)Continued from previous post)
On the ratio of international and domestic law
Regarding the correlation of the norms of the Constitution and international law, some citizens, like supporters of the notorious GCD, had the feeling that now Russia would not live under the dictation of international law, but could rely on the norms of national law. Finally, the occupation is dropped!
But such views are rooted in legal illiteracy and political inconsistency, which is used by politicians like Yevgeny Fedorov, who seek to dust the brains of workers with talk of "occupation", and in fact shift the responsibility for social injustice from the homegrown bourgeoisie to an external enemy. It’s much easier to scold America, living in Russia, than "your" "half-breed" bourgeoisie.
In fact, not all international norms take precedence over the Constitution, but only those that have been ratified by the Russian parliament. After ratification, international norms become part of the Russian legal system and take precedence over Russian law, but only after ratification! Actually, this is preserved in the Constitution even after amendments, since the norm, fixing this provision, is in the first chapter, which is not subject to changes.
According to Part 4 of Art. 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, “generally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation are an integral part of its legal system. If other rules are established by an international treaty of the Russian Federation than stipulated by law, then the rules of the international treaty apply ”(italics ours).
We emphasize once again that this provision is maintained, since Chapter 1 is not subject to revision, it is not amended, so lovers to speculate about the "colonial" position of Russia can not relax.
On the other hand, it is obvious that if the Russian government ratified an international legal act, is it logical that it needs to be implemented, otherwise what will all international treaties cost? In the article of the Constitution, by the way, it is written in black and white that the norms of international treaties have priority over domestic legislation, and not all international legal norms. So there is no "dictate of international law" here, and if there is, then this "dictate" is ratified by the Russian authorities.
Changes are made to Art. 79. According to the current version of Art. 79 of the Constitution, “The Russian Federation may participate in interstate associations and transfer to them part of its powers in accordance with international treaties, if this does not entail a restriction of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen and does not contradict the foundations of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation.”
That is, Russia can participate in international organizations within the framework of international agreements, if this does not contradict the foundations of the constitutional system and does not impose restrictions on human rights and freedoms. If this contradicts the foundations of the constitutional system and carries restrictions on the rights of Russian citizens, the state may withdraw from the agreements. But while the state has not withdrawn from international treaties, it does not have the right not to execute them.
What is proposed to change?
In the new edition of Article 79 we read: “The Russian Federation may participate in interstate associations and transfer to them part of its powers in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Federation, if this does not entail restrictions on the rights and freedoms of man and citizen and does not contradict the foundations of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation . Decisions of interstate bodies adopted on the basis of the provisions of international treaties of the Russian Federation in their interpretation, which contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation, are not subject to enforcement in the Russian Federation ”(our italics).
As you can see, the new version of the norm, such a wording gives grounds for the widest arbitrariness in relation to ratified international legal norms. Obviously, such a “supplement” to Art. 79 of the Constitution, will give rise to the Russian authorities not to comply with decisions of international courts, conventions, citing the fact that they allegedly "contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation."
The Russian government likes to talk about the double standards of Western countries. It is difficult to argue with this, but only the Russian authorities themselves do exactly the same, fixing the actual right not to execute international treaties in the Constitution. In fact, it reflects the ambitions of greater independence of the Russian ruling class from the West, the desire to play a more significant political role in the inter-imperialist confrontation.
On value-ideological amendments
As for the “value-ideological” social block of norms, they are more of an ideological declaration reflecting the rolling of the Russian state into obscurantism, conservatism, bourgeois patriotism, solidarity and, ultimately, fascism.
On the one hand, we have norms that are frankly declarative and non-binding. For example, in Art. 67.1 of the Constitution is supplemented by a clause on succession with the USSR, although it is.
The same article in part 3 states that “the Russian Federation honors the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland, and protects the historical truth. Diminishing the significance of the people's deed in the defense of the Fatherland is not allowed. ”
In h. 4 Article. 67.1 it is proposed to write: “children are the most important priority of the state policy of Russia. The state creates conditions conducive to the comprehensive spiritual, moral, intellectual and physical development of children, the education of patriotism, citizenship and respect for elders in them. The state, ensuring the priority of family education, assumes the responsibilities of parents in relation to children left without care ”.
Regarding the Great Patriotic War, the norm is clearly demagogic, non-binding in nature. As if without constitutional consolidation of respect for victory in the Great Patriotic War, we would not honor the exploits of veterans? And vice versa, it is as if those in power would stop these norms from establishing yet another plaque to Mannerheim or another odious historical character who fought on the other side of the front line. As if this would prevent Putin from singing the pro-fascist philosopher Ivan Ilyin and throwing mud at those socialist ideas and achievements for which veterans of the Great Patriotic War shed blood. And most importantly, as if this would stop the modern bourgeois government from fighting the cause, the system that ensured victory.
On the other hand, a number of norms reflect the ideological degradation of the ruling regime and the intensification of obscurantism, nationalism and conservatism.
In particular, paragraph 2 of Art. 67.1 says: "The Russian Federation, united by a thousand-year history, preserving the memory of the ancestors who transmitted to us ideals and faith in God, as well as continuity in the development of the Russian state, recognizes the historically established state unity."
Despite the fact that legally this norm is also a pure declaration, we see that the religious law and the recognition of “state unity” are formally enshrined in the main law.
The theme of unity generally runs through all the amendments, which is not surprising. It is extremely important for the bourgeoisie in the conditions of an increasing social split to propagate the ideas of unity, the ideas of God, etc., in order to try to somehow unite the working people around themselves. It is another matter that real unity from the fact that it is prescribed in the Constitution does not come. Here the question may arise: what to do with the secular nature of the Russian state, enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation? But here, as the people say, there is no violation in the form, but in fact, a mockery.
So, we read, in the Conclusion of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation: “The inclusion in the text of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of an indication of faith in God transmitted to the people of Russia by their ancestors (Article 67.1, part 2) does not mean a rejection of the secular nature of the Russian state proclaimed in its Article 14 and of freedom of conscience guaranteed by its Article 28 , since in its wording it is not associated with confessional affiliation, it does not declare the presence of certain religious beliefs mandatory in the Russian Federation, it does not put the citizens of Russia in an unequal position contrary to article 19 (part 2) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, depending on the availability of such faith and its specific orientation and is intended only to emphasize the need to take into account in the implementation of public policy that historically significant socio-cultural role,which the religious component played in the formation and development of Russian statehood. ”
But why then not emphasize in the Constitution the values of atheism, humanism, in the end, which played no less role in the history of Russia? Obviously, despite the lack of attachment to a particular denomination, we have before us the propaganda of religious views and their separation from others. Yes, from the point of view of law, this norm does not oblige anyone to anything, but the very appearance of such a norm indicates a tendency to slide into obscurantism. The leader of the Communist Party, by the way, at the stage of amendments, supported this rule .
Another example illustrating the imposition of the most reactionary views is the constitutional consolidation of the state-forming status of the Russian people.
We read part 1. Art. 68 "The official language of the Russian Federation throughout its territory is Russian as the language of a state-forming people."
The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in its conclusion notes that this provision “is based on an objective recognition of the role of the Russian people in the formation of Russian statehood, the continuation of which is the Russian Federation. It does not detract from the dignity of other peoples, cannot be considered incompatible with the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation on the multinational people of the Russian Federation (article 3, part 1), on the equality of human and civil rights and freedoms regardless of nationality (article 19, part 2), on equal rights and self-determination of peoples. ”
But this is pure sophistry, because it is obvious that if we are talking about the equal rights of peoples, that all peoples are equally valuable to the Russian state, that the state itself is multinational, there can be no talk of a state-forming people and its special role. This is the point of recognizing the state as multinational. Moreover, the thesis of the state-forming people is basically unscientific.
First , we, as Marxists, must remember that the states are formed not by nations, but by classes. Peoples in their modern sense arose later than states, but states arose when society could not reconcile class contradictions. Therefore, the passage about the state-forming people is an anti-scientific deception, designed again to extinguish the class essence of the state as an apparatus of violence, a machine of oppression of one class by another.
Secondly , if you study Russian history, it will become clear that Russia (like the USSR) was developing as a multinational state, and the working people of all nations and nationalities contributed to the development of the country. In the Russian Empire, a strict policy of Russification was carried out, oppressing the small peoples of non-Russian regions. In the USSR, a policy of equality of peoples was pursued, the right to self-determination was secured until the secession from the USSR. You might think that only the Russian people won the Great Patriotic War.
The consolidation of the state-forming status of the Russian people is fraught with the growth of nationalism not only of Russian, but, as a response, of nationalism of other nationalities inhabiting Russia. This leads to the provocation by the authorities of another split of workers in national apartments, which, however, is not surprising, because the bourgeoisie always turns to nationalism and clericalism during the hours of the threat of an exacerbation of the class struggle, and today there are certainly threats of such an aggravation.
But so far, we have concerned only those amendments that should play the role of a "distraction maneuver." The role of the amendments considered by us is not to really change something, but rather to dilute the amendments, for the sake of which it is all about, enticing citizens with social Wishlist or religious-nationalist and state-patriotic demagogy. The main thing is ahead.
Now God keeps not only America
The main point of the amendments
The main political meaning of the amendments is that the ruling class carries out a “transit of power” and its further strengthening. It is worth noting here that for the workers again it doesn’t matter who will personally lead the Russian bourgeoisie. From the one who exactly will sit in the presidential chair, while maintaining capitalism, the working lives will not change. But for the one who exactly sits in this chair, the question is really important, because the loss of power can turn former partners in accomplice into prosecutors and escorts. On the other hand, the ruling class itself is also not interested in changing the top manager if the one who is now in power is coping with the tasks of strengthening the rule of the big bourgeoisie. Putin, as you know, copes with this task, because the amendments are aimed at maintaining him as a top manager of the big bourgeoisie in power, and at the same time strengthening this very power. This is their main meaning.
The question of the specific forms of this “transit” was probably initially not completely understood by the authorities themselves. At first, it seemed that the “Kazakhstan version” would take place, during which V. V. Putin would take the post of head of the State Council, and the State Council itself, in violation of the principle of separation of powers, would become the supreme authority in the country, while traditional institutions (President and Parliament) will be nominal executors of the will of real power, concentrated in the State Council. However, Putin’s speech in the State Duma of the Russian Federation on March 10, 2020 clarified the situation and showed that a similar option, if any, was decided to be abandoned. The Council of State is a rather cumbersome structure, and it is hardly suitable for the political center of power. Yes, and the State Council is formed by the President, that is,
Now we are talking about “zeroing out” the presidential terms of the current President. This provision is reflected in the law on amendments in two places.
So, h. 3. Art. 81 states that "one and the same person may not hold the office of the President of the Russian Federation for more than two terms."
It seems that we are talking about a greater change of power and the weakening of the institution of the presidency, because in the current version of the Constitution of the Russian Federation we are talking about two consecutive terms. But no.
We read further in part 3.1 of the same article: “the provision of part 3 of article 81 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, limiting the number of terms during which one and the same person can hold the office of the President of the Russian Federation, applies to a person holding and (or) holding a position Of the President of the Russian Federation, without taking into account the number of terms during which he held and (or) holds this position at the time the amendment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation comes into force, introducing an appropriate restriction, and does not exclude him from holding the position of President of the Russian Federation for a term admissible by the indicated provision ”(italics ours).
Thus, the President, it seems, cannot occupy his post for more than two terms, but those terms that were before (and there were four in total and two in a row) are, as it were, “not considered”, therefore, in fact, it may . Logic is on top.
In another place of the amendment law, namely, in paragraph 6. of Art. 3 states that “The regulation established by parts 3 and 3.1 of Article 81 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation as amended by this Law on the amendment of the Constitution of the Russian Federation permits the number of terms during which the same person may hold the office of the President of the Russian Federation,does not prevent a person holding and (or) holding the post of President of the Russian Federation at the time this amendment enters into force, to participate as a candidate in the election of the President of the Russian Federation after including the amended version in the text of the Constitution of the Russian Federation for the allowable number of terms established by the amendment, regardless of the number the terms during which the specified person occupied and (or) occupies this position at the time this amendment enters into force ”(emphasis added).
From the point of view of many expert lawyers, this clearly contradicts the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of November 5, 1998 No. 134-O “In the case of the interpretation of Article 81 (part 3) and paragraph 3 of the second section“ Final and transitional provisions of the Russian Constitution Federation ". Recall that in the 1990s, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation did not “nullify” the presidency of Yeltsin and did not give him the right to go for a third term. But you can always adopt a new law and a new conclusion of the Constitutional Court and allow you to go not only for the third, but also for the fifth and sixth terms.
This is what the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation did in the current 2020, issuing an extremely vague but definitely allowing Putin to run for the fifth and sixth term: “Decision on the maximum number of terms of office (consecutive terms of office) during which it is possible to take the post of head of state with the republican a form of government by one person (including as transitional provisions) is always, in essence, a matter of choosing a balance between different constitutional values. On the one hand, the constitutional characteristic of a democratic state based on the rule of law presupposes, although it does not predetermine, the establishment of rather strict restrictions in this aspect. On the other hand, the constitutional principle of democracy implies the possibility of the realization by the people of the right to elect a person in free elections, which he considers the most worthy of the post of head of state, despite the fact that his determination in the framework of electoral competition always remains with voters, and the fact that a person has the status of acting head of state does not at all predetermine victory in the elections, since other candidates may be limited to publicizing their programs and criticizing the current heads of state, and the latter is objectively linked by the need to present the results of their activities over the past period. Against the background of this basic balance, the constitutional legislator can also take into account the specific historical factors of making the corresponding decision, including the degree of threats to the state and society, the state of the political and economic systems, etc. ” that his determination in the framework of electoral competition always remains with the voters, and the fact that a person has the status of the incumbent head of state does not at all predetermine the victory in the elections, since other candidates can be limited to publicizing their programs and criticizing the incumbent head of state, and the latter is objectively related to the need to present the results of their activities for the past period. Against the background of this basic balance, the constitutional legislator can also take into account the specific historical factors of making the corresponding decision, including the degree of threats to the state and society, the state of the political and economic systems, etc. ” that his determination in the framework of electoral competition always remains with the voters, and the fact that a person has the status of the incumbent head of state does not at all predetermine the victory in the elections, since other candidates can be limited to publicizing their programs and criticizing the incumbent head of state, and the latter is objectively related to the need to present the results of their activities for the past period. Against the background of this basic balance, the constitutional legislator can also take into account the specific historical factors of making the corresponding decision, including the degree of threats to the state and society, the state of the political and economic systems, etc. ” since other candidates may be limited to the publication of their programs and criticism of the current head of state, and the latter is objectively related to the need to present the results of their activities over the past period. Against the background of this basic balance, the constitutional legislator can also take into account the specific historical factors of making the corresponding decision, including the degree of threats to the state and society, the state of the political and economic systems, etc. ” since other candidates may be limited to the publication of their programs and criticism of the current head of state, and the latter is objectively related to the need to present the results of their activities over the past period. Against the background of this basic balance, the constitutional legislator can also take into account the specific historical factors of making the corresponding decision, including the degree of threats to the state and society, the state of the political and economic systems, etc. ”
Apparently, we are offered a stream of water, telling how difficult it is for the current president, who needs not only to inform his program, but to present his affairs, and his victory is not a foregone conclusion .... The flow of branchy constructions of the words of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation must lead to something. And what is the result? How did judges of the Constitutional Court circumvent the 1998 precedent?
Very simply, the conclusion says the following: “In addition, the Decree of November 5, 1998 N 134-O emphasized, as applied to the situation considered in it, that“ the Constitution of the Russian Federation does not contain a special clause that of the second section “Final and transitional provisions”, the term of office of the President of the Russian Federation shall not be included in the time periods provided for in Article 81 (part 3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. ” This is fundamentally different from the situation when the provisions of Article 81 (part 3.1) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation as amended and part 6 of Article 3 of the Amendment Law provide for a special reservation that does not exclude the possibility of holding the office of the President of the Russian Federation without taking into account the number of terms, during which the person to which these provisions apply, held and (or) holds this position at the time the amendment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation enters into force. Thus, this position, expressed in the above Definition, essentially confirms the possibility of regulation provided for in this aspect by the Amendment Law. ”
That is, we made a dubious amendment to the Constitution, designating a “zeroing” of the term, and everything is fine: Putin can once again run for president. But after all, it was a question of compliance of this amendment with the norm of "no more than two terms." There is a clear contradiction with real life, but since we made a reservation by writing it to the Constitution, then everything is in order. In a word, everything is correct in form, but essentially a mockery. We secured that a person cannot hold a post of president for more than two terms? Secured. So, the current President cannot be put forward for election next time? Can. How so? We simply won’t consider the previous terms, and therefore the current President can again run for office twice. Dates, as it were, are starting to go anew.
Well, is it not a mockery of logic and common sense? And is not this conclusion of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation an exemplary example, once again confirming that law is nothing but the will of the ruling class elevated into law? We are silent about the fact that this provision contradicts the principle of equality of all before the law, because this amendment puts V.V. Putin in an exceptional position in comparison with other Russian citizens: only he was given the actual right to hold a presidential post for more than two terms. And then there is a reference to the vote, which, as we have already shown above, in itself will be a perfect fiction.
“Given that the amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation provided for by Article 1 of the Amendment Law, including its Article 81 (part 3.1), are considered approved only if more than half of the citizens of the Russian Federation who participated in the all-Russian vote vote for them, it is assumed that the possibility provided by her for holding the office of the President of the Russian Federation for more than two consecutive terms will arise only if she receives support as a result of the will of the people of the Russian Federation. This gives additional constitutional legitimacy to the relevant decision. ”
But you and I have already considered what this vote is, how observers will be appointed, what airtime will be spent on, etc.
In addition to the norms associated with resonant “zeroing”, amendments introduce a number of positions that strengthen the presidential power. Those who at first thought that this was a real reduction in the powers of the President in favor of the parliament are deeply wrong. The only thing that can be considered a conditional “limitation” of the presidency is a time limit, but “zeroing” of the previous terms actually “nullified” this conditional “restriction”. But there are more than enough provisions in the new version of the Constitution that strengthen the position of the President.
Here are some examples of specific norms that strengthen the position of the President:
According to the new wording of paragraph a. Art. 83 The President receives the right to appoint and dismiss the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, approved by the State Duma on his proposal. In the previous edition, the President only appointed the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation with the consent of the State Duma of the Russian Federation. Obviously, the right to appoint and dismiss the Chairman of the Government without resigning the Government as a whole makes the figure of the Chairman of the Government more controlled, and on the other hand, it is easier for the President to make personnel changes. The President also retains the right to resign.
According to paragraph b of Art. 83 The President exercises overall leadership of the Government of the Russian Federation. In the old version, the President could only preside over meetings of the Government of the Russian Federation. The change is cosmetic, but still some strengthening of presidential power.
According to paragraph 1 of Art. 83 The President approves, at the proposal of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, the structure of federal executive bodies, makes amendments to it. Moreover, the President in the structure of federal executive bodies determines the bodies, the management of which is carried out by the President of the Russian Federation, and the bodies, which are managed by the Government of the Russian Federation. That is, the President himself can determine those executive bodies that will be directly subordinate to him, and those that will be subordinate to the Government. In the previous version of the Constitution, this was not.
According to paragraph 1 of Art. 83 The President appoints to the post after consultation with the Federation Council and dismisses the heads of federal executive bodies (including federal ministers) in charge of defense, state security, internal affairs, justice, foreign affairs, emergency prevention and disaster management, public security. Earlier, some senior officials were appointed by the Federation Council on the proposal of the President (Attorney General), and some were appointed by the President on the proposal of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. The change is again insignificant, but reinforcing the position of the President.
According to n. 5 Article. 83, forms the State Council of the Russian Federation in order to ensure the coordinated functioning and interaction of public authorities, determine the main directions of domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Federation and priority areas of socio-economic development of the state. Previously, there was no norm at all that enshrined the status of the State Council in the Constitution.
P. 1. Art. 92.1 introduces the norm according to which the President of the Russian Federation, having terminated his powers, has immunity. This was not in the previous version of the Constitution either. That is, now, by law, the President cannot be asked for crimes committed by him if he terminated his powers not because of impeachment. There is no doubt that this rule is an attempt to protect the current President from former partners in accomplice, as well as putting him in a virtually unpunished position.
According to Part 2. P. b Article. 95, the President, who terminated his office not as a result of removal from office, becomes the life senator of the Federation Council. He may waive this right. Also, as we see, a clear strengthening of the presidential institution of power.
According to Part 1. Article. 110, the President exercises overall leadership in the executive branch. In the previous edition this also was not.
In part 4. Article. 111, the President’s right is fixed to dissolve the State Duma in the event of a three-fold rejection of the nomination of the Prime Minister. In general, this norm itself shows all the decorativeness of the parliament, which even from the point of view of the Law cannot impose on the President “his” Prime Minister. But in the current version of the Constitution, the President does not have the right to dissolve the State Duma, but has a procedural obligation. In the new edition, as you see, he receives such a right. That is, he may not dissolve the State Duma of the Russian Federation, but simply approve his Prime Minister. After all, the dissolution of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and new elections, if not cool, but a crisis. In the new version of the Constitution, the President can avoid this crisis by pushing his candidacy for the post of Prime Minister.
The President also receives the right to make a request to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation not only for existing laws, but also for bills. In particular, this will allow the President to return objectionable bills to the State Duma in case it overcomes the presidential veto.
In addition, in the new edition of the Constitution 132 of the article, devoted to local authorities is proposed to supplement 3 part, according to which local authorities and public authorities are part of a single system of public authority. Now there is no such clause in the Constitution. As you can see, here we also see an increase in power.
Thus, as can be seen from the above amendments, the new Constitution is permeated not by the desire to increase the powers of representative bodies of power, but rather, to strengthen the power of the president.
Maybe someone will ask, but what about the ban on senior officials to have deposits abroad and foreign citizenship? But to this we will answer that even now officials have restrictions, for example, regarding the prohibition of doing business, but this does not prevent them from owning the business through their wives, relatives and friends. The same thing here. As long as the ban on having foreign accounts and foreign citizenship does not extend to the official’s inner circle, the ban will successfully bypass the party.
Author: Igor Petrygin-Rodionov
findings
In our opinion, all of the above can be reduced to several conclusions:
Firstly , any changes in the Constitution are a reflection of changes in the system of production relations and the correlation of class forces. In Russia, over the 30 years of restoration of capitalism, the imperialistic nature of capitalism has developed, albeit in many respects. The strengthening of capitalism led to the logical strengthening of the position of the ruling class, which was reflected both in the growth of its economic and political strength. Hence, the strategic task of constitutional reform is to further strengthen the power of the big bourgeoisie in the face of a growing class split between the proletariat and the petty-bourgeois strata of the working people on the one hand and the big oligarchic bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy that has grown together with it on the other.
Secondly , if we talk about the main tactical task of the current moment, then constitutional reform is the desire to ensure the transit of supreme power, and more specifically, the preservation of the current President in power as a guarantor of the stability of the bourgeois (oligarchic) system, neoliberal socio-economic policy and controlled political system with poorly functioning democratic institutions. This is its main political meaning. Also, the new version of the Constitution of the Russian Federation significantly strengthens the presidential powers, further enhancing the presidential character of the Russian Federation.
Thirdly, to make the whole process important in the eyes of wide sections of the population, the political amendments are supplemented by social amendments, which are unlikely to be implemented, but will attract a larger number of participants for voting, as well as increase the positive attitude of Russians to the amendments as a whole. The same, in our opinion, should be attributed to the rules prohibiting senior officials to have foreign citizenship and foreign bank accounts. As long as this requirement does not apply to family members of officials, in practice they will be meaningless, but as a declaration they can be approved by the general public. It is not for nothing that voting for amendments is supposed not separately, but as a package. Voting itself is not necessary to ensure legitimacy, but to strengthen the legitimacy (approval by the population) of the government, which has recently begun to weaken.
Fourth , the introduction of value-ideological norms into the Constitution, which do not change anything in essence, expresses the desire of power under the slogans of patriotism, spirituality and historical memory to rally the population around itself and camouflage the growing class split. On the whole, this set of norms testifies to the further orientation of the authorities towards strengthening the ideas of conservatism, state patriotism and religious obscurantism, solidarity, in a word, about its ideological development towards fascism.
Fifth , these amendments in no way improve the lives of the working people of Russia, but only further strengthen the vertical of bourgeois-oligarchic power, and therefore support for these amendments is unacceptable. RKRP considers the boycott of the dubious procedure to be the most acceptable tactic .
Today, bourgeois propaganda cultivates constitutional illusions in the minds of the working people, trying to pass off the constitutional reform as something fateful and important, capable of changing the fate of the working people. But this is a hoax. Only their own class struggle and the conquest of power by the working people can truly change their lives for the better. Under the dominance of big capital, no matter what is written in the constitutions, all this will be nothing more than the will of the big bourgeoisie enshrined in law, and the simple working people of Russia can not expect anything good from these reforms.
Sometimes they talk about the need to fight for a socialist constitution, moreover, the draft of such a constitutionthere is. But in order to adopt a socialist constitution, the proletariat must first take power and change the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie to the dictatorship of the proletariat (the third, as you know, cannot be), socialize ownership of the means of production and build a communist society (first in the form of its lowest phase - socialism). And only after the proletariat takes power will it be possible to adopt the Constitution of Soviet socialist Russia. To achieve this, the class struggle of those who are most interested in the transition to socialism, that is, the working people (primarily the working class), their self-organization and understanding of their interests, is needed. It is in this main direction - the union of the labor movement with communist ideology,
Osin Roman - member of the Ideological Commission of the Central Committee of the RKRP-CPSU,
Ph.D.
https://www.rotfront.su/konstitutsionna ... i-i-osnov/
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