Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Sun May 18, 2025 12:10 pm

A pre-written script
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 05/18/2025

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“Preliminary conclusions… Russia does not want real and substantive negotiations—which has always been obvious—and instead replaces them with blatantly performative and imitative actions,” Mikhail Podolyak wrote on social media on Friday, barely after the first direct meeting between Russia and Ukraine in three years had ended and before the head of the Ukrainian delegation, Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, had offered a relatively constructive view of a meeting that was unlikely to yield any major breakthroughs. kyiv, with seven years of experience in the art of simulating negotiations and dragging out time, is projecting that capability onto Russia when the negotiations have barely begun. However, the hour and forty minutes that the Ukrainian delegation spent meeting with the Russian team led by Vladimir Medinsky was more than enough to set in motion the script that the European capitals had prepared during the week to use whatever happened in Istanbul, a task in which they have the invaluable collaboration of the Western media, always ready to cling to the most belligerent positions to justify the continuation of the status quo . Those who, by action or inaction, collaborated in the sabotage of the Minsk process and scorned the Istanbul negotiations, uncomfortable since their success would have forced them to resume economic and political relations with Russia that they did not wish to resume, now insist on the path of pressure, or peace through force without giving any option to diplomacy.

“Russia—specifically, Putin—does not want to end the war because it has no alternative to its mass war criminals and refuses to return them to Russian territory. Russia is deliberately and demonstratively insulting all the world mediators who have tried to facilitate the negotiations in Turkey by sending an extremely low-status delegation. Russia is clearly trying to buy time by simultaneously sending a low-level delegation and launching dozens of drones and missiles across Ukraine, targeting major cities,” Podolyak’s message continued, failing to mention that the dozens of drones Russia uses daily are comparable to a similar number fired by Ukraine into Russian territory. Hours before the meeting, for example, Ukrainian drones attacked the territory that matters most to Kyiv, Crimea, the first it lost in 2014. After more than three years in which both the political and media establishments have used the word "Putin" to refer to Russia—Putin's invasion, Putin's war, the sanctions against Putin—any delegation that doesn't include the president can credibly be dismissed as incompetent and incapable of making decisions. "We already know how decisions are made there," Zelensky defiantly stated last Thursday, while still playing a guessing game about whether his delegation would meet with the Russian team.

Reactions to the meeting can be summed up between those who demand firm action against Russia's refusal to negotiate, even though this contradicts the words of the members of the Ukrainian delegation who participated in the meeting, and those who regret that it even took place. “Everyone wants peace, except Russia. Sanctions and political isolation are essential to keep the pressure on Russia. That's why unity matters more than ever,” stated Kaja Kallas, speaking at the European Political Community meeting. Her message was perfectly aligned with Ursula von der Leyen's speech, which stated that, after expressing her and Antonio Costa's support for Zelensky, she wrote that “our immediate priority is a full and unconditional ceasefire. That's why we are further increasing the pressure to bring Putin to the negotiating table. We are imposing tough sanctions on Russia, package after package. We want a just and lasting peace for Ukraine and lasting security for all of Europe.”

“The fact that President Zelensky traveled to Turkey despite everything is a huge gesture,” Foreign Minister Merz had written earlier, giving political weight to a trip that was only meant for show. “Putin didn't show up, and that only put him in the wrong. A new sanctions package is ready. We will decide on it on Tuesday in Brussels,” he concluded. Faced with negotiations they did not want and in which Ukraine has not initially achieved what it demanded, European countries are responding in a tone that has become familiar. This week, the seventeenth package of sanctions against Russia was confirmed starting in 2022—measures that add to those already imposed over the previous seven years—and the eighteenth, which is promised to be even more severe, is expected to be approved imminently due to Putin's withdrawal . This was confirmed by von der Leyen, who added that "now," a moment in which diplomacy is resuming for the first time in three years, "is the time to pressure Putin until he is also ready for peace." "The heads of state and government agreed that we must exhaust all possibilities. We are discussing new sanctions in the energy and banking sectors, new measures regarding assets, and sanctions against individuals. We are working on this with our European partners," Chancellor Merz told a German media outlet, insisting that he opened the door to the possibility of seizing Russian assets frozen by the European Union, a controversial and problematic option that his predecessor was aware would cause serious problems for the European financial system. Merz maintains hope for such an appropriation provided "there is a solid legal basis," which simply does not exist and which would encourage Russia to be somewhat more reticent about diplomacy with European countries.

Faced with the European countries' twisted use of the absence of the only outcome they demanded, a ceasefire, a portion of the press has chosen to remain skeptical and lament what they perceive as a success for Russia. "From the outset, the Istanbul negotiations were not expected to produce major progress," wrote The New York Times, "but the meeting was a tactical victory for Putin, who managed to begin the talks without first agreeing to a battlefield ceasefire that Ukraine and nearly all of its Western backers had demanded as a precondition for negotiations."

In an uncharacteristic dissent, the British newspaper The Times broke away from the widespread opinion to emphasize that the meeting had gone “better than expected.” Samuel Charap of the Rand Corporation, one of the experts who has had access to the 2022 negotiation documents, echoed the sentiment, continuing to propose it as a possible basis for a future agreement between Russia and Ukraine. “The largest prisoner exchange and agreement to continue discussing ceasefire modalities, I would consider “better than expected,” is the outcome of the first direct meeting in three years. The parties also demonstrated they can engage in dialogue without indirect mediation,” Charap wrote on social media, adhering to the optimistic view, currently a minority in Western media discourse. “To be clear,” he added, “it would have been a surprise if results emerged from this first meeting. It will take time.” Charap’s logic is the opposite of that currently held by European countries and, although for different reasons, by Donald Trump.

“Putin is at the table,” Donald Trump said, interrupting the Fox News interviewer Bret Baier, the same man who gave Zelensky the opportunity to deliver his message of redemption to the White House just hours after the catastrophic Oval Office meeting, who was interviewing him. “Putin hasn’t stopped bombing and he hasn’t come to the table.” Trump’s words contradict what European countries and Ukraine were hoping to hear from the US president, who was expected to join the chorus of voices proclaiming that Vladimir Putin’s absence in Turkey is the necessary proof that Russia has rejected negotiations and lacks the will to make peace.

In a completely incoherent speech, in which the journalist never managed to get Trump to answer his questions or maintain the thread of the topic he was talking about, Donald Trump insisted on four ideas: it's all Joe Biden's fault; it was the Javelins delivered by his administration that saved kyiv, which would have fallen "in five hours"; the war would not have started if he had been president; and Vladimir Putin wants peace because "he's looking bad and wants to look good." In the interview, Trump also insisted on other of his usual ideas, such as that Zelensky, "the best salesman in the world, even better than me," has no cards to play, and he again gave false figures about the aid that the United States and European countries have provided to Ukraine. Although it is well known that this is not the case, Donald Trump continues to repeat that Washington has contributed $350 billion compared to $100 billion from European countries. Both figures are simply false, and the contribution of the EU and other European countries is significantly higher than that of the United States. Perhaps the most important point of Trump's speech is his insistence that "nothing will happen until I meet with Vladimir Putin." The idea that a single meeting between two presidents—or three if Zelensky is included—will resolve a war that has lasted more than three years and two conflicts that predate the Russian invasion by many years: the Russo-Ukrainian conflict that began in 2014 and the Russia-NATO conflict that dates back to the Alliance's expansion toward Russian borders, is naive, but useful for European countries, which are also demanding a Putin-Zelensky meeting after which they can claim that the Russian president does not want peace.

The indispensable role of the United States is also one of the trump cards of European leaders at the forefront of the attempt to continue using coercion to achieve what they seek. “In Istanbul, Putin has de facto broken off negotiations,” stated Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. This is the position adopted by the leaders of those countries that call themselves a coalition of the willing . Among them, as in previous weeks, stands out Emmanuel Macron, the visible figure of the image of unity and a certain desperation displayed on Friday in Albania. Although somewhat less explicit in his statements than the Polish Prime Minister, who stated that “in Istanbul, Putin has de facto broken off negotiations,” the French president has led the push for the “toughest sanctions” to date, something practically impossible given that Russia’s disconnection from the international payment system SWIFT was the core option for European countries.

“It is clear that Russia's refusal to accept a ceasefire and a high-level meeting is unacceptable to all of us and unacceptable in light of the American proposal… At some point, this must provoke a response,” Macron said on Friday. However, despite the harshness of the European political establishment 's statements in its promise of sanctions, the image of the day at the European Political Community summit was Macron, Starmer, Zelensky, and Tusk talking on the phone with Donald Trump to act as a lobby for sanctions. This is the image of the strategic autonomy of European countries, which need the United States to ensure that sanctions have the effect they have not had so far. To achieve this, the goal is to convince Donald Trump that the first meeting between Russia and Ukraine in three years is definitive proof that Moscow rejects diplomacy, so the next steps must be to militarily strengthen Kiev and address the Kremlin using only the language of ultimatums.

https://slavyangrad.es/2025/05/18/32231/

Google Translator

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TRUMP, THE EUROPEANS AND ZELENSKY DON’T KNOW THE LESSON OF THE ARROGANT KING AND THE BURNING OF THE ORACLES

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By John Helmer @bears_with

In the outcome, it’s the old story come true again.

That’s the one in which Tarquin, the ancient Roman king, wanted the Cumaean Sybil to sell him the nine books of prophecies known as the Sybilline Oracles. When the king dismissed the Sybil’s price for the nine, she burned three and asked the same price for six. When the king held out again, she burned another three. In desperation, the king then paid for the three remaining at the price he had refused for the original nine.

For two thousand years this has been known as the art of the deal.

As if they didn’t know the story, on Friday the leaders of France, United Kingdom, Germany, Ukraine and Poland (FUGUP) telephoned President Donald Trump and told him to keep fighting President Vladimir Putin until he accepts their price. FUGUP told POTUS to burn Putin until Russia will have nothing left to pay with.

Two leaks from the Istanbul meetings confirm what has happened. According to Oleg Tsarev’s account from the Russian side, the Russian delegation said they would agree to a ceasefire if the Ukraine withdrew its forces completely from the four regions – Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye, and Kherson. The Ukrainians refused. In reply, the Russians said that next time there will be five regions.

According to a London newspaper’s leak from the British adviser to the Ukrainians, the Russian delegation said they would agree to a ceasefire only if the Ukraine withdrew its troops from the four regions, and Kiev refused, Russia would take two more regions – Sumy and Kharkov. The head of the Russian delegation, Vladimir Medinsky, had reportedly said that Russia “does not want war but is ready to fight for a year, two, three — no matter how long it takes. We fought with Sweden for 21 years. How long are you ready to fight? Perhaps someone sitting at this table will lose even more of their loved ones. Russia is ready to fight forever.”

Trump was sitting in his aeroplane flying north from Abu Dhabi, two hours and a thousand kilometres south of Istanbul when he got the call from FUGUP. The day before, he had told reporters ““we will be leaving tomorrow but you know, almost destination unknown because it could be here, it could be there, but probably we’re back to Washington DC tomorrow.”

An hour before he took off, he said: “You know, they all said Putin was going, Zelensky was going, and I said, if I don’t go, I guarantee Putin’s not going. And he didn’t go…We’re going to get it done.” Trump added he would meet Putin “as soon as we can set it up. I would actually leave here [Abu Dhabi] and go [to Istanbul]… in two or three weeks we have a deal.”

As Russian forces accelerate their spring offensive west, north and south, burning what Trump, Zelensky and the Europeans have to fight over, the terms of the Russian deal are now far greater than Vladimir Medinsky, the Russian lead negotiator, accepted at Istanbul-I in March 2022 but were repudiated when he returned to Moscow. Before he set out for Istanbul-II last week, the consensus in Moscow was unanimous, as Putin demonstrated at his lengthy Kremlin session in the evening of May 14 with ministers, intelligence agency chiefs, and senior military commanders from the General Staff and from the front.

“Andrei Belousov [Defence Minister] and Valery Gerasimov [chief of the General Staff] also delivered reports. All commanders of the groups of armed forces in the special military operation zone reported on the situation in their respective sectors along the line of contact. The meeting participants conducted a detailed joint discussion of all reports. Based on these briefings, the President summed up the meeting results, set tasks and charted the negotiating position of the Russian delegation in Istanbul.”

In Abu Dhabi, Trump’s staff had left a four-hour gap in the timing of his flight back to Washington in order to meet with Putin in Istanbul on condition that Trump ordered Zelensky to leave Turkey beforehand and Putin agreed to a summit announcement of an immediate ceasefire. Zelensky was removed to Albania but the Putin’s ceasefire conditions remained unchanged. Trump then abandoned his summit meeting plan; the record of his flight log was erased. He announced his personal success instead – “in two or three weeks”.

For the terms of the Russian consensus, and Putin’s agreement to meet Trump in the future, listen to the podcast with Dimitri Lascaris, recorded in Greece on Saturday, May 17.

PRESIDENT TRUMP’S FLIGHT PLAN DURING MAY 15-16

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Source: https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/calendar/

The impossibility of 30-minute “flying time” between Abu Dhabi and Mildenhall, England, concealed Trump’s hope to meet Putin in Istanbul. The decision-making for the summit meeting went down to the wire, as reported two weeks ago here.

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Source: https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/calendar/

The corrected White House calendar reflects flying time between Abu Dhabi of 7.5 hours, and Trump’s landing at Mildenhall on time, as originally scheduled. The 90-minute stopover was also planned and logged in the original version of the calendar.

THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION AT ISTANBUL ON MAY 16

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Source: https://ria.ru/20250516/peregovory-2017151081.html

The Kremlin announced Putin’s order for the delegation members late in the evening of May 14 here.

THE UKRAINIAN DELEGATION AT ISTANBUL ON MAY 16

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Source: https://ria.ru/20250516/peregovory-2017151081.html

The composition of this delegation was changed between May 14 and May 15 as minister-rank officials and the chiefs of the SBU and the General Staff were replaced by their deputies.

https://johnhelmer.net/trump-the-europe ... more-91604

"For two thousand years this has been known as the art of the deal." I'm still chuckling. This is what happens when everything you 'know' is wrong.

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Russia Stands Firm in Istanbul as EU-Cabal Runs Out of Options
Simplicius
May 16, 2025

The long awaited Istanbul negotiations between Russia and Ukraine took place, and though I have complained of the ‘sideshow’ nature of these distractions, today’s session is worth mentioning for what it revealed about Russia’s stance.

Firstly, it must be said outright that all doomers who claimed Russia was capitulating, and that Putin was again being ‘led by the nose’ toward a Minsk-3-style disaster were proven wrong. By all accounts, the Russian team was even firmer than expected on the chief demands.

Let’s also mention that Ukraine had already admitted their only goal in the negotiations was to push for a truce or ceasefire with Russia, as it has now become the common agenda between Zelensky and Europe to force Russia into a 30-day ceasefire. This would be pushed into indefinite status so that European troops can be injected into theater and the conflict frozen for good, while Ukraine is pumped up to the gills with more lethal aid.

Starting off, the Ukrainian side appeared to try and ‘intimidate’ the Russian side by dressing in military fatigues, while the Russian side donned formal wear: (Video at link.)

Early reports claimed an interpreter was present for the Ukrainian language, but Ukrainian Rada MP Goncharenko confirmed Russian was infact used throughout:

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As he notes above, the Russian side apparently refused any ceasefire offers and demanded Ukraine’s withdrawal from the four regions of Kherson, Zaporozhye, LPR, and DPR. However, where it gets spicy is the claim that Russians gave Ukraine an ultimatum: take this deal or we’ll demand a fifth region next time.

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If only Ukraine were so lucky.

In fact, Russian sources have corrected this version to 8 regions:

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“We didn’t say five. We said eight.”

Where are the doomers now, who claimed Putin would capitulate?

Presumably these eight regions would be the previous four of LPR, DPR, Kherson, and Zaporozhye, plus the stated Sumy, Kharkov, then Odessa and Nikolayev. This would pretty much cover the “likely” orange scenario below:

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Goncharenko confirmed again:

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Other quotes include Russia essentially threatening that it is willing to fight forever to achieve its aims:

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Another interesting quote:

One of the members of the Ukrainian delegation said during the negotiations that Russia plans to attack Poland in 2030.

The Russian delegation laughed, and Medinsky asked “not to transfer the negotiations into the fantasy genre.”


The fact is, the West is only now slowly coming around to the reality that Russia is winning and has all the leverage to dictate terms. However, the West’s yellow press still takes great effort in softening this fact, as in the latest article from NYT which tries to claim that Russia is demanding disproportionately more than it should based on battlefield gains:

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https://archive.ph/PXqQt

It’s beyond ludicrous levels of sophistry to try to spin Russia’s current advances as “inches” when Ukraine’s defenses are collapsing on every front. The article brings up Putin’s March quote, wherein he relayed his opinion that Russia is close to finishing Ukraine off:

“We have reason to believe that we are set to finish them off,” Mr. Putin said, adding: “People in Ukraine need to realize what is going on.”

But of course, as per usual the article trots out the canard that Russia is incurring a very “high cost” for its ‘meager’ gains. Such a high cost that even MediaZona was forced to stop updating Russian losses after they had drooped to such an ‘inconveniently’ low level.

Crunching the Numbers
Let us again revisit the topic of Russian losses and manpower regeneration, since we have some new data at our disposal.

Yesterday Syrsky announced that the Russian contingent in Ukraine has now reached a whopping 640,000. Also, note his mention that Russia has transitioned the conflict into a ‘war of attrition’, which is an important acknowledgement:

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https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2025/05/16/7512454/

I have dug up the past three years’ of updates on Russia’s troop totals—here’s what the data confirms:

In 2023, Bloomberg announced Russia’s troop count at 420,000:

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https://archive.ph/SRBYB
In 2024, head of Ukrainian military intelligence Vadim Skibitzky revealed to the Economist the number had reached 514,000:

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https://archive.ph/wxEDp

And in early 2025? It had swelled to 600,000:

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https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-mi ... nsky-says/

We find that Russia’s troop count is increasing approximately by 100,000 in the Ukrainian theater each year.

The most obvious question follows: what kind of “massive losses” can Russia possibly be experiencing if it’s able to balloon its numbers by 100k troops each year?

Just two days ago Putin said Ukraine press-gangs 30k men a month, while Russia has 50-60k monthly volunteer sign-ups: (Video at link.)

But let’s try out a few new calculations to really plug in those numbers.

You see, the one area of Russia’s manpower regeneration that every other analyst misses is Russia’s contract-based recruitment. Everyone calculates net losses versus volunteer sign-ups without understanding that the vast majority of Russia’s army in Ukraine are now contract troops, constantly churning through contract expirations.

With an AI bot’s help, I managed to crunch some of these numbers:

First we start with the basis that Russia had about 450k troops prior to going full contract. That is, after late 2022 where Russia launched the mobilization for 300k, adding to the ~150k it already had.

So, the challenge becomes to find how did Russia go from ~450k to the current 640k while churning both losses and contract non-reenlistments. As a quick aside, here’s a recent real Russian Army ad. Take special note of the “1 year of service” term being advertised:

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First, how do we know which of the service terms are most popular, 6 month, 1 year, or 2 year?

AI guesstimates as follows:

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This is reasonable enough.

If you take the ‘average’ of 6, 12, and 24 months (42 / 3), you get about 14 months. That means, if Russia recruits 350,000 contract soldiers per year (~30,000 per month x 12, using a lower baseline estimate), most of that pool is being wiped out every 14 months due to contract expiry. However, a certain amount will re-enlist. How can we calculate a re-enlistment percentage? AI shares its thoughts:

In peacetime, modern militaries often see reenlistment rates between 40% and 60% for first-term contracts, with higher rates among career NCOs and specialists.

In high-casualty, high-stress wars, reenlistment rates typically drop. For example, during the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, first-term reenlistment rates for combat troops sometimes fell below 40%, especially in units with high casualties.


It goes on to say:

Given the above, a reenlistment rate of 30–40% is a reasonable estimate for Russian contract troops in Ukraine.

It notes that re-enlistment would likely be lower for those choosing 6 month terms, and higher for those choosing 2 year terms, because they represent more ‘career-minded’ and incentivized personnel.

But let’s assume it averages out to the stated 30-40%, we get something like the following:

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Out of this ~30k number, ~11k or so will re-enlist—though it may be higher.

But for the sake of argument, we get something like:

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In other words, Russia may be losing up to 18-20k soldiers per month just to contract expirations. Then there’s at least another 10,000 per month irretrievable losses, which is both KIA and maimed beyond repair. This comes out to about 5,000 purely KIA per month, or 160 per day.

Latest figures from the likes of MediaZona and Trump’s own hintings are in line with this. For instance, it was reported Russia hit the 100k ‘confirmed dead’ milestone on March 29th, and then the 108k milestone ~45 days later on May 15th. Dividing the 8,000 increase into 45 days we get exactly 177 KIA per day. Irretrievable wounded would likely be the same number per day, so we can estimate 300-350 total losses per day (~10k/month), which would need to be covered by new recruitment.

To cover 10k hard losses, plus ~20k contract expiries, plus an additional 8k monthly growth in order to sustain the proven 100k per year force expansion, Russia would need to recruit nearly 40k per month. Putin in the video above says Russia does 50-60k per month. You can fudge the numbers around a little here or there, for instance if you believe Russia takes higher losses than 10k per month—let’s say 15k—then add another 5k on top of Russia’s necessary monthly recruitment, or lower the contract expirations a bit.

Also, recall that Russia is reportedly standing up other reserve armies that do not even count toward the 640,000 contingent in Ukraine, as we reported on recently. Depending on the growth of those reserve forces we can assume that either Russia’s monthly hard losses or the contract expirations are lower than expected; either that or Putin’s new 50-60k recruitment number is actually accurate, which would cover everything including new reserves growth.

There’s a slight caveat to the above: it’s an oversimplification based on static numbers, when in reality Russia’s force is growing and would require a multiplier that would over-complicate my point. But the general numbers should give a rough idea of what we’re dealing with in regard to the ratios of contract churn, losses, net force generation growth, etc.

To reiterate the most important point: when your entire force generation relies on limited contracts, it becomes absolutely necessary to assume an equation that allows for a huge monthly churn of contracts—i.e. people who choose not to re-enlist. The only question is how big this percentage should be; AI assumes 37% as a re-enlistment average—maybe you can argue Russians are “more patriotic” and a far higher percentage of them do re-enlist. It’s hard to know for sure, but it certainly can’t be 100%. 30-65% at most seems realistic. Officers would be much higher, grunts lower. 6 month, 1 year, and 2 year averages out to precisely 14 months, which means every 14 months the entire period’s worth of recruitment is churned over, less re-enlistments.

A quick note on Ukraine’s situation, which I’ve mentioned before, but would like to repeat for new subscribers. How is Ukraine able to retain its force composition despite presumably much higher losses?

Here’s an illustration of how relatively easy it is to recruit enough people to sustain losses:

Let’s say Ukraine loses 500-600 hard losses per day, which could be 250-300 KIA and 250-300 maimed. This would be 15-18k per month. If you believe the number is double that, then pretend it’s 30k a month total.

The point is this: Ukraine has 24 oblasts, with each of them having many cities, villages, towns, settlements, etc. Let’s say Ukraine needs a 15-30k monthly replenishment as noted above. To make the point, let’s even use the higher figure. That means Ukraine needs to press-gang 30k people per month, which comes out to 1,000 per day, from the entire country. Divide that by 24 oblasts, we get 41 people from each oblast per day.

A cursory search tells me each Ukrainian oblast has on average 1,500 total settlements of all kinds, though most are tiny. Imagine how easy it is to cull 41 people per day from a pool of 1,500 settlements. You virtually only need to capture a single person from a medium sized town each day, and your quota is met. This is a fairly easy feat. That means Ukraine does not really need to break a sweat to replace the upwards of 30,000 losses per month, even much less so if the losses are 15,000. And I don’t believe Ukraine has been taking particularly heavy losses in the past few months wherein the conflict had slowed down.

As such, we should not expect a sudden catastrophic breakdown, necessarily, but the continued slow attrition of Ukraine’s personnel until it hits a critical point sometime much later. But remember, Ukraine has no ‘contract churn’ like Russia—there is no de-mobilization in Ukraine at all. Every single ‘recruited’ soldier is there until death—with one caveat: Ukraine has a huge desertion problem, which can be compared to Russia’s contract de-mobilizations.

But mostly it means Ukraine’s entire monthly ‘mobilization’ figure (whether it’s 20k or 30k per month) represents loss replacement, unlike in Russia’s case where the majority likely represents contract churn, with losses being the smaller component. Therefore we can assume Ukraine’s losses are at a minimum 20-30k a month, and possibly more—in which case, Ukraine will not be ‘breaking even’ but slowly losing overall manpower. This could be accurate given that Zelensky seems to have previously said the AFU had 1+ million people, now reduced to a claimed 880,000.

On that topic, today another exchange of bodies took place with a reported 909 Ukrainian bodies exchanged for 34 Russian ones:

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Today a "body exchange" took place(dead servicemen from both sides)

Ukraine received the bodies of 909 fallen servicemen, Russia - 34.

Graph of exchange of bodies of the dead for the years 23-25. In total, Russia transferred 7790 bodies, Ukraine 1408 bodies.


It appears Russia has ‘capped’ the exchanges at precisely 909 for reasons unknown, but as per usual it’s a window into the loss disparities, though of course it doesn’t tell the full story.

Likewise another report on the agreed-upon prisoner exchange highlights something else I’ve long evangelized on:

The exchange of 1,000 for 1,000 prisoners, which Umerov announced, is undoubtedly good news.

According to some data, this is about half of all Russian prisoners of war held in Ukraine, and only about 15-20% of Ukrainian prisoners in Russia.

Thus, the majority of Russian troops will finally return home, while the majority of Ukrainian prisoners will still remain in custody. It would potentially be the largest prisoner exchange since the start of the conflict.

Military Informant


Worry not, though, Ukraine remains confident of its manpower resources:

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(Much more at link.)

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/rus ... stanbul-as

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<snip>

The Odessa Moment

By Scott Ritter, Substack, 5/16/25

Russia has informed Ukraine of its baseline condition for conflict termination—the withdrawal of all Ukrainian troops from the territory of lands which, from the perspective of the Russian Constitution, constitute part of Mother Russia. These include Kherson, Zaporozhia, Donetsk and Lugansk. Russia has also made it clear that if Ukraine does not accept these terms, the next time Russia is willing to sit down and negotiate with Ukraine their demands will include four additional Ukrainian oblasts, or administrative regions—presumably Odessa, Nikolaev, Dnepropetrovsk, and Kharkov. We have reached the Odessa Moment.

Back in January 2023, while appearing on “The Gaggle” with George Szamuely and Peter Lavelle, I postulated that Russia was approaching what I called “the Odessa Moment,” that confluence of military and political circumstances which, once reached, would trigger a strategic decision by Russia to expand the Special Military Operation (SMO) beyond the geography defined by the territories absorbed by Russia following a controversial referenda held in September 2022 on the territory of Kherson, Zaporozhia, Donetsk and Lugansk, in which the question of self-determination was answered by a vote on whether these territories should be incorporated into the Russian Federation or not.

As originally conceived, the SMO was not about territorial acquisition but rather defending the rights of the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine. In negotiations which began less than a week after the SMO began—first in Gomel, Belarus, and later in Turkey—Russia simply sought to achieve that which had been promised as part of the Minsk Accords entered into with Ukraine, Germany and France in 2014-2015, in which Ukraine promised to make the appropriate changes to its Constitution guaranteeing that the rights and status of Russian-speaking Ukrainians would be protected.

Ukraine, backed by both Germany and France (and the United States as well) opted to treat the Minsk Accords as an opportunity to build up military power sufficient to reclaim parts of the Donbas region (comprised of the oblasts of Donetsk and Lugansk) as well as Crimea which were lost in the aftermath of the CIA-backed Maidan coup of February 2014 which saw the Russian-speaking lawfully elected President, Victor Yanukovych, ousted and replaced by US-backed Ukrainian nationalists. Between 2015 and 2022, the US and its NATO allies trained and equipped hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers for the sole purpose of reclaiming by force the territories of Donetsk, Lugansk and Crimea.

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Zelensky meets with Macron, Merkle and Vladimir Putin, December 2019

In April 2019 Volodymyr Zelensky, the former comedian-turned politician, won the election for the office of President of Ukraine, ousting the incumbent, Petro Poroshenko. Zelensky ran on a platform of peace, winning over the Russian-speaking population on the promise that he would “crawl on his knees” if necessary to work out a peace plan with Russia. Instead, within months Zelensky was convening a war council where he promised to use the Ukrainian military to reclaim the parts of Donetsk and Lugansk that had freed themselves from Ukrainian rule.

This was Zelensky’s first mistake.

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Scott will discuss this article and answer audience questions on Ep. 264 of Ask the Inspector.

The path he chose led to Russia, in the days before the initiation of the SMO and after Ukraine began mobilizing its forces to attack the Donbas, recognizing the independence of both Donetsk and Lugansk and entering into a collective security agreement, actions which guaranteed that the Donbas would never again be part of Ukraine.

This was Zelensky’s Donbas moment.

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Russian troops in Ukraine

Zelensky’s second mistake came in April 2022, when he walked away from the negotiations that Russia had initiated immediately after the start of the SMO which culminated in a finalized signature-ready peace agreement which has become known as the Istanbul communique. This agreement would have recognized the independence of the Donbas republics, but returned all other Ukrainian territory that had been occupied by Russian troops during the SMO.

Zelensky, pressured by his US and NATO supporters, rejected this agreement, and instead took tens of billions of dollars in military aid from the US and NATO which he used to rebuild his depleted military force, which he then used to launch a counterattack against Russian forces which had already began their withdrawal from Ukraine as a good faith measure in keeping with the terms of the Istanbul communique.

Russia responded by organizing referenda in both the Donbas and the two oblasts, Kherson and Zaporozhia, that constituted the land bridge connecting Crimea with Russia proper. These referenda were on the question of these territories becoming part of the Russian Federation; all four voted yes, and after the appropriate legal action was taken by the Russian parliament, President Putin signed a decree which made all four oblasts part of the Russian Federation.

This was Zelensky’s Little Russia moment.

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A Kherson citizen votes in the September 2022 referendum on joining Russia

And now Zelensky finds himself at a new crossroads.

His Odessa Moment.

He has a chance to end the SMO on the most favorable terms possible, terms which reflect the harsh reality the Ukrainian President and the nation he leads faces due to Zelensky’s prior poor decision-making regarding Russia.

The Donbas is gone. So, too, is Little Russia. These losses are irreversible, politically and militarily.

Ukraine has a chance to end the conflict now. But to do so it must respect the reality of the moment.

Unfortunately, the same “friends” and “allies” which encouraged Ukraine to walk away from the Minsk Accords and the Istanbul communique are now urging Ukraine to do the same when it comes to Istanbul 2.

But the promise of European support is illusory—the armories have long since been stripped bare, and the potential for meaningful military intervention never existed, either militarily or politically.

Moreover, any European action would, by necessity, require backing from the United States. While this may have been a possibility during the presidency of Joe Biden, it is a non-starter under the new administration of Donald Trump—even as the Istanbul 2 meetings were underway, the US announced that it was going to be withdrawing its forces from Europe.

Russia is to be taken seriously. While the challenges that Russia will face in occupying the four new territories it has put its sights on if Ukraine balks yet again regarding a peace agreement are many and not to be minimized, this is a military question which is best answered by the political resolve of the Russian leadership and nation, which at this juncture is unassailable.

Last year Vladimir Putin won a mandate to governing as a wartime President.

As the recently concluded May 9 celebration clearly demonstrated, the determination of the Russian people to defeat Ukraine is rock solid.

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Vladimir Putin addresses the crowd on Red Square, May 9, 2025

As the lead Russian negotiator in Istanbul made clear to his Ukrainian counterparts, Russia is prepared to fight for however long it takes, even alluding to the 21 years it took Peter the Great to defeat Sweden.

Ukraine will be lucky to survive the summer.

Zelensky faces one of the greatest tests of leadership he will ever face.

Nationalist forces in his government are willing to commit national suicide in pursuit of the failed Banderist cause.

Ukraine’s erstwhile allies, whose objectives continue to center around Cold War fantasies of strategically defeating Russia, are pushing Zelensky to reject the Russian conditions for peace, all too willing to sacrifice Ukraine as a proxy in pursuit of their unattainable goal.

If Zelensky truly cared about his nation and his people, he would swallow his pride and make the only decision capable of saving them—surrender.

But Zelensky is not a leader who cares about his nation or its people—he has already sacrificed Ukraine’s national integrity and more than a million of its citizens in pursuit of his EU and NATO driven fantasies of relevance and fortune.

This is Zelensky’s Odessa Moment.

And he will fail.

Again.

https://natyliesbaldwin.com/2025/05/rus ... n-ukraine/

******

On the situation in the area of ​​Chasov Yar. May 2025
May 17, 16:48

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On the situation in the area of ​​Chasov Yar. May 2025

As a supplement to the post of our dear comrade MultXama ( https://t.me/multi_XAM/1531 ) regarding the events taking place on the Konstantinovka-Chasov Yar front:

While the heat of battle in the remaining quarters of Chasov Yar under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces does not subside, and the enemy is attempting counterattacks (two days ago there was another attack by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on this section, the enemy got it in the neck and retreated), units of the Russian Armed Forces are beginning to terrorize the enemy in the Konstantinovka area ( https://t.me/genshtab24/87100 ) - a major logistics hub of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, located southwest of Chasov Yar.

The occupation of the commanding heights in Chasov Yar and its environs by the Russian Army allows control over the roads of Konstantinovka, which are used to deliver personnel, ammunition and medicine to the Ukrainian Armed Forces units located on two sections of the front - in Toretsk and in the remaining quarters of Chasov Yar. Fiber optic drones, which proved themselves excellent during the counter-terrorist operation in the Kursk region, are being used en masse by the Russian Armed Forces to destroy military equipment dispersed in Konstantinovka. Today, the enemy, perfectly understanding the situation, is in a hurry to stop this phenomenon and is urgently starting to prepare the city for defense, simultaneously installing the so-called "anti-drone networks" on the main roads in order to prevent a repeat of the "Kursk scenario" - let us recall that thanks to the coordinated and competent actions of the UAV crews of the "North" Group of Forces, it was possible to destroy 70 percent of the logistics of the enemy's "Kursk" group, which, together with Operation Potok, contributed to the rapid breakthrough of the Russian Armed Forces and the subsequent destruction of the enemy in the tactical direction.

As for the main logistics route of the Ukrainian Armed Forces garrison in Chasov Yar, passing through Konstantinovka, this is, first of all, the road through the settlement. Novodmitrovka (🔼48.546136, 37.731751) and Stenki (🔼48.578126, 37.740420). From the above-mentioned settlements, there is a branching through the settlements of Podolskoye (🔼48.572345, 37.770074), Chervone (🔼48.564056, 37.782391) and Nikolaevka (🔼48.576275, 37.795609), and the last settlement in the current reality acts as "zero" for units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to send fighters to the remaining quarters of Chasy Yar. The enemy's foot logistics routes pass through the forest regiments to the west of Chasy Yar and go towards the settlement. Verolyubovka (🔼48.610223, 37.719906), from where you can also drive through the fields towards Kramatorsk.

In fact, the enemy in Chasov Yar now has a part of Dneprovskaya Street, 0.18 km² on the western outskirts of Chasov Yar (the private sector of the city, the battles for which are going on with varying success and actually represent the principle of "drive the enemy into the basement") and, if you count the Shevchenko microdistrict, located to the south of the urban development and representing a private sector and several small forest areas), then in total the enemy has about 10 km², but the main heights are under the control of the Russian Armed Forces and the fate of the garrison and reinforcements of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has already been predetermined.

Separately, it is worth noting the "air" situation in the area - the enemy has brought in a huge number of hexacopter-type UAVs "Baba Yaga" and is trying with all its might to stop the advance of the Russian Armed Forces. The quality of the infantry of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has declined, but the "unmanned" units continue to saturate the area with their drones, so the overall situation "in the air" remains difficult, but controllable.

http://t.me/avcgroup - zinc

P.S., Multiham is currently publishing an excellent analysis of the Donetsk direction. As soon as all the posts are published, I will collect them in bulk into one publication for LJ.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9844371.html

Trump and Putin talks to take place on May 19
May 18, 11:40

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Trump and Putin to hold talks on May 19

Tomorrow, Trump and Putin are scheduled to hold talks to discuss direct talks between Russia and Ukraine, as well as the possibility of a ceasefire. A phone call will be held at Trump's initiative. Trump expects that direct talks (first by phone, then in person) will help end the war on "acceptable terms."
The terms of the ceasefire have been announced - withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the territory of 4 regions of the Russian Federation. And then 30 days of truce. Ukraine, of course, does not want it.
Judging by the comments of Putin and the Foreign Ministry, the Russian Federation has not deviated one iota from the demands voiced last summer. The current stage of negotiations only confirms this, as well as the voiced threat to make these conditions even worse by the next round of negotiations.

In reality, the US can certainly go for it if they see specific benefits in it for themselves. If there is a deal, then the question is (whether Trump will be able to completely bend Ukraine and Europe to this demand). Of course, there are significant doubts about this due to the position of the globalists, for whom such a scenario is a defeat. But without the US, they are forced to act now from a position of weakness. The negotiations in Istanbul took place according to the scenario of the Russian Federation and the US. Europe was not allowed to the negotiating table. Threats of sanctions were ignored. It was not possible to disrupt the negotiations in one way or another. Zelensky's hysteria was ignored. Putin did not even consider it necessary to come. That is why the Western press is gnashing its teeth about "Putin's tactical victory" and quoting the Poles, "expecting hard days." No matter how Europe struts, it is dependent on the US. And this dependence on the US limits the military-political subjectivity of the EU. Moscow and Washington know about this and that is why they behave this way towards the European hysterics who draw their brown lines.

For now, apart from the 1000 for 1000 prisoner exchange, there is no actual progress, so while the sluggish negotiations will continue, Russia has already effectively begun the summer offensive campaign of 2025. Of course, if the goals of the SVO are achieved diplomatically, the war can be stopped in the coming months, but if the negotiations are disrupted, these goals will be achieved militarily in the next couple of years.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9845078.html

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"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Mon May 19, 2025 11:40 am

Diplomatic uncertainty: political maneuvering and media games
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 05/19/2025

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“For Russia, negotiations are just a cover; Putin wants war,” Ukraine's Green cardinal , Andriy Ermak, stated in an interview with the Italian media outlet La Repubblica . The laborious European lobbying effort to seek coercive measures against Russia continues, requiring not only proposed sanctions but also arguments to justify them. Ermak's statement is striking considering that Russia has made efforts to present its negotiation offer based on and as a continuation of Istanbul, a process in which it was clear that Ukraine did not want to accept the terms Moscow was proposing and which continued for months until it managed to receive from its partners and allies the weapons it needed to continue on the military path. Weeks earlier, during a visit to Kiev that has been manipulated by all parties, Boris Johnson had uttered, according to Ukrainska Pravda , the phrase that remains in the annals of this war: “We're just going to fight.”

Although both Russia and pro-Russian sectors, as well as those simply critical of the proxy war, have sought to view this statement as a form of Western blockade of a possible agreement or an order to continue fighting, the words of the then British Prime Minister can also be understood as a guarantee that Kiev would have the weapons, funding, and political and diplomatic protection necessary to do what the Ukrainian government wanted: to continue fighting and achieve at the front what it could not achieve through diplomatic means: an uncompromising peace. In the art of delaying negotiations when the military option is the preferred one, Russia is not only not alone, but also has before it the shining example of Ukraine.

Kiev opted for war, and the battles of 2022 also managed to convince its allies that military victory was possible. Faced with heightened skepticism from the military establishment—parts of the Pentagon leaked to the press that capturing Crimea was unfeasible for Ukraine—the political establishment prevailed and raised expectations of a Ukrainian victory to infinity by 2023, a year in which, according to Kirilo Budanov, Ukrainian troops would enter the Black Sea peninsula. Led by the idealist Antony Blinken, the warmonger Johnson, who even claimed that missiles would replace aircraft in air cover, or the naive Macron, who revealed the strategy of breaking through the front to jeopardize control of Crimea and force Russia to sign the Ukrainian diktat, the Western political establishment suffered the disappointment of the 2023 ground counteroffensive, but never reconsidered its chosen option. After the Istanbul rupture, a logical continuation of Minsk's decision not to accept any political concessions to its opponent—which in that case was not Russia but Donetsk and Lugansk—Ukraine could not afford to negotiate with Russia under conditions of weakness, so continuing the war was the only option.

Since then, only the Ukrainian adventure in Kursk, an invasion that surprised Russian troops and yielded results as rapid as they were media-rich in just a few days, has boosted the morale of the main troops on which Kiev depends: its foreign allies. When the operation began, fears of the possible arrival of Donald Trump had already emerged, charged with his revenge against Zelensky for his refusal to hand over compromising material on Joe Biden and his son, his lack of interest in Ukraine, and his alleged favoritism for Russia—an argument worked on since his first term in office, during which Vladimir Putin was given part of the credit for the election victory. To deal with Donald Trump and win him over to the Ukrainian cause, Volodymyr Zelensky put Ukraine's mineral wealth on the table, from whose future extraction the United States has guaranteed a significant share of the revenue. European partners began to speak in the language of peace through strength , possibly hoping that the Trumpist vision would be more about strength than peace. The fact that European countries, especially the European Union, led by Kaja Kallas, took longer than Ukraine to shift to a seemingly pacifist rhetoric shows that fighting war until Russia was sufficiently exhausted was always the priority option for Ukraine's continental allies, who are now the main proponents of the demand for an unconditional ceasefire.

Unconditional support has become the main argument of European countries, which, although aware that they will not be able to impose on Russia the resolution to the war they desired, cling to the ability to dictate at least the form in which it will occur. As stated by the Russian delegation and confirmed by the Ukrainian one, one of the understandings reached at the Istanbul meeting is that Moscow and Kyiv will prepare a document specifying the conditions necessary for a ceasefire. After his conversation on Saturday with Sergey Lavrov, Marco Rubio confirmed having discussed with his Russian counterpart "several things. He explained to me that he would prepare a document containing his demands for a ceasefire, which would lead to broader negotiations." The dialogue between the United States and Russia is significant, not only for the attempt to promote diplomatic channels, but also for the contrast it represents with respect to three years ago—or in the years of the Minsk agreements—when there was not the slightest Western attempt to promote peace through the agreement. However, as the European press, Ukraine, its continental allies, and some of its political class are demanding, the United States is threatening Russia with the approval of a package of secondary sanctions that would penalize countries that trade with Moscow, a warning that Rubio also conveyed to Lavrov, according to several media outlets.

“A sign of goodwill would be a ceasefire, in which no one fires and external observers supervise for a month,” Andriy Ermak told La Repubblica . He presents a seemingly logical proposal, but one that contains several underlying points that the press, which in its editorials declares that “Russia's oil and banking sector must be subject to extremely severe secondary sanctions, affecting countries that allow the Russian economy to evade punishment,” prefers to avoid. Ukraine and its European allies are seeking to impose a ceasefire on Russia without any guarantee that further negotiations will take place. Like Zelensky less than a day before the ceasefire was due to begin according to the European ultimatum schedule, Ermak is once again using the idea of ​​an external force to supervise the ceasefire, an idea that is not only naive but unworkable. The fact that the Ukrainian authorities are raising verification as a requirement for future political negotiations indicates that the offer is exactly what the European and Ukrainian media and authorities are now claiming Russia's offer of dialogue in Turkey was: a time-buying tactic with no intention of moving towards a process leading to peace.

As one of the prominent figures of the OSCE Monitoring Mission in 2014 recalled a few days ago, the composition and deployment of that team, whose work was partial, limited to a much simpler front line than the current one and always under scrutiny, took weeks. The current war situation is even more complicated than at that time, when the front was limited to Donbass, which had relatively easy access from both Ukraine and Russia. Furthermore, there was an agreement on how the mission should be carried out and who would carry it out, something that no longer exists today and that no one has bothered to consider, because no one has taken the proposal for independent verification seriously. Last week's remarks by Keith Kellogg, who spoke of a "third force" while referring to the future deployment of troops from the coalition of the willing —Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—may even suggest that even a theoretically impartial actor, such as the OSCE, of which both Russia and Ukraine were members, is not being sought in the war in Donbas.

Marco Rubio's summary of his phone call with Lavrov reinforces another idea: the fact that Russia is not satisfied with a temporary ceasefire—which by nature favors the weaker party, which has time to recover and strengthen—but rather aspires to a truce that, when it comes, necessarily entails negotiations with Ukraine. For Kiev and its allies, on the contrary, the ceasefire is the lesser evil that must be accepted to ensure continued US support in the short and long term, since the objective is an agreement to freeze the war that does not result in a treaty that perpetuates conditions that Ukraine hopes to change in the future, especially the NATO issue, but also the territorial aspect. The Korean scenario, a heavily armed border and the danger of a resumption of hostilities, is what Russia is trying to avoid, a resolution that requires political negotiations that Ukraine, its European allies, and part of the US establishment reject precisely because of what it entails.

This contradiction is the first that must be resolved if a negotiation process is truly desired, a task that requires diplomacy and dialogue beyond the sanctions demanded by Ukraine and its political and media allies. However, these nuances are beyond the perception of Donald Trump, on whose opinion military supplies to Ukraine and the increase in sanctions against Russia depend. "I will speak by phone with President Putin of Russia on Monday at 10:00 a.m. The topics of the call will be stopping the 'massacre' that is killing, on average, more than 5,000 Russian and Ukrainian soldiers a week, and trade," Donald Trump announced in a message written entirely in capital letters. In his vein of exaggerating his successes—Trump has taken credit for saving millions of people in India and Pakistan by avoiding a nuclear war that was by no means about to happen—and raising expectations, the US president added that he will later hold talks with Zelensky and his NATO allies. “Hopefully, it will be a productive day, there will be a ceasefire, and this very violent war, a war that should never have happened, will end.” Faced with those who, with experience in similar processes and aware of the complexity of this war, which Trump simplifies to the point of parody, expect a long and difficult process leading to an agreement in which both sides give in but obtain some kind of incentive, the US president remains confident in his ability to resolve the war quickly, with just a phone call.

https://slavyangrad.es/2025/05/19/incer ... ediaticos/

Google Translator

******

From Cassad's Telegram account:

Colonelcassad
The Kremlin explained the negotiations between Putin and Trump, which will take place today by telephone at 17-00 Moscow time.

1. The negotiations will take place taking into account the results of the negotiations in Istanbul on May 15-16.
2. Naturally, they will discuss the issue of ending the war in Ukraine.
3. Russia has already presented its demands, this is necessary for a ceasefire (that is, to withdraw the Ukrainian Armed Forces from 4 regions).
4. In addition to the war, issues of trade relations between the United States and the Russian Federation will be discussed.
5. Following the negotiations, a press release will be announced.

The dates of the direct meeting in person between Trump and Putin have not yet been determined
. In the West, bad things are expected for Ukraine from the negotiations between Trump and Putin.
Of course, if Putin and Trump do not come to an agreement, the war will continue as usual. The summer campaign of 2025 has already begun.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

******

Western gamers at war: from reddit to Pokrovsk

Ukrainian officers beating and killing their subordinates, fortification problems, the war for logistics, suicidal counter-offensive at Toretsk. Analysis of the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions
Events in Ukraine
May 16, 2025

Today my readers have the chance to spend their Saturday reading about western gamers at the frontlines, ‘demonic’ Ukrainian commanders beating and killing their subordinates (in the same unit the foreign gamers are being sent!), badly built fortifications, the war for logistics, and close analysis of the battles for Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk, as well as a postmortum of a suicidal Ukrainian counter-offensive at the city of Toretsk. Much of this 5,000 word article is free, but paid subscribers will receive not only my eternal gratitude, but also access to otherwise locked content.

As I wrote in my last post on the war, Russian advances have sped up of late due to the reemergence of greenery, allowing infantry groups to better avoid drones.

To combat this, video game veterans have been brought into the fray. This was covered by a NYpost article on May 12 titled “Ukraine relies on secret weapon in its drone attacks on Russia: gamers”.

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The Independent put out a longer article on May 12 on the topic:

These gamers are now fighting for real in Ukraine’s war against Russia

Volunteers from the UK and the US tend to have a lot of Xbox experience, course co-ordinator Oleg Grabovyy tells Harry Stourton: ‘The best drone pilot I ever met was a relentless gamer


In it, we learn that “Many found their way here via a single Reddit post.” You don’t say.

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Not only are they importing gamers, but also gamer ethics. The western press gave coverage to the new Ukrainian system of ‘ePoints’, where drone teams win ‘points’ for each documented kill.

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The program — called Army of Drones bonus — rewards soldiers with points if they upload videos proving their drones have hit Russian targets. It will soon be integrated with a new online marketplace called Brave 1 Market, which will allow troops to convert those points into new equipment for their units.

“Brave 1 Market will be like Amazon for the military, [it] will allow military units to directly purchase technologies they need on the war front,” said Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister and minister for digital transformation, speaking at a weekend military tech conference in Kyiv.

The program assigns points for each type of kill: 20 points for damaging and 40 for destroying a tank; up to 50 points for destroying a mobile rocket system, depending on the caliber; and six points for killing an enemy soldier.

Soldiers have to download the video footage taken by their drones confirming the kill to the military's Delta communication and situational awareness system.

Units will soon be able to use the special digital points they’ve been getting since last year by trading them in for new weapons. A Vampire drone, for example, costs 43 points. The drone, nicknamed Baba Yaga, or witch, is a large multi-rotor drone able to carry a 15-kilogram warhead. The Ukrainian government will pay for the drones that are ordered and will deliver them to the front-line unit within a week.


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A Ukrainian Vampire drone with explosive charge attached

However, Ukrainian military commander Stanislav Buniatov had some criticisms of the new system on May 15:

The very idea of the E-point system is sound and useful. However, there is a critical imbalance: enemy infantry, which poses the most immediate threat on the battlefield, is assigned significantly fewer points than vehicles. This creates a problem.

Battlefield scenario:
During an assault—two BMPs and one MT-LB, fully loaded with infantry.
Attack drones strike the first BMP. The other two vehicles stop, the infantry dismounts, and the vehicles retreat.
FPV drones attempt to finish off the retreating vehicles, while the dismounted infantry pushes forward to our positions and launches an assault.

Conclusion:
The undervaluation of enemy infantry in the E-points system leads to flawed strike prioritization, loss of positions, and personnel casualties.


Demonic and brutal officers
But it isn’t only Russian “faggots” creeping up through tree lines that Ukrainian troops have to worry about. The demons higher up are also a formidable enemy. Here’s what Ukrainian military telegrammer “Officer” had to say on it on May 4:

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Ukrainian military generals.

The Role of demons in the Army

In the Armed Forces, not all problems arise solely from the so-called "Soviet mentality," though that’s not entirely false either.
Most of the crap happens because of people who have no moral principles or values in life. These are individuals who likely carry childhood psychological traumas, complexes, or were bullied and ostracized by society—resulting in traits like cowardice, cruelty, selfishness, and pettiness. And such people are extremely convenient for the system. That’s right—the system doesn’t always shape them; they’re already molded this way by society and their parents. The system simply pushes them forward, and unfortunately, they end up in leadership positions. Right now, the fate of many depends on these kinds of people. Believe me, I know what I’m talking about—I’ve seen it since my cadet years, when those with a grudge against everything and everyone were given power… and it was a total shitshow.

Such commanders act solely in their own interests or those of the system they either worship or fear. Their goal isn’t the unit’s effectiveness—they only care about praise from their superiors and saving their own asses. At the brigade level, these commanders build their own little kingdoms (literally like kings—good luck getting an audience with them). They surround themselves with snitches who report every breath taken in the unit, and if anyone "deviates" from the system, the regime punishes them with every available method. There’s no brotherhood, integrity, or honesty here—just pettiness, selfishness, betrayal, and so on.

Just like my last commander, who was too chickenshit to talk to me one-on-one, man to man, to sort out any issues and move forward (because I genuinely had big plans and ambitions in that unit). Instead, the big boss decided to use flimsy, far-fetched formalities to kick me out of the unit—for no damn reason.

If he or any of his rats manage to read this far (which I highly doubt), I just want to say: all the troubles and problems in the unit (which we’ll discuss later) are because of you. And I feel sorry for your subordinates—because there are actually decent people there. I hope they get a proper commander. And purely out of moral conviction, I won’t publish your names or the unit, nor air this mess publicly. Besides, cases like this are a dime a dozen these days—as they say, I’m neither the first nor the last, and no different from other victims of such petty tyrants.

Otherwise, there’s no other way to describe these commanders except as demons.

In my new unit, I really notice the contrast—when you work with decent people, all that unnecessary shit and constant problems just disappear. So let me emphasize: human nature has a hell of an impact on the atmosphere, and consequently, the work and effectiveness of a unit.

P.S. I always tell my subordinates: No matter what, be human first. Have principles in life, and don’t sell your ass or your honor for praise or threats.


No doubt it is with such devils in mind that Buniatov lashed out in the following May 1 post:

Who do we need to reach out to so they start covering the road from Druzhkivka to Kramatorsk with nets?An enemy FPV drone has already hit our armored vehicle in Kostyantynivka, right at the exit toward Druzhkivka. Not long ago, I was talking about the Chasiv Yar–Kostyantynivka route — and still, absolutely fucking nothing has been done between Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka.Why is no one listening? Why the fuck not?!

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Russia Builds 'Anti-Drone Corridors' in Kursk - Ukraine Says They Don't Work
Russia has been actively building drone net tunnels to protect key supply lines. While Ukraine has also tried to follow in this example, as I wrote here they haven’t been as successful

On May 15, Officer shared a video seemingly showing an example of brutal officerial despotism in the Ukrainian army. Though the Ukrainian government soon declared the video to be fake, Officer stated he wasn’t convinced:

Another fucked-up situation in the 25th Separate Assault Brigade

Two absolute pieces of shit—there’s no other way to describe them—are beating up some poor guy to force him to sign some report (likely for a transfer to another position or unit).

I hope higher-ups take notice of this, because chances are, it’s happening with the approval of the very same unit commanders.

P.S. Unconfirmed reports suggest the soldier who was abused has since been killed.


(Video at link.)

Interestingly, note that it is precisely this Pokrovsk unit to which the idealistic foreign gamers have been deployed to, as per the previously cited Independent article. No doubt they will enjoy their time defending democracy.

There are also issues with military salaries.

Buniatov and Officer have been raging of late about the fact that young people in the army aren’t getting their promised 1 million hryvnia. The case they bring up involves a man who was refused the payment because he became an officer after joining the army as a 21 year old in February 2022.

In turn, the Presidential Administration’s representative on military affairs, Dmytro Palysa, confirmed this to be the case on May 13, which was met with ridicule by Ukrainian military telegrams:

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Fortification woes
While higher-ups are busy beating their subordinates and appropriating financial flows, fortification lines aren’t receiving the same attention.

Officer’s May 2 worries about ineffectual defensive positions is the latest case of an old motif in Ukrainian military telegrams. Indifferent command and corrupt construction contractors are likely cooperating in this drama:

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Do you think there is much benefit from defensive positions built this way?

The problem is that such defensive positions were constructed in 2023 in Zaporizhzhia region, in 2024 in Sumy region, and in 2025 in Dnipropetrovsk region, and the benefit from them is absolutely zero.

Not only are these positions designed without taking into account the specifics of combat in this war as it stands now, but they are also built right in the middle of a field…

They continue to build defensive lines in the same way, and no one wants to take such an important factor as CAMOUFLAGE into consideration, which is critical when underground burrows dominate the battlefield, yet we are building a fucking fortress that even the lazy can hit.

It’s long past time to dig underground communications, though the command posts for the guys with big stars are being dug properly.

P.S. The photo was taken from the enemy's video.


Meanwhile, the demons at the very top find it difficult to communicate with the masses. Buniatov ridiculed state war propaganda on May 4. Many ‘draft dodgers’ justify their decision on the basis of the fact that their government has never helped them, yet it expects them to die for its preservation. Even the ultra-patriotic Buniatov has to agree with the draft-dodger logic, but suggests using them as forced labour to build trenches instead:

I laugh at the narratives pushed by some of our propagandists about “Repaying your debt to the state” — while their own kids are abroad or “studying” at university.

Volunteers, did you go to war because you felt indebted to the state for financial benefits, or because you believed in the idea of defending your homeland?

Personally, I believe those who fight should be either ideologically motivated or financially incentivized.
You can’t rely on “debtors” for long — in a short time, they turn into deserters or “lightly wounded” cases trying to get out.

Their real debt is to dig us zigzag trenches and bunkers in the tree lines.


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🚩 Defensive Fortifications on the Front Line

🚜 Fortified Defense Structures (FDS) have always been a hot topic for discussion and debate, and the conversation still hasn’t died down. As often happens, the problem became so well-known that it turned into a routine—one that, over time, triggers less and less emotion. But the issue is not even the presence or absence of fortifications anymore. After public outcry, more attention began to be paid to the issue, and defenses are now being constructed in many areas, often continuously. The real problem is the quality of these fortifications, which must keep pace with the times and be planned with foresight—because war does not stand still.

✈️ Most losses on the front lines now come from air-dropped munitions and FPV drones. Recently, the Russians have started to completely obliterate positions, making it impossible to hold them. An even bigger issue has become the targeting of logistics, which makes it impossible to even reach those positions. This has been well described by our friends from Rozvidka Noem (source):


(Paywall with free option.)

https://eventsinukraine.substack.com/p/ ... rom-reddit

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Preliminary talks in Istanbul are a start… the real show to come is Trump and Putin

May 16, 2025

If the talks have any chance of succeeding, the American side must take responsibility for the war it started and fueled.

The talks in Istanbul this week provide a prospect for peace. It bears emphasizing that the three-year proxy war could have been avoided if diplomacy had been permitted by Washington in early 2022 instead of being sabotaged.

Three years on, we have a new president in the White House, and there appears to be a more enlightened policy. Or maybe it’s an implicit admission that the U.S. proxy war agenda is a failure and can’t go on.

In any case, Trump and his envoys are unequivocally saying that they want to stop the bloodshed in Ukraine. That’s a big change from his predecessor, Joe Biden, who vowed to back Ukraine for as long as it takes in a fantastical, reckless pursuit to strategically defeat Russia.

It was the Biden administration, along with the British government, that intervened to scupper nascent peace talks in March 2022 between Russia and Ukraine for a peace deal. Washington and London coaxed the Kiev regime to fight on with promises of more weapons.

The result: three more years of intense conflict, which have caused millions of casualties, mainly on the Ukrainian side. The proxy war has come perilously close to provoking an all-out world war between nuclear powers.

Trump appears to want peace. If he is genuine in that intention, then the American president will have to address the root causes of the conflict. Russia has consistently explained the deeper causes of NATO aggression and the militarization of Ukraine as a hostile bridgehead on its borders since the CIA-orchestrated coup in Kiev in 2014.

The American president has shown petulance at times, urging Ukraine and Russia to get down to a peace deal. He has even threatened Russia with more (futile) economic sanctions. What the Trump administration needs to understand is that resolving deep causes of conflict requires commensurate negotiations and a realistic commitment to lasting geopolitical security arrangements.

The talks in Istanbul this week to explore a peaceful resolution were initiated by Russian President Vladimir Putin in an announcement last week.

Russia’s delegation was led by Putin’s senior aide, Vladimir Medinsky. That speaks of consistency and commitment. Medinsky led the peace talks three years ago in Istanbul, which were then sabotaged in April 2022 by the American and British intervention.

This week, the Russian side held preliminary bilateral talks with the Americans led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Subsequently, the Russian and Ukrainian delegates engaged in a meeting convened by Turkish diplomats. It was the first direct encounter between Russian and Ukrainian officials since the March 2022 negotiations.

It is not clear if follow-up meetings will take place. But at least one might say that talks took place.

The key to any prospect of ending the conflict depends on Washington demonstrating the requisite commitment. Trump said this week again that he would like to hold a summit with Putin as “soon as possible.” The Kremlin has also said that a formal presidential meeting is desirable.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov cautioned that there must first be adequate preparation for meaningful discussions. That implies that any top-level meeting must be cognizant of Russia’s demands for a resolution, one that deals with the historic, systematic causes of the proxy war.

Western politicians and media denying Russia’s perspective are delusional or duplicitous. To claim that the conflict is all about “unprovoked Russian aggression” against “democratic Ukraine” and “Russian expansionism” towards Europe is a travesty. It’s a bogus narrative that precludes peaceful resolution. Trump seems to be aware of that. But he needs to go beyond a superficial “peace broker” charade.

If Trump wants a gimmicky big summit with Putin for PR ratings, as his tour of the Middle East this week illustrates his egotistical wont, he can forget it.

The meetings this week in Turkey can be seen as preliminary technical discussions.

However, President Trump needs to take the lead. Appropriately, a peaceful resolution will only happen at the senior level of the U.S. and Russian governments. That’s because the United States is the primary protagonist in the proxy war against Russia.

It is clear from the antics and theatrics of the Kiev regime this week that there is no prospect of a meaningful, lasting peace if negotiations are confined to that level. Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky does not even have constitutional legitimacy after cancelling elections last year. His erratic behavior of grandstanding and mudslinging at the Russian diplomatic efforts proves that he is not capable of substantive negotiations.

The European leaders are also an impediment to achieving an authentic peace settlement. Even before delegations met this week in Istanbul, various non-entity European politicians were disparaging Russia’s diplomatic initiative. Macron, Starmer, Merz, Von der Leyen and Kallas were desperately trying to insult the Russian president, indulging Zelensky’s PR stunt demanding a face-to-face meeting with Putin in Istanbul.

The European Union also timed an announcement this week to double its supply of heavy-calibre munitions to Ukraine. Another provocation.

France’s Macron sought to impose a precondition for the talks by demanding a 30-day ceasefire. That was a flagrant attempt to sabotage the negotiations before they even started.

These people are not honest about ending the worst war in Europe since the end of World War Two. Disgracefully, they want the bloodshed to continue for their political survival and gratifying their obsessive Russophobic fantasies.

If Trump wants to end NATO’s proxy war against Russia, he will have to sideline the European naysayers and the Kiev puppet regime. Their involvement is counterproductive. One suspects that Trump already knows that.

An American and Russian agreement at the highest level is the only way to bring the war to an end. It is no use for the American side pretending that they are mere peace brokers. They are the main protagonist, not the European lapdogs nor the Kiev regime.

Preliminary talks are all very well. But they are just that. Preliminary. If the talks have any chance of succeeding, the American side must take responsibility for the war it started and fueled.

https://strategic-culture.su/news/2025/ ... and-putin/

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The Ball’s In Trump’s Court After The Latest Istanbul Talks
Andrew Korybko
May 17, 2025

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The mixed signals that he sent on Friday suggest that he hasn’t made up his mind about what to do.

The first bilateral Russian-Ukrainian talks in over three years were held in Istanbul on Friday after Zelensky agreed, likely under pressure from Trump, to Putin’s proposal from the week prior. They didn’t result in the unconditional 30-day ceasefire that Ukraine demanded nor did Ukraine agree to withdraw from the entirety of the disputed regions like Russia demanded, but they did agree to a prisoner swap and to hold another round of talks sometime in the future. They therefore weren’t for nothing.

Most importantly, Russia and Ukraine were able to show Trump that they’re interested in peace after he signaled his increasing impatience with the US’ hitherto unsuccessful mediation between them, which could result in him either “escalating to de-escalate” or simply walking away from the conflict. Prior to making his fateful choice about the future of American involvement, Trump will likely hold talks with Putin, at the very least over the phone but ideally in person sometime in the coming weeks.

After all, the ball’s now in his court after the Russian and Ukrainian positions have proven to be irreconcilable, so Russia will either inevitably obtain its maximum goals by continuing to rely on military means to that end or the US will double down on support for Ukraine in order to prevent that outcome. The only realistic compromise would be if the US successfully coerces Ukraine into withdrawing from some or all of the disputed regions in exchange for Russia agreeing to an unconditional 30-day ceasefire.

The US hasn’t yet attempted that even though it could have tried doing so anytime over the past three months since Trump returned to the White House, however, thus leading to the aforesaid scenario branch. It therefore remains unclear exactly what Trump will do. On the one hand, he just threatened Russia with “crushing” sanctions, but he also just complained about the billions that the US “pissed away” in support of Ukraine. It accordingly looks like he himself hasn’t yet decided how to proceed.

“Escalating to de-escalate” would entail enormous financial and strategic costs, the latter with regard to potentially offsetting his planned “Pivot (back) to Asia” for more muscularly containing China and even risking World War III in the worst-case scenario. At the same time, walking away would lead to him owning what could then soon become one of the West’s worst geopolitical defeats. The middle ground between these extremes could be strictly enforced secondary sanctions against Russia’s energy clients.

To elaborate, the aim would be to pressure China and India into drastically curtailing their imports, the first as a “goodwill gesture” after Trump’s newly announced “total reset” in their ties and the second as a means to signal its worth to the US in the hopes that Trump reconsiders his incipient pivot to Pakistan. Nevertheless, one or both might still refuse to comply or secretly continue to purchase large amounts of Russian energy, thus forcing the US to either turn a blind eye or worsen ties by sanctioning them.

A blend of these scenarios could see Trump threatening Zelensky with a clean break from this conflict if he doesn’t withdraw from Donbass while threatening Putin with strictly enforced secondary sanctions if he doesn’t accept a (unconditional?) 30-day ceasefire in the event that this happens. Calls could then be made to Xi and Modi to inform them of his plans in the hope that they’ll convince Putin to agree. Such a proposal would be the most pragmatic one from the US’ perspective and could lead to a breakthrough.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/the-ball ... -after-the

Little Andy damn near pleads for Trump to make a deal when he's holding 2 deuces so he can pivot on the hated 'Chi-coms'. Trump is paralyzed by his own ego.

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PATRICK LAWRENCE: Diplomatic Chess, Ukraine the Pawn
May 16, 2025

In Istanbul, a door was pried open after a soap opera’s worth of chicanery in London, Paris, Berlin and Kiev. Now the question is what Trump can do to address Russia’s concerns.

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From left, Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky, French President Emmanuel Macron, U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz speak on the phone with U.S. President Donald Trump during the European Political Community summit in Tirana, Albania, on Friday. (Simon Dawson / No 10 Downing Street / Flickr / CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

By Patrick Lawrence
Special to Consortium News

As was universally expected, little came out of Istanbul this week, where Ukrainian and Russian delegations met with the ostensible purpose of exploring a negotiated settlement of the proxy war the U.S. provoked three years ago.

It is an odd state of affairs when even the people doing the talking did not anticipate anything useful to emerge from their talking.

After less than two hours of negotiation, the two sides agreed only to future talks on subsidiary questions: a prisoner exchange and a 30–day ceasefire — a ceasefire Kiev and its Western backers refused for years but are now desperate to implement.

There was no discussion of an accord to end the war and no final agreements other than one to continue negotiations. And the encounter was not without its acrimonious moments.

Talks to negotiate more talks are not much but not nothing. The two sides have met for the first time since March 2022, when, a month into the war, they previously convened in Istanbul and negotiated a draft document that would have ended the fighting — this until Boris Johnson, then the British prime minister, arrived to scuttle the accord so as to keep the war going.

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Johnson and Zelensky in Kiev, April 9, 2022. (Ukraine government)

There is no feigning surprise or disappointment. It was evident during a week of incessant posturing that the Kiev regime and the European powers that have lately assumed the task of manipulating it, have no desire to begin substantive negotiations with the Russian Federation.

No, for the British, the French, the Germans, and their client in Kiev, the imperative in the run-up to the Istanbul encounter on Friday was to appear earnestly dedicated to talks across a mahogany table while preventing even nascent progress toward a diplomatic settlement.

In this effort the Europeans have failed, at least for now.

Trump Takes Over

President Donald Trump effectively overruled them when, earlier this week, he responded, positively and vigorously, to President Vladimir Putin’s unexpected offer to open talks. Trump insisted, in all caps as is his wont, that Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, should forget the ceasefire and open negotiations “IMMEDIATELY!”

This appears to have pushed to the margins the British, French, and Germans, who have taken over as Zelensky’s hands-on minders since Trump assumed office in January. But I see little chance Friday’s talks will mark the end of their effort to keep the war going and a settlement at bay — even as they pretend to stand for precisely the opposite.

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Putin with the Russian negotiation team this week in Moscow ahead of the delegation’s departure for Isantabul. (Kremlin)

U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Friedrich Merz set things in motion last weekend when they flew to Kiev for a hastily arranged summit with Zelensky. On their arrival, the British, French and German leaders grandly issued an ultimatum: Moscow must accept a 30–day ceasefire by Monday, May 12, or the Europeans would impose a punishing set of new sanctions on the Russians.

So did the curtain rise on a lot of poor theater. As John Whitbeck, the international attorney resident in Paris, remarked on his privately circulated blog, this appeared to be an offer Moscow was bound to refuse in order to convey the impression the Europeans were doing their best for peace — but the Russians remained committed to war.

The fun began then, too. Putin, in a late-night nearly immediate response from the Kremlin, gave the Starmer–Macron–Merz ultimatum all the attention it merited — none — and wrong-footed the Europeans and Kiev by proposing Kiev and Moscow open negotiations in Istanbul on Thursday.

At this point — the chronology has been well-reported — Zelensky began several days of carrying on. The Russian proposal was mere theater: This was his opener. (See what I mean by fun?) O.K., I agree to talks in Istanbul, but I insist on a summit with Putin himself. Putin ignored this, too — as Zelensky

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Vladimir Medinsky in January. (Kremlin.ru, Wikimedia Commons / CC BY 4.0)

and his sponsors knew he would. There must be a ceasefire first — another idea that Kiev and its sponsors dropped.

It was Trump’s intervention that brought the European follies to an end. After the U.S. president’s statements to the press and on social media, the Ukrainian TV–actor-turned-president finally agreed to send a team of Kiev officials, led by Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, to meet with a Russian delegation headed by Vladimir Medinsky, a prominent adviser to the Russian president.

Late Friday afternoon the Russian and Ukrainian delegations both announced that they had agreed to resume talks, but for now only on the ceasefire question. “We are ready to continue contacts,” Medinsky said at a post-session news conference.

There was a little more to this encounter than that. In a report Friday evening The Telegraph quoted Medinsky telling the Ukrainians across the U–shaped negotiation table, “We don’t want war, but we’re ready to fight for a year, two, three, however long it takes. We fought Sweden for 21 years. How long are you ready to fight?”

Medinsky’s reference was to what Russians call the Great Northern War, which Russia waged against the Swedish Empire during the reign of Peter the Great, from 1700 to 1721.

And that is it, a door pried open after a soap opera’s worth of chicanery in London, Paris, Berlin, and Kiev.

Remember the Minsk Protocols

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Putin, French President Francois Hollande, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko at the Normandy format talks in Minsk, Belarus, Feb. 12, 2015. (Kremlin)

My take on the week’s events takes me back to the Minsk Protocols, which Moscow negotiated a decade ago with Kiev, Paris and Berlin.

Signed in September 2014 and February 2015, these committed Ukraine to a new constitution whereby the Russian-speaking provinces in the nation’s east would be granted a considerable degree of autonomy. Kiev and Moscow signed, France and Germany serving as co-signatories backing the former.

Kiev ignored the Minsk accords from Day 1. And, as well-reported at the time, the French and Germans later acknowledged they co-signed only to allow Ukraine time enough to rearm so as to continue attacking the eastern provinces and prepare for the war that eventually broke out three years ago.

This pencil-sketched history is useful to understanding this week’s events and what preceded them. Putin got his fingers burned in Minsk, having personally negotiated the two protocols. I do not know when the Russian president decided the European powers could not be trusted, but he has certainly not trusted them since the Minsk debacle.

Last week’s events proved this a sound judgment. In an improvised game of diplomatic chess, Moscow got the Europeans in check this time, making dexterous use of Kiev as its pawn.

Post–Istanbul, it appears now that the best chance of a settlement of the Ukraine conflict resides in the prospect of a Trump–Putin summit. This, if it comes to pass, would define the Ukraine crisis — altogether properly — as a subset of Trump’s project to restore relations with Moscow.

And it would disarm, not to say humiliate the Europeans who have been leading the Continent to continue its support for the Kiev regime and the war.

A couple of caveats are in order here. One, as earlier suggested, it is not at all clear we have heard the last of the European triumvirate who took center stage for a few days this week. Starmer, Macron and Merz, the last just appointed Germany’s new chancellor, are heavily invested in the Ukraine project and the Russophobia that propels it.

Two, as Putin and other Russian officials have made plain numerous times, and very pointedly this past week, substantive negotiations of a settlement of the Ukraine crisis must begin with mutual recognition of “root causes,” to take the phrase the Kremlin now favors.

This is why Moscow nominated Istanbul as the venue for these new talks. In the draft Boris Johnson disrupted three years ago, these concerns were addressed.

“We view these talks as a continuation of the peace process in Istanbul, which was unfortunately interrupted by the Ukrainian side three years ago,” Medinsky said at a press conference as he set out of Istanbul Thursday. “The aim of direct negotiations with the Ukrainian side is ultimately to secure lasting peace by addressing the fundamental root causes of the conflict.”

The phrase is too ubiquitous in the Russian discourse to ignore. The question now is whether Donald Trump, in any summit he may have with Vladimir Putin, will be at all equipped to address Russia’s concerns.

If he does, he will fundamentally alter relations between the Western powers and Russia for the good — a diplomatic triumph. If he does not, he is unlikely to get anything more done than negotiators accomplished in Istanbul this week.

https://consortiumnews.com/2025/05/16/p ... -the-pawn/

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A Short yet Important Note
Karl Sanchez
May 17, 2025

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Sputnik today published the following very important words along with others:
Moscow considers the candidacy of Kiev's signatory as the main and fundamental thing when signing documents between the Russian and Ukrainian delegations during the negotiations, Peskov said.

"When signing the documents to be agreed upon by the delegations, the main and principal thing for us is who exactly will sign these documents from the Ukrainian side," Peskov said. [Italics Original]
This legal issue was noted by Putin in his chat with the sailors in Murmansk and emphasized by me on that and other occasions. As Marc Sleboda mentioned and I noted elsewhere, the no negotiations edict seems to have been ignored as there’s no record of it formally being annulled. IMO, it remains clear that Russia deems Zelensky illegitimate, which will likely cause there to be no direct talks between him and Putin, plus there must be some other acceptable to Russia legal entity to sign whatever gets produced via negotiations, which takes us back to my writings about the legal issues of making the peace.

https://karlof1.substack.com/p/a-short- ... rtant-note

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Mutiny in the 47th Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces
May 18, 16:59

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Consequences of the attacks on Tetkino in Kursk Oblast.
The commander of the 1st mechanized battalion of the 47th separate mechanized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine "Magura" resigned and threw a public tantrum about how bad everything was and that the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was to blame for everything, which stupidly killed a huge number of people for nothing. In the 4th year of the war, he woke up... The tasks turned out to be idiotic.

Then Butusov started the hysteria.

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Of course, there will be no adequate reaction there. Otherwise, we will have to admit that not only the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Syrsky are responsible for the PR offensive on Tetkino, but also the cocaine Fuhrer personally, who demanded that the attacks continue even after the offensive had obviously died out in blood. Of

course, they didn’t like the videos of our operators working in the Tetkino area.
As a result, the enemy was unable to capture even this unfortunate Tetkino, having lost several dozen armored vehicles (including several valuable engineering vehicles) and several hundred people killed and wounded during the entire attack (drone operators and the Russian Aerospace Forces with their FABs collected a rich bloody harvest in the plantings in the Tetkino area).

P.S. This morning, the enemy tried to change the record and again attacked the village of Novy Put, located right on the border. There he has already been hit in the head 3 or 4 times.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9845804.html

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"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Tue May 20, 2025 11:44 am

Diplomacy from a distance
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 05/20/2025

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Absolutely marked by Donald Trump's announcement of his conversation with Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky, the weekend, like yesterday, was driven by pressure from European countries and Ukraine on the United States seeking more leverage against Russia. With a script prepared long before the Istanbul meeting and completely ignoring Moscow's willingness to negotiate a ceasefire—an unacceptable scenario, given that European capitals demand unconditional acceptance of Ukraine's ever-changing and unworkable terms—the European political establishment has focused on communicating with Donald Trump and his team to gain their trust. On Sunday, a smiling and placid Volodymyr Zelensky, whose image contrasted sharply with the sullen and aggressive president who suffered the humiliation in the Oval Office, met with JD Vance, the second protagonist in that brawl, to showcase the unity between the two countries. Both Ukraine and its continental partners have fully understood that the US president's opinion is malleable and that, as was often said of the last Romanov, Nicholas II, his opinion seems determined by the last person with whom he discussed a particular issue. These sudden changes of heart, which Ukraine hopes to exploit to convince the White House leader that Putin's absence was a de facto rejection of negotiations , are the reason for the intense lobbying effort carried out over the weekend, with calls from all major European leaders and flattery beyond belief.

Following his Sunday meeting with Zelensky, Vice President Vance, considered, along with Donald Trump Jr., to represent the least pro-Ukrainian part of the Trump team, offered positive words for the Ukrainian president and insisted on the need to end this bloody war. Earlier, Vance had criticized Russia, stating that it "demands too much." The alleged Russian conditions for ending the war, published by several US media outlets, starting positions that Russia is aware it cannot achieve through diplomacy, include territorial and security aspects. His proposal for maximums—equivalent to the one Ukraine demands with the unilateral Russian surrender proposed by Zelensky with his Peace Formula and Victory Plan —would entail the acceptance of neutrality, a ban on foreign military presence, and recognition of Russian sovereignty over the four Ukrainian territories annexed in 2022 and Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014.

Faced with these tougher points, which present impossible objectives, since Ukraine's partners are not as reluctant as they were in 2022 to offer security guarantees or even a military presence (symbolic or reduced, opinions vary, and there is still no clear criterion from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), other more feasible ones demand, for example, respect for minorities. This last point, which was also part of the Istanbul pre-agreement, is presented from a striking perspective. If three years ago it was presented as a demand that Zelensky fulfill his campaign promise to respect the linguistic rights of the Russian population and repeal the most nationalist aspects of legislation on language use, the argument now is to comply with European Union legislation on respect for cultural, ethnic, and linguistic minorities. Zelensky flagrantly failed from the outset to keep his promise to limit his predecessor's nationalist excesses, for example, on the issue of language legislation, a much milder sin than failing to follow the rules of the idolized European Union.

Donald Trump's comments last weekend reflect his way of seeing the world and understanding disputes. The US president didn't address who is right, which side is using negotiations to buy time and impose its power, or what the terms of a possible resolution to the war might be—relatively clear since, at the very least, the failure of the 2023 counteroffensive, if not since the initial Russian offensive in the south and Donbass halted in the summer of 2022—but rather focused on personal relationships. Hence, Trump's hope this weekend was to achieve with two phone calls what weeks of work had failed to achieve. In his message announcing the diplomatic work he would undertake on Monday, with talks with Vladimir Putin, Volodymyr Zelensky, and unspecified NATO allies, Donald Trump announced that the ceasefire would be the main topic. According to Barak Ravid, a reporter for Axios , a media outlet that usually has good connections with the authorities, the order of the calls was reversed and Donald Trump spoke first with Volodymyr Zelensky, a good opportunity for the Ukrainian president to influence Donald Trump's opinion just before his conversation with Vladimir Putin.

In his simplified view of a conflict he had already attempted to resolve in his first term and failed, the US president confused a possible ceasefire with the end of the conflict, a dangerous comparison considering the seven-year Minsk process or the Istanbul negotiations, which neither resulted in the end of the war nor in the resolution of the political conflict between the two countries. However, in the confidence of someone who had proclaimed days before that "nothing will happen until I meet with Putin" and considered himself capable of resolving a decade of two wars, an invasion, and enormous human and material losses, yesterday's call was going to be the beginning of the end of the war. The high expectations were not limited to Trump's words but were evident yesterday with the proliferation of headlines announcing as "breaking" or "urgent" news, "according to White House sources speaking on condition of anonymity," not the content or outcome of the conversation, but its beginning.

The expectations surrounding the call were not only met with Donald Trump's comments, who announced that a ceasefire would be one of the topics to be discussed and equated it with ending the war. As the results of the talks later proved, which did not result in any major announcements, a breakthrough was not to be expected. After the two-hour conversation, Vladimir Putin addressed the media to give his version of the discussion and thus prevent Donald Trump from distorting its content—as he did in the case of India and Pakistan. Underscoring the value for Russia of the US president's involvement in favor of peace, Putin insisted that a ceasefire is possible "if the corresponding agreements are reached." In other words, Russia refuses to accept the unconditional support demanded by European leaders like Emmanuel Macron and demands that any truce be the first step in a negotiation process seeking a treaty that definitively resolves the conflict and not, as it understands Ukraine is offering, merely a parenthesis in a political and military war that would resume shortly thereafter.

The results of the conversation proved Trump's team right, having spent the entire day lowering the expectations their own leader had raised. Washington even limited the US desire to reach a quick agreement with Russia to hold a face-to-face meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, which the US president considers a necessary step to achieve the goal of ending the war, and to do so quickly. The speed with which the United States can leave the issue minimally stabilized and disengage from Ukraine, placing all responsibility for the management and costs—though not the benefits—of the postwar period in the hands of European countries, remains the White House's primary desire. This was again demonstrated yesterday by JD Vance, who described the current situation as "something of a stalemate" and insisted that, if it persists in the future, the United States "must say this is not our war," a comment interpreted by pro-Ukraine factions as a threat to abandon the country to its fate. Just as European countries have fallen into the inconsistency of demanding negotiations once they have begun, it is striking that the Vice President of the United States is warning of a stalemate at the moment when the first opportunity in three years to break that deadlock arises.

It's been five months since Trump and Vance took office, and while the United States hasn't approved any further funding for Ukraine, it has also made clear that it aspires to a future presence in the country—primarily economic and for profit, something Kiev insists constitutes a strategic partnership —and has given no indication that, even if it were to withdraw from the negotiations, it would veto arms sales to Ukraine. Compared to the idea of ​​withdrawal, which media outlets such as Foreign Policy and Foreign Affairs continually warn about, a more likely scenario is one in which the United States reduces its involvement in the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and leaves the financing of the war in the hands of European countries, leaving Brussels and London to pay for the acquisition of the American weapons systems required to continue the battle.

"Putin doesn't seem to know very well how to get out of the war," JD Vance said yesterday, who also failed to understand that Russia is capable of calculating the risks of making demands beyond what Washington considers reasonable, at the risk of being led into a situation of continuation of the war of attrition, in which time is on its side, and economic isolation from Western markets, which will cause its economy to suffer in the future. Above all, JD Vance's statements ignore the fact that Donald Trump also doesn't know very well how to get out of this war , which he was going to resolve before taking office, in a conversation or a meeting with Vladimir Putin.

In the message posted on his personal social media platform, President Trump displayed his usual triumphalism and exaggerated to the limit the trade opportunities that would exist between the three countries—the United States, Russia, and Ukraine—if the war were to end. This would also depend on the US's ability to convince its European partners to lift certain sanctions against Moscow—such as disconnecting from the international payment system SWIFT, a red line for Brussels and London—a detail the US leader has not noticed. "Russia wants to TRADE on a massive scale with the United States when this catastrophic 'bloodbath' is over, and I agree. There is a tremendous opportunity for Russia to create vast amounts of jobs and wealth. Its potential is UNLIMITED. Likewise, Ukraine can be a great beneficiary of Trade as they rebuild their Country," Trump wrote regarding trade relations.

Even in the part of the message related to the main topic of the conversation, Trump's tone is noticeably exaggerated. The US president, who claimed to have briefed Ursula von der Leyen, Emmanuel Macron, Giorgia Meloni, Friedrich Merz, Alexander Stubb, and Volodymyr Zelensky on the content of his conversations, proclaimed the Vatican as the site of possible future negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. In contrast to the two hours spent negotiating with Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump used a group call to inform the other side of the war and his European allies. "I think it went very well," Trump commented on the conversation, adding that "Russia and Ukraine will immediately begin negotiations for a Ceasefire and, more importantly, ENDING the War. The conditions for this will be negotiated by the parties, as they should be, because they know details of the negotiations that no one else would be privy to." Trump's words and opinions tend not to be perpetuated over time, but for the moment, his version of events and the steps to be taken in the immediate future are closer to Russian demands—negotiation of ceasefire conditions and a resolution to the war—than to Ukrainian demands—Russian acceptance of European conditions and negotiation in an undetermined future—so he is likely to disappoint those who expected a harsh reaction to Russia's stance. Although future sanctions are not out of the question, there is no sign yet of the threat of massive sanctions that Ukraine and its European allies have been pushing for for weeks.

https://slavyangrad.es/2025/05/20/diplo ... distancia/

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******

From Cassad's telegram account:

Colonelcassad
In the Zaporizhzhya direction, foreign mercenaries were destroyed and captured.

— In the ravine west of Medichnoye, a strike was carried out on the command post of the 65th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is confirmed by footage from the Orlan-30 (destruction of the antenna field and staff armored personnel carriers), and up to 15 officers were eliminated, including the brigade's chief of communications.

— In Novoandriyevka, a company of the Mozart PMC (foreign mercenaries) was destroyed, documents and captured radios were captured, the enemy's losses amounted to 23 killed, 7 captured (citizens of Great Britain and Canada).

— In Kushugum, 2 ammunition depots and a refueling point for equipment were eliminated.

— In the Rabotino area, an enemy counterattack was thwarted, as a result of which 2 M2 Bradley IFVs were destroyed, the enemy was forced to flee.

— As a result of artillery shelling by the Russian Armed Forces on enemy positions, 3 Leopard tanks were destroyed and a bunker shelter was destroyed.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

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******

Brief frontline summary – May 18, 2025

The enemy's defense in the Bogatyr - Dachnoe - Alekseevka strongholds is crumbling at the seams. Report by Marat Khairullin with illustrations by Mikhail Popov.
Zinderneuf
May 18, 2025

Active movements by the Russian Armed Forces are observed along the entire line of combat contact on the Donetsk axis: from the city of Dzerzhinsk (Toretsk) to the settlement of Bogatyr.

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ЛБС 09.4.2025=Line of Combat Contact April 9th, 2025. Зона Активности=Area of Activity.

In the northern sector (Dzerzhinsk), there is intense activity along the Druzhba-Konstantinovka railway line. An assault is underway on the Dyleevka railway station.

Further south, at the junction of the Pokrovsk and Konstantinovka sectors, advances are being made toward the settlement of Romanovka, located on the H-20 highway.

The network of Ukrainian Armed Forces strongholds in the Gnatovka–Zarya–Staraya Nikolaevka area is being cut off from supplies. This area will likely fall entirely under RF control in the coming days.

Simultaneously, an opportunity has emerged for our assault groups to push into the rear of the Shcherbinovka–Petrovskoye sector, roughly 4 km in a straight line. According to all forecasts, the line of combat contact will soon stabilize along the Alexandropol–Shcherbinovka line.

Shifting westward along the line of combat engagements, the right flank of the Pokrovsk axis has become increasingly active.

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ЛБС 02.5.2025=Line of Combat Contact May 2nd, 2025. Зона Активности=Zone of Activity.

RF assault groups have secured positions on the outskirts of the settlement of Novaya Poltavka and advanced northeast of Malinovka, enveloping the AFU stronghold network in the Novaya Poltavka area from the west and threatening encirclement. This is forcing the enemy to retreat northward.

(Note: According to Mikhail Popov, Malinovka and Novaya Poltavka are only half liberated.*)

On the left flank of the salient, the settlement of Malinovka remains isolated from coordination with AFU units near Novaya Poltavka. Both enemy fortified areas (Malinovka and Novaya Poltavka) are now vulnerable to flanking attacks.

Russian Defense Ministry statement:

"Servicemen of the 29th Guards Combined Arms Army of the 'East' Group have liberated the settlement of Bogatyr on the South Donetsk axis during active offensive operations, raising Russian flags."

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ЛБС 31.10.2024=Line of Combat Contact October 31st, 2024. ЛБС 30.11.2024=Line of Combat Contact November 30th, 2024. ЛБС 01.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 1st, 2025. Зона Активности=Zone of Activity.

This is a major blow to the enemy’s defenses on the southern sector of the Donetsk axis.

The Bogatyr–Dachnoe–Alekseevka stronghold cluster was the primary obstacle following the destruction of the Ugledar–Konstantinovka–Andreyevka sector. (Dachnoe is slightly to the northwest of Zeleny Kut. You'll see it on the next map below.)

With the liberation of Bogatyr, the enemy’s defense in this node is considered breached. The next objective is Alekseevka. Neutralizing this area will allow RF forces, without fear for its right flank along the Volchya River, to advance along the road toward the settlement of Komar, enveloping the enemy’s defensive sector of Otradnoye–Komar–Fyodorovka from the north.

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ЛБС 31.10.2024=Line of Combat Contact October 31st, 2024. ЛБС 30.11.2024=Line of Combat Contact November 30th, 2024. ЛБС 01.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 1st, 2025. ЛБС 01.4.2025=Line of Combat Contact April 1st, 2025.

In summary, we see how the tactic of "small cuts" and stretching the enemy’s reserves thin across the entire frontline is yielding tangible results.

https://maratkhairullin.substack.com/p/ ... ay-18-2025

******

How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Nazis (Part 1)

The whitewashing of Azov by New York Times, Washington Post, and The Guardian

Moss Robeson
May 12, 2025

People still often refer to the “Azov Battalion,” which joined the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU) in 2014 and became the Azov Regiment, with two battalions. In 2023, this “openly neo-Nazi” unit was upgraded again as the 12th Special Forces Azov Brigade, with nine battalions on paper, including divisions for artillery, tanks, and air defense. And now NGU Azov commander Denys Prokopenko leads the 1st Azov Corps, consisting of five brigades, including the 12th Special Forces unit and another Azovite brigade.

Meanwhile, the broader Azov movement led by Andriy Biletsky is forming the 3rd Army Corps. There are other Azovite units, and Azov-inspired ones. After three years of war, the “gentle Azovization” of the Ukrainian armed forces is accelerating, but this seems to be met with the quiet approval of western media and officials. Apparently they consider far-right nationalism to be Ukraine’s secret weapon.

In 2022, Russia captured the remaining Ukrainian coastline on the Sea of Azov to establish a land bridge to the Crimean peninsula. The main obstacle, which the Russians destroyed, was the city of Mariupol, with its principal defenders being the NGU Azov Regiment. This partially explains the immediate role played by neo-Nazis in the information war.

With eyes on Mariupol in the early days of the war, the western media mostly abandoned any remaining concern and curiosity about neo-Nazis in the Azov Regiment (and other Azovite units). Hundreds of Azov fighters, in addition to other soldiers and civilians, held out for weeks in the city’s massive Azovstal Iron and Steel Works. New York Times reporter Michael Schwirtz, a winner of the Pulitzer Prize, called it “Ukraine’s version of the Alamo.”

In “The Battle for Azovstal,” a podcast episode by the New York Times, Schwirtz claimed that “this group has a very complicated history going back to 2014,” when Andriy Biletsky, an infamous neo-Nazi, founded a “battalion of misfits” that welcomed everyone. “Anybody who wanted to could join … And, very, quickly, the Azov Battalion became associated with a band of far-right nationalists bordering on fascists.” But this was just “a small contingent of people,” and an “association that the Azov Battalion had in its infancy.” Or so they said…

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As I’ve said before, the New York Times is a case study in the western media’s whitewashing of the most powerful neo-Nazi movement in Ukraine, and probably the world. Andrew Kramer, the Kyiv bureau chief for the NYT, appears to have been its first reporter to describe the “Azov group” as anything other than a “pro-Ukrainian paramilitary” force, a “militia fighting in the east,” or “one volunteer unit.” In 2015, Kramer wrote that Azov is “openly neo-Nazi.”

In early 2022, the NGU Azov Regiment was still “far-right,” according to the New York Times. On February 25, the day after Russia attacked Ukraine, the NYT worried that Azov “has drawn far-right fighters from around the world.” Over the next month, the Times said this “far-right military unit” is “known for having neo-Nazi sympathizers but remains a fringe presence in the country and its military.” That spring, amidst the Russian siege of Mariupol, the ideology of the Azov Regiment started to become past-tense in the “newspaper of record,” for example: “the Azov Battalion … was founded as a far-right volunteer unit.”

During the second half of April, Azov evolved from “a force that does include far-right soldiers, some of them foreign, including white supremacists and people who have been described as fascists”; to “a highly skilled and controversial unit” that is “filled with far-right fighters”; to “a force that does include nationalist soldiers, which the Kremlin has used to paint the unit as fascist”; and finally, a complicated unit “whose history as a far-right group has helped fuel Russia’s largely false claim that it is fighting fascists in Ukraine.” The Times settled on a phrase about Azov’s “history” that it repeatedly deployed. The far-right “roots” of the unit “lent a veneer of credibility” to Russian propaganda.

In May 2022, one might have read in the New York Times, “Though the Azov Battalion was founded in 2014 out of Ukraine’s ultranationalist and neo-Nazi groups, experts say the group has quelled much of its extremist side under pressure from authorities.” Around that time, the NYT conducted a soft-ball interview with Lt. Illia Samoilenko, “an intelligence officer who speaks fluent English, [and] seemed intent on defining the legacy of the Azov Battalion.”

“We know about our past,” he said. He acknowledged the Azov regiment’s “obscure” origins and its past association with far-right extremists — something he said the group had shed when it became part of the national military. Independent military analysts and experts who study the far right support that assertion, saying that Azov’s incorporation into the regular combat forces of the Ukrainian military led to a purging of extremist elements. Lt. Samoilenko said lingering public misperceptions about the battalion could explain why the group did not get as much support as it might have in the run up to the war.

Some so-called experts might “support that [evidence-free] assertion,” but the New York Times must have known this was hardly the consensus among those who study the far-right in Ukraine. The Times did not bother to fact-check Samoilenko, and subsequently began to describe Azov as “a former far-right militia” with ambiguous “connections to far-right movements” and “a hard-core contingent” that has “far-right origins.” The newspaper became a broken record when it mentioned “the Azov regiment, whose roots in far-right movements have offered a veneer of credibility for Mr. Putin’s tenuous claims that Ukraine has been infected with Nazism.” As for Samoilenko, better known as “Gandalf,” he once told a Czech reporter, “I don’t believe in any Holocaust, it’s just a story.”

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Illia “Gandalf” Samoilenko in Israel (December 2022)

The New York Times downgraded Azov from “far-right” to “nationalist.” Unidentified “analysts” assured the Times that “the Russian media’s portrayal of the group exaggerates the extent to which its members hold neo-Nazi views.” In July 2022, this infamous military unit “with roots in ultranationalist political groups” became a “strongly nationalistic group of fighters whose fame in Ukraine and early connections to far-right political figures have been used by the Kremlin to falsely depict the entire country as fascist.” That summer, Michael Schwirtz wrote that Azov became “a source of inspiration and pride for Ukrainians, with the commanders’ likenesses displayed on billboards around the country.”

Even Azov’s undeniably extremist “origins” were watered down as “strongly nationalist,” and the Times said that “Russian propaganda has attempted to paint [the Azov Regiment] as neo-Nazis.” Unfortunately for this newspaper, its Kyiv bureau chief once described Azov as “openly neo-Nazi,” and in 2019 the World News section published an article on the “Global Reach of White Extremism,” which mentioned “the Azov Battalion, a Ukrainian neo-Nazi paramilitary organization.”

It used to be standard to downplay the Azovites as a “fringe presence,” until that changed, and it became fashionable to whitewash these elite neo-Nazis as “fighters who are regarded in Ukraine as national heroes.” By the end of 2022, the New York Times described the “Azov Battalion” as “a powerful symbol of resistance,” “a nationalist fighting force,” and “a nationalist group whose early ties to far-right figures have been used by the Kremlin.”

In 2023, the Azov Brigade quickly went from having “far-right connections” to “onetime far-right connections,” and by spring, the unit reportedly had “little or no political bent.” In June, the month that Ukraine began its failed counter-offensive, the New York Times reported the death of Oleh Mudrak, the former commander of the first battalion in the Azov Regiment, not long after his release from Russian captivity. The Times did not mention Mudrak’s numerous Nazi tattoos, including a Black Sun and SS bolts on his arm, but explained that captured Azov members, “long painted as neo-Nazis by Russia as part of its justification for the war, came in for especially harsh treatment.” Last year, the New York Times said that the Azov Brigade simply “has a nationalist heritage.”

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Oleh Mudrak and a picture of his right arm (taken while he was a POW). The SS bolts flank the emblem of his former platoon, the Borodach Division, which the current NGU Azov commander Denys Prokopenko also joined.

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About a decade ago, the Washington Post reported that Azov “has become a source of controversy for its use of neo-Nazi symbols and rhetoric.” In 2017, WaPo published an op-ed by former USAID project officer Josh Cohen that touched on the Azov movement: “Ukraine’s ultra-right militias are challenging the government to a showdown.” Five years later, less than two weeks after Russian forces invaded, a team at the Post wrote about the (re-)emergence of Azov as “a controversial defender of Ukraine.” The article mentioned “the battalion’s far-right nationalist ideology,” and said that its “own leaders and fighters concede that some extremists remain in their ranks.” However, the Washington Post reassured readers, “Under pressure from U.S. and Ukrainian authorities, the Azov battalion has toned down its extremist elements.” That spring, Azov was described as “a nationalist group” and “far-right.”

In January 2023, when Meta reversed its ban on the NGU’s Azov unit, the Post still described the regiment as “a Ukrainian far-right military group” with “connections to far-right nationalist ideology.” However, “Meta argues that the Azov Regiment is now separate from the far-right nationalist Azov Movement. It notes that the Ukrainian government has formal command and control over the unit.” Within a few months, WaPo reliably echoed the story about “Azov’s apparent evolution,” and reported that “[Azov] Brigade leaders are seeking to move past the controversy surrounding Azov’s far-right roots.” That summer, Azov was said to be “one of Ukraine’s most adept military units,” and a former “far-right militia with ultranationalist roots.” In some cases, it was acknowledged to be a “controversial” brigade that “undoubtedly has at least some extremists in its ranks” and “has used the medieval Wolsangel insignia made infamous by Nazi German SS units.”

In June 2024, the Washington Post broke the news that the State Department cleared the Azov Brigade for US weapons and training, ignoring a Congressional ban that refers to the “Azov Battalion.” The US government insisted that the Azov Brigade of 2024 had nothing to do with the Azov Battalion of 2014, not long after the Ukrainian government celebrated Azov’s “10th anniversary,” going back to the day that Andriy Biletsky became its founder. “The two units are not the same, despite persistent Russian disinformation to conflate them,” the State Department Bureau of Political Affairs said in June 2024, chastising Erik Sperling, who runs a progressive think tank in Washington and brought about the Azov ban as a former senior advisor to Congressman Ro Khanna.

Fact check for you, @ErikSperling: USG [the US Government] never provided supported to the now disbanded militia known as the “Azov battalion.” In contrast, The 12th Special Forces “Azov” Brigade received arms and equipment after successfully completing necessary security forces vetting. [Original emphasis]

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Image posted by Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (May 2024)

The WaPo article that triggered this exchanged quoted Svyatoslav Palamar, the brigade’s deputy commander, several times. For example: “Now that the ban is lifted, it brings us to a full understanding of how poisonous Russian propaganda is.” The Post did not issue an apology for its previous reporting, but dropped the issue about Azov’s “past.” The Washington Post noted that Palamar joined the Azov Battalion in 2014 (before its alleged cleansing), but did not mention his long-time membership in the “Patriot of Ukraine,” the neo-Nazi group that largely formed the unit.

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In 2014, The Guardian published several articles that dealt with Azov and the far right in Ukraine. Aside from an op-ed by sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko, titled “Ukraine has ignored the far right for too long – it must wake up to the danger,” the bylines all included Shaun Walker, who is today the Guardian’s central and eastern Europe correspondent. The most significant article of his, “Azov fighters are Ukraine’s greatest weapon and may be its greatest threat,” is worth quoting at length.

The Azov causes particular concern due to the far right, even neo-Nazi, leanings of many of its members. Dmitry claimed not to be a Nazi, but waxed lyrical about Adolf Hitler as a military leader, and believes the Holocaust never happened. Not everyone in the Azov battalion thinks like Dmitry, but after speaking with dozens of its fighters and embedding on several missions during the past week in and around the strategic port city of Mariupol, the Guardian found many of them to have disturbing political views, and almost all to be intent on "bringing the fight to Kiev" when the war in the east is over.

The battalion's symbol is reminiscent of the Nazi Wolfsangel, though the battalion claims it is in fact meant to be the letters N and I crossed over each other, standing for "national idea". Many of its members have links with neo-Nazi groups, and even those who laughed off the idea that they are neo-Nazis did not give the most convincing denials.

"Of course not, it's all made up, there are just a lot of people who are interested in Nordic mythology," said one fighter when asked if there were neo-Nazis in the battalion. When asked what his own political views were, however, he said "national socialist". As for the swastika tattoos on at least one man seen at the Azov base, "the swastika has nothing to do with the Nazis, it was an ancient sun symbol," he claimed. …

Dmitry said he believes that Ukraine needs "a strong dictator to come to power who could shed plenty of blood but unite the nation in the process”. Many in the Azov battalion with whom the Guardian spoke shared this view, which is a long way from the drive for European ideals and democracy that drove the protests in Kiev at the beginning. The Russian volunteer fighting with the Azov said he believes Ukraine needs “a junta that will restrict civil rights for a while but help bring order and unite the country.”


In 2018, Guardian reporter Kevin Rawlinson referred to Azov as “a notorious Ukrainian fascist militia,” and days later, the Guardian published an article by journalist Marc Bennetts about the newest arm of the Azov movement, its paramilitary street wing, the National Militia, which later became “Centuria.” Bennetts described the Azov movement as “a far-right group with a military wing [the Azov Regiment] that contains openly neo-Nazi members, and its political spin-off, the National Corpus party.” A year later, the Guardian published a photo essay about “Ultranationalism in Ukraine,” according to which, “The growing presence of far-right groups in Ukraine leaves the west in a quandary.” It mentioned “the Azov battalion, a Ukrainian ultra-right paramilitary group that advocated white supremacist views.”

(Video at link.)

Oleksiy Kuzmenko shared the above video in August 2020: "Ukraine's far-right Azov movement now openly talks an EXPANSIONIST agenda for Ukraine and 'Fight of civilizations'. 'We have to attain victories over foreign enemies by grabbing territory': Azov's promo video from the roll-out of the 'Centuria' organization on August 1st."

In 2020, the Guardian published an article that described Azov as a “neo-Nazi extremist movement” and “a neo-Nazi paramilitary force.” About a week before Putin launched his so-called Special Military Operation, the Guardian reported that a British airport was conducting checks “over fears far-right extremists may travel to Ukraine.” According to this article, “The most notorious far-right group is the Azov Battalion, a paramilitary force which uses Nazi-linked symbols and has had many members who have professed far-right extremist views.” Almost three years later, the Guardian reported, without any sense of alarm, “Ukraine’s highest profile combat unit [NGU Azov Brigade] to recruit English-speaking soldiers.”

In April 2022, during the siege of Mariupol, the Guardian published an article that described Azov as “a unit associated with a far-right political party [National Corps] and containing a significant proportion of neo-Nazis.” A month later, the Guardian started to dodge this reality and echo the new narrative that Azov “has in the past had nationalist far-right affiliation … but has become a unit of the Ukrainian national guard.” (It joined the National Guard in 2014.) The next day, another article acknowledged that “some of its leaders are known to hold far-right views.”

A few days later, the Guardian published an article which said Azov “has historical far-right affiliations,” and a series of photos from the press service of the Azov Regiment, with a caption that clarified, “The Azov regiment retains some far-right affiliations.” In a flurry of articles about the surrender of Ukrainian forces that held out for weeks in Azovstal, the Guardian arrived at the following formulation, which it repeated numerous times (with some variations): “The Azov regiment was formed in 2014 as a volunteer militia to fight Russia-backed forces in east Ukraine, and many of its original members had far-right extremist views. Since then, the unit has been integrated into the Ukrainian national guard and its commanders say it has moved away from its far-right origins.”

By September, the Guardian said at least three more times that the Azov regiment “retains some far-right affiliations.” That month, Shaun Walker wrote that Azov “first formed as a volunteer battalion in 2014, when many of its members had far-right leanings.” In February 2023, Walker and a team of Guardian journalists (including Luke Harding) explained that leaders of the Azov Brigade are “insisting they have shed their previous dubious politics and rapidly becoming Ukrainian heroes.”

In March 2024, the Guardian conceded, “The Azov brigade has often been criticized for its links with Nazism and the far-right … [and] some have suggested its far-right links and symbolism have remained.” However, less than a month later, the Guardian's defense and security editor Dan Sabbagh insisted that Azov “has shed any far-right associations … and is one of the military’s elite forces.” After Washington cleared the brigade for US weapons and training, the Guardian reported that “current members reject accusations of extremism and ties with far-right movements.”

This leading UK publication has also dropped the issue of the “revered” Azov’s “past,” apparently except when Sabbagh wants to bring it up (“decade-old nationalist origins have made it a target of Russian propaganda”). He wrote the January 2025 article about the goal of “Ukraine’s highest profile combat unit to recruit English-speaking soldiers” for its own International Azov Battalion.

Last summer, the Guardian quoted a Telegram post from NGU Azov officer Roman Ponomarenko. Fellow readers of “Events in Ukraine” will recognize the name of this Azov military analyst. His other “area of expertise” is “World War II and Ukrainian formations in the German armed forces,” and he also runs a neo-Confederate Facebook page dedicated to the US Civil War. According to Ponomarenko, the “Galicia Division” of the Nazi Waffen-SS was “the most motivated and well-trained Ukrainian military formation of the 20th century.”

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Ponomarenko is associated with the NGU Azov Brigade’s 6th battalion, which is led by Lev “Horus” Pashko (circled above), who joined Azov in 2017, the year that some “experts” say the unit was “cleansed” of extremists.

So did Azov change, or just its Western media coverage? Stay tuned for Part 2: The ‘Experts’ Lied to Us: ‘Evolution,’ ‘Integration,’ and ‘Depoliticization.’ If you want to support my work, you can “Buy Me a Coffee.” Thanks for reading.

https://azovlobby.substack.com/p/how-we ... rrying-and

******

Zelensky III, 2003-2013: private performance for the Russian president

The world is Zelensky’s stage, and we’re all living in it. Kvartal and the Orange Revolution. The stupid essence of political satire. Zelensky-Napoleon
Events in Ukraine
May 19, 2025

Welcome back to my series tracking the life and times of the Joker of postmodern politics - Vladimir Zelensky. Vladimir and not Volodymyr, since we have very far to get to 2019, when he began making at least some efforts to speak Ukrainian.

In our last installment, we spent our requisite time getting tangled up in the backdoor deals and transnational oligarchic clan struggles behind Zelensky’s Kvartal 95 comedy studio. Today, onto something seemingly simpler – Kvartal’s output. But it will lead us onto something much more profound - the dangerous naivete at the heart of political satire, and what it reveals about Zelensky’s political essence.

On the way, we’ll have a look at Kvartal’s desacralization of power in the anarchic political landscape of post-2004 Ukraine, Zelensky’s private show for then-presidents of Russia and Ukraine (Dmitry Medvedev and Viktor Yanukovych), and how Ukrainian politicians signed contracts to be satirized by Kvartal.

The world is Zelensky’s stage, and we’re all living in it.

The Orange years
Winning a score of media awards from 2005 onwards, Kvartal 95 became the country’s most beloved media project. Much of the humour was lowest common denominator content, easily convertible to a whatsapp message for the family chat. Here’s how Konstantin Bondarenko describes it in his book on Zelensky:

For example, there’s the sketch where a husband (Volodymyr Zelenskyy) waits for his wife (Olena Kravets) on International Women’s Day (March 8th). The wife comes home drunk just before midnight, behaving provocatively and assertively. But as soon as the clock strikes twelve, everything changes—Women’s Day is over, and life returns to the familiar male-dominated world.

The scene, in its grotesque and comedic form, captured such recognizable aspects of everyday life and so accurately portrayed the behavioral psychology of men and women that it was viewed by over 10 million people in a short time!


And here is the skit in question:



However, Kvartal was also always political. 2004, the year the studio put out its first major projects, was to be a highly eventful year in the country. It was the year of the Orange Revolution, the first time that Ukraine’s pro-western liberals took power through constitutionally dubious means - at the time with a smaller contingent of nutty nationalists than in 2014. Of course, as I wrote here, that certainly didn’t stop a flock of Reaganite cold warrior CIA agents from taking the reigns in the country in the aftermath of 2004.

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the Orange Revolution

The events had major effects on the present and future stakeholders of Kvartal. The owner of Kvartal at the time, Kiev-born Alexandr Rodnyansky, decided it was his cue to completely move to Moscow, instead of splitting his time between the two capitals. Though he is nowadays known for his opposition to the Putin government and support for artistic freedom of expression, in a 2019 interview to the pro-western outlet Meduza he also stated his distaste for incompetent romantic nationalism that took power in Ukraine following the Orange Revolution. Rodnyansky, in short, is a somewhat rare example of the post-soviet liberal, one whose rational capacities aren’t entirely overcome by his dislike for the Russian government.

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Rodnyansky

Ukrainian oligarch Igor Kolomoisky was a few years from owning Kvartal. Though as we found out in the previous article, Rodnyansky claims that Zelensky was already close to the infamous figure. Unlike Rodnyansky, Kolomoisky had no qualms about supporting the Orange camp in 2004.

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Kolomoisky

In fact, as I’ve written elsewhere, Kolomoisky boasted of personally sponsoring the Orange Revolution to the tune of 5 million US dollars. His aim has always been to destabilize any overly centralizing governments – the best government is one you don’t notice, as he told interviewers. Hence, he sponsored the Orange Revolution in 2004 against President Kuchma, the Euromaidan protests in 2013-14 against President Yanukovych, and then the Zelensky ‘movement’ in 2019 against President Poroshenko.

The Orange Revolution demonstrated that Ukrainian politics would not continue along the path of centralization being charted at the time in Russia, Belarus, or Kazakhstan. Instead, Kuchma’s attempts to do so were shattered by a coalition of competing oligarchs, western-funded liberal activists, and nationalists. I’ve written at length on the American interests involved.

One also has to wonder what Ronald Lauder was doing at the time - he was the American ultra-zionist Republican hawk who financed Kvartal alongside Rodnyansky. I also covered him in the last installment. I wouldn’t be surprised if he did his best to aid the Oranges.

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Ronald Lauder and Ronald Reagan, 1980

I am sure Lauder would have gotten along very well with the Israeli citizen Kolomoisky. Furthermore plenty of Ukrainian-Americans who’d worked in the Reagan administration - where Lauder started his political career - made their way into the halls of Ukrainian power following the victory of the Oranges in 2004. One of them was Kateryna Chumachenko, who became Ukrainian first lady - ‘Washington’s Rasputin’, as I described her here. Media played a major role in the 2004 events, and Lauder’s network of Ukrainian media assets would have been handy.

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Kateryna was first lady of Ukraine from 2005-2010, pictured here with her husband, president Viktor Yushchenko. Yushchenko was known to be a weak personality, with plenty of rumours circulating that major decisions were in fact made by his US-citizen wife. Among other things, Katerina ‘had previously served in the Reagan White House and State and Treasury departments, and did liaison work with Afghani and other anti-Soviet US-sponsored opposition groups,’

While the street desacralized state power in practice, Kvartal did the same on the screen. It came into its own under the Yuschenko (2005-2010) and Yanukovych (2010-2014) governments.

(Paywall with free option.)

https://eventsinukraine.substack.com/p/ ... erformance

******

We are on the right track
May 19, 20:00

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Putin and Trump's talks have ended.

Putin called the talks meaningful and useful. Putin thanked Trump for organizing the talks with Ukraine.

Russia is in favor of stopping the fighting, but it is necessary to develop the most effective paths forward.

Russia is ready to work on a memorandum with Ukraine, including a ceasefire.

Russia and Ukraine need to find compromises that would suit all parties.

We are on the right track (c) Putin

We will continue to negotiate.

Trump's version.

The conversation with Putin went very well.
Russia and Ukraine will immediately begin talks on ending the war (c) Trump

The full text of Trump's statement:

"My conversation with Putin has just ended. I believe it went very well. Russia and Ukraine will immediately begin talks on a ceasefire and, more importantly, a complete end to the war. The terms will be agreed upon between the two sides - as they should be, because only they know the details of the negotiation process that are not available to anyone else. The tone and spirit of the conversation were excellent. If it were not so, I would say so right now, and not later.

Russia wants to do massive TRADE with the United States after this disastrous "bloodbath" is over, and I support that idea. Russia has tremendous opportunities to create jobs and build wealth. Its potential is UNLIMITED. Ukraine can also be a major beneficiary of trade relations as it rebuilds its country.

Russia-Ukraine talks will begin immediately. I communicated this to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian Prime Minister Giorgio Meloni, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and Finnish President Alexander Stubb in a phone call immediately after my conversation with President Putin.

The Vatican, according to the Pope, has expressed a strong interest in hosting these talks on its territory.

Let the process begin! (c) Trump

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9848159.html

Google Translator
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Tue May 20, 2025 6:02 pm

Overflow special))

INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING – DECODING PUTIN STATEMENT AFTER THE TRUMP CALL, TRUMP TWEET AFTER PUTIN’S STATEMENT

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By John Helmer @bears_with

On Monday President Donald Trump telephoned President Vladimir Putin and they talked for two hours before Trump put lunch in his mouth and Putin his dinner.

On the White House schedule, there was no advance notice of the call and no record afterwards. The White House log is blank for Trump’s entire morning while the press were told he was at lunch between 11:30 and 12:30.

Putin went public first, making a statement to the press which the Kremlin posted at 19:55 Moscow time; it was then 12:55 in Washington. Click to read.

Trump and his staff read the transcript and then composed Trump’s statement in a tweet posted at 13:33 Washington time, 20:33 Moscow time. Click to read.

If Secretary of State Marco Rubio and General Keith Kellogg, the president’s negotiator with the Ukraine and FUGUP (France, United Kingdom, Germany, Ukraine, Poland), were consulted during Trump’s prepping, sat in on the call with the President, or were informed immediately after the call, they have remained silent.

The day before, May 18, Rubio announced that the Istanbul-II meeting had produced agreement “to exchange paper on ideas to get to a ceasefire. If those papers have ideas on them that are realistic and rational, then I think we know we’ve made progress. If those papers, on the other hand, have requirements in them that we know are unrealistic, then we’ll have a different assessment.” Rubio was hinting that the Russian formula in Istanbul, negotiations-then-ceasefire, has been accepted by the US. What the US would do after its “assessment”, Rubio didn’t say – neither walk-away nor threat of new sanctions.

Vice President JD Vance wasn’t present at the call because he was flying home from Rome where he attended Pope Leo XIV’s inaugural mass. “We’re more than open to walking away,” Vance told reporters in his aeroplane. “The United States is not going to spin its wheels here. We want to see outcomes.” Vance prompted Trump to mention the Pope as a mediator for a new round of Russian-Ukrainian negotiations, first to Putin and then in public.

Kellogg is refusing to go along. He tweeted on Sunday: “In Istanbul @SecRubio made it clear that we have presented ‘a strong peace plan’. Coming out of the London meetings we (US) came up with a comprehensive 22 point plan that is a framework for peace. The first point is a comprehensive cease fire that stops the killing now.”

FUGUP issued their own statement after Trump’s call. “The US President and the European partners have agreed on the next steps. They agreed to closely coordinate the negotiation process and to seek another technical meeting. All sides reaffirmed their willingness to closely accompany Ukraine on the path to a ceasefire. The European participants announced that they would increase pressure on the Russian side through sanctions.”

This signalled acceptance with Trump of the Russian formula, negotiations-then-ceasefire, and time to continue negotiating at the “technical” level. The sanction threat was added. But this statement was no longer FUGUP. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer was omitted; so too Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. The Italian, the Finn and the European Commission President were substituted. They make FUGIFEC.

Late in the Paris evening of Sunday French President Emmanuel Macron attempted to keep Starmer in Trump’s good books and preserve the ceasefire-first formula. “I spoke tonight,” Macron tweeted, “with @POTUS @Keir_Starmer @Bundeskanzler and @GiorgiaMeloni after our talks in Kyiv and Tirana. Tomorrow, President Putin must show he wants peace by accepting the 30-day unconditional ceasefire proposed by President Trump and backed by Ukraine and Europe.” By the time on Monday that Macron realized he had been trumped, the Elysée had nothing to say.

By contrast, Italian Prime Minister Meloni signalled she was happy to line up with Trump and accept Putin’s negotiations-then-ceasefire. “Efforts are being made,” Meloni’s office announced, “for an immediate start to negotiations between the parties that can lead as soon as possible to a ceasefire and create the conditions for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine.” Meloni claimed she would assure that Pope Leo XIV would fall into line. “In this regard, the willingness of the Holy Father to host the talks in the Vatican was welcomed. Italy is ready to do its part to facilitate contacts and work for peace.”

For the time being, Putin’s and Trump’s statements have put Rubio, Kellogg and the Europeans offside. Decoding the two president’s statements shows how and why.

PRESIDENT PUTIN’S STATEMENT

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Source: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76953

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Good evening.

Our colleagues asked me to briefly comment on the outcome of my telephone conversation with the President of the United States.This conversation has effectively taken place and lasted more than two hours. I would like to emphasise that it was both substantive and quite candid. Overall, [1] I believe it was a very productive exchange.

First and foremost [2], I expressed my gratitude to the President of the United States for the support provided by the United States in facilitating the resumption of direct talks between Russia and Ukraine aimed at potentially reaching a peace agreement and resuming the talks which, as we know, were thwarted by the Ukrainian side in 2022 [3].

The President of the United States shared his position [4] on the cessation of hostilities and the prospects for a ceasefire. For my part, I noted that Russia also supports a peaceful settlement of the Ukraine crisis as well. What we need now is to identify the most effective [5] ways towards achieving peace.

We agreed with the President of the United States that Russia would propose and is ready to engage with the Ukrainian side on drafting a memorandum [6] regarding a potential future peace agreement. This would include outlining a range of provisions, such as the principles for settlement, the timeframe for a possible peace deal, and other matters, including a potential temporary ceasefire, should the necessary agreements [7] be reached.

Contacts among participants of the Istanbul meeting and talks have resumed, which gives reason to believe that we are on the right track overall [8].

I would like to reiterate that the conversation was highly constructive, and I assess it positively. The key issue, of course, is now for the Russian side and the Ukrainian side to show their firm commitment to peace and to forge a compromise that would be acceptable to all parties.

Notably, Russia’s position is clear. Eliminating the root causes [9] of this crisis is what matters most to us.


Should any clarifications be necessary, Press Secretary [Dmitry] Peskov and my aide, Mr Ushakov [10], will provide further details on today’s telephone talks with President Trump.
KEYS TO DECODE
1. This is a qualifier, meaning there are serious differences on the details — Putin asked Trump to pause, halt or cease all arms deliveries to the Ukraine, including US arms shipped through Israel, Germany, and Poland. This is a bullet Trump hasn’t bitten, yet.

2. Putin has made a firm decision to give Trump the “peace deal” he has asked for and wishes to announce at a summit meeting. In their call Putin was mollifying Trump’s disappointment at the failure of their plan to meet when Trump was in the Middle East. A Russian source comments: “Whatever concessions have to be made will be made only by Putin and only to Trump. The Europeans are trying to hog the headlines and turn their defeat into some sort of victory – Trump won’t let them have it and Putin won’t either.”

3. Putin does not publicly admit the mistakes he made with Roman Abramovich and Vladimir Medinsky in March 2022 at Istanbul-I. They have now been corrected at the consensus decision-making session with the military and intelligence chiefs (May 14 Kremlin session) and then on May 16 in Istanbul with Admiral Igor Kostyukov of the GRU seated on Medinsky’s right with General Alexander Fomin, Deputy Minister of Defence. For more details, click to listen.

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Source: https://ria.ru/20250516/peregovory-2017151081.html
At top left, 2nd from left, Fomin, then Kostyukov (obscured) and then Medinsky.

4. Soft qualifier. This means Putin did not agree with several of Trump’s points relating to intelligence sharing, arms deliveries, Ukrainian elections.

5. Future tense. Putin suggested to Trump that he stop Kellogg and FUGUP encouraging Zelensky. Putin made an especially negative remark about the role played by Prime Minister Starmer.

6. This is a Russian lesson in escalation control. By putting the memorandum of understanding in Russian hands to initiate, Putin returns to the key parts of the December 17, 2021, draft treaty which President Joseph Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken summarily dismissed. Placing agreement on these terms first, before a temporary ceasefire, and making that ceasefire conditional on ceaseforce (halt to battlefield intelligence sharing and arms re-supply), Putin has invited Trump to choose between the US and FUGUP; between Zelensky and an elected successor; and between his personal negotiator advisors, Steven Witkoff and General Kellogg.

7. Reiteration of the formula, negotiations first, then ceasefire.

8. Qualifier repeated – see Key 1.

9. This phrase refers to the European security architecture and mutual security pact of December 2021, as well as to the two declared objectives of the Special Military Operation — demilitarization and denazification.

10. Following Putin’s statement, Ushakov added: “other details of the telephone conversation. Among other things, Putin and Trump touched upon the exchange of prisoners of citizens of the two countries: the format of ‘nine nine’ is being worked out. The leaders also discussed their possible meeting and agreed that it should be productive, so the teams of the presidents will work out the content of the summit between Russia and the United States.”

PRESIDENT TRUMP’S STATEMENT

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Tweet source: https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrum ... 3441367601
Trump followed in a stumbling speech in the Rose Garden in which, referring to the morning telephone call, he said “they [Putin] like Melania better.”
Just completed my two hour call with President Vladimir Putin of Russia. I believe it went very well. Russia and Ukraine will immediately start negotiations toward a Ceasefire [1] and, more importantly, an END to the War. The conditions for that will be negotiated between the two parties, as it can only be, because they know details of a negotiation that nobody else would be aware of. [2] The tone and spirit of the conversation were excellent. If it wasn’t, I would say so now, rather than later. Russia wants to do largescale TRADE with the United States when this catastrophic “bloodbath” is over, and I agree [3]. There is a tremendous opportunity for Russia to create massive amounts of jobs and wealth. Its potential is UNLIMITED. Likewise, Ukraine can be a great beneficiary on Trade, in the process of rebuilding its Country.


Negotiations between Russia and Ukraine will begin immediately. I have so informed President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, of Ukraine, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, President Emmanuel Macron, of France, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, of Italy, Chancellor Friedrich Merz, of Germany, and President Alexander Stubb, of Finland, during a call with me,[4] immediately after the call with President Putin. The Vatican, as represented by the Pope [5] has stated that it would be very interested in hosting the negotiations. Let the process begin! [6]
KEYS TO DECODE

1. Trump accepts that negotiations should come before ceasefire.

2. This amounts to rejection of Kellogg’s 22-point term paper first decided with Zelensky and FUGUP in London on April 23 and repeated by Macron the night before Trump’s telephone call; as well as rejection of Witkoff’s term paper discussed at the Kremlin on April 25.

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Source: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76797

From left to right: Witkoff’s interpreter, Witkoff, Putin, Ushakov, Russian interpreter, Kirill Dmitriev. For analysis of the term sheets, read this.

3. Agreement with the business deal-making which Witkoff has been discussing with Kirill Dmitriev. For the deal beneficiaries on both sides, read this.

4. This list includes two Germans, both Russia haters — Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Ursula von der Leyen, former German defense minister and supporter of the German rearmament plan to continue the war with Russia into the future. The British Prime Minister has been dropped by Trump, and also Polish Prime Minister Tusk. Included for the first time in this context are the Italian and Finnish representatives with whom Trump has demonstrated personal rapport. Research by Manos Tzafalias indicates that there is a substantial money interest in Finland for Trump’s associate, Elon Musk.

5. Prompt from the Catholic convert, Vice President Vance.

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Vance and Rubio meeting with Pope Leo XIV on May 18. They invited the Pope to make an official visit to Washington. The last papal visit to the White House was in September 2015 on the invitation of President Obama and Vice President Biden.

6. Trump has covered his disappointment at failing to hold a summit meeting with Putin in Istanbul on the afternoon of May 16 by dismissing the negotiations which occurred without him. For details of Trump’s abortive summit plan, read this.

https://johnhelmer.net/intelligence-bri ... more-91634

*****

Putin-Trump Phone Call Deadend, AFU Brigade Mutinies Surge, & More Updates
Simplicius
May 19, 2025

Today Putin and Trump held a long-awaited phone call, which ended up lasting over two hours, by all accounts. Despite both sides drumming up the call’s significance as a good step forward toward normalizing relations, it achieved nothing. The reason: Putin again repeated to Trump that “root causes” of the conflict must be addressed, and shortly after, Zelensky declared in a press conference that Ukraine will never demilitarize and never give up its territories; the impasse stands as before.

Trump did decline to order a new round of sanctions on Russia, but Rubio days ago threatened Russia with a kind of ‘involuntary’ sanctions, as if to absolve himself:

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Putin’s statement: (Video at link.)

Interestingly, NYT’s new article managed to interview nearly a dozen real Russian soldiers on their views of negotiations and a potential ceasefire.

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https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/17/worl ... putin.html

Every single one of the soldiers, according to NYT, expressed disagreement with any ceasefires and wanted Russia to capture more regions of Ukraine so that the future generation of troops “doesn’t have to fight this war again.”


Eleven Russian soldiers who are fighting or have fought in Ukraine expressed deep skepticism in interviews of diplomatic efforts that on Friday produced the first direct peace talks in three years, but were brief and yielded little. Speaking by telephone, the soldiers said they rejected an unconditional cease-fire proposed by Ukraine, adding that Russian forces should keep fighting at least until they conquer all of the four southern and eastern Ukrainian regions claimed, but only partly controlled, by the Kremlin.

“We’re all tired, we want to go home. But we want to take all of the regions, so that we don’t have to struggle for them in the future,” said Sergei, a drafted Russian soldier fighting in the eastern Donetsk region, referring to the annexed territory. “Otherwise, have all the guys died in vain?”


Well, there you have it.

Of course, the NYT would never publish such an angle without having an agenda. It’s clear they’re shining a light on this to mash the same old globalist narrative that Russia doesn’t want peace, so Europe should arm up and increase sanctions and pressure on Russia.

Funnily enough, the article prints a lie about how Russia has “involuntarily extended” all soldiers’ contracts, effectively making them permanent, yet in the same breath lists two of the servicemen interviewed as having only “fought in the war until” December 2023 in one case, and October of last year in another. This proves the troops interviewed finished their contract and have been demobilized, contradicting the NYT’s lie.

Right now the prevailing mode of negotiations theater can be likened to a game of Musical Chairs, where each party plays along so as not to be the one left out without a chair in the end. In this case, everyone is playing along as wanting peace to deter accusations of warmongering, but in reality each party has their own secret motivations for continuing the conflict. In Russia’s case, it needs a decisive victory to keep the conflict from restarting in the future. In Europe’s case, they need a weakened Russia perpetually held in check via the yoke of sanctions and tensions. The US wouldn’t mind seeing all the parties weakened to the benefit of the US itself.

After all, how else would you explain Trump’s claim that US involvement was a ‘mistake’, while still supplying arms 24/7 to Ukraine?

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If it was a mistake, why are you still pumping them full of ammo? Clearly, the US would like to have its cake and eat it too: while pretending at peace, it still needs to hold the knife over each party’s throat to retain dominance.


Let’s touch on a developing issue within the AFU—that of increasing rebellion within its ranks against unjustified orders and meat assaults. Just in the past week alone, several major cases were documented.

The most publicized was a commander in the famed and elite 47th Brigade resigned after accusing superiors of ordering ‘stupid’ meat assaults that got his men repeatedly killed, particularly pertaining to the wasteful Kursk operation:

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https://www.kyivpost.com/post/52952

“I have never received more stupid missions than in the current sector (Russia’s Kursk region),” said Maj. Oleksandr Shirshyn in a rare public criticism of Ukraine’s Armed Forces (AFU) senior leadership by a fighting officer.

“The loss of people was stupid, who are terrorized by clueless generalship that leads to nothing but failures. All they (top army leaders) are capable of is reprimands, investigations, imposition of penalties. Everything is going to Hell,” Shirhsyn wrote in comments published on his personal Facebook page.


Keep in mind all of this is pulled from Ukrainian sources, so there is no ‘Russian propaganda’ here.

The Kyiv Post article further notes:

Military reporter Yury Butusov, one of Ukraine’s most widely read war correspondents, said Shirshyn’s description of recent fighting in the Kursk region was accurate, and that 47th Brigade attack columns suffered heavy losses because they were ordered to drive their armored vehicles into the teeth of ready Russian defenses covered by dense drone swarms.

Well, that’s what happens when you launch operations for political and PR, not strategic, reasons.

But that wasn’t even the half of it. Nearly at the same time, Syrsky was forced to abruptly fire the commander of the 59th Brigade for insubordination—or, in other words, refusing to sacrifice his troops pointlessly:

🇺🇦 Ukrainian Commander Dismissed After Refusing to Sacrifice Troops

Ukrainian media report that General Syrsky has abruptly dismissed the commander of the 59th Brigade of Unmanned Systems, which is currently operating in one of the most critical and collapsing sectors near Pokrovsk.

Colonel Oleksandr Sak, formerly head of the 53rd Brigade, has replaced Lieutenant Colonel Bohdan Shevchuk. Notably, the decision bypassed the brigade’s direct superior, Commander of Ukraine’s Drone Forces Vadym Sukharevskyi, and was made personally by Syrsky.

Shevchuk was reportedly removed after ordering a withdrawal to avoid encirclement—a move he claims saved his men but displeased Syrsky and Zelensky.

“There was a real risk of my men being surrounded. I took the initiative to pull them back from positions to save lives,” Shevchuk told the press.

“Apparently, that didn’t sit well with the Commander-in-Chief or the President. So I was dismissed.”

As Kiev’s leadership continues to push for symbolic victories at the cost of lives, commanders on the ground are increasingly caught between political optics and battlefield reality.


From Ukrainska Pravda:

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https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2025/05/18/7512842/

If that wasn’t bad enough, Ukrainska Pravda also reports that the AFU’s 155th Mechanized Brigade—not to be confused with the indomitable Russian 155th Marines—has had such severe issues of late that it has recorded more than 1,200 AWOL cases just since the start of 2025:

Ukrainska Pravda reports that, amidst ongoing command issues and corruption allegations, the 155th Mechanized Brigade has recorded more than 1,200 cases of AWOL/desertion since the beginning of 2025. The main causes are transferring soldiers from different MOS' to the infantry and a lack of support, including supply of UAVs. Their sources also allege that other kickbacks were occurring in other battalions in the brigade. After the article was published, Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi ordered an additional investigation into the allegations.

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https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/ ... 9/7512834/

The ‘SZCh-niki’ in question refers to Самовільне Залишення Частини, which translates to ‘Unauthorized Leaving of a Unit’.

Even worse, the article notes the desertions were spurred on by the mass corruption in the brigade, as evidenced by the arrest of the brigade’s drone battalion commander just a week ago on May 11 for stealing pay of his subordinates:

Ukraine's SBU and State Bureau of Investigation detained the commander of the 155th Mechanized Brigade's strike drone battalion last week for demanding kickbacks from his subordinates. They received extra pay for being on the front line for the entire month but were only there for part of the time.

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By the way, a brigade is supposed to have 2,500 - 5,000 people, with Ukrainian brigades tending toward the lowest end of that. So 1,200 desertions in a single brigade just since the start of this year is nearly incomprehensible in scale; nearly the entire brigade is being churned out just to AWOLs, and that’s not even counting the combat losses.

Morale is a precious commodity in Ukraine—just take a look at the latest in Zelensky’s mobilizations from the past day or two alone: (Video at link.)

Rezident_UA rumor-mill channel believes the situation is even worse:

#Inside
Our source in the OP said that on Bankova [they’re] afraid of officer rebellion, [that’s] why they are already looking for a replacement for Syrsky, against whom all field commanders are opposed. Andrey Ermak realizes toxicity of [Syrsky], but wants to choose a technical a figure without political ambitions, so as not to repeat the track with the Zaluzhny.




More problems for Ukraine, as People’s Deputy Egor Firsov reports Russian UAV use is starting to go to new heights beyond what anyone could have imagined. He states plainly that Ukraine was once in the lead in drone tech, but the ‘pendulum has swung’ to Russia:

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At the same time Ukraine’s top radioelectronics expert was amazed at finally seeing one of Russia’s new Geran drones sporting 16x Comet satellite transceivers:

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Thanks to Alexander for the photos. I see it in its entirety for the first time. And in principle I didn't think that I would ever see something like this. 16-element CRPA antenna from Shahed. 16 elements... that's crazy, of course.

It all started with 4, then 6, then 8, then 12—rising each time as the electronic jamming environment had gotten more sophisticated; now Russia is up to 16 modules to make the Geran drones virtually jam-proof.



A new Russian anti-drone interceptor called Elka has been increasingly making appearances on the front:

The Yolka (Elka) air defense drone performs kinetic interception of a Ukrainian Air Force reconnaissance UAV in the SVO zone.

Despite active maneuvering, the enemy drone was overtaken by our interceptor and deprived of its tail.

The AI ​​algorithms embedded in the Yolka air defense drone guidance system allow it to hit the most vulnerable structural elements of enemy UAVs, increasing the probability of target destruction as a result of kinetic interception.


(Video at link.)

As can be seen, it’s a cheap quadcopter drone which auto-locks onto other drones like a manpad missile, then chases after them.

Here’s footage of the Russian 155th Marines utilizing it in real combat: (Video at link.)

What’s most interesting is that Russian authorities appear to already trust this system so much that it was even spotted being utilized by Russian FSO (Federal Security Services) during the May 9th Victory Day parade, to protect Putin and co. from potential Ukrainian UAV threats:

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This of course is likely the future of anti-drone tech: cheap, intelligent UAVs that can find and take out other UAVs.

If you’re wondering how it’s possible Ukraine could have potentially gotten UAVs into the Red Square, or even Moscow in general—well, recently there’s been new confirmation of something I’ve been explaining for over two years now. It was reported a mobile drone command center was seized in the Moscow region last week, which is essentially a van that launches and controls drones from inside Russian territory:

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The Ukranian drones that attack within Russia are started within Russia, through mobile command point. They’re likely produced in Russia too. A mobile drone control center was stopped by Russian cops in Moscow.

Some of the fantasies about Ukraine’s drones “bypassing Russian air defenses for thousands of miles” are just that; in fact, they’ve been operating from within Russia via sabotage groups since the beginning. Since drones are easy to assemble with civilian off-the-shelf parts, it’s not hard to do this undetected.



Speaking of drones and electronic warfare, a report about a new system Russia has been operating on the Kherson front:

Enemy channels write a review of the captured new Russian electronic warfare system "CRAB". Recently, it began to be used in the 49th army in the Kherson direction. This is not just a jammer, but a whole complex that provides detection, interception, reconnaissance and coordination of the fight against UAVs. Each Russian battalion received such a system, along with antennas, thermal imaging cameras and HackRF digital radios for listening to radio frequencies and intercepting analog video from FPV drone cameras at a distance of up to 25 km. Similar systems, but in a more amateur version, were deployed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces a year ago on the right bank of the Dnieper.
In combination with the CRAB, the Silok-02 electronic warfare system can work, which can jam all known video and control frequencies of FPV drones. Also, the " CRAB "can be integrated into work with UAVs Orlan-10, Orlan-30, Supercam. In addition to the jamming function, the system must track friendly drones so that they are not jammed.


(More at link.)

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/put ... eadend-afu

******

2 years ago Artemovsk was liberated
May 20, 17:13

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The battle for Artemovsk ended 2 years ago. The city itself was liberated by the Wagner PMC. During the battle, Wagner lost up to 25,000 people irretrievably. The irretrievable losses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces amounted to 65,000 people. The "Bakhmut meat grinder", coupled with the repelled counteroffensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the summer of 2023, contributed to the interception of the operational-strategic initiative by Russian troops. Its significance for the entire course of the war is enormous.

In Artemovsk itself, they hung a large banner with the Wagner fighters who died in the battles for the city.

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After the war, when the city is being rebuilt, a memorial to the fallen Wagner fighters should certainly appear there.

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Peace to the ashes.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9849794.html

Kirill Dmitriev on US-Russia negotiations on Ukraine
May 20, 14:57

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One of the participants in direct negotiations with the US, Kirill Dmitriev, on the current state of the negotiation process between the US and Russia on Ukraine.

Kirill Dmitriev on the US-Russia negotiations on Ukraine

The dialogue between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump is extremely important for the US to understand the root causes, essence and possible solutions to the conflict in Ukraine. The fact that this dialogue contributes to the balanced and constructive position of the Trump administration so far is causing hysteria among European politicians, European and British media.

Titanic efforts of Western politicians and media are aimed at disrupting the constructive dialogue between Russia and the US.
We will continue to work on possible mutually beneficial projects with the US in the investment and economic spheres.

Western media on the shock of European leaders following the call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump - Part 1

Axios: Trump's compliance with Putin stunned European leaders during the call
Barak Ravid, Dave Lawler - Axios

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and five other European leaders joined a conference call with Donald Trump immediately after his conversation with Vladimir Putin on Monday. They were hoping to hear that Putin had agreed to a cease-fire — or that the U.S. would sanction him if he refused.
Instead, Trump said Putin had agreed to talks, emphasized that the U.S. would not participate in those talks, and opposed sanctioning Putin at this stage, two people on the call and one familiar with the details told Axios. Why

It Matters: Trump seemed closer to walking away from the issue entirely, the people said. Some leaders on the call were “surprised” or even “shocked.”

“I think something’s going to happen. If it doesn’t, I’m just going to step aside and they’re going to have to continue on their own. This was a European situation and it should have stayed a European situation,” Trump told reporters in the Oval Office hours after the calls.

◾️How it happened: Trump spoke briefly with Zelensky on Monday morning and, according to sources, asked him what to tell Putin.

Zelensky was happy that Trump called him for advice. He asked him to demand an immediate ceasefire, threaten new sanctions against Russia, and not make any concessions to Putin without Ukraine’s approval.

◾️Behind the scenes: After the call with Putin ended, Trump contacted Zelensky again — this time, the leaders of Germany, France, Italy, Finland, and the European Commission also participated in the conversation.

“The second call was longer and different in nature from the first,” Zelensky later said.

While one of the European participants called the conversation “constructive,” another source said Zelensky found it “bad.” The White House declined to comment.

Trump told the leaders that Putin had agreed to immediately begin direct talks on a ceasefire. According to one of the sources, there was a few seconds of confused silence.
Zelensky recalled that Putin had agreed to talks before, with the first round taking place in Istanbul on Friday. Trump, according to the sources, did not respond directly to this.

The sources also say that Zelensky and several other leaders pointed out to Trump that it was he who had previously proposed starting peace talks with an immediate 30-day ceasefire.

Western media on the shock of European leaders after the call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump - part 2

◾️Tension point: Other European leaders on the call asked about the possibility of US sanctions against Russia, but Trump responded that he thought it was a bad idea and stressed that, in his opinion, Putin wanted to make a deal.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni intervened to ask why it was not possible to declare a ceasefire for at least two weeks while the talks were being prepared. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz asked what concessions Russia would be willing to make.

Trump responded that Putin would present a “memorandum of peace” with terms for a ceasefire and an end to the war. One of the sources said Trump asked Putin to come up with “something we can work with,” rather than a proposal that would be rejected out of hand.

Zelensky, according to the sources, noted that previous talks, including meetings last week, had yielded no results and stressed that unless Trump pressed, Putin would not budge.
Between the lines: Participants in the call were surprised that Trump seemed pleased with what Putin had said and presented it as some kind of progress, although the Russian leader’s position had essentially not changed, the sources said.

◾️What’s next: Trump said that Russia and Ukraine could hold direct bilateral talks without intermediaries, since they are the ones who best understand the details of the conflict.

Meloni and Merz disagreed and insisted that the US and European countries should be involved in the negotiations.

“Somebody has to be the judge,” Meloni said. Merz suggested a meeting with all parties.

Trump later suggested the Vatican as a possible venue for the talks.

“I think something will happen. And if not, I’ll just step aside and they’ll have to carry on. This was a European situation and it should have stayed European,” Trump repeated to reporters.

◾️What’s happening now: Finnish President Alexander Stubb asked Trump what the next steps are.

“I don’t know. Somebody has to come out and say whether the talks are going well or not, and then we’ll decide what to do,” Trump replied.

https://t.me/kadmitriev/105 -кованный

Europe's main problem is that the US and RF did not let it into the negotiating table on Ukraine, although Europe really wanted to.
That is why Europe has a great desire to disrupt separate negotiations between the US and RF, where Ukraine is discussed without Ukraine.
Over the past week, the US and RF have turned all the EU's "red lines" into "brown lines".

Yesterday, the cocaine Fuhrer again squealed that Ukraine will not withdraw its troops from the occupied territories and will not recognize them as part of Russia. And he will not refuse to join NATO either. A bid for the summer campaign.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9849353.html

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"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Wed May 21, 2025 12:15 pm

No pressure or sanctions, just disappointment
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 05/21/2025

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“We are closely coordinating the next steps,” the President of the European Commission wrote yesterday on social media, referring to the telephone conversation she had just had with Volodymyr Zelensky. Ursula von der Leyen, confusing the European Union with the continent, recalled that “Europe has just adopted the seventeenth package of tough sanctions. And the eighteenth is being prepared with more and tougher sanctions. It is time to intensify pressure on Russia to achieve a ceasefire.” The EU, with no real margin or possibility of imposing sanctions on its own that could undermine the Russian economy—the harshest measures were taken in the first package of sanctions, and the fact that Brussels is heading for the twentieth is not a symptom of toughening but of the failure of all previous packages, including the disconnection of Russian banks from the international payment system SWIFT—remains firm in its intention to continue repeating the same steps, hoping for a different result.

Coordination is currently the main task von der Leyen can devote herself to. Like Zelensky, she spent yesterday's day contacting her allies, all of whom have no particular say in the next steps in the war in Ukraine or in the process of trying to stop it. In the absence of other options, the European establishment has chosen to continue insisting on its sole idea, which can be summed up in Kaja Kallas's statement yesterday: "The longer Russia wages war, the harsher our response will be." The start of the first negotiations in three years is not a reason to ease the pressure of sanctions, but rather, to use them as a convenient tool. The Ukrainian and European logic is that only threats can force Russia to "accept peace," that is, to accept the terms offered by Ukraine, which would entail, among other things, opening the door to the presence of NATO troops on the Russian-Ukrainian border.

“We are all in agreement,” Kallas stated, without specifying who all of them are and whether that includes the countries that have expressed support for negotiations. “And we have said, and we have also heard statements from the United States, that if [the Russians] do not agree to an unconditional ceasefire, as Ukraine agreed to more than sixty days ago, there will be strong action,” the head of EU diplomacy insisted yesterday, clinging to Marco Rubio’s Monday message. Kallas, like von der Leyen and Zelensky, has chosen to cling to selective memory, sticking with the message that most closely matches her wishes and forgetting both the content of the conversation between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump and the subsequent analysis carried out by the American leader.

Even harder to accept, according to what was published yesterday by the Financial Times and Axios , was the way in which the White House leader communicated, in a six-person call, not even in individual meetings, what transpired during the two hours in which he and Vladimir Putin discussed issues regarding Ukraine and the main incentive he can offer Russia to continue the negotiation process: trade. Earlier, JD Vance had stated to the media that the United States was offering Moscow "reintegration" into Western trade, something that European countries, with veto power over the most important aspect: the reconnection of Russian banks to the SWIFT system, will undoubtedly resist. However, to the chagrin of the six expectant leaders, the news they received from Donald Trump did not follow the logic set by Marco Rubio, but rather by Vice President Vance. Trump's words in his Fox News interview , in which he stated his willingness to impose secondary sanctions against Russia, and the certainty that the Russian president would once again reject an unconditional ceasefire without guarantees of moving towards political negotiations to resolve the conflict, had raised the expectations of Zelensky and his European allies. Despite the hope that the time elapsed between the start of contacts after Donald Trump came to power and the lack of tangible steps towards a ceasefire would lead to the desired threats of sanctions, what European leaders and Zelensky heard from the American leader, whose version of events did not differ much from that presented by Vladimir Putin, was a Trump who conveyed what he considered good news.

“A person familiar with the conversation said the leaders involved in the call were stunned by the US president's description of what had been agreed. They added that it was clear Trump was ‘unwilling to put further pressure’ on Putin to come to the negotiating table seriously,” wrote the Financial Times yesterday , describing the audience of six European leaders as horrified by the US president's latest about-face. Earlier, Volodymyr Zelensky had been flattered to receive the call from Donald Trump in the minutes before his meeting with Vladimir Putin. Further raising European expectations of a tough conversation in which Trump would pressure the Kremlin to impose the desired unconditional ceasefire, the US leader asked Zelensky what he wanted to discuss with the Russian leader.

The outcome could not have been more disappointing for European countries, as Trump not only failed to push for an immediate truce, but instead presented as great news the fact that Vladimir Putin was willing to negotiate, to present a peace memorandum to be negotiated with Ukraine, and to proceed with a dialogue seeking to end the war by addressing the root causes of the conflict. All of these aspects are worrying for kyiv and European capitals, as they necessarily imply the continuation, at least for the time being, of the war as it is unfolding—with Russia accelerating its advance on a very sensitive part of the Donetsk front—and the strategy of inducements persists without threats having yet come into play. Perhaps even more worrying was Trump's brief mention that Ukraine and Russia, two countries capable of dialogue without mediation, should negotiate the terms. Yesterday, both Ukraine and the European Union insisted on the possibility of a dialogue involving the United States and the European Union. As has been the case since 2014, even before the Ukrainian political conflict erupted into the civil war in Donbas, Western countries have sought to shield Kiev from the possibility of bilateral negotiations. This was the rationale behind the Normandy Format and one of the reasons why the Istanbul negotiations dragged on for so long and ultimately failed. A European or US presence at those talks would have quickly disrupted a process that involved negotiating Western security guarantees that neither the United States nor the United Kingdom were willing to offer. The situation is even more complicated now, as after three years of mobilizing multi-billion-dollar resources for the battle, the war of attrition continues to benefit Russia.

If in 2022 Ukraine's main strength was its resilience and the certainty that Russia's initial plan had failed and Moscow lacked the personnel necessary to maintain such a vast front, now, after more than two and a half years of failure in the attempt to recover territories in the south and east of the country, kyiv's main strength is what its allies are granting it in the form of military supplies and promises of future increases, funding for the long-term maintenance of the state, and diplomatic power with which to offset the imbalance between Ukraine and Russia. A bilateral negotiation in which the United States takes a position close to that of Moscow, whose position is that a final treaty must be negotiated, a resolution not only to the war, but to the conflict between the two countries, is the most negative scenario for kyiv.

Ukrainian media yesterday lamented Donald Trump's attitude in his conversation with European leaders. "Zelensky had to remind Trump during the call with European leaders that peace negotiations have already begun," The Kyiv Independent stated , referring to the announcement of the good news that peace negotiations were about to begin. In reality, from the Russian perspective, last week's meeting was nothing more than a first contact, in which it was agreed to return to the table with a document in which each party outlines its conditions for a ceasefire and subsequent negotiations. These are the negotiations Vladimir Putin wants to begin, and the ones that have given both countries a timeframe to work on their demands. Yesterday, Ukrainska Pravda , like other Ukrainian media, criticized Trump for his remarks about Volodymyr Zelensky, in which he didn't give an affirmative answer but rather a "give me two or four weeks" response to the question of whether Ukraine is doing enough to achieve peace.

That remains Trump's position for the time being. However, we must not forget that Trump's doubts about Zelensky's stance, which the Ukrainian press criticized yesterday, have also spread to Vladimir Putin, who also needs to show the White House that he wants peace. According to several media outlets, one of Trump's demands of his Russian counterpart was precisely a document detailing the Russian Federation's true conditions, conditions that can be negotiated and cannot be rejected outright, as Medinsky allegedly presented in Istanbul. The possibility of imposing secondary sanctions or even increasing military supplies to Ukraine, the scenario desired by kyiv, remains open.

Faced with the uncertainty of a process with no guarantee of reaching an agreement, even a minimal one, the European strategy will not change. “Obviously, Russia is trying to buy time to continue the war and the occupation. We are working with our partners to ensure that pressure forces Russia to change its behavior. Sanctions matter. If Russia continues to make unrealistic demands and sabotage potential outcomes, there must be harsh consequences,” Volodymyr Zelensky stated yesterday. The tactic continues to be to claim that only Russia delays the negotiations, only Moscow makes maximalist demands as a starting position, and only increased sanctions can force the Kremlin to comply with the dictates of Ukraine and European capitals. This version ignores, in addition to the precedents of previous negotiation processes throughout this conflict, that the easiest way to bring the strongest party to the negotiating table is not threats but incentives. With his conversation, the presentation of the Istanbul results as proposals for the future, and the expertise of someone with years of negotiating experience, Vladimir Putin not only bought time for Russia, but also for Ukraine. Both countries now have a time—perhaps limited—to try to negotiate some kind of breakthrough or risk the wrath of whoever continues to pull the strings of diplomacy behind the scenes.

https://slavyangrad.es/2025/05/21/ni-pr ... decepcion/

Google Translator

******

From Cassad's telegram account:

Colonelcassad
The commotion near Bryansk – what happened on May 21 in the Bryansk region

Today, the Russian segment of Telegram was agitated by the unclear situation in the Bryansk region. According to some reports, more than 70 people “unnoticed” slipped almost to Bryansk.

Local residents reported the closure of three roads: towards Myakishevo, Subbotovo and Lopushi. Later, the sabotage and reconnaissance group grew into a unit of more than 100 people.

In fact, there was a sabotage and reconnaissance group. A detachment of up to 10 people, taking advantage of the green plantings, slipped through the border and, relying on the Desna River, tried to reach the administrative center of the region.

In the area of ​​Subbotovo and Myakishevo, the sabotage and reconnaissance group was discovered, which led to a firefight. The Rosgvardia units blocked this area so that the enemy reconnaissance group could not escape.

Currently, the area is being cleared, but there is no talk of any unimaginable numbers. Attempts by the Ukrainian Armed Forces to send in sabotage and reconnaissance groups are constantly being noted, which is what happened in Bryansk.

However, it should be added that the activity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Bryansk direction has really increased. The enemy is using drones, conducting local attacks in the border area, so new, larger-scale actions are not excluded.

***

Colonelcassad
The Defense Ministry's air defense forces repelled an attack by three drones flying to Moscow, Sergei Sobyanin reported. Emergency services specialists are working at the site of the fallen debris.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces also attacked the Zaporizhzhya NPP training center with the world's only full-scale reactor hall simulator several times. No one was hurt. There is no critical damage, the station reported.

***

Colonelcassad
The main points of D. Peskov's statements:

- Work on the exchange of prisoners of war with Ukraine on the 1000 for 1000 formula is being carried out in pursuance of the agreements in Istanbul.

- Moscow has not received any specific proposals from the Vatican on cooperation in resolving the situation in Ukraine. A decision on the location of further negotiations has not yet been made.

- A list of conditions for a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine will be prepared by the parties separately.

- No one is interested in delaying the process of drafting a memorandum on a future peace treaty with Ukraine. Most of the work is being done behind closed doors.

- The Russian Federation welcomes the efforts of all states, including the Vatican, that want to help resolve the situation with Ukraine.

- Contacts between Russia and the United States on preparing for the exchange of prisoners on the "9 for 9" formula are ongoing, but it is premature to talk about the timing.

- Russia and the United States need to recreate the destroyed legal framework for strategic stability.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

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Insubordination on the rise in the AFU

How long can the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue like this?
Ismaele
May 19, 2025

I have not dealt with the Russo-Ukrainian war for quite a while, but the news coming from the front in the last few days are so juicy that I could not neglect them. Plus, I believe they are more interesting than the theatre of the negotiations between Russia, on one side, and Ukraine and the Outlaw US Empire, on the other. So, here we go, with my English translation of 3 short posts from the Telegram channel of Italian journalist Vittorio Rangeloni.

The first one was published just an hour ago, at the time of publishing this article, i.e. at 20.03 CEST. It’s (almost) breaking news: as per the title of this article (my choice, not Rangeloni’s - all emphasis mine)…

Insubordination on the rise in the AFU

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In Ukraine, yesterday's scandal over the resignation of the commander of the 47th brigade, who was tired of receiving “idiotic orders” [translation of the post in the link further down] on the border with the Kursk region, has not yet been digested, and a new case of “rebellion” among senior officers has surfaced.

This time, however, it is Syrsky, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces himself, who has urgently decided to remove Lieutenant-Colonel Bogdan Shevchuk, who is engaged with his men on the difficult Pokrovsk front, from his post as commander of the 59th assault brigade.

According to Shevchuk, his soldiers were in danger of being encircled by the Russians and, as a result, he “guiltily” decided on his own to order them to retreat from their positions and abandon a residential area. “The commander-in-chief and the president did not like this and decided to remove me from office”, said the former 59th brigade commander.

The second post was published yesterday, Sunday 18th May 2025, and it is the one referred in the link in the post above. (All emphasis mine).

Kiev's military leadership does not abandon the idea of fighting on Russian territory, but officers on the ground rebel: “idiotic orders”

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After the army of the Russian Federation regained control of the borders of the Kursk region with Ukraine, the Kiev commands almost immediately attempted to return to fighting on Russian territory. At first, there were attempts to penetrate the Belgorod region, aimed at gaining control of the villages Demikovka and Popovka, after which the Ukrainian efforts concentrated again in the Kursk region, targeting Tyotkino. Despite the large number of men and means sacrificed, these raids failed. But the attempts continue.

In both directions, the Ukrainian commands have focused on the 47th mechanised brigade “Magura”, formed at the end of 2022 according to NATO standards, equipped with Western means (Bradley, Leopard 2AS and Abrams) and trained in Germany. This formation - considered elite - was forged to participate in the counter-offensive of 2023, which was supposed to take Zelensky's army to the Crimean border, but already after a few kilometres it crashed into the wall of the “Surovikin” line in the Zaporozhye region.

In Kursk, too, the situation was no better. Yesterday [Saturday 17th May 2025], the commander of the 1st battalion of the 47th Brigade, Alexander Shirshin, lashed out at the leadership of his army and resigned. Here are his words:

I have never received more idiotic tasks than those assigned in the current operations. One day I will tell the details, but the loss of people in a stupid way, the shuddering at the stupidity of commanders, can only lead to failures. All they are capable of is reprimands, investigations, disciplinary actions. To hell with them all.

The “political” games and the assessment of the real state of affairs correspond neither to reality nor to possibilities. They have gone too far.

My report has been submitted, I will soon be removed from office and I will be ready to tell my journalist friends something.


Ukrainian journalist (propagandist close to the defence leadership) Butusov also defended the commander, admitting that the country's top leadership thinks more about the political profit of operations than the lives of soldiers:

Attempts to attack head-on with columns of vehicles under Russian supervision and drone attacks lead to significant losses of vehicles and people. The political task of conducting combat operations on enemy territory, set by the Supreme Commander's Headquarters, is poorly organised and planned at the operational and tactical level, and no one tries to draw conclusions and learn, but, on the contrary, the same mistakes are repeated many times, without considering the losses.

The third and final post was published yesterday, Sunday 18th May 2025, and it is the one referred in the link in the post above. (All emphasis mine).

Dnipropetrovsk - Ukrainian corruption allied with the Russian army

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The front line is leaving the mines of the Donbass behind, moving further and further west, close to the Dnipropetrovsk region. It is now only a handful of kilometres to the gates of this new oblast.

The Russian army, which has learnt to identify and press ever more effectively on the weak points of the Ukrainian defences, can also hope to count on a valuable ally in the Dnepropetrovsk region: the corruption of oblast officials.

The conflict has given the Ukrainian regional authorities even more power in the management of emergency situations, more money and consequently also enormous opportunities to speculate and enrich themselves.

The easiest way of laundering public money when the conflict is on the doorstep is surely through the allocation of funds for the construction of fortifications, an area in which the head of the regional military administration is competent: Sergei Lysak, former head of the region's Security Services (and a family friend of the SBU Malyuk's head), appointed on 7th February 2023 to replace Valentin Reznichenko following allegations of corruption and misappropriation of public funds.

Under Lysak, the volumes of corruption have even increased. According to the Financial Times, in 2024 the Dnipropetrovsk region spent more than seven million [US] Dollars on the construction of defensive fortifications, which journalists sent to the region did not find. This complaint triggered checks, mobilising a special commission sent by Kiev. Andrei Bogdanets, one of the members of the commission, admitted that “the theft of money for the construction of fortifications almost always goes unpunished”.

In addition to trenches, anti-tank ditches and casemates, another shameless ploy to make public money disappear are investments in bunkers in schools. The Dnipropetrovsk region between 24 February 2022 and 19 November 2024 was awarded around 10 per cent of the funds (worth around € 65 million) allocated by the country to build bomb shelters.

In Krivoj Rog, in Zelensky's hometown, Gymnasium No. 89, High School No.123 (where the director of the contracting company is under investigation for embezzlement of money) and Gymnasium No. 84 are still waiting for the delivery of the anti-radiation bunkers. The work is still on the high seas, despite being scheduled for completion by the end of 2024. And they will probably never be completed, despite the millions of Euro already allocated.

Another tool for the appropriation of public funds is the so-called “TerOborona” (Territorial Defence Brigades). The “godfather” of this structure in Dnipro is Boris Filatov, a man of the oligarch Kolomoiskij and Lysak's deputy. A few weeks ago, Mikola Lukashuk, head of the Dnipropetrovsk Region Regional Council (where quite a few councillors have not appeared in court for months, preferring to smart-work from their residences in Europe), announced the allocation of more than 400 million gryvne for the defence of the region, most of which has been paid to Filatov's 128th brigade, which is supposed to be in charge of creating new fortifications. The remaining funds were earmarked for the resurfacing of roads in Novopavlovka, a settlement located only a few kilometres from the front line. These roads had not been considered for decades, but just now the need to invest money was perceived... perhaps because there is a greater chance that the Russians will get there before the members of the Anti-Corruption Commission.

Something tells me that the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) are about to collapse. How long can they go on with all this insubordination and corruption?

https://geopolitiq.substack.com/p/insub ... e?r=25fc37

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The Devil’s In The Details As Trump Announces “Immediate” Russian-Ukrainian Ceasefire Talks
Andrew Korybko
May 20, 2025

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The US’ policy towards the conflict will likely depend on the course of these upcoming negotiations.

Trump appeared to have recognized the limits of third-party mediation between Russia and Ukraine in the post that he made after his latest call with Putin on Monday. He announced the “immediate” start of ceasefire negotiations between them but specified that “The conditions for that will be negotiated between the two parties, as it can only be, because they know details of a negotiation that nobody else would be aware of.” Here are ten background briefings that place his latest position into context:

* 12 March: “Will Putin Agree To A Ceasefire?”

* 1 April: “Trump’s Latest Sanctions Threat Against Russia Suggests That He’s Getting Impatient For A Deal”

* 4 April: “Putin’s Economic Envoy Helped Break The Russian-US Impasse On Ukraine”

* 10 April: “How Might The US’ Relations With Ukraine & Russia Change If It Abandons Its Peace Efforts?”

* 28 April: “Five Significant Disagreements Account For Trump’s Newfound Anger With Putin”

* 2 May: “The Amended Minerals Deal Will Likely Lead To More American Weapons Packages For Ukraine”

* 3 May: “Five Benefits That The US Would Reap From Coercing Ukraine Into More Concessions To Russia”

* 10 May: “The US Is Toughening Its Negotiating Stance Towards Russia”

* 13 May: “Third-Party Mediation Between Russia & Ukraine Is Approaching Its Limits”

* 17 May: “The Ball’s In Trump’s Court After The Latest Istanbul Talks”

To review, the US has hitherto wanted Russia to accept freezing the Line of Contact (LOC) in exchange for a series of profitable (likely resource-centric) deals, absent which another round of American sanctions could be implemented and perhaps even the large-scale resumption of military aid to Ukraine. Sanctions are still on the table, but Trump’s latest post was much more politely written than some previous ones that expressed increasing impatience with Putin, thus suggesting that some progress has been made.

It can only be speculated what they achieved during their two-hour-long discussion, but Trump implied that creative economic/energy diplomacy on the US’ part could raise the chances of Russia compromising with Ukraine. He wrote that “Russia wants to do largescale TRADE with the United States when this catastrophic ‘bloodbath’ is over, and I agree. This is a tremendous opportunity for Russia to create massive amounts of jobs and wealth. Its potential is UNLIMITED.”

Putin remains loath to an unconditional ceasefire since he declared last June that Russia would only agree to it if Ukraine withdraws from the entirety of the disputed regions, abandons its plans to join NATO, and is cut off from all foreign arms. Zelensky just said after their talks on Monday that Ukraine won’t withdraw though, while it still remains committed to joining NATO and it’ll also be a struggle for the US to get the Europeans to stop arming Ukraine, so it’s unclear how their ceasefire talks will proceed.

Nevertheless, Putin also said after his call with Trump that “The key issue, of course, is now for the Russian side and the Ukrainian side to show their firm commitment to peace and to forge a compromise that would be acceptable to all parties. Notably, Russia’s position is clear. Eliminating the root causes of this crisis is what matters most to us.” His desire to reach a mutually acceptable compromise suggests that he might display more flexibility than before, perhaps enticed by the US’ economic offers.

While he certainly wants the nascent Russian-US “New Détente” to evolve into a full-fledged strategic partnership after the conflict ends, his reaffirmation that the root causes of the crisis must be eliminated should dispel speculation that he’ll “sell out” by abandoning the special operation’s goals in exchange. To remind the reader, these are restoring Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality, demilitarizing it, denazifying it, and now also obtaining recognition of the new ground realities after September 2022’s referenda.

The first and last are clear-cut while the other two leave lots of room for interpretation. This means that Russia is unlikely to compromise on restoring Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality or withdrawing from any of the land that it claims as its own. It could hypothetically freeze the territorial dimension of the conflict by no longer militarily trying to obtain control over the entirety of the disputed regions, however, if the Ukrainian-controlled remainder receives the autonomy that Donbass was promised under Minsk.

To be clear, there’s no indication that this is being considered and it’s just educated conjecture, as is the proposal for a demilitarized “Trans-Dnieper” region controlled by non-Western peacekeepers that would encompass everything north of the LOC and east of the river. The last-mentioned could represent a mutually acceptable compromise on demilitarization and denazification, the goals of which leave lots of room for interpretation as was written above, but it doesn’t appear to be part of their talks right now.

In any case, the point is that demilitarization and denazification might be the two goals that Putin could most realistically compromise on, but only in order to ensure the tangible improvement of Russia’s long-term national security interests. Generally speaking, this means that Ukraine must either no longer function as a NATO proxy by the time the conflict ends or the threats that it still poses as such must be pushed further away from the border, which could be achieved through the “Trans-Dnieper” proposal.

More broadly, it would be most ideal if there was also a game-changing rapprochement between Russia and the US, thus greatly decreasing the likelihood that NATO’s most powerful member could be manipulated into going to war against Russia by any provocations carried out by its “rogue” allies. This outcome would be the most meaningful by far due to its grand strategic significance so it’s possible that Putin might compromise more than expected if he truly thought that this would then be within reach.

At the same time, he’s only interested in compromising, not in unilateral concessions of the sort that Zelensky is demanding and the US strongly suggested that it wants. This means that whatever compromises he proposes, especially if they’re unexpected ones, must be reciprocated by Ukraine and/or the US. If Zelensky refuses, then it would be incumbent on Trump to coerce him into compliance so as to not lose the opportunity for peace that any unexpected compromises from Putin would present.

Any insubordination from Zelensky would have to be strictly dealt with otherwise Trump’s envisaged “largescale TRADE” with Russia, which he believes has “UNLIMITED” potential, would be lost as would the credible chance of him winning the Nobel Peace Prize afterwards like he wants for his legacy. This could take the form of cutting off all military-intelligence aid and maybe even going as far as to threaten sanctions against any European countries that continue to furnish such during that time.

Trump alluded to the possibility of once again freezing military aid to Ukraine by mentioning after his call with Putin that “This is not our war. This is not my war… I mean, we got ourselves entangled in something that we shouldn’t have been involved in.” He also confirmed that Zelensky is “not the easiest person to deal with. But I think that he wants to stop… I hope the answer is that he wants to get it solved.” If he comes to see Zelensky as the obstacle to peace, not Putin, then he might cut him off again.

Ultimately, the devil’s in the details of the upcoming Russian-Ukrainian ceasefire talks, which will in turn largely determine whether the US goes through with sanctioning Russia or cutting off Ukraine. The public isn’t privy to each team’s negotiating strategy, nor to the flexibility that their leaders have given them, so there’ll be a lot of fake news, speculation, and educated conjecture from here on out. Everyone should therefore brace themselves for this and brush up on their media literacy in order to not be misled.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/the-devi ... s-as-trump

The compromises that Little Andy suggests would be self defeating for Russia, The Nazis must be crushed and Ukraine neutered for the foreseeable future.

*******

Russians Warned.

Don't come, you will be killed. But noo! They thought that Iraq and Afghanistan was the shit. Same as Wehrmacht thought that France and Low Countries will be repeated in USSR. They just don't learn, do they?

МОСКВА, 19 мая — РИА Новости. Российские военные взяли в плен группу наемников из ЧВК Mozart в селе Новоандреевка в Запорожской области, сообщил РИА Новости координатор николаевского подполья Сергей Лебедев. "Новоандреевка. <...> Уничтожение роты ЧВК Mozart (иностранные наемники). <...> Потери противника: 23 убитых, семь пленных (граждане Великобритании и Канады)", — сказал собеседник агентства.

Translation: MOSCOW, May 19 — RIA Novosti. Russian military captured a group of mercenaries from the Mozart PMC in the village of Novoandreyevka in the Zaporizhia region, the coordinator of the Nikolaev underground, Sergei Lebedev, told RIA Novosti. "Novoandreyevka. <...> Destruction of a company of the Mozart PMC (foreign mercenaries). <...> Enemy losses: 23 killed, seven captured (citizens of Great Britain and Canada)," the agency's source said.

Well, that's not a company, that's platoon, but still--boys didn't understand what they were getting themselves into. Meanwhile, Russians are losing so badly now that another batch of Leopards and Bradleys has been disposed of today.
Posted by smoothiex12 at 10:27 AM

http://smoothiex12.blogspot.com/2025/05 ... arned.html

Remember Sebastian Gorka?

And his opinion about the meeting of Trump and Putin being "imminent"? Well ...

Пресс-секретарь российского президента Дмитрий Песков заявил, что переговоры о встрече лидеров России и США сейчас не ведутся. Встреча между президентом России Владимиром Путиным и президентом США Дональдом Трампом на данный момент не готовится, передает ТАСС. Пресс-секретарь Кремля Дмитрий Песков ответил журналистам на вопрос о возможности организации переговоров между двумя лидерами. «Нет, сейчас не готовится», – сообщил Песков, комментируя потенциальную встречу Путина и Трампа.

Translation: Russian presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov said that negotiations on a meeting between the leaders of Russia and the United States are not currently underway. A meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump is not currently being prepared, TASS reports. Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov answered journalists' question about the possibility of organizing talks between the two leaders. "No, they are not currently being prepared," Peskov said, commenting on a potential meeting between Putin and Trump.

Meanwhile, here is Vladimir Putin's explanation (in Russian) the essence of phone call with Donnie--remove root causes, will talk seriously. If not, well, SMO continues. (Video at link.)

Meanwhile, Russia is losing. Didn't you know? Hey, British say so.

Putin's generals are 'lying to him' as in reality 'Russia is losing to Ukraine'. Vladimir Putin has no idea Russia is losing in Ukraine because his generals are lying to him, western intelligence sources believe.

So, you see, Putin is completely oblivious, but amateurs from what passes in UK for military and intel (and the excrement collector aka British media) know it better)) Poor, poor dears--I know, transitioning to the third world shithole hurts.

http://smoothiex12.blogspot.com/2025/05 ... gorka.html

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Rooting Out the Root Causes in Ukraine
May 19, 2025

Vladimir Putin told Donald Trump on the phone Monday the Ukraine war can only end after addressing its “root causes,” which the Western media have been tirelessly rooting out of public discussion since the war began, says Joe Lauria.

Image
Putin with Trump, 2019 (Russian Presidential Press and Information Office CC BY 4.0)

By Joe Lauria
Special to Consortium News

After a two-hour telephone call between the presidents of Russia and the United States on Monday, President Vladimir Putin said:

“I would like to emphasize once again that the conversation was very constructive, and I rate it highly. The question, of course, is for the Russian and Ukrainian sides to show maximum desire for peace and find compromises that would suit all parties. At the same time,I would like to note that Russia’s position is generally clear. The main thing for us is to eliminate the root causes of this crisis.”

It should be no mystery to Western leaders, media and the public what those root causes are, as Moscow has been repeating them ad nauseam beginning 30 years ago and especially in the run up to Russia’s 2022 intervention in Ukraine’s then eight-year old civil war.

The problem is the West appears too full of itself to bother listening to what its adversary has to say, which in itself has been one of the root causes of the conflict.

Unlike consumers of mainstream media — the majority of the population — readers of independent news outlets, like Consortium News, are well aware of what those root causes are. For doing its job by reporting on the causes of the conflict, CN and other alternative media, have been branded Russian propagandists.

The root causes bear repeating here. 1) NATO expansion; 2) Forward deployment of NATO troops and missiles in Romania and Poland; 3) NATO training and equipping Ukraine as a proxy with the intention of bringing Ukraine into NATO; 4) the 2014 unconstitutional change of government leading to attacks against Russian speakers in the south and east of Ukraine; and 5) the outsized influence of Neo-Nazi groups in Ukraine.

Many useful analogies have been made about a Russian-backed overthrow of the Mexican or Canadian governments and Russian missiles pointed at the U.S. being deployed in either country. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis showed how the U.S. reacted when missiles were deployed near its borders.

Meanwhile, establishment media have worked overtime to root out the root causes from the public’s mind.

They bury them by airbrushing out of the story a) NATO expansion; b) the U.S.-backed unconstitutional change of government in Ukraine in 2014; c) Ukraine, with NATO backing, starting the war against ethnic Russian Donbass the same year; d) Ukraine and the West’s failure to abide by the Minsk accords in 2015 to end the war; e) Ukraine pulling out of the Istanbul agreement in 2022 under U.S. and U.K. pressure; and f) ditching its 2014 coverage of the role of Ukrainian Neo-Nazis in this.

After the Phone Call

The big questions emerging from today’s telephone conversation are 1) After two hours of, no doubt, careful explanation by Putin to Donald Trump, did the American president finally allow these root causes to penetrate his mind? Is he prepared to instruct U.S. negotiators to address these causes in a final peace agreement?

Trump has made fleeting remarks before that seem to indicate some sort of understanding of the Russian perspective, such as when he said in January:

“A big part of the problem is, Russia – for many, many years, long before Putin – said, ‘You could never have NATO involved with Ukraine.’ Now, they’ve said that. That’s been, like, written in stone. And somewhere along the line [Joe] Biden said, ‘No. They should be able to join NATO.’ Well, then Russia has somebody right on their doorstep, and I could understand their feelings about that.”

What’s required is a full, sustained comprehension that Trump may be incapable of. He must be prepared to stand up to (or dismiss) the hardliners on his team — namely Gen. Keith Kellogg and Secretary of State Marco Rubio — and to use U.S. leverage to press Ukraine to accept that these root causes must be resolved to bring peace.

The early reaction from Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky, particularly about Russian demands that Ukraine cede territory to Moscow, shows Trump would have his work cut out for him.

“Ukraine will not withdraw troops from part of its own territory and will not succumb to Russia’s ultimatums,” Zelensky said Monday. “I asked him [Trump] not to accept any things about Ukraine without Ukraine.”

But without addressing the root causes, the Kremlin has made clear it is prepared to continue the war until they are resolved. The sacrifices it and Ukraine have made otherwise make little sense from Russia’s viewpoint. Moscow’s chief negotiator in the Ukraine-Russia talks that began in Istanbul last week said Russia had fought Sweden for 21 years in the 18th century and was in for the long haul in Ukraine.

Russia sought in December 2021 to avoid its intervention and an escalation of the war when it offered treaties to the United States and NATO that would see the withdrawal of NATO troops from former Warsaw Pact countries; the removal of missiles from Romania and Poland; and an assurance of Ukraine’s neutrality, i.e., that it does not join NATO. The Kremlin said if the treaties were rejected it could resort to technical/military means to resolve the issues.

The U.S. rejected the treaties, preferring the military response in the misguided and now dashed hope that a Russian intervention would lead to the collapse of Putin’s rule. Only a revival of these treaties and Trump’s determined willingness to negotiate them will bring the war to a close.

The situation could not be any clearer: Ukraine can only hope to win the war and recover its territory if NATO directly intervenes against Russia. As NATO leaders understand this could lead to nuclear annihilation they will only keep the fiction alive that they could still help Ukraine win, thereby preserving their own political careers and reputation, but doing nothing to effect events on the ground.

The longer Ukraine refuses to make compromises, the worse deal it will get in the end unless Trump understands this and uses the power he has to make Ukraine accept reality.

https://consortiumnews.com/2025/05/19/r ... n-ukraine/

Totally gratuitous Photo of Root Boy Slim
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*****

Portnov shot dead in Spain
May 21, 1:00 PM

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It is reported that former Yanukovych adviser Andriy Portnov was killed in the Madrid area of ​​Spain.
If the information is confirmed, it can be assumed that the murder was ordered by Zelensky's gang, with whom Portnov was suing.
Portnov was also under European sanctions.

Spanish police confirmed Portnov's death. He received 4 bullets in the body and 1 in the head.

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Portnov also spoke about the need for filtration in Ukraine after the liquidation of the Nazi regime.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9851303.html

Iskander training
May 21, 11:13

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The enemy actually confirms losses during yesterday's attack on the training center in Shostka, where about 70 Ukrainian Armed Forces trainees and an instructor were killed by an Iskander OTRK strike. The Iskander strike was supported by a drone that was hovering over the training ground and providing targeting. For some reason, the enemy ignored the obvious threat.

(Videos at link.)

As a result, the hysteria and search for the guilty party has been going on for the second day already.

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Of course, the resignation of the butcher Syrsky is once again being demanded.
The moral of the story is simple - there is no need to gather personnel in a crowded form at training grounds and for awards within the effective range of high-precision weapons.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9851017.html

Google Translator

*******

Russia Matters: Trump-Putin Calls Yields No Public Breakthrough on Ukraine With FT Pondering If U.S. Done Mediating
May 19, 2025
Russia Matters, 5/19/25

1.Donald Trump’s Monday call with Vladimir Putin yielded no breakthrough on Russia-Ukraine war with Putin rejecting an unconditional full ceasefire again and Trump asserting that, going forward, Moscow and Kyiv will need to negotiate conditions directly, perhaps, in the Vatican in what Financial Times reporters interpreted as a signal that Washington is “stepping back from a role as a mediator.” Putin was first to offer his take on the call, which lasted for more than two hours, telling Russian media that Russia has stated readiness to work with the Ukrainian side on a memorandum regarding a possible a peace treaty “with a number of positions to be defined.” These positions, according to the Kremlin’s account of Putin’s remarks to the media included “the principles for settlement, the timeframe for a possible peace deal, and… a potential temporary ceasefire, should the necessary agreements be reached.” Trump’s account of the call appeared to be more upbeat than that of the Russian counterpart. “The tone and spirit of the conversation were excellent,” U.S. leader wrote on Truth Social. He also wrote that “Russia and Ukraine will immediately start negotiations toward a Ceasefire and, more importantly, an END to the War” and that “the conditions for that will be negotiated between the two parties, as it can only be, because they know details of a negotiation that nobody else would be aware of.” Ominously, perhaps, Trump also wrote that “the Vatican, as represented by the Pope, has stated that it would be very interested in hosting the negotiations.” Trump’s remarks, in the view of Financial Times’ reporting team, indicate the Trump administration is done trying mediating between Moscow and Kyiv.1 The Monday call was preceded by the direct Russian-Ukrainian talks, which took place in Istanbul on Friday. Those talks did not significantly advance the peace negotiations either, although both sides agreed on what would become the largest prisoner-of-war exchange since the start of the war. The outcome of the Friday meeting represented a “tactical win for Mr. Putin, who managed to start the talks without first agreeing to a battlefield cease-fire that Ukraine and almost all of its Western backers had sought as a precondition for negotiations,” according to NYT.

2.Putin may be thinking that Russia will outlast Ukraine in his war, and he has a reason to do so, according to FT’s Gideon Rachman. This columnist cites “sources” as estimating that “Ukrainian casualties are running at roughly two-thirds the level of Russia’s… while its population is roughly a quarter that of Russia’s.” “Putin [therefore] has reason to believe that he would ultimately prevail in a war of attrition,” in spite of Russia’s “staggering losses,” according to Rachman.2 Putin has also managed to consolidate the public at home as he aims to “outlast Ukraine and the U.S.,” according to Amy Knight’s commentary in Wall Street Journal.

3.A group of CSIS military fellows have inferred insights for future conflicts from the Russia-Ukraine war and they include that West’s “incremental escalation—providing support and then pausing to gauge the Russian reaction before providing more advanced support—contributed to the absence of a nuclear detonation in this conflict.” Another insight is that “Despite rapid advances, the use of unmanned sea and aerial drones today is still an evolution, not a revolution, of warfare” with tanks remaining “relevant.” The Russia-Ukraine war also indicates that “Future success in contested environments will depend not only on moving supplies but on mastering data, defending networks, and leveraging innovation across all domains.”

4.Ukraine’s defense industry keeps churning more and more lethal products with value of the latter increasing by 3400% since the beginning of the war, according to Wall Street Journal. “The value of weapons Ukraine’s defense industry can make has ballooned from $1 billion in 2022 to $35 billion over three years of war… Last year Ukraine said it produced more artillery guns than all NATO countries combined,” according to WSJ. “More than 40% of the weapons used on the front line with Russia are now made in Ukraine” and in “some areas, such as drones, unmanned ground systems, and electronic warfare, the figure is close to 100%,” WSJ reported. At the same time, Ukraine’s efforts to procure arms abroad have not been all exemplary. A Financial Times investigation “has uncovered how hundreds of millions of dollars Kyiv paid to foreign arms intermediaries to secure vital military equipment has gone to waste over the past three years of war.”

5.Trump’s Golden Dome will press Russia into a new arms race, forcing it to devote yet more resources to its strategic forces at a time when the country can least afford it, according to James D.J. Brown of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. So far, the significant increase in Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons “that the Pentagon predicted five years ago has so far not materialized,” according to Hans M. Kristensen of FAS and his colleagues’ report: “Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2025.”

https://natyliesbaldwin.com/2025/05/rus ... mediating/
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Thu May 22, 2025 11:48 am

The murder of Andriy Portnov
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 05/22/2025

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“No matter how long spring lasts, nothing lasts forever. And this too shall pass,” wrote Andriy Portnov in May 2021, hoping for better times and willing to use his legal skills to achieve them. He had returned to Ukraine at the end of the Poroshenko era after five years of exile. In that article , Portnov focused on the state of judicial independence in the country and, in particular, on the games Zelensky and his entourage played in the fight for control of the Constitutional Court, which implied the possibility of imposing political decisions regardless of the judges' opinions—that is, of legality.

“For months, the Ukrainian president has been determining punishments by decree and without trial, approving them through a National Defense and Security Council created by his own people. There is no due process, no analysis of evidence, no right to defense, and no presumption of innocence. To wrest these decisions from judicial oversight, the president has paralyzed the work of the Constitutional Court and increased pressure on ordinary courts. He has introduced a law to abolish the Kyiv District Administrative Court, demonstrating that his willingness to make illegal decisions knows no bounds. Within the judicial system, he has also increased pressure on the Supreme Court.

"Thus, in just a few months, a parallel vertical judiciary has been formed in the country: a system that surpasses and ignores the judiciary, that has assigned itself judicial powers, that concentrates judicial functions in the hands of officers of the state security bodies and forces that belong to the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, directly subordinate to the system of punishments of the country's president, and have created special and extraordinary codes that do not care about procedure or judicial arbitrariness," he wrote, with comments that recall that Volodymyr Zelensky's authoritarian tendencies and attempt to concentrate power in a few hands precede the Russian invasion of February 2022.

Andriy Portnov is the “man shot near a school in Pozuelo” that El Mundo reported yesterday had died, or “the “infamous” pro-Russian advisor to Yanukovych sanctioned by the United States” that El Español referred to . El País , which points out that Portnov was included on the Magnitsky List, forgets that he was also included on the Myrotvorets website that cost the life of journalist Oles Buzina. In a lengthy article, the Spanish outlet writes that “Internews Ukraine’s UkraineWorld project discovered in 2022 that Portnov tried to discredit the Revolution of Dignity—the pro-European and nationalist protests that erupted in the wake of Yanukovych’s decision to suspend the association agreement with the European Union and strengthen ties with Russia—and the pro-European reforms in the country using internet bots.” In other words, in addition to defending the outcome of Maidan, which after eleven years of the consequences of that regime change seems increasingly questionable, El País attributes the murdered man to crimes of opinion and a ridiculous charge of propaganda. But the icing on the cake is the commentary that follows the article, signed by four journalists who were not afraid to give credence to the idea that "these Ukrainian journalists consulted by El País speculate on the authorship of the crime and do not rule out the possibility that it was Russian agents in a kind of false flag operation: a staunch enemy of Ukraine is killed to make people believe it was the Ukrainians."

War lends itself to political revenge, clan settling, the use of force far beyond the front lines, the demonization of the victim, and the insulting conspiracy theory that emerges as soon as a crime occurs that's too uncomfortable to consider who would have an interest in killing a particular person. In 2024, no one in the European press ever doubted the culpability of the Russian secret services in the murder of a helicopter pilot who had defected from the Russian army to the Ukrainian one, and whom Kiev could not, did not know how to, or would not protect in Spain. The situation is different now, with a mafia-style execution, with armed men waiting for their victim at the gates of a school in a heavily guarded area of ​​an upper-class neighborhood in Madrid, and a very high-profile target. Therefore, the false flag theory , in a case that will not entail special scrutiny, is all that Ukraine needs to divert attention.

Yesterday, the press highlighted the corruption charges against Portnov, always forgetting that he was acquitted of them. There was also no mention of the defamation cases he won against Ukrainian media outlets or the threats he had received in the past. Of course, it was also forgotten that this is not the first Ukrainian opposition figure to be the victim of an attack in Spain. Lamenting the death of a friend, Ukrainian blogger Anatoly Sharii, a refugee in the European Union since before the Maidan, recalled that he has suffered two assassination attempts in Spain, the last of which was a year ago, "curiously, we were also returning from school," which have not been investigated. Perhaps El País 's sources also see the Kremlin's hidden hand in them . Throughout the day, Sharii denounced the comments he had received on social media, in which Ukrainian bloggers warned him that he would be next .

In addition to accusations of corruption for cases in which he was never convicted, the media yesterday also highlighted the usual "high treason" that is usually charged against those inconvenient figures whom the country's authorities seek to demonize as much as possible to prevent them from returning with political aspirations. Upon his return in 2019, Portnov left behind his past as a deputy for the Party of Regions or as head of the President's Office during Yanukovych's time, when the position did not carry the level of power that Andriy Ermak holds today in that position. During the three years between his return and his departure after the Russian invasion in 2022, according to Sternenko, with the help of Oleh Tatarov, Ermak's deputy in the President's Office, Portnov dedicated his efforts to legal battles, defending human rights causes, and also to strongly criticizing Zelensky and his predecessor. Poroshenko was one of the targets of Andriy Portnov's legal cases, while the current government was a target of political criticism. “To end the dispute over international aid and IMF services once and for all, I suggest that the authorities directly address the US Embassy with a request to appoint a Minister of Economy, Finance, and other ministers for the government. They should appoint them instead of running the country by hiding behind agents and subordinate officials of the embassy, ​​such as the director of the National Anti-Corruption Agency or the former minister and Attorney General, and do so with written recommendations directly from the embassy,” he wrote in 2020, criticizing the drift toward loss of sovereignty that was already evident in Ukraine. Although his confrontation with the Democratic wing of US politics was highlighted yesterday, this criticism was being raised in the final stages of Donald Trump's first term.

One of Portnov's focuses during his three years in Ukraine was Odessa. “The hated Parubiy has expressed outrage on Facebook because criminal proceedings have been initiated against him for the mass murder that took place in Odessa on May 2, 2014. I have a counter-anger . I made that request to the authorities a month ago. If we take this long to do things, he may always be free. He needs to be arrested and sent to prison so that the investigation can begin. As it should have been five years ago,” stated the famous lawyer Andriy Portnov, a few months after his return to the country, when he managed to have Andriy Parubiy, de facto chairman of the National Security and Defense Council in 2014, indicted for his actions in the days before the massacre at the House of Trade Unions. In this attempt to have the Ukrainian courts do their job in a case as important as that of May 2, something that ultimately failed to happen, two important aspects came together, since Parubiy had been one of the pillars of Petro Poroshenko's party, with which he Portnov maintained a constant confrontation. For years, corruption cases were the lawyer's main cause. His accusations against the 95th Brigade, led by Mikhail Zabrodsky , a deputy candidate for Poroshenko's party and later one of the leading Ukrainian figures in the proxy war against Russia, provoked an aggressive reaction from the European Solidarity party, which saw them as an attack on the political force.

Another of Andriy Portnov's important cases from those years also occurred in Odessa and is a testament to his fight against the nationalist far right. Yesterday, next to an image of Portnov's bloodied body on the ground in front of his car where the hitmen shot him in the head and torso, "Are you resting there?" asked Serhiy Sternenko, who in 2018 fatally stabbed a man, whose agony he broadcast live on social media. Sternenko, the leader of the Praviy Sektor in Odessa and today a respected and well-connected military activist , declared himself a victim even though the only fingerprints on the murder weapon turned out to be his. Portnov represented the widow of the man killed in the street. Sternenko was convicted in February 2020 in a 2014 kidnapping case. His connections and support, as well as Ukraine's lack of judicial independence, were revealed just three months later when the appeals court abruptly overturned the conviction. "It wasn't us," he mocked yesterday, "we would have done it with drones."

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Filimonov at the door of Portnov's apartment in Vienna, demanding that he return to Ukraine.

His involvement in the premeditated murder case against Sternenko earned Andriy Portnov the enmity of another prominent figure in the Ukrainian far-right scene: Serhii Filimonov. Initially the leader of Azov in Kyiv, Filimonov clashed with the movement's leader, Andriy Biletsky, partly over his stance on Sternenko. Close to Valeriy Zaluzhny, Filimonov, one of the founders of Honor, took over the da Vinci Wolves after the death of Ukrainian hero Dmitro Kotsiubailo, at whose funeral the top brass of Ukraine's political and military establishment knelt in homage . In 2019, just months before Portnov's return to Ukraine, Filimonov and his group went to Vienna specifically in search of Andriy Portnov.

In his blog, "Events in Ukraine ," Peter Korotaev described Portnov a few months ago as the last possible interlocutor with Moscow should a political resolution to the conflict between the two countries ever be sought. Along the same lines, Russian opposition journalist Leonid Ragozin lamented the passing of a figure who could have regained relevance in a Ukraine of the future. "He was arguably the most brilliant intellectual on the anti-Maidan side of the Ukrainian political spectrum and the source of several authentic leaks suggesting close contacts with the Ukrainian security services. More recently, he won a large number of lawsuits against Ukrainian media outlets that accused him of treason and working for Russia."

Among those who have publicly welcomed Portnov's murder are Serhiy Sternenko and Maksym Zhoryn of the Third Assault Brigade, as well as the Defense Ministry-linked outlet DeepState, which called him a "pro-Russian dog," and representatives of the pro-European technocratic liberal establishment such as Serhiy Leschenko. The pro-Russian label that the media yesterday attributed to Andriy Portnov has justified his demonization, the lack of interest in who might be behind his death, and the displays of joy at the murder of a person in broad daylight.

https://slavyangrad.es/2025/05/22/el-as ... y-portnov/

Google Translator

******

THE POLITICS OF THE SLOW RUSSIAN ARMY MOVEMENT WESTWARD

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By John Helmer @bears_with

Is it MAGA or is it MEGA?

When President Donald Trump negotiated with President Vladimir Putin on Monday, May 19, was he aiming to lower the cost of the Ukraine war to the domestic US economy, or to enrich it by transferring the war cost to the Europeans, particularly Germany, so that most of their planned €150 billion in loans and €650 billion in country budget outlays for the “ReArm Europe Plan” to fight Russia will get spent in the US?

Is Trump counting on Putin to give him enough of a battlefield pause or armistice in the Ukraine so that Trump can expand US force deployments and allied military procurement further north along the front from the Baltic Sea to Finland and Greenland; south along the Iranian frontier; and east against China?

The last of these, the eastern front war against China – explained Secretary of State Marco Rubio in a Senate committee hearing on Tuesday – is now the strategic priority for the US. Implementing it requires sequencing Trump’s wars. “Every minute we spend,” according to Rubio, “every dollar we spend on this conflict in Europe is distracting both our focus and our resources away from a potential for a much more serious and much more cataclysmic confrontation in the Indo-Pacific…they are related but they’re related both ways — they’re related on the one hand by the precedent that it could set, but they’re also related by the fact that every minute that we spend on this conflict that cannot be won by military means, every resource that’s expended into it is money and time that’s not being spent on preventing a much more serious confrontation from a global perspective in the Indo-Pacific.” – Min 53:51.

This is bigger, “much more serious” than MAGA – Make America Great Again. It’s MEGA – Make the Empire Great Again.

When Rubio went on to explain what the Putin-Trump telephone call was aimed at doing, he was confident the US is taking advantage of what he called Putin’s political weakness, the vulnerability of the Russian economy, high battlefield casualties, and the slowness of the Russian military advance. “I think [Putin] approaches it — we have to assume – from a cold, calculated cost-benefit nation-state evaluation of what’s in the best interest of his view of Russia. What I’m pretty certain of is this is not the war [Putin] thought he was getting when he first invaded Ukraine. I think he anticipated that the government would collapse and that, uh, he would be greeted as a liberator. It has not turned out that way, and in fact Russia today controls less territory than they did after the first two months of the war so they’ve suffered significant losses — they’ve suffered the losses of at least you know by some estimates 200,000-250,000 men in uniform and the Ukrainians have suffered less but nonetheless suffered as well. It is a battlefield today in which the front lines move 10 kilometres at a time in one direction or another. Even if [the Russians] are advancing, they’re advancing at a tremendously high cost. But the challenge Russia faces now is their entire economy stirring up. In their regard we want to see the conflict end in a way that’s enduring, meaning not a peace that lasts three months and then restarts again, but something that’s enduring that both sides could live with for a long period of time without it restarting again.” Min 2:46.50.

The idea that Putin cannot and will not challenge MEGA in Europe except slowly and weakly on the Ukrainian battlefield reinforces the American conviction that if Trump gives Putin enough rope now in the Ukraine, he will hang himself later in the face of MEGA strategy on all fronts, especially on Iran and China, as Putin did in Syria.

Even current critics of Trump’s negotiating tactics with the Russian president believe that Putin doesn’t want to fight MEGA, but aims to come to terms – business deals — that will undermine Russia’s alliances with Iran, North Korea, and China. Putin, as one of the critics claimed this week, “has clearly avoided winning the war because for him it can be achieved for a much greater purpose, a Great Power settlement, a new Yalta.” Min -8:47.

A NATO veteran responds: “The Chinese are in an ill humour. They will take a dim view of any Russian double-dealing, including facilitation of Trump’s sequencing which we can be sure they are aware of.” Regarding Rubio’s answers to the questions he was asked by senators this week, he adds: “I view that hearing with Rubio as nothing more than a council of war.”

In the podcast later today with Nima Alkhorshid and Ray McGovern, we will be discussing the implications for grand strategy on the Russian side, as well as the impact that Putin’s strategy is having on Russian military operations along the front lines.

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Click to listen today at 19:30 Moscow time, 17:30 London, 12:30 Washington.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eKCgX2obVjc

Speaking operationally, the daily bulletin from the Russian Defense Ministry – banned for readers in many NATO countries – has been reporting the two main features of the battlefield. The first is the slow but steady acceleration of the advance on each of five army group directions, measurable by the rising rate of reported Ukrainian casualties. The second is the absence of electric war strikes against power plants and distribution grids west of Kiev.

The current daily average of Ukrainian Killed in Action (KIA) for May, as announced in Moscow, is 1,370; this compares with the average for April of 1,269, a month-on-month increase of 8%; for March of 1,255 (increase of 1%); for the second half of February, 1,183, and for the first half of February, 951. Since the beginning of February, these figures show the Russian spring offensive commencing and then gaining speed, territory, and firepower. The current daily KIA rate is now 44% higher than it was three months ago.

The record of Russia’s electric war strikes in the Ukraine indicates they occurred on October 10-12 and 16-20, 2022; October 22-27, 2023; March 29-30, 2024; June 1, 2024; and November 7, 2024. Putin then accepted Trump’s proposal for a 30-day halt to attacks on civilian energy infrastructure; that began after their telephone call on February 12. Click to follow each stage of the electric war. These missile and drone strikes have not resumed since February.

Some Russian and western military experts believe there has been a correlation between the impact of the electric war strikes and the success of Russian ground offensives, notably because the disruption of electricity has reduced the Ukrainian capabilities to move equipment and reserves to the front, rebuild fortifications, fight back against Russian breakthroughs, and refresh weakened units.

In a series of eighteen podcasts, retired Hungarian Army major Mark Takacs has been documenting these trends tactically and operationally. Russian military bloggers like Boris Rozhin and Mikhail Zvinchuk are inhibited in the analyses they publish but not because they lack the expertise or the sources. Together, however, they and Takacs expose the errors of fact and mistakes of judgement in Rubio’s account of Russian objectives and intentions.

Click to view the most recent Takacs analysis (lead images, top) of the successful Russian offensive between February and April on the southern flank of the Donbass. The presentation draws several conclusions which are relevant for understanding the end-of-war negotiations now under way.

Despite their tactical victories, Takacs says the Russian advance has been hampered by lack of command-and-control between infantry, artillery, and air support, especially drones. Instead of parallel and coordinated fire support, Takacs says that Russian commanders are taking a week or longer to pepper their targets and soften defences with artillery and drone barrages launched in advance, before the infantry moves. When they break through Ukrainian defences or defeat Ukrainian units, Takacs claims the Russians are often unable to maintain their momentum and press their advantage going forward. One reason he gives is that often they are unable to interdict the deployment of Ukrainian reserves and prevent deliveries of replacement weapons and ammunition.

A NATO veteran says: “it’s clear that Putin has been restricting the General Staff. While the tempo of the spring offensive is increasing, the President’s rule to limit Russian casualties by reliance on drones and artillery will continue. The repeated holes punched in the Ukrainian lines followed up by persistent failure to exploit, surround and destroy the Ukrainian forces, tells us that Putin does not want to risk the possibility at the operational level of a Russian spearhead being cut off and destroyed. At the strategic level I think he’s concerned to avoid a potential battlefield success which might increase the pressure on Trump at home and among the NATO allies to escalate sanctions. Call this an operational regime of throttle down.”

https://johnhelmer.net/the-politics-of- ... more-91653

******

Back To The Un-Table
For more non-negotiations.
Aurelien
May 21, 2025

<snip>

The air is thick this week with talk of negotiations to “end” the War in Ukraine. Everyone seems to assume that unspecified “negotiations” are coming, and that both sides are doing everything they can to “improve their position” before the negotiations start. This approach implicitly gives “negotiations” an agency of their own, as though they can decide when they will start and what they will cover. One of the Youtube Channels I follow has for some time been talking breathlessly about the need for the Russians to “take territory” before “negotiations start,” but in spite of numerous false alarms and excited talk, no actual negotiations on the ending of the War have actually taken place, or even look imminent. The recent circus in Istanbul is merely the latest over-egged pudding to be presented to a world which is then disappointed with with the very meagre results from it, although why anyone ever expected more is a puzzle which this essay tries to elucidate.

I have already devoted two substantial essays to the issue of negotiations, including what they are and what their purposes are, as well as their limitations, and more recently an essay trying to explain how the West is completely confused about the very idea of “talks.” I have also written about some historical precedents for how the war in Ukraine might end in terms of written documents. New(ish) readers might like to glance at those essays, because there’s a lot to say this week, and for reasons of space I can only briefly recapitulate what was in those essays here.

In brief, however, negotiations happen between states, (or states and other actors) to settle something that needs to be settled, and in an organised fashion. Some are completely non-confrontational, even routine, some are to resolve differences, more or less amicably, some are difficult and confrontational. Negotiations can take place at many levels, and about virtually any subject that interests more than one government. At one extreme, they may produce elaborate formal treaties, couched in a special type of language and imposing legal obligations, and requiring states to pass new laws to implement them. They may also be politically-binding agreements between departments of different governments. They may, at the other extreme, be nothing more than agreed declarations. And everything in between. The mistake that western pundits have been making is to assume that all negotiations are equal, and all documents produced have the same status, whereas in practice the number of possible variations is extremely large.

We can see this in the talks that have been taking place between the US and Russia recently (and which have not been confined to Ukraine.) Mr Trump seems to have decided that the policy of confrontation with Russia is a mug’s game, and that it is time to put the relationship back on a more normal footing. When Ukraine is discussed, these are not “negotiations.” At most, they will eventually produce a joint statement of some kind, but their real value lies in bringing the views of the two countries closer together on Ukraine, as on other issues, and jointly deciding how to handle the situation. So it might be agreed during the “talks” that the Russians will do such-and-such, and the US will reciprocate. But none of this will be legally binding, and there may, indeed, not even be an agreed written record of the “talks.” This is entirely normal, and happens all the time. Somehow, western pundits became very excited, and assumed (and still appear to) that Russians and Americans were working busily away at some kind of treaty which would then be given to Ukraine to sign.

The history of the Ukraine crisis itself gives plenty examples of different types of agreement between the parties. The so-called “Minsk Agreements” which were intended to put an end to the post-Maidan fighting, and which I’ve discussed extensively in one of my earlier essays linked above, are an example of an essentially informal record of decisions. They are not written in treaty language, and thus not legally binding, and contain various undertakings (such as that the Ukrainian Parliament will pass certain laws) which are never put in treaties anyway. They were signed by the Ukrainians and the two breakaway regions, and countersigned by the Russians, attesting essentially to the accuracy of the record. In practice, they only amounted to a set of minutes of a meeting, but this was enough to secure a halt in the fighting and the withdrawal of some types of equipment. At the other extreme, are the two draft treaties tabled by the Russians in December 2021, before the War began. These are in treaty language, would be legally binding, and would have to be ratified by the Parliaments concerned.

So it will be clear that talking about “negotiations” in the abstract is essentially meaningless. In particular, the idea that “negotiations” will suddenly begin, as though of their own accord, without any preliminary discussions and with no idea of what they will produce, is ridiculous. yet many commentators on all sides of the conflict seem to assume this is so. Much of the rest of the essay will be devoted to trying to explain why this they seem to think this is so. Interestingly, Mr Trump’s behaviour—on Ukraine as elsewhere—might actually be the harbinger of a return to a more traditional and more useful approach.

To begin with, the normal nature of wars between states has been a contest to capture or hold territory, and the fragments of history that European leaders may recall mostly deal with such conflicts. Of course wars have been about other things as well—the Spanish Civil War is an example—but they can almost all be solipsistically represented by arrows on a map, and control of different parts of a country represented by different colours. At least that’s easy to understand. Thus, the West is assuming that the invasion of Ukraine was launched by “Putin” to re-establish the Soviet Union or Greater Russia, that this invasion was not as successful as hoped because of Ukrainian heroism and western support, and that as a result “Putin” will soon be forced to sit down and negotiate which parts of Ukraine will be ceded to “him” on a temporary basis, while Ukraine is rearmed.

Whilst this interpretation of events is wildly inaccurate, and takes no account of actual Russian statements, nor indeed, Russian behaviour, it has a number of pragmatic advantages. The first is that it simplifies the conflict into something that can be represented on maps, that can be understood by the western political leadership and punditocracy, and which, indeed, seems comprehensible in terms of what military leaders learnt at Staff College. Thus, taking, holding and retaking terrain and population centres is a way of understanding and representing the course of the war, and the fact that the Russians are not primarily interested in capturing terrain enables their efforts to be branded unsuccessful. Inevitably, runs the argument, there will have to be “negotiations” before too long. Now of course the Russians do have territorial objectives, but they are essentially secondary to destroying the ability of the enemy to resist, and forcing Kiev to do what Moscow wants.

Given that this is exactly how Clausewitz described the purpose and conduct of war, it seems strange that it is so hard for even military leaders to understand what is going on. After all, one of the most famous wars of European history, the War of Spanish Succession (1701-14), was not about control of territory at all, but about whether a French candidate was to sit on the Spanish throne. But of course if the measure of success in Ukraine is the destruction of enemy fighting potential and thus ability to resist Russian demands, this becomes much more complex to understand, let alone explain. Better to stick to crude maps and arrows, and to assume that “negotiations,” which surely cannot now be long delayed, are going to be about who controls which territory.

The second advantage is that a territorially-based war is simply easier to sell politically. The idea of spending untold billions and sending large parts of European arsenals and stocks to Ukraine to defend the idea that one day Ukraine will be able to join NATO, let alone that certain extremist parties should be in the Ukrainian government even if the Russians don’t approve, is impossible to sell politically, even if it were possible to understand and find a common position on such issues. (Can you imagine 30 NATO members around a table trying to agree on a list of political parties and individuals whose presence in government has to be maintained at all costs, or otherwise the war will continue?)

This is the first reason why “negotiations” of some specified type are assumed to be imminent. And indeed, very powerful US pressure, or a final catastrophic collapse of the Ukrainian Army, may actually produce “negotiations,” although not in the form that many western pundits are anticipating. Here, I’ll just recall that, whilst wars generally end with some kind of agreement, these agreements can in some cases be just about the modalities of surrender, or the detail of doing what the victorious party has imposed. It’s doubtful if the West is thinking of “negotiations” like that.

The second involves a modest excursion into history. The West generally assumes today that all conflicts can in the end be resolved by sensible individuals getting round a table and hammering out a compromise: the basis, in fact, of the Liberal Peace ideology. It wasn’t always thus, and it isn’t always thus today, but in theory this is how the West sees things, and this theory is what influences pundits, NGOs, the media and to a large extent the political system. Historically, though, wars were frequently fought for fairly thorough-going objectives, and if, say, the British had put themselves forward as mediators in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian War, they would have been ignored. That war was about Prussia challenging the historical dominance of France as the principal military power in Europe, and had to be decisively won by one side or the other. There was no possibility of a compromise peace. And the resulting Treaty of Frankfurt was not what we would imagine a peace treaty to be today: it was entirely one-sided. The Prussians gained control of much of Alsace and Lorraine, the French had to pay an indemnity of five billion Francs, parts of France were under military occupation until that was done, and French citizens had to choose between leaving the two regions or becoming German citizens. (Most of them left, forever changing the nature of French cooking.) Thus, the Versailles Treaty, horribly one-sided as it was, was entirely within the traditional pattern of treaties at the end of wars, and indeed a negotiated peace, had one even been possible, would have settled even less than the Treaty did.

Now War, Peace and Treaties were traditionally the affairs of Kings: the French word régalien, which refers to responsibility for these powers, as well as to justice and the maintenance of order, comes from the Latin word for “King.” To the growing commercial and professional middle class in Europe, which sought to displace monarchs and aristocrats from power, whose sons did not become officers or diplomats, and who made their fortunes from trade and not ownership of land, all this started to seem a little anachronistic. Good relations with neighbours were important for trade, and quarrels about boundaries and the ownership of towns seemed a waste of resources.

This way of thinking was especially strong in Britain, with no land frontiers since 1603 and the sea and a powerful Navy as a protection. Liberalism became a major political force early on, and, once the threat from Napoleon was defeated, British policy was to avoid wars whenever possible. From the point of view of Liberals, wars were a waste of money, and a threat to commerce. Liberal opposition to the Crimean War, vindicated in the eyes of many as the ineptitude and suffering during the war received increasing publicity, set the tone for British attitudes to war and peace for some time thereafter, as well as confirming the view that Armies were necessarily run by aristocratic idiots.

The Liberal view of the world was a transactional one, based on pragmatic benefit. Buyers and sellers would sit together and agree prices and terms for delivery. In principle, for every commodity there was a buyer, and for every demand there was a supplier. (The vocabulary of international relations comes very largely from French, where négociant meant, and still means, a businessman or banker, who negotiated commercial deals.) Wars, crises, embargoes, simply got in the way of Montesquieu’s “peaceful commerce,” which in the view of many Liberal thinkers was a much better guarantee of peace than any amount of great power balance-of-power politics. The democratising trend in much of Europe in the nineteenth century greatly strengthened the middle-class advocates of this way of thinking: indeed, before 1914 it was common to say that Europe was now so connected by trade and banking that a war would make no sense.

Liberals opposed overseas involvements generally, and colonies in particular. The latter were expensive to acquire and run, required forces to garrison them which had to be paid for by taxes, and always ran the risk of embroiling the country in pointless wars. There was no economic benefit from colonies that could not be gained from ordinary trade and commercial agreements, and attempts by Rhodes and others to sell imperialism as profitable resulted in humiliating failure, and expensive nationalisation by the government. There was a fairly clear class distinction in the attitude to Empire in Britain, for example: Great Power status and national prestige were important to the still-ruling Crown and aristocracy, much less so to those who considered themselves practical businessmen, and whose apologists who looked to Germany, a country without colonies, as Britain’s major commercial rival.

Now of course even countries led by absolute monarchs did not resort to war light-heartedly. Wars were expensive, had somehow to be financed, and could result in humiliation and economic ruin for the losers. So as the costs of the War of Spanish Succession spiralled out of control and threatened the very solvency of the belligerents, and with no end in sight, multiple attempts were made to end the fighting by negotiation, although all ultimately failed. This pragmatic approach to avoiding war, or negotiating an end where possible, received a massive additional impetus from the experience of the two World Wars of the twentieth century. The First World War in particular, where large numbers of educated middle-class young men fought in the front line, was decisive in moving the dominant discourse towards the search for peace at almost any cost. Chamberlain and Daladier have been much sniggered at for attempting a deal with Hitler which would have prevented a war with tens of millions of deaths, but in fact negotiations about transfers of territory were a standard method of reconciling differences and preventing wars.

After the shattering experience of the Second World War, the dominant discourse turned even more towards the “peaceful settlement of disputes.” The major powers of the world were careful to restrict their military involvement to proxy wars, and did not fight each other directly. After the end of the Vietnam War the West never fought a peer or near-peer enemy again. And after the end of the Cold War, as I have described many times, western thinking about the nature of contemporary conflict substantially changed. The traditional Liberal assumption that war was an anomaly, the result of a breakdown in political and economic systems, of the systematic cultivation of hate or the wickedness of individuals, came to dominate. Around the world, countries were believed to have “fallen into” conflict, as a result of the “widespread violations of human rights,” “instrumentalisation of grievances” by “entrepreneurs of violence,” the “struggle for control of resources,” and even, in true Liberal fashion, cost-benefit analyses of violence compared with peace. Various theorists produced models claiming to be able to predict conflict, although, like many such initiatives they were much better at predicting the past than the future.

Whilst all those factors were certainly present from time to time, such theorising, sanctified by the UN, the EU and various other international agencies, largely ignored the reasons why actual conflicts were fought. That being so, it seemed obvious that the solution to such conflicts lay in the patient, Liberal identification of common ground and scope for bargaining between warring parties, much as merchants might haggle over the price of wheat. Since the locals were clearly incapable of doing this themselves, then the international organisations the NGOs and the donors would regrettably be obliged to do it for them. (Ironically, it became clear to those with ears to hear that many parts of the world—notably Africa—had traditional conflict resolution mechanisms that worked far better than anything imported from the West did.)

So the model of western experts jetting in with ready-made peace settlements just needing to be signed was established early and disastrously, in Rwanda (1993), in Bosnia from 1992-95 and in Sudan in 2005, to name only three egregious examples of western processes imposed in situations that were not remotely appropriate. It should also be added that western-influenced initiatives, such as the Sun City talks on the DRC in 2002 under South African sponsorship were just as unsuccessful. Nonetheless, because the theory is right, it has to be applied irrespective of the circumstances. Undaunted by the tendency of flawed negotiations and peace settlements to bring disaster (as in Rwanda and Sudan) or simply to bury problems instead of resolving them, as in Bosnia, the idea of precipitately bringing parties together for negotiations has become a conditioned reflex within the large industry devoted to crisis management issues. And as time passed, peace agreements became more and more elaborate, as every interest group strove to have its pet projects included in the text (elections, human rights, liberal economic ideas, gender parity, etc. etc.)

Now it is very reasonable to prefer peace to war, and it would be a strange person indeed who wanted suffering to continue when peaceful solutions were available. (Though they do exist, believe me.) But of course it is necessary firstly that the opportunity for substantive agreement actually exists, secondly that the various parties share objectives which are least compatible, and finally that what is agreed is actually possible to implement and and effective in bringing peace. Few negotiations actually lead to such outcomes, and it is more common for some (not necessarily all) of the actors to be dragged along to negotiations and persuaded to sign an agreement which looks good, even if it can never be implemented. But because Liberal ideology is obsessed with the belief that everybody wants peace under all circumstances, and that compromise solutions are always possible, pointless negotiations and ineffective treaties continue to proliferate. As I have said a hundred times, if the will to agreement is there, the words are secondary: if the will to agreement is not there, the words are irrelevant. But many in the West are under the delusion that words and signatures are magical totems that will in themselves resolve problems.

The more you think about it, the more you realise that the majority of conflicts in the world do not begin as Liberal thinkers imagine they do, and so are not amenable to business-style negotiations. Many conflicts are, in fact, irreconcilable. This does not mean that nothing at all can be done, but it does mean that such crises can at best, only be managed, and their consequences limited as far as possible. Thus, in areas such as the Caucasus or the Levant, there is no actual “answer,” to the reality of the multifaceted crises, other than the abolition of nation states and the re-establishment of Empires, which has theoretical attractions, but is hardly feasible. In Palestine, for example, either I can live in your house or you can live in my house, but we can’t both live in my house, and one of us will have to be disappointed.

Solutions that last, at least for a while, tend to be based on a certain correlation of forces, and a recognition by each side of the limits of what can be achieved. So after initially acting as defenders of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland at the beginning of the “Troubles,” for example, the Irish Republican Army quickly returned to its historic objective of driving the British out of Northern Ireland, and creating a 32-county Socialist Republic. In the early 1970s it thought it could do this. By the mid-1970s it realised that it couldn’t, and adopted its “long war” policy of urban terrorism. When that failed to work, it began hesitantly to move towards a political solution, which eventually produced the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. In the end it ran into the brick wall of what was possible: the British (for all that they were weary of the conflict and generally disliked the Ulster Protestants) could not give way because the result would be a civil war much bloodier than anything that happened in the 1970s and 80s. Negotiations were thus inevitable. It looks as though much the same situation may be developing with the PKK and Turkey: dispirited, losing members and commitment and heavily attrited by Turkish drones, the PKK seems to have decided to seek a political solution.

It may now be clearer why pundits and politicians have been so confused about recent “negotiations.” For a start, the objectives of Russia and the West are simply not compatible, and, insofar as we can talk of “Ukrainian” objectives in the current confused situation, they are probably different again. Put simply, the Russian desire for security on its western border, for potential threats to be kept far away, and for nearby states to be strictly neutral, cannot be made compatible with the current situation, nor with current and potential future policies of the governments of those states. A neutral status, even for Ukraine, would be a shock to NATO which it would have difficulty surviving. The withdrawal of western stationed forces to the 1997 situation would be a terminal political defeat.

With the greatest of respect to diplomats, a caste I value very highly, there are some situations that you can’t negotiate your way out of. Ukraine cannot be semi-neutral. Neutrality goes well beyond formal membership of NATO or not, since any country can permit foreign troops to be stationed on its territory if it wants to. Even the type of formal neutrality practiced by Sweden during the Cold War (a de facto NATO ally but entirely in secret) would be unlikely to satisfy the Russians. They would want something rather closer to the old Finnish model, or indeed Ukraine as an informal ally for themselves. And to repeat, you cannot compromise on such things: it’s one or the other, and whether it is one or the other will be decided by the correlation of political and especially military forces. And when the Russians talk about the “underlying causes” of the War, which they are determined to deal with, this is what they mean.

There are some elements of the problem that can perhaps be negotiated, such as the size and composition of Ukrainian forces and the areas where they can be stationed: indeed there are historical precedents for this, and for inspections to verify compliance. It looks as though some progress was made in this area in the Istanbul talks in 2022, though the sides were still far apart, and it’s not impossible that those ideas could be picked up again. But as a whole, I don’t think those negotiations were ever going to work, because they mixed together objective things like troop levels with subjective things like neutrality. In practice, Russian troops would have had to stay in Ukraine, probably for years, while the Ukrainian political system was changed, laws were passed, the Constitution modified, and various military changes made. One of the problems with withdrawing troops after a peace settlement is that it’s much harder to send them in a second time, so the temptation would have been for the Russians to find excuses to stay, which would have had unpredictable but probably dangerous results politically.

So you can see why the West is so confused. Its Liberal-state model of negotiation takes as a point of departure that everything is indeed negotiable, that verbal formulas can always be found to paper over differences, and that somehow good sense and reason will prevail, since in the end conflicts are not about anything important. Thus the western obsession with control of territory, because it is both something they understand, and something tangible which can be negotiated about with the assistance of maps. The idea that there are demands which are non-negotiable, both in the sense that one side cannot compromise, and also in the sense that a state cannot be semi-neutral, for example, is more than the western system can swallow. Indeed, it’s doubtful whether the West, and probably Ukraine, could bring itself politically to actually negotiate about the “underlying causes” that the Russians want to discuss.

Thus, in part, the confusion about what the recent talks were, and were about. They were at most an exchange of prepared positions without commitment, and as much a public relations exercise as anything. It should be obvious that the conditions for any substantive negotiations don’t yet exist, and may not exist for a while, simply because of the nature of the Russian objectives. But the West and perhaps the Ukrainians, obsessed by decades of “peacemaking,” of rapid deals which look good, even if they go wrong, by proclamations of “peace” even when they are premature, and by statements of good intentions even when they are not followed up, is intellectually unequipped to understand what they are seeing. It simply cannot comprehend the mentality of a state which is seeking to definitively assuage its security concerns for the next 25-50 years, and is prepared to devote the time, resources and lives required to make that happen.

I’ve already mentioned the various formulaic and superficial efforts made by the West to settle conflicts around the world since the Cold War, which have often sought to dispose of intractable problems by adding successive layers of complexity to documents of which they are the authors, and which generally go wrong, and seeking wholesale and often abrupt changes in the way that economies and societies are run. In some cases (notably Iraq) the West has been so sure of itself that it has been prepared to use force to try to create the conditions for what it confidently imagines will be the flowering of a Liberal democracy. In others (notably Afghanistan) it has flooded the country with goodthinking Liberal initiatives, even while fighting is going on. And in still others, like Libya and Syria, it has charged into other peoples’ wars, hoping to dictate the outcome, and to later re-model the societies and economies that resulted. You may detect a certain consistent lack of success here.

None of this is going to apply to Ukraine. The Russians do not mean what the West means by “negotiation,” and they are unlikely to change. The trouble is, the West itself is unlikely to learn, so it will waste much time sitting around a half-empty table waiting for the Russians to turn up to discuss subjects they have no intention of talking about. Ironically, the election of Mr Trump, an actual businessman with experience of actual negotiations, uninterested in theory and the forcible imposition of Liberal political norms, might actually help here, and the age of rampaging Liberal adventurism, gun in one hand and copy of John Rawls in the other, may finally be coming to an end.

https://aurelien2022.substack.com/p/bac ... e-un-table

*****

Ukraine Negotiations Still Hover Around Its Root Cause

The most important sentence from President Trump about yesterday's phone call between President Putin and him is this:

Russia and Ukraine will immediately start negotiations toward a Ceasefire and, more importantly, an END to the War. The conditions for that will be negotiated between the two parties, as it can only be, because they know details of a negotiation that nobody else would be aware of.

The most important sentence by President Putin about yesterday's phone call is this:

Notably, Russia’s position is clear. Eliminating the root causes of this crisis is what matters most to us.
Russia will not fall for ending the war without having achieved its main goal.


Western media, here the NY Times, continue to play dumb (archived) about what the Russia's main goal is:

[Putin] repeated his mantra that a peace deal needs to “remove the root causes of this crisis,” referring to Russia’s pursuit of wide-ranging influence over Ukraine.

David Ignatius, a CIA spokesperson at the Washington Post, makes a similar (archived) nonsensical claim:

He still wants victory, which he described once again after Monday’s call with the phrase “eliminate the root causes of the crisis.” That’s code for his conviction that Ukraine cannot be a European country, as it wants, but must remain under Russian hegemony.

Russia as well as Ukraine are European countries. Russia has no interest in having 'hegemony' or 'wide-ranking influence' over Ukraine. Its interest is the defense of the Russian Federation. It had to prevent Ukraine from becoming a U.S. (NATO) spear tip aimed at its heart.

A different NY Times piece about the Russian northern defenses build up after Finland joined NATO is far more correct when it states (archived):

From Moscow’s perspective, the Russians need to bolster their defenses to protect themselves from NATO expansion, which has always been a sore subject. The Baltic nations were the first members of the former Soviet Union to join NATO, bringing large stretches of Russia’s border up against NATO’s. The prospect of Ukraine, an even bigger former Soviet republic, following suit was so threatening to Moscow that it became one of the causes of the most devastating land war in generations.

It is NATO expansion, not Ukraine the country, that is the root cause of the war. It is NATO expansion that has to be eliminated.

The U.S. and its European allies are still in denial of that. To ignore that the U.S. has, for over 30 years, been driving the NATO expansion that led to the war, allows Trump to play a 'mediator' in war in which the U.S. is a dominant participant.

It is stupid for western media to accept Trump's claim (archived) of such a role:

After phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Trump posted that “Russia and Ukraine will immediately start negotiations toward a Ceasefire and, more importantly, an END to the War”.
...
In remarks that indicated that Washington may be stepping back from a role as a mediator, Trump said the “conditions” for a deal could only be agreed by the warring parties “because they know details of a negotiation that nobody else would be aware of”.

...
Trump also said that immediately after his call with Putin, he recounted the conversation to Zelenskyy together with the leaders of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Finland and the European Commission. (1)
...
But two people briefed on the call with the European leaders said Trump was clear that he would pull the US back from engaging with the conflict and leave Ukraine and Russia to directly negotiate a ceasefire. He also made no promise of future US sanctions against Russia should Putin refuse any peace attempts. One person familiar with the conversation said the leaders were stunned by the US president’s description of what was agreed. They added it was clear Trump was “not ready to put greater pressure” on Putin to come to the negotiating table in earnest.
Trump is pretending to wash his hands (archived) over Ukraine:

The US desire to disengage has been flagged for weeks, by Trump himself but also by secretary of state Marco Rubio and vice-president JD Vance, who have repeatedly expressed frustration with Russia and Ukraine in equal measure. Vance told reporters on Monday that the US might ultimately have to say: “This is not our war.”

The U.S. can not be a mediator in a war, or wash its hands over it, when it continues to supply weapons and the all important field intelligence and communication means needed to wage it. Only yesterday the U.S. allowed Australia to send (old) U.S. made tanks to Ukraine.

Trump's claims of disengaging from the war has yet to be confirmed by any evidence that he is really going to do so.

The only thing Trump did reject so far was to join the European attempts to escalate the war by inserting their own troops into it.

Having learned from the economic disaster his tariffs have caused Trump also rejected plans to impose secondary sanctions in form of 500% tariffs on anyone who continues to buy oil from Russia.

Aside from that Trump has kept support for the war on the same level as before and only refrained from expanding it.

That he is, for now, leaving the negotiations to Russia and Ukraine, is an admission that he has failed to keep his election promise of making peace.

The U.S. will have to reengage in negotiations if peace is to be achieved. It is U.S. (NATO) expansionism that has cause the war.

Russia needs to remove the root cause, U.S. (NATO) expansionism, to achieve peace.

A complete victory in Ukraine is a necessary but not yet sufficient condition for that.

But chances are good that the further disagreements over the defeat of Ukraine will rip NATO apart.

That might be the victory President Putin has on his mind.

---
(1) The FT claims that: "[Trump] recounted the conversation to Zelenskyy together with the leaders of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Finland and the European Commission.

But Trump's statement does not mention Britain at all: "I have so informed President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, of Ukraine, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, President Emmanuel Macron, of France, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, of Italy, Chancellor Friedrich Merz, of Germany, and President Alexander Stubb, of Finland, during a call with me, immediately after the call with President Putin."

It seems like, despite the FT's claim, Prime Minister Starmer was left out in the cold on this.

Posted by b on May 20, 2025 at 12:23 UTC | Permalink

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2025/05/u ... .html#more

******

We've arrived
May 21, 19:11

Image

Historical shot.
Russian fighters reached the border of the Dnipropetrovsk region in the South Donetsk direction. During the summer campaign, combat operations should be fully transferred to the territory of the Dnipropetrovsk region. Ground combat operations on its territory have not been conducted since the beginning of the SVO, but this will soon change.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9851911.html

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Fri May 23, 2025 11:27 am

Priorities: territory at the cost of troops
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 05/23/2025

Image

In its war report yesterday, Ukraine insisted on denying the Russian version that Moscow's troops retain control of the entire Kursk Oblast . In Ukrainian fiction, which has never admitted defeat on Russian territory, its troops' struggle to maintain their positions there continues. The presence in Kursk is not limited to a few political statements by the authorities; the Russian adventure of Zelensky and Syrsky continues to loom as a weapon in the political vendettas of the military establishment, the only one truly operational at this time when war is the state's raison d'être. Although the discourse of unity remains part of Ukraine's official narrative, which prefers to publicly deny internal fissures rather than trying to hide and resolve them, reproaches toward the Armed Forces' commanders have been a constant since it became clear that the 2023 counteroffensive would not succeed in breaking the front and putting Russia on the ropes. In August 2024, in an operation that surprised Russia even though military movements in the area suggested it was possible, hope of victory returned, and Ukraine's ability to defeat its enemy on its own territory was widely praised by the Western political class and press.

Russia's reaction to the Ukrainian operation, which within hours demonstrated a momentum that Kiev's troops' offensive actions had lacked since 2022 and within days gained control over a significant area of ​​the oblast , also reflects the changes brought about by the war. In the process of learning from its mistakes, Russia has managed to improve some logistical, coordination, and control aspects that hampered its efforts in the first months. Initially with Iranian support and later based on that experience, Moscow regained lost ground in such important areas as the use of drones, absolutely basic in the day-to-day of this conflict and its main innovation. Time and experience also helped manage the troops' performance when organizing the operation to recover what was lost on its own territory. Without rushing into an operation that would entail enormous casualties in an attempt to recover the towns and honor lost in the Ukrainian lightning attack, Russia waited until it had the necessary resources to carry out a reliable offensive.

For months, Volodymyr Zelensky had extolled the valor of his troops based on their performance in Kursk, Ukraine's main victory since the Kharkiv and Kherson offensives in the fall of 2022. The Ukrainian leader even boasted—falsely—that his troops could have easily captured both the regional capital and the Kursk nuclear power plant. Protected by the willingness of much of the media not to contradict him, Ukraine wanted the official narrative to be that he gave up a strategic success—capturing the most important parts of the oblast —in favor of a tactical one. Although it had been clear for months that Zelensky intended to use the Kursk lands under his control as a bargaining chip in a possible negotiation, a card with which to recover part of his lost territory (quite possibly the Energodar nuclear power plant), the defeat that took place last April rendered months of fighting and an unknown, though presumably high, number of casualties worthless. Despite everything, Ukraine continues to maintain that the Kursk operation was successful, something that could only have a modicum of credibility if the sole objective was to inflict Russian casualties. In that case, admitting that Ukraine was only seeking to undermine Russia, knowing it would gain neither territory nor control of strategic objectives, would imply accepting that it was simply a suicidal operation in which its troops were sent to their probable death. Statements by Ukrainian soldiers who fought at Kursk in the final phase of Ukraine's defeat, and which were reported even by the Ukrainian media, point to this possibility, at least during the last few weeks, when Russian success was a matter of time and continuing to fight was nothing more than a punishment for its own troops.

In August 2024, Zelensky had claimed that the offensive on Russian territory was intended to create a buffer zone to protect Ukraine's Sumi region. If that was the objective, it also failed. At the start of the operation, there was no indication in the vicinity of Sumi that Russia was planning to advance on that region of northern Ukraine, which has been hit much harder by Russian artillery, missiles, and drones since the Ukrainian attack began. After the recapture of the Kursk territories initially captured by Ukraine, it was Russia that raised the need to create a buffer zone in the Sumi region to achieve two objectives: to prevent a new massive attack on Kursk and to force Ukraine to keep its troops in the region instead of being able to transfer them to other areas of the front, primarily Donbas, where much of the battle is concentrated.

Even after the defeat, Kursk remains too important for Ukraine, which quickly began to carry out offensive actions both in the unpopulated area of ​​the region and in neighboring Belgorod. The Russian-Ukrainian border is extensive, and it is always possible to find porous points. The fact that there have been no major media reports, no images of Ukrainian troops posing in Russian supermarkets, or politicians in front of destroyed statues of Lenin indicates the limited success of these movements. However, these actions ordered by the Ukrainian command have elicited some responses from the troops.

“I wouldn't be surprised if they found a 'scapegoat' in the form of a brigade commander, a special operations unit commander, or a special forces unit. The military high command isn't used to taking responsibility. And the reality is this: almost 99.9% of the tasks that reach the battalions are direct orders from the General Staff. What a position to recover, what a landing to clean up: completely populist, unfounded and unsupported, stupid assault operations, or tasks that pointlessly expose personnel to danger,” wrote Bohdan Krotevich, former chief of staff of Denis Prokopenko's Azov Brigade and one of the strongmen of the Ukrainian defense of Mariupol, who in recent years has become one of the most influential figures in the Ukrainian military establishment. In his message, Krotevich asked, "Why? So that this person looks at the president as if he has everything under control. In fact, nothing is under control. The Commander-in-Chief lives in his own world, where the main source of information is Anna Malyar. God forbid it's an intelligence agency, although I doubt it, too." Krotevich's message was in response to complaints recently made by another commander participating in the Kursk operation, who has addressed his complaints directly to the highest levels of the decision-making chain.

In a message posted on his Facebook profile, Oleksandr Shyrshin, alias Geniy , commander of the 47th Separate Magura Mechanized Brigade, addressed the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, requesting his dismissal and wishing that any children he may have “will one day be in the infantry and have to fulfill the tasks you order.” Regarding Ukraine’s actions on the Russian-Ukrainian border, Shyrshin is even more clear. “I have never received such idiotic orders as under the current leadership. I will tell you the details someday, but the stupid loss of people, trembling before the stupid class of generals, leads to nothing but failure. All they can do is reprimand, investigate, and impose sanctions,” he wrote. The theory that Ukraine seeks to inflict casualties on others, knowing full well that it will achieve no strategic or even tactical success, regardless of its own losses, gains credibility with this type of testimony from people seeking to be relieved of their duties by refusing to accept orders they consider unwise.

Shyrshin's testimony and accusations have gained enormous relevance in Ukraine, where articles have surfaced exposing the errors that ultimately doomed the Kursk operation and are causing casualty figures that commanders on the ground believe are exaggerated and, in many cases, avoidable. "The resignation of the 47th Brigade's battalion commander puts the Ukrainian military leadership under new scrutiny," is the headline of a lengthy report on Shyrshin and his brigade published Tuesday by The Kyiv Independent . It reflects highly on the resigned commander, though not so highly on the chain of command, especially Oleksandr Syrsky, who is the target of all the criticism. The complaints “previously raised in a series of scandals that have rocked the Ukrainian military under Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky, are closely related to the perception of an inefficient, “Soviet-style” command culture that has plagued the armed forces since Ukraine’s independence,” the article states, clinging to the usual excuse despite the 47th Brigade being created by and for a Western approach.

The significance of the stir caused by Shyrshin's criticisms is precisely that they come from one of the brigades that were to be decisive in the famous 2023 counteroffensive in Zaporozhye. Armed and trained by the West, the group was to be the one that, once the front was broken, was to take Melitopol, considered key to the entry into Crimea and a city that Ukraine never managed to approach. Designed as a brigade with clearly offensive intentions, it was subsequently sent to another failed area of ​​the front, Avdeevka, where it was to defend the city to avoid losing the last Ukrainian stronghold near Donetsk. Any complaints about these two operations should be directed not at Syrsky, but at the still-adored Zaluzhny. The Avdeevka operation, a battle already lost when Syrsky took command, ended a few days later with the order to withdraw, with Syrsky not intending to hold on to the town at all costs.

The 47th Brigade has also fought in the two hottest spots on the front over the past year, Pokrovsk-Krasnoarmeisk and Kursk, where it occupied some of the most remote positions along the supply route, further complicating the situation for the soldiers. “Due to the ‘not one step back, we will resist to the last soldier’ attitude of our generals, we suffered avoidable losses,” Shyrshin said of the Ukrainian command’s orders in the fight for Pokrovsk, a logistical and communications hub that Ukraine cannot afford to lose and that is more important than the lives of its soldiers. The situation was repeated for the 47th Brigade in Kursk, where it “was systematically sent to the areas with the most intense fighting,” places where Shyrshin says that “this particular sector only differs [from the rest of the front] in that it is politically important to our top political leaders.”

“It is crucial for them to hold this area at any price, and that is precisely why they disregard the number of human losses necessary to hold this land, this territory,” insisted Shyrshin, who has finally realized what was evident from the moment Zelensky and Syrsky gave the order to attack the Kursk region: the objective was more political than military, and the territory was more important than the troops—exactly the modus operandi that Ukraine so accuses Russia of.

https://slavyangrad.es/2025/05/23/prior ... de-tropas/

Google Translator

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From Cassad's telegram account:

Colonelcassad
Moscow expects the next talks on Ukraine to take place next week after the prisoner exchange is completed. Trump said a large-scale prisoner exchange has already taken place.

Moscow is not interested in holding talks in the Vatican. Russia is more than happy with Istanbul, unlike Ukraine, which is trying to avoid associating Istanbul 2.0 with Istanbul 1.0, which reminds us that Ukraine lost territory and hundreds of thousands of lives in order to negotiate a worse deal than in 2022, when the conditions were really great for Ukraine, but not so much for Russia. Now the situation is the opposite.

There will be no cessation of hostilities during the talks. Moscow has skillfully avoided the globalists' trap with a 30-day truce and, as originally stated, intends to conduct military operations in parallel with the talks. The experience of the Minsk agreements has been taken into account, and no new "gestures of goodwill" are in sight.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

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SITREP 5/21/25: Trump 'Distances' US from Ukraine as Russia Smashes AFU's Defenses on Donetsk Front
Simplicius
May 21, 2025

Little by little, the US seems to be distancing itself from Ukraine, but with a kind of infant ‘separation anxiety’. From refusing to call Russia’s invasion “illegal”, to claims US will not re-up Biden’s weapons aid, to new statements claiming Trump is ‘walking away’, we’re now seeing a kind of slow dawning of reality unto the collective West—that Russia is in control and is ready to conquer all Ukraine should no one step in to put Ukraine out of its own misery before then.

Lavrov conveyed Russia’s fatigue with the “truce first” charade, saying there will be no more “truce then we’ll see”-style agreements: (Video at link.)

And why is that? The reason was most clearly conveyed yesterday by Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken who said that NATO troops will immediately be able to operate on Ukrainian territory as soon as a ceasefire is established: (Video at link.)

“The moment there is a ceasefire the coalition of the willing can operate on Ukrainian soil” — Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken says France, Uk, Belgium and others will move in troops into Ukraine instantly when the fighting stops. Russia cannot agree to a ceasefire because of that.

Well, there you have it—what I’ve been talking about for months now is spelled out with exceeding clarity: as soon as the ‘ceasefire’ trap is laid on Russia, Europe intends to flood Ukraine with troops in order to freeze the conflict until such time that Ukraine can be pumped up to the gills with new arms and is able to restart its aggression against Russia.

And as for what will happen if Ukraine doesn’t agree to Russia’s terms—an interesting exchange occurred at yesterday’s meeting between Putin and Kursk officials: (Video at link.)

At a meeting with heads of municipalities in the Kursk region, in response to a statement by one of the meeting participants that Sumy should become Russian, Putin joked that Alexander Khinshtein also wants more of everything, which is why he was appointed acting governor of the region.

At the meeting, the head of the Glushkovsky district, Pavel Zolotarev, speaking about how many kilometers the enemy needs to be driven away from the border, stated:

"Sumy must be ours. We cannot live like on the peninsula. There must be more of us. At least Sumy. I think so. And with you as commander-in-chief, we will win," said a participant in the meeting.

"That's why they elected Alexander Yevseyevich, he also wants more of everything," Putin joked.


Putin did not seem to balk at the suggestion of Sumy being incorporated into the Russian Federation. That wasn’t even the most provocative statement of the day. Putin’s advisor Anton Kobyakov stated that the USSR was never even legally dissolved to begin with, and thus the Ukraine-Russia conflict is an ‘internal process’: (Video at link.)

Sounded to me like he was being pretty serious.

I’ve recounted before how Ukraine never legally seceded from the USSR because the August 1991 parliamentary ‘declaration’ was illegal due to the USSR constitution’s strict requirement that secession can only be recognized via popular referendum. A retroactive referendum was held in December 1991 to “affirm” the earlier parliamentary secession, but this can only be deemed legally invalid given that the August secession itself was already illegal as per the constitutional requirements.

On the Front
Russia continues its season of advances. Recent data has shown another huge spike in Russian territorial captures:

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Average daily advancement of the Russian Armed Forces in the SMO zone. Updated data from May 14 to May 17, 2025. The rate of advance is 31.5 km² per day for the period, the total advance is 126 km². In May, no less than 400 km will be captured, clearly marking a return to the offensive operations that began around this time in 2024 and lasted until early 2025.

Despite the above, here’s the lie Western mainstream yellow press is feeding its NPC audience:

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<snip>

Last time we reported on the troubles of the Ukrainian 47th Brigade—the commander who resigned wrote a further damning statement that’s worth reading:

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Another important thing to note. Recall at the Istanbul talks the only ‘breakthrough’ was the agreed upon 1000 to 1000 prisoner exchange. Many rightfully were dubious if Ukraine even had that many Russian prisoners, now evidence has emerged those doubts were justified. Ukrainian outlet ‘Strana’ reports all kinds of political prisoners are being given the opportunity to be included in the exchange in place of Russian POWs:

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Ukrainian newspaper "Strana" reports: “On the eve of the largest prisoner exchange under the '1000 for 1000' formula, detainees in Ukrainian detention centers who are charged with treason, separatism, collaborationism and similar offences have begun to be summoned and offered inclusion in the swap.”

“Those receiving these proposals are mostly Ukrainian citizens. 'They include businessmen, teenage photographers who snapped missile strikes and military objects, car arsonists, hard‑core pro‑Russians, and people who were simply framed', our interlocutor noted. Russian citizens make up only a tiny share of the political detainees in the detention centers.”

“'Strana' has already suggested that, after this exchange, Ukraine may be left with virtually no Russian prisoners—or very few. This may explain the push to recruit Ukrainians in pre‑trial detention who are willing to take part in the swap.” Again, this is not a new practice. It goes back to 2014. Kiev started taking hostages from their own civilian population and exchanging them to the militias for their own captured soldiers back in the first Donbass War.


Russian Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee Andrey Kartapolov confirms, stating that Zelensky is rounding up random people because he doesn’t have that many Russian prisoners to offer up: (Video at link.)

This confirms our longstanding findings that the Russian-Ukrainian POW disparity is likewise off the charts as with the casualty figures. Ukraine has ever had as much as 1,000-2,000 Russian POWs at any given time, with the bulk of them coming during the first Kursk debacle where a comparatively large amount of border guards were captured on the border in the first surprise assault. Russia on the other hand has provably maintained upwards of 10,000+ Ukrainian POWs since the early portion of the war. Literally every day new videos of Ukrainian POWs being captured flood the networks, here’s just a sampling of the past week alone:

Video 1, Video 2, Video 3, Video 4, Video 5, Video 6, Video 7, Video 8, Video 9 and there’s many more. Ukraine manages a video of captured Russians maybe once every week or two by comparison.

(Much more at link.)

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/sit ... es-us-from

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Brief Frontline Summary – May 21, 2025

The Armed Forces of Ukraine do not cease their activity on the Russian state border. The Russian Army looks toward Seversk. Report by Marat Khairullin with illustrations by Mikhail Popov.
Zinderneuf
May 21, 2025

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The Armed Forces of Ukraine continue their activity on the Russian state border between Tetkino and Novy Put. Here, Russian and Ukrainian villages are located in close proximity to each other. The worker's settlement of Tetkino (Russian territory) practically transitions into the village of Ryzhevka (Ukrainian territory). From the northwest, it is bordered by the Seim River—a low-lying area with dense vegetation and small bodies of water. Heavy machinery can not pass through here, but it is ideal for sabotage groups on quad bikes.

The settlement of Tetkino is regularly shelled by Ukrainian forces. As of November 2022, it had been shelled at least 15 times, including an attack in May 2022 that killed one person.

The area near the village of Bessalovka lies in the direction of Volfinsky. In this sector, the opposing side (Ukraine) is positioned on higher ground (with a 10-meter elevation difference). The Volfa River bed and the road from Belopolye to Volfino serve as the main routes for enemy advancement, both located in largely open terrain. As a result, this area sees less activity and is primarily used for reconnaissance, reserve accumulation, and fire support. Direct offensive actions are only possible after success on the flanks (the Ryzhevka and Novy Put sectors).

Pavlovka – Novy Put Sector

The Ukrainian village of Pavlovka stretches from northeast to southwest along the right bank of the Pavlovka River and lies on the reverse slopes of Hill 185.5. It is shielded by this elevation, allowing concealed movement along the Belopolye-Pavlovka road. Northwest of the village (toward the Russian border), a ravine with steep slopes provides another covert approach to the border—near the Krasnooktyabrsky settlement, which transitions into the Ukrainian village of Volfino.

This settlement has developed infrastructure: roads, a railway, and dense vegetation. By advancing into it with their right flank through the Russian settlement of Novy Put (population: 5 as of the 2010 census), the enemy aims to turn it into a heavily fortified defensive stronghold.

Additionally, the central part of the Tetkino-Novy Put sector has an extensive road network in both radial and lateral directions, enabling rapid and concealed movement of forces and equipment.

Enemy Activity in the Three Designated Zones

- In Ryzhovka, Russian reconnaissance detected enemy combat groups on quad bikes preparing to move toward the border. These groups were destroyed by drone strikes.

- In Bessalovka, the enemy (using the 225th Separate Assault Regiment) set up an observation post and personnel staging positions. These positions were eliminated by drone and artillery strikes.

- From Pavlovka, enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups (DRGs) from the 425th Separate Assault Regiment advanced toward Novy Put. They were neutralized by combined firepower.

Increased Activity on the Seversk Front

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Russian assault groups have reached the western outskirts of Verkhnekamenskoye. From here, the shortest route to Seversk lies through low-lying terrain, but this is a highly challenging sector. It is covered by enemy fire from the dominant height of Belaya Gora (Hill 221), which provides observation and firing control over the entire approach to the Seversk fortified area.

However, movement has begun, indicating that opportunities and favorable conditions have emerged. At this stage, the primary objective for Russian forces in this direction is Belaya Gora.

https://maratkhairullin.substack.com/p/ ... ay-21-2025

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Azov rising

'We’re being deliberately ground down. Lives are spent like spare change at a party.' Ukrainian liberal media glazing Azov vs Zelensky. More corruption in the 155th brigade. Fortification schemes
Events in Ukraine
May 21, 2025

Ne tak stalosya, yak hadalosya

— Ukrainian proverb, meaning ‘Things didn’t happen as planned’

1933. German’s traditional bourgeois parties are hopelessly outgunned in parliament. They make a coalition with Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist party. They make him chancellor. It’d be easy for big business to control this hotheaded petit bourgeois intellectual and his lumpen followers.

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A destroyed German factory, 1945

2013. The anti-nationalist, NATO-neutralist, Russia-friendly president of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych funds west Ukrainian ethnonationalists in the Svoboda party. They were a good electoral foil, convincing southeastern Ukrainians tired of Yanukovych that supporting him was the only way to avoid a fascist takeover. It’d be easy for Yanukovych to manipulate these peasant yokels.

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Svoboda at the 2013 anti-Yanukovych Euromaidan protests holding portraits of the 1940s fascist leader Stepan Bandera
2019. The archetypally cunning tycoon Igor Kolomoisky does everything in his power to bring his employee to power - the comedian Vladimir Zelensky. Kolomoisky was tired of the pressure on his business empire being exerted by both the IMF and rival oligarch president, the pro-western Petro Poroshenko. It’d be easy for the all-powerful Kolomoisky to control this air-headed showman.

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Zelensky and Kolomoisky during their only public meeting in 2020

Except Hitler dragged the German bourgeois into an unwinnable war, Svoboda and its sister organizations toppled the Yanukovych government in the bloody winter days of the Euromaidan revolution, and Zelensky imprisoned his former employer and supposed puppetmaster in 2023.

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The latest photos of Kolomoisky show that he hasn’t taken well to life in captivity. His iconic head of hair has gone missing
And now, 2025.

Ukraine’s pro-western liberals and media thought leaders are tired of Zelensky’s geopolitical antics and the corruption of his entourage. Representatives of the largest pro-western opposition party, ex-president Poroshenko’s ‘European Solidarity’, worry openly that the US is ‘washing its hands of Ukraine’ - they blame Zelensky’s incompetence. Another European Solidarity MP stated on May 20 that US military aid to Ukraine will end in the summer, since Trump hasn’t decided on any new shipments.

As the front continues slowly but steadily crumbling, the only thing Zelensky can state is his unwillingness to entertain Russia’s demand Ukraine abandon its constitutionally fixed desire for NATO membership. The western media is also hardly confident in the clown-in-chief.

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May 20
If this continues, Ukraine is doomed. This is the message the liberal nationalist segment of Ukrainian media constantly repeats. But it also has an answer.

There is a unit of the army which is uniquely talented, technologically advanced. It is constantly held up as the antithesis to the corruption endemic to the ‘old, Soviet’ Ukrainian army and the Zelensky entourage. (Formerly) USAID-funded liberal media like Ukrainska Pravda or Bihus constantly put out stories about the corruption of other military units, or the corruption of officials close to Zelensky like Tatarov, Tymoshenkov or Reznikov, but never about this unit.

And this unit of the army is not just a unit - it is a ‘movement’, a ‘family’ as it calls itself. It is at the forefront of the reformation of the army along NATO organizational standards. It is led by a charismatic leader who is constantly given glowing interviews by the liberal media.

Of course, this is Azov.

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Today’s article is about the influential liberal forces in Ukraine and abroad agitating for the neo-nazi Azov movement to take full control of the Ukrainian army. And the way they glaze its leader, Andriy Biletsky, and rail against Zelensky, it seems hard to believe they want anything other than for Azov to take full control of politics as well.

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Azovites erecting a pagan monument at one of their bases, 2017. I wrote about this incident here. The photo is from their official press release.

No doubt they think they will be able to ride the tiger. Indeed, Azov and Ukraine’s liberals have plenty in common. Both are made up of Ukraine’s small ‘middle class’, which sees itself as fighting a holy war for ‘civilization’ against both the uneducated, easily manipulable Ukrainian masses and the Russian ‘asiatic’ threat. Ukraine’s liberals call for increased censorship of anti-militarist censorship just as much as Azov’s nazis do.

And the German big bourgeois also made plenty of money off war, both before and after 1945. It goes without saying that the same wasn’t quite true of the people.

I’ve also written in the past on the conflicts between the liberal ‘Sorosites’ and the Azovite nationalists. But for now, they have a clear tactical alliance against a greater enemy. Who knows what the future holds, whether their paths will diverge.

Today, we’ll have a look at what’s been happening so far. On the one hand, liberal media has been glorifying Biletsky and Azov as possessing the unique answer to all Ukraine’s woes - if only they are given the keys to the castle.

On the other hand, the same liberal media has been on the offensive of late against the dismissal of ‘patriotic, new elite commanders’ by the ‘old corrupt Soviet generals’. The ‘patriotic new elite commanders’ - symbolized by Azov - want to minimize casualties by fighting a ‘high-tech war’, while the ‘old corrupt Soviet generals’ waste endless lives and care only about the division of rents.

Zelensky is sometimes named as the one responsible for these senseless losses, but he is even more directly responsible for yet more recently uncovered corruption in the construction of fortifications. Finally, the usual questions have been raised by the latest mass casualty event of newly mobilized Ukrainian troops.

(Paywall with free option.)

https://eventsinukraine.substack.com/p/azov-rising

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Interview with Vladimir Medinsky – lead Russian negotiator to the Istanbul peace talks
May 20, 2025

]

https://natyliesbaldwin.com/2025/05/int ... ace-talks/

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Russian Air Defense Successfully Repels Ukrainian Drone Attacks Targeting Moscow

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Moscow’s air defense foils nighttime drone assaults.Photo:EFE.

May 21, 2025 Hour: 9:46 pm

Russian anti-aircraft systems thwart multiple waves of Ukrainian drone assaults aimed at Moscow, demonstrating the resilience and vigilance of Russia’s defense amid ongoing conflict.

In the early hours of May 22, 2025, Moscow’s air defense systems successfully intercepted and destroyed a series of Ukrainian drone attacks targeting the Russian capital. Mayor Sergei Sobyanin confirmed that since 11:00 PM local time, Russian forces shot down 20 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) launched by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This decisive action underscores Russia’s commitment to protecting its sovereignty and civilian population from ongoing aggression.

Throughout the day, Moscow’s air defense remained vigilant, repelling a massive drone offensive that threatened not only the capital but also border regions. Sobyanin reported that a total of 24 drones launched by Kiev were neutralized before they could inflict damage.

This persistent defense effort highlights the effectiveness of Russia’s integrated air defense network in countering asymmetric warfare tactics employed by Ukrainian forces.

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This assault on Moscow highlights Ukraine’s refusal to compromise despite the prospect of peace.Photo:EFE.

From a left-wing perspective, these defensive successes reflect the broader struggle against imperialist-backed aggression aimed at destabilizing Russia and its allies. The drone attacks represent attempts by Western-supported forces to undermine Russian sovereignty and security.

However, the resilience of Russia’s defense systems and the solidarity of its people demonstrate a determined resistance to external interference, affirming the right of nations to defend their territorial integrity against hostile incursions.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/russian- ... ng-moscow/

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Ukrainian Armed Forces: two days of continuous attacks on Russian regions
May 22, 2025
Rybar

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Over the past two days, Ukrainian forces have been launching drones almost non-stop at the rear and border regions of Russia. To date, over 500 drones have been intercepted in the skies over the Belgorod, Oryol , Bryansk , Kursk ,
Ryazan , Lipetsk , Voronezh , Smolensk, Rostov , Kaluga , Tula , Vladimir regions , the Moscow region , as well as in the Crimea region .

During the raid, which also involved Lyuty drones, several attacks on industrial facilities and civilian infrastructure were recorded. Almost all UAVs were intercepted during the raid.

More information about the Ukrainian Air Force raid
An unprecedented number of drones were shot down over the Oryol region - almost 150. The Bolkhov Semiconductor Plant and several residential buildings were damaged . Over 120 UAVs were shot down over the Kursk region . There were no reports of casualties or damage.

For two days, local authorities have been reporting hourly drone interceptions over the Moscow region . As a result of UAV debris falling, minor damage was recorded in Domodedovo . The "Carpet" plan is introduced and cancelled several times a day at local Moscow region airports. On May 21-22, 82 planes flying to Moscow landed at alternate airfields .

In Tula , on the night of May 22, a drone crashed into the roof of an apartment building in the Proletarsky District . Two people were injured, they received medical assistance, and the residents were evacuated to hotels.

In the course of repelling the attack, mobile internet has been shut down for the second time since the massive raid in early May . Restrictions have been recorded in the Ivanovo , Vladimir , Oryol , Voronezh , Tula , Lipetsk regions , as well as in the Moscow region , as reported by local authorities. Internet outages have also been recorded in other regions.

This is intended to complicate the orientation of enemy drones in space. The Ukrainian Armed Forces often supply them with Russian SIM cards that connect to local cell towers in the conditions of electronic warfare. Judging by the absence of reports on the Internet about any significant damage, this measure was useful.

https://rybar.ru/massirovannyj-nalet-vs ... e-regiony/

Ukrainians to be deported: new rumors about upcoming purge in the US
May 22, 2025
Rybar

The Washington Post writes that the Trump administration is planning to spend up to $250 million to deport migrants from countries with military conflicts, including the so-called Ukraine. About 200,000 people who received temporary refugee status after the start of the Cold War are at risk.

Who else could be on the list:
▪️ Afghans
▪️Palestinians
▪️Syrians
▪️Libyans
▪️Yemenis and Sudanese

In March, the idea of ​​deporting Ukrainians after the meeting between Trump and Zelensky was already discussed , but it didn’t go beyond words. Now, apparently, they have returned to the issue — and with money for implementation.

The incident with Ukrainian activists who attacked US Vice President Vance during his walk in April could have been the reason. Such stories are not forgotten in the US.

The White House is looking for ways to reduce government spending, and the large army of refugees is clearly hindering this. If deportations begin, there will be resistance - many will try to stay illegally. But judging by the scale and preparation, Trump is more serious this time than before.

https://rybar.ru/ukrainczev-deportiruyu ... ke-v-ssha/

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The Weakness of Western Militaries & Weaponry Exposed
Roger Boyd
May 22, 2025

In World War 2, the Japanese government knew that in a longer war they would lose due to the overwhelming manufacturing capabilities of the US. Capabilities that supplied the Pacific and European theatres in parallel, as well as the shipments to the Soviet Union. That manufacturing capability has now been thrown away and China has now risen as the manufacturing Goliath of the world with one third of the globe’s manufacturing capacity. The US is considered to have 16% of the capacity, but a more accurate accounting would increase the Chinese share and reduce the US share. As it dominates one critical area of high technology after another, China has also developed the capabilities to excel in advanced weaponry.

At the same time, Russia (once derided as a “gas station with a nuclear arsenal”) has displayed a level of manufacturing capacity greater than any of the European nations; making a mockery of Western assessments that consider it only has 2% of global manufacturing capacity. It should be considered to be on par with Germany at 4.8%; Japan has 6.5%. As Chinese competition (e.g. in cars and machine tools) and the US import tariffs destroy large chunks of German and Japanese manufacturing capabilities they may very well sink below those of Russia. Another country that is greatly under-estimated is that of Iran, that has shown itself capable of developing and manufacturing a vast array of advanced missile and drone weaponry.

Recent conflicts have pointed to the real military balance of power between the West and Russia, China and Iran being in the latter’s favour, with even small nations being able to fend off US military power. Those conflicts have not shone a positive light on Western capabilities, and have shown the world the reality that the West cannot military beat Russia, China and even most probably Iran; especially if those nations stick together. The Germans may think that through massive new war spending they can match the Russians but this is merely a pipe dream that will only serve to enrich the Western MICs while accelerating the deterioration of German society and its economy.

The cat is out of the bag and cannot be put back into it, the military weakness of the West and the hollowness of its bluster can be seen by all. Including the militaries around the world that purchase weaponry from abroad. More and more they will look to China and Russia, and develop the deeper linkages that are inherent in the arms trade at the expense of the West and its weapons producers.

Ukraine War
The Ukrainian Army is the biggest in NATO and has been equipped with the best training and weaponry that could be provided. It has been methodically destroyed over three years of fighting by a Russian army that has used the conflict to greatly improve its doctrines and tactics, the quality of its soldiers, and its weaponry and munitions. The loss ratio is around 10:1 in Russia’s favour, and Western aircraft tend to stay well clear of Russian air defences and Russian fighter jets. One Western wunderwaffe after another has been shown to be easily destroyed or countered by the Russians, whether it be aircraft, tanks, armoured vehicles or missiles. For example, when tracking Ukrainian losses one can see a new batch of tanks and armoured vehicles being delivered to the Ukrainians only to be destroyed within weeks. In this article Russian experts describe the Leopard 2 tank as “German Trash” which has suffered heavy losses in Ukraine:

According to Oryx, a Dutch open-source intelligence blog that tracks equipment losses in the Ukraine War, Ukraine lost 18 Leopard-2A5, 26 Leopard-2A4, and 13 Leopard-2A6. These figures are based on visual confirmation of tank destruction or abandonment, which means that the actual number of losses could be higher.

The Leopard’s much weaker top and side armour make it a sitting duck for attacks from FPV drones and anti-tank missiles launched from both ground and air. The same outcomes for the British Challenger 2 and American Abrams. Their extreme weight (75 tons for the Challenger, 74 tons for the Abrams, 63 tons for the Leopard 2), especially compared to the Russian tanks (45 tons for the T72 and T80, 48 tons for the T90), together with over-complex components (e.g. the Abrams gas turbine engine), make them unsuitable for a peer-peer war where roads and rear repair facilities are open to extensive attack from drones and missiles. Even many of the Ukrainian bridges cannot support their weight and they may have severe difficulties operating in the “season of mud”. Unlike the Russian tanks, the Western tanks do not have autoloaders, which requires an additional crew member and a leads to a lower rate of fire (8-12 rounds a minute for the autoloader vs. only 4 for the human loader).



The “Kursk Salient” was a graveyard for masses of Western tanks and armoured vehicles. And now Russia is even rapidly overcoming the shortcomings it had in drones while also developing advanced anti-drone electronic warfare systems and anti-drone surface to air and air to air systems. Western drone technology is quite unimpressive compared to the developments from the hot house of the Ukraine War.



It is also very telling that the Ukrainian air force was wiped out extremely rapidly during the first weeks of the war, and ever since the West has been loath to put its own aircraft at risk against the Russian anti-aircraft systems and Russian aircraft equipped with air-to-air missiles that outrange their Western counterparts. Only a small number of much older F16s have been provided, and already three of perhaps sixteen have been shot down. It would be extremely embarrassing to see more advanced Western fighter jets get shot down, as has happened in the India-Pakistan War (see below).

The West may make this happen if they ever implement a proposal called SkyShield (somebody has been watching too many James Bond movies!) to put 120 Western fighter jets into Ukraine to protect Ukraine’s Black Sea coast from Russian missiles and drones. “Make my day” is probably what the Russians would think about this idiocy.

The incredible scale and cost effectiveness of the Russian military industrial production of everything from artillery shells to tanks to guided bombs to missiles to drones has also been displayed. Russia can produce equal or better quality at much lower costs and much higher volumes than the West can achieve. With modern warfare being shown to be one of massive equipment attrition, this is a winning advantage. For example, three times the number of shells than the West combined at a cost of US$1,000 a shell vs. US$4,000 in the West, and that latter cost is escalating as attempts to boost production are made. Decades of Western neoliberalism and MIC profiteering and corruption have come home to roost; they are optimized to make profits not weapons.



It is an advantage shown on an even greater scale by China, for example with its massive yearly output of new military ships and submarines.

India-Pakistan War
In the India-Pakistan War the latter was predominantly armed by China while the former was armed by the West together with some weaponry and equipment from Russia. India’s airforce was equipped with French and Russian multi-role fighter jets (46 Dassault Mirage 2000, 36 Dassault Rafale M, 59 older MIG-29, 259 Sukhoi SU-30) and 113 ground attack Jaguar aircraft. Pakistan shot down 3 Rafales (considered to be India’s best fighter aircraft), 1 Mirage 2000, 1 Mig-29 and 1 SU-30. These all seem to have been brought down by the Chinese-supplied single-engined multirole J10-C fighter jets employing the export version of the Chinese PL-15 air-to-air missile that has a range of 145km and flies at up to Mach 4. The non-export version used by the Chinese air force has a range of 300km.

This, together with the stellar performance of other Chinese military equipment in the hostilities, was a shock taken in by the world’s militaries and even the stock prices of the related Chinese arms manufacturers. It has shown that as in the EV space, Chinese arms are not just much cheaper than their Western equivalents but also better! For example a J-10C costs about US$40 million while a Rafale M costs about US$288 million. At such staggering price differences, a country utilizing Chinese weaponry could easily out equip one using Western weaponry.

The J-10 has been manufactured by China since 2002, and is said to have bettered the SU-35 in simulated combat due to its smaller radar signature (its deemed to be a 4.5 generation aircraft). China has 608 of them in service. It also has 300+ twin-engined J16/D 4.5 generation strike fighters and 300+ J20/A/S fifth generation stealth air superiority fighters. Plus 370 SU-27, SU-30 and SU-35. The capabilities of the Chinese-made aircraft had been previously downplayed in the West, but the performance of the J-10C against the advanced Rafale M puts any doubts to rest. It would be logical that as China outstrips the West in so many high technology areas, at lower costs, it would do the same with its weaponry. Especially when its military industrial complex is well controlled by the state and focused on producing good weaponry at a good price rather than profiteering and corruption.



US War on Ansar Allah
The utter inability of the US military to defeat Ansar Allah in Yemen, including the shoot down of many US surveillance drones and near misses on an US aircraft carrier, showed both the colossal over-estimation of US military power and how with modern technology a very limited opponent can hit well above its level.

For example, on April 28th, major media outlets became abuzz with news that the USS Harry S. Truman - which led the Trump administration’s effort to crush Ansar Allah’s anti-genocide Red Sea blockade - lost an F-18 fighter jet and tow tractor, while executing a hard turn to evade fire from the Resistance group. While a US Navy press release on the incident made no reference to Yemen’s assault, nameless American officials briefed several mainstream journalists that God’s Partisans were responsible.

Showing a woeful level of battle readiness, the Truman’s battle group shot down one of its own planes in December 2024, then in February 2025 the aircraft carrier was damaged when it collided with a commercial vessel near the Suez Canal, leading the Truman’s chief being fired, and the ship having to spend time in Greece being repaired.

A previous mission in 2024 against Ansar Allah under the Biden administration had expanded very large amounts of expensive missiles with little or no real impact, and the aircraft carrier USS Eisenhower may have actually been hit; the US Navy denied this but the Eisenhower was seen suddenly and rapidly scurrying away from the battle scene. Pointing to the utter unreadiness of US Navy staff to a real shooting war, even with a poor nation using drones and home made/perhaps Iranian-made missiles:

Associated Press revealed participating sailors and pilots had found the experience “traumatizing”, as they “weren’t used to being fired on.” Many had repeatedly come within seconds of being struck by “Houthi-launched missiles”, before they were destroyed “by their ship’s defensive systems.” The Pentagon was thus considering providing “counseling and treatment” to thousands of USAF and Navy employees suffering from “post-traumatic stress”, and their families.

The US Navy’s utilization of relatively small amounts of very expensive missiles, both for self defence and attack, may be very profitable for the US MIC but was shown to be severely wanting as ship-based supplies were rapidly run down. The implications for a war with Iran (from the Arabian Sea) or China (from the South China Sea or Philippine Sea) are that such supplies would be rapidly denuded, blunting offensive capabilities and rendering the ships relatively defenceless to attack. A US aircraft carrier group would not survive long in such a war, and that’s not even taking into account the threat of Chinese submarines and hypersonic missiles against which the US Navy has no defence.

It has been a long-running joke that aircraft carriers are simply moving targets for modern submarines, and now they can also be seen as the same for modern drones and missiles. Much of US military power is dependent upon the ability of its 11 carrier strike groups to project its power around the globe, an ability now shown to be a hollow shell; a very expensive one at that.

With Russia showing that it can withstand the West’s “sanctions from hell”, China showing that it has the upper hand in any trade war with the US, one country after another showing that it can withstand Western colour revolution attempts, and Western militaries shown to be much less of a threat than previously thought, what does the West have apart from bluster to maintain its global power?

https://rogerboyd.substack.com/p/the-we ... militaries
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Sat May 24, 2025 12:20 pm

"Could this lead to something big?"
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 05/24/2025

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“Why did Washington fail in its attempt to end the Russo-Ukrainian war?” asks this week German political scientist and pro-Ukrainian propagandist Andreas Umland, one of the foremost experts on this war to present his wishes in the form of an analysis. After an insubstantial reference to Clausewitz, Umland asserts that “the military invasion of Ukraine has changed in these three years.” “The war itself has taken on a stabilizing function, militarized the economy, and mobilized society,” he asserts, failing to realize that this list better defines Ukraine since 2014 than Russia since 2022. “There are no tangible results from the intensive trilateral negotiations between Washington, Moscow, and Kyiv, nor from the direct interactions between the presidents of the United States and Russia,” he concludes, unwilling to believe—evidently because he is opposed to the diplomatic path—that the existence of political negotiations for the first time in three years is, in itself, a more promising outcome than dialogue solely through artillery, drones, and missiles. Perhaps precisely for this reason, arguments are growing these days about the need to maintain the military path as the only possible solution in this conflict.

“A massive exchange has just been completed between Russia and Ukraine. It will happen shortly. Congratulations to both sides of the negotiation,” Donald Trump boasted yesterday on his personal social media account, proudly announcing a success before it even happened. The agreement on the prisoner exchange, the clearest result of the first diplomatic contact in Istanbul, will mean, if the terms are met, the release of 2,000 people over the next three days. Trump's announcement underscores that Andriy Ermak's remarks on Thursday, confirming that Ukraine had submitted the list of prisoners to be exchanged and urging Russia to expedite the process, were merely propaganda intended for domestic consumption. Moreover, by then it was already known that Moscow had submitted its list and had called on Ukraine to do the same. After all, the task was much easier for Russia, which has a larger number of prisoners to exchange than kyiv. "It will take place in three exchanges over three days, with the participation of mainly military personnel, but also some civilians," wrote Financial Times journalist Christopher Miller shortly afterward, a fact that was confirmed later in the afternoon. Russia and Ukraine exchanged 270 military personnel and 120 civilians in the first of three exchanges that will conclude the process.

"Could this lead to something big?" Donald Trump asked in his exultant post . Even as a novice, he is unaware that prisoner exchanges have been the tool used by the parties every time they wanted to stage a step forward, without any further progress having been made subsequently. The handover of captured soldiers, as well as the return of the bodies of soldiers who fell in battle, has been the easiest aspect since 2014, although not without difficulties and manipulations, for the Russian and Ukrainian delegations and even for the commanders, who on the ground have managed exchanges with their counterparts on the other side of the front. But although the current process, the largest prisoner exchange of those eleven years of war, will not necessarily result in a reduction of tensions or a step toward a ceasefire, it is in itself a tangible result of the negotiations.

From positions contrary to Trump's unjustified optimism and aiming to maintain the status quo , other sectors downplay the value of the resumption of dialogue, deny any progress, and seek ways to present the contacts as definitive proof of the failure of diplomacy. "Appeasing Russia today is much more difficult than forcing it to make peace by force. Putin does not openly show his willingness to a diplomatic solution. Acceding to his demands would deprive Ukraine of its viability, which means they are not even up for discussion. There is currently no room for compromise," wrote Mikhail Podolyak yesterday, adding that "the strategy of forcing Russia to make peace has already been successfully tested and only requires persistence in its implementation." Andriy Ermak's advisor in the President's Office tends to offer seemingly simple solutions to complex problems. According to Podolyak, "Arms supplies must continue so that Ukraine can continue to inflict devastating losses on the occupiers, losses that Putin cannot compensate for without resorting to politically toxic mobilization."

kyiv continues to insist on using conscription as an argument to defend military action as the only acceptable way to resolve the conflict, even though it is in Ukraine, not Russia, where images of men resisting forcible recruitment in the streets are seen daily. Despite constant announcements by Ukrainian intelligence and even Zelensky himself of an imminent mobilization decree in the Russian Federation, Moscow has not needed to take such a step since the partial mobilization of September 2022. The arrogance of war makes reality less important than the myth of the invincibility of Ukrainian soldiers, invincible as long as the West supplies the necessary weapons. Hence, Podolyak, reflecting the sentiment of the Ukrainian government despite the current rhetoric of peace, demands weapons, ammunition, sanctions, and "support for Ukraine in the production of drones and missiles to attack enemy infrastructure."

The Ukrainian official seems to maintain the hope that the long-range attacks, which are carried out daily and massively using drones—currently with the main objective of disrupting Moscow airports—will change the course of the war, an argument that was already used a year ago to obtain permission to use missiles on Russian territory and that has not changed the dynamics of the conflict. Podolyak's logic is the same as that of Andreas Umland, who in his article proclaimed that the situation leads "to only one conclusion: to achieve the end of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Russia must experience a humiliating defeat on the battlefield." Using the logic of someone who expects a different result by doing the same thing over and over again, Umland does not explain how Ukraine will be able to inflict such a decisive defeat on Russia.

This has always been the objective of Ukraine's European allies and the previous US administration. This is why the massive mobilization of military and economic resources is needed to sustain the Ukrainian state and enable the fight against Russia to the last Ukrainian, as even the most privileged brigades of the Armed Forces have perceived, denouncing impossible tasks that must be carried out at the cost of enormous casualties. Unlike the frontline commanders, aware of the difficulty of the situation, continuing to fight remains the priority option in the offices of Kiev, and especially in the rest of Europe. Hence, European countries are seeking ways to compensate for the decline in US military contributions and are proposing the porcupine strategy and a situation comparable to that of the 38th parallel separating the two Koreas, given the possibility of a peace agreement. As Foreign Minister Merz has repeatedly stated, European countries will continue to supply arms to Ukraine regardless of a ceasefire or peace agreement. War has been the raison d'être of the Ukrainian state since 2022, if not years before, a view not limited to the Kyiv cabinet but extending to many European capitals, far more fearful of peace than of a continuation of the current situation.

Looking to the future, Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine's current ambassador to the United Kingdom, also wanted to speak out this week. "I hope there is no one in this room who believes in some kind of miracle or wonder, in a white swan that will bring peace to Ukraine, restore the 1991 or 2022 borders, and bring enormous happiness afterward," stated the former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. However, Zaluzhny's intention is not to advocate a peaceful solution or a search for compromise, but rather a long-term war that would allow Ukraine to do what Podolyak demands: defeat Russia in its rear. "In my opinion, as long as the enemy has the resources, strength, and means to attack our territory and attempt localized offensive actions, they will continue to do so," argued Zaluzhny, whose recipe for future victory is to completely destroy Russia's ability to fight. In addition to the military path advocated by Podolyak, Zaluzhny's recipe also includes economic and technological warfare. His vision, an eternal war that goes beyond the military, fits perfectly with the current government's position. "Our children must prepare for war because it will last a long time," Irina Vereshchuk, deputy head of the President's Office, stated yesterday, according to the newspaper Strana .

To sustain such a war, a massive army with continuous supplies is required. Having seemingly lost hope that the United States will sustain the Ukrainian Armed Forces forever, kyiv is looking for ways and arguments to demand future funding guarantees. To this end, Ukraine's Finance Minister has proposed that European countries be directly responsible for funding the army starting in 2026. "The cost of sustaining the Ukrainian Armed Forces for the benefit of European security would amount to only a small percentage of the European Union's GDP," unabashedly stated Serhiy Marchenko, who, in addition to the funding he uses to support the state, also intends to get Brussels to pay for maintaining what Ukraine aspires to become the second largest army in Europe (behind only Russia). This decision, according to Marchenko, would bring "a number of strategic advantages for Ukraine, especially maintaining financial stability in 2026 and beyond."

The benefits would not be limited to Ukraine, but financing a massive military force until further notice would, according to this version, mean for the European Union, "guaranteeing security against a potential Russian aggression." Marchenko explained that Ukraine offers: participation by allies in the financing of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and integration of the Ukrainian army into the European defense system. By exercising its ability to present demands as offers, kyiv aims to ensure that the economic privileges it obtained from its allies during the war continue beyond a possible ceasefire and to maintain future external financing of its army as a military force in an eternal proxy war against Russia.

https://slavyangrad.es/2025/05/24/podri ... go-grande/

Google Translator

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From Cassad's telegram account:

Forwarded from
Sovereign economy
🛞 Europe is going to war — with money

The ambassadors of the EU countries have agreed to create a special militarization fund worth $150 billion. But this is just the tip of the iceberg. Back in March, the head of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen announced a large-scale ReArm Europe program — $800 billion for the accelerated rearmament of the European Union. The plans include not only the easing of fiscal rules, but also the provision of loans for the purchase of weapons and support for the defense industry.

For comparison: the entire military budget of the EU in 2024 was $325 billion, including supplies to Ukraine. Of the $800 billion, about $150 billion will go to the purchase of air defense systems, including Patriot PAC-3 and HIMARS missiles. The remaining $650 billion is an increase in the military budgets of the EU countries (by +1.5% of GDP) and the attraction of private investment. This money should go to European-American military projects — from tanks to ammunition, with an eye primarily on US equipment.

However, there is a problem with production. Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger openly admitted that German factories simply cannot cope with the volumes. Back in 2023, the concern refused to continue supplying tanks to Ukraine. Now it will have to restore the Bundeswehr's armored vehicles, the state of which the army audit recognized as depressing. Competition is expected on the market between manufacturers from the USA, Germany, Sweden and South Korea.

And what about the implementation of this entire "titanic" program? So far, it is unclear. Experts doubt its feasibility. But the EU is already cutting budgets for the development of poor regions and plans to raise the threshold of public debt. New NATO members, such as Finland, are announcing the reduction of social programs in order to build up the defense industry. And it seems that the "bourgeois comfort" of Europeans is gradually becoming a thing of the past. And the ReArm Europe program has not even started in full force.

Yes, not all European countries will follow the path of Germany and especially Poland, where the focus is on the quantitative growth of the army and the expansion of the organizational structure of the branches of the armed forces. Nevertheless, in some ways it can be said that a number of states have been assigned the role of "soldiers", while others are "workers in a weapons factory". The latter category goes beyond the borders of the Alliance in the form of the same South Korea. Analyzing NATO's recent military exercises and other indirect signals, Europe is preparing for a full-scale war of a new type, and far from defensive, as indicated by the growth of the permanent number of the Armed Forces, and not by the correction of the plan and nature of mobilization.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

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Lavrov Fences with UK Media
Karl Sanchez
May 23, 2025

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Today, a short verbal fencing bout occurred between FM Lavrov and one of the UK Media outlets, it’s not clear which one. The bout is over the West’s propaganda narrative versus Russian realistic lines which Lavrov handles very well in an almost comical fashion:
Question: Is Russia ready to sit down and sign a peace treaty with President Vladimir Zelensky?

Sergey Lavrov: You are putting the cart before the horse. First you need to have a contract, and when it is agreed, then we will decide.

But President Vladimir Zelensky, as President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly said, does not have legitimacy. This is also recognized within Ukraine. Therefore, when the agreement is ready, and it is far from certain that this will happen tomorrow, it should be such that there is no repetition of what the putschists who came to power in 2014 did through a bloody coup d'état. Then we will see who has legitimacy from the Ukrainian authorities.

The current Constitution (President of Russia Vladimir Putin has repeatedly analysed it in detail) seems to allow us to talk about the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada. The best option would be to hold elections. Only here, in Britain, you don't have to become prime minister through elections. So they agree among themselves and change places.

The most important task now is to prepare a reliable peace treaty that ensures a long-term, sustainable and just peace, without threatening anyone's security. In this case, we are interested in the Russian Federation. Without any attempts to infringe on the rights of Russians and Russian speakers in violation of the UN Charter, which prohibits discrimination on religious and linguistic principles.

Europe, including Britain, is a champion of human rights. I gave an example: Arabic is not banned in Israel, Hebrew is not banned in Arab countries, English is not banned in Ireland. It will seem simply unthinkable to you if the opposite happens.

And in Ukraine, everything Russian can be banned. You keep quiet. [My Emphasis]
How much of that bout was revealed by the UK meda outlet is unknown, but it was recorded and provided by Russian media to the Foreign Ministry, which put it to use. Most notable is the eventual treaty’s basic, most important outcome, and that’s the inclusion of the Indivisible Security concept bolded above, which actually is the goal of the December 2021 treaty proposals made to the Outlaw US Empire and NATO. That goal must be kept in mind every time talks occur and results are provided. As Lavrov stated initially, until such an agreement is arrived at and legitimate authorities emerge to sign it, there will be no ceasefire. And given the speculation on just how large the “security buffer” will be—drones and himars have rather long ranges, 300+ Km—much of the current Ukraine might fall within such a zone. Another factor that’s clear is ISR flights over the Black Sea by the Outlaw US Empire have resumed signaling Trump isn’t being honest when he claims to want peace. And then there’s the glaring loophole in the “minerals agreement” I noted that allows arms supplies to Ukraine from the Empire to resume as an “investment” in Ukraine’s future. So, the duel continues with Team Trump’s Cold Warriors currently holding sway.

https://karlof1.substack.com/p/lavrov-f ... h-uk-media

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Missile Attack on Lgov, Kursk: 16 Civilians Killed Amid Ukraine’s Escalation

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Ukraine’s missile strike on Lgov leaves 16 dead and any injured.Photo: Tass.

May 22, 2025 Hour: 10:23 pm

The Ukrainian missile strike on Lgov, Kursk region, has claimed 16 civilian lives and caused widespread destruction. Left-wing sources denounce Kyiv’s aggression and highlight Russia’s defensive efforts to protect its people from NATO-backed violence.

On May 22, 2025, the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched a missile attack on the Russian city of Lgov in the Kursk region, killing 16 civilians and injuring dozens more, including children. The assault damaged dozens of homes and vehicles, deepening the humanitarian crisis in the border region. The attack is part of a broader campaign of aggression fueled by NATO’s expansionist policies, which Russia has been forced to confront to defend its sovereignty and population.

According to Alexander Khinshtein, acting governor of Kursk, the missile strike damaged 30 homes and shattered windows in 26 apartments across three buildings. In addition to civilian casualties, the attack destroyed two stores, a car wash, 14 cars, and nine trucks.

Four victims remain in critical condition, with doctors fighting to save their lives. This attack follows the recent liberation of parts of the Kursk region, where Ukrainian forces intensified bombardments targeting civilian areas, including the Belovsky district, resulting in further deaths and injuries.

The number of victims following the missile attack in Lgov has risen to 16 people.
Lgov is located on the Central Russian Upland, in the Dnieper basin, about 40 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

Russian officials have condemned these attacks as acts of terrorism orchestrated by Kyiv and its Western backers. The Russian military continues its special operation, initiated in February 2022, aimed at protecting Russian citizens from what it describes as genocide and national security threats posed by NATO’s eastward expansion.

Authorities emphasize the importance of counterterrorism operations and humanitarian support for affected residents in the border regions, underscoring Russia’s commitment to safeguarding its people against foreign mercenary violence and indiscriminate attacks on civilians.

This escalation is viewed as a direct consequence of NATO’s provocative policies and the West’s refusal to respect Russia’s legitimate security concerns. They argue that the West’s support for Kyiv’s military actions only prolongs the suffering of civilians on both sides and destabilizes the region.

The defense of Russian border regions is framed as a necessary response to imperialist aggression, with calls for peaceful resolution grounded in respect for sovereignty and international law.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/missile- ... scalation/

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Brief report from the front, May 22, 2025

The task is to take control of the Vladimirovka - Popov Yar - Malinovka - Koptevo area. Report by Marat Khairullin with illustrations by Mikhail Popov.
Zinderneuf
May 22, 2025
Message from the Russian Ministry of Defense:

"As a result of the active and decisive actions of the units of the 'Center' Group, the settlement of Novaya Poltavka in the Donetsk People's Republic has been liberated."

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ЛБС 02.5.2025=Line of Combat Contact May 2nd, 2025. Зона Активности=Zone of Activity.

The village of Novaya Poltavka is the eastern gateway to the ridge of the watershed between the Kazenny Torets and Poltavka rivers. This ridge begins north of the settlement of Sofievka and ends at the line of Novoekonomichnoe–Novaya Poltavka. Its location is highly advantageous: the flanks are protected by rivers, and the terrain is elevated. The height reaches 212 meters near Novaya Poltavka, 188 meters to the west near Novoekonomichnoe, and 190 meters at the start of the watershed near the settlement of Poltavka. (The heights are marked by triangles with a dot in the middle on the map.*) The most advantageous place for the deployment of blocking positions (positions in the depth of the defense) to cover the areas of accumulation and deployment of enemy reserves and fire cover for the cavalry line is the height of 212 to Malinovka and the radial line Popov Yar to Vozdvizhenka.

The village of Malinovka is under the control of the Russian Armed Forces, with clearing operations and position consolidation underway. The enemy’s ideal area for blocking positions is now being locked out from the south.

It appears that the primary objective for the Russian Armed Forces in this sector is to gain control over the Vladimirovka–Popov Yar–Malinovka–Koptevo area. By dislodging the enemy from this zone, our units will secure control over all logistical and maneuver routes for the enemy while establishing a bridgehead that ensures operational freedom for future actions: either advancing eastward on the right flank toward Popov Yar–Rusin Yar or westward on the left flank toward the Ukrainian Armed Forces' defensive area of Vladimirovka–Novoekonomichnoe.

The tempo of combat operations in this sector is high, with the initiative firmly in the hands of the Russian Armed Forces. We will continue to monitor developments closely.

To our fighters: may you have military success, decisive action, and victory!

https://maratkhairullin.substack.com/p/ ... ont-may-22

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Liberation of Otradny
May 23, 18:54

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During intensive offensive actions, the Russian Armed Forces were able to quickly liberate the important settlement of Otradnoye in the Yuzhno-Donetsk direction. Russian flags were raised in the settlement. After the fall of the defense of Bogatyr, the situation for the enemy to the west and southwest of Constantinople continues to deteriorate sharply.

(Video at link.)

The battles for Alekseyevka will begin soon. The main target in this area is Komar. Current operations from Constantinople and Velikaya Novosyolka are aimed primarily at liberating Komar. This will complete the liberation of the southwestern part of the DPR.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9855890.html

Only military objects will be selected as targets
May 23, 21:00

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Russian Foreign Ministry on enemy UAV attacks.

The Kiev regime does not stop terrorizing civilians and civilian objects in many Russian regions, including Moscow.

According to the Russian Defense Ministry, from May 20 to 08:00 on May 23, a multiple increase was recorded - 788 attacks by aircraft-type UAVs and Western-made missiles on the territory of the Russian Federation, and outside the Special Military Operation zone. Our air defense forces destroyed 776 drones and missiles, 12 UAVs, unfortunately, reached their target.

There are dead and wounded. On May 22, as a result of an attack on the village of Panteleimonovna in the DPR, 8 people were wounded. On the same day, in the Vasilievsky municipal district of the Zaporizhia region, as a result of drone strikes, a girl born in 1990 was killed, four children were wounded - 10, 9, 8 years old and a one-year-old child. On the night of May 23, as a result of the crash of a downed UAV, which caused a fire in the industrial zone of the city of Yelets in the Lipetsk region, 8 people were injured. In addition, the Armed Forces of Ukraine carried out two strikes with "Hymars" missiles on civilian objects in the city of Lgov in the Kursk region, where people were also injured, including two children.

It should also be noted that even after the Kursk region was cleared of Ukrainian servicemen, the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to try to penetrate our territory and strike with UAVs, as well as long-range artillery and missiles.

Under these conditions, the President of the Russian Federation was forced to make a decision to create a security zone in the adjacent territory in order to minimize the possibility of infiltration by the Armed Forces of Ukraine and strikes on our border areas using various weapons.

The latest barbaric terrorist actions by the Kiev regime have been undertaken in an attempt to disrupt the process of direct Russian-Ukrainian negotiations, which have resumed with the assistance of the US Administration and are aimed at a final settlement of the conflict, and to prevent the implementation of the first agreements agreed upon in Istanbul on May 16, including a large-scale exchange of prisoners of war.

The course taken by the Ukrainian "war party" also includes violations of the so-called "energy" and Easter truces, which Russia strictly observed, as well as the ceasefire we declared during the celebration of the 80th anniversary of the Great Victory.

Of course, Russia will give an adequate response to the massive terrorist attacks by the Kiev regime. Unlike the Ukrainian side, only military facilities and enterprises of the military-industrial complex will be selected as targets.

But, we emphasize, our fundamental commitment to a constructive search for ways to peacefully resolve the conflict through dialogue remains unchanged.

Diplomatic preparations for a massive strike on Ukraine. We are waiting.

Lavrov also separately spoke about the need for regime change in Ukraine.

"If Zelensky's junta expects that somehow an agreement will be reached to end the hostilities, and what remains of Ukraine will live according to the laws that they adopted, this is an illusion, this cannot be allowed under any circumstances. Millions of people on the territory of Ukraine speak Russian, it is their native language, and putting them under the leadership of a junta that has banned even speaking Russian - this will be a very big crime. We will definitely not allow this" (c)


The Nazi regime in Ukraine is a guarantee of the resumption of war in a certain amount of time.
Without the denazification of Ukraine, the goals of the SVO cannot be achieved.

P.S. The photo shows the consequences of one of the missiles hitting the port infrastructure in Odessa.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9856131.html

Strikes on Kyiv. 05/24/2025
May 24, 9:44

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At night, as promised by the Foreign Ministry, there was a response. For several hours, a powerful drone attack was carried out, supplemented by missile strikes. The attack affected 9 regions with multiple Iskander and Geranium strikes. In Kyiv, the Antonov plant was hit especially hard, where after a cascade of hits, large fires broke out.

(Videos at link.)

It is worth noting that in addition to the Geraniums, their jet variations were used, which are now especially difficult for enemy air defense to combat. In addition, there were many different decoy drones, the task of which is to draw enemy air defense missiles onto themselves, which the enemy has a problem with.

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(Other images at link.)

In addition to cities, several airfields and checkpoints were hit with missiles.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9856626.html

Google Translator

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Putin's War of Coercive Diplomacy from Istanbul to Istanbul or the Beginning of the End of the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War
Gordon Hahn
May 16, 2025

In the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War, the peace wars of propaganda are over. The political struggle for the post-war peace has begun. Ukraine has been forced under Russian military power and American political and economic power to begin the process of capitulation. This process will be as dangerous as is the present war for Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskiy’s surreal, ‘simulacric’ iteration of the semi-oligarchic, semi-neofascist Maidan regime.

Russia has won the ‘politics by other means’ in the NATO-Russia Ukrainian war, and Moscow will be as firm in its pursuit of winning the peace as it has been in prosecuting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ‘special military operation.’ Russia is positioned, therefore, to win the politics of negotiating the war’s end of the subsequent peace, such as it might be achieved.

The causes are many. The U.S., under President Donald Trump has woken up, has adopted a national realist policy of defending the preserving the Western hemisphere as its exclusive sphere of influence as well as of building national power elsewhere by economic more than by military means rather than projecting utopian ideals on other civilizations and national cultures. Ukraine is being positioned to capitulate by dint of Russian power on the battlefronts and American political pressure. The reality of defeat in war, a crushing ‘democracy deficit’, and corruption that makes Moscow look like the epitome of the rule of law. Europe’s gambit to replace American power and preserve the post-modern West’s bizarre quest for wokist-globalist dystopia failed miserably in the absence of any real European economic and military power; its desperate measures only draw the attention of an even more desperate Kiev. Trump’s America and Putin’s Russia look on Europe’s flailing about here and there with smiles, laughs, and incredulity.

All the above boiled down to Zelenskiy’s decision to risk direct talks with Russia, despite a Ukrainian presidential decree making such action illegal. There is no other ultimate reason for why Kiev and finally, so it seems, Zelenskiy have finally come to realize that the war is lost. They must capitulate, perhaps while attempting to convince the Ukrainian people, particularly the families and friends of the more than one million dead and gravely wounded that they have not done so. The only questions remaining are: How badly the defeat will ruin Ukraine? How many more Ukrainian soldiers must die and be seriously wounded, given an attrition rate of 40-50,000 per month? How much more economic and other infrastructure must be destroyed? How much more territory must Ukraine sacrifice in order to put up the fiction of reliable defense? Will Zelenskiy and his team survive the transition to peace in the face of numerous Ukrainian neofascist threats that talks with Moscow will forced them to turn their weapons on corrupt Kiev?

But Ukraine is not alone in paying a high price for the greatest geostrategic catastrophe of the 20th century – NATO expansion to Russia’s borders, particular to Ukraine. Since this has been a NATO-Russian war more than or at least as much as a Russo-Ukrainian war, NATO is also suffering a military defeat, underscoring the weakness of Western military systems, weapons, social and economic systems, and political will – in short, of Western power. As perhaps no other force in history, NATO has shot itself in the foot and fallen low when it was at the height of its supremacy and could have reforms towards a more constructive role for the post-Cold War era.

Now the chickens have come home to roost. Ukraine and NATO must capitulate. In an attempt to create yet another alternative reality, they will say the war saved Ukraine from total Russian conquest—something neither Putin nor the overwhelming majority of Russians supports. The Ukrainians and their Western backers must say this to cover up the fact that war was unnecessary and eminently avoidable. Putin was engaging in coercive diplomacy, as I proposed at the time might be the case. He offered talks from the first day, 24 February 2022, of his SMO, negotiations got under way, an agreement was arrived at and initialed by both sides in April 2022—the one sabotaged by Washington and London, with the Europeans following dutifully along.

The creeping capitulation that is gaining ground is evident in the fact that Zelensky and the Europeans – EU and NATO – were all dead set against a ceasefire just months ago. But the front line continued to slide ever more west towards the Dnieper River as the Ukrainian army falls back in a persistent forced retreat. Then Zelenskiy demanded a 30-day ceasefire without conditions or talks and massive Western sanctions if Moscow refused. The Europeans chimed in setting deadlines this week for what day by which Putin will have had to agreed to the ceasefire to avoid yet another round of sanctions. Zelenskiy then stated that he would fly to Istanbul and demand that Putin meet with him there and agree to a ceasefire or be faced with new sanctions. Putin was not in Istanbul yesterday, and Zelenskiy stopped short of arriving, remaining in Ankara as a Ukrainian delegation moved on to meet with Putin’s negotiators. Instead, the Russians took note of the Ukrainians’ delivery of Zelenskiy’s request for a meeting with Putin. Gone was the language of ultimatum and threats.

Nor did Russia agree to a ceasefire. The two sides agreed to continue the negotiating process. Each will draft a document detailing their vision of a ceasefire and its implementation. This means that any ceasefire will be established after negotiations over what Putin called the “nuances,” meaning the technical issues necessary to be resolved for a proper ceasefire to be implemented, monitored, and maintained so negotiations on a full-fledged peace agreement can be hammered out. Despite Russia’s continued refusal to agree to an unconditional ceasefire, the Europeans – many hours after the close of the meeting – had not followed through on their threat of massive new sanctions. If they do not, then it will not just be clear that the ‘king has no clothes’, it will be visible to all that they never had any and would not know how to put them on if they did.

In the interim of a few weeks, more likely months before a ceasefire is firmly established, Russian forces will continue to grind forward, with an apparent major offensive in the offing this summer. Then peace talks must ensue. All the while, the numerous neofascist units in the Ukrainian army will be idle and angry at the front, feeling betrayed by Zelenskiy’s talks with their most hated figure. With the march on Moscow many of this ilk dreamed of, their fancies will turn to completing the nationalist revolution by seizing power in Kiev and declaring a plague on both the Western and Russian houses. Zelenskiy, the Maidan regime, all Ukraine, and the West have a real dangerous dilemma on their hands.

It did not have to be this way. NATO could have kept its promise not to expand even an inch beyond reunited Germany. It could have foregone policies: to expand the Atlantic alliance to Ukraine; to destabilize the country in the 2005 Orange and 2014 Maidan revolts to facilitate NATO expansion to Ukraine; to tolerate and then support Ukrainian neofascists in order to build a broader and rabid anti-Russian Ukrainian national identity to turn popular support to favor Ukraine’s entry into NATO; to condone Maidan revolt’s violent seizure of power and in the process accept the Maidan opposition forces’ violation of the 20 February 2014 agreement brokered by Europeans and Russia that would have ended the revolt and re-stabilized the country; to back the new Maidan regime’s ‘anti-terrorist operation’ (ATO) against pro-Russian elements in the Donbass rather than demand negotiations; to demand that Kiev end the civil war the fulfill its obligations under the Minsk 2 accords establishing a ceasefire in the ATO and peace process for ending the the Donbass separatist movement; to train, arm, and otherwise equip the Ukrainian army to NATO standards; to ignore Ukraine’s continuous ceasefire operations in 2015-2022; to establish 14 CIA bases along Russia’s borders; to retract in January 2022 US President Joseph Biden’s December 2021 commitment to Putin in a phone call that the US would never deploy nuclear capable ballistic missiles in Ukraine; to refuse to engage in diplomacy to prevent Putin’s ‘special military operation’ through fall and winter 2021-2022; to sabotage the April 2022 Russo-Ukrainian peace agreement by refusing to give security guarantees for the agreement and instead enticing Kiev to walk away from the agreement by promising massive military and other assistance to Kiev ‘for as long as it takes.’

It did not take long, but it also did not take the path of a ‘strategic defeat’ for Russia and the Putin’s fall from power. Putin won his war for a Russian peace in the face of the NATO threat, and Putin’s Russia will win the peace. This prospect creates unease, because those Putin has defeated are unaccustomed to this and their bear an enormous burden of responsibility and, for some, guilty consciences for what they have put Ukraine through. How might they be able to kick the game board over and maintain their power, prestige, and life’s purpose? I fear a trick up their sleeves.

https://gordonhahn.substack.com/p/putin ... -diplomacy

Gordon's desire to see Trump as having some sort of 'strategic vsion' is a common affliction of conservative critics of this NATO war. They cannot admit that their savior of Culture War ain't nothing but an emotional Magic Eight Ball.
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Sun May 25, 2025 12:39 pm

Security at the front and in the rear
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 05/25/2025

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“A lasting peace agreement will not be possible that does not address Ukraine and Russia's long-term mutual concerns. As they did in Istanbul in 2022, both sides continue to prioritize these national security concerns. Other issues—such as the status of disputed territories, the lifting of sanctions against Russia, and the financing of Ukraine's postwar economic reconstruction—are important but largely secondary,” write Sergey Radchenko and Samuel Charap, the two American experts who, over the course of three years of diplomatic absence, have had access to the negotiation documents from the first months of the war and who, long before Vladimir Putin called for Istanbul 2.0, were already defending that dialogue as a possible basis for a future resolution to the conflict, in the current issue of Foreign Policy.

Based on documents produced by Russia and Ukraine during the spring of 2022 and contacts with individuals involved in the negotiations, the conclusion of Radchenko and Charap, a professor at Johns Hopkins University and an expert at the RAND Corporation, respectively, reflects what could already be observed in the statements of the parties and in Russia's initial offer at the time of the invasion. In April 2022, just weeks after the invasion of Ukraine and when Russian troops were still holding out—albeit with enormous casualties, no possibility of advancing, and with great difficulty holding their positions—in the vicinity of Kyiv, Russia proposed abandoning all the territories captured since February 22 beyond Donbass, whose borders were pending an agreement between Volodymyr Zelensky and Vladimir Putin. Contrary to the notion of Russian imperial expansionist ambitions, which Western press experts have preached for years, the main objective was to halt NATO's expansion toward its border in Ukraine and secure the country's neutrality, the counterpart offered to kyiv for recovering much of its lost territory. The two exceptions, Crimea and Donbass, were justified as the fait accompli of 2014 in the case of the peninsula and the punishment Ukraine deserved for its refusal to comply with the Minsk agreements in the case of the mining region.

According to Charap and Radchenko, the talks dragged on much longer than was apparent at the time, as the war was already heading toward a phase of close combat in Donbass and Ukraine was preparing the ground for its autumn counteroffensives. "Until the last moment, they hoped we would sign," David Arajamia, the leader of the Ukrainian delegation, declared in an interview months later. Like the American experts, he also understood that the NATO issue was Russia's only priority. During those months when negotiations were combined with open warfare, the Russian struggle focused on Donbass, with no serious attempt to advance beyond the city of Kherson or approach Zaporozhye. Holding positions in southern Ukraine was key because at that time, as now, territory, whether or not the most important aspect, is a negotiating tool and demonstrates the strength of each side on the ground, an idea that remains true today.

In the nearly three years between the collapse of the first attempt to resolve the conflict through diplomatic means and the reopening of negotiations a week ago, the war has changed significantly. During this time, the initial weaknesses of the Russian Federation have been evident, as it did not believe an organized and sustained resistance could be achieved across virtually the entire Ukrainian territory. These errors, many of them significant, especially in terms of logistics and intelligence, have led to changes that have demonstrated the country's strengths. At the cost of territorial losses, Russia reduced the front to a more manageable line without insurmountable obstacles like the Dnieper River, even if this meant giving up the fight for the only Ukrainian capital beyond Donbass, Kherson. Partial mobilization and strong incentives to recruit volunteers, in addition to the notorious North Korean troops, have been sufficient to avoid images like those often seen in Ukraine. Even the Rada has had to admit the existence of the famous busification , the forced recruitment of recruits in the street, often with the resistance of the future soldier.

Ukrainian rearmament, courtesy of its European and North American allies, made a massive breakthrough impossible, but it was not enough for Ukraine to do the same with the Russian defense line in 2023. This time has also led to the demonstration of Western weaknesses and mistakes very similar to those made by the Russian Federation a year earlier. Underestimating the opponent and relying on its inability to improve its performance or achieve technological advances can lead to wrong decisions. With the arrogance of those who believe their own propaganda and consider their weapons invincible, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine prepared a ground counteroffensive in which armored vehicles were subjected to the main novelty of this war: the massive use of drones, which makes a rapid advance in large armored columns unfeasible. Surprisingly behind in the development of this technology, Russia took advantage of the preparation time for the Ukrainian offensive to make up for lost time. With eight years of experience in trench warfare, Ukraine was much more aware of the importance of drones, often a cheap, civilian technology adaptable to the realities of war to perform simple tasks very effectively.

Drones have changed warfare both at the front and in the rear. On the front line, any convoy can be spotted, ambushed, and destroyed, something that the Leopard tanks and their Russian and Soviet companions quickly realized in the fields of Zaporozhye. But that action, or the widespread use of kamikaze drones, was only the first step in the development of both aerial and maritime drones that has been a major obsession for both countries.

“2024 was undoubtedly the year of the first-person view (FPV) drone, with its distinctive screech through the air and its messy, static image that often captures the last moments of a soldier’s life. In 2025, something new has arrived. Images of mile-long tunnels of networks erected over entire roads, of city streets and fields covered in a dense tangle of glowing thread, and of the same FPV drone strike footage, but now with perfect camera quality,” explains an article published this week by The Kiev Independent . “Russia has taken the lead in the drone race, overtaking Kiev in the manufacture and use of medium-range FPV drones and fiber-optic variants that have reshaped the entire 1,200km front line,” adds The Times . “The changes brought about by drones are so rapid that the concepts we applied just a month ago no longer work,” says an infantry battalion commander, whose nom de guerre is Cuba , from the 13th Jartia Brigade. “We live in a space of perpetual rapid adaptation. In the last week alone, the range of Russian drone attacks has increased by four kilometers,” he insists.

For every Russian step, there's also a Ukrainian one. “Large-scale Ukrainian drone attacks have rocked several Russian regions for a third consecutive day, grounding flights, disrupting internet access and testing the country's air defense systems,” The Washington Post wrote yesterday , referring to a more traditional use of long-range attack drones. At Kyiv's urging and accepting the possibly inflated figures on domestic drone production as absolute truth, Western countries have proclaimed Ukraine a world power in drone production, a capability that European allies consider an important asset and a guarantee for the future. “According to Russian authorities, more than 700 drones have been intercepted in the past 72 hours, nearly 100 of them near the capital. The attacks, while far less destructive than the Russian missile barrages on Ukrainian cities, demonstrate the evolution of Ukraine's use of this low-cost, high-impact technology,” the article continues.

Drones have also become the indispensable supporting actor in any artillery or missile attack. Yesterday, Russian aircraft attacked the city of Kyiv. Hours earlier, at least two missiles had hit the port of Odessa. “With each such attack, the world becomes increasingly convinced that the cause of the prolonged war lies in Moscow. Ukraine has proposed a ceasefire numerous times, both total and in the air. All have been ignored. It is clear that much greater pressure must be exerted on Russia to achieve results and initiate real diplomacy. We expect sanctions measures from the United States, Europe, and all our partners. Only additional sanctions targeting key sectors of the Russian economy will force Moscow to a ceasefire,” wrote Volodymyr Zelensky, following his usual demand for a step, that of pressure and sanctions, which have not worked in three years. Yesterday's missile attack, in which the Ukrainian air force claims to have shot down six of the fourteen projectiles (although the number of explosions calls into question this triumphalism), and tonight's subsequent one were Russia's response to the sharp increase in the use of drones against industrial facilities and airports in the Russian Federation, which, according to the US media, in addition to causing damage seeks to "disrupt daily life and serve as a stark reminder to Russians far from the front lines that warfare is not limited to the trenches." While the Russian attacks alone are considered evidence of a lack of will for peace, the Russian air war does not occur in a vacuum nor is it unilateral.

The development of drone use makes attacking anywhere in a country's geography and at enormous distances from the front easier and more affordable, which also complicates the task of air defenses. Contrary to the data provided by the Ukrainian air force, yesterday there were more than eight explosions from missiles and five from the Russian drones that accompanied the attack, of which Ukraine claims to have shot down 245 of the 250 launched. One of the many fires whose images emerged yesterday throughout the day is at the Antonov plant, a strategic infrastructure for Ukraine that kyiv is currently unable to protect. Over the past few days, the number of Shahed drones, previously easily shot down, that Russia has managed to detonate on their targets has been particularly striking.

The innovations of this war, in which both countries have achieved successes and made significant progress, have further blurred the line between front and rear. Hence, ideas like the one proposed hours before the Istanbul meeting by Keith Kellogg seem almost an anachronism. The American general proposed a 15-kilometer withdrawal of weapons from both sides, creating a 30-kilometer demilitarized zone between them and resulting in a verifiable ceasefire. The circumstances of the current war make such an approach insufficient and practically a guarantee of failure. The danger is not only on the front lines but extends to the entire geography of the two enormous countries that have been at war for three years and which, despite the insistence on the territorial issue, much more accessible to those who want to resolve the conflict quickly by drawing a line on the map, have security as their main objective.

Three years of war and the West's failure to force Russia to accept the terms imposed by Ukraine make it clear that the issue will have to be resolved through negotiations in which security will be the most important and contentious issue. "Ukrainians fear that, unless they have guarantees from Western powers and the ability to defend themselves, any apparent peace agreement will only prepare for a future Russian invasion. Russians fear that a well-armed Ukraine may try to recapture any Ukrainian territory that Moscow still occupies. And the Kremlin is concerned about the prospect—however unlikely it may seem now—of Ukraine's eventual entry into NATO, and the long-term security implications of such a development. Although the Trump administration rules out NATO membership, this does not reassure Moscow: a future administration could change course," Charap and Radchenko write this month, adding that, despite their pro-Ukraine stance, they are aware that "the current talks have an obligation to address these threat perceptions to maximize the chances of success." The question today is whether there is truly a will to address these more complicated issues or whether, on the contrary, the intention is not to continue using the Ukrainian theater as a testing ground and pursue the strategy of pressure and the language of ultimatums to aspire to dictate the terms in the future. All this at the risk of further causing casualties and destruction, and creating an even more dangerous and intractable situation for the region and the continent.

https://slavyangrad.es/2025/05/25/segur ... taguardia/

Google Translator

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From Cassad's telegram account:

Colonelcassad
0:06
12-gauge against drones: a simple solution against complex technologies

Smooth-bore weapons of the 12-gauge are becoming more and more common in the SVO zone. What used to look like improvisation has today become a proven and effective solution.

When using a standard cartridge with shot, the accuracy and precision of fire allow you to effectively counter low-flying air targets.

The emergence of a net cartridge (homemade or industrially produced 12x70 mm "Intercept" and 12x76 mm KS), in which the striking element is several lead elements connected by a net, allows you to completely "catch" and immobilize an enemy drone.

The enemy is increasingly losing drones from the 12-gauge. On the line of combat contact, everything that works effectively is used.

@operationall_space

***

Colonelcassad
TASS reports that the second round of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine will take place in Istanbul. The option being floated about negotiations in the Vatican does not suit Russia for obvious reasons.
The negotiations will be preceded by the completion of a large exchange of prisoners of war, which will record the only practical result of the first round of negotiations in Istanbul.

In addition, both sides must soon submit memoranda on their negotiating positions. The Russian position is quite clear - there will be no truce without the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the territory of Russian regions.
The negotiations themselves may continue, but in parallel with ongoing military actions, in the framework of which Russia is liberating its territories.

***

When "I am your president" became "Only for Ukrainian speakers"

Much has been said about the fact that the persecution of the Russian language in Ukraine is only intensifying. The Verkhovna Rada Committee on Humanitarian Policy, led by the language inquisitor Poturaev, who, by the way, does not know Ukrainian himself (!), has officially decided: there is no more time for your Russian speech.

Today we are publishing a fresh document - the Decision of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy of February 11 of this year. Everything is simple there:
the Russian language is "zero tolerance",
speaking Russian with children at home? Bad.
searching for something in Russian on Google? We will ban it.
working and not knowing Ukrainian? Goodbye.
Media, social networks, books, films in Russian? Not allowed.

Now everything will be different:
bills on "excluding the aggressor country from the public space",
filters on the Internet so that God forbid someone hears their native language,
state policy on "re-educating" parents and children - so that they speak correctly. That is, in Ukrainian.

And in 2019, Zelensky said: "I am your president." But, judging by this document, "yours" is only if you have undergone language cleansing!

We are Bereginya . We know and remember everything!

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

******

Analysis: Russian 'Triple Chokehold' Tactic, + Offensive Season Outlook
Simplicius
May 23, 2025

The Telegraph’s latest article outlines a purported Russian strategy being dubbed the ‘triple chokehold’ which has been responsible for Ukraine’s setbacks and territorial losses of late:

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https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/ ... aine-back/

The term and concept appears to actually have been pulled from a Center for European Policy Analysis article from last month, which we’ll get to afterwards. But let’s first cover the Telegraph piece as it at least provides some artwork to better visualize the claimed Russian tactic.

They start with a Ukrainian expert who gives credence to the concept:

There were early signs that Russia was deploying the tactic on the battlefield last year, The Telegraph was told – but Moscow’s armies have significantly increased its use over the last two months along the front line.

“The whole Russian army is using the triangle strategy,” said Serhii Kuzan, the chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Centre. “We call it the strategy and war of exhaustion.”


Let us also mention that there has been an increased spate of acknowledgments in Ukraine and the West recently that Russia has transitioned to a strategy of attrition—self-evident as it may be to us. Even Zaluzhny was forced to reiterate this in a new interview:

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https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/no-retu ... 37054.html

Note his mention of Ukraine’s deteriorating condition, which will play into the later theme of this report:

Under our current conditions — with an enormous shortage of human resources and the catastrophic economic situation we’re facing — we can only talk about a high-tech war of survival. One that uses minimal human resources and minimal economic means to achieve maximum effect. Ukraine is simply incapable of fighting any other kind of war given its demographic and economic realities, and we shouldn’t even entertain that thought,' he said."

Recall that it was Zaluzhny who had advocated for ‘underground plasma bots’ to break the so-called strategic ‘stalemate’ of the front.

The Telegraph again underscores the ‘attritional’ style of warfare model while prefacing their tactical exegesis:

“It’s a very attritional mode of warfare,” explained Nick Reynolds, research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). “These three elements create conflicting imperatives for Ukrainian defenders.”

One might go so far as to invoke the Fabian strategy:

The Fabian strategy is a military strategy where pitched battles and frontal assaults are avoided in favor of wearing down an opponent through a war of attrition and indirection.

Employment of this strategy implies that the side adopting this strategy believes time is on its side, usually because the side employing the strategy is fighting in, or close to, their homeland and the enemy is far from home and by necessity has long and costly supply lines.


The definition above mentions long supply lines, which may imply it is Russia in the unfavorable position. In reality, despite Russia being the ‘attacker’, it’s Ukraine that technically has the longer, slower supply lines: they are forced to import everything from the distant west through the Polish border, without an ability to repair most things on the front—particularly when it comes to Western armor, vehicles, artillery systems, etc., which must all be sent back on long circuitous trips to Western nations.

And recall: though the Fabian strategy might generally refer to smaller forces fighting larger ones, it is Russia that is technically the smaller force in the war; Zelensky himself recently bragged that the AFU is 880,000 in number, while the Russian force in Ukraine is only now approaching 640,000. (In reality, things aren’t so clear: the vast majority of Ukraine’s force consists of non-combat roles, while Russia has more active combat units.)

Getting to the main “triple chokehold” tactic, the Telegraph begins:

The methodical approach begins with ground assaults fighting to pin down Ukrainian troops, forcing them into defensive positions and stalling their ability to manoeuvre.

The continued assaults put heavy pressure on Ukrainian defences.

“By using huge numbers of people and sending them in assaults on Ukrainian positions, they are trying to exhaust our soldiers and our resources,” said Mr Kuzan. “The intensity of the fighting in places like Pokrovsk is very high, with assaults every two hours. This is of course exhausting for our soldiers.”


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The key point of the above is: “stalling their ability to maneuver”. What’s important to understand in this is that Russia essentially “screens”—to use a sports analogy—Ukrainian units on a given front, keeping them busy with a constant stream of low-intensity assaults. I.e. these may be small assaults of a few moto-bike units each which continuously flow in and out to attack positions, “freezing” the Ukrainian defensive units by forcing them to dig in.

This keeps them from having the ability to be swiftly and efficiently rerouted to other corridors nearby when an attack occurs—partly due to the “exhaustion” factor mentioned above. Why aren’t Russian units equally exhausted by this? Because they are able to undergo far more rotation, which keeps fresh units coming in through a kind of restless attack ‘carousel’.

Also, as a quick mention—what did I mean by units moving “in and out”? These aren’t simply suicide squads constantly going in and dying, to be replenished by more ‘meat’. In many cases, Russian units attack, hold positions briefly, then roll back. This happened just recently with the assault of the 80th Regiment of the 90th Guards Tank Division. Recall in the last SitRep the mention of the Dnepropetrovsk border being breached from the DPR side: these were the troops of the 80th who briefly captured positions over the border, harried Ukrainian defenders, then fell back. A reliable Russian military-linked analyst confirmed this today:

The guys who broke into the Dnepropetrovsk region, fighters of the 80th regiment of the 90th tank. All are alive, all returned.

Earlier, there was information that everyone died during the retreat.

I was also informed by the 80th tank regiment yesterday that the guys have returned. Well, and the rest, as I described, is just something someone needs to hype up for the sake of fake truth-telling.


(Paywall with free option.)

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/ana ... -chokehold

******

Brief report from the front, May 23, 2025

Liberation of Radkovka and planned exit to the settlement of Komar. What next? Report by Marat Khairullin with illustrations by Mikhail Popov.
Zinderneuf
May 23, 2025

Kupyansk Direction

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ЛБС 10.11.24=Line of Combat Contact November 10th, 2024. ЛБС 01.01.25=Line of Combat Contact January 1st, 2025. ЛБС 01.02.2025=Line of Combat Contact February 2nd, 2025. Участок Продвижения=Area of Advancement.

Message from the Russian Ministry of Defense: "As a result of decisive actions by units of the 'West' Group, the settlement of Radkovka in the Kharkov region has been liberated."

Radkovka is a small village. According to the 2001 census, its population was 39 people.

The village is situated on elevated terrain between the Kupyanka and Oskol rivers, on a flat high ground intersected by ravines. The main heights in the Radkovka-Kondrashevka sector reach 187 meters above sea level. To the southeast, there is a fairly steep descent toward the city of Kupyansk, with an elevation drop of up to 70 meters over 2 km.

Kupyansk is now open to fire control and support of Russian assault units as they advance into the city.

The village is traversed by the P-79 highway, connecting Kupyansk and Dvurechnaya. This long, convenient lateral road branches off radially in Kondrashovka (under Ukrainian Armed Forces control) as route S-211901, leading to Monachinovka (Ukrainian: Monachynivka, Monachynovka on the map, left of Doroshovka) and Shipovatoe (north of where the map cuts off, Ukrainian: Shypuvate)), deeper into enemy territory. Now, this supply route to Kupyansk and its forward positions has been severed. The enemy will have to use a detour through Bolshaya Shapovka-Kovalevka, which is three times longer (the next road to the west).

Radkovka is a small settlement, barely visible on the map, yet it provides a significant tactical advantage.

To our fighters—success, luck, and victory!

South Donetsk Direction

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ЛБС 31.10.2024=Line of Combat Contact October 31st, 2024. ЛБС 30.11.2024=Line of Combat Contact November 30th, 2024. ЛБС 01.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 1st, 2025. ЛБС 01.4.2025=Line of Combat Contact April 1st, 2025.

Russian assault units, continuing their offensive after the liberation of the settlement of Bogatyr (18.5.25), bypassed Otradnoe from the north and began clearing it. Photos and videos have emerged showing Russian flags in various areas of Otradnoe.

Utilizing the advantageous terrain in this area—specifically, the bend of the Volchya River, which flows east to west before making a near-90-degree turn south near the settlement of Filya, where it merges with the Mokrye Yaly River, dividing the region into two parts—the enemy has established fortified positions. Additionally, the Solenaya River, a tributary of the Volchya, flows into it from the north here. By using these riverbeds to cover their flanks, the enemy has developed strong defensive positions and halted the Russian advance from Velikaya Novosyolka northward.

Advancing along the radial route N-15 (Konstantinopol-Komar), Russian forward units are splitting the enemy’s defensive zone in the Komar-Dachnoe-Alekseevka sector, creating a deep southern envelopment of the enemy’s strong grouping along the Filya-Dachnoe-Alekseevka line. On the left flank of this sector, the enemy is attempting to hold back Russian assault groups near the settlement of Orekhovo, where Russian forces are advancing along the Zaporozhye-Troitskoe-Orekhovo line.

The advance of our units toward Komar will create conditions for the elimination of the heavily fortified enemy defensive zone in the Fedorovka-Komar-Otradnoe sector, where protracted positional battles have been ongoing for nearly a month and a half.

https://maratkhairullin.substack.com/p/ ... ont-may-23

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Liberation of Bogdanovka: situation in the Novopavlovsk direction
May 24, 2025
Rybar

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Russian troops continue to advance in the Novopavlovsk direction. Thus, today, thanks to objective control footage, it became known about the final liberation of Bogdanovka by fighters of the 80th tr. regiment of the 90th tank division of the Russian Armed Forces .

More about the situation on the site
▪️The battles for the settlement itself began at the end of March after Russian troops broke through the enemy's defenses in the area of ​​the village of Zaporozhye.

▪️After two months of fighting, the soldiers of the 80th Tank Regiment managed to drive the enemy into the fields west of the village. After which Russian attack aircraft raised the Russian flag in the center, confirming the liberation of the settlement.

▪️Taking Bogdanovka will increase pressure on neighboring Troitske , where the Ukrainian Armed Forces' defense is already beginning to collapse. However, according to incoming information, the enemy still continues to maintain its focal presence there.

After the liberation of Troitskoye itself , the Russian troops will have only one serious stronghold of the enemy, located in Orekhovo . The village is the last line of defense on the way of our fighters to the Dnepropetrovsk region in this area.

https://rybar.ru/osvobozhdenie-bogdanov ... pravlenii/

Google Translator

******

About the humanities
May 25, 12:40

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Regarding the controversy over the need for licensing humanitarian aid.

1. I support simplified licensing of humanitarian activities aimed at helping the front.
2. I do not support it in the form it is proposed. This is a classic case of throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

What is needed, in my opinion:

1. Creating a simplified mechanism for filing a notification for volunteer/humanitarian activities to help the army.
The state must know who is doing humanitarian work. Those who donate to the army must know that this volunteer is in a system approved by the state, and not some no-name with a card.

2. A volunteer who has received a registration number in such a system must be protected from arbitrary blocking of bank cards through which aid is collected. This work (and it is precisely work) should be encouraged by the state (various benefits for operational activities, volunteer awards, etc.)

3. At the same time, the state, if necessary, should check the accounts and compare them with the volumes shipped to the front, so that the collections and shipments at least roughly correlate (and not collect 10,000,000, but deliveries for 1,000,000). This will gradually separate normal volunteers from scammers parasitizing on collections. At the same time, the anonymity of large donors/sponsors who transfer significant amounts to help the army through humanitarian funds, without wanting to be seen in any way, should be protected.

4. Since most volunteers/humanitarians operate without creating charitable foundations with tax reporting and the 20% allowed by the state for operating activities (if you take 20% without a BF, then this is sort of the same, but from a legal point of view it is not the same), it is necessary to create separate legislation on the activities of volunteers, which will be applicable not only to the SVO, but also to any other potential wars and conflicts and, among other things, will determine the issue of expenses for operating activities (fuel, personnel, technical expenses - all this eats money).

5. A reasonable balance is needed between the desire of the state to control large financial flows passing through the volunteer/humanitarian environment and the desire of humanitarians (normal humanitarians) for greater speed and efficiency of their work.
It would be appropriate if the state, before scaring volunteers, collected proposals/wishes from volunteer groups and then built them into potential legislation regulating the activities of volunteers.

It is not difficult to roll up everything with prohibitive measures, but in the current reality this will most likely damage the army supply system, which still (despite the greatly reduced collections - fatigue from the war + talk of a deal) plays an important role in supplying front-line units. The reality is that military humanitarian aid will be relevant until the last days of the war.

There will be no situation when everything is available and sufficient at the front. Do not have any illusions. At the same time, do not underestimate the efforts of the state, which has achieved a significant improvement in the supply of the army compared to 2022. But this is still not enough for the state to refuse private humanitarian aid.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9858892.html

The only resident of Maryinka
May 25, 12:31

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The only resident of Maryinka

This is Galina, the only resident of Maryinka, the very city that closely adjoins Donetsk from the west, and for which there were bloody battles.
She is the only resident who decided to return here, despite the complete devastation in the city, as she told us "without money, but within my native walls"

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https://t.me/WarInMyEyes/10552?single - zinc

The battles for Maryinka have been going on since 2014. They ended in December 2024.
After 10 years of fighting, Maryinka is almost completely destroyed. Serious restoration work on its territory has not yet been carried out, except that the road has been slightly corrected and partially demined. Complete demining will take a long time.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9858570.html

Sea delivery failed
May 25, 10:41

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Sea delivery failed.

The Russian military launched an Iskander missile attack on a container ship in Odessa that was carrying more than a hundred containers with sea drones, unmanned aerial vehicles, and ammunition. This was reported by the Russian Defense Ministry.
It is noted that on May 23, not only the cargo ship but also container warehouses in the port were hit.

The strike resulted in a secondary detonation of ammunition on the pier and a strong fire, the military department added.
According to war correspondents, two missiles hit the infrastructure of the Odessa sea trade port in the area of ​​​​the 2nd and 3rd berths. The ships "Krym" and "Titan", used as floating bases and radio-technical platforms, were damaged by the explosions.
Eyewitnesses filmed a column of thick white smoke over the landing site.

https://rg.ru/2025/05/24/minoborony-soo ... desse.html - zinc

This strike shows that there is no moratorium on strikes on ships.
It also shows once again that military cargo is delivered directly to Odessa by sea. Of course, it cannot be stopped with one strike, only systemic strikes on ships during unloading.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9858315.html

Google Translator
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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blindpig
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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Mon May 26, 2025 11:59 am

The return of the hawks
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 05/26/2025

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“Hi, sorry for the inconvenience, but have you heard anything about Taurus and these severe sanctions? Let me know, thanks,” wrote the offended former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrilius Lansbergis yesterday. He presents himself on social media as an “escalation management consultant,” evidently not in sports but in politics. This was his reaction to the dual Russian missile and drone attack that has caused serious damage in Ukraine and highlighted the country's difficulties in protecting its infrastructure, even in the capital, which was once much more tightly protected. Andriy Ermak echoed this sentiment, writing that “the enemy will not stop and will continue to fight: this can be stopped with harsh sanctions and by halting its military-industrial complex, and certainly not by ignoring the Russian problem.” Without needing to say so openly, the head of the Ukrainian President's Office is seeking weapons to attack the Russian military industry, a Ukrainian aspiration for over a year. The idea didn't work, and the long-range missiles and the permit for their use against Russian territory were so disappointing that no one is currently considering that option as a solution . Those who insist on a military approach are now focused not on forms of attack but on strengthening defense, a sign of the current state of the war.

While there is no agreement in sight, even those sponsoring the diplomatic effort are taking the military factor into account, albeit in defensive terms. A few days ago, in an appearance before the Senate, Secretary of State Marco Rubio admitted the shortage of Patriot systems and that Washington is working to seek potential donations of weapons and ammunition from its allied countries. In the United States, he argued, "we simply don't have any more." Pressure on NATO member countries, including, for example, Spain, Turkey, and Romania, to hand over some of their Patriots for the defense of Ukraine is not new, but it is now a higher priority. Despite Rubio's words, it is clear that, as of today, there are no plans in the United States to commit multimillion-dollar sums to a war in which neither the Pentagon nor the current political leadership believes Ukraine can achieve a decisive victory.

Adding to the clear shortage of air defense equipment, evident in Ukraine's growing difficulties in responding to drone attacks, which are now able to reach their targets with increasing ease, are the improvements that Russia has made to its missiles, according to the Ukrainian air force itself. Following Saturday's attack, which had been announced as retaliation for Ukraine's attempt to paralyze airports around Moscow with an increasing number of drones, Yuti Ignat, head of the Air Force Command's Communications Department, stated that Russia has modernized its Iskander ballistic missiles to make it more difficult for air defense systems to shoot them down. According to Ignat, Russia has installed "heat traps" and systems so that the missiles can "maneuver upon impact on the target." The result is that even exaggerating the successes, the percentage of missiles shot down claimed by Ukraine on Saturday did not reach 50%, a far cry from the triumphant interceptions of yesteryear.

According to Bloomberg , European countries are discussing the purchase of weapons from the United States and their transfer to Ukraine if Trump refuses to continue funding the Ukrainian Armed Forces. To continue or intensify the war in the event of a failed diplomacy, or to create the conditions for armed peace in the event of an agreement, European countries require enormous quantities of weapons and ammunition, which they are not always able to produce and will have to acquire on the market, primarily the American market. In a Europe that is rearming and doubling its military spending, financing the war or a post-war period focused on perpetuating the political conflict with Russia will not be a problem, but the lack of strategic or military autonomy leaves the continent at the mercy of the United States. Therefore, convincing Donald Trump of Russia's culpability in the war, of Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to reach an agreement, or of the need for a resolution to the war that makes it impossible to maintain normal relations with the Russian Federation, are a priority right now.

In contrast to the exaggerated optimism displayed by Donald Trump on social media last week—both after his conversation with Vladimir Putin and with the announcement of the start of the prisoner exchange process, which was completed yesterday—the US president's words in the six-party call last week have sparked some hope in European countries. According to their interpretation, which the White House denies, Trump not only stated that "Vladimir Putin feels like he's winning the war," but that he "doesn't want peace." This message of criticism of the Russian president, which European countries sought to understand from Trump's words, adds to the US support for this week's harsh statement from the G7, in which the group of the world's most industrialized countries (in the 1970s) condemned Russian aggression and demanded the continued imposition of sanctions and the seizure of frozen Russian assets in the EU until the conflict ends and Russia has compensated Ukraine for its war losses. The Trump administration's continued missteps are the result of its inability to resolve a conflict more complex than expected, as well as the strategy of incentives and inducements that European countries are now trying to leverage to their advantage.

In parallel with their search for their own funding to acquire weapons, London, Paris, and Berlin continue to aggressively lobby for the implementation, always without mentioning it, of the Kellogg-Fleitz plan. The proposal, ignored at the time of its publication because it was considered excessively equidistant, is now the main argument used to convince Donald Trump that the correct way to force Russia to negotiate peace is to increase arms supplies to kyiv. That option remains viable, as the Trump administration continues to vacillate in its position on the war, Russia's will, the proposed resolutions, and, more generally, what to do with Ukraine in the future.

While the political establishment focuses on trying to maintain US support and ensuring that Ukraine has sufficient material to maintain the status quo , more radical sectors are once again increasing pressure for a new military, economic, and sanctions escalation as a way out of the current blockade or the danger of diplomacy and the possibility of an agreement.

Eleven weeks ago, a "coalition of the willing" met to discuss what they were willing to do. Highlights of their progress to date:

Macron had to remind his colleagues that sovereign countries do not need Putin's permission to deploy troops in Ukraine.
Poland nevertheless opposed the deployment of troops.
Merz said that [the delivery of Taurus missiles] was on the table, and then he took it back.


The decision was made to issue a ceasefire ultimatum, but it was later decided not to implement it. This was perhaps because no one had a plan to enforce it, which raises questions about the appropriateness of issuing it, ” wrote former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrilius Lansbergis, one of the many hawks of the use of military means as the only possible solution to the Ukrainian conflict who have re-emerged strongly this past week, in which the danger of diplomacy has been combined with an increase in drone attacks (albeit only targeting Russians and not Ukrainians).

This trend joins another existing one, which once again insists, despite all evidence to the contrary, that Russia's luck is running out. Now that Russian troops are once again advancing in the most fortified part of Donetsk, Ukraine's most heavily defended front, Foreign Policy states, for example, that "the Russian army is stagnating as deaths and casualties mount" in an article proclaiming that "Russia has begun to lose the war." Meanwhile, another of the week's news stories has been the difficulty Volodymyr Zelensky is encountering in implementing his flagship infrastructure proposal: a mega-cemetery. Despite the fact that Russia has more prisoners of war, returns dozens more bodies of dead soldiers than it receives from Ukraine, and there is talk of new directions for offensives, part of the press is proclaiming that Ukraine's opportunity is now.

“Russia is not capable of taking any ground, and this has been the situation more or less since the end of the Ukrainian counteroffensive” in 2023, the Ukrainian official said. “Even though they still have a three-to-one superiority in troops—and maybe even higher in terms of [weapons] systems—it’s still not enough,” he said in an article whose sources are either Ukrainian or from pro-Ukrainian think tanks , The Washington Post . Incredibly considering the amount of resources expended and the losses incurred, Ukraine continues to try to present its counteroffensive as a victory and downplays the territory captured by Russia since then, a major advance in the key part of the front, the Donetsk region.

Only from such self-deception is it possible to believe that "Russia's battlefield strength in Ukraine has begun to wane and it could face severe manpower and weapons shortages next year, even as President Donald Trump backs down on pressure on Moscow to end the war, according to senior US and European officials and military experts," without realizing that each of the problems blamed on Moscow is more serious in Kyiv. The radicals return to the charge, ignoring reality and appealing to the most familiar clichés of this war—such as immense Russian casualties, always ignoring Ukrainian casualties and the complaints of their commanders on the front lines, who denounce a lack of personnel and tasks being carried out at the cost of enormous human losses—always to demand the usual: an additional effort of military assistance to Ukraine now that the time is right. One might ask, "What is the right moment?" None of the recent articles advocating for massive military assistance to Ukraine manage to address what they hope kyiv could achieve with a new offensive. And perhaps that is the most telling fact of this discourse.

https://slavyangrad.es/2025/05/26/el-re ... -halcones/

Google Translator

******

From Cassad's telegram account:

Colonelcassad
The Kremlin on Trump's statements about "Putin's madness" in connection with the strikes on Ukraine:

Of course, the beginning of the negotiation process, for which the American side has made a great deal of effort, is a very important achievement. And we are truly grateful to the Americans and personally to President Trump for their assistance in organizing and launching this negotiation process. This is a very important achievement. Of course, at the same time, this is a very important moment, which is associated, of course, with the emotional overload of absolutely everyone and with emotional reactions. We are closely monitoring all reactions. At the same time, President Putin makes the decisions that are necessary to ensure the security of our country. We all witnessed how the Kiev regime threatened foreign leaders on the eve of their arrival in Moscow to celebrate Victory Day. Everyone heard these threats from the Kiev regime. And many leaders who were here, they actually witnessed the Kiev regime's attempts to carry out drone strikes on the territory of the Russian Federation, on large cities and on the capital on the eve of such an important day. These attempts continue. We are forced to take action. And President Putin is doing what he must to ensure Russia's security (c) Peskov

Of course, the US knows perfectly well why the Russian Federation is striking Ukraine. So Washington's hypocrisy in this matter perfectly shows the real interest of the US, and not declarations about "stopping the bloodshed".

Therefore, if the goals of the SVO are not achieved by diplomatic means, they will be achieved by military means. Russia has the resources for this.

***

Colonelcassad
0:37
A new batch of captured Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, which fell into the hands of our soldiers in one of the sections of the front.

The exchange fund continues to be replenished.
At the same time, many times faster than the enemy, who already has problems with who to offer for exchange, so already in the exchange of 1000 for 1000 he offered captured civilians and political prisoners.

Even the current exchange fund of Russia will be enough to last until the end of the war, and it will be constantly replenished. On average, 50-70 people are added to it per week.

***

Colonelcassad
In the period from 20:00 Moscow time to 25.05, the air defense systems on duty intercepted and destroyed 96 Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles of the fixed-wing type:

- 31 UAVs over the territory of the Bryansk region,
- 16 UAVs over the territory of the Belgorod region, - 11 UAVs
over the territory of the Kursk region, - nine UAVs over the territory of the Tula region, - eight UAVs over the territory of the Oryol region, - six UAVs over the territory of the Moscow region , - five UAVs over the territory of the Kaluga region, - four UAVs over the territory of the Ivanovo region, - two UAVs over the territory of the Ryazan region, - two UAVs over the territory of the Vladimir region, - one UAV over the territory of the Yaroslavl region, - one UAV over the territory of the Republic Tatarstan . In total, during the raid from 10:00 Moscow time on 25.05 to 8:00 Moscow time on 26.05, 148 Ukrainian fixed-wing UAVs were shot down over Russian regions .

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

******

Russia Produces More Drones and Missiles Than It Spends
May 26, 1:04 p.m.

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The Western press today unanimously burst into whining about concentrated Russian strikes in Ukraine.

1. Russia produces a lot of missiles and produces them faster than it spends them.
2. Russian missiles have become more sophisticated and can penetrate the dome of Western air defense systems.
3. Western air defense systems have a critical shortage of missiles, some Crotale and SAMP-T systems are practically out of ammunition. The Patriot has a chronic shortage of PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles.
4. Russia can easily launch 200-300 drones per day, and in the fall it will be able to increase this figure to 500 or even 1000.
5. Russia is improving its drones, which are becoming more and more sophisticated and harder to shoot down.
6. Russia has not yet reached its peak in missile and drone production.
7. Ukraine is not capable of fully covering entire areas and even regions from massive Russian strikes.

In fact, the strikes of recent days have been quite illustrative.

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https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9861088.html

Not a single Azov resident
May 26, 11:05

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Not a single Azovite. This looks like a mockery.

"Radis" whines that not a single Nazi from "Azov" was included in the completed exchange of 1000 for 1000 (the last group was exchanged yesterday).
Although the gang of the cocaine Fuhrer demanded that they be included in the exchange, in fact, they never received anyone. The bargaining position turned out to be weak - they could not disrupt the exchange, but the Russian prisoners of war were almost gone, so political prisoners and captured residents of the Kursk region have already been exchanged. At the same time, there are still 10-12 thousand Ukrainian prisoners of war in Russia + another 2-3 thousand Nazis received sentences and are sitting in prisons serving their sentences (by the way, there are plenty of "Azov" members there).

We can expect that in the next exchanges, they will continue to offer us pro-Russian citizens of Ukraine and forcibly detained civilians (purely like negotiations with terrorists about civilian hostages). But they are also not enough to exchange all Ukrainian prisoners of war. Especially since this number grows by 50-80 people every week.

Actually, that is why the proposed exchange of "all for all" is categorically not beneficial to us, since even due to the current exchange of the fund we can easily conduct exchanges until the end of the war, but the enemy is already experiencing serious problems with this. An exchange according to the "all for all" formula is possible only after the end of the war and the achievement of the goals of the SVO, when the need to hold on to prisoners of war disappears. At the same time, this issue does not concern war criminals who killed civilians of the Russian Federation and the DPR and were sentenced by the court to long prison terms, since they are no longer classified as prisoners of war.

Well, I hope the turn of the gay circle of Redis and Kalina will also come.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9860609.html

Google Translator

(I have no idea what that last sentence means.)

******

No missiles: Ukrainian Armed Forces have problems with European air defense systems
May 26, 2025
Rybar

While the EU press continues to make statements about "unflagging support for Ukraine", in practice the opposite is happening in some places. As Le Monde writes , the so-called Ukraine has run out of missiles for the SAMP/T air defense systems supplied by France and Italy.

In March, the media already wrote that both batteries supplied to the Ukrainian Armed Forces had almost exhausted their ammunition, but since then they have not received a single missile. A similar picture is observed with the French Crotale systems transferred.

The reason is simple: production capacity is limited, arsenals are not endless, and the political will to replenish Ukrainian stocks for free at the expense of its own is becoming weaker. Against this background, plans to transfer the third SAMP/T battery in the fall of 2025 may be revised.

It is possible that other Western air defense systems have similar problems, especially in the context of increased ammo consumption due to massive strikes by the Russian Armed Forces. Perhaps, in the case of Patriot , it has so far been possible to “undress” Germany, whose authorities are apparently determined to remain without air defense for the sake of free aid to the so-called Ukraine.

As the War-Crazed have well noted , even the most technologically advanced and potentially effective systems lose their combat value without a stable supply of ammunition, when supplies are supplied on a handout-by-handout basis.

As for the Le Monde article itself, it is aimed primarily at a Western audience, and the message is: urgently give the so-called Ukraine missiles. But a good question is whether France and Italy have enough of them .

https://rybar.ru/raket-net-problemy-s-e ... zrk-u-vsu/

Erdogan's Enemies in the Ukrainian Government: New Investigation into Defense Minister Rustem Umerov
April 12, 2025
Rybar

In the context of talk about how the Turkish authorities are trying to challenge the ownership of Crimea, the appearance of an investigation conducted by a Turkish journalist about the Minister of Defense of the so-called Ukraine, Rustem Umerov , coincided very well .

What does the article reveal?
Rustem Umerov and his inner circle have been promoting the ideology of the late Fethullah Gülen's organization (FETO), which is banned in Turkey, among the Crimean Tatars for the past few years .

In January, Umerov issued a decree concentrating control over all combat and non-combat supplies to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the hands of Arsen Zhumadilov , his long-time friend and business partner. It is known for certain that both officials studied in the 1990s at a gymnasium in the village of Tankovoye in Crimea, which was financed by the Gulen Foundation.

At that time, the Turkish company “New Technologies in Education” operated in Crimea under the leadership of Said Enver Yildiz . He was also a teacher at the Azov Madrasah in the Dzhankoy region and left Crimea for Turkey in December 2014.

He left Turkey in 2016 after authorities began to persecute him for his complicity in the failed coup led by Gulen. And according to Turkish media, he maintains contacts with the Umerov brothers.

In addition, in 2020, the Zincirli project was launched on Ukrainian territory to create a network of educational institutions for Crimean Tatar children with the support of the Astem Foundation , owned by Rustem and Aslan Umerov. The organizer of the project was Mehmet Kangiev , the former director of the gymnasium in Tankovo, where the Umerovs studied. In 2021, the Birlik cultural center and a school for Crimean Tatar children were opened in the village of Chaiki in the Kiev region.

This article is notable because it was published in a Turkish publication and essentially sheds light on the fact that Umerov is actively promoting the ideas of an organization banned in Turkey. The very same one that Erdogan is trying with all his might to suppress around the world, but without much success.

Umerov spent many years establishing contacts with Turkey, and after receiving the post of Minister of Defense, he actively promoted the interests of the Ukrainian Crimean Tatar community under the guise of a “friend of the Turkish leadership.”

In 2023, information was already published that Umerov is a supporter of Erdogan's worst enemy, but at that time the Turkish administration either did not pay attention to this or did not want to do so because of its own interests in the so-called Ukraine.

The repeated revelation of such connections may indicate some discontent with Umerov in Turkish political circles. It will be interesting to see where this all leads.

At the same time, Turkey's true attitude towards Russian Crimea is once again confirmed: for Erdogan, it is a coveted goal , which he is desperately but vainly trying to get his hands on. Therefore, their state media actively appeal to the fact that Russia allegedly "annexed the peninsula."

https://rybar.ru/vragi-erdogana-v-ukrai ... e-umerove/

Google Translator

******

Brief Frontline Report – May 25, 2025

Control of Heights Near Romanovka – Another Tactical Victory for the Russian Army. Report by Marat Khairullin with illustrations by Mikhail Popov.
Zinderneuf
May 25, 2025

As we have already reported, another tactically important settlement—Romanovka—has been liberated.

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ЛБС 02.5.2025=Line of Combat Contact May 2nd, 2025. Зона Активности=Zone of Activity.

This small village has only 50 inhabitants, but its location provides the Russian Armed Forces with an advantage for further combat operations:

1. The settlement is crossed by the N-20 highway, which connects the combat zone to the N-32 Konstantinovka-Pokrovsk lateral route.

2. The village is situated on a watershed ridge. To the west lies the Kalinovka River, while to the east is the Sukhaya Balka ravine. The N-20 highway runs along the ridge of the watershed. Romanovka is located at an elevation of 180 meters—practically the highest point of the watershed (800 meters to the east, the elevation reaches 184.4 meters).

East of the village lies the Sukhaya Balka ravine, on the opposite side of which are the settlements of Pavlovka and Shcherbinovka. This is a well-fortified enemy area that our units have been assaulting for the past two months from the Leonidovka-Dzerzhinsk (Toretsk) direction.
Control of the heights near Romanovka effectively allows our artillery to strike the rear of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' fortified area in Petrovka-Shcherbinovka.

3. To the north (with a 30-meter drop in elevation), 4 km away, lies the Ukrainian Armed Forces' fortified area of Aleksandro-Kalinovo to Yablonovka, which anchors its left flank on the Kleban-Byk Reservoir. This area is part of the Novoalekseevka–Yablonovka defensive line (left flank), stretching along the Bychok River and covering the N-32 lateral route.

The positions in Romanovka allow Russian artillery to control the Aleksandro-Kalinovo area and provide fire support to our assault groups.

4. To the west (2 km from Romanovka), in the lowland of the Kalinovka River (35 meters below) lies the settlement of Zarya. Through converging attacks from Aleksandropol and Romanovka, our forces have the opportunity to encircle a significant group of units from the Ukrainian 109th Territorial Defense Brigade, which is defending the Ignatovka–Staraya Nikolaevka area.

The elimination of this "pocket" will secure the rear of our units operating in the direction of Shcherbinovka and Aleksandro-Kalinovo.
———

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The Russian Armed Forces continue active operations to establish a buffer zone.

Reports indicate that, under pressure from our army, the enemy has begun withdrawing its units from Belovody, a settlement that covers the strategically important Yablonovka–Yunakovka lateral route in the combat zone. The enemy used this defensive area to block access to the watershed heights, on the eastern slopes of which lies the settlement of Yunakovka. The advance of our troops to these heights will significantly worsen the situation for the Ukrainian forces defending the Yunakovka area.

We await reports on the clearing and complete liberation of the village of Belovody.

To our warriors—good luck, success, and victory!

https://maratkhairullin.substack.com/p/ ... ay-25-2025

*****

The 'Experts' Lied to Us
How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Nazis
Moss Robeson
May 21, 2025

Last week’s post chronicled the whitewashing of the notorious Azov unit in the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU) by the New York Times, Washington Post, and The Guardian. Citing mostly unnamed “experts” and “analysts,” the Western media has claimed that Azov’s “integration” in the NGU led the group to quietly overcome its “neo-Nazi past.”

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Last month the historian Marta Havryshko noted that a (formerly) USAID-funded Ukrainian outlet produced a “heroic saga” documentary about the NGU Azov Brigade, featuring one of its ideological/recruitment officers, Vladyslav “Docent” Dutchak. According to Havryshko, the filmmaker said to him, “The roots of this demonization of Azov go back to its formation. So, I have to ask — were there people in the unit at the beginning who held neo-Nazi views?”

“I didn’t see such people in the unit,” Dutchak answered. Back in 2015, before the New York Times and Foreign Policy magazine described Azov as “openly neo–Nazi,” but after it joined the National Guard, a foreign affairs reporter for USA Today interviewed Alex, a drill sergeant in the Azov Regiment, who “admitted he is a Nazi and said with a laugh that no more than half his comrades are fellow Nazis.”

He said he supports strong leadership for Ukraine, like Germany during World War II, but opposes the Nazis’ genocide against Jews. Minorities should be tolerated as long as they are peaceful and don’t demand special privileges, he said, and the property of wealthy oligarchs should be taken away and nationalized. He vowed that when the war ends, his comrades will march on the capital, Kiev, to oust a government they consider corrupt.

Andriy Diachenko, a spokesperson for the Azov Regiment, tried to do some damage control, and said that “only 10% to 20%” of Azov fighters in the National Guard were really Nazis. “I know Alex is a Nazi, but it’s his personal ideology. It has nothing to do with the official ideology of the Azov,” Diachenko told Oren Dorell from USA Today. “He’s a good drill sergeant and a good instructor for tactics and weapons skills.” Dorell also spoke with Oleg Odnorozhenko, then deputy commander of the regiment, who “complained that Alex does not speak for the group.” Odnorozhenko was in those days the main ideologue of two neo-Nazi organizations (the Social-National Assembly and Patriot of Ukraine) associated with the Azov Battalion.

After a handful of critical mainstream media reports, the House of Representatives unanimously adopted an amendment to its 2015 military spending bill to ban US assistance and training to the “Azov Battalion,” which the late Congressman John Conyers (D-MI) denounced as a “repulsive neo-Nazi” group. The Nation reported that the House Defense Appropriations Committee eventually stripped Conyers’ amendment “under pressure from the Pentagon.” (The amendment finally stuck, or so it seemed, in 2018.)

In the meantime, Kristofer Harrison, a former advisor to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in the George W. Bush administration, smeared Conyers as “Putin’s Man in Congress” for promoting “the Moscow-inspired lie that [the Azov Regiment] is a neo-Nazi organization.” Azov’s emblem isn’t a wolfsangel, he insisted; “the resemblance is merely coincidental.” Harrison offered no serious debunking of “the Moscow-inspired lie,” but said that “one of [Ukraine’s] most effective units” had “some PR spade work to do.” He helped them get started by interviewing “Azov’s spokesman, Roman Zvarych.”

The Azov’s spokesman, Roman Zvarych, told me that the battalion has a selective screening program that accepts only 50 out of almost 300 recruits each month. He says they have a thorough background check and reject members for various reasons, including having fascist leanings. He explained further that they have actually committed two former members to psychiatric hospitals because of their pro-fascist viewpoints.

In those days, the Azov Regiment had a Swedish neo-Nazi running its training program, while Roman Zvarych allegedly functioned as “the interlocutor between the Ukrainian far-right and their foreign sponsors.” Zvarych was a leader of the new “Civic Corps,” on its way to establishing a political party for Azov veterans. Today his brother, Ihor Zvarych, is the treasurer of the nationalist Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA).

Born in Yonkers, New York in 1953, Roman Zvarych at least used to be a prominent member of the OUN-B, or “Banderite” faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. (Note for readers of the “Bandera Lobby Blog”: Andriy Diachenko, the other Azov spokesman, was a former member of the OUN-B’s “Youth Nationalist Congress” from western Ukraine.) By the 1980s, the OUN-B took over the UCCA, and Zvarych became a personal secretary to Banderite ideologue Yaroslav Stetsko, who led the OUN-B from 1968 until his death in 1986. In the early 1990s, his widow Slava Stetsko co-founded the unsuccessful far-right political party, “Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists,” with Roman Zvarych. Meanwhile, according to the historian Per Rudling, the 1990’s “Social-National Party of Ukraine” — a neo-Nazi forerunner to the Azov movement — rooted itself in “Stetsko’s ideology of ‘two revolutions,’ one national and one social.”

Zvarych regularly participated in events of the Stetskos’ Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, “the largest and most important umbrella for former Nazi collaborators,” and the World Anti-Communist League, the unofficial “Fascist International” of the Cold War. Decades later, Zvarych reportedly helped the Azov movement seize its “ATEK” headquarters in a former factory on the outskirts of Kyiv, which became the home of a recruitment and training center for the Azov Regiment, as well as an Azovite sergeant school, named after OUN founder Yevhen Konovalets. As told by the journalist Leonid Ragozin, “The school functioned outside Ukraine’s system of military education - one of many reasons to suspect that Azov was highly autonomous and never truly integrated in the armed forces.” (More recently, the Azov school formed the 354th Mechanized Training Regiment in the Ground Forces of Ukraine.)

Zvarych and Azov parted ways by the 2016 launch of the National Corps, an Azovite political party led by Andriy Biletsky, the first Azov commander, rumored to be called the “White Chief.” The creation of his National Corps ironically helped to launder the reputation of the military unit that he founded, as well as the larger Azov movement. After Vladimir Putin launched his “Special Military Operation,” the Western media (and apparently Washington) scrambled to revive a debunked narrative from several years ago. “Pro-Ukraine” propagandists essentially argued that Azov already achieved “deNazification,” if only by establishing a far-right political party.

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Far-right march in Kyiv that coincided with the launch of the National Corps (October 14, 2016)

When people said that the NGU Azov unit “shed any far-right associations,” that included the Azov movement led by Andriy Biletsky, who now commands the 3rd Army Corps in the Ground Forces. From 2023 until recently, Biletsky led the Azovite 3rd Assault Brigade, which will continue to exist in the new corps, like the NGU Azov Brigade. Certain “experts” argued before the war, such as Anton Shekhovtsov in 2020, that “the toxic far-right leadership formally left the [Azov] regiment and founded what would become a far-right party called ‘National Corps.’” The journalist Oleksiy Kuzmenko refuted this, also in 2020: “the available evidence indicates that the regiment remains joined at the hip to the internationally active National Corps party it spawned, and the wider Azov movement associated with the regiment.”

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Shekhovtsov, a far-right activist turned “far-right expert,” was responding to an op-ed in the New York Times by then-Congressman Max Rose (D-NY) and former FBI agent Ali Soufan, in which they called for the US government to designate the “Azov Battalion” as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. In the spring of 2022, the Soufan Group, led by Rose and Soufan, made a U-turn and published a special report on Ukraine that claimed, “Azov has been largely regularized under the command and control of the Ukrainian armed forces, which has worked to winnow extremists from its midst. … According to experts on the European far-right like Anton Shekhovtsov, the Azov of 2022 is nothing like the group from eight years ago.” Mollie Saltskog, a senior intelligence analyst at the Soufan Group, told the Washington Post that the National Guard “had to purge a lot of those extremist elements.”

Vyacheslav Likhachev is another “expert” cited by the media to downplay the far-right in Ukraine. He has echoed Shekhovtsov’s claim that Biletsky and the National Corps retained no more than a symbolic link with Azov, having tried and failed “to exploit the Azov ‘trademark’ in political life.” To be fair, the NGU Azov unit, wanting US support, has paid lip service to this narrative. In a March 2022 statement to CNN, the Azov Regiment said it “appreciates and respects Andriy Biletsky as the regiment’s founder and first commander, but we have nothing to do with his political activities and the National Corps party.” However, as Oleksiy Kuzmenko wrote in 2020,

the role of the far-right leadership in the regiment remains evident. Both the National Guard unit and the political party admit to being part of the wider “Azov movement” led by the regiment’s first commander and current National Corps party leader Andriy Biletsky. The unit routinely hosts Biletsky (and other former commanders) at its bases and welcomes his participation in ceremonies, greeting him as a leader. Biletsky positions himself as the curator of the regiment, and has claimed to deal directly with Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov on related matters – a claim that Avakov appeared to confirm in early 2019. Shekhovtsov describes the regiment as a regular unit of the National Guard, but it is not. Regimental commanders have said that their unit owes its special status to being shielded from government interference. In 2019, the head of Azov’s military academy claimed Biletsky protected Azov from being “destroyed” by Ukraine’s leaders, while another commander described Biletsky as someone who “finds sponsors that really invest money.” Furthermore, Azov’s Kyiv recruitment center and military academy share a location with the offices of the National Corps.

The NGU Azov Brigade might have distanced itself from Andriy Biletsky in the past few years, but as deputy commander Illia “Gandalf” Samoilenko admitted in 2023, “Soldier to soldier and officer to officer, we have good relations with the 3rd Brigade [led by Biletsky].” In addition to the Yevhen Konovalets Military School, which unites the Azovite units and salutes Biletsky as their collective leader, the NGU Azov Brigade has a “standard-bearer school” named after Mykola Stsiborskyi, a fascist OUN ideologue who drafted an explicitly totalitarian constitution for Ukraine on the eve of World War II. The Azovites have also called this their “Natiocracy School,” named for Stsiborskyi’s concept of nationalist dictatorship. Kuzmenko observed several years ago, this school trains “political-ideological officers” for the NGU Azov unit, and was “tied to the far-right National Corps party” since its establishment in 2017. He called this “another strong link between AR [the Azov Regiment] and the larger Azov movement.”

“THE AZOV OF 2022 IS NOTHING LIKE THE GROUP FROM EIGHT YEAR AGO.”

Denys Prokopenko has been the NGU Azov commander since 2017. Andriy Biletsky made a speech at his torchlit inauguration ceremony. According to Stanford University’s “Mapping Militants Project,” Prokopenko was one of the earliest members of the Azov Battalion. He is known to be a former football hooligan, affiliated with the “Albatross” firm, which is a member of the racist “White Boys Club” that refers to Prokopenko as a “legend of our movement.” Reporting Radicalism, a website created several years ago by the Ukraine branch of the US-funded Freedom House, had this to say about the “death rune,” which Prokopenko has tattooed on his upper-right arm.

It is one of the most common neo-Nazi symbols and is used widely by members of the Far Right in various countries as a marker of Nazi, neo-Nazi, and racist views. ... The ‘death rune’ is used widely in Ukraine to demonstrate Nazi and racist views, often without any connection to a specific organization. Supporters of far-right ideologies almost always use it to symbolize death, most commonly in conjunction with the ‘life rune.’ This rune is almost never mistakenly used.

Prokopenko was one of the first members of the Azov Regiment’s “Borodach Division” platoon, just like his predecessor, Maksym Zhorin. The group’s symbol was a bearded Nazi Totenkopf, which is flanked by SS bolts in some cases, for example, on the arm of Oleg Mudrak, who commanded the first battalion of the Azov Regiment in 2022. On the birthday of the Borodach (“Bearded Man”) Division, in 2017 and 2018, the regiment shared a group photo of Prokopenko’s old platoon on social media, but with their backs turned away from the camera, facing toward a large Perun idol outside of Kyiv.

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(Last year I wrote something about Nazi paganism and the Azov movement)

Perun is a Slavic god of war, worshipped by some pagan fighters in Ukraine. In 2017, on the initiative of Maksym Zhorin, the third commander of the Azov Regiment, the unit installed a Perun idol on its base in Mariupol. As the shrine went up, Azov fighters threw up their right arms in a ceremony that involved bloodletting. According to the NGU Azov press service, this site was intended as a “sacred place, where before combat missions, each fighter could consecrate their weapons and worship the deity, gaining strength and invincibility from the shrine for the upcoming battle.”

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Meanwhile Azov held a sports tournament to celebrate a 10th century Kievan prince’s military victory over Khazaria, which had a Turkic elite that converted to Judaism. “This grandiose victory over the Jewish state ranks among the most significant events in Slavic and world history,” Zhorin told assembled fighters. “With small forces, the prince was able to defeat the enemy. This testifies, first of all, to the courage and professionally high level of training of his warriors. The invincible spirit and weapons of the descendants of Perun destroyed the parasitic system. We can draw many parallels to today’s events.”

(Much, much more at link. This man does his homework.)

https://azovlobby.substack.com/p/the-experts-lied-to-us
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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