Africa

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Re: Africa

Post by blindpig » Mon Mar 20, 2023 2:02 pm

Italy’s Fascist Government Accuses the Wagner Group in Libya of Waging Hybrid War, Flooding Europe with African Migrants
Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° on MARCH 18, 2023
Martin Jay

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The duplicitous role of western media in assisting NATO in its dark endeavours is nothing new. But Reuters may well have broken a world record in partisan journalism with its latest efforts to implicate Russia in the Libyan immigrants crisis.

Reuters is not the news legend it used to be. Gone are the days when it had armies of clever young people fact checking polemic statements made by world leaders to be even faintly accurate. Case in point the recent incendiary claim by Italy’s defence minister that the “rising number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean is part of ‘hybrid warfare’ waged by Russia using mercenaries as proxies on countries supporting Ukraine”.

“I think it is now safe to say that the exponential increase in the migratory phenomenon departing from African shores is also, to a not insignificant extent, part of a clear strategy of hybrid warfare that the Wagner division is implementing, using its considerable weight in some African countries,” Crosetto said in a statement, dutifully republished verbatim by the great news legend itself.

Reuters itself then appears to cover itself by doing a frenzied back-peddle by not even substantiating that Wagner even has a presence in Africa.

“Wagner is believed to be operating in several African countries, including Libya, Mali, and the Central African Republic. The group has been heavily involved in Russian efforts to capture the city of Bakhmut, in eastern Ukraine” the global news outlet adds. “Believed”? Hilarious.

The article, copy-pasted by third rate European news outlets like Deutsche Welle, goes on to quote the Italian minister with his rant.

“Just as the EU, NATO and the West have realised that cyber attacks were part of the global confrontation that the war in Ukraine opened up, they should now understand that the southern European front is also becoming more dangerous every day,” Crosetto said.

Reuters claims that some 20,000 people have reached Italy so far this year, compared to 6,100 in the same period of 2022, Italian interior ministry figures show. In the past weekend alone 1,200 people reached Italian shores which is a “problem for Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government, which was elected on a staunchly anti-immigration platform” it explains.

But what it fails to explain is whether there is any truth whatsoever in the allegation.

In basic terms, the allegations made by the Italian minister are a gross misrepresentation of facts, based on one simple minutia of the overall story. While it is true that the migrants themselves are coming from some of the African countries which are now protected by Russian mercenaries it fails to mention or explain that this is not subsequent to those countries becoming controlled by the Russian group.

If anyone, or any entity which Reuters might have chosen to interview were asked simply “has there been a significant increase in migrants coming to Libya since these countries were taken over by Wagner?” the simple response would be “no”. Or even “impossible to say, probably not” at best.

But Reuters didn’t want to ask this question as facts standing in the way of a good story seems to be its mantra.

The entirely unpalatable truth about the migrants is that they come from African countries which for decades have regimes which were propped up by the EU in exchange for these despots flying the EU flag and playing the “fake hegemony” game when EU officials jet in and check themselves into the capital’s Hilton for the annual visit. To suggest, as Reuters has done in its piece, that the surge in migrants is as a direct result of some of these countries biting the hand that feeds them and abandoning the EU as big brother, is both disingenuous and quite wrong. Put bluntly it’s fake news. For at least a decade, Libya has been one of the locations for African migrants to travel to, with a view to getting to Europe. And Italy was always the preferred choice. For years, the EU pumped money into the bank accounts of these despots — in the case of Central African Republic an incredible 2 billion dollars in 2016 to “help” its government recover after the effects of a civil war — and in doing so signalled to them that the EU was happy to turn a blind eye on human rights. The result is that all of these countries today are now ruled by the most backward, brutal regimes who carry out atrocities on their own people on a genocidal scale just to retain power — with the immediate knock-on effect being the brain drain of the middle classes who leave by whatever means is at their disposal.

What the Reuters article also fails to mention, along with this EU hand, is that all of these migrants are middle class and have paid many thousands of dollars just to get to Libya. It also fails to mention that the estimated 400-700,000 or so who are stuck in camps in Libya arrived long before the Wagner group were even heard of in Mali, Burkina Faso or Chad. The truth is simply that it is the EU which produced these migrant roots in the first place and a wholesale failure of the EU to resolve the problem with Libya, before, during or after the Gaddafi regime. Interesting how the Meloni government refuses to point the finger at the EU in any way, preferring to appeal to NATO to intervene. What is behind this is simple. Meloni is looking to improve relations with the EU and to extract more money from its coffers and doesn’t want to ruin that possibility so she chooses another multiconfessional international body to do the tough job. But NATO cannot intervene so easily. And what is more, this idea that a multinational (western) taskforce could use force to stop these boats leaving in the first place was floated in 2015 by yet another Italian lightweight called Federica Mogherini who was the EU’s top diplomat at the time. The lawyers in Brussels blew this idea out of the water as the litigation potential from families or even the Libyan government were too huge, not to mention that it would require the agreement of both governments in Libya.

But this is not the first time that the new controversial Italian far-right leader has peddled complete bullshit just to stir up domestic support or international media coverage. After days of being in office an impassioned video clip of her running down the French and their hold over West African countries through repressive monetary control – even Paris keeping 50% of all gold they mine – turned out to be a tad controversial. It was all lies. The entire clips’ claims were proved to be all untrue as France had long ago stopped insisting on keeping the gold and no longer even holds the West African countries with stringent controls over their own currency which the French created for them. Facts are important. And it seems that the Meloni government isn’t too fond of them or, typically, the fourth estate which are supposed to check them before serving them to a gullible public.

The simple truth about the Italian story is that Meloni wants the EU itself to solve the African migrant problem and it is using the call to NATO to intervene to stir some measured hostility in the Belgian capital just to show that it too can play the fake news game to its advantage. It is not shocking that Italy’s far-right government have resorted to the “blame all on Putin” tactics as western journalists prefer not to fact check anything which holds Russia to account for the failings of western elites.

It is not shocking that, even if we are to humour the Italians for one moment and go along with their baloney about Russia being behind the migrant surge on the Italian shores, that no Italian nor international journalists have not risen to the claim and made the link to Rome supporting Ukraine in the war with Russia.

What is shocking is that Reuters would help Meloni with this fake news.

https://libya360.wordpress.com/2023/03/ ... -migrants/

The West’s Battle for African Hearts and Minds
Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° on MARCH 18, 2023
George Trenin

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Protesters stand atop a Unitend Nation armored vehicle as they demonstrate carrying a Russian flag in Ouagadougou on October 2, 2022. © AFP

On Sunday, March 19, the 2nd International Parliamentary Conference “Russia – Africa” will start in Moscow. Over 40 official delegations from all over the continent will participate in the event, with discussions ranging from Russian-African cooperation to Western neocolonialism.

The forum is just one link in a long chain of recent contacts between officials in Moscow and their African counterparts that will culminate in the second Russia-Africa Summit, scheduled for July of this year in St. Petersburg. Moscow hopes that the event will elevate its relations with the countries involved to “a new level of cooperation”. Based on recent meetings between Russian diplomats and their African counterparts, it is clear that the new relations will be marked not only by economic, but also military partnership.

The US and its allies have expressed concern over the issue and, as the Russian Foreign Ministry warns, have attempted to disrupt the upcoming summit. But is this something the West can achieve, considering its slackening grip on the developing world?

A bet on the Global South

Moscow demonstrated its serious interest in the world’s fastest-growing region, Africa, at the end of the last decade. The first Russia–Africa Summit, held in Sochi in 2019, gathered representatives of all 54 African countries, with 43 states being represented at the highest level. Eight major integration associations and organizations also participated.

The event cost the Russian authorities 4.5 billion rubles ($69 million) and was one of the most expensive of its kind. However, the investments paid off a hundredfold – by the end of the summit, the sides signed contracts worth at least 800 billion rubles ($12 billion).

Following the military offensive in Ukraine and the rupture of relations between Russia and the West, contacts with the Global South have become even more valuable for Russia. This is evidenced by Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov’s recent activity.

In the first months of 2023, he has already toured Africa twice. At the end of January, he visited several sub-Saharan countries: South Africa, Eswatini (Swaziland), Angola, and Eritrea. In February, he traveled around North Africa to Mali, Mauritania, and Sudan. Lavrov’s previous large-scale tour of Africa was in July 2022 and included Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, and the Republic of the Congo.

Moreover, in the first months of 2023, his deputies held meetings with the ambassadors of African states in Moscow, while Russian ambassadors to African countries met with local authorities.

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Military cooperation

In addition to discussions of the forthcoming Russia–Africa Summit, Lavrov’s recent encounters with African representatives focused on cooperation on food and energy security and military partnership.

In South Africa, the Minister discussed joint trilateral naval exercises with China, which took place in the Indian Ocean from February 17 to 27. For these exercises, a Russian Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate crossed the Atlantic.

In Angola, Lavrov recalled the successful launch of the Angosat-2 satellite by Roscosmos in October 2022. He assured the authorities of further high-tech cooperation, expressed happiness at the growing interest in the Russian language, and spoke about creating common currencies within the framework of institutions like BRICS.

In Eritrea, Lavrov stated that Moscow is ready to meet the country’s needs in the matter of “maintaining defense capabilities” and developing military-technical cooperation.

In Mali, the Russian Minister discussed the joint fight against terrorism in the Sahel-Saharan zone, the education of Malian students through the Russian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the ongoing supply of weapons and military equipment.

In Mauritania, the parties discussed Russian tech transfers and cooperation in healthcare, including training Mauritanian students at Russian medical universities and the work of Russian doctors in the country.

With Sudanese leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, a preliminary agreement was made regarding the construction of a Russian naval base on the Red Sea coast in Port Sudan.

These events received broad coverage in Western media and apparently became a source of concern for the bloc’s politicians. Soon afterwards, the West embarked on its own series of contacts with African countries.
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Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, left, and Eswatini’s Foreign Minister Thuli Dladla arrive for a meeting in Mbabane, Eswatini. © Sputnik / Russian Foreign Ministry

The West strikes back

In December 2022, at a press conference on the eve of a US-Africa Summit forum, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin claimed that the growing influence of Russia and China in Africa could destabilize the region. Backing loud statements with action, the United States promised to allocate $55 billion to African countries.

Indeed, at the beginning of 2023, the United States conducted joint military exercises with 32 African countries in the Atlantic Ocean. There were also reports of US plans for a military base in Morocco, which would be used to limit the influence of Russia and China in Africa.

In March, the United States openly called on African countries to limit partnership with Russia, tying this to the conflict in Ukraine. “Our goal, frankly, is to make very clear to these countries, from an economic standpoint, that your economic interests are aligned with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine ending as soon as possible,” Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo said. In March, Adeyemo is scheduled to pay an official visit to Ghana, Nigeria, and one other African country. In her turn, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen already traveled to Senegal, Zambia, and South Africa in January.

Washington’s contacts with Africa are not limited to officials from the Department of Treasury. In February, the First Lady Jill Biden herself paid a diplomatic visit to Namibia and Kenya. The series of US visits is scheduled to continue with the trip of Vice-President Kamala Harris who will visit Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia from March 25 to April 2.

According to the Special Representative of the President of Russia for the Middle East and Africa, Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, “the United States and its allies are waging an unprecedented campaign to politically and economically isolate Russia, and also disrupt the second Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg this July.”

Incidentally, Bogdanov mentioned not just the US, but also its partners since another country has been very active (even if less successfully) in Africa lately – France.

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US First Lady Jill Biden (R) meets with women from the Maasai community at Loseti village in Kajiado county, Kenya, on February 26, 2023. © Tony KARUMBA / AFP

In early March, French President Emmanuel Macron visited four Central African states during a week-long tour: Gabon, Angola, the Republic of the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). During the trip, he stated that the “Françafrique” era, which supposed the informal guardianship of Paris over its former colonies, is now over and has given way to a new harmonious partnership.

According to Macron, this new partnership implies a “noticeable reduction” of French military personnel in Africa, the reorganization of military bases, and a new model of military cooperation. However, these statements look a lot more like the inevitable acceptance of reality than a gesture of free will.

In recent years, Paris has decided to withdraw troops from the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and Burkina Faso. The decision was preceded not only by mass anti-French demonstrations by the local population, but also by Russia’s growing ties with these states.

Paris backs off

The most striking example of French failure is the Central African Republic. France took home its troops only in December last year. For many years, Paris used various means, including military, to intervene in the country’s national politics by supporting or removing its presidents. When in 2012, civil war broke out between the government and insurgents, peacekeepers from France and other EU countries unsuccessfully tried to end the conflict. In 2018, CAR authorities turned to Russia for help and signed an agreement on military cooperation.

Moscow supplied the republic with ammunition, trained the local military, and gradually increased the number of military instructors in the country. Less than a year after Russia intervened, the authorities managed to negotiate a truce with several local groups. CAR authorities later expressed gratitude to Russia for its role in the peacemaking process.

The success of Russian weapons and diplomacy was converted into economic benefits. In 2020, Russian companies were given permission to mine gold and diamonds in the Central African Republic. Not long ago, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central African Republic, Sylvie Baipo-Temon, openly stated that the “mistakes of France” cleared the path for Russia.

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Ivorian environmental activist Andy Costa (L) speaks during a meeting of African youths with France’s President Emmanuel Macron (C) on the sideline of the COP27 climate summit. © Ludovic MARIN / POOL / AFP

Events in Mali played out in a similar manner. At the request of the local authorities, French troops had been fighting Muslim insurgents since 2013. But the situation only got worse over time. Finally, the leaders of the military junta requested Russian assistance in fighting the insurgents associated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. As a result, Russian military instructors trained the local army and helped fight the militants.

In general, France is losing its military and diplomatic presence in Africa. Mali expelled the French ambassador in early 2022, and by August, French troops were withdrawn to neighboring Niger.

In September 2022, a military coup occurred in Burkina Faso, and in January the new government demanded French troops leave the country.

Thousands of demonstrators gathered in the capital of Burkina Faso, Ouagadougou, to support the new government just several days after Paris confirmed the withdrawal of its troops from the country. The protesters reportedly carried the flags of Burkina Faso and Russia.

The newspaper “Vzglyad” reports that the coup in Burkina Faso resulted in Niger’s first officially authorized protest in fifty years. The demonstrators shouted the slogans, “France – out!” and “Long live Putin and Russia!”

Tug of war

The French publication “Le Point” put a telling headline on its article summarizing the events in Africa: “France shown out the door, a red carpet spread before Russia.” The article notes that the situation was caused by public skepticism regarding the ability and willingness of the French troops to protect the people in Mali and Burkina Faso. According to French media sources, only 2,000 French military remained in Niger, 500 in Senegal, and another 900 on the Côte d’Ivoire.

During his speech in Benin immediately after Lavrov’s summer tour of Africa, Macron attempted to throw shade at Moscow by labeling it “one of the last imperial colonial powers.” The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, echoed him and voiced concerns about the demonstrations in Mali. “I saw on TV these young African people walking the streets of Bamako with posters saying ‘Putin, thank you! You saved Donbass and now you will save us!’. It’s shocking,” he said.

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A supporter of Malian Interim President holds up a sign with the images of President of Russia Vladimir Putin kicking President of France Emmanuel Macron during a pro-Junta and pro-Russia rally in Bamako on May 13, 2022. © OUSMANE MAKAVELI / AFP

Former US Special Envoy J. Peter Pham told the FT that the collective West has lost its influence in certain African countries due to its unwillingness to cooperate in the military-technical field. In particular, he noted that the US State Department vetoed the sale of an Airbus transport aircraft equipped with an American-made transponder to Mali. The Malian Ministry of Foreign Affairs thus agreed to receive both equipment and military aid from Moscow.

According to The Times, the US and the former powers Britain and France have been losing their grip on Africa, while Moscow and Beijing are expanding their presence in the region.

“Russia’s growing influence highlights the evolving relationships on the world’s fastest-growing continent [Africa],” the newspaper reports. The authors claim that Moscow can count on Africa, which “has long been the playground of the great world powers,” to support it at the global level and particularly at the UN.

The Times added that the goal of the US–Africa Summit was to “lure African leaders” into joining the Western side. But the renewed fight for Africa “may already be lost considering the expanding presence of Russia and China in the region.”

Lowered expectations

Incidentally, compared to the West, Russia is a lot more restrained in assessing its prospects in Africa. A number of experts believe that Moscow’s increasing military presence there is not a solid enough foundation for successful Russian-African relations.

Anthropologist and host of the Telegram channel “African Behemoth” Artyom Rykov notes that in order to secure its influence and gain new allies on the continent, Russia needs more than just a military presence. It needs to establish large-scale joint cultural and economic projects with African countries, which, as of now, do not exist.

“It’s about informal ties. For example, understanding where local elites spend their free time and where they educate their children. It’s also about trade – finding a market for our goods in an African country. It’s also important to understand what kind of goods we’re talking about,” Rykov said.

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Dirt road traffic scene with a lot of motorcycles in outskirts of Nigeria’s capital city. © Getty Images / peeterv

Grigory Lukyanov, a researcher at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) is also confident about establishing cooperation between Russia and Africa in various fields in order to build partnerships. He believes that bilateral relations are currently in need of specific economic projects and a more systematic approach.

According to Lukyanov, Africa’s current sympathy for Russia is mainly rooted in anti-Western sentiments.

“The anti-French, anti-British, anti-colonial agenda is once again dominant in Africa. It has gained supporters who are ready, able, and willing to loudly discuss it and receive major political benefits from it. But does this really mean that the region has become more pro-Russian?” Lukyanov wonders.

The researcher believes that pro-Russian views based on anti-American, anti-European, anti-French, and anti-British sentiments cannot be considered a stable model.

“The absence of a constructive agenda will soon become apparent. If France or the United States leave a particular country, the pro-Russian views will lose their foundation. If you can’t hate someone together, why should you be friends? Why should you love or at least tolerate and understand each other?” he says.

Artyom Rykov believes that Western media and politicians are aware of this and discuss the threat posed by Russia in a preventive sort of manner. In reality, he notes, we cannot say that Russia has come to “replace” the West in Africa.

Representatives of the African elite aren’t quick to express such views either. In an interview with RT France, in response to the question “Does Burkina Faso want Russia to replace France?” the Prime Minister said, “Our goal is to have more opportunities. It’s not to have someone replace somebody else.”

It’s also worth noting that most African countries refrain from publicly taking sides in the conflict between Russia and the West. This is the true reason (and not Africa’s alleged sympathy toward Russia) why the region does not support anti-Russian sanctions, as noted by the Washington Post back in December.

However, Lukyanov says, “Russia does not need to win the favor of African countries. Russia needs partnerships with African countries.” He believes that Russia and Africa need mutually beneficial relations – not in order to extract resources or win votes in the UN, but to establish partnerships within a new and just world order – one that would replace the current crisis. Lukyanov is confident that the course of events in Russia, Africa, and the world – both in the coming decade and in the 21st century in general – will depend on effectively achieving this task.

According to many experts, we currently stand at the beginning of a long journey and may only anticipate the results of Russia’s activities in Africa. As Lukyanov emphasizes, a lot of work is still necessary – especially in the quad aspects of “church, society, state, and business” – before we are able to discuss major results in the long term.

https://libya360.wordpress.com/2023/03/ ... and-minds/

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Brutal military raid in Accra suburb spurs calls for accountability in Ghana

One person is reported to have died days after Ghanaian soldiers invaded Taifa, brutalizing residents and arresting 184 people. The military claimed that the raid was an “intelligence-led operation” in response to the alleged killing of a soldier in the area

March 18, 2023 by Peoples Dispatch

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Armored military vehicles in Ashaiman during a brutal military operation on March 7. (Photo: via social media)

Calls for an independent investigation, accountability, and compensation have grown in Ghana following a violent military operation in Ashaiman-Taifa, an urban slum settlement located in the suburbs of the Greater Accra Region.

On March 7, the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), reportedly from the Burma and Michel military camps, stormed the area in armored vehicles, with helicopters flying overhead. In the ensuing raid, soldiers brutalized residents of Taifa, broke into homes, and detained 184 people.

On Thursday, March 16, Ghanaian media confirmed that one of the victims of the operation, a man identified as Alhaji Mohammed Musah, had died. Musah had allegedly collapsed after soldiers chased him into his house to beat him.

In a statement on March 8, GAF claimed that it had “conducted a swoop in Ashaiman and its environs in a manhunt for some criminals, who are suspected to have stabbed and killed a young soldier (identified as Trooper Imoro Sheriff who had himself grown up in Ashaiman) in the early hours of Saturday, March 4.”

It also confirmed that the operation had been sanctioned by higher-ups: “GAF wishes to state categorically that the military operation, which was sanctioned by the Military High Command, was NOT to avenge the killing of the soldier but rather to fish out the perpetrators of the heinous crime.”

“We knew instantly that this is not something that could have been done by rogue elements in the military,” Adib Saani, a security expert, said during a discussion hosted by Pan African Television on March 15. “The galvanization of military hardware made it almost look like we are at war, as if it was a major counterterrorism operation.”

While GAF claimed that the “swoop was not targeted at innocent civilians but was an intelligence-led operation conducted on suspected hideouts of criminals and crime-prone areas,” disturbing visuals from the raid circulated on social media show Taifa residents being forced to lie in the mud.

There are also reports of people being tortured and flogged, made to eat cow dung, and given bottles filled with water from the gutters to drink. GAF’s refusal to apologize for this violence, while acknowledging that there may have been “excesses,” has been widely condemned.

On March 12, the Ghana Police Service announced that it had arrested six people suspected to be involved in the killing of Sheriff after a week of a “sustained intelligence-led operation.” None of them, Saani pointed out, had been previously apprehended by the military, which meant that the 184 people detained were innocent.

The incident has raised questions about the military’s deployment and jurisdiction in matters of “internal security,” and why an “intelligence-led operation” saw this level of mass violence in the first place.

The classification of certain areas, especially areas housing urban poor communities, as “crime-prone” also raises concerns—and this is not specific to Ghana—given that such language is often used to justify state violence, including heavily militarized forms of policing, or, in the case of Ashaiman, direct military action.

“The use of military force against civilians is a clear violation of Ghana’s Constitution, which protects the right to life, freedom from torture, and the right to a fair trial. Military personnel are bound by these laws and must be held accountable for any violations they commit,” the Accra Collective of the Socialist Movement of Ghana (SMG) said in a statement.

Speaking to the government’s refusal to condemn the violence, SMG General Secretary Kwesi Pratt Junior added, “I heard a minister complaining that in the past we used to fear the soldiers and policemen and now we do not fear them anymore. And that this exercise should teach us important lessons so that we shall begin to fear the military uniforms.”

“I thought that was the most unfortunate statement, which betrays the colonial mentality of our leaders. It was during the colonial era that colonizers decided that if [they] are recruiting policemen, to not recruit them from the areas where they will be doing the policing because they will have family there and so they would not be able to be brutal enough. So they brought in policemen from Nigeria, who they thought had no relatives, here so they could brutalize us,” he said.

“If this is the mentality of those who govern us today, then we are in deep trouble. Why should we fear soldiers and policemen if they are there truly to protect us?”

Organizations including the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), have also condemned the operation: “Because of their (the military’s) personal interest they come [to Ashaiman], take over the law and do what they want… It is degrading and dehumanizing treatment to put such persons, who are going to their work, [to] arrest them, make them do press ups in mud, sitting down with all their clothing removed apart from some briefs… this is exacted by the army of Ghana? It’s completely unacceptable.”

Others have accused Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, of “tacit endorsement” of the military’s actions, given the government’s refusal to speak out against the incident, or to “condemn and sanction the military officers implicated in this barbaric episode.”

https://peoplesdispatch.org/2023/03/18/ ... -in-ghana/
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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blindpig
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Re: Africa

Post by blindpig » Fri Apr 07, 2023 2:34 pm

Moscow Accuses US of Trying to Sabotage 2nd Russia–Africa Summit
APRIL 4, 2023

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Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. Photo: Sputnik.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has warned that Washington and its allies are attempting to disrupt the second Russia–Africa Summit by putting pressure on countries on the African continent to cancel their participation.

The senior Kremlin official stated that “the United States and its vassals” are doing everything possible to try to isolate Russia from the rest of the international community.

“In particular, they are trying to disrupt the second Russia–Africa summit, scheduled for the end of July in St. Petersburg, to discourage our African friends from participating in it,” said Lavrov to the Russian newspaper Argumenty i Fakty.

According to Lavrov, most African countries do not want to “sacrifice their fundamental interests in favor of Washington.”

Last January, officials in Moscow noted how the United States and the member-states of the European Union (EU) want to restore the colonial dependence of the African continent.

“In Africa, we know, delegations from the United States, Britain and other European countries appear regularly, persistently demanding that African countries not cooperate with Russia, that they not go against a general mandate, thus Washington understands the restoration of colonial dependence, in general, but already under a new form,” remarked Lavrov to reporters at the end of his visit to Eritrea.

According to information from the Russian Foreign Ministry, the main issues to be addressed during the second Russia–Africa Summit are the transfer of technology, energy, and food security.

https://orinocotribune.com/moscow-accus ... ca-summit/

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Dozens more killed defending unionist city of Las Anod from separatist Somaliland

Scores were killed on April 1 while defending Las Anod—the city at the heart of movement to reunify the region with Somalia—from attacks by the separatist Somaliland army

April 06, 2023 by Pavan Kulkarni

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On Saturday, Somaliland forces “attacked [Las Anod] from three sides, but they could not capture any territory.”(Photo: Qalib Barud)

Troops from Somaliland, a separatist breakaway from Somalia, shelled the contested city of Las Anod—the epicenter of the movement to reunify the Sool, Sanag and Cayn (SSC) region with Somalia—again on Tuesday, April 4. Somaliland forces’ previous attempt to recapture Las Anod, on Saturday, April 1, had left 37 dead and over 200 injured, Jaama Mohamed Mursal, a doctor at the bombed-out Las Anod General Hospital, told Peoples Dispatch.

On Saturday, Somaliland forces “attacked the city from three sides, but they could not capture any territory. They in fact took a lot of losses,” added Elham Garad, a UK-based Somali activist who has been volunteering in Las Anod.

The fighters defending Las Anod are mostly former Somaliland soldiers recruited from the SSC region into the army, which they deserted after it turned against the city’s civilians, claimed Garad Mukhtar, one of the 14 traditional elders of the SSC region to whom these fighters report.

Most of the deaths on the SSC side on April 1 were of these fighters on the frontlines. However, at least four civilians, including a local councilor, died in the shelling by Somaliland’s army on the city center and other residential areas, according to Dr. Jaama.

Somaliland soldiers allegedly also killed another civilian by opening fire in Ade Adeye, a village about 35 km from Las Anod, where they were met with a protest when retreating with their wounded to Oog, the nearest Somaliland city outside SSC, about 100 km from Las Anod.

Both sides claim to have taken prisoners of war after the eight-hour long battle on Saturday, which was preceded on Friday by extensive shelling on the city by Somaliland army, reportedly hitting even the Mayor’s office. Two were killed in the shelling on March 31, including 19-year-old Fatumo Yusuf, moments after she filmed this clip under mortar fire.


Dr. Jaama estimates that over 350 people have died and more than 1,800 injured since February 6, when Somaliland started its offensive to recapture Las Anod. The city had originally been captured from Somalia’s autonomous State of Puntland in 2007. According to Garad, when Puntand withdrew its forces to minimize the destruction of Las Anod, Somaliland occupied the broader region.

SSC leaders allege that the Somaliland state has since been systematically assassinating prominent leaders, including politicians, intellectuals and businessmen of the region, a region which has historically opposed secession from Somalia.

Somaliland, which was formed as a secessionist breakaway from Somalia in 1991, claims that the SSC region has always been a part of it. This region is rich in oil wealth and makes up over a third of what the self-declared republic of Somaliland regards as its territory. However, Somaliland’s claim of sovereignty has no international recognition.

While Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi claims that the SSC region is a part of the national agreement that formed Somaliland, SSC leaders maintain that their only agreement was to have peaceful relations with Somaliland, and never to accede into it.

Las Anod becomes epicenter of the movement to reunite SSC with Somalia
Protests calling for reunification with Somalia started in Las Anod in late December 2022, triggered by the killing of another prominent politician. Somaliland forces cracked down on the protests, killing 20 civilians, but was later forced out of the city and retreated to its Goojacade base in early January 2023. Protests soon spread to other cities across the SSC region, where the blue flag of Somalia was raised in place of Somaliland’s tricolor.

The unionist movement in the region was consolidated at a conference in Las Anod that declared the SSC a part of Somalia and the presence of the Somaliland administration in the region illegal.

It was after the Las Anod conference that Somaliland began the war on February 6, forcing over 200,000 people in and around the city to flee from their homes by the end of the month, according to the UN. Many more are likely to have fled subsequently as the attacks continued, including on March 18, when 47 were killed and over 280 injured.

After several such attacks, the Somaliland National Defense Forces (SNDF) spokesperson announced on March 26 that “SNDF has shifted from defensive approach to offensive against foreign invaders in LA [Las Anod]. Professionally planned strategic military operations will be launched onward.”

“Bring it on,” SSC leader Garad responded, exuding confidence that their forces could defend the city. “Just let us know when you need an exit strategy or way out,” he said, adding that another attack had been repelled that very day, when a delegation of traditional elders from Mogadishu had come to SSC to mediate for a negotiated settlement.

The following day, on March 27, European Union (EU) Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, Annette Weber, called for a ceasefire and for the parties to “engage in negotiations for a long-term settlement and enable humanitarian access.”

The US, which has been making several overtures interpreted as attempts to legitimize Somaliland’s claim to sovereignty without recognizing it, also called “on Somaliland to pull back its security forces” in a statement on March 30. It also asked “militias in Lascanood [Las Anod] to refrain from any offensive actions against Somaliland forces.”

“We are not a part of Somaliland. And we will not be a part of it.”
The Somaliland army shelled the city throughout the next day, before launching another invasion on April 1. This was also repelled, albeit with high casualties. That day President of the Federal Republic of Somalia Hassan Sheikh Mohamud appointed Abdikarim Hussein Guled as the Special Envoy for Somaliland Affairs.

Abdikarim not only “has corruption charges against him,” but is also related to Somaliland’s President Muse Bihi, alleged Elham. “His wife and children live in [Somaliland’s capital] Hargeisa, and he has massive business investments there,” she added, reiterating the widespread perception among Somali nationalists that Hassan Sheik has been inept and pliable to foreign powers.

In a carefully worded statement, the SSC leaders welcomed the envoy and wished him well in the talks with Somaliland. The leaders, however, added that “these talks do not concern us” because “we are not a part of Somaliland, we were never a part of it. And we will not be a part of it.”

https://peoplesdispatch.org/2023/04/06/ ... omaliland/

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Former Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah Is No Doubt Rolling in His Grave As AFRICOM Carries Out Military Training Exercises in Ghana
By Jeremy Kuzmarov - April 3, 2023 0

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Neocolonialism 101: African soldiers being trained by U.S. Army Special Forces officer in Flintlock exercise. [Source: africom.mil]

Nkrumah had envisioned the creation of an all-African military force to police the continent and protect it from outside exploiters—AFRICOM is his worst nightmare.

In early March, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) hosted a two-week training exercise called Flintlock around the Ghanaian cities of Daboya, Tamale and Volta as well as in the Ivory Coast.

More than 1,300 soldiers from 29 nations participated in the two-week event, which involved war-game simulations where soldiers fought mock terrorist forces and pirates on land and sea.

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Soldier in Flintlock training exercise. [Source: africom.mil]

General Michael E. Langley, the AFRICOM commander, said in a meeting of the Senate Armed Services Committee that “the Gulf of Guinea is like the wild, wild West of illicit activity, especially the drug trade. We’ve had a number of countries that come together to focus on illicit activity across the Gulf, and the drug trade is one of them, smuggling is another and training citizens as well across the region.”[1]

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General Michael E. Langley [Source: dvidshub.net]

The New York Times reported that African soldiers participating in Flintlock were paired with mentors from NATO countries: The Ghanaian naval forces were matched with commandos from the Netherlands, Nigerian troops were mentored by British forces, and Ivorians worked with Italians.

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[Source: nytimes.com]

American soldiers from the Texas National Guard also helped to mentor their African counterparts at the joint headquarters in Accra.[2]

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The U.S.-led Flintlock exercise spread troops across five sites in Ghana and neighboring Ivory Coast. [Source: ]

Rear Admiral Milton J. Sands, the commander of U.S. special operations forces in Africa, said that Flintlock was “very much us [the U.S.] in support and partnered shoulder to shoulder with our African partners in the region. We are here, we care about Africa and ultimately our goal is a safe, secure and stable African continent.”[3]

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[Source: wikipedia.org]

Sands’ claims about a safe African continent was undercut by an earlier paragraph in the Times story noting that Ghanaian army officers in Accra had “pegged the rise in terrorist activity to the 2011 overthrow of Muammar el-Qaddafi and [subsequent] disintegration of the Libyan state…which allowed arms to reach Mali and fall into the hands of Islamist groups” that “flourished across the Sahel states like Burkino Faso, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.”[4]

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Anti-Qaddafi terrorists in Sirte. After Qaddafi’s ouster, many spread across the African continent, emboldened by their “success” in Libya and backing by the U.S. and NATO. [Source: bbc.com]

The U.S., along with Great Britain and France, were the key drivers behind Qaddafi’s overthrow in Operation Odyssey Dawn. A key motivating factor had been Qaddafi’s opposition to AFRICOM and refusal to allow AFRICOM to be headquartered in Libya.

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Muammar Qaddafi [Source: spyuganda.com]

Qaddafi was a Pan-Africanist inspired by the vision of Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah (1957-1966), a man voted “Africa’s Man of the Millennium” who sought to unify the African continent under socialism.

In Nkrumah’s vision, Africa would be protected from Western imperialists and neo-colonialists by an all-African army that could police the continent’s own internal disputes.

Nkrumah’s 1965 book, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd., 1965), provided a sophisticated framework for understanding how Western capitalist interests were intent on penetrating and exploiting the African continent even after the European countries had relinquished their formal colonies.

This analysis is particularly relevant today where we see an intensified drive to exploit the African continent’s mineral wealth along with growing geo-economic competition between the U.S. and China—which is what lay behind the establishment of AFRICOM in 2007.

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[Source: consortiumnews.com]

The first step in the achievement of Nkrumah’s pan-Africanist vision was to be the liberation of the continent from colonial and neo-colonial regimes, which Nkrumah was actively supporting as Ghanaian president.

The U.S. State Department complained in a 1962 report that Nkrumah’s Bureau of African Affairs had 100 agents supporting “nationalist and…opposition movements in such African states as the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Togo, Senegal, Cameroon, Liberia and Nigeria with the ultimate goal of assisting more radical elements in gaining power.”[5]

The State Department was worried further that Nkrumah was mounting an offensive against apartheid South Africa, furnishing money and sabotage training to “extremists” bent on overthrowing the white supremacist regime.[6]

CIA-Backed Coup Alters Trajectory of Ghanaian History
Ghana’s current acquiescence to AFRICOM is in many ways a legacy of the CIA-backed coup that ousted Nkrumah in February 1966.[7]

The military regime that succeeded Nkrumah was advised by a Harvard University economist (Gustave Papanek) who recommended the privatization of state-run corporations, and ended Ghanaian support for African revolutionaries.[8]

Robert Komer, a National Security Council staffer and CIA officer who headed the Phoenix operation in Vietnam, called Ghana’s post-coup regime almost “pathetically pro-Western,” while U.S. Ambassador to Ghana Franklin H. Williams considered the coup the “greatest opportunity we have had to date to enhance U.S. policy objectives in Africa.”[9]

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Franklin H. WilliamsFranklin H. Williams [Source: history.nycourts.gov]

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Robert Komer [Source: alchetron.com]

These objectives have reached fulfillment today with the expansion of AFRICOM exercises into Ghana under President Nana Akufo-Addo, who is too weak and visionless to resist.[10]

The country is currently wracked by debt and inflation and desperate for any foreign aid it can get so pays fealty to outside powers like the U.S.[11]

Akufo-Addo’s father, Edward Akufo-Addo, was part of the post-1966 coup government along with three of his uncles, one of whom, J.B. Danquah, played a central role in the CIA-backed coup.

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Nana Akufo-Addo Source: thisdailylive.com]

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J.B. Danquah [Source: wikipedia.org]

Were Nkrumah alive today, he would be horrified that a descendant of the coup masters who ousted him has allowed a neo-colonialist instrument like AFRICOM to host military exercises on Ghanaian soil.

AFRICOM is the very antithesis of the all-African force that Nkrumah envisioned as a pathway to the liberation of the African continent.

AFRICOM Commander Admits to Training Coup Leaders

An ascendant isolationist wing of the GOP, which opposes military aid to Ukraine, is beginning to raise concerns in Congress about AFRICOM.

On March 24, Matt Gaetz (R-FL), who recently sponsored congressional resolutions to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria and Somalia, grilled AFRICOM commander Michael Langley, getting him to admit that AFRICOM had trained over 50,000 African troops and that at least two of these soldiers had gone on to lead coups (in Guinea and Burkino Faso).

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Michael Langley, left; Matt Gaetz, right. [Source: todaynewsafrica.com]
At one point in the exchange, Gaetz held up a photo of Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, who led a 2021 coup in Guinea, with two AFRICOM soldiers.[12]

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Photo presented by Matt Gaetz (R-FL) in an exchange with AFRICOM commander Michael Langley that features Guinean Colonel Mamady Doumbouya who was trained by AFRICOM forces before leading a 2021 coup in Guinea against Alpha Condé. [Source: dailymail.co.uk]

Gaetz also mentioned a 2021 article from The Intercept published by Nick Turse, “Another U.S. Trained Soldier Stages a Coup in West Africa,” which focused on AFRICOM trained Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who led a coup in January 2022 that ousted Burkino Faso’s democratically elected president, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré.

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Demonstrators gathering in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, to show support to the military hold a picture of AFRICOM trained General Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who led a coup in January 2022. [Source: theintercept.com]

In 2010 and again in 2020, Damiba participated in the Flintlock exercises that this year took place in Ghana. According to Turse, since 2008, U.S.-trained officers have attempted at least nine coups (and succeeded in at least eight) across five West African countries, including Burkina Faso (three times), Guinea, Mali (three times), Mauritania, and the Gambia.

This is exactly what Nkrumah back in his day had warned against and why he wanted an all-Africa trained force.

Kamala Harris: Working to Subvert Nkrumah’s Legacy and That of Her Grandfather
During a visit to Accra on Monday to meet with President Aku-Addo, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris announced that the U.S. would provide $100 million to Ghana and four other West African countries to help them deal with “violent extremism and instability”—another boon to U.S. arms-makers.

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Kamala Harris shakes hand of Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo on March 27. [Source: cbsnews.com]

An underlying U.S. objective is to pry Ghana away from China, which since 2019 has been allowed to dig for bauxite ore in Ghana in exchange for multibillion dollar infrastructural investments that include building highways.

The New York Times reported on the irony that as Ms. Harris’ motorcade passed a traffic circle in Accra, a People’s Republic of China placard announcing Beijing’s funding of the rotary’s construction was visible directly behind a poster featuring her and Nana Akufo-Addo.[13]

If he were still alive, Kwame Nkrumah might be weary of Chinese efforts to exploit Ghana and other African countries’ mineral wealth, though Nkrumah admired communist China for its achievements in overturning the pernicious legacy of British neo-colonialism, reclaiming national control over its economy and initiating social progress for its people, as well as for its support for anti-colonial movements and economic development in Ghana and the rest of Africa.

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Kwame Nkrumah embraces Mao Zedong in 1962 in Beijing. [Source: bridgemanimages.com]

After her visit to Ghana, Harris went to Zambia where her grandfather, P.V. Gopalan, served as an adviser to Zambia’s first President Kenneth Kaunda.[14]

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Kamala Harris upon arrival in Lusaka. [Source: kiro7.com]

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P.V. Gopalan [Source: latimes.com]

Kaunda was a close ally of Nkrumah who shared a similar worldview and was also a target of a U.S. regime change operation—in his case in the early 1980s.[15]

Kaunda too would have condemned Harris’ agenda in Africa, and function in providing a friendly cover for the interests intent on exploiting Zambia and Africa’s mineral wealth.

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Kenneth Kaunda [Source: thebrenthurstfoundation.org]

Zambia is currently governed by Hakainde Hachilema, the richest man in the country who is a counterpart of Akufo-Naddo: He has welcomed AFRICOM facilities into Zambia, and supports low taxes in an attempt to lure foreign corporations into Zambia.

This is the opposite approach of Nkrumah and Kaunda who prioritized the development of local industries; pushed for high taxes on foreign corporations to fund robust social programs; were against covert military intervention by white powers, and supported nationalization of major industries so the revenues could be used to help improve the people’s quality of life.

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Brigadier General Peter Bailey, right, and U.S. Chargé d’Affaires to Zambia Martin Dale, left, with President Hakainde Hichilema, center.[Source: zm.usembassy.gov]

As CovertAction Magazine has previously detailed, the U.S. has growing interest in Zambia because it is a copper producing country—and copper is needed in the manufacture of electric vehicles as well as computers and electronic gadgets.

Goldman Sachs recently released a report, Copper is the New Oil, emphasizing copper’s importance in the transition to a clean energy economy.

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[Source: youtube.com]

It is unlikely under current policies that Zambians will benefit much from the new copper rush–currently Zambia stands as the fifth hungriest nation in the world after the Central African Republic, Chad, Madagascar and Yemen.

At the U.S.-Africa Summit in Washington, D.C. in December, Zambia and DR Congo signed a memorandum that effectively surrendered their supply chain and production of copper and cobalt to American control.[16]

The Socialist Party of Zambia responded to the memo by saying that: “The governments of Zambia and Congo have surrendered the copper and cobalt supply chain and production to American control. And with this capitulation, the hope of a Pan-African-owned and controlled electric car project is buried for generations to come.”[17]

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Secretary of State Antony Blinken joined by Congolese and Zambian leaders in signing an agreement that will effectively enable U.S. control over copper and cobalt production in the two countries. [Source: twitter.com]

Kwame Nkrumah is likely rolling in his grave about this too, as is Kenneth Kaunda and P.V. Gopalan whose grand-daughter has switched sides to the capitalist exploiters and imperialists in betrayal of her family and people.

https://covertactionmagazine.com/2023/0 ... -in-ghana/
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Africa

Post by blindpig » Wed Apr 12, 2023 2:11 pm

Life or Debt: The Stranglehold of Neocolonialism and Africa’s Search for Alternatives
APRIL 11, 2023
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Dossier no. 63

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The art in this dossier is based on still frames from the music video ‘IMF’ by Seun Kuti and Egypt 80 (Knitting Factory Records) featuring Dead Prez’s M1, directed by Jerome Bernard and produced by Duck Factory.

Seun Kuti is a member of the band Egypt 80 and the youngest son of the late Nigerian Afrobeat pioneer and political figure Fela Kuti, whose popular album Zombies, released in 1976, heavily criticised the military dictatorship that was in power at the time and inspired resistance among the Nigerian people. Nearly forty years after the release of his father’s album, Seun’s music video ‘IMF’ harks back to the continued assault against the sovereignty of the African people, featuring rows of growing zombie-like International Monetary Fund (IMF) officials chasing an African man and, finally, turning him into a money-obsessed, disfigured monster identical to themselves.

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Before the pandemic was announced by the World Health Organisation in March 2020, the poorer nations of the world already struggled with seriously high – and unpayable – levels of debt. Between 2011 and 2019, the World Bank reported, ‘public debt in a sample of 65 developing countries increased by 18 percent of GDP on average – and by much more in several cases. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, debt increased by 27 percent of GDP on average’.1

The debt crisis did not take place because of government spending on long-term infrastructure projects, which could eventually pay for themselves by increasing growth rates and allow these countries to exit from a permanent debt crisis. Rather, these governments borrowed money upon borrowed money to pay off older debts to wealthy bondholders as well as to pay for their current bills (such as to maintain education, health, and basic civic services). ‘Among the thirty-three sub-Saharan countries in our sample’, the World Bank noted, ‘current spending outstripped capital investment by a ratio of nearly three to one’.2 When the pandemic struck, countries that had adopted the World Bank-International Monetary Fund policy to grow their way out of the debt crisis floundered. Growth rates shrank, which meant that debt volumes ballooned, and so these governments decided to borrow more and adopt deeper austerity policies, which dramatically increased the debt burden on their populations.

Registering, in their own way, what is universally acknowledged as an intractable debt crisis in the poorer nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) warned that a serious banking crisis is likely to emerge (while ignoring the factors driving this scenario). ‘Our updated global bank stress test shows that, in a severely adverse scenario, up to 29 percent of emerging market banks would breach capital requirements’, the IMF wrote in October 2022.3 This means that the context of high debt, high inflation, and low growth rates (with lowered employment expectations) could lead to the collapse of a third of the banks in the poorer nations.

Neither the IMF nor the World Bank nor indeed any of the international financial institutions (IFIs) have any credible pathway out of this crisis. Indeed, the IMF report surrenders to reality as it tells central banks across the globe to ‘avoid a de-anchoring of inflation expectations’ and to ensure that ‘the tightening of financial conditions needs to be calibrated carefully, to aim at avoiding disorderly market conditions that could put financial stability unduly at risk’.4 The focus here is to keep ‘the market’ happy, while there is remarkably no care for the downward spiral of living conditions for the vast majority of the people on the planet. In its October 2022 Fiscal Monitor Report, subtitled Helping People Bounce Back, the IMF noted that while governments’ top priorities must be ‘to ensure everyone has access to affordable food and to protect low-income households from rising inflation’, they must not attempt ‘to limit price increases through price controls, subsidies, or tax cuts’, which would ‘be costly to the budget and ultimately ineffective’.5

In January 2023, the IMF’s World Economic Outlook predicted a slightly better, albeit ‘subpar’, growth forecast but warned of continued worries of debt distress in the poorer nations, writing that ‘The combination of high debt levels from the pandemic, lower growth, and higher borrowing costs exacerbates the vulnerability of these economies, especially those with significant near-term dollar financing needs’.6 The antidote to debt distress, according to the IMF, is ‘fiscal consolidation and growth-enhancing supply-side reforms’, namely more of the same old austerity-debt trap. If the governments of the poorer nations are told not to use these basic tools (which are used routinely in the richer nations), their only choice – as far as the IMF is concerned – is to borrow in order to provide even low levels of relief to the very poorest people in their countries. Effectively, the IMF has surrendered to the prevailing reality and offers the poorer nations no viable exit from a permanent debt crisis.

This dossier has been drafted with the knowledge that the permanent debt crisis besieging the poorer nations has not resulted from short-term market failures or from business cycles that will rebound, and that it is not fully a consequence of governments’ mismanagement of finances or deep-rooted corruption. Rather, our assessment of the debt crisis draws from an important speech given by Burkina Faso’s President Thomas Sankara (1949–1987) at the Organisation for African Unity in July 1987. ‘Debt’s origins come from colonialism’s origins. Those who lend us money are those who colonised us’, Sankara explained. ‘Debt is neocolonialism’, with the fiscal and monetary policies of many of the African states taken over by the ‘technical assassins’ of the IFIs. ‘Debt is a cleverly managed reconquest of Africa aimed at subjugating its growth and development through foreign rules’, he continued, with the IFIs setting policy by using the debt as an instrument to demand ‘structural adjustment’ of domestic finance ministries and central banks.7

Gro Harlem Brundtland, Norway’s former prime minister and then chair of the United Nations’ World Commission on Environment and Development (also known as the Brundtland Commission), came to the Organisation for African Unity meeting in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) in 1987 to say that the entire debt of the poorer nations could not be repaid and should be forgiven. Sankara acknowledged the importance of the Brundtland Commission’s assessment and then said:

Debt cannot be repaid, first because if we don’t repay, lenders will not die. That is for sure. But if we repay, we are going to die. That is also for sure. Those who led us to indebtedness gambled as if in a casino. As long as they had gains, there was no debate. But now that they suffer losses, they demand repayment. And we talk about crisis. No, Mr. President, they played, they lost. That’s the rule of the game, and life goes on. We cannot repay because we don’t have any means to do so. We cannot pay because we are not responsible for this debt.8

One alternative to the debt crisis is a debt strike, which is what Cuba’s Fidel Castro began to raise in his speech at the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in New Delhi in 1983 and which was on the agenda for the Continental Dialogue on the Foreign Debt
in Havana in August 1985. It is within this dynamic that Sankara spoke of the need for an ‘Addis Ababa united front against debt’.

The context for such a ‘united front against debt’ has returned, but the political will for it now is as low as it was then. However, the world is very different today than it was in the 1980s. Other alternatives have since presented themselves, such as those available through regional integration and through alternatives to the Western-backed IFIs (for example, financing from China and other large developing countries).9

This dossier opens with an introduction to the world of the IFIs – mainly the IMF – and their role in exacerbating the poverty brought on by colonialism and transforming it into a permanent debt crisis, and then moves into a deeper assessment of the contradictions of sovereign debt on the African continent. The final section carries a statement on the IMF-induced debt crisis by the Collective on African Political Economy and offers alternatives to IFI-led funding to manage the turbulence of debt.

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The Fundamentalism of the IMF and the Permanent Debt Crisis
In 1919, John Maynard Keynes of the United Kingdom’s Treasury Department published a book that became a sensation. In the book, entitled The Economic Consequences of the Peace, Keynes observed that the Great War had ‘so shaken the system as to endanger the life of Europe itself’.10 The Treaty of Versailles, which ended the war, did not grasp the underlying problems that had led to the war and only cemented the victory of some countries against others. The treaty left structural problems intact, such as the ‘disordered finances’, in Keynes’ words, of many countries (not only Germany, which faced an enormous and unpayable reparations bill). The Wall Street Crash of 1929, the Sterling Crisis of 1931, and the Banking Panics of 1931–1933 revealed the underlying vulnerabilities of capitalism, with the ‘disordered finances’ being the spur towards the potential general collapse of the system. In 1936, Keynes published The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, a manual to save capitalism by a theoretical plea for governments to use state resources to recycle profits and balance an unbalanceable system. Keynes, who dabbled in eugenics theory, did not extend his views on state intervention to protect the system in the British colonies and prevent the decline of their population’s living standards.

When the United States invited its allies to Bretton Woods (New Hampshire) in July 1944 to discuss how to manage the structural crises that contributed to the Second World War, Keynes – who was one of the main figures at this meeting – said that it would be ‘the most monstrous monkey house assembled for many years’, suggesting that ‘twenty one countries [that] have been invited’ – presenting a list of primarily colonised countries, from Guatemala and Liberia to Iraq and the Philippines –
‘clearly have nothing to contribute and will merely encumber the ground’.11 Instead, Keynes preferred that the two founder states of the Bretton Woods Conference, the United Kingdom and the United States, ‘settle the charter and the main details of the new body without being subjected to the delays and confused counsels of an international conference’, as he explained a few years earlier.12 In fact, Keynes (on behalf of the United Kingdom) and Harry Dexter White (on behalf of the United States) arrived at the meeting with two plans already drafted, which they put on the table and upon which the final Articles of Agreement for the International Monetary Fund as well as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (or the World Bank) were built. The other participants were largely onlookers.

Despite the limited input of most of the world, which was still under colonial rule, the purpose of the IMF as laid out in the Articles of Agreement was straightforward, none of it built to extend the power of the British imperial system. The main thrust of the articles was to assist the ‘expansion and balanced growth of international trade’ and to ‘contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy’.13 To establish these ‘primary objectives’, the IMF was tasked with preventing any short-term problems from becoming long-term crises, such as by maintaining exchange rate stability and facilitating loans to prevent balance-of-payments spirals ‘without resorting to measures destructive to national or international prosperity’. When the former colonial countries won their freedom, most of them became members of the IMF based on the Articles of Agreement, and in 1961, the IMF created its Africa Department. Until the Third World Debt Crisis that began to spiral with Mexico’s default in 1982, the IMF had primarily operated by providing short-term financing in a relatively modest fashion through the Compensatory Financing Facility (1963) and the Buffer Stock Financing Facility (1969).14

In the aftermath of Mexico’s default, the IMF conducted what its managing director, Michel Camdessus, called the ‘silent revolution’.15Against its manifest purpose, the IMF began to respond to requests for short-term bridge financing by demanding that countries radically change their domestic economic policies as a condition for approval. Through their new programmes, the Structural Adjustment Facility (1986), and then the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (1987), the IMF put a singular recipe on the table: privatise the economy, including the state sector; commodify areas of human life that had up to that point been in the public domain; terminate any government deficit financing; and dissolve any barriers on foreign capital investment and trade (such as subsidies and tariffs). The IMF had experimented with these measures in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru in the 1950s with limited success before turning them into the basis for their policy not towards all countries, but specifically to be used against states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, which struggled with an international economic system shaped by colonialism and capitalism. These were the countries that had championed the formation of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 to advance their own proposals to exit the neocolonial world order, proposals that were passed by the UN General Assembly in 1974 as the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The new IMF policy emerged in contest against the possibility of an NIEO, since rather than allow for a better deal for raw material prices or for tariff-subsidy arrangements, it demanded the withdrawal of all these anti-colonial schemes. Even Raghuram Rajan, the IMF’s own chief economist from 2003 to 2007, wrote in his book Fault Lines (2010) that the IMF’s policies appeared as a ‘new form of financial colonialism’.16

The IMF’s ‘silent revolution’ intensified the crisis faced by the poorer nations, driving them into a spiral of indebtedness and poverty. The general formula for this spiral is as follows:

Countries go into short-term balance-of-payments debt because of their lack of capital – much of it stolen during the colonial period – and their reliance upon borrowing to conduct (often expensive) capital improvements in their countries (some of which are in the raw material extraction sector, thereby operating as a subsidy for foreign mining companies).
The IMF arrives and informs the finance ministries that government spending for education, healthcare, and other social development projects must be cut in order to prioritise payments to wealthy bondholders (in the London Club) and to governments – mostly the old colonial states – (in the Paris Club) who have lent them money.
To pay the debt servicing on these loans, the poorer nations cut their government spending, thereby impoverishing their people further, and export more of their cheapened raw materials (rather than more profitable finished products). When countries start to export more and more primary commodities, this produces a price war that leads to a steep decline in the revenues gained from the volume of exports.
With weakened revenues from imports, the poorer nations must continue to cut their social spending, ramp up their sales of raw materials and public assets, and borrow more money from external private and governmental sources… just to pay off the interest on their ballooning debt.
The imperative of ‘exchange rate stability’ prevents governments in the poorer nations from exercising any effective monetary policy – including implementing capital controls – while their fiscal policy is already eviscerated by balanced budget demands from the IMF, social spending cuts, and pressure from wealthy bondholders to ‘reform’ (i.e., surrender) their tax policy.
In 2016, senior members of the IMF’s research department published an article called ‘Neoliberalism: Oversold?’, which argued that the ‘adverse feedback loop’ set in motion by austerity, followed by increased inequality and then yet more austerity, had to be broken by a less rigid, less fundamentalist approach to ‘liberalisation’ and neoliberalism.17 There was even a suggestion of ‘greater acceptance of [capital] controls to deal with the volatility of capital flows’. While there was a decline in the conditions that the IMF required to receive their loans over the course of the decade before this paper was published, there is no evidence of any qualitative change in IMF policy.18

Guinea, for instance –
a country that has at least a third of the world’s bauxite – entered the IMF rollercoaster in 2011 and immediately became trapped in the debt-austerity cycle.19 In 2014, the Guinean government of Alpha Condé wrote to the IMF that the ‘tight fiscal and monetary policy’ had led to a ‘reduction in spending, including on domestic investment’, which made it impossible for Guinea ‘to respect the indicative targets for spending in priority sectors’.20 In other words, Guinea borrowed to try and exit a crisis, but the borrowing itself led to cuts in social spending and deepened its crisis. In 2019–2020, the country experienced a cycle of protests sparked both by Condé’s attempt to change the constitution as well as the worsened economic situation. A UNICEF report found that, in 2019, twenty-five very poor countries spent more on debt servicing than on education, health, and social protection combined. Sixteen of those countries are on the African continent.21

In the early months of the pandemic in 2020, the IMF offered to open up new windows for borrowing that they said would come without conditionalities.22
The G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative and other such offers to pause debt payments suggested that the poorer nations would receive assistance to prevent total economic collapse and to gain access to vaccines. However, Oxfam found that thirteen of the fifteen IMF loan programmes during the second year of the pandemic (2021) required ‘new austerity measures such as taxes on food and fuel or spending cuts that could put vital public services at risk’.23 The Commitment to Reducing Inequality Index reveals that fourteen out of the sixteen countries in West Africa planned to cut their budgets by a total of $26.8 billion in 2021 to contain haemorrhaging national debt crises and that these policies have been encouraged by the IMF’s COVID-19 loans.24

The evidence is clear: the IMF not only engineers austerity-driven debt crises, but its policies are designed to ensure and manage a permanent debt crisis, not to erase debt.

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Africa’s Sovereign Debt Crisis
In 2009, the Zambian-born economist Dambisa Moyo published the instant bestseller Dead Aid.25 Moyo’s main argument in the book was that there was little to show for the hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign aid that had been given to the African continent since 1970. Rather than spurring development, she said, aid had financed grand-scale corruption and civil wars, which in turn thwarted economic growth on the continent. Moyo’s case against aid was not a new one. Her book’s arguments were inspired by the Hungarian-born British conservative economist Peter Bauer, in whose memory Moyo dedicated her book. Bauer made a career singling out foreign aid – not colonialism or neocolonialism – as the chief architect of Africa’s underdevelopment.26

What was new about Dead Aid was Moyo’s prescription. In a chapter titled ‘A Capital Solution’, Moyo called for the substitution of aid with private market debt. That is, she called on Western countries to significantly reduce their aid to Africa and at the same time called on African governments to make up for the shortfall by borrowing from private creditors and bondholders such as hedge funds, banks, and so on. For Moyo, this was an elegant solution to the problem of corruption, which had historically bedevilled the foreign aid industrial complex. Money sourced from private debt markets was unlikely to fuel corruption in Africa because, Moyo argued, private creditors were sophisticated enough to not invest in countries likely to engage in corruption. After all, corruption acted as a drag on economic growth, which in turn threatened the prospects of debt repayment. On the other hand, to access much-needed private credit, African governments would need to demonstrate to private creditors that they were committed to fighting corruption and to investing the proceeds in growth-enhancing activities. Moyo’s policy solution was, therefore, a supposed win-win for all concerned.

Moyo’s ‘capital solution’ provided the intellectual cover for the financialisation of capital flows to Africa through the issuance of so-called Eurobonds (i.e., the issuance of bonds in US dollars and Euros), whose meteoric rise would engulf the continent in a new debt crisis by 2020. Ghana’s first issuance of a Eurobond in 2007 was a turning point for the continent. The country’s debut bond of $750 million was issued to much fanfare and was highly sought after by financial investors in New York and London.27 In a quest to satisfy investors’ appetites, Ghana followed up by issuing two additional Eurobonds totalling $2 billion in 2013 and 2014. Other countries in Africa soon followed suit.28 In 2011, Zambia obtained its first sovereign credit rating (a credit score of sorts) from the ratings agency Fitch. Shortly thereafter, the country issued two Eurobonds in quick succession in 2012 and 2014, a scenario that increased Zambia’s external debt by an incredible 300% in three years.29Kenya likewise jumped on the bandwagon, issuing three Eurobonds between 2014 and 2019 that totalled around $5.5 billion.30

Eurobond issuance on the continent grew at an incredible pace in the second decade of the twenty-first century: by 2020, twenty-one African countries had issued Eurobonds (several, in many cases). According to the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics handbook, the stock of Eurobond debt for sub-Saharan Africa grew from about $32 billon in 2010 to $135 billon in 2020, a 322% rate of increase.31In other words, the stock of Eurobond debt had more than tripled in just ten years.

The rate of increase in the stock of Eurobond debt between 2010 and 2020 far outstripped other sources of foreign currency debt in Africa. For example, multilateral debt from the World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank, and other institutions increased by about 144% over the same period, a rate that is less than half that of the increase in Eurobond debt. Similarly, bilateral debt from governments in countries such as China, France, the US, and the UK to governments in Africa also increased at a rate of 145%, which was also less than half the rate of increase in Eurobond debt.32

This last point on bilateral debt is worth highlighting given the argument on ‘debt trap diplomacy’ that has become commonplace with respect to debt from China. The argument alleges that China is using debt to trap Africa in a perpetual cycle of indebtedness and servitude. However, the facts present a different picture. Though World Bank’s International Debt Statistics handbook does not provide a country-by-country breakdown of bilateral debt to Africa that would allow us to isolate the Chinese component, it shows that by 2020 Africa’s total external debt owed to bilateral creditors (i.e., countries) stood at $115 billion, compared Eurobond debt of $135 billion. Further, the figure for bilateral debt provided by the World Bank is for all bilateral creditors, implying that Eurobond debt outstripped all debt from bilateral creditors, which includes China. A careful analysis from Debt Justice shows that African debt to China was $83 billion in 2020, a number smaller than the $135 billon owed to private bondholders.33 Figures on Chinese loans and Africa’s debt produced by researchers working at the China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) at Johns Hopkins University in the United States are often cited in support of the debt trap diplomacy argument (despite their own researchers having published articles debunking the Chinese debt trap narrative).34However, they are not very useful in this particular case because, according to CARI itself, its database ‘does not track [debt] disbursements and repayments’.35In other words, CARI only reports on newspaper announcements of loan contraction but does not track to see if the contracted loan left China and, if it did, if the recipient government in Africa subsequently paid it off or paid off portions of it. Therefore, CARI figures can be misrepresented in ways that vastly exaggerate the true stock of Chinese debt to Africa.

This goes to show that the current sovereign debt crisis currently engulfing the African continent is largely the creation of private creditors via the Eurobond craze that possessed and took hold of the continent in the second decade of the twenty-first century, helped along by the intellectual justifications of Dambisa Moyo and others. Eurobonds did not fix the problem of corruption that was said to be endemic with foreign aid, as Moyo argued they would. For example, hundreds of millions of dollars of Kenya’s first Eurobond issuance are said to have gone ‘missing’. In Zambia, questions have been raised about where the Eurobond money went.36 In Mozambique, loans and bonds were illegally withdrawn and misused by state-owned enterprises (known as the Tuna Bond Scandal). As these cases illustrate, Western private bankers and creditors have facilitated this type of theft.37

Finally, analysing the sources of debt in Africa casts doubts on current multilateral initiatives aimed at resolving Africa’s sovereign debt crisis. One example is the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), launched by the G20 in May 2020, soon after the COVID-19 pandemic began to send shockwaves across the globe, to encourage bilateral and multilateral creditors to suspend interest payments on debt owed by poorer nations, including those in Africa, for a year. The DSSI was hardly successful, as many creditors – with the exception of a few, such as China – refused to suspend interest payments.38 In addition, many analysts remarked that the DSSI was not fit for purpose, since it only applied to official debt (multilateral and bilateral), while the sovereign debt crisis was largely fuelled by a private bond crisis as shown above.

As the DSSI expired in June 2021 and the sovereign debt crisis got worse, the G20 launched the Common Framework for Debt Treatments, which would become the guiding mechanism for debt restructuring after the initial years of the pandemic.39 Unfortunately, it is bedevilled by many of the same problems that afflicted the DSSI. First, the Common Framework only has mechanisms for resolving official credit. But, as the above analysis shows, a substantial portion (and by far the largest single source) of Africa’s sovereign debt is owed to private bondholders and creditors. Their absence largely confines debt restructuring discussions to the theoretical sphere, with little practical value. Second, the Common Framework lays the ground for an official creditor committee, which in the case of Zambia is co-chaired by France and China. France is seen to represent the old Paris Club of creditor countries, which together make up a sizeable portion of the official credit given to Zambia. China is a co-chair given its emergence as an important source of credit to Africa, and Zambia in particular. However, the structure and governance of Zambia’s creditor committee with the two co-chairs has opened the country to geopolitical manoeuvrings and, in the process, largely paralysed the prospects for genuine debt restructuring anytime soon.

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A Permanent Solution to the Debt Crisis
The fifty-four sovereign African states are vastly different from each other, with distinct languages, histories, social and economic challenges, and possibilities. However, they are united by a political project that has been institutionalised through the African Union and its legal and organisational frameworks and by a neocolonial sovereign debt crisis.

This final section of the dossier is divided into two parts. The first is a statement made by the Collective on African Political Economy, which lies at the root of the analysis presented in this dossier. The second elaborates on the finance section of A Plan to Save the Planet, a document drafted by twenty-six research institutes from around the world.40 These alternatives are provisional and require far more theoretical and practical elaboration, which is precisely the task of the Collective on African Political Economy

The IMF Is Never the Answer: A Statement from the Collective on African Political Economy
Many countries across the Global South, particularly those in Africa, are currently in the throes of fiscal crises – largely the result of a perfect storm of global events. The COVID-19 pandemic triggered a global economic recession, which in turn impacted national economies. The ongoing war in Ukraine has disrupted vital global supply chains for food, fertilisers, and energy, thereby increasing many countries’ import bills and straining their budgets. The fiscal crisis is fundamentally a result of an unsustainable build-up of sovereign debt in the last decade, fuelled by cheap credit from Western economies and encouraged by international financial institutions, including the IMF. The COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine made what was already a tenuous situation worse.

Many poor countries are turning to the IMF as a credible source for finance in the present moment, largely egged on by claims that the IMF has reformed from its bad old ways and no longer demands crashing austerity as a conditionality.41 Back in 2016, IMF economists published a mea culpa in which they (sort of) confessed the sins of the past and promised that they had turned over a new leaf.42The evidence, however, suggests anything but a reformed IMF. A study from the International Labour Organisation that carefully tracked IMF conditionality in 2020, when many countries were grappling with health and financial burdens related to the COVID-19 pandemic, found that in most of the 148 countries examined, the IMF still required austerity as a condition for granting assistance.43

The government of Zambia, the first country to default on its debt as a result of the pandemic, recently concluded a financing deal with the IMF with the signature condition of ‘a large, front-loaded, and sustained fiscal consolidation’, as the IMF put it –
in other words, austerity in black and white.44 The IMF wants the Zambian government to reduce its expenditure by billions of dollars over the next three years, which will be most acutely felt by the poor majority.45 The government of Sri Lanka, a country whose debt-fuelled boom came to a spectacular halt earlier this year, is also seeking IMF assistance, with early indications showing that the conditions attached to the deal will be as indefensible as the Zambian deal.46The Ghanaian government too is desperately seeking another IMF deal, this after the last one was celebrated as the deal that would ‘restore the lustre to a rising star in Africa’.47

All this goes to show that the IMF cannot be the answer to the poorer nations’ economic challenges. Alongside its sister institutions, the IMF has provided ‘assistance’ to poor countries ever since its establishment in 1944, and yet many of these countries have remained poor in spite of this. The reason is that IMF assistance has never confronted the structural factors that have continued to consign many countries to the ranks of the poor. As diagnosed many years ago by scholars such as Walter Rodney and Andre Gunder Frank, development in the North is sustained by underdevelopment in the South.48 Seen this way, the IMF, as the archetypical Northern institution, is duty bound to maintain and entrench this status quo. How else does one explain the IMF’s solution to Zambia’s financial woes, for example? The IMF prescription ignores the fact that the country’s foreign-owned copper mines continue to generate billions for their overseas shareholders yet pay so little in taxes in a country where the estimated annual income taxes for one mining project alone could have amounted to nearly half the 2020 national water supply and sanitary budget.49

A new kind of institutional apparatus that fosters cooperation, rather than competition, is required for Africa’s economic liberation and that of the Third World more generally. This would mean, for example, establishing currency arrangements that bypass the US dollar, which is a strong lever of IMF conditionality and a weapon of US foreign policy. These kinds of long overdue
proposals are already underway in parts of the world, such as in Latin America, where Brazil’s President Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva (known as Lula) and Argentina’s President Alberto Fernández have proposed the establishment of a regional currency, the sur, that could be used to settle cross-border claims and store reserves.50 The hard work of figuring out the technical details related to the implementation of such regional currencies must begin in earnest.51 Africa, for example, needs a continental bank that is wholly owned by the people and will serve as a genuine tool to bolster sovereign industrial policies. The highly influential African Development Bank, with its significant Western shareholding, is not fit for purpose.52

Furthermore, there is an urgent need to restore and reinvigorate the capacity and autonomy of the African state to deliver on its development agenda. State capacity and state autonomy depend on the ability to adequately mobilise tax revenues, an area in which the African state has continued to underperform. The tax-to-GDP ratio, a measure of resource mobilisation, has remained incredibly low in Africa largely as a result of illicit financial flows that continue to spirit away billions of dollars from the continent every year.53 As a consequence, the adequate delivery of the kind of social services that underpin people’s dignity (social security, health, education, etc.) continue to be hamstrung.54 Further, the low tax-take in the poorer nations forces many governments to seek the easy way out by borrowing on the international capital markets, setting into motion dangerous debt dynamics that ultimately lead governments back into the unloving arms of the IMF. Notably, IMF conditionality rarely confronts the fact that state capacity and autonomy have been eroded in Africa largely as a result of the tax dodging practices of transnational corporations.

Just as problematic is the leading role that the IMF and its allied institutions have taken in the fight to save the planet from climate change. The IMF’s answer to climate change, which is influential given its inordinate role in the world, points to the private capitalist sector as the solution to the planet’s problems.55 All this is ironic given that the private capitalist sector’s insatiable appetite for profits at all costs has been responsible for the climate crisis.

The Third World must re-imagine a path out of our current crisis that doesn’t depend on the IMF, its allied institutions, and Western capital. The last seventy years or so have demonstrated that a reliance on these institutions only serves to trap the Third World in a perpetual state of underdevelopment. We need an emancipatory set of institutions and frameworks that will lead to the total independence of the Third World.

This is a task that the Collective on African Political Economy (CAPE) has decided to take on in a serious way. CAPE is a new grouping of Africans from different walks of life that are committed to the economic, and thus total, emancipation of the African continent and the Third World more broadly. CAPE hopes to recapture the emancipatory scholarship and politics of a previous generation of intellectuals that emerged from the post-independence movement in the 1960s and reformulate it to respond to the needs of today’s world. The lessons of that generation and the institutional infrastructure that it built have been forgotten largely as a result of IMF and World Bank-inspired structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that began in the 1980s. The SAPs are responsible for widespread destruction, including the evisceration of progressive scholarly communities in Africa and much of the Third World. It is precisely such communities that CAPE hopes to bring to life to rebuild a present, and future, that centres the needs and aspirations of the majority.

Âurea Mouzinho
Peter Magati
Crystal Simeoni
Hibist Kassa
Brian Kamanzi
Ndongo Samba Sylla
Grieve Chelwa
Ihsaan Bassier



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Constructing Financial Alternatives for a Sovereign Africa and Third World
Over the course of the past two decades, the stranglehold of Western-based bondholders and Western-controlled IFIs has weakened as other countries – mainly China – have emerged as the largest trading partners with African states and as the largest lenders to these states. Importantly, China’s public and private debt forgiveness during the pandemic has put pressure on IFIs to rethink the harshness of their debt repayment-austerity governance model.

The opening provided by Chinese funding is not an opportunity merely to borrow more: it is an opportunity for African states to construct genuine, and sovereign, development projects in this climate. These projects must seize multiple opportunities to raise funds, and the fragility of IMF power must also be utilised to advance fiscal and monetary policies that are built on an agenda committed to solving the problems of the African people, not facilitating the demands of wealthy bondholders and the Western states that back them. A number of mechanisms are on the table to avoid the IMF-driven debt-austerity trap. Some of them, expanding upon A Plan to Save the Planet, are listed below.

Invalidate historical debts and rescue stolen assets:

Renegotiate all odious external debts of the poorer nations. An ‘odious debt’ is a debt incurred by a country without the assent of its people, such as during the phase of a military dictatorship.56
Seize assets held in illicit tax havens, which as of 2010 total at least $32 trillion.57
Build progressive tax codes:

Build the capacity of tax departments in each country, including digital tax infrastructure.
Implement taxes on wealth and inheritance.
Implement higher rates of taxation on income, such as capital gains, that is made through financial speculation by all non-bank corporate entities.
Discourage the profit-shifting activities of multinational corporations and adopt a unitary approach to tax the share of global profits generated by subsidiaries of multinational corporations.
Reform domestic banking infrastructure:

Democratise the banking system by expanding the role and size of public banking and by implementing more regulations of and transparency for private banking.
Enforce ceilings as a percentage of liabilities on speculative banking activity by commercial banks.
Regulate the interest rates that banks charge for specific goods, such as housing loans.
Implement tight regulations for pension funds so that the savings of the people are not used recklessly for financial speculation and encourage the creation of public sector pension funds.
Build alternative funding sources to the IMF’s debt-austerity traps:

Set capital controls to prevent both foreign and domestic capital flight, policies that even the IMF argues are important.58 As highlighted earlier, capital flight is not only deleterious for local financial markets: it also robs the continent of the resources needed to drive an autonomous developmental agenda. With capital controls, governments will be able to devise effective monetary policies in an environment that would not be buffeted by shocks and unexpected fragilities. Capital controls must be implemented alongside a robust wealth tax collection system, pro-labour distribution policies, and the prevention of dollarisation.
Attract investment from institutions that do not enforce structural adjustment conditions, such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the BRICS’s New Development Bank. The absence of SAPs-like conditions on these emerging and alternative sources of capital explains their growing popularity in the South and Africa in particular.
Take advantage of local currency central bank swap arrangements (such as those offered by the People’s Bank of China).
Adopt ceilings on the interest rates that commercial and multilateral lenders charge developing countries.
Enhance regionalism:

Encourage the creation of regional trade and reconciliation mechanisms.

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Notes
1 Marcello Estevão and Sebastian Essl, ‘When the Debt Crises Hit, Don’t Simply Blame the Pandemic’, World Bank (blog), 28 June 2022, https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/when ... e-pandemic.

2 Estevão and Essl, ‘When the Debt Crises Hit, Don’t Simply Blame the Pandemic’.

3 International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report – Navigating the High-Inflation Environment (Washington, DC: IMF, October 2022),https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFS ... tober-2022, ix.

4 IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, ix.

5 International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Monitor: Helping People Bounce Back (Washington, DC: IMF, October 2022), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/ ... october-22, xi–xii.

6 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update: Inflation Peaking amid Low Growth (IMF, January 2023), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO ... nuary-2023, 7.

7 Thomas Sankara, ‘A United Front Against Debt’, Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debts, 27 October 2011, https://www.cadtm.org/spip.php?page=imp ... %20lenders.

8 Sankara, ‘A United Front Against Debt’.

9 For more on this, see Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, Looking Towards China: Multipolarity as an Opportunity for the Latin American People, dossier no. 51, 11 April 2022, https://thetricontinental.org/dossier-5 ... ipolarity/.

10 John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London: Palgrave Macmillan, [1919] 2019), 58.

11 John Maynard Keynes, The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Volume XXVI, Activities
1941–1946. Shaping the Post-War World: Bretton Woods and Reparations, ed. D. E. Moggridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 42.

12 International Monetary Fund, IMF History Volume 3 (1945–1965): Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation Volume III: Documents (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, [1969] 1996), 15.

13 International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2020), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf, 2.

14 International Monetary Fund Policy Development and Review Department, ‘Review of the Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) and Buffer Stock Financing Facility (BSFF) – Preliminary Considerations’, International Monetary Fund, 9 December 1999, https://www.imf.org/external/np/ccffbsf ... /index.htm.

15 James M. Boughton, The IMF and the Silent Revolution Global Finance and Development in the 1980s (International Monetary Fund, 11 September 2000), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/silent/index.htm#3.

16 Raghuram Rajan, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010), 93.

17 Jonathan D. Ostry, Prakash Loungani, and Davide Furceri, ‘Neoliberalism: Oversold?’ Finance and Deveopment 53, no. 2 (June 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fa ... /ostry.htm.

18 Alexander E. Kentikelenis, Thomas H. Stubbs, and Lawrence P. King, ‘IMF Conditionality and Development Policy Space, 1985–2014’,
Review of International Political Economy
23, no. 4 (2016): 543-582.

19 Lounceny Nabé and Kerfalla Yansané, ‘Guinea: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding’, International Monetary Fund, 20 June 2011, https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2011/gin/063011.pdf.

20 Mohamed Diaré and Lounceny Nabé, ‘Guinea: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding’, International Monetary Fund, 1 February 2014, https://www.imf.org/External/NP/LOI/2014/GIN/020114.pdf, 5.

21 UNICEF Office of Research – Innocenti, COVID-19 and the Looming Debt Crisis, Innocenti Policy Brief 2021-01, Protecting and Transforming Social Spending for Inclusive Recoveries (Florence: UNICEF, April 2021), https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications ... crisis.pdf, 15.

22 Kristalina Georgieva, ‘The Next Phase of the Crisis: Further Action Needed for a Resilient Recovery’, IMF (blog), 16 July 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2 ... t-recovery.

23 Oxfam International, ‘IMF Must Abandon Demands for Austerity as Cost-of-Living Crisis Drives up Hunger and Poverty Worldwide’, Oxfam Press Release, 19 April 2022, https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases ... nd-poverty.

24 Matthew Martin et al., The West Africa Inequality Crisis: Fighting Austerity and the Pandemic, Oxfam and Development Finance International, 14 October 2021, https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.co ... 021-en.pdf, 4, 19.

25 Dambisa Moyo,
Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009).

26 Peter Bauer, ‘The Case Against Foreign Aid, Intereconomics’, Verlag Weltarchiv 8, no. 5 (1973) 154–157.

27 Reuters, ‘Huge Demand for Ghana’s Debut Eurobond’, Ghana Web, 27 September 2007, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/ ... ?ID=131428.

28 Vivian Kai Mensah, ‘Ghana Issues Third Eurobond’, 11 September 2014, Citi 97.3 FM, https://citifmonline.com/2014/09/ghana- ... XkD86.dpbs.

29 Grieve Chelwa, ‘It’s Time to Treat Commodity-Backed Loans to African Countries the Same Way We Treat Equity’, Quartz, 2 June, 2015, https://qz.com/africa/417167/its-time-t ... eat-equity; Grieve Chelwa, ‘The “Truth” about Zambia’s Debt’, Grieve Chelwa (blog), 15 October 2020, http://gchelwa.blogspot.com/2020/10/the ... -debt.html.

30 Paul Wafula, ‘Kenya: Eurobond Dossier Reveals Kenya’s Deep Economic Ties to China, IMF’, AllAfrica, 17 June 2021, https://allafrica.com/stories/202106170380.html.

31 World Bank, International Debt Statistics 2022 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2022), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bit ... sAllowed=y, 39.

32 World Bank, International Debt Statistics 2022 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2022), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bit ... sAllowed=y, 39.

33 ‘The Growing Debt Crisis in Lower Income Countries and Cuts in Public Spending’, Debt Justice, July 2022, https://debtjustice.org.uk/wp-content/u ... _07.22.pdf, 2.

34 Deborah Brautigam and Meg Rithmire, ‘The Chinese “Debt Trap” Is a Myth’, The Atlantic, 6 February 2021, https://www.theatlantic.com/internation ... cy/617953/.

35 ‘Loan Data’, China Africa Research Initiative,
Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, accessed 13 February 2023, http://www.sais-cari.org/data.

36 Edwin Mutai, ‘Ouko Says Eurobond Billions Still a Mystery’, Business Daily Africa, 23 January 2018, https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/ ... ry–2186608; Steven Mvula and Frank Ching’ambu, ‘Where Did the Eurobond Given to ZR Go?’, Frontlines Zambia, 4 August 2022, https://frontlineszambia.com/archives/26311.

37 ‘Mozambique and the “Tuna Bond” Scandal’, Spotlight on Corruption, 9 February 2021, ; Lily Kuo, ‘Kenya’s Ex-PM Accuses US Banks of Helping the Government Steal $1 Billion from the Country’s First Eurobond’, Quartz, 4 January 2016, https://qz.com/africa/594324/kenyas-ex- ... t-eurobond.

38 Alicia García-Herrero,
Suman Bery, and
Pauline Weil, ‘How Is the G20 Tackling Debt Problems of the Poorest Countries?’, Bruegel (blog), 25 February 2021,https://www.bruegel.org/blog-post/how-g ... -countries; ‘China Says Has Given $2.1 Billion of Debt Relief to Poor Countries’, Reuters, 20 November 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chin ... SKBN28009A.

39 ‘The Common Framework for Debt Treatment beyond the DSSI’, Ministry of Economy and Finance of the Italian Government, accessed 13 February 2023, https://www.mef.gov.it/en/G20-Italy/com ... ework.html.

40 ALBA-TCP, Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, and Simón Bolívar Institute, A Plan to Save the Planet, 24 November 2021, https://thetricontinental.org/text-a-pl ... he-planet/.

41 ‘Factsheet: IMF Conditionality’, International Monetary Fund, 22 February 2021, https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets ... itionality.

42 Ostry, Loungani, and Furceri, ‘Neoliberalism: Oversold?’; Grieve Chelwa, ‘Is it Too Late Now to Say Sorry?’ Africa Is a Country, 29 May 2016, https://africasacountry.com/2016/05/is- ... mf-edition.

43 Shahra Razavi et al., ‘Social Policy Advice to Countries from the International Monetary Fund during the COVID-19 Crisis: Continuity and Change’ (ILO Working Paper 42, International Labour Organisation, Geneva, 10 December 2021), https://www.ilo.org/global/publications ... /index.htm.

44 International Monetary Fund, ‘Zambia: Request for an Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility-Press Release; Staff Report; Staff Supplement; Staff Statement; and Statement by the Executive Director for Zambia’, IMF Country Report, no. 22/292 (September 2022), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/ ... aff-523196, 10.

45 Grieve Chelwa, ‘IMF Deal: Cry, My Beloved Zambia’, Grieve Chelwa (blog), 7 September 2022, .

46 Peter Doyle, ‘The IMF’s Zambian and Sri Lankan Programs are Indefensible’, Peter Doyle (blog), 14 September 2022, .

47 ‘Ghana to Conclude IMF Deal in March – Akufo-Addo Hopes’, Africanews, 7 February 2023, https://www.africanews.com/2023/02/07/g ... ddo-hopes/; ‘Ghana: IMF Program Helps Restore Luster to a Rising Star in Africa’, International Monetary Fund, May 2019, https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/GHA/gh ... case-study.

48 Andre Gunder Frank, ‘The Development of Underdevelopment’, Monthly Review, 18 April 1966, https://monthlyreviewarchives.org/index ... -1966-08_3; Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (New York: Verso Books, 2018).

49 Daniel Mulé and Mukupa Nsenduluka, ‘Potential Corporate Tax Avoidance in Zambia’s Mining Sector? Estimating Tax Revenue Gains from Addressing Profit Shifting or Revising Profit Allocation Rules. A Case Study of Glencore Mopani Copper Mines’, Oxfam Research Backgrounder Series, December 2021, https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/re ... ng-sector/.

50 Alberto Fernández and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Escriben Lula y Alberto Fernandez: Relanzamiento de la alianza estratégica entre Argentina y Brasil’ [Lula and Alberto Fernandez Write: Relaunching the Strategic Alliance Between Argentina and Brazil], Perfil, 21 January 2023, https://www.perfil.com/noticias/opinion ... ilva.phtml.

51 Zinya Salfiti,
‘Nobel Economist Paul Krugman Slams Brazil and Argentina’s Joint Currency Plan, Saying “It’s a Terrible Idea”’,
Markets Insider, 30 January 2023,
https://markets.businessinsider.com/new ... dea-2023-1.

52 ‘United States of America’, African Development Bank, accessed 13 February 2023, https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/non-r ... of-america.

53 African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF), African Union Commission (AUC), and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Revenue Statistics in Africa 2022 (Paris: OECD Publishing, Npvember 2022), https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/bro ... africa.pdf, 3; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Economic Development in Africa Report 2020. Tackling Illicit Financial Flows for Sustainable Development in Africa (Geneva: United Nations, 2022), .

54 Isabel Ortiz et al., Fiscal Space for Social Protection. A Handbook for Assessing Financing Options (Geneva: International Labour Organisation, November 2019), https://www.ilo.org/secsoc/information- ... /index.htm.

55 ‘COP27: IMF Calls for Climate-Smart Investment in Africa’, Africanews, 8 November 2022, https://www.africanews.com/2022/11/08/c ... in-africa/.

56 Michael Kremer and Seema Jayachandran, ‘Odious Debt’,
Finance & Development 39, no. 2 (June 2002), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fan ... kremer.htm.

57 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Economic Development in Africa Report 2020. Tackling Illicit Financial Flows for Sustainable Development in Africa, 88.

58 International Monetary Fund, ‘Review of The Institutional View on The Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows’, IMF Policy Paper, 30 March 2022, .

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Re: Africa

Post by blindpig » Thu Apr 13, 2023 2:51 pm

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White Malice: The CIA and the Covert Recolonization of Africa

A review of “White Malice: The CIA and the Covert Recolonization of Africa” by Susan Williams
By Kim Scipes (Posted Apr 13, 2023)

Originally published: Countercurrents on April 10, 2023 (more by Countercurrents) |

Africa has long been looked at by outsiders as a continent that is hopelessly mired in corruption and incapable of social and economic development. This especially pertains to sub-Saharan Africa, overwhelmingly populated by black people, thus fitting the trope of white supremists that black people cannot successfully govern themselves.

This book by Susan Williams annihilates the lie. Williams details the impact of stealing millions of people for enslavement, the subsequent colonization of the continent by Western European powers and then, after the decolonization of a number of these countries, the recolonization of the continent by the United States operating explicitly albeit covertly through its Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). She expressly shows in mind-blowing detail the process by which this recolonization was affected, including the 1960 authorization of the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, Prime Minister of the Congo, by U.S. President Dwight David Eisenhower.

Williams begins her account with the slave trade: “recent authoritative research for a major database estimate that more than twelve and a half million captive individuals were forced to leave Africa between 1501 and 1875,” and those “Nearly two million of those people are estimated to have perished during the horror of the journeys; many died through disease or ill treatment, and others, in despair or defiance, jumped overboard” (19-20). She orients her account from the perspective of Ghana, pointing out that,

To facilitate the transatlantic slave trade, more than fifty castles and forts were built along the 260 miles of the Gold Coast by the various slave trading nations. Through the bleak fortifications passed people captured within what is now Ghana and in surrounding territories (21).

She continues with her account of the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference, whereby the countries of Western Europe divided Africa up among themselves “in order to acquire natural resources to feed their growing industries, and also to build global markets for these industries” (26). One of the key prizes was awarding the Congo to King Leopold of Belgium,

a territory that was bigger than all of Western Europe and nearly eighty times the size of Belgium (27).

It is from this perspective—Ghana and the Congo—and through key leaders like Kwame Nkrumah of the former and Patrice Lumumba of the latter, that Williams tells her story which really extends across southern Africa as a whole, and at times, the entire continent. It is developed from World War II—the uranium for the atomic bombs used by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki came from a Belgian-owned mine near Shinkolobwe in the Congo— until the early 1960s, focusing on the efforts by many African countries to gain and keep their independence, rejecting and repudiating colonization from European countries.

Colonization had been horrific. The Western European countries sought to obtain raw materials and natural resources at the absolute cheapest prices possible, and without any regard for the impact on the peoples of the colonies they plundered. They used extreme brutality to get them. In the Congo alone, under the 23 year direct rule of King Leopold II, before he gave it to Belgium,

an estimated ten million people died as a consequence of brutality and execution; this amounted to about 50 percent of the population (27-28).

The brutality of colonization was rationalized as trying to “civilize” the heathens, to train them to fit into the modern world. At independence day in the Congo—June 30, 1960—the King of Belgium, Baudouin, claimed that over the previous 80 years, Belgium had sent “The best of its sons. These “pioneers,” he added,

had built communications, founded a medical service, modernized agriculture and built cities and industries and schools—raising the well-being of your population and equipping the country with technicians indispensable to its development (177).

The practices of the colonizers undercut this lie: as a New York Times reporter who was present later stated,

barely half of the Congolese can read and write, and only sixteen Congolese are university or college graduates. There are no Congolese doctors, lawyers or engineers, and no African officers in the 25,000-man Congolese Army (177).

And from that, the Congolese were expected to develop a modern society … and immediately.

Yet, at the same time, the political context in which “independence” was achieved must be remembered: it was during the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. And that meant that “outsiders” were taking great interest in what was developing in southern Africa. When we realize the incredible mineral deposits in the country in general, as well as the greatest deposits of enriched uranium in the world at Shinkolobwe, and we see private business interests and U.S. government political interests combined, then we see riding in is the CIA: the Congolese were not allowed to develop their country in peace. The Congo became recognized as the lynch pin of anti-colonial liberation across the continent.

Williams detailed the importance of the clear-sighted Kwame Nkrumah, who became the first president of Ghana upon its independence in 1957. Nkrumah and his political forces wanted to advance the liberation of the entire continent, and were envisioning a “United States of Africa,” seeing continental political unity the only way possible to achieve such. Incredibly important to this political project was the All African People’s Conference in Accra, Ghana in December 1958. This was “the first time in history that Africans from across the continent would assemble together” and on African soil (36).

More than three hundred political and trade union leaders responded. They represented some sixty-five organizations from twenty-eight African territories, including colonies ruled by Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain. Fraternal delegates and observers also came, including visitors from Canada, the People’s Republic of China, India, Indonesia, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, the USA, Britain, and other European countries (37).

Perhaps most fateful for Nkrumah and Africa was the attendance of Patrice Lumumba of the Congo.

Nkrumah and the 33-year old Lumumba met and hit it off. Lumumba was the leader of an independence-seeking political movement in his country. Nkrumah recognized the importance of the Congo:

“Geographically, strategically, and politically … the Congo is the most vital region of Africa. Military control of the Congo by any foreign power would give it easy access to most of the continent south of the Sahara,” he wrote in his 1967 book, Challenge of the Congo. He recognized its central position, including “its vast area and tremendous resources.”

“Foreign powers,” noted Nkrumah, “clearly regard the Congo as the key to military control of Africa.” This was the significance …

of the aid which Belgium received from her allies, to build great military bases at Kitona in the West and Kamina in the East of the Congo. This is the reason why there are eight international airports, thirty principal and over a hundred secondary and local airports in the Congo.

The Congo, he argued, was the buffer state between independent Africa in the North and the lands beset by colonialism and white supremacy in the South.

Northwards stands free Africa determined on a free continent. Southwards, Angola begins and stretches to the stronghold of colonial and racial oppression, the Republic of South Africa.

The degree of the Congo’s independence … will substantially determine the ultimate fate of the whole Continent of Africa (34-35).


It was from this understanding that Nkrumah recognized the importance of Lumumba.

Unfortunately, however, people in the United States government, and especially the CIA, also understood the importance of Africa to the Cold War and of the Congo’s importance to Africa. They refused to see Africa’s desire to remain independent of both the United States and the Soviet Union, and assumed that any effort that did not embrace the United States meant being pro-Communist, thus serving as an enemy of the United States.

Key to American government efforts was positioning the United States as an ally to liberation struggles and being against European colonialism. The U.S. was against European colonialism, but it was also against African liberation, seeking to control Africa for its own economic and political interests.

Williams carefully and extensively documents the CIA efforts to gain control over Africa and especially the Congo. Perhaps most critically—building off reporting by Ramparts magazine, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and later books by Frances Stonor Saunders and Hugh Wilford—she reports efforts by the CIA to influence the thinking and cultural impact of intellectuals: “Eventually, more than 225 different organizations—operating in many parts of the world including Africa—were identified as direct or indirect recipients of CIA funds” (56). These included organizations that suggested they were supportive of African liberation, both in the U.S. and in Europe, but were specifically advancing the interests of particular U.S. businesses, the U.S. government, or both.

This—it must be kept in mind—was in conjunction with U.S. military operations in the South Atlantic, private businessmen seeking to advance their financial and economic interests ahead of everything else, as well as efforts by the CIA operating directly to bribe Congolese officials at all levels so as to buy their political support. This was done under both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations in the 1950s and ‘60s. [Although Williams did not put it in these terms, the U.S. Empire must be advanced under both Republicans and Democrats, while perhaps differing on domestic policies.]. And, of course, it continued beyond.

In other words, this was a massive effort to recolonize the Congo under American control, replacing European colonialism with U.S. neo-colonialism.

A key figure in all of these machinations was Joseph-Désiré Mobutu. Mobutu helped remove Lumumba from his office as Prime Minister, leading to incredible civil unrest, and then was active in Lumumba’s killing in early 1961. (Mobutu and allies killed Lumumba before the CIA could; in efforts supported by Eisenhower, the CIA had brought a trained assassin into the country, as well as the CIA’s leading bio-technician with poison for Lumumba.). The resulting civil unrest was extensive: “It has been estimated that the conflict in the Congo between 1961 and 1965 led to the deaths of one million people.” Mobutu was a collaborator with the U.S. And “In December 1965, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu once again overthrew civilian rule in a coup backed by the CIA” (518). Williams concludes her account,

For the next thirty-one years, the Congo was ruled with an iron fist by Mobutu—a dictator chosen by the U.S. government and installed by the CIA (518).



This is a sweeping book. Williams is a careful scholar who extensively details her sources and the evidentiary bases of her findings, and is unwilling to make claims she cannot support. Her choice of Nkrumah and Lumumba for perspective was excellent, and she conveys well the importance of their efforts. Her approach is systematic and rigorous. She interweaves successfully various levels of politics and analysis. Her sources provide an understanding of what really happened, but she also has the knowledge and experience to reject claims that cannot be substantiated or are “disingenuous,” especially when using autobiographies of former CIA agents.

This book provides an extremely rigorous and detailed history of CIA activities in the Congo during 1960-61, which is absolutely crucial to understanding subsequent developments on the continent, especially in the southern part. Because of the activities in the Congo by Angolan organizations, especially concerning the organization and activities of CIA-supported Holden Roberto, she provides additional information on the struggles in Angola prior to its gaining its independence in 1975. It seems likely that the details in the Congo will also “slush over” into Zambia and particularly Zimbabwe, although probably not into Mozambique and South Africa, nor Namibia. What one gains from such a detailed account is how difficult the U.S. has made “independence” in southern Africa, and how much revolutionaries have had to do to prevail. And then, how difficult it has been subsequently to transform neo-colonial societies into liberatory ones.

The fact is that limitations of post-independence governments have not been primarily because of Black people’s incompetence, but mainly because of machinations by the CIA and related agencies, and organizations dominated by the United States, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Williams does not make the argument—although by providing such conclusive evidence, she moves us closer to our understanding of the US’s foreign policy and operations—but critical observers must shift our understanding from considering the U.S. as an individual country, albeit first among others, to understanding that the U.S. is the heartland of the U.S. Empire that has consciously been trying to dominate the world since about 1943, but definitely since 1945, and has had the economic, political, cultural, military, and diplomatic power and will to do so.

It is this evidence from southern Africa that perhaps illuminates the U.S. Empire most clearly to date, although we need to know more about AFL-CIO operations in the region—we know they were present—as well as activities of the U.S.-dominated financial institutions. We also need similarly detailed accounts of U.S.-South African relations during the period; the U.S. government interacted differently with white-dominated South Africa than it did with Black-led countries.

Why the southern African case is so important is that the U.S. extended massive effort to undercut Black independence and then democracy when events in southern Africa at that time were of all-but-no consequence to the safety and security of the United States. Emotionally, and perhaps for some even politically, southern Africa was of importance to some African Americans, but it was for a relative few among them, and much, much less for all but a few white Americans. Southern Africa was not linked to a country that could theoretically be seen as a potential enemy, as one could argue—albeit incorrectly—about Vietnam and China. This case unambiguously illustrates that U.S. government activities around the world are for something much larger, much more impactful, than the mere defense of a single country, the United States of America. That larger entity, as I’ve been arguing since 1984, is the U.S. Empire.

This might grate on most Americans’ ears. Yet Alfred W. McCoy, in his brilliant ‘In the Shadows of the American Century’: The Rise and Decline of U.S. Global Power (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2017)—reviewed in Class, Race and Corporate Power (Volume 6, Issue 1) by this reviewer—put it clearly:

Calling a nation that controls half of the planet’s military forces and much of its wealth an ‘empire’ became nothing more fitting an analytical frame to appropriate facts” (McCoy: 44).

Accordingly, this case has a relevance beyond the early 1960s and beyond southern Africa. Establishing the existence of the U.S. Empire enables us to see why so much time, resources, military troops, and determination was put into subjugation of Vietnam, and then later, Iraq and Afghanistan, not one of which was a threat to the United States. It also explains the motivation behind efforts by the CIA and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to undercut and destroy progressive efforts around the world. And—by arguing the need to include the efforts of the AFL-CIO in southern Africa—we can understand that the leadership of the AFL-CIO thinks the U.S. should dominate the world, and has been working for the past 100+ years to help realize that goal.

Where this comes together contemporaneously is in understanding U.S. efforts in the Ukraine; the Empire has found a way to undercut a major rival, Russia—which it has never been able to subjugate—while supporting the “heroic” government of Zelensky, without getting its dirty hands soiled further. And yet, we know enough to know that the U.S. government precipitated the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While this is not to applaud or even to accept the invasion of Ukraine by Russia or to ignore the suffering of the people of Ukraine, it is to recognize that much is going on below the surface today that will eventually be detailed.

And for those who are looking, events in the Ukraine are showing that most of the U.S. mass media—and I specifically include the New York Times—are not just reporting but are actually supporting the efforts of the U.S. Empire in Ukraine, despite their pious duck tears for the embattled Ukrainian peoples.

This, I’m willing to bet, will all come out in the future. In White Malice, Susan Williams has shown us how to do it. We need to study her work, and then apply its lessons to the future. Those who fail to learn the lessons of the past are doomed to repeat them; as Country Joe and the Fish once sang,

Be the first one on your block to have your boy come Africa has long been looked at by outsiders as a continent that is hopelessly mired in corruption and incapable of social and economic development. in a box

To Williams, I give the highest compliment I can give: I wish I had written this book!

https://mronline.org/2023/04/13/a-revie ... -williams/

*********

US Still Imposing Illegal, Unilateral Economic US Sanctions on Eritrea
Ann Garrison, BAR Contributing Editor 12 Apr 2023

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An Eritrean official explains how U.S. sanctions impact the people of his country.

The Ethiopian army decisively defeated the US-backed Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in November 2022, after a two-year war that cost hundreds of thousands of lives and displaced over five million people. However, none of the unilateral US sanctions imposed on Ethiopia and Eritrea, all of which violate international law, have been lifted.

The most punishing sanctions were imposed on Eritrea when, in November 2021, it was excluded from the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Transactions) system, used to conduct international financial transactions. SWIFT allows banks to rapidly relay information to one another, conducting virtually instantaneous transactions. Exclusion put Eritrea in the exclusive company of Iran and North Korea and, as of February 2022, Russia.

I spoke by phone with Yemane Ghebreab, Advisor to Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, about the current US economic sanctions.

ANN GARRISON: How is Eritrea affected by exclusion from the SWIFT system?

YEMANE GHEBREAB: Much of world trade is done in the dollar and the euro, especially the dollar, and if you're going to trade internationally, then those transactions have got to go through banks. And if you’re using the US currency, they go through US banks.

So they stopped it. Countries excluded from the SWIFT system have trouble conducting trade of all sorts because they can’t complete financial transactions in dollars.

ANN GARRISON: And how do you cope with that?

YEMANE GHEBREAB: Well, it takes some creativity, but there are ways. For one, we do business with those who are willing to do business with us. As you know the West dislikes Eritrea and wants to isolate us, but Russia and China are willing to do business with us. And if we can’t settle all our accounts instantly using SWIFT, we can complete transactions over a longer period of time.

AG: I think there’ve been other economic sanctions in addition to exclusion from SWIFT. Could you talk about those?

YG: The US has also closed the accounts of Eritrean diplomatic missions in a number of countries, which meant that it became almost impossible for those diplomatic missions to function because they cannot pay rent, and they cannot pay utilities and other bills. So the US greatly disrupted the diplomatic work of Eritrea.

They also caused problems for Eritreans in the Western diaspora trying to send money to their families by making it impossible to exchange dollars for nakfa, the Eritrean currency.

AG: How do the families cope with that?

YG: Where there’s a will there’s a way. People will send money to their families even if they have to carry cash or send it with someone else traveling to the country.

AG: How do the sanctions affect the global environment for trading or investing in Eritrea?

YG: This can become a problem in all sorts of ways. Once major corporations, institutions that we do business with, get a feeling that Eritrea is under sanctions, they become very nervous about doing any business with Eritrea. They become afraid of falling afoul of US sanctions and becoming sanctioned themselves.

We had an experience with this during the previous nearly 10-year UN sanctions on Eritrea. Those UN sanctions were an arms embargo, but people don’t always read the fine print of sanctions resolutions on Eritrea. They just hear that Eritrea is under sanctions, so they don’t want to deal with Eritrea.

For instance, many times we had difficulties importing vaccines and medicines to Eritrea because the carriers feared that because they were dealing with a sanctioned country, they might themselves run afoul of sanctions, and therefore they refused to transport the vaccines.

At one point, UNICEF, the United Nations Children's Fund, had to charter a plane to deliver vaccines to Eritrea because the commercial carriers refused to transport them. They were in short supply and there was a period when we ran out of vaccines, even though vaccination to stop easily preventable diseases—especially childhood diseases—has been one of Eritrea’s top priorities for many years. We did succeed in all but eradicating childhood diseases that can be prevented by vaccination, but that was despite that period when we ran out of vaccines.

Sanctions become extremely difficult and do extreme damage when they run for extended periods. The last UN sanctions went on for almost 10 years. So that had a major impact for the economy, for the living conditions of the population.

Those sanctions were lifted in 2018 after Prime Minister Abiy and President Afwerki negotiated peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea, but then in 2021, the US imposed these unilateral sanctions on Eritrea. They have already had the sorts of impacts I’ve described, but if they go on for an extended period of time like the UN sanctions, then their cumulative impact will be that much greater.

AG: Yemane, thank you for speaking to Black Agenda Report.

YG: Thank you and Black Agenda Report for taking interest in Eritrea.

https://www.blackagendareport.com/us-st ... ns-eritrea

Socialist Party of Zambia attacked by members of ruling party, Dr. Fred M’membe arrested

According to the Socialist Party, their party members were attacked at a campaign meeting ahead of a by-election in the Serenje district and SP President Dr. Fred M’membe was later arrested

April 10, 2023 by Tanupriya Singh

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Members of the Socialist Party of Zambia were attacked by alleged cadre of the UNDP. Photo: Dr. Fred M'membe

On Saturday, April 8, members of the Socialist Party of Zambia (SP) were targets of a violent attack by alleged cadres of the ruling United Party for National Development (UPND) in the district of Serenje, Central Province. Shortly after, Zambian police arrested SP president Dr. Fred M’membe, even as the attackers remained at large.

According to the Zambian police and local media, violence had been reported in the district’s Mwalilima and Kamalamba areas on Saturday as political parties campaigned ahead of a by-election for the Muchinda ward on April 20.

Speaking to Peoples Dispatch, M’membe described how SP members had been attacked in Kamalamba on Saturday afternoon. As per the timetable prepared by the Electoral Commission of Zambia, April 8 had been allocated to the SP for campaigning in the area.

However, just as SP members were about to begin their public meeting, two vehicles with UPND cadres pulled up, “they descended upon us with stones and sticks. At least one person was carrying a catapult. We tried to evade the situation, and eventually the police arrived. We were being attacked, kicked, and punched in front of the police, they were incapable of doing anything,” M’membe said.

He added that eventually the police fired tear gas and it was then that SP members managed to reach a police post. The attack by UPND cadres left Preston Chinyama, a political advisor to M’membe, badly injured.

SP spokesperson Frank Bwalya also stated that other officials and residents had been injured, and that vehicles had been damaged.

In the statement shared with Peoples Dispatch, M’membe added that UPND cadres carried out a second attack against the SP on Saturday at midnight, this time at the party’s main campaign camp in Mwalilima, looting campaigning materials and foodstuffs.

‘The attacked have been framed as the attackers’
On Sunday, the Zambia Police Service announced that police in Serenje had charged 64-year-old M’membe with “Unlawful discharge of a Firearm”. He was also jointly charged with “Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm” along with two other “suspected” members of the SP, 62-year-old Saili Chita, and 41-year-old Daniel Mumba who is a part of M’membe’s security detail.

They were arrested for allegedly having assaulted nine suspected members of the UPND. Chita had been a former local deputy campaign manager for the UPND before quitting the party to join the SP.

The police statement also noted that two members of the SP had been injured. While members of the party were immediately remanded in custody, the police said a “manhunt” was launched to find the suspected UPND members behind the assault.

Though M’membe, Chita, and Mumba were released on police bond on Sunday pending court appearance, the police had allegedly been under pressure not to release them, with the senior police command, UPND cadres, and the District Commissioner locked in a meeting “for hours” at the Serenje police station, M’membe said on Twitter.

In an audio message shared on his Facebook page, M’membe said, “Let us not allow ourselves to be deceived that political violence ended with the removal of the PF [Patriotic Front] from government [following the 2021 elections]…Today we were attacked, and after being attacked we have been framed as the attackers.”

“I am being accused of assaulting someone, a UPND cadre, when I was nowhere near [the scene]. I saved a situation that could have ended in the death of a UPND cadre or a Socialist Party cadre.”

He explained that he had fired a few shots to disperse the crowd, and that many had run away, but that “no one was aimed at, nobody was assaulted. But today, I am being framed and [there is an] attempt to make me out to be a violent person, which I am not. It won’t work.”

M’membe added that he had been the first one to go to the police to complain about the violence. “The UPND cadres who attacked us are not being arrested, they are not in any way being questioned…I was myself assaulted in front of police officers, I was threatened in front of police officers at the police station. This is the type of policing we are seeing today, when we complain about the structure of the police leadership…we were seen as being malicious, but this is what happens when you run the police in this way.”

Meanwhile, Serenje Radio 89.5 FM also reported that three members of its staff had been attacked by suspected UPND cadres while on duty outside the Serenje police station on April 8. It added that the cadres had been “imported from outside” and attacked a journalist for filming their protest at the scene.

Condemnation
Zambia’s Green Party strongly condemned the attacks and arrest of M’Membe. Speaking to News Central TV, the party’s president Peter Sinkamba said that M’membe had been framed, “We have a situation where the police in this country have always wanted to side with the political party in government during elections. Because of this kind of behavior we have ended up having political violence reoccur every time there are elections.”

He added, “Dr M’membe had a lawful permit to run the campaign yesterday but unfortunately they were confronted by members of the ruling party, the UPND.”

Sinkamba emphasized that the major problem in the incident was the failure of the police to discharge their duties under the Electoral Processes Act, “We have an electoral code of conduct which mandates the police to be impartial in their conduct.” He added that it was also the responsibility of the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) to ensure that police do act in a partial manner.

The ECZ condemned the violence in Serenje in a statement, warning all participating political parties that they may face disqualification “should these acts of violence continue”.

The SP has held UPND leaders responsible for the attacks, and denounced their failure to condemn or stop the violence — “Don’t believe or trust whatever UPND leadership says about them being against political violence. They support, encourage, and sponsor the violence of their cadres and supporters”, M’membe said.

“Violence is used as a tool to stop, paralyze, slow down or frustrate the campaigns of their opponents.”

The 2021 presidential elections in Zambia had witnessed bouts of political violence including attacks on members of the SP. While president Hichilema has continued the neoliberal policies of his predecessors, with a new wave of austerity-driven measures being imposed at the direction of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the SP has forged an alternative political path for the people in Zambia, one that is grounded in addressing issues including poverty and access to education.

https://peoplesdispatch.org/2023/04/10/ ... -arrested/

Solidarity with the Socialist Party of Zambia: Drop the charges against Dr. Fred M’membe!
Liberation StaffApril 11, 2023 372 2 minutes read
Download PDF flyer https://flyer-generator.herokuapp.com/? ... sts/112444

The Party for Socialism and Liberation strongly condemns the brutal attack on April 8 against a public meeting organized by the Socialist Party of Zambia, and the subsequent arrest of party president Dr. Fred M’membe on false charges. The assault, carried out by members of the ruling United Party for National Development, came amid an election campaign. This is a cowardly attempt to suppress the rising popularity of the Socialist Party of Zambia, which fights for the rights of workers and the poor.

The U.S. government views Zambia as an arena to conduct its strategy of “great power competition” against China. This includes using Zambia as its base for the recent “Summit for Democracy” – a soft-power tool designed to sharpen the new Cold War atmosphere around the globe. The “World Liberty Congress”, a regime-change operation with ties to Western intelligence circles, is also attempting to use Zambia as a base to train activists to overthrow anti-imperialist governments in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere. As long as the UPND government is on its side in this perilous new Cold War, the United States is happy to turn a blind eye to the violent political repression it carries out despite its empty rhetoric about “human rights.”

The Socialist Party has been a resolute voice against Zambia becoming a pawn in the game of U.S. imperialism to control the world for a tiny elite. Their clear voice is undoubtedly dangerous to the ruling party, who hopes to confuse the working class and peasantry.

Absurdly, the police arrested the victims of the attack, not the attackers. The day after the assault, police announced that M’membe along with Saili Chita and Daniel Mumba would be charged with assault, with an additional bogus firearm charge leveled against M’membe. He explained:

“The UPND cadres who attacked us are not being arrested, they are not in any way being questioned…I was myself assaulted in front of police officers, I was threatened in front of police officers at the police station. This is the type of policing we are seeing today … ”

The UPND government of president Hakainde Hichilema has ignored the well being of the people of Zambia in the interests of big corporations and western governments. Violence and repression is its only option to prevent alternative political forces from challenging its power.

Clearly, the Socialist Party of Zambia’s program of pro-people development is considered a danger to the entrenched power of the elite. We demand an end to the physical and legal attacks on the Socialist Party, its members and leaders.

https://www.liberationnews.org/solidari ... rationnews
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Re: Africa

Post by blindpig » Sun Apr 16, 2023 8:23 pm

Sudan: The Left Calls for Restoring the Revolution
Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° on APRIL 15, 2023
Pavan Kulkarni

Image
Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF head Hemeti

The Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces have begun fighting each other. The root of the conflict lies in disagreements over integrating the paramilitary into the army. The Sudanese left has noted that both parties seek to escalate armed conflict, so that it can be used as a reason to not hand over power to civilian forces


Tensions simmering between Sudan’s army and the powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) boiled over into armed clashes on the morning of Saturday, April 15, following disagreements over the integration of the autonomous RSF into the army’s command chain.

The issue of integration was a key aspect of a deal that Sudan’s ruling junta was to sign with right-wing civilian forces to share power with the latter. The left in Sudan has been critical of the proposed deal, questioning the sincerity of the parties. Speaking to Peoples Dispatch a few hours before the fighting broke out, the Sudanese Communist Party’s Foreign Relations Secretary, Saleh Mahmoud, said “Both the forces, the army and the RSF, have a mutual interest in escalating armed conflict, so that it can be used as a reason to not hand over power to the civilian forces.”

According to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the air force carried out strikes destroying RSF’s Tiba and Soba base in Khartoum State on Saturday. Heavy gunfire began in the morning in several cities, including in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace and the airport in the capital Khartoum city.

Earlier, the RSF, which is led by the ruling military junta’s deputy chairman, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, aka Hemeti, claimed to have taken control of the Presidential Palace, the seat of the junta’s chairman and army chief, General Abdel Fattah al Burhan.

Later, however, after continued fighting, the SAF claimed that the RSF troops had left their weapons behind and fled the the presidential palace area to hide in the residential areas. The army has called on the residents to stay home.

The RSF had also claimed to have taken control of the airports in Khartoum and in El-Obeid, over 400 km southwest of Khartoum in the state of North Kordofan. It also claimed control over the military airbase in Merowe, 200 km to Khartoum’s north, in the Northern State which borders Egypt.

While Hemeti is backed by the UAE, Egypt, which is said to be backing Burhan in this internal struggle, reportedly has planes in this airbase, making it a crucial infrastructure.

On April 12, at least a hundred military vehicles surrounded this airbase. Sudan Tribune reported that “the army surrounded the RSF troops and requested them to evacuate but the paramilitary force refused.” Subsequently, military vehicles of the RSF also rolled into Khartoum and several other cities.

Complaining that “this deployment and repositioning” of the RSF “clearly violates the law,” the SAF spokesperson issued a statement at 3 am on Thursday, warning that the “continuation” of such deployments “will inevitably cause more divisions and tensions that may lead to the collapse of security in the country.”

According to the RSF, which first issued a statement on the fighting, clashes began after a surprise attack by the army on its troops in Soba, before simultaneous attacks on its bases in several other cities. The SAF has in turn accused the RSF of lying to conceal its own aggression.

RSF and the army worked together to protect military rule from pro-democracy movement

Established in 2013, the RSF was formed by coalescing the various militias used by the state during the civil war in Darfur in the 2000s to commit alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

Omar al-Bashir, the former dictator under whose administration these alleged crimes were committed, stands trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC). He was forced out of power on April 11, 2019, about four months after the start of the pro-democracy protests that have come to be known as the December Revolution.

By the time of his ouster, the RSF had become, and remains, one of the most powerful organizations in the country with a vast financial network built on mining gold in Darfur. Hemeti had pledged over a billion dollars to help stabilize Sudan’s central bank in the aftermath of Bashir’s removal.

Such increasing power and influence of the RSF have been making the army uneasy over the years. Reports about underlying tensions between the Burhan and Hemeti have been frequent. However, united with the intent to maintain military rule and protect it from the December Revolution, the two forces have been working together.

The junta formed by the generals in Bashir’s security committee after his removal was chaired by army chief Burhan, who in turn declared RSF head Hemeti his deputy on April 12, 2019, exactly four years before he would deploy the RSF to surround Merowe military airbase.

When the mass sit-in demonstration occupying the square outside the army HQ continued after Bashir’s removal, insisting on a civilian administration, the junta deployed the RSF on June 3, 2019. In the massacre that followed, RSF troops killed over a hundred protesters, wounding many more and raping several while the army watched over from its HQ.

Right-wing parties seek compromise with the military junta, again

In the aftermath of this massacre, right-wing parties in the coalition, Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), entered into negotiations with the junta, forming a joint civilian-military transitional government in August 2019. In protest against this compromise, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), a key player in the December Revolution, broke away from the FFC, which was formed in January that year to represent the pro-democracy protest movement.

Under this power-sharing arrangement with the FFC, the military controlled the defense, the police, the foreign policy, and much of Sudan’s economy. The little power that was ceded to the FFC-chosen civilians in this government was taken back with the military coup in October 2021, since when military rule has been absolute.

“No negotiations, No Compromise, No partnership” with the military, is a slogan that has been resonating in the mass-protests that have continued since the coup, regularly drawing hundreds of thousands to the streets in several towns and cities across the country.

Disregarding this popular call for the complete overthrow of the junta and the prosecution of its generals under a fully civilian transitional government, the FFC returned right back to negotiations after the coup, seeking a compromise and partnership with the military again.

The unpopular negotiations were supported by the Trilateral Mechanism, formed by the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), African Union (AU), and the seven-countries regional bloc, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

The US threw its weight behind these negotiations, imposing pressure on the military as well as the right-wing FFC parties to make compromises and come to another power-sharing agreement.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which are backing Burhan, and the UAE, which is backing Hemeti, all want a military regime in Sudan, albeit with different hierarchical structures, Fathi Elfadl, national spokesperson of the SCP, told Peoples Dispatch.

“But the Americans,” he added, “have been pushing for a comprehensive agreement with the FFC to establish a civilian authority, which, however, will only serve as a cover for the real authority that will be invested in the Security and Defense Council controlled by the junta.”

Under much Western pressure and growing threats to their authority from the radical mass-movements below, the junta and the FFC signed a Framework Agreement in December 2022, laying the path toward a final political agreement on another power-sharing arrangement.

By then, at least 120 had been killed and thousands injured in the crackdown on pro-democracy protests by the army, the police, and the RSF. Yet, unwilling to compromise with the military, the network of over 5,000 local Resistance Committees (RCs) across Sudan, which have been leading the mass-protests since the coup, rejected the agreement, and vowed to continue mass-actions till the junta is toppled.

Hundreds of more protesters have since suffered injuries in the crackdown that has continued despite the junta’s commitment in the Framework agreement to respect “international human rights charters.. freedoms of peaceful assembly and expression”.

While the agreement stated that a civilian Prime Minister will be the supreme commander of the armed forces, Burhan clarified to media only days later that the “civilian Supreme Commander of the SAF” neither “presides over the army chief” nor appoints him, but “only approves recommendations made to him.”

Despite these demonstrations of bad faith, the FFC proceeded under the aegis of the trilateral mechanism to negotiate the contested issues left unresolved in the framework agreement.

These included the review of the Juba peace agreement which has brought no peace to the war-torn regions like Blue Nile and Darfur where hundreds of thousands have been displaced since in continuing armed attacks, mostly by the RSF and the militias it supports. Another contested issue was the nature of transitional justice for the victims of the June 3 massacre and other atrocities.

With several compromises, the FFC had found common ground with the junta on most of these issues by last month when the signatories of the framework agreement announced that the final political agreement will be signed by April 1. This was to be followed by a constitutional declaration on April 6, and finally, the establishment of the new joint transitional government by April 11, the anniversary of the overthrow of Bashir.

‘Only way out of the crisis is to restore the revolution’

However, on April 1, the signing of the political agreement was postponed to April 6, and then indefinitely delayed. The FFC said that the delay was caused due to a disagreement between the army and the RSF over the integration of the latter into the former’s structure.

While Burhan is insisting that the integration should take place within the two years of the transitional period by the end of which an election is to be held as per the agreement, Hemeti has refused, demanding 10 years.

“By lining up with the RSF in this dispute, the FFC has lost the little credibility they may have been left with after entering into negotiations with the junta for the second time,” SCP’s Foreign Relations Secretary, Saleh Mahmoud, told Peoples Dispatch.

While the FFC has denied the allegation, Middle East Eye reported that according to a draft of the final agreement it has seen, a period of 10 years had been agreed upon for this process of integration. Given that the FFC claims that it is only the disagreement within the security forces that is impeding the final agreement, the provision of 10 years in the draft might be an indication of the FFC’s willingness to allow the notorious paramilitary another decade of autonomy.

One explanation for the alleged siding of the FFC with the RSF is that the RSF agrees with the FFC that parties that have not signed the framework agreement should not be a part of the political agreement or have a share in state power. Burhan, however, has shown his keenness to also include other parties outside the framework agreement, especially those who had been in alliance with the ousted Bashir’s Islamist National Congress Party (NCP).

With the escalation of hostilities, however, the prospect of a final political agreement on the basis of the framework agreement has practically fallen apart, argued Mahmoud.

SCP reiterated in its statement that “the only way to get out of the crisis is to restore the revolution and establish the authority of the people.”

https://libya360.wordpress.com/2023/04/ ... evolution/

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Clashes in Sudan leave at least 56 dead and nearly 600 injured

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Clashes between the Army and the FAR paramilitary group broke out on Saturday in the capital of the African country, Khartoum. | Photo: @AhmadFaezal4
Posted April 16, 2023 (4 hours 46 minutes ago)

The Sudan Doctors Union warned that the number of deaths and injuries could rise due to a lack of information from hospitals.

The death toll from the clashes between the Sudanese Army and the Rapid Action Forces (FAR) rebel group stood at 56 and the number of wounded reached 595, reported the Sudanese Doctors Union.

The medical organization warned that the number of deaths and injuries could rise in the coming hours due to the lack of first-hand information from hospitals and medical centers.

Although information on the situation in Sudan is still imprecise, UN officials announced that according to hospital reports the death toll is high.


The UN indicated that three Sudanese employees of the World Food Program were killed in the city of Darfur in the west of the African country.

The UN Secretary General, António Guterres, condemned the armed clashes in Sudan and, according to official sources, spoke with various political leaders to try to put an end to the situation of violence in the country.


Guterres communicated throughout Saturday with the president of the African Union (AU) Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat; the President of Egypt, Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, and with the FSF leader Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemeti).


Clashes between the Army and the FAR paramilitary group broke out in the early hours of Saturday in the capital of the African country, Khartoum, and in other nearby cities.

Tensions between the Army and rebel forces have been rising in recent months, but the conflict between the two parties intensified this week, following a series of disagreements over security issues and military reform.

https://www.telesurtv.net/news/sudan-en ... -0004.html

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So Much Lying from the International Monetary Fund: The Fifteenth Newsletter (2023)

APRIL 13, 2023
Español German Italian

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Dear friends,

Greetings from the desk of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research.

Remarkably, during her visit to Ghana in late March 2023, US Vice President Kamala Harris announced that the US Treasury Department’s Office of Technical Assistance will ‘deploy a full-time resident advisor in 2023 to Accra to assist the Ministry of Finance in developing and executing medium- to long-term reforms needed to improve debt sustainability and support a competitive, dynamic government debt market’. Ghana certainly faces significant challenges in this arena, with its external debt standing at $36 billion and its debt to Gross Domestic Product ratio hovering over 100 percent. As Harris left Accra, Reuters reported that Ghana had hired the Bermuda-based financial advisor Lazard to represent it in talks with the Paris-based Rothschild & Co., which will represent the international bondholders that are the largest creditors of this cash-strapped nation. Rather than pressure these wealthy bondholders to cancel some of the debt (what is known as a ‘haircut’) or to extend a moratorium on debt servicing payments, the US government merely provided Ghana with a ‘technical advisor’.

In December, Ghana signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) through its Extended Credit Facility to receive $3 billion over three years. In return, Ghana’s government agreed to ‘a wide-ranging economic reform programme’ that includes a commitment to ‘increase domestic resource mobilisation and streamline expenditure’. In other words, Ghana’s government will conduct an austerity regime against its own people. At the time of this agreement, consumer inflation in the country had risen to 54.1 percent. By January 2023, it was clear that electricity, water, gas, and home prices had risen by 82.3 percent over the course of a year. The World Bank estimates that Ghana’s poverty rate is already 23.4 percent, which it projects will ‘increase slightly, due to the cumulative effects of increases in electricity and water tariffs, rising food prices, and an increase in [consumption taxes]’. Further cuts to public spending alongside the restructuring of domestic debt will mean despair for almost all of Ghana’s roughly 33 million people.

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It is unlikely that the US government’s ‘full-time resident advisor’ on Ghana’s debt will offer either a factually based assessment of the escalating debt or proffer practical solutions to what has become a permanent debt crisis. It is already clear that there will be no focus on the wealthy Western bondholders such as the United Kingdom’s Abrdn and Amundi or the United States’ BlackRock, which hold a considerable portion of Ghana’s 13 billion dollars in Eurobond debt. It is far easier for the US to blame China, even though the country holds less than ten percent of Ghana’s external debt. That is perhaps the reason why Ghana’s President Nana Akufo-Addo told Harris, ‘There may be an obsession in America about Chinese activities on the [African] continent, but there’s no such obsession here’.

The final section of our latest dossier, Life or Debt: The Stranglehold of Neocolonialism and Africa’s Search for Alternatives, offers practical policy proposals for countries that are afflicted by permanent debt crises. Among them are suggestions to create progressive tax codes, reform domestic banking infrastructure, build alternative sources of funding to the IMF’s debt-austerity trap, and enhance regionalism. Given that the IMF and the World Bank punish any country that deviates from their orthodoxy, such policies would have been unthinkable even a decade ago. Now, with the arrival of alternative sources of financing for development (from China, certainly, but also from other locomotives of the Global South), space has been opened up for the poorer nations to build their own national and regional projects that are grounded in genuine, and sovereign, development theories. As we write in the dossier, ‘These projects must seize multiple opportunities to raise funds, and the fragility of IMF power must also be utilised to advance fiscal and monetary policies that are built on an agenda committed to solving the problems of the African people, not facilitating the demands of wealthy bondholders and the Western states that back them’.

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The principles that ground our dossier emerged out of a statement written by the Collective on African Political Economy (CAPE) entitled The IMF Is Never the Answer, which is published in the dossier. Among other key reflections, this statement points out that there is a need for a ‘new kind of institutional apparatus that fosters cooperation rather than competition’, which includes ‘establishing currency arrangements that bypass the US dollar’. Why is de-dollarisation such an important point? US Senator Marco Rubio provided clear insight to this question: ‘We won’t have to talk about sanctions in five years because there will be so many countries transacting in currencies other than the dollar that we won’t have the ability to sanction them’. Reliance upon the dollar not only allows the US to sanction countries; it is also ‘a strong lever of IMF conditionality’, as the CAPE statement notes. The statement also indicates the importance of the ‘urgent need to restore and reinvigorate the capacity and autonomy of the African state to deliver on its development agenda’. This includes increasing the ability of states to mobilise tax revenues and use these funds to build the dignity of their populations. Any approach to development in our times that respects nations’ sovereignty must be focused on creating a new form of financing for development apparatuses as well as a new role for state institutions in this process.

If you are interested in getting involved with CAPE, do write to the collective’s coordinator, Grieve Chelwa, at grieve@thetricontinental.org.

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At the mid-April World Bank meeting, Ajay Banga, a former executive from Citigroup and Mastercard, will be anointed as its president. He will be the fourteenth US citizen to hold this job and the fourteenth man since the bank’s first president was appointed in 1946. Banga has no experience in the world of development – prior to commercial banking, he was involved in launching the US fast-food franchises Pizza Hut and Kentucky Fried Chicken in India. Meanwhile, the New Development Bank, also referred to as the BRICS Bank, has just elected its new president, Dilma Rousseff, the former president of Brazil. Rousseff comes to the BRICS Bank with extensive experience in Brazil’s programme to eradicate absolute poverty. Unlike Banga, who will promote the religion of privatisation, Rousseff will bring her experience of working with robust state policies, such as the income transfer programme Bolsa Família (‘Family Grant’) and the social protections programme Brasil Sem Miséria (‘Brazil Without Extreme Poverty’). As we note in the dossier, the emergence of the BRICS Bank, alongside other institutions in the Global South, has already begun to put pressure on the IMF and World Bank on key issues such as the exhaustion of the neoliberal debt-austerity model and the need for new tools, including capital controls, for governments to increase the sovereignty of their states and the dignity of their populations.

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Ten years ago, the Nigerian musician Seun Kuti released a song called ‘IMF’ in his album A Long Way to the Beginning. The song is a damning critique of IMF policy, and the video, directed by Jerome Bernard, develops that critique through the personage of an African businessman being bribed and, ultimately, turned into a zombie. When King Midas touched objects, they turned into gold. When the IMF touches people, they turn into zombies. The art in our dossier is based on images from Seun’s music video, some of which are reproduced in this newsletter. The song is hypnotic:

So much lying from the IMF
People power

So much stealing from the IMF
People power

So much killing from the IMF
People power

Manipulation from the IMF
People power

Intimidation from the IMF
People power

So much suffering from the IMF
People power


Warmly

Vijay

https://thetricontinental.org/newsletterissue/debt-imf/
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Africa

Post by blindpig » Wed Apr 19, 2023 2:42 pm

24-hour humanitarian truce comes into force in Sudan

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The paramilitaries accused the Army of not respecting the truce while denouncing that "their planes continue to attack." | Photo: Twitter @FreedomHonor666
Published 18 April 2023

The FAR accepted the armistice after a contact with the US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken.

The first 24-hour truce since the start of the fighting in Sudan four days ago came into force this Tuesday at 6:00 p.m. local time (4:00 p.m. GMT), after the Sudanese Army and the Rapid Support Forces (FAR) paramilitary group arrived to an agreement proposed by the United States (USA).

However, shelling and shooting have been heard in Khartoum after the ceasefire agreed by the Sudanese army and the FAR began.

In this regard, without a mechanism to monitor the ceasefire, humanitarian groups and medical personnel fear that fighting could resume again.


Hours earlier, the Sudanese paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (FAR) announced Tuesday that it accepts a 24-hour humanitarian truce while accusing the Army of that country of not respecting the armistice.

Through their social networks, the FAR announced that they had contact with the US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, as well as with representatives of other countries who called for a temporary ceasefire.

Meanwhile, the Sudanese army said in a separate statement that it was "not aware of any coordinated action with mediators or the international community regarding a truce, so the announcement of a 24-hour truce by the most It seems like a smoke screen over his resounding defeat in the next few hours".


However, the paramilitary group communicated "we declare our acceptance of the proposed armistice for a period of 24 hours" and ratified "the commitment of our forces to the directives issued in this regard since early yesterday morning."

At the same time, the FAR accused the Army of not respecting the agreed truce while denouncing that "its planes continue to attack within populated areas."

For his part, the spokesman for United Nations Secretary General António Guterres, Stéphane Dujarric, said during a press conference that the clashes continue.

"For now, the fighting in Sudan, including Khartoum and other areas, continues without signs of a real decrease," Dujarric said, adding that the entity's representative in the country, Volker Perthes, continues to talk with the actors in the conflict to achieve a de-escalation. immediate and cessation of fighting.


Violent clashes resumed Tuesday morning around the Sudanese Army Command and the presidential palace, Khartoum International Airport and around some RSF bases south of the Sudanese capital, according to witnesses.

The Sudanese Central Committee of Doctors reported this day that at least 144 civilians have died and more than 1,400 have been injured since the clashes broke out last Saturday.

However, the director general of the World Health Organization (WHO), Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, indicated that at least 270 people have been killed and more than 2,000 injured in clashes between the army and paramilitaries in Sudan,

"We condemn these losses in human lives and we convey our solidarity to our Sudanese brothers," Tedros told a press conference, stressing that the escalation of violence makes the work of health personnel enormously difficult, especially in the capital Khartoum.

https://www.telesurtv.net/news/sudan-gr ... -0008.html

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Sudan: More than 180 Killed and Over 1,800 Injured as Security Forces Continue Infighting in Civilian Areas
Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° on APRIL 18, 2023
Pavan Kulkarni

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An armed confrontation erupted between the RSF and SAF early on April 15.

Civilians have been forced to hole up in their homes for days with no supply of water or electricity, as the fighting rages on with increasingly heavier weapons


Over 180 people have been killed and more than 1,800 injured as the fighting within Sudan’s security forces continued in several densely populated cities for the third day. The figures were announced in a press conference given by Volker Perthes, United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan on Monday, April 17.

The highest number of deaths have been reported in the capital Khartoum city where Sudan’s powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is trying to capture key areas and infrastructure from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

Led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, aka Hemeti, the deputy chairman of the military junta ruling since the coup in October 2021, the RSF is battling the army for the Presidential Palace, the HQ of SAF, the airport, as well as other key areas in the capital.

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by the junta’s chairman and army chief, Abdel Fattah al Burhan, is fighting back and has in turn launched its own offensive on bases of the paramilitary in Khartoum and other cities. Both sides have made competing claims about controlling key infrastructures.

“According to the information I have been able to gather from several sources, the RSF had taken over most of SAF’s general command by Sunday. But the airforce tilted the balance,” said Abdul (name changed), whose NGO had been conducting workshops to promote some form of an agreement to avert this war in its run-up.

“The SAF forced the RSF out on Monday with airstrikes on its own HQ for two days,” he told Peoples Dispatch. “The RSF has now moved to the northeast of the HQ in the Burri neighborhood, which had seen massive protests during the December Revolution.” He was referring to the pro-democracy demonstrations that began in December 2018 and overthrew former dictator Omar al Bashir on April 11, 2019.

Against the backdrop of Revolution and Counter-Revolution

The December Revolution’s forces have since been in a struggle to wrest power from army-chief Burhan and RSF head Hemeti, two close confidants of Bashir who had formed a military junta the very next day, with the former as its chairman and the latter as his deputy. When the mass sit-in demonstration occupying the square outside SAF’s HQ continued calling on the military junta to hand over power to civil authority, the RSF cleared it, and committed a massacre on June 3, 2019. Over 100 protesters were killed.

The junta led by the duo had shared power with some right-wing parties of the coalition called the Freedom and Change Forces (FFC) for a brief interregnum from August 2019 to October 2021, when all power was once again seized by the military with a coup.

Since then, however, the junta has been unable to govern the country rocked by perpetual protests. As calls from the militant pro-democracy movement, including the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), for a complete overthrow of the junta grew louder, the junta also faced increasing international pressure. This led Burhan and Hemeti to once again begin talks with the right-wing parties, resulting in the Framework Agreement on December 5, 2022.

The finalization of the Political Agreement to govern with the FFC was postponed from April 1 to April 6, before it effectively fell apart in the build-up to this war which started on April 15. One of the key pending items for its conclusion was the question of the integration of the RSF into the SAF.

While RSF’s Hemeti demands a 10-year period for this integration, SAF’s Burhan insists on its completion within two years. Fearing Burhan’s intention to undercut FFC by bringing on board the Democratic Block coalition, which includes parties that had been in an alliance with ousted dictator Bashir’s Islamist party, the FFC appeared to be siding with the RSF, willing to cede to it another decade of autonomy.

Armed conflict between the SAF and the RSF has erupted in this context, marked by several contradictions within what the SCP calls the “counter-revolutionary camp” – i.e. the different components of the divided security forces as well as the different coalitions of right-wing parties competing with each other to share power with them.

SCP remarked that revolutionaries, who were earlier coming under fire when the army and the RSF together attacked their protests against the military rule and the right-wing parties’ attempts to legitimize it with a civilian partnership, are now caught in the crossfire between them.

Hospitals under attack

The RSF is launching attacks on SAF’s HQ from the positions they have taken in the Burri neighborhood, which was a site of many militant pro-democracy demonstrations and fierce crackdowns. “And the SAF is in turn shelling this densely populated area with tanks and artillery fire,” said Abdul.

Health workers have denounced that even hospitals and medical facilities have not been spared. “We have repeatedly appealed to the parties involved in the conflict not to attack health facilities…but what happened was exactly the opposite. Hospitals and health institutions in Khartoum and cities all over Sudan are being hit with heavy artillery and firearms,” Sudan Doctors Union (SDU) said in a statement on Monday.

The bombing of Al-Shaab Teaching Hospital in Khartoum has left it “completely out of service, leaving the medical staff, patients, children, and companions in an unsafe environment and in a state of confusion and fear.” Ibn Sina Specialist Hospital in the city has also suffered “severe damages”, SDU said, adding, “The Police Hospital was evacuated due to attacks and is now completely out of service.”

To the north of capital Khartoum, in the city of Khartoum Bahri, which has seen many civilian casualties, the Bashayer Hospital was shelled in an exchange between the army and the RSF. After a power outage in another one of the city’s hospitals, Al-Dowali Hospital, its fuel reserve to run electricity generators has fallen “dangerously low, which puts the lives of patients in intensive care and emergency surgeries in severe danger,” the doctors’ union warned.

Deaths have also been reported in Khartoum’s twin city of Omdurman. Abdul, who resides in an upper-middle-class neighborhood of this city, said with a sense of relief, “I can only hear intermittent firing today (on April 16).”

Dwindling supplies increases strain on civilian population

Abdul’s neighborhood, like many others across the three main cities of Khartoum state and elsewhere, has run out of water and electricity, making residents’ survival increasingly difficult by the day. “We’ve had no electricity since the grid was hit on Saturday. It is a matter of time before the stored food products in supermarkets start rotting,” Abdul said. Many fear a looming food shortage as fresh produce from rural areas cannot reach the city under bombardment.

“The water in the taps stopped soon after the fighting erupted on April 15. We managed on the reserves we had stored for three days, but now, we are only left with only three liters,” for a family including his wife, two children below the age of five, and aging parents, he said, adding, “The nearest store is out of water. I have to cross three streets to reach the next store, but I will risk exposing myself to fire on the way.”

“I am planning to take my family and leave from here for another safer neighborhood in the city. Not for electricity and water, but because my neighborhood is getting increasingly dangerous. The RSF is taking positions on one side and the SAF is on the other. The worst is yet to come. I want to get my family out of here before that,” he added.

The SAF’s stay-at-home warning has remained in place, as its fighter-planes swoop down to strike targets, and occasionally get shot out of the urban sky by anti-aircraft guns manned by the RSF which claims to be controlling all the entrances and exits to Khartoum state.

Several deaths and injuries have also been reported outside Khartoum, 400 km southwest of Sudan’s capital, in El-Obeid, capital of North Kordofan state, where “Al-Dhaman Hospital…was closed down after it was stormed by armed personnel,” according to the SDU.

Over 200 km to the north of Khartoum, fighting continues in the Northern state bordering Egypt for the control of the Merowe military airbase. It was RSF’s deployment to surround this airbase on April 12, amid simmering tensions with the army, that finally sparked off an armed confrontation on April 15.

Egyptian soldiers in Merowe airbase

Later that day, the RSF claimed control over this airbase and released a video showing some Egyptian soldiers it had captured from this base. One MiG-29 Fulcrum belonging to the Egyptian air force was destroyed in this base, while two others appear to have been damaged, according to The War Zone’s analysis of satellite imagery.

The RSF, which is backed by the UAE, said it had to take over the airport to prevent Egypt, which is supporting Burhan and his army, from using it to attack the RSF. The Egyptian armed forces said it is “in close coordination with the Sudanese authorities to ensure the safety of our troops during the joint training exercises.”

On Sunday, SAF claimed to have wrested back control, adding that over a hundred RSF vehicles had fled the base with the Egyptian pilots in their custody. On Monday, the RSF in turn claimed control over Merowe airbase with a video showing its troops in front of a fighter plane.

Fighting is also underway for control over Sudan’s main seawater port facing Saudi Arabia across the Red Sea in the city of Port Sudan. SAF claimed to have taken over RSF’s bases in Port Sudan, along with those in Kassala in eastern Sudan, Gedaref and Damazin in the southeast, close to the Ethiopian border, and Kosti and Kadugli in the south, close to the border with South Sudan.

More bloodletting in Darfur

Intense fighting is also underway in Sudan’s western region of Darfur, which is the old stomping ground of the RSF. The militias used by the state under Bashir’s dictatorship, to commit alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur during the civil war which started in 2003, were coalesced into RSF under Hemeti’s command in 2013.

While Bashir is on trial for these crimes at the International Criminal Court (ICC), RSF has become a powerful organization with a vast financial network built on mining gold from Darfur’s lands, where it has continued an alleged depopulation campaign in cahoots with the SAF.

Read more: Massacres in West Darfur: Depopulation campaign on mineral-rich lands by Sudan’s military junta?
West Darfur is among the worst affected states in the Darfur region, where 100,000 people were displaced only a year ago in April 2022 after massacres led by RSF killed at least 200 in the state’s capital El Geneina. RSF claimed to have taken complete control of this state and its capital on Monday, April 17.

Fighting in North Darfur state’s capital, El Fasher, has resulted in over 50 serious injuries and many deaths. In South Darfur’s state’s capital Nyala, where the RSF reportedly took control over SAF’s base, the army called on residents in the city center to leave their homes and move to safer locations.

Calling on the international community to ensure the safety of the people in the region, Adam Rojal, spokesperson of the General Coordination of IDPs and Refugee camps said, “We have lost trust in the warring parties.. [T]he army and the RSF are the ones who committed genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, war crimes in Darfur, and forced us to leave our villages.. and agricultural lands.” Speaking on behalf of the displaced, he also expressed the loss of trust in the civilian parties which are seeking a partnership with the army and the RSF.

International Community fails to acknowledge demands of the pro-democracy mass-movement

Nevertheless, the international community persists in calling on these very forces to come together in an agreement to rule Sudan jointly. Speaking at a joint press conference with UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly on Monday from the G-7 trip in Japan, the US State Secretary Antony Blinken called on the SAF and the RSF to “return to talks, talks that were very promising in putting Sudan on the path to a full transition to civilian-led government.”

Joseph Borrel, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said, “In the past months, Sudanese parties including SAF and RSF have made tremendous efforts to bring back the country toward the path of democracy through agreeing the framework agreement, paving the way towards a civilian-led government.”

The UN has also been using the term “civilian-led”, instead of just “civilian”, indicating that the security forces will continue to have a share in state power in the kind of government envisaged in partnership with the FFC in the framework agreement. If a final agreement is concluded and a government is formed on the basis of this agreement, it is expected to be some variation of the short-lived joint civilian-military government that was ousted with the coup in October 2021.

Defense, police, foreign policy and much of the economy had remained under the control of the military in this government, even though the Prime Minister and most cabinet ministers were civilians chosen by the FFC. Such a government, SCP maintains, will only serve to legitimize the structure of the military rule by giving it a civilian facade.

In fact, according to SCP’s analysis, this willingness of the right-wing parties to legitimize the military junta led by Burhan and Hemeti in exchange for a share in power is an important factor that has brought Sudan to this bloody juncture.

A network of over 5,000 neighborhood Resistance Committees (RCs) – which had been leading the mass-demonstrations since the coup in October 2021 with the slogan “No Negotiations, No Compromise, No Partnership” with the military – cautioned people to not get duped into backing any of the warring parties.

“We are against military solutions.. and we don’t stand behind any gun,” it said, stressing “the need to end the…militarization of political and economic life” by forcing “the military establishment out of politics.”

While reiterating the urgent need for an immediate ceasefire – which has been urged by the African Union (AU), EU, UK, US, Russia, China and civilian political forces within the country – SCP insists that the RSF should be dissolved, and not integrated into the army. And the army, it reiterated in its statement, should be forced back to the barracks, and should not be ceded any political power

Regional left forces extend solidarity

“The armed conflict is the culmination of a process of both open and obscured clashes supported by the local classes and the most reactionary political circles linked to comprador and corrupt regional alliances,” read a joint statement by left and progressive parties and organizations from other countries in the region.

These include Tunisia, Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania and Egypt in Africa, and Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Bahrain and Kuwait in West Asia.

The 16 regional organizations said they renewed their “support for the revolutionary forces in Sudan, led by the Sudanese Communist Party, which has remained an authentic expression of the coherent revolutionary position and..,developments, including the armed conflict, have confirmed the correctness of its positions.”

Its statement ended by calling “on all progressive forces… to strengthen support for the Sudanese people and their revolution, and to confront all forms of regional and international interference in order to interrupt the revolutionary process…as happened with the rest of the Arab revolutions…as happened with the rest of the Arab revolutions, in order to perpetuate control over the region.”

https://libya360.wordpress.com/2023/04/ ... ian-areas/

Gunshots in Khartoum
Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° on APRIL 18, 2023
Joshua Craze

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Sudan’s military and a powerful paramilitary force battled fiercely Saturday in the capital and other areas, reportedly causing more than 200 deaths and injuries.

On 15 April, clashes began in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital, pitting the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), loyal to Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the general who runs the country’s governing council, against the paramilitary forces of his deputy, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, otherwise known as ‘Hemedti’ (little Mohamed), the Bonapartian pretender to Sudan’s throne. Initially, Hemedti’s militias, known as the RSF, or Rapid Support Forces, seemed to have the advantage. They took control of several airbases and installed themselves in Khartoum’s residential areas, auguring a difficult campaign of urban warfare for Burhan. By the end of 16 April, however, the SAF’s superior weaponry was telling, with fighter jets strafing RSF barracks and dislodging the paramilitary force from positions around the city. Much about the situation remains uncertain, even for those on the ground. All I can tell you, one friend wrote to me, is where the smoke is coming from. Unlike during the coup d’état of October 2021, the internet is still working, yet it has brought little clarity. The facts are concealed by claims and counterclaims, all delivered via Facebook posts.

What is clear is why this confrontation erupted. Tensions between the two sides had been mounting since the signing of an accord in December 2022, the so-called Framework Agreement, which was supposed to pave the way for a transition to a civilian-led government and the departure of the military junta that had ruled Sudan since October 2021. The agreement kicked all the difficult issues into the long grass. Crucially, it did not address the integration of the RSF into the army – a development that Burhan wishes to take two years, and Hemedti, ten. The political process it initiated had the rare distinction of being both extremely vague and entirely unrealistic. Delicate compromises that would have taken months to achieve were expected within weeks, according to a timetable largely created for international consumption. These demands heightened latent tensions between the two sides, prompting the RSF to believe that Egypt – a longstanding backer of the Sudanese military – would intervene. Hemedti deployed his forces next to the Merowe airforce base at the beginning of Ramadan, providing the catalyst for the current clashes.

To understand the roots of the struggle between the army and the RSF, one must go back to the formation of the Sudanese state. Sudan’s first civil war began in 1955, the year before its independence from the British Empire. Postcolonial strife followed the lineaments of colonial rule, with a riparian elite in Khartoum and its satellite cities, dominated by a few families, fighting against the multi-ethnic peripheries of the country, which they exploited for labour and resources. One civil war (1955-1972) was soon followed by another (1983-2005). In the 1980s, a debt crisis almost bankrupted Sudan, and Khartoum struggled to pay for its army, while the conflict continued at the country’s margins, largely in the south.

From these unpromising foundations, Omar al-Bashir, then an army brigadier who took power in a coup d’état in 1989, forged an enduring form of rule. Rather than providing services in the peripheries, he used militias to wage a counterinsurgency on the cheap, setting Sudan’s many ethnic groups against each other. He privatized the state, carving it up into fiefdoms ruled by his security services, which he multiplied and fragmented in order to coup-proof his regime. The Sudanese army was soon competing with the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), and later had to contend with Hemedti’s RSF, to name only a few of the security organs. Each of these forces built up its own economic empire. The Sudanese military ran construction firms, mining services, and banks, while the RSF took control of gold mining and lucrative mercenary services.

Bashir made a Faustian pact with Sudan’s cities: accept terror in the country’s margins in exchange for cheap commodities and subsidies for fuel and wheat, whose import required foreign currency obtained from the sale of resources produced in the peripheries. Oil had begun to flow in 1999, largely from southern Sudan. Income from its sale subsidized urban consumption and greased the wheels of a transactional machine with Bashir at its centre, acting as fixer-in-chief for an unwieldy coalition of security services and politicians. Were the margins able to control their own resources, this machine would inevitably grind to a halt. Thus, their interests were structurally opposed to those of the centre – a class relation articulated as a geographical antagonism.

*
In 2003, as the war in southern Sudan was coming to an end, a new war in Darfur broke out. Bashir decided to repeat the trick he had used in the south – where militia forces had fought against a southern rebel force – and arm Darfur’s Arab communities to fight non-Arab rebels. Nicknamed the ‘Janjaweed’ (the evil horsemen), these militias quickly metastasized into a force of tens of thousands, which waged a vicious war against Darfuri rebels and civilians alike. This was the war that would make Hemedti. A camel-trader from the small Mahariya tribe of the Rizeigat Arabs, which live in both Chad and Darfur, he became a war chief, quickly assembling a force of 400 men. In 2007, he briefly became a rebel, but only in order to leverage violence for a better position in the government. Five years later, with Bashir’s control of the Janjaweed faltering, Hemedti presented himself as the man who could fight Sudan’s rebellions as the head of the newly created RSF, which absorbed much of the Janjaweed.

Hemedti grew close to Bashir, and quickly became his chosen enforcer. It’s said that Bashir became so fond of Hemedti he affectionately called him ‘Himyati’ (my protector). Yet while Hemedti inflicted a series of defeats on Darfur’s rebel movements, Bashir’s regime was struggling. In 2005, under international pressure, the Sudanese government signed a peace agreement with southern rebels, with the promise of a southern referendum on independence. In 2011, South Sudan voted to secede, depriving Khartoum of 75% of its oil revenue. Without dollar liquidity, Bashir’s transactional machine started to seize up.

The regime tried to diversify its economic base by selling land to the Gulf states and getting into gold mining. Hemedti led the way. He used his position as the head of the RSF to build up an economic empire, founding a holding company called al-Jineid and taking over Sudan’s most lucrative gold mine. Like all great entrepreneurs of violence, Hemedti soon expanded his interests – sending RSF forces as mercenaries to fight against the Houthis in Yemen on the Emirati payroll. He also became involved in organizing migrant passage in the Sahel: first by stopping migrants crossing the country (an enterprise once funded by the EU), and then by forcing the same migrants to buy their freedom. By 2018, Hemedti was running a business empire that included real estate and steel production, and had built up a patronage network that rivalled Bashir’s. Few in the centre were happy. For the riparian political elite and the Sudanese army alike, Hemedti was an uneducated usurper from the peripheries. Though he was an Arab, he didn’t come from the narrow coterie of families that had long ruled Sudan, and his economic empire was a direct threat to Sudanese military dominance.

Despite Bashir’s efforts to find alternative sources of foreign currency, by 2018, the economy was in a terminal nose-dive. In desperation, the dictator cut subsidies on wheat and fuel, breaking his pact with Sudan’s cities. Protests began in the peripheries and quickly spread across the country. The Sudan Professionals Association (SPA), an umbrella group of white-collar trade unions, led the way, and soon began calling for his resignation. By January, it had joined with a loose coalition of opposition political parties in a grouping called the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC).

Protests in Khartoum were organized by a number of resistance committees and had a carnivalesque atmosphere, offering mutual aid and free healthcare in an explicit rebuke to the violence and repression of the regime. As the revolt intensified, Bashir’s backers in the Gulf prevaricated and the military became increasingly uneasy. It was one thing to kill people in the peripheries, quite another to mow down the urban youth of Khartoum, many of whom came from the soldiers’ own families. On 10 April 2019, Bashir allegedly gave an order to open fire on the sit-in. Hemedti claims he refused this order, and by the next day, Bashir was gone.

*
The security services hoped that by deposing Bashir, they could conserve control of their own economic empires. For a moment, the soldiers were heroes, and Hemedti even found some popular support in Khartoum, a city that has always thought of him as an outsider. But it was only a moment. The protesters wanted a civilian government, not a new military dictator, and rather than disperse, they staged a sit-in in front of the military headquarters in Khartoum. The security services played for time and hoped they could wear down the protesters, but as the months dragged on, the military became alarmed, and the SAF and the RSF would find common cause in repressing civilian unrest.

Early on the morning of 3 June, the security services, including the RSF, attempted to disband the sit-in. By the end of the day, approximately 200 protesters were dead and some 900 injured. Nevertheless, the protests continued. On 30 June, the thirtieth anniversary of Bashir coming to power, a million people marched against the junta. Yet the opposition’s political leadership were divided over how to proceed. Many resistance committees thought that the 3 June massacre had destroyed the army’s credibility, and that the time was right to prepare for a general strike to push them out of power. But the FFC opened negotiations with the military – which was under pressure from the US and Britain, via Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to enter into a transitional government with civilians. On 1 July, the SPA announced plans for two weeks of protests leading to a general strike. A few days later, the FFC announced a verbal agreement with the military, and the SPA changed course.

The agreements that were finally signed in August 2019 brought the FFC into a transitional government with the military, but they deferred Sudan’s most substantive issues, which were to be resolved in the distant future. Elections would be held in 2022, and until then the country would be ruled by a sovereign council composed of military officers and civilian politicians, with Burhan at its head and Hemedti as his deputy, overseeing a technocratic cabinet led by the former-UN economist Abdalla Hamdok.

Belatedly, the West became interested in Sudan’s struggle for independence. At stake was regional realignment – Sudan was to normalize relations with Israel – and the reformation of the national economy. To listen to the diplomats and World Bank officials that invaded Khartoum’s air-conditioned cafes after the revolution was to regress to the End of History. For them, a democratic utopia would emerge through austerity and the elimination of subsidies. Hamdok’s cabinet were early converts to this doctrine, even if it meant riding roughshod over the socio-economic goals of the revolution that had toppled Bashir. Upon taking office, the first Minister of Finance, Ibrahim Elbadawi – a World Bank alum – announced that the aim of the revolution was to free the country from its debt crisis by cutting subsidies.

Many of the FFC’s actions seemed designed to appeal to an international audience, and the organization was otherwise stymied in its domestic agenda by a military establishment that, far from disbanding the economic engine of the old regime, was intent on picking it over for scraps. Military finance fell outside the purview of the civilian part of the government, and security sector reform never got started. Hemedti continued to increase his military and economic power: the RSF recruited across the country, and not simply in Darfur, leading some of his supporters to claim that it was his paramilitaries, rather than the SAF, that constituted Sudan’s real armed forces.

Hemedti also took the lead in dealing with the peripheries. The August 2019 agreement had sidelined the Sudan Revolutionary Front, a grouping of many of the armed rebels from the country’s margins. Once again, power had been hoarded by the centre. For this reason, some rebel commanders saw the FFC as merely the latest iteration of riparian rule, and hoped that while Hemedti had inflicted grievous defeats on them during the previous decade, he might be someone with whom they could do business. While it was the civilian government that formally took the lead in subsequent negotiations with the rebels, Hemedti exercised informal control over the process. In October 2020, a deal was signed between the transitional government and the rebels that guaranteed them seats in government and promised greater political devolution. In the end, almost none of the agreement’s more ambitious measures were implemented. Instead, the rebels’ integration into the Khartoum government allowed Hemedti to use Bashir’s playbook – fragmenting opposition forces and setting them against each other – against his rivals. From October 2020 onward, Hemedti used the rebels to split the centre.

At this point, public frustration with Hamdok’s government was growing, with some protesters calling for his resignation and the military heightening the pressure. The rebels, now incorporated into the government, organized Potemkin protests outside the military headquarters, mimicking those that had led to the fall of Bashir. They claimed that Hamdok’s government had lost its way: it was only interested in the centre, not in justice for Darfur or in changing the geographical inequalities that had long blighted the country. There was much truth to this rhetoric, but beneath it lay a different political motivation – to destabilize the country and lay the groundwork for a coup.

*
That coup, long predicted, came as a shock only to the apparatchiks of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, who never imagined that the military could willingly forgo the international investment that would dry up in the event of a power grab. Burhan and Hemedti, promised funds from the Gulf, had no such hesitations. On 25 October, Burhan thanked Hamdok for his service and then declared a state of emergency. International commentators bewailed a season of coups, and placed Sudan in a motley line-up next to Myanmar, Mali and Guinea. But in truth, Sudan’s coup was never going to usher in a military dictatorship in the Egyptian mould. Unlike Bashir’s regime, which had ruled with the assistance of Sudan’s Islamists, at least for the first decade, Burhan’s junta had no ideology and no real social base. Their takeover was effectively a negotiating move, designed to push Hamdok back into government with a weakened cabinet while preserving the military’s powerbase.

Hamdok duly returned to office a month after the coup, only to resign amid continued street protests six weeks later. By October 2022, it was clear the military regime was flailing. The Gulf had failed deliver on its financial promises to the junta, inflation and hunger were spiralling, and there was no let-up in public demonstrations. The coup proved that the basic antagonism of the Sudanese revolution remained intact. On one side was Bashir’s security council (only nominally transformed in the absence of Bashir himself). On the other, with the FFC sidelined, were the urban citizens of Sudan, wedded to civilian rule and represented by the various resistance committees.

For the Americans and British, the military were not going anywhere, so realism required a new civilian-military transitional government. In diplomatic circles, Burhan isn’t considered an Islamist, and is therefore someone whom the West can tolerate. For its part, the junta reckoned the best way to preserve the coup was to end it and form a new transitional government, on which the military could subsequently blame Sudan’s deepening economic woes. This was the background to the Framework Agreement, signed on 5 December 2022, which brought together some of the FFC and some of the Sudanese political parties in a new government with the military. UN officials and Western diplomats pronounced their satisfaction – while, throughout Sudan, the deal was met with protests.

Yet again, the agreement refused to face up to the country’s most pressing issues. The dynamics of the security sector, the place of the RSF, and the role of the military in government were all left to Phase II, which was given the absurdly short time-frame of one month. The deal foregrounded Hemedti, who was at pains to criticize the coup, and attempted to position himself closer to the civilian FFC. This worried Egypt, which feared the marginalization of the SAF and so established a separate negotiating framework in Cairo, including some of the rebel groups that had joined the government prior to the coup.

With the signing of the Framework Agreement, the civilian-military opposition that had previously dominated Sudanese politics became considerably more complicated. Burhan and Hemedti began searching for both civilian and rebel support, while also looking for regional backers. This meant the reform of the security forces was almost impossible to envisage, as the country’s two main military actors were increasingly at loggerheads: Egypt aligned itself with Burhan while Hemedti was in business with Russia’s Wagner Group.

By March, workshops were provisionally underway on the deeper issues affecting the country’s conflict, including the place of the RSF within the Sudanese military. The head of the UN mission to Sudan, Volker Perthes, announced to the UN Security Council on 20 March that he was ‘encouraged by how little substantive difference there remains among the main actors.’ Yet the rest of Sudan was not convinced. My friends who live in Khartoum felt that a conflict between Burhan and Hemedti had become inevitable.

*
And so it was. The can, kicked down the road for so long, hit a wall. Burhan expelled representatives of the RSF from a meeting on security sector reform, while the RSF started building up its forces around Khartoum in preparation for clashes. The arbitrary timetables of the diplomats, who wanted a government by the end of Ramadan, no doubt intensified these divisions. Now, as fighting enters its third day, there is little chance of a ceasefire in the immediate future. The rhetoric of both men is bellicose. For Hemedti, this is in all probability his first and only shot at rule. If he is defeated, and the RSF is dissolved into the army, his support base will be eroded and the dissolution of his economic empire will follow. For Burhan, backed by Egypt, there remain more options for negotiations, but the depth of rancour felt by the army against the Darfuri upstart should not be underestimated. Despite the SAF’s strength – and Egyptian support – it is unlikely to be an easy battle. The RSF are embedded in the civilian areas of Khartoum, and some of the most deadly fighting has already occurred in Darfur, on Hemedti’s home turf.

Whatever the outcome of the conflict – and the likelihood is that it will lead to a devastating loss of life – it will mark a new era for Sudan. The three previous civil wars were fought in the peripheries, and preserved the geographically-inflected class relations associated with Bashir. By contrast, this civil war – if that’s what it becomes – is taking place in Khartoum and its satellite cities. Hemedti, who came to prominence through Bashir’s transactional politics and his instrumentalization of militias, now has a political life of his own. His outsider status is a challenge to Sudan’s riparian elitism – one that is playing out in the streets and skies of its urban spaces.

https://libya360.wordpress.com/2023/04/ ... -khartoum/

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Deadly conflict in Sudan sparks global concerns
By OTIATO OPALI in Nairobi, Kenya | China Daily Global | Updated: 2023-04-17 09:59

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People run past a military vehicle in Khartoum, Sudan, on Saturday amid clashes in the city, which killed at least 56 people. AFP

The deadly conflict in Sudan between the army and the paramilitary group stretched into a second day on Sunday, raising international concerns about escalation.

At least 56 civilians have been killed and 595 people wounded in the fighting between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces, which started on Saturday, according to a doctors' organization.

Heavy artillery firing was heard in Omdurman, which adjoins the capital Khartoum, and nearby Bahri in the early hours of Sunday. Witnesses also reported gunfire in the Red Sea city of Port Sudan.

The RSF said it had taken control of the presidential palace, the residence of the army chief and Khartoum international airport.

The African Union Commission's chairman Moussa Faki Mahamat released a statement on Saturday calling on RSF chief Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo's forces and the Sudanese Army to end the clashes and reach a cease-fire agreement. He further urged the political and military parties to find a fair political solution to the crisis.

"We appeal to all parties involved in the violence and the Rapid Support Forces in particular, to immediately stop the destruction of the country, the terrorization of its population, and the bloodshed during the last 10 days of Ramadan," Mahamat said in the statement. The African Union's Peace and Security Council has called an emergency session on Sunday to discuss political and security developments in Sudan, it said on Twitter.

The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, formed in 2013 predominantly with fighters from the Janjaweed militia that brutally fought off rebels in Darfur, have been at the center of Sudan's long-standing dispute.

UN slams violence

Following the reports of armed fighting in Khartoum, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Saturday issued a statement strongly condemning the violence.

Guterres said he was engaging with leaders in the region and reaffirmed the commitment of the UN to support the people of Sudan in their efforts to restore a democratic transition and realize their aspirations for building a peaceful and secure future.

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson urged both sides in Sudan's armed conflict to cease fire as soon as possible and to avoid further escalation.

The spokesperson called on the two parties to the conflict to end fighting as soon as possible and prevent the escalation of tensions, hoping the parties in Sudan will increase dialogue and jointly move forward the political transition process.

Countries in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, also expressed concerns over the conflict, and called for an immediate cease-fire and resolution of differences through dialogue.

http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/20230 ... cdfc5.html

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Terrorist attack causes 40 deaths among Burkina Faso soldiers

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The Army and volunteer militias are carrying out a military campaign against Islamist armed groups that have been destabilizing the country since 2015. | Photo: Ministry of Defense
Published 16 April 2023

Armed group ambushed a government detachment. It caused 40 deaths -six uniformed and 34 volunteers-, in addition to 33 wounded.

The Governorate of the northern region of Burkina Faso reported this Sunday that unidentified armed individuals attacked Burkina Faso government forces, including soldiers and volunteers, the day before, causing at least 40 deaths and 33 injuries.

The event occurred around 4:00 p.m. local time not far from the village of Aorema, about 15 kilometers northeast of the town of Ouahigouya, in the north of the African country, according to the Governorate of this region.

The armed group ambushed soldiers and members of the so-called Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP). As a result of the attack, six uniformed officers and 34 members of this militia lost their lives. The injured received medical attention and are in stable condition.


In a statement, the Army announced that it launched an operation after the attack that resulted in the number of 50 neutralized terrorists.

In a press release, the Ouahigouya Governorate detailed that on Friday the military and volunteers engaged in "fierce combats against armed terrorist groups", which took place in an area close to the border with Mali, where irregulars frequently operate. armed groups linked to Al Qaeda and the self-styled Islamic State.

For months, the Army and volunteer militias have been carrying out a military campaign against Islamist groups that have been destabilizing the internal situation since 2015.

According to press reports, the authorities decreed a general mobilization last Thursday to face the increase in attacks, which are also perpetrated by Boko Haram, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and the Support Group for Islam and the Muslims.

According to humanitarian sources, these groups caused over a decade around 10,000 fatalities and the forced displacement of two million people.

https://www.telesurtv.net/news/burkina- ... -0024.html

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Re: Africa

Post by blindpig » Fri Apr 21, 2023 2:27 pm

Sudan in the Clutches of Army and Militias

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Sudanese military and civilians, April, 2023. | Photo: Twitter/ @agenzia_nova

Published 21 April 2023 (50 minutes ago)

The ruling of the country by Omar Al-Bashir for 3 decades can be described as the main factor for everything that is happening in Sudan now.

After decades of friendship, the political and military alliance between the Sudanese army, led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Muhammad Dagalo (Hemedti), Sudan is living in the worst situation these days, due to the violent military conflict between these two military forces.

This situation has put the country in a state of insecurity, and uncertainty, and the plans for a transition to a civilian-led democracy are now in shambles.

In addition to the fears of a civil war and the severe struggles of the two generals to control the country, the number of civilian deaths is rising and the concern, that the conflict may escalate, is growing, which resulted so far in the death of over 600 people (although it is difficult to get to know the real statistics), a large numbers of wounded people and the massive movement of Sudanese from the capital, Khartoum, to other states.

The two appointed warlords, Al Burhan and Himedti, were faithful to the past military dictatorial government of Omar Hassan Al Bashir in different circumstances and moments. The first, served as high rank military during both South Sudan and Darfur war. The second, head of the militias, Janjaweed, fought in Darfur regime against non-arab groups and its main goal was to protect Al Bashir, even from his own army.

As a result of this abhorrent war, dozens of hospitals in Khartoum, and in the adjacent states to the areas of clashes, went out of service, as a result of their exposure to bombing, forced eviction, poor medicine supplies, water cutting and food shortage and a scarcity of medical personnel.

Sudan, which until 2010 was the largest country of Africa, witnessed a revolution in December 2018, in which the corrupt regime of Omar al-Bashir, who ruled the country for 30 years, was toppled. The ruling of the country by the corrupted government of Al Bashir for 3 decades can be described as the main factor for everything that is happening in Sudan now.


The military regime, allied with the Muslim Brotherhood movement, waged war with the south region of the country, before its independence and it was known as the longest war in history, resulting in the killing of nearly 2 million people from the south, beside carrying out genocide in Darfur.

For this reasons Omar Al Bashir has been wanted by the International Crime Court for crime against humanity, war crimes and genocide in Darfur since 2009. He is the first sitting head-of-state to be issued with an ICC arrest warrant.

The Sudanese revolution was peaceful, rejecting all means of violence and expressed a great popular yearning for freedom, democracy and social justice, after thirty years of horrible military dictatorship.

The support and main engine of the revolution was a wide range of political parties, trade union and civil forces, including liberal, reformist and leftist forces under the name of the "Declaration of Freedom and Change".

On the first day of 2019, Freedom and Change announced a text that included several issues, on top of which was the demand for “the immediate resignation of Al-Bashir and his regime from ruling the country” and “the formation of a national transitional government of national competencies in agreement with all spectrums of the Sudanese people.”

After the fall of al-Bashir, the head of the military council, Ibn Auf, who quickly resigned from power and appointed Abdel Fattah Burhan, announced “the formation of a transitional military council to administer the country’s rule for a transitional period of two years.”

One of the biggest mistakes of Freedom and Change, is that it left the door open to an agreement with the military establishment, as it spoke of a “totalitarian regime” in order to avoid talking about “military rule.”


It also did not disclose an explicit commitment to waging the battle with the military until the establishment of civilian rule. It rather used words that opened the way for the military to participate in the desired government.

One of the most important repercussions of the April 11 coup was that it blocked the way for the revolution, pretending that it supported it. The Rapid Support Forces led by Hemedti participated in the coup.

Its aim was to protect the class interests of parasitic military and civil capitalism, the army, the security force, the police and rapid support companies, and obstruct the return of looted people’s money and impede accountability for the perpetrators of crimes against humanity.

And when the armed forces removed Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, in an attempt to save the military regime, they collided with popular rejection of the continuation of this regime, and insistence on replacing it with civilian rule.

The revolutionaries, where female participation was remarkable, have shown unparalleled valor in rejecting the coup and military rule on a continuous basis. They organized marches in a programmed manner, in which they expressed their categorical rejection of this, and their desire not to submit to the dictatorship of military rule: the army and the RSF.

Facing the revolutionary momentum, the military was forced to respond to the demands of the street to form a Sovereign Council, composed of civilians and military personnel and to conform a new government headed by the well-known economist Abdallah Hamdok.

The military then started thwarting it and provoking divisions between political currents, in a way that aborts the civil democratic experiment and gives the generals the opportunity to monopolize power again without a partner or competitor.


The plan succeeded indeed, the street was divided, and there was huge division and polemic among groups and formations, all affiliated under the civil banner. In that atmosphere, perfectly prepared to pounce on the revolution, Al-Burhan carried out his military coup on October 25, 2021, officially overthrowing civil rule.

Since the success of the Sudanese revolution in overthrowing Omar al-Bashir, the military component appeared to control the course of the transitional period.

It did so through the manipulation of the transitional government establishment, passing through the negotiations of the constitutional document, and the formation of the transitional government, plus the presidency of the Sovereign Council.

Finally, it carried out the coup against the civilian partner in October, 2021, which devoted power entirely in the hands of this military component. Throughout this period, the military component continued to play the main role controlling the political situation in Sudan.

We must also pay attention to an important fact, which is that despite the greatness and peaceful nature of the Sudanese revolution, the reins of affairs were still in the hands of the followers of the Omar al-Bashir.


In the beginning, in the face of the thundering revolutionary waves, many symbols of his regime among the elite leaders in various sectors were kicked out, and the ruling Congress Party was removed from the scene.

Since Al Burhan and Himedti took real power of the country, everything changed then. The power was in the hand of the armed forces in the beginning, passing it then to the rest of the sectors. We should consider that the elements and cadres of this regime are the ones who manage the scene in various fields throughout the three decades.

On the external arena, several countries an organizations at that time, including the United States and the European Union, called on the military council to involve civilians in the transitional process, bearing in mind that Sudan has a geostrategic position that puts it at the sight of the outside world and makes it vulnerable to these goals.

Regarding this point, Dr. Aisha Al-Basri, expert in Sudanese affairs, stated that “the hands of the members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are stained with the blood of the Sudanese” and that “the Big Five, who have a permanent seat and have the right to veto, share the responsibility for what is happening today in Sudan, consisting in the brutal fighting between Al-Bashir army and his militias, where civilians will pay the price.”

On several occasions, the UNSC held the Janjaweed responsible for the crimes committed in Sudan, but Al Bashir regime did not care about that and continued to commit them against non-Arab tribes.


Having said that, we can assume that one of the biggest mistakes of the Freedom and Change group is sitting and negotiating with the Rapid Support Command, and giving it constitutional character, knowing that it is linked with the Islamists to war crimes and genocide in Darfur, and the brutal suppression of the revolutionaries as in the September 2013 massacre.

The RSF also has external support. That is how it became so powerful financially and militarily, and their sources of income were from the European Union, in order to help stop immigration. It also controlled the export of mercenaries for the Yemen war, where Hamidati organized that with Al-Burhan by order of the defeated Al-Bashir regime.

He is also involved in the looting of gold, land, and other resources. He benefitted from the state budget by order of the ousted President Al-Bashir personally to protect him, which was not subject to review. All the previous, made Hemedti greedy for monopolizing power, especially after the fall of Bashir himself.

Now the Islamists formed Janjaweed militias to practice genocide in Darfur and being the ones who created the devil who terrorized them, so the goal of their coup now is to get rid of him after he became a competitor to them, and a threat to their class interests.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Sud ... -0008.html

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Death toll from clashes in Sudan close to 300

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Clashes between the Army and the FAR rebels have been concentrated in the capital Khartoum and in the west of the country. | Photo: EFE
Posted 20 April 2023 (3 hours 50 minutes ago)

The WHO figure is contrasted with data from the Sudanese Central Committee of Physicians, which has estimated deaths due to the clashes at 198.

The World Health Organization (WHO) reported Thursday that the death toll from armed clashes in Sudan is close to 300, while the number of injured exceeds 1,200.

The WHO death toll is contrasted with those announced by the Sudanese Central Committee of Doctors, which have put the number of deaths at 198 due to clashes between the Army and the rebel group Rapid Support Forces (FAR).

"The number of civilian deaths since the start of the clashes has risen to 198 and the number of wounded to 1,207," the Sudan Doctors Union said on its official Facebook account.


The Sudanese Doctors Union indicated that the figures for deaths and injuries could be much higher because they do not have information from hospitals in different regions of the country.

The differences in the figures of deaths and injuries of the UN and the Sudanese medical entity occur because the agencies of the multilateral organization have a greater presence in some areas of Sudan, as in the case of Darfur, one of the hardest hit by the conflict. .

According to Sudanese doctors, the death of at least 24 civilians was recorded the day before, a reduction compared to 30 on Tuesday, with the most affected areas being the capital Khartoum and the North Dafur region in the west of the African country.

Last Tuesday, a new 24-hour truce began, which was not respected by the parties to the conflict, to allow civilians to return to their families safely and obtain the emergency supplies they need.


The international community is pressing for the Sudanese Army and the Rapid Support Forces group to reach an agreement to stop the clashes during the holy month of Ramadan.

https://www.telesurtv.net/news/sudan-ci ... -0008.html

Google Translator

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US/EU/NATO Meet with Somaliland Secessionists
Ann Garrison, BAR Contributing Editor 19 Apr 2023

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Somaliland President Muse Biho Abdi and his delegation met various officials, including Sen. Chris Van Hollen, in Washington in March 2022. This was one of many meetings between officials from the US, EU, and secessionist Somaliland. (Photo:US State Dept)

As Somaliland forces continue to fire on Somali nationalists in Laasaanood and the surrounding region, Sool, Sanaag and Cayn, US/EU/NATO officials held a joint call with secessionist Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi.

On April 17, a group of 15 international partners—Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the US—issued a statement about their conversation with Somaliland secessionists waging war against Somali nationalists in the Somali city of Laascaanood and the surrounding region, Sool, Sanaag and Cayn .

The diplomats plodded through the usual platitudes, calling for a cessation of hostilities and urging both sides to sit down and talk but, most fundamentally, reinforcing the West’s de facto recognition of secessionist Somaliland, encouraging the further fracturing of Somalia and disrespecting the nation’s sovereignty.

Why were they engaging in direct conversation with secessionists? The report resembled those of Antony Blinken regarding his meetings with the seditious Tigray People’s Liberation Front, meetings which disrespected Ethiopian sovereignty. Somaliland aspires to be the Taiwan of Africa , and Western officials can’t do enough to encourage it.

Their statement ended with this startling sentence:

“Partners were disappointed that H.E. [His Excellency] the President did not commit to a withdrawal of Somaliland forces centered around Laascaanood.”

One might at first think that they were referring to Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, but no, the “H.E. the President” they’re disappointed in is Muse Bihi Abdi , the “President” of Somaliland, one of Somalia’s seven federated states.

The Somali president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, hasn’t objected to being left out of the conversation. His only response to the conflict has been to mumble that both sides should talk and try to work it out, even as thousands of people die and as many as 100,000 may have been displaced.

Somalia has a flag and a UN seat but hasn’t had much else since the collapse of the Siad Barre government that existed from 1969 to 1991. The Islamic Courts established welcome stability between 2000 and 2007, but a 2006 US-backed invasion by Ethiopia overthrew the courts, inspired extremism, and gave rise to Al Shabaab, the terrorist organization that has plagued the nation and served as the excuse for US drone bombing and military presence ever since.

The Somali coast is as geostrategic as any in the world, along the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean, and it may have the richest untapped oil reserves in the world, so whatever the US’s actual concerns with Al Shabaab are, US military presence in Somalia is about more than Al Shabaab. The navies of multiple world powers swarm all over these waters, where roughly 12% of the world’s trade passes through the Suez Canal, and roughly 50% of its oil passes through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz .

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has no objection to drones bombing the Somali landscape, frequently hitting innocent nomads, farmers, and the livestock that often represents an entire family’s wealth. Nor does he object to the increasing US troop presence, or expansion of the US air base, Baledogle Airfield , command center for US drone operations in Somalia and training center for the Danab Brigade , a US trained, commanded, and paid special operations force.

He has no problem with ATMIS , formerly AMISOM , the UN Peacekeeping operation that has failed to keep the peace since its inception in 2007.

According to Somali scholar and Horn of Africa Institute founder Abdiwahab Sheikh Abdisamad, “President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is a foreign project and has no vision and mission for the country. He has no political philosophy to defend. He is simply there to enrich himself.”

Farmaajo tried to build a sovereign military to defend a sovereign Somalia

Somalia’s last president, the hugely popular Mohammed Abdullahi Mohammed, aka Farmaajo, was quite a different story. He was trying hard, within extreme circumstances, to negotiate the exit of US and other foreign troops and build a sovereign Somali military capable of defending a sovereign Somalia.

So Farmaajo had to go. The last thing the US and its EU/NATO allies want to see is a strong, sovereign Somalia exercising control over its own vast oil resources and its geostrategic coast, and even—shudder—forming a regional trade, cultural, and security allian ce with its neighbors Ethiopia and Eritrea.

With staggering hypocrisy, the US used the IMF to batter Somalia into holding a corrupt, clan-based election in 2022, when Farmaajo and the nationalist, aka unionist, movement was struggling for universal suffrage, a one-person-one-vote election. Farmaajo was out, and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was back into the office he had misused from 2012 to 2017.

It often seems against all odds that Somalis will ever have a functioning nation again, but Somali unionists are determined, and they don’t have to struggle with the ethnic divisions that have to be overcome in so many African nations because colonial boundaries were drawn without regard to whether the people inside them shared language, culture, or religion.

“Somalis speak one language, share one culture, and practice one religion,” says Somali American organizer Abdirahman Warsame, “and Somalia will become a nation again.”

https://www.blackagendareport.com/useun ... essionists

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Libya: Statement of the Forum of National Political Leaders
Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° on APRIL 20, 2023

Statement of the Forum of National Political Leaders

Held in Sirte on March 15-17, 2023.

In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful

Believing in the need to unify their efforts in these delicate historical circumstances that our dear country is going through after many years of chaos and turmoil and what they created of grave danger to the present and future of our people, and in response to the pressure of their popular bases to work to restore the initiative to find a solution to the Libyan crisis that is based on the will of the people, respond to their hopes and aspirations, and put an end to their increasing life suffering.

Perceiving that the political process which has been going on for years has reached a dead end, due to the reprehensible external interference and the inability of local institutions to confront its futile initiatives aimed at preserving external interests at the expense of our country and its interests, leading to the closing of the doors of hope in finding a resolution that puts an end to agonizing conflicts; responds to the aspirations of the Libyan people to rebuild their state; preserve their dignity; lay the foundations for stability; and stop forever the blunt foreign interference and manipulation of the people’s fate and capabilities.

Deeming in the loss of the opportunities it provided for local and regional tools to resolve the chronic Libyan crisis and put an end to successive political absurdity, shameful economic plunder and the continuous neglect of sovereignty, security, and independence, which made the country a hotbed for foreign mercenaries and a base for hateful colonial bases.

The national political leaders in Libya have realized that the time has come to restore the initiative and reestablish the role of the Libyan people to decide their fate, chart their future, and rebuild their State on democratic foundations based on its glorious history, rich heritage, and legitimate aspirations for progress, development, and prosperity.

And after extensive and in-depth discussions during this preparatory and consultative forum, they, after relying on God Almighty, announce the following:

1. The restoration of the State and the rebuilding of its institutions require uniting the efforts of national forces from now on to formulate a purely Libyan initiative and a comprehensive national project without submitting to external dictates and suspicious projects aimed at realizing foreign interests. Such a project must be based on well-established national constants, foremost of which is preserving the country’s unity, independence, and national security.

2. The United Nations Support Mission and the countries involved in the Libyan affairs shall be called to re-read the scene in order to understand the nature of the crisis and to evaluate their previous positions that contributed to deepening the crisis and urging them to cease non-constructive interventions and to change their methods and direct them towards support and back the will of the Libyans to build their State as the only way to achieve cooperation; to exchange interests; and to open doors to instate equal relations based on mutual respect and the desire for coexistence.

3. The only way to solve the Libyan crisis is to reach a comprehensive agreement among all Libyan parties, reflected in a sacred national charter, emanating from the clear and explicit will of the people, which can only be reached by convening a national conference of a constituent nature that brings together all parties without exception, marginalization, or exclusion. Such a conference must listen to all opinions, remove all fears, spread reassurance, respond to all aspirations, chart the way for building state institutions, correct its political and constitutional path, and lay solid foundations for comprehensive national reconciliation.

4. The national leaders, on their way to convene the founding conference as soon as possible, call for the creation of an appropriate climate to spread reassurance and hope as a top priority for rational political action, by supporting the armed forces and security services to enable them to perform their role in protecting the popular will and national choices.

5. The national political leaders stress the importance of unifying the sovereign, military, security, and economic institutions and appreciate the important role played by the armed forces and their leadership in combating terrorism, rebuilding the army, protecting the borders of the country, eliminating the dens of corruption and crime. They also salute the efforts of the Public Prosecutor’s Office to enforce the law, deter crime and impose the prestige of the State.

6. The national political leaders announce the formation of a committee to follow up on the results of this preparatory, consultative forum. This committee shall communicate with all parties and local and international bodies to present the Forum’s initiative and visions geared to solve the crisis and create the necessary conditions for convening the founding conference as soon as possible in order to formulate a unified vision and a real road map to solve the crisis in a serious way that guarantees stability and reconciliation and rebuild state institutions.

The national political leaders, as they conclude the work of their forum, extend their deep thanks to the General Command of the Armed Forces, which made this meeting possible in the safe city of Sirte, which is looking forward to embracing such national activities as it embraced the major jihad battles against brutal colonialism and salutes its honorable people. They also extend their thanks and gratitude to the national forces in the House of Representatives who supported the forum and facilitated its convening and was generous in such support. They, finally, pray to God Almighty to make this meeting a good omen and a turn of hope for a successful political process that heals the wounds of the homeland, restores pride to our people, and bring back to our country its prestigious position above the earth and under the sun.

The National Political Leaders’ Forum

Issued in Sirte on Friday, March 17, 2023

The final statement of the meeting of national political leaders, which concluded its work on Friday morning, 15-17. 03. 2023 at the Ouagadougou Hall in Sirte

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Re: Africa

Post by blindpig » Mon Apr 24, 2023 1:54 pm

Over 420 people have been killed in fighting in Sudan. Foreign countries accelerate evacuations
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 3,700 people have been injured since fighting broke out on April 15. The humanitarian crisis, including mass displacement, has continued to worsen as multiple ceasefires have failed to hold

April 24, 2023 by Peoples Dispatch

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(Photo: Sudan Doctors Union)

At least 427 people have been killed as clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) entered their ninth consecutive day on Sunday, April 23.

In a statement on Monday, April 24, morning, the Sudan Doctors Union (SDU) reported that various areas of the capital Khartoum were being bombarded, which had resulted in civilian deaths in the Kalakla area. It added that a hospital, already overcrowded with people with serious injuries, had also been hit with the number of people injured reaching 50.

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 3,700 people have been injured since fighting broke out on April 15. Multiple ceasefire declarations have failed to hold, including a three-day truce that was confirmed by both the RSF and SAF on April 21 to mark the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported ongoing fighting over the weekend, including “unverified reports indicating clashes [had] intensified in Bahri and Omdurman on April 22.”

In a separate statement released earlier on Monday, the SDU had reported nine deaths—in Khartoum, Omdurman, Nyala, and Marawi—along with 36 injuries among civilians on Sunday.

It added that hospitals had been difficult to access due to lack of mobility given the security situation in the country. A widespread internet blackout was also reported by internet watchdog Netblocks, “with connectivity at 2% of ordinary levels” late on Sunday night.

As of Sunday, a total of 13 hospitals had been bombed and 19 had been forced to evacuate, the SDU said on Monday. 69% of hospitals adjoining the conflict zones are still out of service. These include 55 of the 79 basic hospitals in Khartoum and other States affected by the fighting.

Existing medical facilities are also on the brink of collapse due to a lack of medical personnel, medical supplies and electricity. The SDU added that six ambulances had also been attacked, while others were not allowed to pass through to transport patients or receive aid.

Tens of thousands of people have been forced to flee, with bulk of the displacement reported in the North, West, and South States of the Darfur region, the States of Khartoum, Blue Nile, North Kordofan, and the Northern State, according to preliminary findings released by the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) on April 22.

People are fleeing not just due to the armed clashes, but also because of severe shortages of water and electricity—as observed in Khartoum’s Bahri locality. People are also fleeing to Egypt, South Sudan, and Chad, according to the DTM report.

Meanwhile, foreign countries including the US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, Spain, Jordan, and Canada have accelerated the evacuation of their citizens and diplomats. Turkey initiated evacuation efforts via road from the southern city of Wad Madani on Sunday. Egypt has evacuated its citizens through land ports. UN convoys have also transported foreign citizens to Port Sudan for evacuation.

While the US has temporarily closed its embassy in Sudan, it has announced that its forces “will remain deployed in Djibouti to protect US personnel and others until the security situation no longer requires their presence.”

Other countries including India, Libya, Tunisia, Japan, Sweden, Ireland, Ghana, and Kenya are also coordinating evacuation efforts. Nigeria has requested safe passage for 5,500 of its citizens, which includes students.

In a statement on April 22, the SDU warned that the ongoing evacuation efforts were an indication of not only the failure of the demand for a ceasefire, but pointed to the expectation that the conflict in Sudan will continue and “spread in residential neighborhoods” across large parts of the country. This has resulted in concerns—especially from foreign countries—of an increase in violence and casualties.

SDU also said that evacuations would put Sudan’s own defenseless citizens in greater danger, “as experience has shown that the parties to the conflict [the RSF and the SAF] are keen on [saving] the lives of foreign nationals only, without any regard for the lives of peaceful Sudanese citizens.”

Amid calls by the US and the European Union for talks and a political settlement, Sudan’s revolutionary forces have reiterated the need for an urgent ceasefire, while also steadfastly emphasizing that any meaningful solution to the crisis in the country must emerge from the demands of the years-long mass movement which had declared “No Negotiations, No Compromise, No Partnership” with the military.

https://peoplesdispatch.org/2023/04/24/ ... acuations/

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Sudan: Alignment of Forces, Players
Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° on APRIL 23, 2023
M. K. Bhadrakumar

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People fleeing fighting in Khartoum, Sudan, April 19, 2023

The worst-case scenario is coming to pass, apparently, in Sudan. That is, at any rate, the apocalyptic message streaming out of Khartoum in the western media.

President Biden lent credence to the alarmist perception by confirming that on his orders, the US military conducted an operation “to extract government personnel from Khartoum.”

According to the US Department of State, about 16,000 American nationals are currently in Sudan. The US embassy in Khartoum had an excessive staff strength — on par with its Mission in Kiev — which was unwarranted by the scale and volume of US-Sudanese bilateral ties, leading to speculation that it was a key intelligence outpost.

In the Horn of Africa, the Gulf states traditionally took a deep dive into the complexities of power projection, political rivalry and conflict across the Red Sea, which has lately re-emerged as a geo-strategic space in which competing global and regional players have sought to project influence.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand, and Qatar and Turkey on the other, intensely competed to counter each other’s influence and project their rivalries on to the politics of the Horn, but, after years of fierce competition, signs have appeared lately that they’ve begun cautiously recalibrating their respective roles.

The post-Covid strain on their financial resources, the drawdown in Yemen, and the eagerness of the Gulf states to appear as constructive and reliable partners, adopting a more pragmatic approach on regional issues — all these contributed to the notable signs of détente replacing the intense intra-Gulf competition in the Horn of Africa.

In Sudan, Saudi and Emirati efforts to shape the political transition after Omar al-Bashir’s ousting in April 2019 led to partial successes but also significant difficulties, as they came at severe reputational cost under scrutiny from both the Sudanese population and the international community.

The US and the EU saw GCC countries as useful partners in the Horn in terms of their surplus capital to invest that Western powers lacked, as well as their good personal networks. The Faustian deal between the Trump administration, Israel and the Gulf states to lure the Sudanese military leadership into the Abraham Accord in 2020 was a defining moment.

However, this dalliance proved short-lived ans the Western powers’ game plan to ride on the wings of the Gulf states to counter the growing influence of Russia and China in the Red Sea met a sudden death too, as the ground beneath the feet of the US-Saudi alliance shifted dramatically under the Biden presidency and Riyadh began strengthening its ties with Moscow and Beijing.

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The Greater Horn of Africa

This, in turn, compelled the Western powers to explore the opportunity to push for greater coordination and constructive engagement directly with the generals in Khartoum, banking on their own efforts and resources running parallel with the Gulf states’ recalibration of their involvement in the Horn.

In a nutshell, the crux of the matter is that the Western understanding of stability and sustainable development in Sudan through the prism of the neocon ideology that permeates the Biden administration lies at the core of the aggravation of the sluggish internal political crisis in Sudan that has been brewing since 2019 between the army led by the de facto leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and armed formations led by Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo.

The immature, unrealistic political settlements promoted by the Western liberal democracies significantly fuelled the military’s infighting. The Anglo-American dealmaking was largely limited to the Transition Military Council and the Forces for Freedom and Change, an inchoate coalition of hand-picked civilian and rebel Sudanese groups (reg., Sudanese Professional Association, No to Oppression Against Women Initiative, etc.) that by no means represented the national forces in Sudan. Unsurprisingly, these neocon attempts at imposing exotic settlements on an ancient civilisation were doomed to fail.

The spin propagated by the western media reduces the present crisis in Sudan — manifesting as conflict within the military establishment — is a grotesque oversimplification and attempt at cover-up. Simply put, this crisis cannot be reduced to a personal dispute between the two generals — Burhan and Hemedti — who had been friends for a very long time.

The crisis can be resolved only through a “security solution,” which means an integration process involving the Rapid Support Forces in an appropriate manner as a political partner in governance, not just a military force affiliated with the army.

Lest it be forgotten, Sudan is a vast country of great ethnic and regional diversity — inhabited by something like 400-500 tribes. The country’s stability depends critically on an optimal model of interaction between the elites and clans.

Basically, what drives the special forces in the current conflict is their expectation to increase their importance in the domestic political process of the country. It must be understood that the current strife is not about access to some military resource, but about control over the economy and the distribution of power.

Meanwhile, the clumsy, inept handling of the formation of the new government by the UN Representative Volker Perthes significantly contributed to the present crisis. Perthes, a German establishment think tanker, fired up by the neocon ideology, was the wrong man to handle such a sensitive mission.

This is yet another edifying example of the legacy of UN Secretary General Guterres to preferring Westerners as envoys to those hotspots where the West’s geopolitical interests are at stake. The UN meeting on March 15 exposed that the overzealous Perthes was detached from reality by rushing through the transfer of power from the military administration to the civilian one — rather than concentrating on helping to form a government and creating a committee to draft a new constitution — which, alas, provoked the intensification of confrontation between the warring parties.

The good part is that there is not yet any signs of radicalization in this conflict on religious grounds. Nor is there any power vacuum that could be exploited by a terrorist group. At the same time, mediation by external powers is required.

The countries of the region can help resolve the conflict. A comprehensive settlement may not happen soon, since the internal contradictions that accumulated over time require compromises, and so far at least, the parties are not ready for this.

In the present climate of conflict resolution enveloping regional politics in the West Asian region and the Gulf in particular, there are are no objective prerequisites for the conflict to move to the regional stage. The main countries that are associated with the warring factions have come up with peacekeeping initiatives — the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt.

In addition, other external partners, especially Russia and China, will make efforts to prevent a prolonged open conflict. By the way, Sudan has an external debt under $ 60 billion, and most of it falls on China — and Russia, on the other hand, is well-placed to foster rapprochement between al-Burhan and Dagalo.

Russia takes a balanced position. During his visit to Sudan in February, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with the leaders of both opposing sides. Russia is a stakeholder in Sudan’s stability.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement, “The dramatic events taking place in Sudan cause serious concern in Moscow. We call on the parties to the conflict to show political will and restraint and take urgent steps towards a ceasefire. We proceed from the fact that any differences can be settled through negotiations.”

However, the Anglo-American agenda remains dubious. Their focus is on internationalising the crisis, injecting big power rivalries into the Sudanese situation and willy-nilly create pretexts for western intervention. But any attempt to reignite the embers of the Arab Spring will be hugely consequential for regional security and stability. The Gulf states and Egypt will need to be particularly watchful.

Sudan would have figured in the phone conversation between the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Russian President Vladimir Putin on Friday.

https://libya360.wordpress.com/2023/04/ ... s-players/

It’s Not Military Force but an End to Impunity that Can Bring Peace to the Congo
Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° on APRIL 22, 2023
Peoples Dispatch

Kambale Musavuli talks about the political situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo following the discovery of mass graves in North Kivu, in Eastern DRC. He also explains why the solutions proposed by the East African Community do not have much of a chance of working



Kambale Musavuli of the Center for Research on the Congo explains the current situation in the DRC, including the violence by the M23 group. He explains how the Rwanda-backed M23 group has been devastating Congo for over a decade but has escaped accountability. One of the key reasons for this has been the west’s support for Rwanda. Kambale also talks about the role of the East African Community in the current conflict and how peace cannot come to the DRC without justice.

The full transcript of their conversation is available below:

Peoples Dispatch (PD): The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the DRC, one of Africa’s most important countries, continues to be in the news. There have been reports of mass graves in the North Kivu province of the DRC, which saw a lot of fighting between the government forces and the M23. Multiple reports, including by the the UN, have indicated that the M23 is supported by the DRC’s neighbor Rwanda. However, Rwanda has not faced any consequences although it has a long history of supporting such rebel groups that have wreaked havoc on the DRC. Meanwhile, the East African Community (EAC), a regional body, has been trying to intervene in the conflict, supposedly trying to bring about peace. But there are many questions about whether the EAC’s approach is actually working. Kambale, could you first take us through what is happening on the ground with the M23 group’s assault? Is the fighting still going on?

Kambale Musavuli (KM): Every time we speak about the M23, we must recall that they are a proxy militia funded, trained, and equipped by the Rwandan military. Numerous UN reports have documented this. For now, they have withdrawn from some areas after negotiations with different parties, such as the East African forces or the Congolese government. African Intelligence just recently published an article documenting how the Congolese government is secretly negotiating with the M23. So we know there are many efforts to stop the fighting. But we have to look at this in the overall context.

The DRC is a country of over 100 million people. The country has known conflict for the past two decades. This conflict is a proxy war by its neighbors, Rwanda and Uganda. And the Congolese people have been held hostage. They have been held hostage by processes for bringing about peace that do not consider their interests. There have been so many peace accords signed and these rebels — specifically the M23 and its earlier renditions, be it the CNDP or the RCD — have always gone back to the bushes and saying that the Congolese government is not respecting the agreements they’ve signed.

Now, when you look at the agreements, one will ask, why is it that every time someone picks up the gun and subsequently goes to the table, the solution is that the killers have to be part of the government. One should ask why is it that in these negotiations, Congo is losing sovereignty by providing territory and providing political positions that are giving amnesty to people who have committed atrocious crimes such as rapes and mass killing.

So if you look at the discovery of the mass graves — which was already known since November or 2022 — in Kishishe and other areas, the M23 massacred these civilians and put them in mass graves. Congolese citizens have already shared with the world what happened. The UN is investigating. These mass graves are being found. When there will be negotiations again with the M23 which massacred civilians, what are they going to do? Give them amnesty again.

This is why all these processes are not holding. Because it’s not taking into account the will and interests of the Congolese people.

PD: In this context, let’s also look at Rwandan President Paul Kagame’s recently trip to Benin and his comments there. Like you said, it’s pretty much common knowledge across the world that Rwanda is supporting M23. They have a history of doing it. But nonetheless, Kagame has been a vital partner of the West in many of their endeavors, including, ‘handling’ the refugee crisis, which means more atrocities on refugees. So what have been Kagame’s positions as of late?

KM: It’s really important to understand why we have a conflict in the Congo. Why are there millions of people dying? Millions of Congolese are dying because there is a push to get access to Congo’s land and Congo’s mineral resources and in the process, narratives are created. Rwandan President Paul Kagame has been on a tour in West Africa and in a stop in Benin, he said something that should worry many people around the world, especially Africans because Rwanda is a member of the African Union.

Kagame was asked by a journalist about the DRC and in his response, said something very bizarre. He questioned the 1884 Berlin Conference [during which Africa was divided by European colonial powers]. It sounds like a normal thing to do as the Berlin conference was done by the Europeans. One should question such things. But he added something much more cynical. He stated that during the Berlin conference, the land that is today the eastern part of Congo belonged to Rwanda. So when he says that, he is questioning the current borders of the African continent, a question that was already addressed by the African Union. It had already been decided that every African country that is a member of the African Union and had signed on to the African Union Charter, would respect the boundaries that were in existence in 1960.

I could go on and [add another dimension]. For example, during World War One, it was the Congolese army under Belgian rule that actually went to Rwanda and liberated Rwandans from German colonialism. So it’s so interesting that today Kagame is saying something different. But now that he has said that, it is firstly sad, and also eye-opening and helps people understand the conflict. There’s always been a fear, which is sometimes presented as a conspiracy theory, that Rwanda and Uganda are in an operation to Balkanize the Congo, to actually make a new country with Congo’s territory

So when you hear the Rwandan president question Congo’s borders, question the existence of North Kivu and South Kivu [provinces in the Congo] by saying that these are territories that belong to Rwanda before the Berlin conference, we know why over 6 million Congolese people have died. And if we are fighting for a free and liberated Congo and a free and liberated Africa, we are talking about Pan-Africanism, not Balkanization.

I would have been much more happier if the Rwandan President had said, for example, that he would love for Rwanda to become an additional province of the Congo and other that other African countries should come together in regional blocs to create a federation of states where in the final stage, the African continent as a bloc will be a union, a Pan-African union fighting for the interests of the African people. That is not what he’s saying. He’s actually advocating for carving up African states, which means weakening these countries. And then, of course, opening up access to the lands for the interests of the Rwandan elite and also their agents in the West, specifically those in London, Paris, and Washington, D.C.

PD: But has there been any pressure on Kagame from the West, his traditional allies? We do know that in 2012, similar pressure led to the end of fighting.

KM: There’s been pressure on Paul Kagame but it has to be contextualized. On one hand, they are putting pressure, but on the other, they’re not taking action. So US Secretary of State Antony Blinken put pressure on the Rwandan government to free political prisoners and stop support to rebel groups in the Congo. But the United States continues to support the Rwandan military and provide military aid. And then the UN reports that the M23 has sophisticated weapons such as night vision goggle and missiles that have greater range. António Guterres, the UN secretary general, stated that the United Nations forces do not have the capacity to fight the M23 because they have sophisticated weapons. So for the US, it’s all words, as far as I am concerned.

It’s the same with the United Kingdom. Yes, they have made statements saying that Rwanda should stop supporting rebel groups in the Congo. France has asked Rwanda to end its support for the M23. But what did the European Union do in the beginning of the year? It provided Rwanda 20 million Euros in military support for the latter’s operation in Mozambique. And in Mozambique, Rwanda is protecting the interests of the French oil company Total and not actually helping the people of the country.

So we are seeing denunciation. We are seeing strong condemnation. But we are not seeing action. And we know what works. We know that in 2012, when international pressure was put on Rwanda, when they withdrew military aid to Rwanda, the M23 disappeared. 10 years later, the M23 is back with great support and the action that was taken in 2012 is not happening.

PD: Let’s take a look at the East African Community. We know its soldiers are on the ground there. There was a peace delegation too. How is the Congolese population and the political establishment responding to the U.S. initiative?

KM: The DRC is the biggest member of the East African community. It also has the biggest population with 100 million people. So the DRC joining the EAC brought more hope to the people of the latter than for the Congolese people. Firstly, most Congolese were not informed or consulted about this process. Secondly, the decision to join was not openly discussed in parliament.

There was hope that the solutions coming out of the EAC would take into account Congo’s history and the belligerence of Rwanda and Uganda. However, in the solutions being proposed by the East African Community, there was no understanding that Rwanda and Uganda, members of the EAC, are actually the forces causing the chaos. So when the EAC is talking about sending troops to stop the M23 rebel group, you have Ugandan soldiers as part of the military force. That does not make any sense because the Congo actually took Uganda to the International Court of Justice. We won a US$ 325 million judgment for the war crimes, crimes against humanity, and pillaging of resources while they were occupying the Congo in the 2000s.

So they are already a belligerent force and they continue to support rebel forces. Secondly, Rwanda is part of the discussion around the military operations. On one hand, the United Nations is saying that Rwanda is supporting the M23. On the other hand, the EAC that is coming up with a strategy to stop the M23 actually has the country supporting the M23. It will never work.

Everything they are doing will not work until the fundamental question of justice is addressed. What will bring about peace in the DRC is justice, not a new military force. We had the best force coming into the Congo in 2012 — the SADC forces comprising soldiers from South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. These forces came and stopped the M23. They put military pressure on a political problem. They achieved some goals. But how do we explain the fact that a decade later, we are still talking about the M23. So we know that the military action is not going to stop the situation.

We believe that a culture of impunity enables those who committed crimes yesterday to continue doing so today. As no one is holding them accountable, it gives them a green light to continue to commit these crimes. So if we don’t address the question of justice, we will continue to have a war in the Congo. As the Congolese people, we support the creation of an international tribunal for the DRC to hold perpetrators of the violence accountable — be it Congolese, be it our neighbors Rwanda and Uganda, and be it the international actors and corporations who have been involved in the conflict. As long as we don’t have justice, we will continue to have conflict. This is, of course, why the EAC solution is not working in DRC.

https://libya360.wordpress.com/2023/04/ ... the-congo/

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Chris Matlhako: Remarkable South African Internationalist
April 20, 2023Chris Matlhako, South Africa, South African Communist Party

Comrade Chris Matlhako, the Secretary for International Affairs of the South African Communist Party and Central Committee member, passed away this morning, April 20, 2023, at the age of 58. He was a diligent friend to the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean and partner in the building of socialism internationally. Deepest condolences were expressed by the Cuban embassy and Ambassador in South Africa: “The world loses one of its most exceptional sons.”

Chris, an internationalist, traveled on many occasions to Venezuela and Cuba, offering solidarity and accompaniment from Africa and was an important voice in opposing NATO and the cold war on China. Chris condemned imperialist aggression against Palestine, Cuba, Venezuela, Iran and other countries, urging international solidarity from South Africa and was on the Steering Committee for The Black Alliance for Peace’s U.S. Out of Africa Network.

The African National Congress paid tribute in a statement that can be read here. https://twitter.com/MYANC/status/1649123179313365018


Below is the statement issued by the South African Communist Party on Comrade Chris Matlhako’s passing.

South African Communist Party

20 April 2023

SACP dips its red flag and mourns the passing of Central Committee member Comrade Chris Matlhako (21 October 1964 – 20 April 2023)

The South African Communist Party (SACP) conveys its message of deepest condolences to the family of Comrade Chris Matlhako, SACP 15th National Congress Central Committee member who served our Party and movement diligently.

Comrade Chris Matlhako passed away on Thursday morning, 20 April 2023.

The SACP also sends its message of condolences to the entire liberation movement which he served till he breathed his last, as well as the working-class across the world.

At the time of his passing, Comrade Chris Matlhako served the SACP as a full-time Central Committee Member as elected by the SACP 15th National Congress held 13 – 16 July 2022. In this capacity, he served as Secretary for International Relations at the Party’s Headquarters in Johannesburg. Previously, he was the SACP 2nd Deputy General Secretary as elected by the 14th National Congress in 2017, and served as a Central Committee member before that tenure. He was also a member of the African National Congress and participated in the mass democratic movement as an activist and leader.

Comrade Chris Matlhako joined the South Africa liberation struggle as a student, actively participating in the student movement to fight against the apartheid system. He later joined the SACP and never shifted from the socialist course.

An astute intellectual fully committed to the socialist cause, Comrade Chris penned many articles for various publications, local and international, on numerous subjects concerning the revolution. A collection of his articles published in various publications over the years was made available and serialised in the magazine Thinking Che, with the first volume appearing in 2019.

Comrade Chris Matlhako did not limit himself to serving the South African working-class, however. He also spread himself across the world, helping to raise the international struggle against imperialism and assiduously delivering the SACP’s message to various parts of the world. As part of his internationalist work, Comrade Chris served as the General-Secretary of the Friends of Cuba Society – South Africa (FOCUS-SA) and was also a member of the South African Peace Initiative, among other responsibilities. He also represented the Party in the Working Group of the International Communist and Workers Parties, directly contributing to shaping and sharpening the socialist voices across all lands.


In paying tribute to Comrade Chris Matlhako, the SACP will continue to tirelessly organise the working-class, galvanise the left forces in order to deepen the building of a socialist movement of the workers and the poor, as mandated by our 15th National Congress. In taking forward his work, the SACP calls for more revolutionaries to actively involve themselves in Marxist-Leninist intellectual work as well as working-class internationalism.

The SACP calls upon young communists, as led by the Young Communist League of South Africa, whom Comrade Chris worked very hard to nurture, to preserve his legacy by organising the youth of our country to fight against imperialism, towards socialism.


https://kawsachunnews.com/chris-matlhak ... ationalist

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Russia To Deliver Free Fertilizer To Kenya And Nigeria

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The Black Sea Grain Initiative was negotiated last July by the UN and Türkiye. Apr. 21, 2023. | Photo: Twitter/@russembkenya

Published 21 April 2023

Moscow has shipped 20 000 tons of fertilizers to Malawi.


Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin said Friday that Moscow is preparing two shipments of fertilizers to be delivered free of charge to Kenya and Nigeria.

Speaking to Russia 24 TV, the diplomat said the country has already sent 20 000 tons of its fertilizers to Malawi over a six-month period. This is the only shipment delivered, although Moscow has offered to donate 262 000 tons of fertilizers blocked in European ports to poor countries.

On this occasion, the Deputy Foreign Minister denounced the Western sanctions affecting the country's agricultural exports, with implications for payments, insurance, and shipping.

In this regard, Vershinin brought up the Black Sea Grain Initiative, stating that its expansion depends on the resolution of the problems blocking the access of Russian agricultural products and fertilizers to the world market.


Referring to the conditions Russia sets for the extension of the Istanbul grain deal, the Russian diplomat stressed, "reconnection of the Rosselkhoznadzor to SWIFT, resumption of spare parts supply and maintenance of agricultural machinery."

In addition, Vershinin mentioned the "reinsurance of agricultural goods and lifting of the ban on their access to ports, lifting of sanctions on Russian companies and their owners engaged in food and fertilizer production."

The grain deal was negotiated last July by the UN and Türkiye to ship agricultural products from Ukrainian Black Sea ports amid Russia's special military operation in Ukraine.


Russia agreed in March to a 60-day extension of the agreement, which was due to expire on May 18. However, its suspension is feared due to the West's failure to fulfill its part of the agreement on maintaining barriers to the export of Russian grain and fertilizers.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Rus ... -0019.html

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Enslavement of African Migrants ‘Big Business’ in Libya Thanks to EU Funding — UN
APRIL 21, 2023

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By Alexander Rubinstein · Apr 17, 2023

An investigation by the United Nations has concluded that money provided by the European Union to state entities in Libya has facilitated crimes against humanity ranging from forced labor and sexual slavery to torture.

Through its financial support of the Libyan Coast Guard and the Libyan Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM), the European Union has aided and abetted crimes against humanity, according to a recent UN report.

On March 27, 2023, the United Nations released the findings of a three-year investigation, confirming that “arbitrary detention, murder, rape, enslavement, sexual slavery, extrajudicial killing and enforced disappearance” has become a “widespread practice” in the once-prosperous nation of Libya, which was plunged into civil war by NATO’s regime change war over a decade ago.

While crimes against humanity were found to be widespread throughout the country, the report homed in on the plight of migrants and blamed the European Union for enabling the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity to enact abuses against Africans seeking asylum in Europe.

The report stated in its introductory section: “The Mission found that crimes against humanity were committed against migrants in places of detention under the actual or nominal control of Libya’s Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration, the Libyan Coast Guard and the Stability Support Apparatus. These entities received technical, logistical and monetary support from the European Union and its member States for, inter alia, the interception and return of migrants.”

In other words, rather than directly intercepting migrants traveling by boat to Europe, the European Union has outsourced the dirty work to the Libyan Coast Guard. Once the coast guard detains the migrants, they are sent back to Libya and transferred to both official and “secret prisons” where they are often exploited for financial gain through forced labor, ransom, or sexual slavery.

“There are reasonable grounds to believe that migrants were enslaved in detention centers of the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration,” the report stated, adding that DCIM and Coast Guard personnel and officials are implicated “at all levels” while high-ranking officials “colluded” with traffickers and smugglers both in the context of detention and interception.

“The Mission also found reasonable grounds to believe that guards demanded and received payment for the release of migrants. Trafficking, enslavement, forced labor, imprisonment, extortion and smuggling generated significant revenue for individuals, groups and State institutions,” the report claims.

In 2017, international media reported the revival of the slave trade in Africa due to continuing fallout of the NATO-backed regime change operation to depose Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi. The United Nations has now confirmed that the practice not only persists, but that it has been enabled by the EU.

“The support given by the EU to the Libyan Coast Guard… led to violations of certain human rights,” UN investigator Chaloka Beyani told reporters. “It’s also clear that the DCIM has responsibility for multitudes of crimes against humanity in the detention centers that they run. So the support given to them by the EU has facilitated this. Although we are not saying that the EU and its member states committed these crimes, the point is that the support given has aided and abetted the commission of the crimes.”

According to a 2021 report by the Brookings Institution, the EU has funneled $455 million to the Libyan Coast Guard and other government agencies since 2015.

Meanwhile, an investigation by The Outlaw Ocean Project and The New Yorker found that money from the EU “pays for everything from the buses that transport captured migrants at sea from port to the prisons to the body bags used for the migrants who perish at sea or while detained.

According to their joint investigation, Libya’s Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration “received 30 specially modified Toyota Land Cruisers to intercept migrants in Libya’s southern desert,” while money from the EU also helped DCIM purchase “10 buses to ship captive migrants to prisons after they are caught.”

The violent overthrow of Gaddafi’s government by NATO and the bands of Salafist insurgents it sponsored in 2011 plunged Libya into a state of civil war, with swathes of the country overtaken by Al Qaeda and ISIS-aligned bandits. As NATO and its jihadist proxies bore down on him, Gaddafi warned that his ouster would result in the destabilization of entire regions of the continent and a new migration crisis for Europe, with the Mediterranean transformed into a “sea of chaos.”

Gaddafi’s son, similarly warned at the time, “Libya may become the Somalia of North Africa, of the Mediterranean. You will see the pirates in Sicily, in Crete, in Lampedusa. You will see millions of illegal immigrants. The terror will be next door.”

The UN investigator, Professor Beyani, blamed Libya’s current crisis on a “contestation for power,” alluding to the power vacuum the West created in Libya with its regime change war while avoiding any direct reference to it. Human Rights Watch has also veered away from discussion of NATO’s 2011 intervention in its coverage of the UN report, which it described as “brutal and damning.” Perhaps that was because its director at the time, Ken Roth, was a prolific supporter of the assault.

The transformation of Libya into an anarchic hellscape has dramatically reduced the risk that would-be migrants to Europe would be detected by EU authorities. The UN report estimates that more than 670,000 migrants were present in Libya during parts of its investigation.

The lack of a strong, stable central government in Tripoli has allowed for an entire industry to develop with exploitation of migrants as its business model. “Detention, trafficking migrants, is big business in Libya. It’s an entrepreneurial project,” Beyani told France 24 following the report’s release.

While the International Criminal Court has indicted Russian President Vladimir Putin over allegations cooked up by US State Department-sponsored researchers, the new UN report on Libya has been treated by US and European media largely as a footnote, despite the West’s role as the key architect of the country’s ongoing nightmare.

(The Grayzone)

https://orinocotribune.com/enslavement- ... unding-un/

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43 years on, China remains Zimbabwe’s all-weather friend
On April 18, Zimbabwe celebrated its 43rd independence anniversary. The Southern African country won its liberation primarily through a people’s war, known as Chimurenga, that defeated British colonial and white racist rule. This liberation struggle was strongly supported by China and a number of other countries.

Marking this anniversary, the Xinhua News Agency, in an article we reprint below, quoted Christopher Mutsvangwa, Secretary for Information and Publicity of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), which played the main role in the liberation struggle, as saying that, after standing firmly with Zimbabwe in its struggle for national independence and liberation, China has been playing an important role in the country’s economic transformation by investing in its key economic pillars such as mining, agriculture and infrastructure. “This is probably the most exciting time just like in the 1960s and 1970s when China’s arrival gave an option to the liberation movements to fight for their freedom.”

He added that, through Chinese investment in infrastructure, Zimbabwe will be transformed into a regional trade hub, citing the Chinese-funded expansion of the Robert Gabriel Mugabe International Airport, the country’s largest, as an example.
As Zimbabwe is celebrating its Independence Day on Tuesday, experts have praised China for having been the African country’s all-weather friend for more than four decades.

After standing firmly with Zimbabwe in its struggle for national independence and liberation, China has been playing an important role in the country’s economic transformation by investing in its key economic pillars such as mining, agriculture and infrastructure, said Christopher Mutsvangwa, secretary for information and publicity for Zimbabwe’s ruling Zimbabwe African National Union party.

He said Chinese modernization has created opportunities for African countries including Zimbabwe.

“This is probably the most exciting time just like in the 1960s and 1970s when China’s arrival gave an option to the liberation movements to fight for their freedom,” Mutsvangwa told Xinhua, adding that Zimbabwe’s victory against colonial forces would have been unthinkable without Chinese support.

“Now this has moved into the economic era where the world markets have become flat so that if you are not happy with the price in New York you can always try Shanghai,” he said.

Mutsvangwa further said through Chinese investment in infrastructure, Zimbabwe will be transformed into a regional trade hub.

For example, the Chinese-funded expansion of Zimbabwe’s largest airport — the Robert Gabriel Mugabe International Airport — is due for completion in 2023. The upgrade will allow the airport to grow its passenger handling capacity to about 6 million a year from the current 2.5 million.

Hopewell Mupanganyama, chairman for the youth desk in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, praised China for standing with African countries in their quest for national independence and liberation.

“Around the 1970s, though China was classified to be a poor country of Asia in terms of development,” it “made sure” that it assisted “Africa to dismantle colonialism,” Mupanganyama said, adding that China now once again stands at the forefront of transforming African economies through investment and trade.

Over the years, China and Zimbabwe have kept boosting economic and trade ties. Trade between the two countries surged nearly 30 percent year-on-year to a record high of 2.43 billion U.S. dollars in 2022, the Chinese Embassy in Zimbabwe said.

https://socialistchina.org/2023/04/19/4 ... er-friend/
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Africa

Post by blindpig » Tue Apr 25, 2023 2:09 pm

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https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/8313363.html

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Conflicting parties in Sudan agree to 72-hour truce

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Blinken pointed out that Washington will promote the creation of a committee to establish a permanent cessation of hostilities. | Photo: Screenshot (Video)
Published 25 April 2023

The senior US official noted that after "intensive negotiations" the parties agreed to implement a truce.

The United States Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, announced Monday that the Sudanese Army and the Rapid Support Forces (FAR) paramilitary group have agreed to a new 72-hour ceasefire.

The head of US diplomacy said in a statement that after "intense negotiations" the parties agreed to implement a truce "throughout the country starting at midnight on April 24, with a duration of 72 hours ”.

Based on this, the head of US diplomacy urged both the Army and the paramilitaries to respect and immediately apply this consensus, as well as to negotiate a permanent cessation of confrontations.


In this sense, Blinken assured that Washington together with its regional allies will promote the creation of "a committee to supervise the negotiation to implement a permanent cessation of hostilities" in the East African nation.

Last weekend, the Government of Washington closed its embassy in Khartoum and evacuated its staff due to the increase in clashes and violence in the country while the US authorities assure that they are exploring options to resume their diplomatic activity.

Accordingly, the US State Department indicated that one of the variants would be a headquarters in Port Sudan, a city on the shores of the Red Sea where two US military ships were deployed to evacuate US citizens who wish to leave the African nation. .

The World Health Organization (WHO) noted that more than 420 people have died in Sudan and more than 3,700 have been injured since the start of hostilities on April 15.

https://www.telesurtv.net/news/eeuu-sud ... -0010.html

Compare and contrast.....The hypocrisy of the US regime is epic.


https://www.telesurtv.net/news/eeuu-sud ... -0010.html
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Re: Africa

Post by blindpig » Fri Apr 28, 2023 1:58 pm

US/EU/NATO Meet with Somaliland Secessionists
Ann Garrison, BAR Contributing Editor 26 Apr 2023

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Somaliland President Muse Biho Abdi and his delegation met various officials, including Sen. Chris Van Hollen, in Washington in March 2022. This was one of many meetings between officials from the US, EU, and secessionist Somaliland. (Photo:US State Dept)
As Somaliland forces continue to fire on Somali nationalists in Laasaanood and the surrounding region, Sool, Sanaag and Cayn, US/EU/NATO officials held a joint call with secessionist Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi.

On April 17, a group of 15 international partners—Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the US—issued a statement about their conversation with Somaliland secessionists waging war against Somali nationalists in the Somali city of Laascaanood and the surrounding region, Sool, Sanaag and Cayn .

The diplomats plodded through the usual platitudes, calling for a cessation of hostilities and urging both sides to sit down and talk but, most fundamentally, reinforcing the West’s de facto recognition of secessionist Somaliland, encouraging the further fracturing of Somalia and disrespecting the nation’s sovereignty.

Why were they engaging in direct conversation with secessionists? The report resembled those of Antony Blinken regarding his meetings with the seditious Tigray People’s Liberation Front, meetings which disrespected Ethiopian sovereignty. Somaliland aspires to be the Taiwan of Africa , and Western officials can’t do enough to encourage it.

Their statement ended with this startling sentence:

“Partners were disappointed that H.E. [His Excellency] the President did not commit to a withdrawal of Somaliland forces centered around Laascaanood.”

One might at first think that they were referring to Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, but no, the “H.E. the President” they’re disappointed in is Muse Bihi Abdi , the “President” of Somaliland, one of Somalia’s seven federated states.

The Somali president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, hasn’t objected to being left out of the conversation. His only response to the conflict has been to mumble that both sides should talk and try to work it out, even as hundreds of people die and as many as 100,000 may have been displaced.

Somalia has a flag and a UN seat but hasn’t had much else since the collapse of the Siad Barre government that existed from 1969 to 1991. The Islamic Courts established welcome stability between 2000 and 2007, but a 2006 US-backed invasion by Ethiopia overthrew the courts, inspired extremism, and gave rise to Al Shabaab, the terrorist organization that has plagued the nation and served as the excuse for US drone bombing and military presence ever since.

The Somali coast is as geostrategic as any in the world, along the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean, and it may have the richest untapped oil reserves in the world, so whatever the US’s actual concerns with Al Shabaab are, US military presence in Somalia is about more than Al Shabaab. The navies of multiple world powers swarm all over these waters, where roughly 12% of the world’s trade passes through the Suez Canal, and roughly 50% of its oil passes through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz .

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has no objection to drones bombing the Somali landscape, frequently hitting innocent nomads, farmers, and the livestock that often represents an entire family’s wealth. Nor does he object to the increasing US troop presence, or expansion of the US air base, Baledogle Airfield , command center for US drone operations in Somalia and training center for the Danab Brigade , a US trained, commanded, and paid special operations force.

He has no problem with ATMIS , formerly AMISOM , the UN Peacekeeping operation that has failed to keep the peace since its inception in 2007.

According to Somali scholar and Horn of Africa Institute founder Abdiwahab Sheikh Abdisamad, “President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is a foreign project and has no vision and mission for the country. He has no political philosophy to defend. He is simply there to enrich himself.”

Farmaajo tried to build a sovereign military to defend a sovereign Somalia

Somalia’s last president, the hugely popular Mohammed Abdullahi Mohammed, aka Farmaajo, was quite a different story. He was trying hard, within extreme circumstances, to negotiate the exit of US and other foreign troops and build a sovereign Somali military capable of defending a sovereign Somalia.

So Farmaajo had to go. The last thing the US and its EU/NATO allies want to see is a strong, sovereign Somalia exercising control over its own vast oil resources and its geostrategic coast, and even—shudder—forming a regional trade, cultural, and security alliance with its neighbors Ethiopia and Eritrea.

With staggering hypocrisy, the US used the IMF to batter Somalia into holding a corrupt, clan-based election in 2022, when Farmaajo and the nationalist, aka unionist, movement was struggling for universal suffrage, a one-person-one-vote election. Farmaajo was out, and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was back into the office he had misused from 2012 to 2017.

It often seems against all odds that Somalis will ever have a functioning nation again, but Somali unionists are determined, and they don’t have to struggle with the ethnic divisions that have to be overcome in so many African nations because colonial boundaries were drawn without regard to whether the people inside them shared language, culture, or religion.

“Somalis speak one language, share one culture, and practice one religion,” says Somali American organizer Abdirahman Warsame, “and Somalia will become a nation again.”

https://www.blackagendareport.com/useun ... essionists

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The Current Conflict in Sudan Part I: Background
Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° on APRIL 27, 2023
Ian Beddowes

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“…the miserable reality that the masses are living due to the chaotic war unleashed by the generals among themselves.”

– From statement by the Central Media Office of the Sudanese Communist Party 19th April 2023


Sudan, Egypt, and Britain

The territory of what now consists of the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan (which gained Independence from Sudan in 2011) was conquered by Egypt by the year 1874. Although Egypt was formally a province of the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire, the provincial governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, adopted the title of Khedive (Viceroy) and ruled Egypt from 1805 to 1848 (he died the following year). In 1820-1824, Muhammad Ali captured most of Sudan. His grandson, the Khedive Ismail Pasha, completed the conquest of Sudan by 1879.

The Suez Canal was built by the French with European finance in 1869. The British, who controlled the Cape route around Africa, were at first hostile, but by 1875, Khedive Ismail Pasha avoided bankruptcy by selling the Egyptian share of the Suez Canal to the British government. Within three years, British and French financial controllers sat in the Egyptian cabinet and became the real power in its government.

From 1877 to 1879, British Army officer General Charles George Gordon became Governor General of Sudan, a position previously held by Egyptians.

Obvious foreign control of the Egyptian government led to a nationalist uprising led by army officer Ahmed Urabi. Khedive Ismail Pasha was forced to concede to nationalist pressure but in 1879 he was removed by the British and replaced by his more compliant son, Khedive Tewfik Pasha. Nevertheless, Ahmed Urabi became Prime Minister in July 1882. The British replied to this by invading and defeated the Egyptian nationalists at the Battle of Tel el Kabir in September 1882.

In 1881, a Nubian from northern Sudan, a Sufi mystic called Muhammad Ahmad declared himself the Mahdi (the Guided), the Islamic messiah, and organised a movement which by 1883 controlled most of Sudan. In 1884, General Gordon was sent to evacuate European and Egyptian civilians from Khartoum, the Sudanese capital. In defiance of orders, he stayed there to defend the city and was killed by the Mahdists after a long siege. 6 months later, the Mahdi himself died unexpectedly of a water-borne disease.

Leadership of the Mahdists was then assumed by Abdullah Ibn Mohammed who was known as Khalifat al-Mahdi or simply the Khalifa. He was also the leader of the Ansar Sufi religious movement. This independent religious state was to rule Sudan until a joint British-Egyptian force defeated the Khalifa at the Battle of Omdurman in 1898.

In 1899, a British-Egyptian Condominium was formed and the whole territory was named Anglo Egyptian Sudan. And as a result of the First World War (1814-1818), the Ottoman Empire fell and Turkey lost the last vestiges of imperial control over both Egypt and Sudan. Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was nominally under the King of Egypt, (a title adopted by the descendants of Muhammad Ali after 1922), but in reality, the whole territory of Sudan was run as a British Crown Colony until Independence in 1956.

The British recognised the huge cultural difference between the Arabised Muslim north which had historical affinities to ancient Egypt long before the arrival of Islam and the largely nomadic cattle herding cultures of the south, in which it was normal in some ethnic groups for people to remain unclothed and to worship the spirits of nature. Christian, mainly Protestant, missionaries had a strong impact on the people of southern Sudan during the colonial period.

Following the overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy and the beginning of its own genuine Independence in 1952, Egypt renounced any claim on Sudan.

Sudan Independence

Sudan became independent on 1st January 1956. Under the Transitional Constitution adopted, the Governor General was replaced not by a President but by a five-member Supreme Commission with the head of government being the Prime Minister.

The language of administration of Sudan was Arabic, but administrators in the South had been trained in English. In 1953, the British administrators began to leave giving posts to Sudanese, but of 800 positions only 4 were given to southerners.

The first Prime Minister of the Republic of Sudan was Ismail al-Azhari, he came from the Sufi Muslim Khatmiyya sect and had no time for the Christians in the South who had hoped for a federal system. Civil war broke out in August 1955 when it was realised that the interests of the South were not going to be considered. This, the First Sudanese Civil War would continue until 1972.

Squabbling among political factions and weak governance prompted the first military coup in Sudan in November1958. The two generals who led the coup, Ibrahim Abboud and Ahmad Abd al Wahab, belonged to the Khatmiyyah and Ansar Sufi sects respectively. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces with Abboud at its head would govern Sudan until 1964.

During this period, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), founded in 1946, played a significant role as a disciplined force of the workers, peasants and revolutionary intelligentsia, as it still does today.

Abboud showed as little respect and understanding of the people of the South as his predecessor, Azhari. His government suppressed expressions of religious and cultural differences and supported attempts to Arabise and Islamicise the South. From 1963, the armed struggle against the government which had started in 1955 was intensified.

In October 1964, a seminar on Southern Sudan held at the University of Khartoum was viciously attacked by police with 3 people being killed. Anger with military rule boiled over and Abboud was forced to resign the following month.

There was a return to the 1956 Transitional Constitution and an interim government formed under the leadership of educator Sirr Al-Khatim Al-Khalifa as Prime Minister.

The General Election of 1965 only ushered in a period of confusion as the electorate voted along ethnic or religious lines. There was an attempt to ban the Sudanese Communist Party and Islamic elements refused to recognise the rights of non-Muslims in the South. A succession of weak governments led to another military coup in 1969.

Nimeiry and the Democratic Republic of Sudan

On 25th May 1969, young officers calling themselves the Free Officers Movement seized power in Sudan. They were led by Colonel Jaafar Nimeiry. He justified the coup, not unreasonably, on the grounds that civilian politicians had paralysed the decision-making process, had failed to deal with the country’s economic and regional problems, and had left Sudan without a permanent constitution.

The coup leaders, joined by Babiker Awadallah, the former Chief Justice, constituted themselves as the 10-member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) under Nimeiri’s chairmanship.

The RCC proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Sudan dedicated to advancing ‘Sudanese Socialism’. The following year, a new national flag was adopted in traditional Arab revolutionary nationalist colours of black, green, red and white.

[Note that Kwame Nkrumah in 1967 criticised the concept of ‘African Socialism’—as opposed to scientific socialism⸺in African Socialism Revisited. A.M. Babu dealt with this in more detail in 1981 in his work African Socialism or Socialist Africa? Both argue that only scientific socialism can save Africa from neo-colonial domination.]

The RCC immediately suspended the Transitional Constitution of 1956 and the banned political parties. The RCC also nationalised many industries, businesses, and banks. Furthermore, Nimeiri ordered the arrest of sixty-three civilian politicians and forcibly retired senior army officers. Awadallah was appointed as Prime Minister. In order to dispel the notion that the coup had installed a military dictatorship, he presided over a twenty-one-member cabinet that included only three officers from the RCC, among them its Chairman, Nimeiri, who became Minister of Defence. The other two military members of the Cabinet held the portfolios for Internal Security and Communications.

Nine members of the Awadallah Cabinet are believed to have been members of the Sudanese Communist Party including one of the two southerners in the cabinet, John Garang, Minister of Supply, and later, Minister for Southern Affairs. Garang was to play a major role in future Sudanese politics. The Communists played a significant role in shaping government policies and programmes.

Awadallah clashed with Nimeiri in November 1969, after he claimed that the new government would not survive without assistance from the socialist countries. Nimeiri then became Prime Minister. Awadallah retained his position as RCC Deputy Chairman and remained in the government as Foreign Minister.

Conservative forces, led by the Ansar, posed the greatest threat to the RCC. Imam al-Hadi al Mahdi had withdrawn to his Aba Island stronghold in the Nile, near Khartoum. The Imam had demanded a return to ‘democratic government’, the exclusion of Communists from power and an end to RCC rule. In March 1970, hostile Ansar crowds prevented Nimeiri from visiting the island for talks with the Imam. Fighting erupted between government forces and the Ansar. When the Ansar ignored an ultimatum to surrender, army units with air support assaulted Aba Island. The Imam was killed while trying to cross into Ethiopia.

Soon after the army had crushed the Ansar at Aba Island, Nimeiri moved against the SCP. He ordered the deportation of SCP General Secretary Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub. When Mahjub returned illegally after some months abroad, he was placed under house arrest. In March 1971, Nimeiri indicated that trade unions would be placed under government control. The RCC also banned communist-led students’, women’s, and professional organisations.

Nimeiri then announced the planned formation of a national political movement called the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), which would assume control of all political parties, including the SCP. After this speech, the government arrested the SCP’s Central Committee and other leading Communists. The SCP, however, retained strong covert organisation. Before further action could be taken against the Party, on 19th July 1971 the SCP launched a coup. Nimeiri and the RCC together with a number of pro-Nimeiri officers were arrested while meeting at the Presidential Palace. A seven-member Revolutionary Council led by Major Hisham al-Atta was formed. Three days after the coup, however, loyal army units stormed the palace, rescued Nimeiri, and arrested Atta and others. Nimeiri ordered the arrest of hundreds of Communists and dissident military officers, some of whom, including Atta, were executed.

Nimeiri reaffirmed his commitment to establishing a socialist state. A provisional constitution, published in August 1971, described Sudan as a ‘socialist democracy’ and provided for a presidential form of government to replace the RCC. A plebiscite the following month elected Nimeiri to a six-year term as President.

The Southern armed resistance known as the Anyanya controlled much of the southern countryside while government forces occupied the region’s major towns. In 1971 Joseph Lagu, who had become the leader of southern forces opposed to Khartoum, proclaimed the creation of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). Anyanya leaders united behind him, and nearly all exiled southern politicians supported the SSLM.

Nimeiri remained committed to ending the southern insurgency. He believed he could stop the fighting by granting regional self-government and undertaking economic development in the South. By October 1971, Khartoum had established contact with the SSLM. A conference between SSLM and Sudanese government delegations convened at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in February 1972.

The Addis Ababa accords guaranteed autonomy for the southern region — composed of the three provinces of Equatoria (present-day Al Istiwai), Bahr al Ghazal, and Upper Nile (present-day Aali an Nil) with a Regional President leading a High Executive Council and an elected Southern Regional Assembly. National government would be responsible for defence, foreign affairs, currency and finance, economic and social planning. The accords also recognised Arabic as Sudan’s official language, and English as the South’s principal language, which would be used in administration and would be taught in the schools.

Both sides agreed to a cease-fire. An amnesty was announced retroactive to 1955 allowing exiles to return. The two sides signed the Addis Ababa Agreement on 27th March 1972, which was thereafter celebrated as National Unity Day.

After the settlement in the south, Nimeiri attempted to mend fences with northern Muslim religious groups. The government undertook administrative decentralisation, popular with the Ansar, that favoured rural over urban areas. Khartoum also reaffirmed Islam’s special position in the country and recognised the Sharia as the source of all legislation, and released some members of religious orders who had been incarcerated. However, Sadiq al-Mahdi, the Imam of the Ansar and who had briefly been Prime Minister in 1966-1967 and other religious conservatives remained outside the country.

In August 1972, Nimeiri created a Constituent Assembly to draft a permanent constitution. He then asked for the government’s resignation to allow him to appoint a cabinet whose members were drawn from the Constituent Assembly. Nimeiri excluded individuals who had opposed the southern settlement or who had been identified with the SSU’s pro-Egyptian faction.

The new Constitution recognised the SSU as the only authorised political organisation, and supported regional autonomy for the South. It also stipulated that voters were to choose members for the 250-seat People’s Assembly from an SSU-approved slate. Although it cited Islam as Sudan’s official religion, it also acknowledged Christianity as the faith of a large number of Sudanese citizens. In May 1974, voters selected 125 members for the assembly; SSU-affiliated occupational and professional groups named 100 and the President appointed the remaining 25.

Discontent with Nimeiri’s policies and the increased military role in government escalated as a result of food shortages and the southern settlement, which many Muslim conservatives regarded as surrender. There were coup attempts by Muslim conservatives in 1973, 1974 and 1976. In September 1974, Nimeiri responded to this unrest by declaring a state of emergency, purging the SSU, and arresting large numbers of dissidents. Nimeiri also replaced some cabinet members with military personnel loyal to him. Conservative opposition to Nimeiri coalesced in the National Front, formed in 1974. In July 1976, soldiers deployed by government quickly restored order by killing more than 700 rebels in Khartoum and arresting scores of dissidents, including many prominent religious leaders.

Following the 1976 coup attempt, Nimeiri and his opponents adopted more conciliatory policies. In early 1977, government officials met with the National Front in London, and arranged for a conference between Nimeiri and Sadiq al Mahdi in Port Sudan in what became known as the ‘national reconciliation’. The two leaders signed an eight-point agreement that agreed to the dissolution of the National Front while admitting its former members into the SSU. The agreement also restored civil liberties, freed political prisoners and reaffirmed Sudan’s non-aligned foreign policy, and promised to reform local government. As a result of the reconciliation, the government released about 1,000 detainees and granted an amnesty to Sadiq al Mahdi. Sadiq renounced multi-party politics and urged his followers to work within the one-party system.

In the February 1978 People’s Assembly elections, Nimeiri authorised returning exiles who had been associated with the old Islamist parties including the Muslim Brotherhood to stand for election as independent candidates. These independents won 140 of 304 seats.

Nimeiri moved closer to the Islamists. The end of the SSU’s political monopoly, coupled with rampant corruption at all levels of government, cast increasing doubt on Nimeiri’s ability to govern Sudan.

Nimeiri adopted a more dictatorial leadership style. He ordered the State Security Organisation to imprison without trial thousands of opponents and dissidents. He also dismissed or transferred any minister or senior military officer who appeared to be developing his own power base. Nimeiri selected replacements based on their loyalty to him rather than on their abilities. This strategy caused him to lose touch with popular feeling.

In June 1983, Nimeiri sought to counter the South’s growing political power by redividing the Southern Region into the three old provinces of Bahr al Ghazal, Al Istiwai, and Aali an Nil; he had suspended the Southern Regional Assembly almost two years earlier. The southern-based Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which emerged in mid-1983, unsuccessfully opposed this redivision and called for the creation of a new united but federal Sudan.

In September 1983 Nimeiri proclaimed Sudan to be an Islamic state with the Sharia as the basis of the Sudanese legal system. Nimeiri’s decrees, which became known as the September Laws, were bitterly resented both by secularised Muslims and by the predominantly non-Muslim southerners. The SPLM denounced the Sharia and the executions and amputations ordered by religious courts. The Southern Autonomous Region was abolished and by the end of 1983, the Second Sudanese Civil War commenced. The discovery of oil in the border area between North and South played an important background role in this conflict.

In early 1985, anti-government discontent resulted in a general strike in Khartoum. Demonstrators opposed rising food, petrol, and transport costs. The general strike paralysed the country. Nimeiri, who was on a visit to the United States, was unable to suppress the rapidly growing demonstrations against his regime. A bloodless military coup led by his Minister of Defence General Abdel Rahman Swar al-Dahab ousted him from power. The name Democratic Republic of Sudan was dropped and once again, it became simply the Republic of Sudan. At the subsequent elections the Islamist Sadiq al-Mahdi became Prime Minister.

https://libya360.wordpress.com/2023/04/ ... ackground/

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Thousands of Inmates Escape From Prisons Around Sudan

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Journalists outside Kober Prison in Khartoum, Sudan, April 25, 2023. | Photo: Twitter/ @RadioDabanga

Published 26 April 2023

Nevertheless, the Sudanese Army claims that former dictator Al Bashir and his top officials are still under the custody of the Judicial Police.


According to Radio Dabanga and other Sudanese media, thousands of inmates have escaped from jails taking advantage of the intensification of fighting between the Sudanese Army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

On Wednesday, the Sudanese Army affirmed that former dictator Omar al Bashir and some of his high-level officials, who are wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes, have not escaped and remain detained in a military hospital in the Umm Dorman city.

Previously, social networks circulated a recording attributed to former Interior Minister Ahmed Haruon in which he claimed to have escaped from Kobar prison.

Since the overthrow of Al Bashir in April 2019, some twenty officials of his regime remained in that jail after being tried for illicit enrichment and for having carried out a coup in 1989.

Currently, however, the Sudanese Army claims that Al Bashir, former Vice President Bakri Hasan Saleh, former Defense Minister Abdelrahim Hussein, and two other former officials are still being held in a military hospital under the custody of the Judicial Police.


The ICC demands the surrender of Al Bashir, Hussein and Haroun for their responsibility in the crimes committed during the civil war that took place in Darfur between 2003 and 2008, a bloody period in which at least 300,000 people died.

In June 2021, the Sudanese transitional government pledged to hand over the Al Bashir officials to the ICC. This, however, did not happen because that transitional government was overthrown by another military coup in October 2021.

After Haroun's recording was posted online, the Armed Forces accused the RSF of attacking several prisons in Khartoum and other cities to allow the escape of inmates and to provoke a state of insecurity in the country.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Tho ... -0005.html

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Democracy is defended by the struggles of the people: South Africa’s Abahlali baseMjondolo marks UnFreedom Day

South Africa held its first democratic elections post apartheid on April 27, 1994. While the day is observed as ‘Freedom Day’, movements including Abahlali baseMjondolo have used it to highlight the continued repression and inequality faced by poor communities in the country

April 27, 2023 by Peoples Dispatch

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AbM members at the UnFreedom Day protests. Photo: AbM

April 27 is commemorated as Freedom Day in South Africa. It marks the first elections with universal voting rights after the fall of white supremacist apartheid rule, 29 years ago.

However, for South Africa’s socialist militant shack dwellers’ movement, Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM), the occasion is a day of mourning – an expression of how poor and otherwise marginalized communities in the country remain profoundly unfree. On Wednesday, April 26, AbM members marched in the city of Durban to mark ‘UnFreedom Day’. Wednesday’s mobilizations was one of three to mark this year’s UnFreedom Day, with events scheduled in the Mpumalanga province on April 28, and in Gauteng on April 29.

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The red river runs through Durban on UnFreedom Day: Photo and caption: Abahlali baseMjondolo)

“All that we achieved in 1994 was the right to vote, it is not a complete political freedom,” AbM’s founding member and president, S’bu Zikode told Peoples Dispatch ahead of the mobilizations. This sentiment informed much of the movement’s early organizing, especially the ‘No land. No house. No vote’ campaigns organized in 2006 and again in 2011, calling upon people living in informal settlements to withhold their vote in local elections.

“Freedom is not only a question of service delivery and budget constraints. It is a question of our full participation in all discussions and decisions about the future of our own communities and our country. It is a question of honesty, respect, and dignity for the poor. It is a question of full recognition,” the movement had said in 2011.

AbM would develop and expand its approach over the coming years, these issues would remain at the core of its work, with the movement ultimately organizing under its present slogan of ‘Land. Housing. Dignity.’

Access to land remains a crisis in South Africa, Zikode said, “Up until today, 87% of land remains in the hands of the white minority, mainly the white commercial farmers.”

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AbM UnFreedom Day march in Durban. Photo via International Peoples’ Assembly

“We are not free because we are denied the right to well-located urban land and thereby our right to a place in the cities.” AbM said in a statement on April 25. The alternative then becomes clear, “Those who do not have land must simply occupy vacant and unused land as a political act, not as a criminal act,” Zikode stressed.

“Land will not be given, land is taken.”

Occupation has served as the movement’s key strategy to secure access to land, what AbM calls “expropriation from below.” It has maintained that the “social value of land must come before its commercial value,” and this not only informs how the movement occupies land, but how it is organized. “Land must be collectively owned and democratically managed,” AbM has said.

The right to land is inseparable from the right to housing which is enshrined in South Africa’s constitution, drawn up by the very parliament that was elected on Freedom Day in 1994. Occupation has been used by the AbM not only to provide housing, but to realize other rights guaranteed by the constitution, but still denied in practice.

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Photo: Abahlali baseMjondolo

This is visible in its land settlements, including the eKhenana Commune in Cato Manor, where the movement has not only built housing but a “self-connected” electricity and sanitation network, a communal garden and kitchen, a poultry farm, and a political education school.

“When the state is busy connecting water and electricity for the rich… when it starts from the wealthy areas, we start from the poorest of the poor areas and we will meet halfway, and that is called urban planning from below,” Zikode said.

For this, the movement has faced persecution and deadly violence. 24 of its members have been assassinated, including three leaders from eKhenana — Ayanda Ngila, Nokuthula Mabaso, and Lindokuhle Mnguni — who were killed in 2022. AbM activists have been routinely arrested on bogus charges and imprisoned for months on end, or forced to go into hiding even when they are ‘free.’

AbM’s land settlements have been subject to violent evictions and attacks on collective projects, including by forces of the police and the Anti-Land Invasion Unit, and armed attackers with ties to local African National Congress (ANC) leaders.

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AbM demands the removal of South Africa’s minister of police, Bheki Cele, as the movement’s leaders continue to face deadly violence. Photo: Abahlali baseMjondolo

“We are not free because we are assassinated and murdered by the izinkabi (hitmen) and the police…We are not free because our attempts to build autonomous and democratic communities in which access to land and housing is decommodified are repressed with violence from the state and the ruling party,” the AbM statement read.

Efforts by the movement to bring these issues to light, including on UnFreedom Day, have been met with police violence and repression.

Wednesday’s march in Durban concluded at the City Hall, where AbM presented a memorandum of 16 demands addressed to President Cyril Ramaphosa. These included broader demands beyond the movement’s most immediate issues including an end to loadshedding, a demand for job creation, an end to harassment of street traders, respect for taxi workers’ rights, and an end to discrimination on the bases of nationality, gender identity, and sexual orientation.

The movement has demanded that the minister of police, Bheki Cele, be removed from his position, “as he has made no attempt to stop the assassination of activists and treats us with contempt”. It has reiterated its longstanding demands the provision of all basic services, a “rapid release of urban and rural land for decent housing, an end to “transit camps”, immediate and collective tenure security, and support for farming cooperatives.

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AbM members gather in front of the City Hall in Durban to deliver a memorandum of demands during the UnFreedom Day march. Photo: Abahlali baseMjondolo
On behalf of urban and poor communities, AbM has called for “genuine participation in all decision-making”.

“This democracy was not won by the politicians and it does not belong to them. It was won by the struggles of the people and it is defended by the struggles of the people…The wealth regulated and controlled by the state was not built by the politicians… It comes from our dispossession and exploitation… The wealth of society belongs to the people. It is public property.”

In a statement of solidarity, the International Peoples’ Assembly, a network of over 200 social movements, trade unions, and political and other organizations, said, “Since the movement’s formation, AbM has experienced continued political persecution for struggling for the very freedoms celebrated on April 27.”

“We echo the demands of AbM which insist that we cannot be idle whilst the kleptocratic elite continue to prioritize profit over people’s lives. The social value of land must be prioritized over its commercial value!…We stand with AbM as the movement continues to organize, mobilize, and build towards a movement of communes!”

https://peoplesdispatch.org/2023/04/27/ ... eedom-day/
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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