Iran

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Re: Iran

Post by blindpig » Mon Jan 20, 2020 9:03 pm

Iran Counters EU Threat Of Snapback Sanctions
U.S. President Donald Trump wants to destroy the nuclear agreement with Iran. He has threatened the EU-3 poodles in Germany, Britain and France with a 25% tariff on their car exports to the U.S. unless they end their role in the JCPOA deal.

In their usual gutlessness the Europeans gave in to the blackmail. They triggered the Dispute Resolution Mechanism of the deal. The mechanism foresees two 15 day periods of negotiations and a five day decision period after which any of the involved countries can escalate the issues to the UN Security Council. The reference to the UNSC would then lead to an automatic reactivation or "snapback" of those UN sanction against Iran that existed before the nuclear deal was signed.

Iran is now countering the European move. Its Foreign Minister Javad Zarif announced that Iran may leave the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) if any of the European countries escalates the issue to the UNSC:

Zarif said that Iran is following up the late decision by European states to trigger the Dispute Resolution Mechanism in the context of the JCPOA, adding that Tehran officially started the discussion on the mechanism on May 8, 2018 when the US withdrew from the deal.
He underlined that Iran sent three letters dated May 10, August 26 and November 2018 to the then EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, announcing in the latter that Iran had officially triggered and ended the dispute resolution mechanism and thus would begin reducing its commitments to the JCPOA.

However, Iran gave a seven-month opportunity to the European Union before it began reducing its commitments in May 8, 2019 which had operational effects two months later, according to Zarif.

Iran’s top diplomat said that the country’s five steps in compliance reduction would have no similar follow-ups, but Europeans’ measure to refer the case to the United Nations Security Council may be followed by Tehran’s decision to leave NPT as stated in President Hassan Rouhani’s May 2018 letter to other parties to the deal.

He stressed that all the steps are reversible if the European parties to the JCPOA restore their obligations under the deal.

The Europeans certainly do not want Iran to leave the NPT. But as they are cowards and likely to continue to submit themselves to Trump's blackmail that is what they will end up with. Britain is the most likely country to move the issue to the UNSC as it is in urgent need of a trade deal with the U.S. after leaving the EU.

Adherence to the NTP is controlled through safeguard agreements between the individual member countries and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which inspects nuclear facilities. If Iran were to leave the NPT it could still decided to continue its safeguard agreements with the IAEA and could continued to have its nuclear facilities under inspections. That would increase international confidence that Iran is not up to something nefarious.

Leaving the IAEA and ending its inspection role in Iran would then become a separate step the country could still take.

Trump would probably like it if Iran would end its NPT commitments. It would be used to allege that Iran was doing so to build nuclear weapons even if that were not the case.

If Iran were to leave the NPT it would no longer have any obligation to not build a nuclear weapon. But that does not mean at all that it would start to make nuclear bombs. Iran's Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa, a binding religious verdict, that prohibits the production or use of any weapon of mass destruction by Iran:

Khamenei.ir @khamenei_ir - 12:49 · Feb 26, 2015
'We consider the use of WMDs as Haraam.'
Ayatollah Khamenei's fatwa on 4/17/2010
link

Khamenei has publicly emphasized that position (vid) again and again.

Khamenei's fatwa is not his personal decision but a longstanding official policy position of the Islamic Republic. During the Iran-Iraq war Iraq's Saddam Hussein ordered the use of chemical weapons against Iranian front lines and cities. Ten thousand Iranians died of those and many more were wounded by them. Back then the Islamic Republic still had chemical weapons which were leftovers from the previous Shah regime. But it refrained from using them as its Supreme Leader at that time, Ayatollah Khomeni, prohibited their use.

Meanwhile the Trump administration continues to press Iran with other petty measures.

Foreign Minister Javad Zarif had a personal invitation to speak at the the World Economic Forum in Davos. But when Trump announced that he would come to Davos the planned event with Zarif was modified in a way that led to his cancellation of the event:

Zarif had been scheduled to attend the gathering after receiving a personal invitation, his ministry said.
"They changed the original program they had for him, the program that had been agreed upon, and came up with something else," said spokesman Abbas Mousavi.

"Either way, this trip unfortunately will not happen," he told a news conference in Tehran.
...
In a tweet published later on Monday, Mousavi suggested that the change in program by the organizers of the Davos forum was “perhaps geared to have only one outcome,” and called Zarif’s absence a “missed opportunity for dialogue.”

It is likely that Trump demanded the WEF to take that step.

In another petty measure the Asian Football Confederation stripped Iranian football teams of their right to host their own international matches:

The Asian Football Confederation has reportedly banned Iran from hosting international matches based on safety fears over the current tensions in the region. Iranian club sides have responded by planning to withdraw from the AFC Asian Champions League. The clubs have said Iran is “safe”, while Iranian media and fans have claimed that politics, rather than security, is behind the AFC’s decision.
Iran are one of the top nations in the Asian Champions League, and have some of the best supported clubs in Asia. Iranian clubs had a poor campaign last year, but the year before that, Persepolis reached the final of the competition. They, along with Esteghlal, Sepahan and Shahr Khodro, will withdraw from the competition should the AFC’s fixture ban not be reversed.

Iran suspects that Saudi Arabia pushed the ACL to take that step.

All this is part of Trump's maximum pressure campaign against Iran. His Special Representative for Iran recently repeated what Trump hopes to achieve:

Hayvi Bouzo هيفي بوظو @hayvibouzo - 15:24 UTC · Jan 16, 2020
Brian Hook detailing how a new “nuclear deal” with Iran would differ from JCPOA:
1- Iran will NOT be allowed to enrich uranium, period.
2- The deal will be submitted to the Senate to make it a “treaty”
3- It will include Iranian missile programs
4- Iran’s regional aggression
video

Brian Hook forgot to ask for pink ponies. There is no chance at all that Iran will ever give up its 'indelible right' to nuclear enrichment or the missile program on which its strategic security is based. These unfulfillable demands the Trump administration makes are not designed to reach an agreement but to lead to a deeper conflict.

Posted by b on January 20, 2020 at 18:46 UTC | Permalink

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2020/01/i ... tions.html
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Re: Iran

Post by blindpig » Fri Apr 03, 2020 1:13 pm

Covid-19 Infects Over 50,000 In Iran

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TEHRAN, Apr. 03 (MNA) – According to Iran’s Health Ministry Spokesman Kianoush Jahanpour, the total number of confirmed coronavirus cases has reached 53,183 8 on Fri., with a total death toll of 3,294 and 17,935 recovered.

As he said, some 2,715 new cases of COVID-19 have been reported in the past 24 hours across the country.

Jahanpour went on to say that 17,935 cases have recovered and have been discharged from hospitals.

Jahanpour put the number of those who lost their lives to the virus in the past 24 hours at 134, which brings the total death toll to 3,294 in Iran.

Up to the present date, more than 69 million Iranians have been screened for COVID-19, he added.

Iran is presently in the phase of managing the outbreak which has been realized with the collective efforts of all Iranians and responsible bodies.

https://en.mehrnews.com/news/157194/COV ... um=webpush

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4mn tons of basic goods ready for import in coming days: Pres Rouhani

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TEHRAN, Apr. 02 (MNA) – Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said Thu. that 4 million tons of basic goods that were held up at customs will be discharged for import in the coming days.

The Iranian president made the remarks at a meeting of the Government's Economic Board for Examining the Effects of Coronavirus Outbreak held on Thursday.

Here are some excerpts of his address at the meeting:

Today's meeting was an economic meeting about what situation we are in today. Meeting the country's needs, both for people's health sector and countering coronavirus, and providing essential goods and needs that must be addressed by the end of the year.

A detailed report from the ministries of agriculture and industry was presented regarding our stockpile conditions in the coming months, and it was very good and promising.

The central bank also provided a good overview of the country's foreign currency conditions and the conditions we have to provide currency to in the first place for health, medicine and medical needs, and in the second part for basic commodities.

Thankfully, we will have no problem supplying our needed forex until the end of the year with the trend that we have anticipated.

The first part of the discussion was about basic commodities, medicine, and medical equipment, how to supply them until the end of the year 1399, what resources we have and what to do about them.

The second part was about customs, which currently holds about 4 million tonnes of basic goods. We examined the situation of the essential commodities that were purchased, transported and brought into customs, and the regulations that were needed to free them from customs and enter the country.

The Central Bank and the Ministry of Industry have outlined this framework, and today the owners of the commodities will be told how their goods will be delivered and discharged from customs.

We also made a good decision about the goods on the decks and we can be sure that in the coming days, this 4 million tonnes of goods will be imported into the country and this is great news for the country's market and resources.

That was the first decision we made. There are other goods in customs that are not essential commodities, but which are needed for production or equipment that has been imported into the country. It was also discussed that the Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade should specify the list of essential goods to be released.

Of course, we also discussed domestic production, including wheat, which will be harvested and ready to grow depending on the climate of the country.

It was also decided on the foreign exchange resources and actions that the foreign ministry should take, as well as the business relations we need to have with neighboring countries and the health protocols that need to be followed.

There was, of course, another debate here that the final decision would be left to the National Task Force for Fighting Coronavirus, and how businesses should start work after April 8 and what their protocols should be.

We must try to provide for people's lives and meet their needs; those who have to do their business should be able to do their business and observe the same health principles exactly. Both principles are important to us. The fight against poverty is similar to coronavirus, both of which must be considered on two fronts.

At today's meeting, we made good decisions in the economic aspects of the spread of coronavirus, and God willing, the final decisions will be made at the National Task Force meeting on Sunday.

We hope all our people stay safe. All the organs in the country, especially the health system, are performing their duties well. I have to thank all those who worked in production centers during the holidays.

Last night I was in contact with the Ministry of Health. Almost most of the requirements are met domestically. I asked about ventilators last night and found out that almost three-quarters of our needs were met domestically.

I would also like to thank the banks of the country that were active during this time. I also thank the police and the Red Crescent, which are very active these days, and all the departments that are working for people's health these days.

God willing, we can work as fast as we can to get to a stable situation where we can all get on with our normal business.

Here again, I emphasize that coronavirus is not a matter of saying one day it will be completely over. Coronavirus may be with us for months to come; maybe by the end of the year. We should always follow the health guidelines and protocols issued by the Ministry of Health.

Production centers, businesses, offices and everywhere must observe health protocols. Open communities may be limited for a period of time.

https://en.mehrnews.com/news/157180/4mn ... um=webpush
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Re: Iran

Post by blindpig » Thu May 28, 2020 11:46 am

Image
Over 100 domestically-built speed boats join Iran’s IRGC fleet

TEHRAN, May 28 (MNA) – The naval forces of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) have received more than 100 missile-launching speed boats in the southern waters.

112 new-generation speed boats of different classes, designed and manufactured by Iranian experts, joined the IRGC fleet in the waters of southern Hormozgan province on Thursday, in a ceremony attended by top Iranian military officials, including Defense Minister Brigadier General Amir Hatami, IRGC Chief Major General Hossein Salami, and IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri.

The move comes in line with the plans to boost the Islamic Republic’s offensive power in the strategic Persian Gulf waters.

The vessels enjoy high hydrodynamic and maneuver capabilities in different conditions.

MR/IRN83802563

https://en.mehrnews.com/news/159166/Ove ... um=webpush

It's Parthian tactics all over again. Beware, Crassus.
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Re: Iran

Post by blindpig » Sat Jul 11, 2020 1:08 pm

UN Calls Soleimani’s Killing an Arbitrary Execution, US Rejects

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Massive protest against Qasem Soleimani's assassination, 2020. | Photo: Twitter/ @Antiwarcom

Published 10 July 2020

Special Rapporteur Callamard cataloged the U.S. attack as an international law violation.


U.S Secretary of State Mike Pompeo Friday rejected a United Nations report accusing Iranian General Qasem Soleimani’s assassination as illegal.

The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions Agnes Callamard also called Soleimani’s death an "arbitrary execution" given that Washington has not yet provided evidence to justify the Iranian general was planning attacks against the U.S.

"The attack is a violation of the United Nations Charter, and an arbitrary assassination for which the United States is responsible under international law.”

Pompeo rejected Callamard’s conclusions and called them false, justifying the attack on Soleimani as a self-defense response to the threat Iran was posing to the U.S in the region.


According to the Secretary of State, the drone strike that ended Soleimani’s life came as a preventive measure after “the escalation of armed attacks against U.S. forces and interests in the Middle East, conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the militias it supports.”

Nevertheless, Callamard warned about the danger posed by the fact that, under the premise of self-defense, anybody could constitute a legitimate target for the U.S.

“The international community must now confront the very real prospect that States may opt to 'strategically' eliminate high ranking military officials outside the context of a 'known' war, and seek to justify the killing on the grounds of the target’s classification as a 'terrorist' who posed a potential future threat.”

General Soleimaní was killed in an airstrike on January 3 by President Donald Trump’s orders. In response, Iran launched missile attacks against two bases used by the U.S. military in Iraq leaving over a hundred injured.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/un- ... -0004.html

Perhaps an ineffective gesture but a sign of declining US influence.It is almost poetic that the guy who has come to display the Id of Capitalism has done significant damage to imperialism. The contradictions accumulate...
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Re: Iran

Post by blindpig » Mon Nov 30, 2020 2:56 pm

Overview: nuclear scientists as assassination targets
By William Tobey, November 27, 2020

Editor’s note: This article was originally published in the January/February 2012 issue of the Bulletin. It is being published here in updated form as part of the Bulletin’s coverage of the November 2020 assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a prominent Iranian nuclear scientist who had been involved in the past in that country’s efforts to develop nuclear arms, but whose death, the Washington Post reported, would have little effect on Iran’s current nuclear program.

Since 2007, international media have reported the violent deaths of four scientists and engineers connected with Iran’s nuclear program and an attempt on the life of a fifth. The news reports on such killings are murky, incomplete, and, in some instances, likely inaccurate. The motivations and identity of the persons behind the killings are also obscure,1 but the fact that they are taking place is undeniable.

On January 15, 2007, Ardeshire Hassanpour, who had won a military prize for his work as a nuclear physicist at Iran’s Isfahan uranium conversion plant, reportedly died under mysterious circumstances related to “gas poisoning.” While possibly an industrial accident, his death went unreported for six days (Baxter, 2007). On January 12, 2010, physics professor Masoud Ali-Mohammadi was reportedly killed by a remotely controlled bomb wired to a motorbike (Saba, 2010). On November 29, 2010, a similar device also reportedly killed Majid Shariari, and a separate blast wounded Fereydoon Abbasi. Shariari was a nuclear engineer (Time, 2010). Abbasi is now vice president of the Islamic Republic and heads the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (Sanger and Broad, 2011). On July 23, 2011, two gunmen shot and killed Darioush Rezaeinejad; Iranian state media published a report linking the killing to Tehran’s nuclear program (Cole and Schone, 2011), a tie later confirmed by the head of Iran’s nuclear program.

The appropriateness and legality of targeted killings of terrorists is already a matter of substantial discussion among legal scholars (Allston, 2010), as controversy over the recent killing of Muslim cleric Anwar al-Awlaki via a US drone attack illustrates. But nuclear scientists—even those in suspected illicit weapons programs—are different from terrorists. In fact, the killing of nuclear scientists and engineers raises many important—even unique—policy questions: What impels nations to undertake such extreme actions? What are the likely effects on nuclear proliferation programs? What disadvantages or retaliatory responses can be anticipated? Do legal and moral standards have a role in the matter?

Like most calculations related to the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the answers to these questions are neither easy to formulate nor categorical. And like many questions related to nuclear proliferation, these have roots stretching back to the dawn of the atomic age.

The Heisenberg uncertainty and beyond

Targeting atomic scientists to retard a potential nuclear weapons program predates the existence of nuclear weapons. Alarmed by the possibility that the giant of German physics, Werner Heisenberg, was working on an atomic bomb for Adolf Hitler, noted theoretical physicist Victor Weisskopf consulted with Hans Bethe, a renowned colleague working in the Manhattan Project, in the autumn of 1942; Weisskopf subsequently corresponded with Robert Oppenheimer, then newly appointed to lead theoretical work for the Manhattan Project. According to Thomas Powers’s account in Heisenberg’s War, Weisskopf wrote, “I believe that by far the best thing to do in this situation would be to organize a kidnapping of Heisenberg in Switzerland” (Weisskopf, 1942). Over time, within the Manhattan Project and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Weisskopf’s proposal mutated into a plot to kill Heisenberg—a plot that very nearly came to pass.

Because much, although still not everything, about the plot to assassinate Heisenberg is known, and because it is no longer politically sensitive, the case is worth delving into in some detail, as it adds clarity to more modern cases. One key element in the problem that confronted the Allies during World War II, however, was very different from later episodes: No one could doubt that Heisenberg would greatly advantage any Nazi effort to build an atomic bomb. Powers relates Oppenheimer’s view in 1944 that “the position of Heisenberg in German physics is essentially unique. If we were [undertaking a bomb project] in Germany, we should make desperate efforts to have Heisenberg as a collaborator” (Powers, 1993: viii). What the Allies could not know were Heisenberg’s intentions, and they famously remain a matter of debate, and even drama, today (Frayn, 1998).

American and British officials initially ignored the suggestion of Weisskopf and Bethe that Heisenberg be kidnapped (Powers, 1993). But the seed was planted—and it sprouted into kidnapping plans 15 months later (Powers, 1993).

Physicist Niels Bohr escaped from Nazi-controlled Denmark in September 1943, bearing what the New York Times described—in an early leak of nuclear weapons-related information— as “plans for a new invention involving atomic explosions…of the greatest importance to the Allied war effort” (New York Times, 1943). What Bohr carried was a rough sketch given to him by Heisenberg during their famous 1941 Copenhagen conversation;2 Bohr took the sketch to be of a weapon, but it was most likely a nuclear reactor. During a two-day rail journey in December 1943 from Chicago to Lamy, New Mexico, Bohr convinced Brig. Gen. Leslie Groves, then in charge of the overall Manhattan Project, that the drawing was evidence of a German bomb program. Despite Oppenheimer’s “formal assurance” that the sketch did not depict a viable weapon, Groves concluded that he must act to blunt the Nazi effort (Powers, 1993: 246–248).

Groves contacted the OSS—the swashbuckling US agency then responsible for intelligence and covert action—and by February 1944, Special Operations Branch officers were forming improbable kidnapping plans that included flying Heisenberg from an anticipated snatch in Switzerland, parachuting with him into the Mediterranean Sea, and rendezvousing in the water with a surfaced submarine. The inherent danger of such an operation shows that Heisenberg’s survival was not a high US priority; indeed, if capture by German authorities were imminent, the plan was to kill him (Powers, 1993). Nothing, however, could be done until he was located. Before he could be, these kidnapping schemes—but not the desire to neutralize Heisenberg as a threat—were put aside (Powers, 1993).

In November 1944, the OSS learned that Heisenberg planned to visit Switzerland the next month. Former major league baseball catcher and then OSS officer Moe Berg was dispatched to Zurich with orders that “Heisenberg must be rendered hors de combat” (out of action) if Heisenberg gave evidence that the German bomb effort was close to completion. Apparently Berg alone was to decide whether or not to kill Heisenberg (Powers, 1993: 391–392).

With a pistol in his pocket, Berg attended a lecture by Heisenberg, waiting for some sign of an advanced German atomic bomb program. Heisenberg offered no such signal and therefore survived. Instead, Berg reflected on his own “uncertainty principle” in regard to killing Heisenberg, a reference to the scientist’s most prominent contribution to the theory of quantum mechanics (Powers, 1993: 398–399).

Later that week, as the Battle of the Bulge turned to Allied advantage, Berg attended a dinner given for Heisenberg and heard him lament Germany’s coming loss of the war. This appeared to clinch the case that Heisenberg could not be part of a successful atomic bomb project and effectively ended any further US interest in killing him (Powers, 1993).

The end of World War II, however, did not mean that nation states were no longer interested in killing foreign scientists to address a perceived military threat. As Ian Black and Benny Morris reported in their 1992 book, Israel’s Secret Wars, under “Operation Damocles” in 1962, the Mossad assassinated Heinz Krug, the head of a German company involved in procurements related to Egypt’s missile-development efforts, and attempted to kill Hans Kleiwachter, an electronics expert with experience in Germany’s World War II V-2 rocket program (Black and Morris, 1992). On June 14, 1980, Yahia El-Meshad, who then led Iraq’s nuclear program, was beaten to death in a Paris hotel room; his killer was never identified (Russell, 1981). In 1990, Gerald Bull, a Canadian engineer and expert in long-range artillery who reportedly provided advice to both Iran and Iraq, was shot and killed outside his apartment in Brussels; authorities ruled out robbery as a motive when they found $20,000 left untouched in his pocket (Fried, 1990).

The attacks in Iran

The most recent killings of nuclear scientists involve the Iranian nuclear program. In an aggressive September 2011 speech to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, Abbasi, the leader of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, denounced the killings of Ali-Mohammadi, Shariari, and Rezaeinejad, calling them “our scientists and experts.” He linked their deaths to recent international pressure, arguing that their names and addresses (along with other scientists’) were included in documents related to sanctions levied against Iran by the UN Security Council and the European Union (Abbasi, 2011: 6). Although the exact meaning of Abbasi’s speech is obscured by a poor translation, he seemed to hold the IAEA at least partially responsible for the killings. After describing the assassinations, he said, “We strongly urge the Agency to clear its name in cooperating and preparing the ground in these measures” (Abbasi, 2011: 6). Finally, he called on IAEA member states and Director General Yukiya Amano to condemn the killings “to prove their good will” (Abbasi, 2011: 6–7). Iranian Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh went further, calling the killings “a crime against humanity.” Still, Soltanieh added that Iran “is not going to retaliate” (Jahn, 2011).

Responsibility for the killings and attempted killings of the Iranian nuclear scientists remains an unsolved mystery. Iran has accused several countries, but all have denied involvement. It is therefore impossible to know, with certainty, the thinking of those who sponsored the assassination plots. Nonetheless, assassinations would not go forward if the country sponsoring them did not believe there was some possibility of achieving positive results.

History suggests that when nations contemplate the extreme step of targeting nuclear scientists in another country, they are focused on the existential imperative that a hostile nuclear weapons program can raise. When the potential negative consequences of inaction are perceived to be infinite, otherwise reasonable doubts—about the quality of intelligence, or the negative consequences associated with unsavory action—may seem irrelevant. The specter of annihilation dramatically changes risk–benefit analyses. Under such circumstances, doing something will nearly always appear better than doing nothing.

Policy benefits and risks

A nation that made the fateful decision to proceed with assassinating nuclear scientists could hope, at most, to delay, but not halt, a hostile nuclear weapons program. Assassination might produce an effect beyond the individual scientists who are killed, perhaps deterring other scientists from joining or continuing to work in a nuclear program. Deterrent messages could even be transmitted in a psychological operations campaign. (Such messages were reportedly sent during Operation Damocles.)

Nonetheless, the empirical evidence is clear: Nuclear weapons programs are large, complex undertakings, involving hundreds of key people. Killing a few workers, even if they are talented and working on important projects, will not halt the undertaking. It is difficult to imagine a country having a scientific infrastructure large enough to support a nuclear weapons program, but too small to sustain a viable effort after the loss of even several individuals. (Had General Groves died during the Manhattan Project, could the US Army have found another hard-charging, talented manager to replace him? Very likely.) Nonetheless, if diplomatic efforts to halt a hostile program have broken down or evince little likelihood of success, even delay can be seen as victory.

From the perspective of the attacking nation, there is one other advantage of targeting nuclear scientists with covert action: deniability. There are many paths to deniability—claims of a rogue act by a deranged individual, false trails pointing to action by another nation, even sheer secrecy. Targeting scientists would probably be less effective than military strikes on nuclear facilities in terms of lasting programmatic setbacks. Because of its deniability, however, assassination might be seen as less provocative than an overt military operation. As a result, it might also carry a lower risk—in terms of both likelihood and severity of retaliation.

These are modest advantages, even from the perspective of a nation that fears a failure to act will lead to its own destruction. Indeed, they can rightly be seen as manifesting desperation born of the absence of viable diplomatic or military alternatives. Such was the case in the plot against Heisenberg. In the midst of World War II, diplomacy, export controls, and sanctions were irrelevant. The Allies bombed German scientific facilities but were unsure of the strategic results, because they could not accurately assess the damage they had caused or identify all covert facilities. Yet they were desperate that Germany not prevail in a race for an atomic bomb.

The disadvantages of targeting nuclear scientists are, of course, many. First, even in theory, it is very difficult to target effectively those scientists and engineers most critical to a program’s success. Such precise targeting would require intimate and detailed knowledge of a program’s day-to-day operations and problem solving—a difficult matter, given that nuclear proliferation programs are shrouded in secrecy. Moreover, it is not enough simply to target those who have made significant past contributions to a program. Rather, it would be necessary to predict whose skills will be necessary to solve future technological problems.

Nuclear weapons programs are dynamic and the relative importance of a particular individual can change over time. In 1993, Hans Bethe reflected on the idea of kidnapping Heisenberg, saying: “It may have made some sense when we suggested it, but later on, in ’44, it made no sense. By that time, we knew pretty well that not much was going on” (Broad, 1993).

Neither is seniority necessarily a useful gauge; depending on the maturity of a program, engineers may be more valuable than scientists, and technicians, who actually operate machinery, may be most indispensable of all. At least with respect to crude but still-devastating nuclear weapons, manufacture is now more about engineering than science.

The case of Heisenberg also illustrates how difficult it can be to know what a particular scientist is doing. Advanced physics in the 1930s was a small club. Several scientists in the Manhattan Project had studied with or under Heisenberg, who had also visited the United States. Despite this intimate professional knowledge, or perhaps because of it, scientists involved in the Manhattan Project tended to overestimate Heisenberg’s role in the German atomic program.

Second, targeted killings can be counterproductive, providing the country with a covert nuclear program a reason to diminish cooperation with the IAEA. Whether out of genuine belief, or simply as a pretext, a country can argue that divulging the names and responsibilities of key scientists and engineers—a fundamental part of the IAEA’s methods for verifying safeguards implementation—would make them vulnerable to attack. If the IAEA is prevented from understanding the role of significant personnel in a nuclear program and denied opportunities to speak with them, its effectiveness will be severely impaired. Safeguards verification is analogous to creating a mosaic: Without access to individuals, IAEA inspectors would not have half the tiles they need for a complete and accurate picture.

Worse, targeted killings can become a pretext (albeit an illegitimate one) for suspending or even ending cooperation with the IAEA. Abbasi’s evidence-free statement that the IAEA must “clear its name” of abetting the killing of Iranian nuclear personnel amounts to an attack on the agency’s legitimacy and may not bode well for future cooperation, should Iran decide for its own reasons that IAEA inspections are no longer convenient.

Third, and related to the previous disadvantage, targeted killings would inevitably increase operational security within a nuclear proliferation program. If secrecy is a matter of life and death, security breaches are likely to be fewer and farther between. Given that lack of information about the progress of nuclear programs is a huge barrier to effective export control and diplomatic or military action, this is a significant problem.

Fourth, killing nuclear personnel may well have a strong negative effect on any chance of a negotiated solution to a nuclear proliferation issue. Such action understandably raises levels of hostility and mistrust within the targeted program. The venom apparent in Abbasi’s IAEA speech surely reflects his own experience as a target, as well as his empathy for dead colleagues. Given the covert origins of Iran’s enrichment program and its longstanding refusal to abide by IAEA Board of Governors and UN Security Council resolutions, it is not clear that a negotiated solution to the nuclear crisis is or ever was possible, but the violent deaths of several Iranian nuclear personnel are likely to harden Tehran’s position. (Likewise, recent criminal charges detailing an Iranian plot to kill the Saudi Arabian Ambassador Adel al-Jubeir in Washington raise levels of hostility and mistrust among US policy makers, who now may find it difficult to pursue a negotiated solution.)

Finally, targeted killings of nuclear scientists may provoke retaliation, either in-kind or asymmetrical. Soltanieh’s claim that Iran will not retaliate is both an argument that Iran is showing forbearance and a reminder: Revenge is possible. Indeed, the media has linked the plot against al-Jubeir to purported Wikileaks disclosures of US diplomatic cables recounting that he told US officials that the Saudi king urged them to “cut off the head of the snake,” an apparent reference to attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities (Shuster, 2011).

What role do legal and ethical considerations play in the matter of targeted killings of nuclear scientists? In the abstract, the world will be more dangerous and less just if every nation feels within its rights to kill citizens of another country that advance their country’s military capabilities. Moreover, nuclear scientists are different from terrorists. They do not pose an immediate threat of violence against another nation. Presumably, they are acting within the laws of their country. Unless their nation is at war, they are not obviously legitimate military targets.

All the same, as a practical matter, if the existential imperative is present, it will likely trump legal and ethical considerations in the deliberations of any nation seriously contemplating attacks on nuclear scientists. Nations have an inherent right of self-defense. Although that right is limited by treaty and international law, when the maximum risk is a nuclear detonation, the historical record demonstrates that, plausibly, nations cannot be expected to refrain from contemplating whatever steps are necessary to avert it. The preceding judgment is an assessment about what is likely, not what is right or just.

What conclusions then are to be drawn about the killing of nuclear scientists? Two come to mind. First, given that the assassination of nuclear scientists can only impede, but not stop, nuclear weapons programs—and even this outcome is uncertain and very difficult to achieve—and that there are significant disadvantages to such actions, prudent nations will contemplate assassinations only in the gravest of circumstances. These circumstances would seem to have to include at least several components: There must be solid and substantial evidence of a covert nuclear weapons program. That program must be in the hands of a hostile power that has such fundamental differences with another country as to pose an existential threat to it, attempts to deter notwithstanding. There must be no credible possibility of a diplomatic solution. In short, the circumstances are those that would make an act of desperation seem reasonable.

The second conclusion relates to instances in which killings have taken place. Given the obviously limited advantages and serious disadvantages of targeted killing of nuclear scientists, a state that undertakes such action must calculate that it has essentially no other choice: that all other options (short of military operations) to halt a hostile nuclear weapons program have failed and will fail, that time is running short, and that knowledge about the status and development of the program is less important than slowing it down immediately.

That some nation has apparently come to these conclusions about Iran only underscores the enormous danger of an Iranian nuclear program that continues to operate in violation of international law, as held by the UN Security Council. Writing of the judgments involved in the Heisenberg case, Thomas Powers wisely concludes, “All we can say at this remove is that strange things may seem reasonable to men who know only enough to fear the worst” (Powers, 1993: 252). This, of course, is the paradox that daily confronts those who oppose nuclear proliferation.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

1 Iran has variously blamed Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom for the attacks; for example, the Iranian parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani called the fatal shooting of electrical-engineering postgraduate Darioush Rezaeinejad in July a “US-Zionist terrorist act.” All three countries have denied the Iranian accusations.

2 Heisenberg discussed with Bohr the possibility of using fission to produce a weapon; whether his intentions were to warn Bohr of a potential Nazi effort, discourage the Allies from undertaking a similar project, or simply to pursue a scientific question remains unresolved.



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Re: Iran

Post by blindpig » Fri Mar 05, 2021 12:45 pm

Images of the Iranian attack on the US base in Iraq, Ayn al-Assad (Photo: 60 Minutes)
WHY DOES THE US REVEAL DETAILS OF IRAN'S ATTACK ON AYN AL-ASSAD A YEAR LATER?
Elijah J. Magnier

5 Mar 2021 , 8:12 am .

Image

CENTCOM's highest-ranking commander, Gen. Frank McKenzie, revealed details about the accuracy of the 1,000-pound Iranian ballistic missiles, fired more than a year ago in retaliation for the general's illegal assassination. Qassem Soleimani. This historic as well as critical event marked the first direct attack by any country (in this case, Iran) against the United States since World War II. It was an act of great audacity, and a shocking decision: to openly confront the most powerful superpower on Earth. He clearly indicated that Iran was prepared for war when it bombed that US military base of Ayn al-Assad, the largest in Iraq.

But there is another reason behind publicly sharing these details a year later. This is not simply an acknowledgment by the United States of the accuracy of the Iranian bombings, because Iran itself announced it a year ago (in addition, various photos of the place appeared all over the news). There are ulterior motives behind the disclosure of such details. What does the US administration want to show, and what is its message behind the latest MacKenzie revelations?

This all has to do with the nuclear deal: the US general released a significant amount of information received by the US drone. At the same time, Iran launched its missiles, demonstrating and sending different messages at the same time. In fact, revealing the details that confirm Iran's power could be part of the way the United States paves the way for Iran to return to the nuclear deal (known as JCPOA). It is a sign that the Americans recognize Iranian regional power, and recognize the effectiveness and deterrent effect of its missiles.

On the other hand, it could also explain to Iran and the world why the United States wishes to introduce amendments to the 2015 JCPOA agreement, thus bringing the issue of Iran's ballistic missiles to the negotiating table.

During the years of negotiation leading up to the final agreement in 2015, Iran refused to include its precision missiles in any negotiations, despite the insistence of all parties. Iran considers these missiles as the first line of defense and protection of the existence of the Islamic Republic. Iran lives in a sea of ​​hostile countries and is also surrounded by 35 US military bases. The United States seizes every opportunity to send its B-52H bombers, aircraft carriers and destroyers into the Strait of Hormuz in a clear display of power off the Iranian coast, and American drones and spy planes have repeatedly violated Iran's air sovereignty.

The CENTCOM commander also revealed that the Iranian attack on Ayn al-Assad would have destroyed between 20 and 30 aircraft and that, had there not been the evacuation of soldiers and officers hours before the bombing, it could have killed between 100 and 150 of them. We can also understand this confession as the way in which the United States warns other countries that Iran can attack any country in the region with great precision, and destroy the air power of any country in the Middle East that is within range of its missiles.

But there is another aspect that the Biden government may want to share, which could justify why the president of the United States is going to negotiate with Iran and return to the nuclear agreement as it was signed in 2015. Biden, as a candidate, sent several messages indirect to Iran asking it to de-escalate and refrain from offering Donald Trump the possibility of declaring war in his last month in office, despite US provocations. Biden also acknowledges that Iran played an indirect positive role in the last US elections, when it refrained from responding to Trump's call for negotiation, denying him the opportunity to add the negotiation with Iran to his list of achievements.

We should not understand this as proof that Iran believes that Biden is better than Trump, it is rather because the former US president was directly responsible for the assassination of Soleimani, and the fact that his stay in the White House would have triggered a inevitable war in the Middle East.

Iran wants to believe that there are different sensitivities within the new US administration, yet while Trump's harsh "sanctions" remain in place, Biden benefits from this economic punishment against the Iranian people.

There are two crossed views between the current US administration and Iran. Each party believes that time is on their side, and that delaying the agreement serves their interests and increases the pressure on the other party. For Iran, the result is simple: if the "sanctions" are not lifted, the path to expand its nuclear capabilities and raise its enrichment to the highest level - without allowing access to inspectors - is the only option available. Could this lead to war? Possibly to an exchange of attacks because, as General McKenzie "shows", Iran is prepared to retaliate with precision.

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US soldier checks the ruins of the Ayn al-Assad base in Iraq, after the Iranian attacks (Photo: Qassim Abdul-Zahra / AP)

There is great caution when dealing with Iran: it deterred the United States and fired 16 precision ballistic missiles, which hit all targets with precision, and did so from just three locations. Iran has shown that it possesses thousands of missiles, since it has hundreds of aerial and underground emplacements scattered across the borders and throughout Iranian territory that can hit any target in the Middle East. This means that all 35 US bases deployed around Iran and in the region are within range of Iran's missiles, and can be attacked if a war breaks out with the United States. Consequently, the great offensive capacity of the United States will not prevent the destruction of its aircraft and military centers, and a large number of deaths. For this reason,

The United States has only a few weeks to lift the "sanctions" on Iran and return to comply with the agreement, before the month of Ramadan, scheduled for April 12. After that day, Iran will be busy with the recent presidential elections, which will end the term of President Hassan Rouhani, who will not be able to run for a third term. Consequently, the United States will have to face a new Iranian administration more prone to a heavy hand, along the lines of the current Shura Council headed by Muhammad Baqer Ghalibaf, a partner of the late Major General Qassem Soleimani. If so, the negotiations could be postponed to an even later date.

The US administration considers that the time factor is not in Iran's favor due to the serious economic crisis that overwhelms the Iranian people. Therefore, the Islamic Republic would do well to rush to reach the nuclear deal before the internal Iranian turmoil escalates. Biden is certainly aware that he is taking advantage of the harsh "sanctions" imposed on Iran. But the American president may not be fully aware that he is falling into the hands of the leader of the revolution Sayyed Ali Khamenei, whose theory is that no American administration can be trusted, that Iran must be self-sufficient and that it must increase its capacity. nuclear, regardless of the reaction of the international community.

Iran believes that the time factor is in its favor because it has the nuclear "card" to apply pressure, since it has increased its uranium enrichment to 20%. Khamenei has declared that he is willing to reach 60% (90% being what is necessary to make a nuclear bomb).

Iran rejected the presence of a US representative in the European negotiations (4 + 1, France, Great Britain, Germany, China and Russia) and demanded that the United States first lift all "sanctions". This is not a position that denotes weakness. On the contrary, Iran does not want to give Biden what it refused to provide Trump, and wants the United States to honor its commitment to Security Council Resolution 2231 first. Iran thus confirms that it is not interested in optimistic words and speeches, but in deeds, and that it wants the United States to back down from its violation of international law.

Iran has several cards at its disposal and believes that the firmness of its position will lead it to get the US "sanctions" lifted or to acquire nuclear energy, which would be an irreversible path. The maximum pressure strategy has not been able to bring Iran down since 1979, and the Biden administration certainly will not. Therefore, Iran sees no reason to comply with Biden's demands and take the first step.

It may also be that President Biden has to manage hotheaded associates, like Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The American president may also want to take into account his allies, such as Saudi Arabia and Europe, and even within his administration, where many believe that a regime change in Iran is necessary or that it is unnecessary to negotiate with him, since it will give up sooner or later.

General McKenzie said his intelligence officers informed him that "Iran was preparing 27 missiles but only launched 16." This means that Iran did not fire 11 missiles that remained ready to hit other targets. What the American general did not say is that Iran informed Iraqi leaders in advance of its intention to bomb Ayn al-Assad, so that the United States could reduce its losses. In fact, only 100 soldiers were injured.

Iran did not hesitate to hit the United States when its esteemed general was assassinated, and it will not reach out to Biden if he does not lift the "sanctions" first. In this case, the world must be prepared to see Iran advance to the point of no return in its nuclear program. If Biden opted for war against Iran, he has already experimented with his precision missiles on Ayn al-Assad. Iran is far from being stronger than the United States. However, there are many US bases in the region that may be targeted by missiles from Tehran, who will not hesitate to turn this threat into an opportunity. It is up to Biden to learn from history and from a saying used in the Middle East: "Deduce what will be by what has been, because everything looks alike."

Ester article was originally published on Elijah J. Magnier's blog on March 4, 2021 , the translation was done by Eli C. Casas.

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Pretty good analysis, except for that part about "the first direct attack by any country (in this case, Iran) against the United States since World War II. " which is clearly contradicted by Tet, Beirut and numerous other examples.
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Re: Iran

Post by blindpig » Thu Apr 22, 2021 12:54 pm

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Delegations in Vienna to negotiate the assumptions of the Iranian nuclear agreement (Photo: EPA)

IRAN SHAMES NETANYAHU, CORNERS WEST IN VIENNA
Elijah J. Magnier

21 Apr 2021 , 1:58 pm .

The Islamic Republic proved to be a sharp-toothed shark, during negotiations in Vienna with the JCPOA signatories (Russia, China, France, Great Britain and Germany), leaving few options to the negotiators. Iran demonstrated how complex and inflexible its position is towards the most powerful country in the world, prohibiting the US envoy from joining the mediators in the same room because Donald Trump decided to abandon the 2015 agreement. In addition, Iran used sabotage actions Israelis against the Natanz nuclear facility as a pretext to attack Israel, the US and all European negotiators who side with the Americans. He brought to the Vienna negotiating table the news that he has begun to enrich uranium up to 60%, and that its advanced IR9 centrifuges produce 9 grams per hour (although Iran will drop production to 5 grams per hour in the coming days).

This new Iranian capacity is embarrassing for the Prime Minister of Israel, Benyamin Netanyahu, who believed he was in control of the situation. However, he now realizes that he is to blame for Iran's surprising reaction, which has greatly improved its negotiating position. European negotiators had no choice but to bow to Iran's response and retaliation. It was a blow to Netanyahu, who had bragged about Natanz's sabotage operation and declared that he, in a personal capacity, "would never allow Iran to gain nuclear capability." US intelligence wrongly estimates Iran needs nine months to restore Natanz production. Both the United States and Israel considered that Iran is in a weak position, demanding nine months of negotiations, and that, therefore, there was no rush to lift the sanctions. It took Iran nine hours to swap out the old IR1 centrifuge for a more advanced one, the IR6, which can separate isotopes faster than the old one, quickly resuming production, in a serious setback for Iran's adversaries.

Prime Minister Netanyahu mistakenly believed that the lack of Iranian responses to its 1,000 attacks in Syria, against targets that included some Iranian warehouses and assets, meant that it could act in the same way against Iran in the Strait of Hormuz and in the Red Sea.

Netanyahu was the victim of his own bravado. It broke the Israeli tradition of denying responsibility for sabotage attacks carried out by Mossad abroad. Iran surprised Netanyahu and his chief of staff, Aviv Kochavi , when an Israeli ship was hit by a missile launched from a drone in the Red Sea, which is not far from the Iranian zone of influence. The Iranian intelligence capabilities demonstrated the effectiveness of the close surveillance of the Israeli-owned ship sailing through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. The army of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) proved capable of carrying out a competent response.

IRANIAN NEGOTIATORS CALL FOR ALL SANCTIONS TO BE LIFTED

In the last ten years, the Israeli prime minister and his military advisers were correct in estimating that the war in Syria was an opportunity to destroy the capacity of the Syrian army, since the country was occupied by the Takfiris (ISIS and al-Qaeda), Turkey and the United States occupied the north, the EU and the United States had imposed sanctions on the central government, and the economy was in critical condition. Furthermore, Russia wanted at all costs to avoid another front between Syria and Israel. Moscow offered President Bashar al-Assad unlimited quantities of interception missiles and got Assad to approve not to go to war with Israel, at least until the country recovered. The Syrian president rejected the multiple Iranian arguments that deterrence - such as that established by Hezbollah in Lebanon - should be imposed by bombing Israeli targets and using Syrian reserves of Iranian precision missiles, to prevent further violations of Syrian sovereignty by Iran. Israel - However, Netanyahu and his team were wrong to expect Iran to refrain from retaliating for Israeli killings, sabotage and attacks on Iranian ships. Iran changed its strategy of avoiding conflict when it shot down America's most expensive drone and bombed the largest American military base in Iraq, Ayn al-Assad. Iranian officials had decided to take charge of the matter rather than ask their allies to fight on their behalf.

The fact that Iran has become a regional power with significant influence in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Afghanistan, means that it can show its allies, spread throughout its zone of influence, that it dares to fight. face to face with the most powerful country in the world and to strike back without hesitation against America's main ally in the Middle East, Israel.

Iran accepted the Israeli challenge and seized the opportunity provided when Israel acknowledged its responsibility for the sabotage attack at Natanz and against the Iranian ship in the Red Sea. Iran has managed to transform the threat into an opportunity and impose its conditions on the Vienna negotiators. Netanyahu was wrong, and now he better understands that playing Iran is not without consequences. Furthermore, it has considerably weakened its European and American partners in the Vienna nuclear negotiations.

The Iranian delegation told its interlocutors at the table that it does not have much time to lose and that any attempt to circumvent the negotiations will not be tolerated. Tehran showed its ability to develop military nuclear grade, regardless of any defensive or offensive strategy.

Iran did not ask for a guarantee against another decision similar to Trump's - withdrawing from the agreement - in the future because its nuclear capacity already serves as a guarantee. Iran is not asking for a guarantee from China and Russia, which are also under US sanctions. Iran ran out of patience in 2018 when it waited an entire year without exercising its right to gradually withdraw from the JCPOA. Iran believed then that Europe could step up and keep its commitments even if the United States withdrew. It was not like that, and Tehran is now aware that Europe and the United States have the same hidden goals, under different superficial behaviors.

Today it is known that Iran is enriching uranium up to 60% and it can reach 90% in several months. This does not mean that Iran is necessarily producing nuclear weapons, but it is enough to cross the red lines of the West. If US sanctions are not lifted or are partially lifted, if the agreement is revoked or other sanctions are imposed in the future, Iran will enter the full nuclear cycle without notice.

Iranian negotiators call for all sanctions to be lifted. They will provide a list of sanctions that must be removed immediately. Supreme Leader Khamenei instructed his negotiators that Iran is not willing to make any goodwill gesture, nor is it in a position to understand the US president's internal disputes and the fight with those who oppose the nuclear deal. The ball is in the US court and Biden has little time to lose. This time Netanyahu is licking his wounds instead of being an actor in the negotiations.

This article was originally published on Elijah J. Magnier's blog on April 18, 2021 , the translation was done by Eli C. Casas.

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Re: Iran

Post by blindpig » Sat Jun 12, 2021 11:53 am

US Warns Venezuela, Cuba to Reject Iranian Navy Ships

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Two Iranian Navy ships rounded the Cape of Good Hope and appear to be headed across the Atlantic, continuing a journey U.S. officials believe could ultimately end in Venezuela. | Photo: Twitter @politico

Published 10 June 2021 (16 hours 5 minutes ago)

Experts cautioned that there is not much the United States will be able to do to deter the warships if they continue on their current trajectory. The ships are in international waters, and it is not clear they are breaking any laws.


The United States has reportedly issued threats to Venezuela and Cuba against letting in two Iranian Navy ships sailing across the Atlantic, apparently heading to South American shores with an unknown cargo.

Citing an unnamed senior official with the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden, Politico claimed the ships are believed to be carrying weapons from Iran to Venezuela under a deal signed between the two countries during the administration of former President Donald Trump.

“The delivery of such weapons would be a provocative act and understood as a threat to our partners in the Western Hemisphere,” the official said in a statement to Politico. “We would reserve the right to take appropriate measures in coordination with our partners to deter the transit or delivery of such weapons.”

The vessels are said to have already traveled a significant distance across the Atlantic Ocean, completing more than half the journey from Iran to Venezuela, marking the first time the Iranian navy has rounded Cape Town, South Africa, to get far into the Atlantic.


During his tenure, Trump withdrew U.S. recognition of Nicolas Maduro as Venezuelan president and pulled Washington out of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. In addition, under Trump, Washington tightened its economic sanctions on both the Iranian and Venezuelan nations.

“The sale of the Iranian weapons happened one year ago under the previous [U.S.] administration and like many situations related to Iran under the previous administration — including the breakout of Iran’s nuclear program following the Trump administration’s reckless withdrawal from the [Iran nuclear deal] — we are working to resolve it through diplomacy,” the U.S. official said.

On Tuesday, the Iranian administration reacted to the reports in U.S. media about Iran shipping weapons to South America, denouncing the monitoring as interference in Iran’s legal trade with other countries. Tehran, however, did not comment on the cargo of the ships.

“Regardless of the cargo of the ships, there is no ban on Iran’s sale of weapons, as confirmed by Resolution 2231,” adopted in 2015 by the UN Security Council to endorse the Iran deal that the US abandoned less than two years later, said Ali Rabiei, the administration’s spokesman. “America has long tried to get the resolution violated [by others], but to no avail.”

“Iran reserves the right to enjoy normal trade ties in the framework of international law and regulations, and considers any interference and monitoring of these relations as illegal and insulting, and strongly condemns it,” Rabiei told reporters at a weekly news conference.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/US- ... -0018.html

Remember when the US mined the harbors of Nicaragua to prevent Soviet ships from supplying the Sandinista government? Not this time.
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Re: Iran

Post by blindpig » Tue Jun 29, 2021 1:16 pm

Iran Has Achieved its “Empowerment”, so What Will the West Choose?
Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° on JUNE 28, 2021
Elijah J. Magnier

Image
Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei and the new Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi-

The Islamic Republic of Iran reached the level of “empowerment” (Tamkeen) with the arrival of Ibrahim Raisi to the presidency, the highest executive authority of the pyramid in harmony with the supreme leader, Wali al-Faqih Khamenei, and with the legislative authority headed by the chairman of the Shura Council, Muhammad Baqir Qalibaf. The formation of the harmonious trio in power is unprecedented in the history of the Islamic revolution in Iran since 1979: to this must be added Iran’s advanced nuclear research and technology, its advanced missile program and military capabilities, and the high capabilities of its allies in the Middle East and West Asia. Iran has reached a point in history where it offers the Western world two options, both of which are difficult from a Western perspective.

In 1980, al-Hassan Bani Sadr was elected at the polls the first president of the Republic. The Wali al-Faqih and leader of the Revolution, Imam Khomeini, disapproved of Bani Sadr without necessarily announcing his position or acting in accordance with his opinion and will. At that time, Iran was suffering from the first US “sanctions” followed by Saddam Hussein’s war imposed on the Islamic Republic. Many Arab and Western countries were on Saddam’s side and supported the war against Iran.

During the first few years, Iran could hardly stand up to Saddam Hussein, who enjoyed broad international and regional support. Saddam Hussein was armed and authorized to use chemical weapons, which were apparently not prohibited as long as they were used against the Iranians, who rejected U.S. hegemony and called him the “Great Satan”. The lack of the simplest weapons caused this thirst for defensive and offensive arsenal during the Iran-Iraq war: at the front, convoys of young men waited for the martyrdom of their comrades to take their weapons. Elderly volunteers walked through minefields to make way for the young men who attacked and advanced to recapture the territory occupied by Saddam’s forces. Proof of this are the planes that the U.S. envoy, Robert McFarlane, took to Iran in exchange for the release of Western hostages held in Lebanon in 1985, which became known at the time as the “hostage crisis” and the “Iran Contra” scandal.

Iran builds its defensive-offensive capability.

Iran could not stand on its own feet for many years, even after the war, due to the “sanctions” imposed by the United States. Iranian domestic military industrialization then began, which started through technology imported from Russia, China and Korea. Over the years, Iran has developed its missile capability, after recognizing that it cannot compete and build an air force that represents an adequate deterrent weapon capable of confronting the U.S. air force or the air power of U.S. allies; Iran accepted that air superiority is its own. Nevertheless, it managed to build tactical and strategic missiles and thus has been able to defend itself and its allies.

Indeed, Israel’s war against Lebanon in 2006 demonstrated the lessons imposed by one of Iran’s strongest allies, Hezbollah. surface-to-surface missile attacks versus Israeli air strikes created a balance of deterrence. In 2011, Iran’s electronic warfare specialists severed the communications link and captured one of the most advanced CIARQ-170 Sentinel spy drones, and its experts cloned it. In 2018, Iran fired its long-range, all-weather precision subsonic subsonic cruise missiles from Iran against ISIS positions in Syria and Iraq. In addition, during the decade-long Syrian war, Iran and its allies used several new types of missiles (Burkan), the specification of which depended on the nature of the battle, the scenario and the topography.

Drones and missiles were further developed to suit the needs of the Iranian military and its allies, each according to the nature of the geography and theater of operations in which it operates. Thus, Palestinian groups in Gaza-who received Iran’s missile know-how and technology-were able to impose deterrence on Israel during its latest battles. Israel was forced to stop bombing when Palestinian rockets and missile attacks hit targets in northern and southern Israel, previously unimaginable, and they continue to fall daily no matter how much the Israeli air force destroys military and civilian targets in the city.

In 2020, Iran attacked Iraq’s most important US base, Ayn al-Assad, with 16 precision-guided ballistic missiles. U.S. CENTCOM commander General Kenneth Mackenzie admitted that Iran could have caused more than a hundred deaths if it had not informed in advance the time of its attack and the targets it wanted to destroy. Mackenzie revealed the accuracy of Iran’s 1,000-pound precision missiles, the first such missiles since World War II.

Iran, a nuclear power

What has dramatically increased and tipped the balance dramatically in Iran’s favor is the nuclear project. Iranian atomic technology has reached the stage of domestic production such that many centrifuges enrich uranium at a faster rate and production is 60% enriched uranium. Thus, all nuclear obstacles have collapsed and the level of knowledge, experience and expertise required to manufacture military grade nuclear material has been reached. The only reason Iran is not producing a nuclear bomb is the banning fatwa (a binding Islamic religious opinion, pronounced by the highest theological level of Muslim clergy) of the guardian of the jurists (Wali al-Faqih) Sayyed Ali Khamenei. However, a fatwa is not permanent and, in fact, is somewhat flexible depending on the magnitude of the risks facing Iran’s national security or existence. The conclusion is simple: it is no longer impossible, or even difficult, for Iran to arm and equip itself with all the military power necessary to defend itself. It is in a position to showcase its capabilities and persuade other countries that they should avoid a direct war against the Islamic Republic.

Iran’s allies are part of its national security.

In addition, Iran has established relations with many peoples and organizations in the Middle East. Iran managed to establish a solid wall against its enemies by winning the hearts and minds of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, Iraqi factions and brigades within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) groups in Syria, Afghanistan and with the Houthis in Yemen. Iran’s allies are an integral part of its national security and, these allies also consider Iran as a source of loyal support. Iran’s enemies cannot ignore all the elements of power that allies represent, and must take them into account before declaring war on the Islamic Republic.

Iran has reached a crossroads with the West.

Iran’s long-standing policy of slow and gradual empowerment has transformed it from a weak, isolated and powerless country in the 1980s into a strong regional and even international power. Iran’s strength allows it to expand beyond the Middle East, sailing the seas to deliver aid to its allies in Venezuela, challenging the United States in its backyard. It has certainly established deterrence, affecting U.S. willingness and resolve to recognize the potential damage Iran can inflict in the event of war. Iran’s new capabilities are enough to convince its enemies not to act against it in a state-to-state war, but to think about the “nuisance alternatives” (sabotage, assassinations, drone strikes, intelligence strikes, cyberwarfare).

Iran achieves al-Tamkeen (empowerment).

The importance of the recent presidential elections is highlighted in these circumstances, because they complete Iran’s cycle of power and achieve the ultimate goal Iran set out to achieve, i.e., to fortify and unify the internal front. During the decades since the 1979 revolution, the Wali al-Faqih realized that the younger generation could look at the West positively and with great acceptance. The new generation is vulnerable because it did not exist during the days of the revolution and has not lived to memorize the damage the U.S. inflicted on Iran in the attempt to bend its will. Many young Iranians want to imitate the West with its temptations and characteristics, the most important being “democracy,” with technology, innovations and all the tools that distinguish a slowly growing Middle East from a rapidly modernizing West.

However, the young generation does not realize that democracy, as practiced in the West, provides neither power nor protection. Freedom of speech does exist in Western countries, but is forbidden to others. Recently, the United States has seized thirty-six Iranian and allied websites and those of Sayyid Ali al-Sistani. However, in most European countries there are free elections, and voting is even compulsory in some countries such as Belgium.

However, laws and international law, long judged to be the backbone of the Western constitutional system, have now become a burden for decision-makers. When the President of the United States (Donald Trump) threatens Germany with preventing the entry of its imports if it does not abide by his will, he is using the law of the jungle of the mightiest against the weakest, disregarding all international legality.

When the United Nations Security Council issues 187 resolutions in favor of Palestine, and against the Israeli apartheid regime that prevents the return of the indigenous people, confiscates their property, rejects the simplest means of humanity and jeopardizes their livelihood in the eyes of the world, international laws become mere ink on paper. The simplest example is the nuclear agreement signed by President Obama, revoked by President Trump. Europe felt irresistibly powerless and unable to enforce its commitment, now renegotiated by President Biden. The modern West also views with impotence its submission to the hegemon.

President Donald Trump has inadvertently contributed to rekindling the revolutionary spirit in Iranian society by assassinating, minutes after arriving in Baghdad, Brigadier General Qassem Soleimani, a prominent military chief much loved in Iran and the Middle East.

Khamenei realized the magnitude of the threat against the country and the need to take Iran to another, much higher level of preparedness to confront “sanctions”, U.S. hegemony and protect Iran’s sovereignty. First, he fortified the military forces to hand over the management of these forces to military leaders loyal to the line of Imam Khomeini and the doctrine of wilayat e-faqih. This move has allowed Iran to open the doors of politics without restructuring or the need to impose its will on domestic politics. The so-called reformists had repeated opportunities after al-Hassan Bani Sadr, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Muhammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani.

The Wali al-Faqih has never imposed his will on the President of the Republic, except as permitted by the Iranian constitution in matters of foreign policy and national security. He has the constitutional authority to make important decisions and assume his responsibilities. Before taking office, the Iranian president pledges to respect the Constitution. Since the time of Imam Khomeini, the leader of the revolution left room for the president and his ministers to make decisions, as long as they do not conflict with the strategic security of the state, especially the foreign relationship.

As for foreign policy, Wali al-Faqih has supreme power, and no president can challenge his decision. Imam Khomeini sent a direct message to the leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev; Sayyed Khomeini accepted the end of the war with Iraq and asked the government to reform the relationship with Saudi Arabia after the Mecca incident in which hundreds of Iranian pilgrims were killed. After the appointment of Sayyid Ali Khamenei as successor to Imam Khomeini, he led the country towards scientific, nuclear and ballistic development. He agreed to negotiate with the United States the lifting of “sanctions” in exchange for not developing nuclear weapons.

Today, with President Ibrahim Raisi (who has said he does not want to meet with President Biden) at the head of the executive branch, Iran has completed its military and political empowerment, with the president of the Shura Council, Muhammad Qalibaf – a colleague of Qassem Soleimani – at the top of the legislative pyramid. No country can declare war on Iran and get away with minor damage. Deterrence has prevailed; the home front is more powerful than ever.

Iran has reached a crossroads with the West. Thanks to its total empowerment, the Islamic Republic has been able to present the world with two options. The main one is to lift the “sanctions” and allow Iran to regain its economic strength, restore its purchasing and financial capacity, develop the process of economic self-sufficiency, increase its preparedness and with it one of its allies. Consequently, it allows Iran to increase its financial power with hundreds of billions annually to enrich its coffers with oil and non-oil revenues. In addition, Iran will recover more than $110 billion frozen in various countries. Iran will be more vital than ever to its allies. The other option for Iran is to achieve full-cycle nuclear power and enriched uranium, which is already approaching 90%, the level needed for nuclear military capability.

https://libya360.wordpress.com/2021/06/ ... st-choose/
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Re: Iran

Post by blindpig » Sat Dec 04, 2021 3:14 pm

Nuclear Talks - Western Negotiators Fail To Recognize Iran's Position

This week new negotiations about a U.S. return to the nuclear deal with Iran took place. To set these into context and to understand the various positions it is helpful to look back at how this came to pass.

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In 2015 the Iranian government, the five members of the UN Security Council and Germany agreed on a deal (JCPOA) that would lift sanctions against Iran in exchange for limits on Iran's nuclear developments. The deal happened after a lengthy period during which Iran had been under global sanctions.

But even with the deal in place then U.S. president Barack Obama did not lift all the sanctions he had agreed to lift. Iran's economic situation recovered a bit after the deal but never to the extend that had been expected. Still in general both sides stuck to the deal. Iran limited its nuclear program which was also put under continuous IAEA inspections.

Donald Trump, the next U.S president, did not like the deal. Israel and his donors told him to end it to later goad him into attacking Iran. In May 2018 the U.S. left the deal and reimposed sanctions.

Iran waited for a full year. It then started to expand its nuclear program under a clause in the deal that allowed it to do so when other participants do not fulfill their promises. The program has since made quite significant progress towards higher enriched Uranium.

The Trump administration expanded the sanctions against Iran under a 'maximum pressure' campaign. These new sanctions were often not directly related to Iran's nuclear program and hit entities that had no relations to it. The point was to create so many 'unrelated' sanctions that any of Trump's successors would have problems to remove them and to reenter into the nuclear deal.

During the 2020 election campaign now president Joe Biden promised to reenter the nuclear deal. But even several months after he took office nothing had happened on the U.S. side. Instead of simply removing the sanctions Trump had imposed the Biden administration wanted Iran to give more for less. Next to a reduction of Iran's nuclear program it also wanted to prolong the deal, add new negotiations about Iran's ballistic missile program and still keep some of the sanctions.

During the same time Israel waged a secret war on Iran by sabotaging its nuclear program and by killing its nuclear scientists.

After some stops and goes new negotiations were launched in 2020. Six rounds of talks followed during which a scheme of step by step, sanction releases against nuclear program reductions, were agreed upon. But one clause the U.S. insisted upon led to breakdown of the negotiations. The U.S. wanted the ability to reimpose all sanctions unless Iran agreed to serious negotiations about its ballistic missile program and its support for resistance groups in the Middle East. Neither of these issues were part of the original nuclear deal.

Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected those conditions and the negotiations broke down. Meanwhile elections in Iran put a less liberal government into place.

The new government had criticized the previous one for giving in to U.S. demands. The U.S. expected the new government of Iran to immediately return to negotiation table and to start from where the previous negotiations had stopped. The new Iranian government was never likely to do that. It took time for the incoming Iranian administration to work its way through all the details of previous negotiations and to agree to a new strategy.

This week new negotiations between Iran, the other JCPOA members and the U.S. took place in Vienna.

The new Iranian negotiation team presented two papers. One describes all the sanctions Iran expects to get lifted and the measures that need to be taken to guarantee that these will not be arbitrarily imposed again. The second paper describes how Iran will reduce its nuclear program after the lifting of sanctions has been verified.

Iran's demands are now stronger than some of the points the previous Iranian negotiation team had asked for and which it had preliminarily agreed upon.

The 'western' participants of the negotiations badmouthed the new Iranian requests:

The nuclear negotiators for the E3 – France, Germany and the U.K. – told Iranian negotiators in coordination with the U.S. that the opening proposals they presented in Vienna nuclear talks this week were unserious and unacceptable, an E3 diplomat briefed on the talks said.
...
The E3 diplomat said the draft on sanctions relief was extreme and maximalist, with the Iranians increasing their sanctions relief demands in comparison to the draft agreement achieved with the previous Rouhani government last June.
The second draft on Iranian nuclear measures was also very hardline. The E3 diplomat said the Iranians removed all of the previously agreed compromise language on steps they will take to roll back their nuclear program. In practice, the Iranians agree to fewer limitations on their nuclear program.
That is not what Iran has asked for or demanded.

The request by Iran is a return to the state of the original deal before the U.S. left it and reimposed sanctions. Iran also wants some form of guarantee that the U.S., after a potential return to the deal, will not again leave it.

These requests are not 'hardline' but quite reasonable.

Iran is now expecting a statement from the other side that would constitute a reasonable offer and opening position. Differences between the proposals by each side could then be talked about.

The 'west' has so far made no such offer but insist to go back to the state of the previous negotiations and to the concession the Rouhani administration had made. However the supreme leader and the Iranian electorate have rejected those positions. They elected the new President Ebrahim Raisi because he insists on a full return to the original deal while rejecting any further conditions.

Today, after a second day of negotiations, the delegations went back to their home countries. They will reconvene next week for another round.

The U.S. and its 'western' proxies will the have to make their position clear. Does the U.S. want to go back to the original deal or will it keep insisting on a much bigger one?

If the U.S. takes the second path the negotiations will fail. Iran will then leave the JCPOA deal. It will restrict supervision by the IAEA and it will further develop its nuclear program. Since its founding the Republic of Iran has consistently rejected the use of weapons of mass destruction for religious-ideological reasons. This even while it was under gas attacks during the Iran-Iraq war. That position might however not prevent it from building and testing some nukes.

The Biden administration and opponents of the nuclear deal claim to have a Plan B should the negotiations fail.

They would keep sanctions on Iran and add new ones. The plan would also include military threats.

However - before the original deal was negotiated China and Russia took part in the sanction regime against Iran. Now they are supporting Iran's position. China is buying oil from Iran and is investing in Iranian infrastructure. Russia recently signed a deal with Iran about the development of Iranian gas fields in the Caspian Sea. Neither country would participate in a new sanctions regime. Without them new 'western' sanctions against Iran will have little effect.

There is also no believable military threat that can be made against Iran. Any bombing of its nuclear facilities would only drive those underground and without IAEA supervision. Any attack would be responded to with attacks on U.S. bases in the Middle East. Should a real war break out Israel would also come under fire from Iranian allies in Syria and Lebanon. That would be its end.

If the U.S. (and Israel) want to keep limits on Iran's nuclear program there is only one way. A full return to the JCPOA deal including the lifting of all sanction the Trump administration had imposed onto Iran.

The U.S. may not like such a deal but it is the only one it can have.

Posted by b on December 3, 2021 at 18:00 UTC | Permalink

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2021/12/n ... .html#more
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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