Turkey

[blindpig]

Turkey is preparing its own Zelensky
April 7, 19:13



The pro-Erdogan press is worried that the United States has finally gambled on the overthrow of Erdogan for the sake of the interests of the war against Russia, where Turkey, led by the opposition, will be thrown into the fire of an ongoing war, which, in a troubled economy, could be fatal to Turkish regional ambitions.

Turkey is preparing its own Zelensky

America, which cannot achieve its goal in Ukraine and is rapidly losing influence in the Middle East, is in search of new options for the period after the elections in Turkey. According to Haber7, if the Turkish opposition wins, Washington expects to drive a wedge between Moscow and Ankara and push them face to face in Syria, the Black Sea, and Central Asia. To do this, the opposition coalition in Turkey has been tasked with taking on the role of Zelensky. However, so far, during the negotiations that have been held between the United States and partners in the opposition coalition on this issue for a long time, it has not been possible to reach a definite agreement.

As the portal continues, experts, paying attention to the statements of the partners in the opposition coalition in Turkey, recalled the speeches of the chairman of the Republican People's Party (CHP) of Turkey, Kemal Kılıçdaroglu, during his mysterious visit to the United States. Thus, sources note the following words of the RPP leader: “We think that we should be on the side of Ukraine in its military conflict with Russia.” This, analysts say, is a clear message to the United States and NATO, as well as a commitment to take a stand against Russia if it comes to power.

Experts also focus on the statements of the chief adviser to Kılıçdaroglu, Unal Ceviköz, with a NATO past in an interview with the American magazine Politico and the “road map” outlined by him. It is emphasized that Cheviköz's views on NATO expansion and Ukraine are dangerous, and the words "we will remind Russia that we are a member of the North Atlantic Alliance" demonstrate a hostile position.

The same applies to other partners of the opposition coalition. All of them view the region through the prism of US plans. Thus, the chairman of the Good Party of Turkey, Meral Aksener, actually challenges Russia: “I respectfully greet the brave sons of Ukraine.”

Another partner of the opposition coalition, the chairman of the Democracy and Breakthrough Party (DEVA), Ali Babacan, said: “We unconditionally support the Ukrainian people.”

The government failed to take a clear position on Ukraine. Turkey's Future Party chairman Ahmet Davutoglu, who once greeted the US Secretary of State with a high-five gesture, also advocates for Turkey to act jointly with NATO.

Retired Colonel Eray Güçluer draws attention to US plans to use Turkey as a battering ram in the region and foment confrontation between Ankara and Moscow if the opposition comes to power in the country.

“While elections are starting in Turkey, the US is supporting the opposition,” the expert says. “The decision not to nominate a candidate from the Democratic Party of the Peoples of Turkey is a decision made in accordance with American requirements. As part of all this, speeches from the opposition coalition attract attention. The statements made by Kılıçdaroğlu, his chief foreign policy adviser Unal Ceviköz, the leadership of the Good Party and other partners are truly serious. They insistently emphasize that Ankara, in the conditions of Russian-Ukrainian tension, should support Kyiv. Apparently, they have made commitments to the United States. An attempt is being made to set in motion a plan to pit Turkey against Russia. This is very dangerous for Turkey.”

“If Turkey clashes with Russia, tensions in Syria and elsewhere could escalate into conflict,” the expert warns. - The US can resort to any means for this. Provocations are possible. In the coming period, the United States assigns Turkey the role of Ukraine and Zelensky through the opposition coalition in the country. Unfortunately, the coalition also assumes obligations in this regard. This is also shown by the voiced statements.”

“Ankara's interests require coordination with Moscow. Russia for Turkey is a country with which it will build a real strategic partnership. America openly threatens Turkey. We need combat aircraft. We are unlikely to get them from the US and other NATO countries. At the same time, Russia can satisfy our need for fighters. We have to make a decision within a year. Along with this, we need to act together with Russia in Syria. We need this to eliminate the threat to our country from the east of the Euphrates. In addition, we have multifaceted relations with Russia, primarily in the energy sector and in the field of nuclear energy. Turkey's strategic interests do not allow cooperation with Russia to suffer,” adds the retired colonel.

“Another question is the Black Sea. The US hopes to ignite tensions between Turkey and Russia, circumvent the Montreux Convention and enter the Black Sea. What will happen if the opposition coalition comes to power and comes to conflict with Russia? The government will ask NATO for help. The Alliance will also enter the Black Sea. We may face a period full of traps for Turkey,” the expert concluded.

https://russian.rt.com/inotv/2023-04-07 ... cheno-vbit - zinc

It did not work in 2016, they will try in 2023. The chances are about 50 to 50. Erdogan's position is now very precarious, and if it were not for the economic gesheft from Russia, his position would be even worse. The current choice for Turkey is either an aggressive multi-vector approach according to Erdogan, or Turkey's return to the role of a Western satellite. So, indeed, Turkey will have a historic choice.
For all Erdogan's cunning ass and his favorite "scimitar in the back" method, at the current historical stage, it is Erdogan who is more beneficial to Russia as a situational fellow traveler, being, for all his obvious disadvantages, the lesser evil against the background of alternative scenarios with pro-American opposition in power. If Erdogan resists, then muddy affairs and agreements on the principle of "nothing personal - just business" will continue to stir up with him. Still, Erdogan is a player in the emerging new world order and one of the actors in the changes taking place in the world.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/8278172.html

Google Translator

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Will Turkiye’s Elections Impact Its Place in a Multipolar World?
APRIL 17, 2023



By Ceyda Karan – Apr 11, 2023

An opposition victory in upcoming elections could ‘westernize’ Turkiye’s foreign policy and disrupt Ankara’s delicate balancing act in the new multipolar order.

On 14 May, 2023 Turkiye’s much anticipated, yet critical elections will take place for both the presidency and parliamentary seats. The upcoming polls are crucial for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose domestic political reputation has been tarnished by his handling of the 6 February earthquake, compounded by a deepening economic crisis over the past two years.

Despite pragmatic maneuvers to balance east and west, Erdogan’s foreign policy is also under fire. Not only is the longtime Turkish leader now facing the biggest test of his political career, but the future direction of Turkiye is also potentially up for grabs.

In the past two weeks, various parties, including the DEVA Party, the Good Party, the Young Party, the People’s Liberation Party, the Left Party, the Homeland Party and the Resurrection Party have objected to Erdogan’s candidacy.

They argue that he cannot run for a third term, per the Turkish constitution – an objection that has rallied together nationalists, socialists, center-rightists, Islamists, Kemalists, and the “seven dissimilarities” of Turkish politics.

The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), which is the founding party of Turkiye, did not attempt to object to Erdogan’s candidacy.

Erdogan’s third term candidacy
Leading legal experts explain that according to Article 101 of the Turkish Constitution, in force since 2007, “a person can be elected president at most twice.” Erdogan was elected in 2014 and 2018, and he has already served two terms.

The only exception to Article 101 would be if parliament decided to renew the elections. However, Erdogan’s Justice and Development (AKP) party does not refer to the Constitution, but to the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK), whose powers are limited to the general administration and supervision of elections.

The AKP argues that the technical changes in the “presidential government system,” introduced in the controversial 2017 referendum in which the YSK recognized unsealed votes as valid, make Erdogan’s candidacy possible. In other words, even if the Constitution remains in place, Erdogan’s first term in office does not count.

In the past, Erdogan has said, “we don’t recognize” the decisions of the Constitutional Court. In fact, the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality election, which defeated his party handily in 2019, was repeated without any legal basis. The result was an even bigger defeat for the AKP.

In brief, the CHP has accepted Erdogan’s third nomination based on his track record of following the written law. Insisting otherwise could play into the “victimization narrative” he has effectively employed over the past two decades.

Recently, the Supreme Electoral Council announced the presidential candidates who will compete on 14 May:

Erdogan is running as the candidate of the “People’s (Cumhur) Alliance,” which is comprised of the AKP, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Grand Unity Party (BBP), the New Welfare Party (YRP) and HUDA-PAR.

Kemal Kilicdaroglu, meanwhile, is running as the candidate of the “Nation (Millet) Alliance,” which includes the CHP, the Good Party, the Felicity Party (SAADET), the Democratic Party (DP), the Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA) and the Future Party (GP). This electoral alliance is also known as the “Table of Six” coalition.

Aside from these two main rivals, there are two other candidates: Muharrem Ince and Sinan Ogan. Ince was the opposition’s joint candidate in 2018 but left the CHP after losing to Erdogan, and he has now founded the Homeland Party.

Ogan, a former MP was expelled from Erdogan’s partner MHP in 2017 and is running as the candidate of the Ata Alliance, which unites four small nationalist and right-wing Kemalist parties.

Erdogan faces a tough challenge this time, as polls show Kilicdaroglu leading by 2.5 to 5 points. There is also the possibility of a second round run-off due to the Muharrem Ince factor.

Unexpected alliances
Although the disparate small parties in Turkish politics do not care for the “Nation Alliance,” they are mostly supporting Kilicdaroglu to eject Erdogan after two decades of his rule.

Turkiye’s main “Table of Six” opposition finally managed to unite behind Kilicdaroglu after painful discussions, but an even more critical factor favoring its electability is the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy Party (HDP), which indirectly supports Kilicdaroglu (under the threat of being shut down) by not fielding its own candidate.

Particularly crucial are the HDP’s estimated 9-13 percent of the vote, which has forced Erdogan to expand his alliance in a surprising way.

In the early 2000s, Erdogan and the AKP emerged from the ‘Welfare Party’ of Necmettin Erbakan’s National Vision, which had been the hallmark of Turkish Islamism in the 20th century. A year before his death, Erbakan, an important mentor of the current Turkish president, criticized Erdogan for being “the cashier of Zionism.”

In late March, his son Fatih Erbakan, the leader of the New Welfare Party, which he founded based on his father’s legacy, refused to join Erdogan’s People’s Alliance, citing “principles,” but shortly after, capitulated to join his old foe. However, the Felicity (SAADET) Party, whose roots are also in Erkaban senior’s National Vision, has aligned with Kilicdaroglu’s Nation Alliance.

But Erdogan’s most striking move to expand his alliance came with HUDA-PAR, which political pundits link to the so-called “Turkish Hezbollah” or “Kurdish Hezbollah” – a deep state-backed movement that carried out terrorist attacks in the southeast of Turkiye in the late 1980s and 1990s.

“The founding philosophy, beliefs, and founders [of HUDA-PAR] are exactly the same” as Turkish Hezbollah, says nationally-renowned, retired police chief Hanefi Avci. The latter, from its inception, was officially designated a terrorist organization, and many of its affiliate associations have been systematically shut down. Sometimes confused with the Shia Lebanese Hezbollah resistance organization, the Turkish movement is the polar opposite: it is, instead, heavily steeped in the ideology of Sunni Kurdish religious extremists.

The inclusion of HUDA-PAR in Erdogan’s alliance has raised questions among the Turkish public about his motives, with varying opinions on the matter. Some believe that Erdogan is trying to appeal to religious Kurds, while others see his alliance with the highly controversial party as a sign of his electoral desperation. The party doesn’t represent any significant number of voters, so the jury is out on why the Turkish president went out on that limb.

Populist promises and foreign policy maneuvers
Erdogan’s previous election victories were largely due to his aggressive tactics, but after 20 years, this approach is no longer reliable. The collapse of the Turkish lira currency – triggered by Erdogan’s decision to cut interest rates in late 2021 based on the Islamic “nas” rule – and inflation, which has reached 70 percent and, unofficially, 140 percent, are major issues for the average Turkish voter. The devastating earthquakes that struck on 6 February, further destablized the Turkish economy.

In an effort to win back support, Erdogan is focusing his campaign on promises of reconstruction. He has implemented populist economic policies such as raising the minimum wage, which is the primary source of income for around 60 percent of Turks, and increased civil servant and pension salaries.

Erdogan is known for his ability to skillfully use Turkiye’s foreign policy as a tool for both domestic and foreign policy objectives. However, in recent years, Turkiye’s economic outlook has posed a challenge to Erdogan’s foreign policy calculations.

Since the collapse of Turkiye’s US-backed, neo-Ottoman projects in West Asia and North Africa, Erdogan has sought out more pragmatic approaches that prioritize realpolitik over ideology. The Turkish president has reversed course on a number of issues, including reconciliation with regional leaders who he has publicly disparaged, and taking a neutral stance in the Ukraine crisis between the US and Russia.

There have sometimes been immediate upsides to Erdogan’s efforts: By improving relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two countries invested billions of dollars in Turkiye – though the details of these deals remain unclear.

Erdogan also made amends with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, whom he has previously accused of orchestrating a coup against the elected Muslim Brotherhood-led government. These reconciliations have involved negotiations over issues related to the Brotherhood and Libya.

Erdogan’s foreign policy challenges
Relations with Russia and Syria, however, remain two of the thorniest issues for Ankara – mainly because they place Turkiye in the crosshairs of Washington’s main foreign policy goals.

The interests involved could not be more clear: Turkiye depends on Russia for energy and tourism, while Russia needs Turkiye to mitigate the impact of US sanctions.

Despite Erdogan’s efforts at foreign policy pragmatism, his attempts to reconcile with Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad have stalled due both to US objections and conditions set by Damascus. Although Erdogan signaled a willingness to reconcile with Assad last November, the issue has not progressed much further, despite high-level meetings between their officials under Russian mediation.

The Turkish and Syrian defense ministers met in Moscow in December 2022, and while their respective deputy foreign ministers briefly met on 3-4 April, the top level official meetings have yet to materialize. It is a sign that either the political will or ground conditions do not yet exist for accelerating diplomacy, on one or both sides.

Much of this has to do with a Syrian red line demanding the evacuation of all Turkish troops from Syrian soil before rapprochement talks progress. Yet, in a meeting with his Russian counterpart Sergey Shoigu, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar still claimed that Turkiye’s military presence in Syria was for “counterterrorism,” “peacekeeping” and “humanitarian aid.”

Some commentators believe it will be difficult for the Turkish army to withdraw from Syria and meet Assad’s conditions because of the ongoing activity of Kurdish separatist militias in the country’s north, and issues posed by Turkish-backed radical Islamist organizations in Idlib.

Even Erdogan’s rhetoric about repatriating the three million Syrian refugees has lost credibility due to the employment of this cheap labor by AKP-linked business leaders. All these factors make it increasingly difficult for Erdogan to achieve foreign policy success before the May election.

Retired Turkish diplomat Engin Solakoglu tells The Cradle that while the AKP has been able to expand its foreign policy autonomy due to weakening US regional influence, it still operates within the framework of Turkiye’s existing relationships with the west: “The funds that the Turkish economy chronically needs come mainly from European financial centers,” he says.

According to Professor Behlul Ozkan, while medium-sized countries like Turkiye have the ability to act independently in foreign policy on occasion, Erdogan’s worldview does not lean toward Eurasianism, as is often claimed by both eastern and western pundits.

Ozkan emphasizes the significant role the west has played in the Turkish economy over the past two decades, telling The Cradle:

“If Erdogan and the AKP win the elections, there is a strong possibility that Turkiye will become even more dependent on the west for a way out of its economic crisisxs. The AKP’s role for Turkiye is to be the west’s gendarme in the region, just as it was during the Cold War”

The opposition’s worldview
Instead of capitalizing on Erdogan’s foreign policy constraints and vulnerabilities, his multi-party opposition has put forth a weak “Joint Memorandum of Understanding” that scantily addresses its external agenda. More platitudes than substance, the opposition emphasizes a principle of “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” and says that national interest and security will be the basis of its policies.

The document also states that “relations with the US should be institutionalized with an understanding between equals,” while Russia is mentioned only twice. It is also noteworthy that the CHP has recently reminded Moscow that Turkiye is “a NATO country.”

According to Hazal Yalin, a researcher and writer specializing in Russian affairs, the Turkish bourgeoisie’s inability to break ties with western imperialism makes it challenging for the Turkish opposition to communicate with Russia. As he explains to The Cradle:

“Russia has the perspective of continuing its interstate relations with Turkiye, as it does with any other country, regardless of which party is in power; therefore, in the event of a possible change of power, it can act as if nothing has happened.”

Despite the opposition alliance’s potential for pursuing more western-oriented policies, Professor Ozkan believes that it will adopt a more peaceful approach in the region compared to the AKP:

“Establishing diplomatic relations with Syria is the first priority. Turkiye’s military presence in Syria will be gradually reduced, probably in contact with other regional powers, and territorial integrity will be restored in cooperation with Damascus.”

Ozkan adds:

“It is not possible to take a similar step with the AKP. As long as the AKP remains in power, it will want to keep its military presence and the continuation of the conflict in Syria as a bargaining chip with both the west and Russia, and to benefit from it.”

Some things will never change
But retired diplomat Solakoglu argues that even if the opposition wins, they are unlikely to give up the autonomous foreign policy space gained under the AKP:

“I don’t think that the military presence in Syria, Iraq, and Libya will suddenly disappear. Likewise, I don’t think that the Kilicdaroglu government will take a [different] position in the Eastern Mediterranean, on the ‘Blue Homeland’ issue and on Cyprus. On these issues, they are the same as the AKP. ”

Professor Baris Doster does not foresee a significant change in Erdogan’s policies, despite his newfound pragmatism, “If the opposition wins the elections,” he says that “Turkiye’s realities and economic relations will continue to slow down even if it wants to turn westward.”

Regardless of the election outcome, it is unlikely that Turkiye will sever its ties with the west. While some argue that Ankara should adapt to the multipolar global trend, Turkiye is still a full-fledged member of the NATO military alliance, which will certainly create obstacles in joining the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – as Erdogan has periodically threatened to do.

But that does not prevent Turkiye from joining the extended BRICS+, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Eurasian economic institutions and/or land-rail-water connectivity mega-projects. The question is whether the upcoming elections – regardless of its results – can sideline or redirect the multipolarity that has already swept through Turkiye’s every institution.

https://orinocotribune.com/will-turkiye ... lar-world/

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There is America. Europe is a mule in America's convoy. There's nothing special about her
April 19, 14:53



There is America. Europe is a mule in America's convoy. There's nothing special about her

Turkish Interior Minister in touch

"There is no such thing as Europe, don't think about it. There is America. Europe is a mule in America's convoy. There is nothing special about it. Europe cannot make a rational judgment on its own behalf. America is losing its reputation. The whole world hates America. Europe is America's pawn in Africa. All African states hate the states that exploit them, including France. Dear friends, I want to tell you that the game has changed. Turkey's biggest task is to achieve its full independence. Turkey is solving this problem together with Tayyip Erdogan"

Actually, with such views of the Erdogan administration, it is not surprising that the United States is betting on the Turkish opposition. Friend Recep is too multi-vectored for Washington, and this is haram at the present time.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/8302465.html

Google Translator.

[blindpig]

Turkey’s crucial elections are set to go down to the wire
The majority of left parties are backing opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as president against incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who is facing his toughest elections in the last two decades

May 05, 2023 by Abdul Rahman


Turkish President Recep Erdogan and opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu

Turkey will be holding elections for its national parliament and presidency on May 14. Early polls indicate that long-term ruling President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) are, for the first time in the past two decades, facing a tough challenge in both the elections. This is a critical election for the country and several left and progressive forces have decided to join the united opposition to defeat Erdoğan and his right-wing AKP.

Centrist Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) is the joint presidential candidate of the alliance of six major opposition parties with mixed ideological positions. Apart from the left, the other five parties in the alliance are DEVA, Gelecek or Future Party, Democrat Party, Islamist Felicity, and the nationalist iYi or Good party. He is also backed by several other smaller parties. This united effort, helped by the accumulated anti-incumbency of the last two decades, can have a significant role in deciding the outcome of the elections. According to the latest polls, Kılıçdaroğlu holds a 3% lead over Erdoğan.

The other two presidential candidates are Muharrem Ince, who was the runner-up in the last presidential elections in 2018 and has decided to contest despite CHP deciding on Kılıçdaroğlu this time, and Sinan Ogan, who is the candidate of an alliance of smaller nationalist parties.

In Turkey, elections for the post of president take place on the basis of a majority system where if no candidate gets at least 50%+1 vote in the first round, a second round is held between the two leading contenders.

The elections for the parliament take place through a closed party list under a proportional representation system. The country is divided into 87 electoral districts with the number of seats for each district based on its population. A party or an alliance needs a minimum of 7% votes at the national level to win seats in the parliament.

These elections will see three major alliances fighting for a total of 600 seats in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey: the CHP-led Nation Alliance, the AKP-led People’s Alliance, and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP)-led Labor and Freedom Alliance. Parties in these alliances won almost all the seats in the last parliamentary elections in 2018.

Meanwhile, much before voting starts in Turkey, expatriates have already begun voting. There are around 3.5 million expatriate voters across the globe, and according to some analysts, their vote may be decisive in the close race for the presidency.

Major electoral issues
According to the public opinion polls, the deteriorating economy is the most important issue for voters. The majority of the Turkish people are suffering from a prolonged rise in prices of basic commodities, which, together with the falling value of the Turkish lira, is creating a massive cost of living crisis. The year-on-year inflation touched a 24-year high of over 85% last year. According to the latest official data, the inflation rate is still close to 44%.

The Erdoğan government also failed to respond in a timely manner to the demand for increasing minimum wages raised by the country’s trade unions and left parties. When Erdoğan announced the raise in the minimum wages with an eye on the elections, the unions called it too a little too late.

Apart from economic concerns, Turkish voters are also concerned about corruption in government institutions.

Among other issues, the presence of over four million refugees in the country, a majority of them from Syria, has led to various local-level mobilizations by the right-wing parties, forcing all presidential candidates to take positions on the matter, with both Kılıçdaroğlu and Erdoğan promising their repatriation.

Accusations of inefficiency in the rescue and rehabilitation of the millions of victims of the February 6 earthquake has also become a major poll issue. The earthquake impacted both Turkey and Syria and killed over 50,000 people in Turkey alone.

Another major issue raised by the six-party Nation Alliance is the question of centralization of power in the presidency due to constitutional amendments brought by Erdoğan in 2018. The Alliance has promised to undo the presidential system and make the parliament as powerful as it was before the amendments.

Erdoğan, who has been in power in Turkey since 2003, first as prime minister and then as president, has also been accused by the opposition of being dictatorial and pursuing a campaign of persecution against opposition forces.

Significance of Left presence
Left parties are fighting the parliamentary elections under two broad alliances. The Union of Socialist Forces (SGB) includes the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) and the Left Party (SoL), along with two others. Fighting these elections on people’s livelihood issues, these parties are trying to enter the parliament for the first time.

The second, Labour and Freedom Alliance, includes the HDP and the Workers Party of Turkey (TiP), among others. It was the third largest group in the Turkish parliament in the 2018 elections, with HDP winning 56 seats and TiP four.

While the SGB has not taken any official stand on the presidential elections, the HDP and its allies have formally announced their support for Kılıçdaroğlu.

The left-wing, pro-Kurdish HDP is expected to retain its current position in the parliament and its loyal voters can play a significant role in deciding the next president of Turkey. This is despite a prolonged period of persecution faced by the party and its cadres under Erdoğan’s rule.

Erdoğan has already tried to make HDP’s support to Kılıçdaroğlu an electoral issue by alleging its links with terrorism in his election rallies.

https://peoplesdispatch.org/2023/05/05/ ... -the-wire/

It's tough when you gotta root for a treacherous bastard like Erdogan because the other guy will undoubtedly turn out to be a US tool.

[blindpig]

Elections in Türkiye: Challenges Facing Erdogan
Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° on MAY 11, 2023
Yoselina Guevara López



On May 14, Türkiye will hold presidential and parliamentary elections in which citizens will elect the new president of the country and the 600 deputies of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The head of state will be elected in the first round only if he/she reaches 50%+1 of the votes; otherwise, the two candidates with the highest number of votes will go to a second round to be held on May 28. For many analysts, these are the most important elections in the history of Türkiye, after the Ottoman period, which will have important effects not only on the internal panorama of Ankara, but also on the regional and international horizon.

Kilicdaroglu: Erdogan’s challenger

After twenty uninterrupted years in power, President Erdogan will face the biggest test for himself and his party, the AKP (Justice and Development Party). This time his main rival is 73-year-old Kemal Kilicdaroglu, a long-time politician of Alevi Kurdish origin and leader of a coalition of six opposition parties seeking to unseat the incumbent. Although some polls give Kilicdaroglu a slight lead, the coalition appears structurally weak and faces major challenges to achieve a victory at the polls. However, it should be noted that this uniting of the opposition around a common candidate is a historic event in Türkiye.

Kilicdaroglu has shown during the election campaign a markedly anti-Russian and pro-American stance. However, as far as Moscow is concerned, he will not be able, if he comes to power, to shatter the relations that the two nations have built up so far, especially in terms of energy subordination. An eloquent example of this is the Akkuyu nuclear power plant which consolidates dependence on Moscow, the Russian company Rosatom being one of the main builders of this authentic energy cathedral. Likewise, although Kilicdaroglu is openly pro-American, he threatens not to go down a path of reconciliation with Israel, promising to make the Zionist state pay the price for the massacre of the Mavi Marmara. As will be recalled, the latter was a ship carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza which was attacked in a brutal Israeli military operation in international waters, killing human rights activists, among them 9 Turkish nationals.

As for the internal issue of winning, both Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu will have to face great challenges; on the one hand, the latent drama, almost forgotten by the media, of the damage caused by the devastating earthquake of last February, which is forcibly leading to a reconstruction of the country. As well as the terrible results of the Turkish economy, which at its worst moment has reached an internal inflation rate of 85% and has brought the Turkish lira to the brink of collapse, without forgetting the devastating effects that the pandemic left in Ankara.

Türkiye’s geopolitical role

In the case of Ankara, its strategic position on the Black Sea,the Mediterranean and the Middle East gives it an important role in the region. However, its relationship with neighboring countries, the EU and NATO is complicated due to political and economic differences.

For now Türkiye’s relations with Russia are an example of how geopolitics can influence a country’s foreign policy. Erdogan has been able to use his personal relationship with President Vladimir Putin to mediate the Russia-Ukraine conflict. A victory for the current Turkish leader was the important role he played in bringing about the agreement between Russia and Ukraine on the passage of grain and fertilizer through the Black Sea. However, due to this rapprochement with Moscow, his position in NATO has been affected. In addition, the purchase of Russian missile systems has generated tensions with the United States and has led to the exclusion of Türkiye from the F-35 program.

As for the regional context, Ankara’s actions in Syria, Libya, Greece and Cyprus have been characterized by the pursuit of its interests, and to this end it acts with a characteristic diplomatic offensive that has allowed the Turks to redirect the tactical axis with Israel and partially reconcile with Egypt, since the nature of the relationship between Ankara, Jerusalem and Cairo has a decisive influence on the stability or instability of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Ankara’s internal situation also influences its geopolitics; the rupture with the European Union due to accusations of violations of human rights and freedom of the press has worsened the country’s situation and continues to generate tensions with countries such as France and Austria that do not accept Türkiye within the EU. This is precisely one of the arguments of the Turkish opposition in this election campaign; that is, to seek to resume relations with Brussels in order to insist on a supposed return to democracy, which is incomprehensible given the holding and participation in democratic elections in Türkiye. From Erdogan’s perspective, although his positions are anti-American and anti-Western, he has always tried to move in the geopolitical arena with balance and neutrality.

There is no doubt that the elections in Türkiye will take place in the midst of a polarized political climate and with an increasingly divided society. These elections have great symbolic and political weight for the future of the country. Will this be the historical turning point that many analysts have been waiting for? The outcome of the elections is uncertain and only time will tell what the future holds for Türkiye after May 14.

https://libya360.wordpress.com/2023/05/ ... g-erdogan/

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MAY 11, 2023 BY M. K. BHADRAKUMAR
Kemalism vs Kemalism in Turkish elections


Turkish presidential election Sunday goes down to the wires

From a geopolitical perspective, the Turkish presidential election on Sunday may appear to be one of the most crucial non-violent political events of this year. But appearances can be deceptive in Turkish politics.

In the surcharged polarisation of “West versus Rest” in international politics, western media is rooting for the defeat of incumbent President Recep Erdogan so that one of the leading proponents of multipolarity and strategic autonomy in the emerging world order who is setting a horrible example for the Global South, walks into the sunset.

Truly, the importance of Erdogan is that unlike many self-styled proponents of the Global South, who have mushroomed lately, he practices what he preaches.

The Western media’s excitement stems out of a simplistic notion that Erdogan, a charismatic “strong man” who has been riding the wings of his immense popularity and astuteness to exploit the fragmentation of Turkish electoral scene is meeting his nemesis in the unified opposition candidacy of Kemal Kilicdaroglu.

Although Sunday’s election may seem too close to call, it may well produce a clear-cut victory for Erdogan in the first round itself (with over 50% votes) that would obviate the need for a runoff. The known unknown today is whether Kilicdaroglu’s eclectic brand of party politics that helped him clinch the presidential nomination and paper over ideological divides that are as much historical as cultural, would be sufficient to persuade enough voters to help him win the race.

Erdogan is a man of history with a formidable track record in power in consolidating civilian supremacy in a working democracy. Kilicdaroglu, on the contrary, has nothing to show and never held an elected post. Yet, if Western capitals are dreaming about a Kilicdaroglu victory, it underscores the high stakes in Sunday’s election.

However, the paradox is, even if Kilicdaroglu is the winner, western powers shouldn’t expect an outright alignment of Turkish foreign policies with western demands. Kilicdaroglu himself remarked recently that Turkish foreign and defence policies “are managed by the state” and are “independent of political parties.”

What does he mean by that strange remark? Make no mistake, Kilicdaroglu is an old-world “Kemalist,” a social democrat passionately devoted to the ideological foundations of the Turkish state that Ataturk created, who believes in the core principles of nationalism, secularism and “statism.”

The Western hope is that given the alchemy of the rainbow coalition that may propel Kilicdaroglu to victory, he will be leading a weak government — unlike Erdogan’s assertive, stable government.

Indeed, the West does have immense experience in manipulating weak allies and partners in directions that suit the requirements of western hegemony. But, as current happenings in the West Asian region testify, especially in the Gulf, the US’ erstwhile vassal states are resisting being pushed around and are asserting their strategic autonomy and are systematically plotting the advancement of national interests from a long-term perspective.

The Saudi-Iranian detente; Saudi-Emirati reconciliation with President Bashar Al-Assad; the nascent peace talks over Yemen and Sudan — these show that regional states are perfectly capable of navigating their national interests, and the exclusion of Western hegemony can actually have productive outcome rather than perpetual conflict and strife.

When it comes to Turkiye, the foreign policies are rooted in its history, geography, national interests and the ethos of a classic “civilisational state”. Ankara largely followed a non-aligned independent foreign policy with accent on preserving its strategic autonomy in the highly volatile external environment that surrounds it.

Typically, half a century ago, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit risked US sanctions and ordered military intervention in Northern Cyprus to safeguard the security and welfare of ethnic Turkish community. No successor government rolled back that decision and Turkiye learnt to live with Cyprus and Greece’s veto on its EU membership.

Kilicdaroglu will adhere to Turkiye’s Cyprus policy (and strategy). Considering that President Biden is fully in the orbit of the influential Greek lobby in US politics (which lavishly funded his political career through decades), Kilicdaroglu will have no illusions while upholding Turkiye’s claims of maritime boundaries, special economic zones or exploration of gas reserves in East Mediterranean.

The single biggest impediment in Turkish-American relations is the trust deficit and that is largely attributable to Washington’s intentions toward Turkiye being a national security state. This is not only about the failure of the CIA-backed coup attempt in 2016 to overthrow Erdogan, but specifically, about Washington’s alliance with separatist Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq (who also have long-standing ties to the Israeli intelligence) that destabilise Turkiye (and Iran).

Ironically, Kilicdaroglu himself is an ardent proponent of normalisation of relations with the Assad government. He would favour resuscitation of Adana Agreement (1998), which envisaged bilateral cooperation between Ankara and Damascus in counter-terrorist activities, something that will horrify Washington or Paris and Berlin.

The bottom line is, of course, the close, friendly, mutually beneficial relationship that Erdogan forged with Russia. Now, this has an old history. The new kids on the block do not know that Ataturk himself was on friendly terms with the Bolsheviks. In the Cold War era too, Ankara, its NATO membership notwithstanding, maintained a certain non-alignment. Succinctly put, Erdogan has only reverted to that past but openly, and built on it rapidly, being in a hurry to position Turkiye optimally in the emerging multipolar world order.

The Turkish neutrality in the Ukraine conflict cannot be understood as a “stand-alone” issue. In reality, geoeconomics has been a driving force in Turkish-Russian relationship. Whether Kilicdaroglu may or may not have uses for the Russian S-400 anti-missile system is a moot point, but he certainly cannot do without the $20 billion Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which Russia’s Rosatom is not only constructing but will also be operating in future.

Turkish economy is partly built on the “German model” — Turkish companies use cheap energy from Russia to produce industrial products at competitive prices for the European market. Why would Kilicdaroglu emulate the folly of the present “trans-atlanticist” leaders in Berlin to terminate cheap long-term energy supplies from Russia at the cost of de-industrialisation?

Scholz has deep pockets and can probably afford to replace Russian piped gas under long-term contracts with LNG supplies from America at phenomenally marked-up prices, but Russia has proven to be a highly reliable source of abundant energy through pipelines that run just across the Black Sea to Turkiye.

The raison d’être of Turkiye’s dual orientation –- eastward and westward –- corresponds to an old tradition in Turkish foreign policy. Turkiye has its own understanding of Russia, borne out of a long, difficult common history. Therefore, the great deliberateness and congruent interests involved in Erdogan and Vladimir Putin, who are complex personalities each in his own way, taking such pains to understand each other and work together, cannot be viewed as an aberration.

The Western powers are fantasising that by manipulating the right-wing, pro-western parties aligned with Kilicdaroglu in the Faustian deal to keep Erdogan out of power, they can bring the dour Kemalist to his knees. In reality, though, Erdogan too has largely followed a foreign policy rooted in the ideology of the Turkish state that Ataturk founded, including in the fetishism over secularism typical of an archetypal Kemalist like Kilicdaroglu.

https://www.indianpunchline.com/kemalis ... elections/

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US Asked Türkiye for Access to Russian Air Defense System – FM
MAY 11, 2023


S-400 air defense systems. Photo: Sputnik/Alexander Galperin.

Ankara turned down a proposal that would have involved giving S-400s to Ukraine, Mevlut Cavusoglu has said

The US approached Türkiye in the hope that the country would grant Washington access to its Russian-made S-400 air defense systems or hand them over to Ukraine, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu claimed on Sunday. Ankara refused the request on the grounds that doing so would undermine its sovereignty and independence, he added.

In an interview with the newspaper Habertürk on Sunday, Cavusoglu recounted how the US had “made offers that directly concern our sovereignty, such as giving us control of [S-400], and giving it to somewhere else.”

The minister clarified that Washington had suggested providing the air-defense systems to Ukraine, but that Ankara said no.

Türkiye received the first batch of S-400s from Russia in 2019.

Commenting on the prospects of Ankara’s return to Washington’s F-35 fighter jet program, Cavusoglu said that his country is no longer interested because it is now working on its own military aircraft.

Last March, several Western media outlets reported that the US had offered Türkiye a “return to the F-35 program” in exchange for “giving up the S-400 system and sending it to Kiev.”

Commenting on the claims, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made it clear that Türkiye’s use of the S-400s was a “done deal for us.”

“They are our property serving our defense, so it’s over,” he stressed at the time.

Erdogan’s spokesman, Fahrettin Altun, meanwhile, pointed out that “what the West must do is deliver the F-35 fighter jets and Patriot batteries to Türkiye without preconditions.”

Back in 2020, Washington imposed sanctions on the Turkish defense industry and kicked the country out of its F-35 fighter jet program over Ankara’s decision to buy the Russian military hardware.

The US refused to deliver the already ordered aircraft to its fellow NATO member, claiming that Türkiye’s purchase of the Russian system “would endanger the security of US military technology.”

https://orinocotribune.com/us-asked-tur ... system-fm/

Bwahaha, across the planet the decay of US supremacy is more and more evident.

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In Turkish elections, will unprecedented legitimacy crisis bring down Recep Tayyip Erdogan?

Anıl Çınar of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkey talks about the elections that will be held on May 14, the project of President Erdogan’s AKP, and the failures of opposition over the years which have enabled his fundamentalist agenda

May 12, 2023 by Peoples Dispatch



Anıl Çınar of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkey talks about the elections that will be held on May 14. He explains the project of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his AKP, the failure of the opposition over the years to pose a challenge, and the agenda of the communists.

He explains the economic woes facing the Turkish people and the strategies of the capitalists over the years, and also talks about the role of Erdogan in these strategies. He also analyzes the assault on Republican values and the concentration of power in the country.

https://peoplesdispatch.org/2023/05/12/ ... p-erdogan/

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The US Has Been Meddling in Türkiye's Elections, Soylu Warns


Presidential candidates in Türkiye, 2023. | Photo: Twitter/ @HispanatoliaEN

Published 12 May 2023

If no presidential candidate gets over 50 percent of the votes on Sunday, a second round will take place on May 28.

On Friday, Türkiye's Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu criticized the United States for leading a Western media campaign to rig the country's upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections due to take place on Sunday.

"Everyone knows that the United States seeks to carry out a coup in this country every ten years," he said, adding that Washington has encouraged attacks on Turkish politicians during the electoral process.

"I am one of the people most vulnerable to attacks and insults through foreign social media accounts. The United States is interfering in these elections."

"Kilchdar Oglu is the candidate of the United States and all his projects refer to that. He also voted against the memorandums to extend Turkish operations in Syria."


"The U.S. wants to change Türkiye. If Erdogan wins, then Türkiye wins. The U.S., which works to blackmail others, will not win. Can we get the U.S. dirty hand out of Türkiye," he said.

"Türkiye has become a country free of terrorism. It continues to grow and ensure its political stability. Our nation triumphed on May 14, 1950 and it will triumph again," Soylu added.

As of Friday, opinion polls did not yet show a clear favorite to win the presidential election. If no candidate gets over 50 percent of the votes, a second round will take place on May 28.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/The ... -0021.html

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Elections in Türkiye Run Without Incident


A citizen casts his vote in Türkiye, May 14, 2023. | Photo: Twitter/ @metesohtaoglu

Published 14 May 2023

The influx of voters occurs normally even in the southeastern provinces, which were devastated by two earthquakes that caused some 50,000 deaths in February.


On Sunday, the presidential and parliamentary elections that Turkey is holding are taking place without notable incidents.

From 08:00 local time, some 61 million voters began to cast their vote in the 192,000 ballot boxes arranged throughout the country.

The influx of voters occurs normally even in the southeastern provinces, which were devastated by two earthquakes that caused some 50,000 deaths in February.

"The most important thing that can be said after voting is that the process has gone smoothly so far," said President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who exercised his right to vote in Istanbul.


Although the electoral authorities have not yet released participation data, the influx of citizens to the polls is very fluid. In Turkey, where voting is compulsory, turnout usually exceeds 80 percent of those authorized to vote.

According to the provisions currently in force, news related to the elections may not be disseminated until 6:00 p.m. local time and the electoral results may only be disseminated after 9:00 p.m. local time. The Electoral Commission, however, can lift this veto earlier.

"More than 30 political parties and over 150 independent parliamentary candidates will compete in the elections," AA news agency recalled, adding that "there are five multiparty blocs in the running: the People's Alliance, Nation Alliance, Ancestral Alliance, Labor and Freedom Alliance, and Union of Socialist Forces Alliance."

https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Ele ... -0011.html

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TÜRKIYE: ERDOGAN WILL FACE KILICDAROGLU IN A SECOND ROUND
May 15, 2023 , 1:56 p.m.



The president of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, prevailed in the elections this Sunday, May 14, with 49.50% of the votes, approximately 5% above the candidate of the Alliance of the Nation and leader of the Republican People's Party. , Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who obtained 44.89% of the vote.

However, the number of votes was not enough to consolidate the victory, so the two candidates will meet again in a second round scheduled for May 28, announced this Monday, May 15, the head of the Supreme Electoral Board of the country, Ahmet Yener.

The Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections this weekend were considered as one of the most important events of this year. Its importance lies in the fact that a defeat for Erdogan would mean the end of 20 years of rule and changes in the country's foreign policy.

For example, an eventual victory for Kilicdaroglu would reinvigorate the country's relations with NATO, as the candidate has vowed to "be a friend of the West again" and among his first plans is the reinstatement of the US-led F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. The country's role in the Ukrainian war is also likely to change.

Without a doubt, these elections are important for the United States. Before the elections, the Turkish interior minister, Suleyman Soylu, accused the United States of meddling in the elections and denounced that the Biden government is increasing its presence in the country. "The United States is interfering in this election, and this is what US President Joe Biden himself said," Soylu said.

It should be noted that the importance of these elections was outlined in a report by the congressional research service, which referred to the Turkish elections, as well as relations with this country, as one of the main issues this year.

"Should opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu win the 2023 elections and seize power, or if Erdogan wins re-election but loses control of parliament, some changes in domestic and foreign policy could take place," the report said.

https://misionverdad.com/turkiye-erdoga ... nda-vuelta

Google Translator

Well, Erdogan's party did win control of parliament....

[blindpig]

MAY 17, 2023 BY M. K. BHADRAKUMAR
Turkiye rallies behind Erdogan



It comes as no surprise that the United States and the European Union didn’t have the face to commend the performance of Recep Erdogan and his party in the presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkiye on Sunday. The election results do not serve the geopolitical interests of the US and its European allies. It is apparent that the entreaties and media management in the run-up fell on deaf ears.

The western powers hoped for a weak unstable government and are instead worrying that a turbo-charged Erdogan with a commanding majority in the parliament will be presiding over a strong government and won’t be a pushover.

Thus, pin-pricking has begun. A question mark is put on the legitimacy of Erdogan’s victory over his opposition rival Kemal Kilicdaroglu who is backed by the West. A real time report by the OSCE election observer mission’s preliminary findings have come handy, which alleged attempts to gerrymander the election results.

The report accuses Erdogan of enjoying “unjustified advantage” and resorting to “misuse of administrative resources”; and the election commission of “lack of transparency and communication” and independence.

In a direct attack on Erdogan, the OSCE mission report says, “The president is not explicitly subject to the same restrictions in the campaign period” and took undue advantage of incumbency… (and) blurred the line between party and State, at odds with the 1990 Copenhagen Document” (which contains specific election-related commitments.)

The report said the election administration, law enforcement bodies, and courts did not enjoy the confidence of the opposition in resolving electoral grievances “impartially and effectively.” The secrecy of the vote was not always guaranteed; family and group voting were frequent; and unauthorised people participated in the count, “raising concerns over its integrity.” During the vote count, “several significant procedural errors were reported.”

The US State Department has promptly urged the Turkish authorities to conduct “the next phase of the presidential election in line with the country’s laws and in a manner that is consistent with its commitments to the OSCE as well as a NATO Ally.”

The state department’s principal deputy spokesperson Vedant Patel said on Monday that the Biden Administration is “continuing to closely monitor the country’s ongoing electoral process.” He noted that “broadly we congratulate the people of Türkiye for peacefully expressing their will at the ballot box, and also congratulate the newly elected parliament.”

Patel repeated the stated US position that “we’ll continue to work together with whatever government is chosen by the Turkish people to deepen our cooperation and our – deepen our shared priorities.”

But he also parried that “the election process is still unfolding, as is the work of the OSCE’s election observation mission, which, as you know, released some preliminary findings… But I’m not going to predict anything additional from here.” Patel confirmed that there were US observers represented in the OSCE team.

Taking a cue from Patel, perhaps, the EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell was upfront in a statement issued in Brussels on Tuesday. He stated, “We note the preliminary findings and conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission of the OSCE and the Council of Europe, and call on Turkish authorities to address the shortcomings identified.”

Borrell added, “The EU attaches the utmost importance to the need for transparent, inclusive and credible elections, in a level playing field.” Borrell too welcomed the elections as such, and took note of the high turnout as a clear sign of the commitment of the Turkish people to exercising their democratic right to vote.

The salience of these remarks lies in the subtle hint by both Patel and Borrell that all is not lost yet and the jury is still out as regards Erdogan’s victory. (Interestingly, Turkish Foreign Ministry has pointed out that a total of 489 international election observers watched the May 14 elections in Türkiye and it is also “reflected in the reports of these delegations that the elections were held in accordance with the standards of free democratic elections and with exemplary participation in the OSCE and the CoE geography.”)

That said, by now, it must be sinking in surely in the western calculus that Erdogan has retained his core constituency, which has not suffered erosion, and his charisma cannot be matched by Kilicdaroglu. In “systemic” terms, the Globalists cannot match Erdogan’s nationalistic plank, either.

Erdogan is all but certain to win the runoff. The big question is about the third candidate Sinan Ogan who secured 5.2% votes in Sunday’s first round and now bows out of the race. Where will his supporters go in the runoff? No doubt, that will affect the “balance of power” in the runoff and tilt the scales decisively.

The odds are in favour of Kilicdaroglu getting the bulk of the “anti-Erdogan” votes of Ogan, but will that be sufficient to win in the second round? It may not be. Put differently, Ogan will not be able to deliver his entire electorate to Kilicdaroglu.

Clearly, if Erdogan can retain his voter base exceeding 49.5% it is and goes on to attract even a quarter of the votes Ogan secured, he is going to be the victor in the runoff. The strong likelihood is that Erdogan will win.

The fact that AKP secured a comfortable majority in the parliamentary elections — against all forecasts — also creates a new momentum. The AKP’s success goes to show that the Turkish voter seeks a stable government in Ankara when the external environment is becoming extremely dangerous for the country and the economic crisis demands attention. Whereas, the sort of rainbow coalition that Kilicdaroglu is heading used to be the bane of Turkish politics for many decades in the pre-Erdogan era, and a recipe for instability. Equally, it needs to be factored in that the groundswell of Turkish public opinion remains staunchly anti-western.

If he wins, this will be Erdogan’s final term. And it is going to be a “legacy term.” Erdogan will no doubt aim to transform Turkiye as a regional hub in energy, food, connectivity and transit. There is going to be breakthrough in nuclear industry, defence industry, infrastructure projects, etc. with Russian participation.

It is entirely conceivable that in the highly polarised political atmosphere in the country, there could be protests staged by the opposition if Erdogan wins in the runoff on May 28. But that won’t pose a serious challenge to Erdogan.

Turkey is not ripe for a colour revolution. The point is, unlike Georgia’s Eduard Shevardnadze or Ukraine’s Viktor Yanukovich, Erdogan is a grassroots politician with a solid mass base and the politics he practises is in sync with the zeitgeist in the region.

https://www.indianpunchline.com/turkiye ... d-erdogan/

[blindpig]

“Turkey is a NATO Country and Will Continue to be so, Unless the Turkish People Change the Existing Order”
Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° on JULY 2, 2023
Marinella Correggia



“Turkey is a NATO country and will continue to be so unless Turkish people change this existing order”; “Erdoğan is a man of Turkish big capital”

Interview with Kemal Okuyan. general secretary of the Communist Party of Türkiye (Türkiye Komünist Partisi, TKP)

In the last elections, the TKP (heir to the Communist Party funded in 1920) was part of the Union of Socialist Forces coalition and supported
Erdoğan’s opponent Ahmet Kılıçdaroğlu because the priority was to beat the sultan rather than to put forward its own candidate. In the TKP’s action programme (‘What would the TKP do if it won the elections’) they included: get out of NATO (list other central points in brief). And in its manifesto it challenged the hypocrisy of the AKP (Erdogan’s party) which continually evoked “morality”, in the face of so much social injustice and unemployment, in the face of the perpetuation of patriarchy, in the face of the bargaining of the country to international monopolies based on cheap labor force and unlimited plunder, while making comments on being “local and national”; and in the face of the support given to NATO’s dark operations.

Q. Erdoğan also won in the provinces devastated by the earthquake: despite the fact that real estate speculation permitted by his party resulted in many deaths; despite the great shortcomings of the relief effort, which even the TKP had verified on the ground; despite the pre-election rubble clearance operations, conducted without regard for the health of the workers… Why?

A. Yes indeed the election results shows that Erdogan and his party AKP continued to have the wide support in the region that was affected by the earthquake. It is true that this wide region was relatively conservative and traditionally voted for the right wing parties for a long time. However it is not true that the earthquake did have no impact on the ideological and political dynamics on the population. Just the opposite. Millions of people were shocked and even traumatised as no help came from the state which was something sacred for them. They questioned, for the first time in their life started to discuss and even decide to “leave” the protective shelter of the conservative ideologies. We have clear evidence from our party experience in the region and reports covered by trusted journalists.

Q. Then, why has nothing changed as long as the electoral results in the region are concerned?

A. Simply the bourgeois opposition was not trusted and did not give the impression that it was capable of running this country with too many problems. The conservative population did not feel secure with the opposition that already had no unity. During an election which was reduced to two main blocs, the opposition in fact pushed the masses again back to the secure harbor of AKP. While AKP was distributing small but meaningful money to the poor people in the region, the opposition was doing nothing to reach those hopeless millions. The effect of the earthquake on the ideological and political orientation in the regions can be seen through the prism of TKP’s work in the region. TKP had some organizations in the region but managed to open many new branches. Our work did not turn to votes but we could manage to continue after the elections. No new branches were closed. This would be impossible before the elections. Either nationalistic or Islamist prejudice would be strong barriers for a communist party to function. We function, we have new recruits from the conservative parties. However this is only a beginning, we need a lot of work to get use of this crack. But there is a real crack now.

Q. In the manifesto of the TKP written at the beginning of 2023, we read: ‘The Akp came to power with the slogan of fighting poverty, corruption and prohibitions. Today our citizens are even poorer, the country is suffocated by corruption and ruled by oppression and prohibitions’. Not even the extremely difficult economic situation has been able to defeat the sultan. How much has the Islamist and nationalist card played? And the subsidies and gifts?

A. The Islamist and nationalist cards are valid thanks to the strategy of the opposition. The alliance of the opposition nearly had the same ideological references and they persuaded that this is the “normal” of the country. So there existed no political alternative to an Islamist, neo-Ottoman line. However at the same time the opposition tried to combine this with a stupid pro-western stand. The poor sectors in the society are highly concerned by the “outside world”. That is not simply nationalism. That is also a sense of not being secure. Erdogan kept saying that he was struggling against all world powers. This would be a risk for him if the people realized that the foreign policy of AKP was bringing instability. Wide sections of the Turkish population seek for a strong internal protector that would save them from economic crisis, wars, uncertainties and chaos. And there is the issue of subsidies… AKP managed to get rid of the social rights and the remains of social state policies but instead promoted a more Islamic model: Charity system. You have no right but the state grants! The only thing the opposition did against this was to make fun of those gifts and subsidies. If and only if a strong working class movement could change the mentality of the poor people.

Q. Erdoğan and his government are among the major culprits for the ruin of Syria: with money from the Gulf monarchies (economic partners) and political support from NATO countries, Turkey has been a highway for jihadists and terrorists from dozens of countries. Together with the TKP, the Peace Association of Turkey denounced this often before being dissolved by the Turkish government in 2016; the Peace Committee of Turkey was then born, which condemned the invasion of areas of Syria by the Turkish army in 2018. Is this also your position?

A. Sure, TKP is against any military presence of Turkey abroad. Plus we also struggle against any foreign military presence inside Turkey, mainly NATO and USA. In the Syrian case, TKP has been very consistent starting from the very beginning. We warned all the forces in the region that the so-called “Arab Spring” was becoming an imperialist project and US and some reactionary forces were using peoples’ demands and struggling against some governments that were corrupted and caused a great deal of poverty. While some “left forces” were singing “down with Assad” TKP was saying that the change should be based on the Syrian people’s own struggle and no illusion should be created about the jihadist gangs. We have not changed this position till now and we will not.



NO TO NATO!“We do not accept the existence of NATO, which committed massacres, occupations and hostility towards the people in its entire history. We do not want the nests of the world’s largest terrorist organization in our country.” TKP

Q. Many Turkish citizens are now impatient with the presence of millions of Syrians; do they not realise that these refugees are the fault of Erdoğan’s belligerent and pro-jihadist policy? And what about the last-minute attempt by Kılıçdaroğlu to get some votes by promising thyat the Syrians would be rapatrieted in 2 years, thanks to peace with Syria? Was one of his mistakes?

A. There is of course a problem of immigrants with all dimensions. TKP is handling the issue with a class-based approach, struggling against any form of racism and trying to defend the rights of the immigrant workers. However we also take into account the organised fundamentalist armed groups within the immigrants coming mainly from Syria, Libya and Afghanistan. This is a real security problem for the working masses. We can not deny that there is also a systematic attempt to change the demographic structure of some regions of Turkey which also has political and ideological consequences. So TKP has no intention to be a part of the immigrant romanticism which is pumped by liberal circles. Of course where there is capitalist exploitation there are attempts to break the unity of the working classes, to promote nationalism or some other divisions to weaken the class movement. All over the world they are using the immigrant workers not only for cheap labour but also for creating confrontation inside the working masses. The same happens in Turkey. However the main source of the reaction towards the immigrants is the secular middle classes which were poisoned by the idea that the Syrians were threatening the society culturally. True, there is a real cultural problem but those who fear that immigrants will harm their daily life forget that the conservatism and the fundamentalist ideas are basically domestic issues. Kılıçdaroğlu exaggerated the hatred towards the Syrians and exercised an extreme nationalistic line especially during the last weeks of his campaign. Plus, the opposition dşd not have a solid policy towards the Syrian problem. They could not convince the people.
They are saving the AKP by saying “We will send away the immigrants”The argument used by the government and the so-called opposition parties that many problems in Turkey are caused by immigrants, only serves to sweep the real causes of the economic problems under the carpet. TKP

Q. In foreign policy, Erdoğan plays on many tables: at the same time he occupies Syria, supports the most fundamentalist militias in Libya, but has very good relations with non-Western countries that were against the proxy war in Syria and are against NATO and its wars (also in Libya in 2011). It sells arms to Ukraine but is considered sided with Russia by those who are not with Kiev. Finally, Turkey is in NATO and will remain there and will even accept Sweden’s entry, bartering it with the handing over of Turkish political opponents. Why does even part of the Western left (always in opposition) consider Erdoğan independent of NATO, NATO which is present at his coronation?

A. Turkish capitalism should not be underestimated. Yes, we have a fragile economy, a great deal of depth, and the financial system is relatively weak, in some sectors dependent on Russia and some on Germany. Yet the Turkish capitalist class is very flexible and dynamic, benefiting from the weakness of the Turkish working class. But not only that. Turkey for many years had close links with Germany economically and with the USA politically. As the hegemony of the US imperialism has been weakened, like many other actors in the world Turkey started to look for a wider space and acted more courageously for new markets. The Turkish bourgeoisie has been investing a lot for many years now in the Caucasia, Balkans and the Middle East and some parts of Africa. These were mainly parts of the Ottoman Empire and the AKP government is promoting Neo-Imperialism towards those regions. So ideological motives also accompany the Turkish capitalist classes’ interest. And there is also the Turkish army, which has a lot of bases abroad, defending those interests. Nobody should expect that Turkish foreign policy will be pro-US like it was during the 1970’s or 80’s. It is still pro-US and pro-NATO but in a different style. The problem with some left forces in the world who think that Erdogan is against NATO or even anti-imperialist is their shortcomings related to the concept of imperialism. Imperialism cannot be reduced to foreign policy of bir powers. It is an outcome of monopoly capitalism and each and every capitalist country has a tendency towards imperialism. Not all can practice of course but this process is intrinsic to all. TKP has always evaluated Erdoğan with a class based analysis. He is a man of Turkish big capital. That is the main issue. His bargaining with US and NATO sometimes of course presents us time and some possibilities but at the end of the day we should know that Turkey is a NATO country and will continue to be so unless Turkish people change this existing order. Of course this does not mean that we see the NATO issue as a problem of the future. TKP is constantly waging a struggle against NATO.

Q. And now, how will the opposition to Erdogan move? The coalition already dissolved.

A. The bourgeois opposition has disintegrated. The right wing parties, after helping the social democrat CHP to turn itself to a right wing party and getting into the Parliament by the help of her, now keeping their distance. And CHP (the Republican People’s Party) now has severe internal problems. The Parliament is the most reactionary, right wing parliament ever. Erdoğan will be very confident in the National Assembly and try to impose a new Constitution. This parliament can create no problem for the AKP. People started to free themselves from parliamentary illusions. TKP is trying its best to benefit from this. The electoral results that TKP got has nothing to do with the influence of TKP among the society and its organizational strength. As the burden of the economic problems will be put on the working people in the coming period, there will be a real and tough task for TKP. This class-oriented struggle will be combined with an anti-imperialist and secular stance as Erdoğan will need to have better relations with he Western monopolies and also increase the Islamic elements in Turkish social and political life. We are ready for this challenge.


https://libya360.wordpress.com/2023/07/ ... ing-order/

[blindpig]

Russo-Turkish Relations: The ‘Indivisible Security’ Principle Is No Longer Binding

Richard Hubert Barton

July 20, 2023

Turkey seems to demonstrate what some experts on Turkey call “transactional relationship” or “eastern bazaar mentality.”

I recall vividly the latest NATO Summit that took place in Vilnius and was given a lot of coverage on the Russian TV. As a result of digesting daily news I can instantly visualise a huge gathering of Western politicians, military officials and diplomats.

Within that sizable assemblage one could easily spot nearly ceaselessly gloomily walking president Erdogan. He was nonstop followed by his wife as usual wearing a head scarf. The only other less conspicuous person but overwhelmed to a greater extent by gloom as well as isolation was Mr. Zelensky. All this because he wasn’t getting his NATO membership not even in foreseeable future. In fact, he turned impudent and unjustifiably so, towards the British defence minister Mr. Ben Wallace who already gave him a short shrift by stating that “Ukraine had a habit of treating allies, including the UK, as if they were an Amazon warehouse with lists of demands for weapons.”

But what was president Erdogan up to? It is worth noting, that yet prior to the NATO Vilnius summit, Erdogan told bluntly a joint press conference with the Ukrainian president in Istanbul: “There is no doubt that Ukraine deserves membership of NATO.”

At the Vilnius summit Erdogan’s activities and talks essentially reflected security and economic affairs. Not only he envisaged a purchase of U.S. F16 lots but also spoke about being accepted after fifty long years to be a member of the European Union in exchange for his approval of Sweden as a member in NATO. All this, even though some Swedes were demonstratively burning copies of the Holy Quran.

The NATO and EU officials made strenuous efforts to explain to Mr. Erdogan that to qualify for NATO and to qualify for EU are two quite different things and it is not a matter of applying any exchange mechanism: you allow me to join EU and I will allow Sweden to join NATO. Strictly speaking, the NATO spokesperson declared:

NATO and EU enlargement were ‘separate processes.’ The accession process for each candidate country is based on the merits of each country. The two processes cannot be linked.

This must have been the case of what some experts on Turkey call “transactional relationship” or “eastern bazaar mentality.”

Importantly, what was absent in Erdogan’s support for Ukraine to join NATO and granting NATO membership to Sweden was how it would affect security of other countries such as Russia. Why did he disregard Putin’s sine qua non principle of “indivisible security”? The principle was first used in the 1975 Helsinki Act, but also appeared in the 1990 Charter for a New Europe and in the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security. It will be essential to note that all those treaties were signed by the west and the Russian Federation. It appears that such principle does not mean much not only for Turkey but also all the remaining NATO countries.

What would be a Western response to such a commentary? In all probability, the west would make reference to two (OSCE) documents that promote its version of indivisible security: the European Security Charter, signed in Istanbul in November 1999, and the Astana Declaration of December 2010. The US is a signatory to both documents. The Istanbul charter says countries should be free to choose their own security arrangements and alliances, but… it adds – something that they deliberately omit in their present declarations – that while choosing their security arrangements countries “will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other states.” Would Mr. Erdogan and his NATO colleagues claim that Ukrainian and Swedish membership of the NATO bloc is not at the expense of the security of Russia? If so, will anybody in his/her right senses accept their claim, to put it mildly, as credible?

Turkish participation in the NATO enlargement isn’t a single hostile act displayed towards the Russian Federation in recent times. For instance, since August 2022 Turkey has been proceeding with the construction of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) Bayraktar TB2 drones plant in Ukraine that will be used against Russian troops involved in the Special Military Operation. In addition, Baykar company had already sold some of them to Ukraine but also promised that it would establish joint training and maintenance centres for Turkish UCAVs in Ukraine.

In another instance, just recently, violating the agreement with Russia, Turkey freed Azovstal commanders allowing them to return to Ukraine with Zelensky to bolster his declining popularity. According to the original agreement they were supposed to be released after the end of the military conflict in Ukraine. As if it wasn’t enough, Erdogan made a deliberate faux pas by neither consulting nor notifying Russia about his treacherous decision.

Russia and Turkey Relations: A brief military overview

Despite the 2017 S-400 mobile surface-to-air missile system sale to Turkey by Russia that caused a great furore in the west and prompted the then president Trump to sanction Turkey, one could enumerate quite a number of international moves where both countries (Russia and Turkey) represent opposing interests, sides and undertakings. To begin with, in 2015 Turkey shot down a Russian fighter plane on its way to Syria. It led to a temporary diplomatic freeze. In Syria, Turkey and Russia back opposing sides, be it covertly, deploying foreign mercenaries, be it openly, deploying troops and military equipment. Libya is another case of that type.

However, it is the 2020 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan that should be highlighted in some detail. After all, it may have become not just a proxy war between Turkey’s and Russia’s respective backers, but possibly a direct military clash between them. In this context it should be reminded that Turkey denies Armenian claims that up to 1.5 million people were killed during the WWI and that it constituted an act of genocide. President Erdogan offered condolences to Armenian victims’ descendants and calls their genocide “mass killings” while Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu called the 1915-16 events a “mistake.” Russia is among the number of countries sticking to the term genocide.

It is worth noting that even though Azerbaijan, Turkey’s close ally, promises – under Russian pressure – to come to terms with the Armenian side with respect to Nagorno-Karabakh, it makes from time to time some officially sanctioned genocidal threats towards Armenia and Armenians. How one may not be shocked by the 2005 statement by Baku Mayor Hajibala Abutalybov who told the visiting German delegation:

Our goal is the complete elimination of Armenians. You, Nazis, already eliminated the Jews in the 1930s and 1940s, right? You should be able to understand us.

or a 15 years later a statement by Qarabag FK Soccer Club’s Nuran Ibrahimov who wrote:

We must kill all Armenians – children, women and the elderly. We need to kill them without making a distinction. No regrets. No compassion.

Hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan may take on a new dimension in the light of a new agreement between Israel and Azerbaijan. Most briefly, the latter country obtained $5 billion-worth of Israeli weapons and explosives in exchange,

for Azerbaijani energy and access to Azerbaijan’s airfields if Israel chooses to strike militarily at Iran’s nuclear program locations. It should be noted that Israeli drones were instrumental to Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Such a clandestine pact has an enormous potential to embroil the whole region in a war with possibly catastrophic consequences not only for Iran, Azerbaijan’s close ally Turkey, as well as possibly for Armenia. In case of an encroachment onto Armenian territory the conflict would not leave unscathed the Russian Federation which has a defence agreement with Armenia.

Turkey appears the only connection of Russia to the West

We all remember how Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov was prevented from flying to Serbia in June 2022. All told, Lavrov was due to meet his counterpart Nikola Selakovic and Serbian Orthodox Church Patriarch Porfirije but such NATO members as Montenegro, North Macedonia and Bulgaria closed their airspace to his plane. Lavrov blamed NATO for devising the flight ban.

Perhaps, nothing better explains the prevailing geopolitical situation in the region than Lavrov’s own online comments after attempted, unsuccessful flight to Serbia:

“An unthinkable thing has happened, a sovereign state has been deprived of its right to conduct foreign policies. The international activities of Serbia on the Russian track have been blocked. From the Western viewpoint, Serbia mustn’t have any choice, any freedom in choosing its partners. The West clearly shows that it would use any base means to apply pressure.”

In contrast to that, contradicting western sanctions, not only Lavrov but millions of Russian citizens are allowed to travel to Turkey. According to official data last year, 5.2 million Russian tourists visited Turkey. Turkish authorities expect about 6 mln tourists from Russia to visit the country by the end of 2023. With the Turkish economy being in poor shape it is a big boost in terms of the balance of payments and easing unemployment. That arrangement is beneficial to both sides: Turkey is obtaining economic benefits and Russian tourists gain leisure at the sunny Mediterranean coast. Even if the conflict in Ukraine comes to an end soon that pattern of exchange is unlikely to be undermined.

President Erdogan regardless of whether the west picks on tourism, the grain deal, the Akkuyu power station or Turkey becoming a gas hub is firm and knows what to say when they accuse him of disregarding western sanctions. It could be claimed that his explanations are part of his permanent home-spun philosophy which are part of his cultural background. His arguments contain plain logic. Let us justify all in his own words: “The Turkish authorities will not be able to join the sanctions against Russia, as they cannot let their citizens freeze without Russian gas, if we take natural gas alone, about half of the natural gas we use comes from Russia. Besides that, we are building our Akkuyu nuclear power plant with Russia.”

It is certain that with huge and growing population (85 mln+) in line with Erdogan staunchly pro-Muslim policies Turkish dependence on Russian natural resources, food and technologies will only increase in the future. The Turkish political opposition, even if it comes to power in five years, is neither in a position nor has any intentions to introduce any major policy changes towards Russia. Turkish presidential candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the main challenger to incumbent President Recep Erdogan, admitted in May 2023 that had he won the presidential election he would have not broken friendly relations with Russia.

There is one more reason why Russia’s relations with Turkey should be handled with utmost care. As Kerim Has, a Moscow-based freelance political analyst claims, “Turkey is de facto the only remaining connection of Russia to the West.” It is apparent that some Russian companies have restarted business with Europe via Turkey to bypass the sanctions. The Turkish business daily Dunya maintains that mechanism of “reexporting” has, in the past few months, turned Turkey into a busy transit hub for goods destined for Russia. The value of all goods transferred to Russia this way since March till August 2022 may have already reached around $4 billion.

No wonder, Turkish President Recep Erdogan and his counterpart, Vladimir Putin, met in August 2022 in Sochi. The two leaders held marathon talks behind closed-doors. There was no word on circumventing western sanctions. Yes, afterwards there were a few clever lines on strengthening mutually beneficial cooperation. President Erdogan was even bombastic when he said: “The world was watching the Sochi summit.” Surely, the west was watching it.

https://strategic-culture.org/news/2023 ... r-binding/

[blindpig]

Neither east nor west: Turkiye’s travails as a 'swing state'

Amidst a global power play, Turkiye finds itself at the heart of a high-stakes balancing act, as it struggles to juggle the expectations and pressures from influential players like the US and Russia, with crucial implications for its foreign policy and economy.


MK Bhadrakumar
JUL 24, 2023



The Russian Foreign Ministry website featured two press releases last week on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s conversations with his Turkish and Iranian counterparts, Hakan Fidan and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, respectively. The conversations took place at the initiative of the Turkish and Iranian sides.

Lavrov’s conversation with Fidan was business-like and formal, while with Amir-Abdollahian, Russia’s top diplomat, was in a noticeably relaxed freewheeling exchange — “trust-based” and signaling “mutual interest in closely coordinating the approaches” to world politics. (here and here)

The alchemy of the Russian-Turkish relationship has distinctly changed, whereas, the strategic partnership with Iran has consolidated and a high level of maturity and predictability is visible.

Russian concerns and Turkish diplomacy

One recent factor that corrupted the Russian-Turkish relationship is the Kremlin’s unilateral decision to let the Black Sea Grain Initiative expire on 17 July. Ankara tried behind the scenes to avert the moment, but the Russian decision was not Turkiye-centric. Therein lies the hope — and the despair.

Russia has since offered that a new grain deal with Turkiye might be possible if Moscow's demands are met, announcing works on new export routes. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reciprocated by calling on western countries to “follow up on Putin’s expectations.”

However, the crisis of confidence in the Russian-Turkish relations has a geopolitical dimension, and it concerns the war in Ukraine. Succinctly put, Turkish foreign policies have lately displayed a nuanced “westernism” that affects vital Russian interests.

Indeed, there is no plausible explanation for the sudden visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to Istanbul on 8 July, the sudden release of notorious Azov commanders who were in Turkish custody per an understanding with Russia on the exchange of prisoners, or the plan to set up a co-production venture in Ukraine for Turkiye’s Bayraktar drones.

One way of looking at such a sharp Turkish turnaround could be that interest groups in Turkiye's defense industry are being manipulated by Zelensky. Erdogan’s open support for Ukraine’s NATO membership is blatant tokenism.

The big picture is that Zelensky, with encouragement from the US, is looking for opportunities to erode the mutual trust and confidence that has accrued in the Turkish-Russian relationship over recent years, thanks to the hands-on diplomacy between Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Anyway, on the eve of the NATO Summit in Vilnius (11-12 July), where Erdogan was expected to meet up with US President Joe Biden (and Zelensky), Lavrov made Moscow’s concerns known to Foreign Minister Hakan in a phone conversation initiated by the latter.

Geopolitical dimensions of the Ukraine crisis

The Russian readout said:

“The sides exchanged opinions on the regional agenda and prioritized the latest developments around Ukraine, including the situation regarding the return of Azov battalion “ringleaders” from Istanbul to Kiev. The Russian side drew the attention of Ankara to the fact that continued deliveries of military equipment to the Kiev regime amounted to a destructive course. It was noted that subsequent steps could only bring about negative consequences.”

When asked about these Turkish moves, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov reacted, “certainly, as a modern state, Turkiye has the absolute right to develop relations with any country, including Ukraine. But, being partners with Turkiye, we are hopeful that that relationship will not be aimed against us.”

Peskov described the relations between Russia and Turkiye as “quite close, developed, multifaceted, and mutually beneficial.” However, “there are certain areas where we have differences,” he added. But Peskov also said the the implementation of the joint gas hub project of Russia and Turkiye won’t be affected since the interests of “a very large number of countries in the region, and even European countries” are involved.

Undoubtedly, some questions hang in the air, especially on how keenly the west is seeking to mend diplomatic relations with Erdogan. At the end of the day, Erdogan’s wish list remains fulfilled — Washington’s approval for sale of new F-16 fighter jets and modernization kits; the EU support for resumption of Turkiye’s accession talks; an invitation from Biden to Erdogan to visit Washington: Erdogan has been in power for more than twenty years, and Biden is the only US president who has refused to meet him in an official capacity, either in Washington or in Ankara.

These are complicated issues. The F-16 deal may run into headwinds in the US Congress, where Turkiye is a toxic subject for a variety of reasons. Biden also has to bear in mind the solid backing from the Greek lobby in an election year, which has been an asset in his political life all through.

As for the EU, fundamentally, it is a Christian club that will never admit a Muslim country with a population of 85 million that would upset its ecosystem.

Travails of a ‘swing state’

So, the big question is about Turkiye's own calculus as a geopolitical “swing state.” The first hint of Erdogan shifting toward orthodox western-oriented economic policy and the muscular diplomacy needed to back it up came in his announcement of a new cabinet on 3 June after a lavish inaugural ceremony in Ankara marking the beginning of his third decade in office.

Erdogan’s choice of two Wall Street veterans as finance minister and central bank governor — Mehmet Simsek and Hafize Gaye Erkan — provided signs of a potential new direction for his rule, necessitating a rapprochement with the West.

Again, his choice of Hakan Fidan, the longtime head of Turkiye’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) spy agency as foreign minister to replace tenured diplomat Mevlut Cavusoglu, suggested a future potential shift in Turkiye’s style of foreign relations. Under Fidan, MIT had held secret peace talks with the outlawed separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) armed group in Oslo, and was also pivotal in the normalization talks with Israel and Syria.

Turkish experts call it “smart diplomacy” — a foreign policy set to advance to a more independent level without severing Turkiye's relations with the west, which is dynamic but wouldn’t be a radical shift in Turkiye’s international stance, and would further deepen to buttress existing achievements and negotiating in a way that will not exhaust the Turkish economy.

Quintessentially, this entails Turkiye maintaining an attitude of neutrality as far as it can in the highly polarized international situation and the grave uncertainties in its own neighborhood.

The Erdogan-Putin relationship

As prominent Turkish expert Mehmet Ozkan, Professor of International Relations at the Joint War Institute under the Turkish National Defence University in Istanbul, put it:

“Turkiye is a third path. While building its relations with both the West and the East, Ankara’s policy is one to guarantee its strategic autonomy and ability to move independently in order to avoid being caught between the two blocks.”

But Erdogan also insists that Putin is due to visit him in Turkiye in August. And, the Kremlin remains open to the pattern of intense contact between Moscow and Ankara that Erdogan and Putin have established in recent years.

Equally, Russia has conveyed to Turkiye that the grain deal to which Erdogan was passionately committed is still workable if only the west delivers on its promises to allow Russian exports of wheat and fertilizer to the world market.

However, the zero-sum western mindset expects Erdogan to jettison his friendly ties with Putin and roll back the Turkish-Russian relationship, and also make sure that Ankara will not help Moscow in the conditions under western sanctions. Clearly, the US will not tolerate Turkiye, a NATO member country, gravitating towards the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or BRICS, or seeking Eurasian integration in any form.

Where US and Turkish interests collide

Washington basically expects Ankara to dismantle the entire foreign policy architecture that Erdogan built through the past two decades in power, particularly after the US-backed failed coup attempt to overthrow his rule in 2016.

Zelensky's diplomatic offensive — again, in concert with the US and NATO — aims to bring Erdogan on board a project to establish a new maritime route for grain exports through the northwestern Black Sea region, excluding Russia from it, and instead, pass through the territorial waters of fellow NATO-member Romania, where the 101st Airborne Division of the US Army is deployed.

Quite possibly, this could be a prelude to inserting US/NATO “boots on the ground” into Ukraine eventually. The point is, the US and its allies realize that the battered Ukrainian military cannot possibly defeat Russia, and a Plan B is needed to restrict the Russian forces tactically to the east of the Dnieper River until a Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian military axis, currently being groomed, can be inserted into western Ukraine by autumn.

Meanwhile, the US hopes to pre-empt any Russian offensive toward the hugely strategic port city of Odessa. However, any western attempt to undermine Russia’s traditional regional dominance in the Black Sea is a non-starter without Turkiye's cooperation. Notably, the paragraph on NATO’s strategic agenda for the Black Sea specifically flagged the 1936 Montreux Convention, which is the essential element in the context of Black Sea security and stability. Biden may reciprocate by allowing the IMF to provide a bailout of the Turkish economy, which is in dire straits.

Erdogan's tour of the Gulf states last week aimed to create space for Turkiye to negotiate by securing more investments from wealthy West Asian states. According to the official WAM news agency, the signed agreements during Erdogan’s visit to the UAE were “estimated to be worth $50.7 billion.”

The paradox is, the US strategists who began applying the coinage “swing state” to geopolitics in the late 1990s as the “unipolar moment” was fading away, ascribed to Turkiye the classic features of a nation whose affiliations in geopolitics would determine the outcome of big-power rivalry for decades to come. Thus began the agony and ecstasy of Turkiye’s foreign policies.

Today’s travails bear out that this trajectory is not easy. Swinging one side risks punishing revenge by the other side. And at the end of it all, Turkiye might be better off by not swinging at all but sticking to a straight path. Erdogan must be aware of whether he’d feel safe to take a walk in the dark with Biden. If not, his choice is clear — avoid it at all costs.

https://new.thecradle.co/articles/neith ... wing-state