
Obviously, the benefits of expanded collaboration based on, for example, Argentine lithium, Peruvian copper reserves and "Guyanese oil" stand out.
Officially, in an apparently germinal state, the network of like-minded figures is pre-established there, even more pro-American than the preceding presidential generation, that of 2015-2020, and even more willing to surrender sovereignty and territory for little in return.
Will the Lima Group inherit a new round of electroshock?
This degree of willingness to "open" guarantees sufficient cement and block for the desired hemispheric wall. It also guarantees open hostility to the hotbeds of multipolarity.
The Arctic mystery has been partially cleared up by the show regarding Greenland and Canada, with Trump and Musk at the helm, and the focus on the south has been less explored or explicit, directly, except for one or another obligatory and routine public demonstration, saving Mexico.
Given the complexity of all the factors of proximity between Washington and Mexico, it is natural that at all scales, what affects the latter is more particularized and exposed.
But in general terms, little has been said about the rest of the continent. But it is clear that, based on the 2016-2020 precedent, the new stage that is being structured and the new role played by some actors, there is a kind of "tactical silence".
They care a lot.
This can be better explained by the two central themes of the presidential campaign: migration (and security) and inflation.
The first of the two promises remains in the center and they have confirmed that there will be strong actions from day 1.
It is worth noting the role of Mauricio Clavier Carone. For this administration, he was special envoy for Latin America and senior advisor in the previous one, dealing, among other things, with the keys to the sanctions program against Venezuela.
The Cuban-American, who served at the Inter-American Development Bank (until he fell out of favor over a love affair in 2022), probably played a more significant role than the visible one in adventures such as Operation Gideon, from the National Security Council.
The preemptive signaling regarding the increase in tariffs on commercial activity, particularly China, in the recently inaugurated Peruvian port of Chancay reflects the pseudo-protectionist side.
We will know in detail how it will be associated with other “desks” in the region, in particular with the folders of Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua, from the 20th onwards.
The situation in Chancay confirms that, whether it is in the areas of trade, migration, security issues, cooperation initiatives in defense and the fight against drug trafficking (also in the Caribbean), the change in vision regarding South America is beginning to be revealed.
We are now an internal issue, unofficially subordinated to the United States' hemispheric security sphere, and therefore our treatment is domestic when contrasted with references to the BRICS and the main Eurasian powers: Russia, Iran and China.
The pushes within the "internal" of the plutocracy make an even more primary perception of the region emerge in form and substance.
It enters into dialogue with what has already been said, and the interpretation becomes even more viable.
As entertaining as it can be to watch the jarring passage from one order to another (which remains to be seen), local translations can be brutal.
The blatant disregard for life outside their home by the overwhelming majority of the MAGA replacement conglomerate, with Gaza on their backs and in a solution of continuity between one party and another, forces us to think about precedents.
The awareness of an even more explicit decline, the assimilation into the existential form it is taking, does not absolve it from the generalized nihilism that permeates the current facet of things up there.
The primitiveness of the forms, almost guaranteed in the pursuit of the objectives, demonstrated in many sectors of the market (starting with the energy sector) on a negotiating and cautious path, are also present the lessons of loss from the previous adventure.
But the continuity of imperial imponderables will persist.
What is clear is that the projection of force will be a decisive element in the way you start the relationship. Many remember that the art of the deal is that if the pressure surprises you on the weak side, you are already in the negotiation and you don't realize it.
If not, ask Europe.
Esteban Hernández, one of the most astute observers of the internal movements of the right, the conservative sectors and the Republican Party, wrote after the victory of November 6:
“The Republican Party has shown one constant for 50 years, and that is its continuous evolution towards more daring positions. After Nixon came Reagan, the two Bushes and Trump. Reagan transformed everything, Bush Jr. brought the profound neocon turn and Trump shook up the international order. The Republicans have not taken steps backwards, they have all been moving forward. The specificity of this administration, however, is that it will take a position at a different historical moment, in which there is a threat to US hegemony.”
The lame duck period between one change of government and another has always been subject to the outgoing administration, in a last-minute sprint, completing some things on its agenda, usually controversial measures or those that might have encountered resistance.
But perhaps never before has there been such an overwhelming effort to make things more difficult for the incoming administration in some cases, while in others perpetrating as much destruction as possible in its obsessive hotspots, such as Ukraine. Especially when the incoming administration has a diametrically opposed position.
But it is no coincidence that many of them, like the relatively protectionist drift (which began with "bidenomics"), are pronounced, and with regard to Israel the position is even more comfortable (or is supposed to be).
Despite playing close quarters, the animosity and look of vassalage when thinking about Latin America does not change either, and that includes the relationship with Brazil, which was so close to the previous administration.
All these are points where there is "administrative continuity" at the imperial level. The forms and perhaps the implementation of twists in the reformist vision of someone like Rubio are changing. But the essence remains.
It will become clearer starting on January 21st. The Western Hemisphere first.
https://misionverdad.com/opinion/tres-p ... 0-de-enero
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