TARECK EL AISSAMI KNEW ABOUT THE MERCENARY OPERATION BETRAYAL AS THE LAST CHAPTER OF OPERATION GIDEON
May 6, 2024 , 10:41 am .
The objective of Operation Gedeón was to assassinate members of the Bolivarian Government, starting with President Nicolás Maduro. (Photo: Archive)
On the morning of May 3, 2020, Venezuela witnessed an invasion attempt carried out by a group of mercenaries trained in Colombia and sponsored by the administration of Donald Trump, whose objective was to enter the territory through the coasts of the Aragua and La Guaira states. Its essential purpose: assassinate members of the Bolivarian Government, starting with President Nicolás Maduro. This meant creating a situation of violence and destabilization in the country that would make foreign occupation viable in the same national space and achieve the definitive seizure of power by Juan Guaidó.
Four years after this mercenary incursion into Venezuela was thwarted, it is necessary to point out two aspects that, in the current context, acquire crucial relevance, beyond the obvious failures in the planning and execution of the operation and the unquestionable responsibilities of sectors of the Venezuelan extremist opposition and some foreign governments in its development.
Firstly, the civil-military-police union that, in just 48 hours, dismantled the incursion and that has become a fundamental piece to guarantee the political stability of the country. Secondly, we highlight Operation Gideon as a plan in which significant political and financial resources were invested, aimed at subverting the Venezuelan constitutional order, and in which international actors, extremist opposition factors and, furthermore, after the new known evidence, a power sector infiltrated in "Chavismo" that participated in the PDVSA-Cripto conspiratorial plot.
4 years ago, Joint Operation Negro Primero, in a civic-military-police union, crushed a group of mercenaries and terrorists who tried to invade Venezuela with the aim of ending my life, but the people did not let them and came out to defend themselves. of the territory in the… pic.twitter.com/BVLOp182OT
— Nicolás Maduro (@NicolasMaduro) May 3, 2024
SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE AS A KEY FACTOR
Above the resounding military and political failure of Operation Gideon, two serious strategic miscalculations on the part of its perpetrators stand out. Firstly, it was based on a mistaken perception on the part of extremist actors about the willingness of coastal populations to support the mercenary incursion; and secondly, it implied a "jump into the void" by betting on desertion and support from the forces of public order to the insurrectional movement.
Neither of the two scenarios occurred and, to the surprise of the mercenaries, Joint Operation Negro Primero had the participation of the organized community that, together with police and military forces, managed to dismantle the plans involved in Operation Gideon. Without this articulation, the possibilities of success would have been reduced, or at least compromised, since we are talking about areas, especially on the coasts of Aragua, without a significant military presence at the moment.
The outstanding participation of the organized community in an operation of such magnitude not only demonstrates its unwavering commitment to the comprehensive defense of the national territory, but also highlights the fundamental role that popular bodies play in the management of the affairs of State and of government in Venezuela.
Thus, having as a conceptual framework the Bolivarian military doctrine, specifically the necessary co-responsibility between the State and citizens in the comprehensive defense of the nation, the government in the territory has become a neuralgic pillar for the construction of an organic defense system. robust, where the people act as guarantor of the sovereignty and independence of the nation.
"WE HAD THE CORRUPT AND TRAITORS AT OUR SIDE"
Operation Gedeón highlighted the extensive international and national networks woven by the subjects behind the conspiracy against the institutions of the Venezuelan State. This plot, hatched since 2017, materialized in a political-diplomatic boycott orchestrated by the Organization of American States (OAS), followed by the creation of the Lima Group and, finally, supported by the US State Department that protected the self-proclaimed " interim" of Juan Guaidó starting in 2019.
However, it was with the failed coup attempt on April 30, 2019 and the mercenary raid of the aforementioned operation that the military dimension of this conspiracy was revealed in its full magnitude.
With the paramilitary incursion, the governments of Iván Duque of Colombia and Donald Trump of the United States were exposed, since both countries provided financial and logistical means for the development of the plan. Likewise, as subsequent investigations would demonstrate, there was a non-negligible business component in the international operation against Venezuela.
But the most striking thing four years after the failed action are the implications that government sectors, today prosecuted for treason, had in the mercenary incursion. Thus, President Nicolás Maduro commented on his television program that recent investigations into the PDVSA-Cripto plot revealed that former Minister Tareck El Aissami, along with the sector that accompanied him, were aware of the frustrated assassination of August 2018, the attempted coup of April 30, 2019 and Operation Gideon of 2020.
#InVideo Pdte. @NicolasMaduro : "we had the corrupt and the traitors on our side." #ConMaduroMásPueblo pic.twitter.com/hXXA2OrMnr
— ConMaduro+ (@ConMaduroMas_) April 30, 2024
In this way, as the president stated , what seemed like investigation hypotheses ended up being confirmed with the various evidence obtained from the PDVSA-Cripto investigation that the Public Ministry has been carrying out: "They were aware of the attack carried out on August 4, 2018 against me. And they were also informed of the coup carried out 5 years ago, known as the green bananas coup, carried out in Altamira on April 30, 2019, coordinated with Leopoldo López and the White House, with John Bolton, James Story and a last name that appears, 'Fouli'" , of whom President Maduro said that "he is the one who ruled and still rules."
The events that took place in those 48 hours in which the mercenary operation was dismantled showed the world the unbreakable will of the Venezuelan people to guarantee peace, sovereignty and democracy in the country. However, the commitment to the destabilizing plans that sectors, supposedly loyal to the institutions of the State, maintained with the factors that have traditionally been conspiring in Venezuela cannot go unnoticed.
LEOPOLDO LÓPEZ AND THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE PDVSA-CRIPTO PLOT
May 4, 2024 , 8:15 am .
Attorney General Tarek William Saab presented other findings on the PDVSA-Cripto plot at a press conference . This time the statements of businessman Samark López were shown in which he explains part of the modus operandi of the network associated with Leopoldo López and Julio Borges as star protagonists.
In the update on the case, the Prosecutor indicated that there were new arrests in this second phase of investigation, bringing a total of 67 detainees. He added that the Public Ministry obtained new revelations through the confessions of those involved.
The testimony of the businessman and also Tareck El Aissami's emissary was shown, who described the corrupt scheme regarding the oil shipment process and the modalities they used to engage in flawed practices on this matter.
In his confession, Samark explained the two modalities applied from 2020 to 2022:
Allocations of oil shipments to different companies in order to distribute high commissions to contractors who have ties to the far-right parties Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular. Profits ranged from 120 to 140 million dollars, depending on the market.
Contractors were required to, instead of paying only the price of crude oil, also send diluents or oil derivatives so that they obtained double profit, that is, they absorbed the benefits of both the sale of oil and the derivatives determined in that business. . Profits could exceed 2 billion dollars.
In summary, Borges and López benefited from the illegal assignments of shipments of oil and derivatives through two contractors hiding behind Spanish companies , which provided crude oil shipments valued at more than one billion dollars.
In this sense, Samark emphasized that the contractors were long-standing as they continued shady methods inherited from the Rafael Ramírez administration.
Furthermore, it is important to mention that the participation of an actor like Leopoldo López suggests that this scheme still maintains the methods of that historical link related to the diversion of funds from PDVSA to the Primero Justicia Civil Association in 1998 .
Returning to the plot, in principle it is known that the process of assigning vessels in an oil company involves various considerations to ensure the efficient transportation of crude oil. This goes through an administrative control procedure and PDVSA contracting regulations , which is why this corrupt group simulated a bidding process with different contractors, to then decant the new assignments to the predetermined wholesalers of yesteryear, who were embedded in the bowels of PDVSA.
Faced with this, Samark adds that another of the mechanisms used to guarantee the sustainability of this illicit cohabitation was directed at large-value vessels, where service-providing companies or registered suppliers that they classified as "small" were believe that the assignment corresponded to a contract for a price they could pay.
However, the trick was that, when delivering that ship, a price was announced far above what these small suppliers could pay. In this way, Samark and his group outsourced the exchange, offering as a solution that they make payments through traditional and preferential wholesalers that were already linked to the murky network, and whose final beneficiaries were López and Borges.
In this way, small service providers benefited from the contract with a transparent and competitive process, but in the end they were absorbed by two previously determined wholesalers, who operated the business from the shadows, using bribery tactics and diversion of funds. resources to the detriment of the interests of the company and the country.
Finally, the aforementioned emissary from El Aissami narrated that one of those two wholesalers sent letters to the United States Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in which he requested that they not sanction one of the companies that operated. in PDVSA, and they offered that office that, once there was a change of government, it could increase its operations and production in oil matters.
Future revelations are expected about the PDVSA-Cripto case which, in its second phase of investigation, has shown the insidious tactics of the sector led by Leopoldo López, who has continued to be infiltrated in the oil industry and has broken loyalties and raised the blackmail through threats with the imposition of sanctions or licenses, and those who still maintain their questionable practices for the embezzlement of funds through the oil trade.
BRIEF PROFILES OF THE OPPOSITION PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
May 6, 2024 , 1:00 p.m.
The manipulation of the 2023 primaries by certain groups marginalized large sectors of the opposition spectrum. (Photo: EFE - Miguel Gutiérrez)
Venezuela is approaching its election day for the presidency of the republic on July 28, 2024 in a complex context, but with marked differences from previous processes. The country continues to face illegal international sanctions imposed by the United States, the impact of which has been significant on its economy. However, thanks to the right decisions of the Venezuelan government, the oil industry and the national economy are showing a progressive trend of recovery.
The regional panorama has also changed since the 2018 presidential elections. Venezuela no longer faces a bloc of Latin American governments subordinated to the US strategy, and the level of siege and political pressure is lower.
In this context, different factions of the Venezuelan opposition, following the guidelines of the National Electoral Council (CNE), have presented their nominations and they have been accepted by the competent body. Below, we present a brief profile of each of them:
*Edmundo González Urrutia: Candidate of the Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD), he has academic training in International Relations obtained in the United States. He began his diplomatic career as first secretary of the Venezuelan embassy in that country. Subsequently, he worked in the General Directorate of International Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served as international liaison of the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) between 2013 and 2015. During this last role, González Urrutia was in charge of projecting strategies of ignorance against President Nicolás Maduro internationally. He reflects a strong interest in realigning Venezuela towards the US sphere of influence , leaning towards a position of relationship of tutelage and subordination.
*Antonio Ecarri: He is a dissident Venezuelan lawyer and politician from the ranks of Primero Justicia (PJ) with experience as a councilor in the Chacao municipality. He has expressed differences with the traditional opposition and has been building the image of being an alternative to it. He presents his candidacy as a " center option " to overcome the polarization between Chavismo and the opposition. Founder of the organization Alianza del Lápiz, Ecarri stands out for his sectoral work in the educational area, which has allowed him to position himself in Caracas and Miranda. He has added the support of Fuerza Vecinal, after the resignation of Manuel Rosales from the candidacy.
*Luis Eduardo Martínez: He is the presidential candidate of Democratic Action (AD), a party led by Bernabé Gutiérrez. He represents a new leadership within the traditional Venezuelan organizations grouped in the G4 that changed their political direction because they disagreed with the abstentionist strategy. In an interview, Martínez stated that some radical elements of the opposition are not motivated by national interests, which is why he distances himself from them. He has added support from Copei and the Popular Democratic Right party.
*José Brito: Venezuelan politician who serves as a deputy in the National Assembly, elected in 2020. He stands out for his critical expression towards the majority opposition grouped in the Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD) and considers that international sanctions are a threat to the economy. from Venezuela. Like Martínez, he is part of the leadership that was formed in the opposition parties abandoned by the abstentionist leaders. In April 2024, the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) appointed Brito as leader of an ad hoc board of directors of PJ , allowing him to present candidates to the CNE.
*Daniel Ceballos: Serves as presidential candidate for the Arepa party. His political career includes his tenure as mayor of San Cristóbal in 2013, interrupted by an arrest warrant from the TSJ for having supported the 2014 guarimbas and calling for violence. Thanks to the dialogue table promoted by the Venezuelan government, he received a pardon and resumed his political path. Ceballos was part of Voluntad Popular during his political rise, but distanced himself from the party due to differences with its violent and radical strategy. He considers that the guarimbas were a mistake that weakened the opposition.
*Javier Bertucci: He is an evangelical pastor, businessman and Venezuelan politician who has run for president twice for the El Cambio party. He is currently a deputy of the National Assembly. Although he identifies himself as an opponent of the government of Nicolás Maduro, his approach is distinguished from that of the traditional opposition by his openness to dialogue. Bertucci managed to obtain 11% of the vote in 2018 , making him one of the few political actors capable of attracting voters beyond the typical division between Chavismo and opposition.
*Benjamín Rausseo: He is running as a candidate outside of traditional political parties, seeking to attract voters disenchanted with polarization and existing party structures. He has spoken out against the international sanctions imposed on Venezuela. The Redes party has withdrawn its support due to ideological differences and the perception that Rausseo is carrying out an "empty" campaign without connection with the people.
*Claudio Fermín: The political career of Claudio Fermín, former mayor of Caracas, is characterized by his experience in public management and his moderate stance within the panorama of the Venezuelan political opposition. He began his public career in Democratic Action, but his dissent from the party line led him to separate from it. He founded the Solutions for Venezuela party, which he currently leads. He has participated in dialogue initiatives with the national government, seeking agreements in favor of the country and rejecting sanctions.
*Enrique Márquez: Former rector of the CNE, he defends that participation in elections is the only legitimate and effective way to achieve political change in Venezuela. He joined the Un Nuevo Tiempo party in 2007, and was expelled in 2018 for supporting Henri Falcón's candidacy in 2018, which contradicted the abstention strategy promoted by the MUD. He believes that international sanctions have failed to weaken the national government; on the contrary, they have harmed the Venezuelan population.+
When analyzing the profiles of this spectrum, the lack of unity and underlying strength between the oppositions can be clearly observed. Although all the candidates are facing the Maduro government, they represent a wide range of political places that seem to be irreconcilable with each other.
This current fragmentation has its roots in a series of strategic errors over the years, such as the excessive influence of María Corina Machado in the problematic 2023 primaries, in which she imposed her candidacy despite being politically disqualified, which marginalized to dissident voices.
Machado's refusal to name a replacement exacerbated the divisions, the result of which was the unilateral imposition of Corina Yoris as a candidate and, finally, the last-minute acceptance of support for Edmundo González, a candidate who at times seemed to be a cover option for María Corina, at other times one that responds to the sectors represented in the PUD, but never a postulate agreed upon by all the opposition factions, much less when there has been an electoral offer full of candidates with their own particular agendas.
AGAINST THE POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL OPACITY OF NGOS
May 23, 2024 , 3:35 pm .
US institutions such as USAID have provided financing to some NGOs in Venezuela without any oversight (Photo: Reuters)
In Venezuela, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have had a leading role in the political-media scene since at least the first decade of the 21st century, although the rise in financing of these institutions began at the end of the previous century as an accompaniment of the neoliberal practices implemented by governments prior to the Bolivarian Revolution.
As the Venezuelan State in the 1980s and, above all, 1990s, abandoned its traditional role in certain economic and social sectors, NGOs took their place as operators, becoming arbitrators, interpreters and facilitators between government entities. and the population.
In this way, they began to participate in Venezuelan society by acting as a neoliberal device, in which they took on an increasingly greater role in the absence of the state, and institutionalized popular organizations by emptying their political content and eroding citizen participation, proposing in its place the privatization of public goods and services towards a model of consumerism that brought with it its document of barbarism. The neoliberal regime was implemented in the country.
On a global scale, large NGOs have worked jointly with corporations —under the guise of "social responsibility" and philanthropy—in the areas of politics, economics, social affairs, the environment, among others, which has filled the coffers of those entities and has raised its profile until, for example, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Doctors Without Borders in 1999. From then on, these organizations have enjoyed an "apolitical" aura and have been accepted as a state substitute in societies where neoliberal dogma prevails in matter and spirit.
The Venezuelan case contemplates an additional nuance: the "apolitical" and socially beneficent nature of many NGOs, narratively reinforced by private media and multilateral institutions of the liberal order - such as the UN or the OAS - take a belligerent position in politics and management. partisan, and has become asymmetric resources of the hybrid war against the population and the State.
The United States has expanded its organizational, logistical and financial channels in matters of foreign policy through the USAID and the NED to other societies, leading the baton of countless NGOs. Venezuela is a repository of these schemes with direct and indirect connections to US financing or other politically related entities.
Thus, it is essential to understand that the logistical and financial devices of the NGOs associated with opposition parties and leaders of the Democratic Unitary Platform—and their political partners—are fundamental in a possible post-electoral scenario, after the presidential elections on July 28, where Chaos and violence prevail with destabilizing purposes of national institutions and society as a whole for destituent reasons.
In addition to the political plot that characterizes the Venezuelan present, with the elections, the tours throughout the country of María Corina Machado—herself an NGO activist in her political beginnings—and the preaching of "the transition" well positioned on the spectrum media-digital, the increasing flow of resources to NGOs from the United States and the White House's attempts to disrupt and influence the recovering national economic activity through the issuance - or not - of OFAC licenses - maintaining the regime of illegal sanctions against the republic—are elements that, accumulated and well manipulated, could generate a fabricated event that triggers days characterized by political violence.
A REGULATORY AND INSPECTION FRAMEWORK
In this way, the second discussion in the National Assembly (AN) of the Draft Law on Supervision, Regularization, Performance and Financing of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Related Organizations, has had a singular prominence on the political agenda.
The claims and denunciations of coercion of human rights by the most openly anti-Chavista NGOs and linked to the most belligerent sectors of the opposition as a result of the legislative proposal in favor of transparency and institutional formality are signs that these entities do not They do not intend to account for their financing—much less their objectives—nor to consider a regulated margin of action.
This is a legislative mechanism that many Western countries already have, including the United States and the European Union (EU), where protests have also arisen over the bill under discussion in the chamber. What the Venezuelan State requires is transparency from these non-governmental people, not restricting their activities.
Currently, the AN has approved nine articles while the discussion continues on the rest of the articles.
The future regulation of the activity of NGOs in Venezuela is due both to the experience in recent history, due to the political, corrupt and destabilizing role that many of them have taken, and to the need to generate a favorable oversight framework for them.
Regarding the latter, the first vice president of the Permanent Commission of Internal Policy, deputy Julio García Zerpa (PSUV), one of the promoters of the law, commented that more than 80% of the NGOs "do not even have legal personality, which It is part of what is legislated in this norm, they do not exist before the registry, in this case the Saren, but they receive large amounts of millions of dollars! They are a vest, a cap, a motto, a website and they receive significant amounts. of millions of dollars!"
He also indicated that the Simón Bolívar Foundation of the subsidiary of Petróleos de Venezuela, SA (PDVSA) in the United States, Citgo Petroleum, created during the government of President Hugo Chávez and which continued to operate with the administration of President Nicolás Maduro until 2019, now stolen by Washington, DC and administered indiscriminately by people affiliated or associated with Voluntad Popular—the López-Guaidó side—has lost its original nature—caring for surgical interventions on child and adolescent patients with serious illnesses—and has dedicated itself to distributing money to a organization called Convite, "which, according to Congressman García Zerpa, receives financing whose funds are illegally managed by these institutions."
Convite Civil Association was created in 2006 and works through various projects in the health sectors - monitoring and information -, youth and community activism and "humanitarian action". Most of its projects date back to 2020, a year after the United States imposed its puppet Juan Guaidó as "interim president" of Venezuela and gave him power at Citgo.
But Convite has another direct connection with American institutions: Luis Francisco Cabezas, its director, is a member of the Ford Foundation , an entity whose activities in Latin America and other parts of the world played an important role in the CIA's Cultural Cold War , a well-connected documented by British researcher Frances Stonor Saunders. American sociologist James Petras also wrote : "The ties between top Ford Foundation officials and the U.S. government are explicit and ongoing. A review of projects recently funded by the Ford Foundation reveals that it has never funded "an important project that contravenes US policy."
For the political and social stability of Venezuela, it is important that the existing connections between the actors that directly affect the Venezuelan scenario are known and recognized, but above all those that are veiled by a cloak of opacity. The bill points to the need for the regulation and supervision of NGOs to comply with the mechanisms so that their activities can be carried out normally throughout the national territory, without partisan or conspiratorial pretensions.
The same purpose has the parliament of Georgia, a Eurasian country whose political and social life is immersed in chaos driven by NATO , which seeks to make the financial and logistical instruments of NGOs transparent. The protests have escalated to the level of a soft coup, following the same hackneyed script, against the implementation of the law "On the Transparency of Foreign Financing."
From American and European bodies, this law harms Georgia's path towards the UN, while local entities and people that receive foreign financing organize to disobey the legislative order and take to the streets in search of a possible scenario of destabilization in favor of change. of regime. Legislators from the Georgian Dream party, the group promoting the law, stated last year that the EU is financing anti-Russian polarization in Georgia and that this bill would solve that problem.
Otherwise, in Venezuela, a scenario of extreme polarization with condiments of violence and social destabilization after the presidential elections in July - "the transition" in operational progress - is a possibility that the NGO partners of the most quarrelsome sectors of the Venezuelan opposition contribute as asymmetric resources while there is no official solution to their regulation and supervision.
THE NEED FOR A LAW AGAINST FASCISM IN VENEZUELA
May 22, 2024 , 4:45 pm .
A law against fascism would allow experiences such as the "arrechera" or the murder of Orlando Figuera to not be repeated (Photo: Archive)
The first vice president of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and deputy to the National Assembly (AN), Diosdado Cabello, asked parliament to carry out an in-depth investigation into the crime committed against Orlando Figuera.
This is a young man who was walking near Altamira Square, Chacao municipality in Miranda state, during the guarimbas of 2017. He was approached by an opposition group, stabbed and burned up to 80% of his body. He was hospitalized from May 20 of that year until he died on June 4.
The then attorney general, Luisa Ortega Díaz, declared that his lynching was not a hate crime, as the government and several human rights organizations have stated until now. Enzo Franchini Oliveros, who appears in various images shown on social networks dressed in a jacket and motorized helmet, setting Figuera on fire, was accused as the alleged material person responsible for the incident.
Franchini was captured in July 2019 by Interpol in Getafe (Spain) for the crimes of "public instigation, qualified intentional homicide and terrorism." In November of that year, the Prosecutor's Office of the Spanish National Court rejected the extradition procedure.
During the ordinary session on Tuesday, May 21, Cabello recalled that at that time the Prosecutor was rebuked and "the lady said that she could not act because those videos were manipulated. What manipulation was there? If that was recorded with the people in the street (...) you can clearly see what she is doing; that speaks of the complicity of that lady with those who ordered the violence in Venezuela and she should also be investigated for omission, for denying justice to a woman mother, Inés, of that young".
Deputy Diosdado Cabello asked parliament to carry out an in-depth investigation into the fascist crime against Orlando Figuera in 2017 (Photo: Infobae)
The deputy warned the opposition that lives in the AN that in these types of events one cannot be passive:
"They have tasted something of the evil of those other sectors of the opposition, of what they are capable of. I am going to tell you something: if they can, they will go for us first and then they will go for you."
ONLY ONE GOAL: ERADICATE FASCISM
The proposed Law against Fascism, Neofascism and Similar Expressions, presented by the Executive Vice President of the Republic, Dr. Delcy Rodríguez Gómez, on April 2, consists of four chapters and 30 articles. That same day it was approved in the first discussion and generated the usual stigmatization by the corporate media.
Its objective is to "establish the means and mechanisms to preserve peaceful coexistence, public tranquility, the democratic exercise of the popular will, the recognition of diversity, tolerance and reciprocal respect against expressions of fascist, neo-fascist or similar nature that may arise in the territory of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela".
The instrument focuses on the eradication of any type of ideological position or expression of superiority or discrimination, whether racial, ethnic, social or national. In her speech for the presentation of the bill, the Vice President recalled how in the last 25 years extremist sectors carried out acts of violence against the Venezuelan people. He added that "we really know that those who committed these atrocious crimes claimed, claim and are militants of hatred, death, intolerance, racism, discrimination of all kinds. They were very hard times that our country went through."
Its content contemplates various sanctions for those who carry out fascist, neo-fascist or similar acts. These sanctions could be criminal (years in prison), administrative (fines) or involve the dissolution of organizations.
SIGNS OF POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE AND SOPHISTICATION OF "TRANSITIONAL" HATE
Between the transnational media stigmatization and the purism of academic definitions, the different opinion leaders— NGOs included —overlook the fact that cases like Figuera's and many others reside in Venezuelan historical memory due to their detrimental effects on the exercise of politics. It is clear that, within the framework of several attempts at color revolution, the Venezuelan opposition resorted to the exercise of political violence and generated both deaths and destruction, as well as the imposition of anti-politics as a notion.
In addition to the Figuera case, the post-electoral violence of April 2013 is recorded: in that episode one of the losing candidates, Henrique Capriles, called on his voters to "unload the arrechera", the consequence of which was a wave of political persecution and violence. The balance was eleven murders, two minors among the victims and the attack on public facilities, health centers among them.
Days after the violent wave, it was learned that since October, November and December 2012, the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (Sebin) had begun investigations to detect an operation called " Conexión Abril " that sought to generate chaotic situations in the country to attack the governability, with the creation of a violent scenario after the elections that took place after the death of Commander Hugo Chávez, then president.
Expressions of post-electoral violence are part of the expected scenario if the opposition does not achieve its objectives on June 28 (Photo: File)
Precisely, post-electoral violence is one of the scenarios envisioned in the event that the results of the presidential elections on July 28 are adverse to the expectations of the opposition. From that sector they have shown that politics and dialogue are not exactly their forte, in other electoral scenarios they have hesitated to accept the results and their disqualification of the suffrage system is permanent.
The opposition sector that is openly directed from Washington took on the electoral route after Trump was defeated in 2020 and the Democrats were installed in the White House. Although they talk about this route as if they were doing society a favor, the reality is that they opted for it after their "maximum pressure" strategy failed.
A law like the one being discussed in the AN would allow experiences such as those of April 2013 or May 2017 to not be repeated, by establishing exemplary punishments against those who have requested economic sanctions and military intervention against Venezuela, in addition to building a framework of reference related to expressions of fascism, neo-fascism and belligerent ideologies of the extreme right.
On the other hand, the circulation of supposedly condescending messages regarding an eventual government transition after 28J seems to imply hate messages under other codes. The common factor of these speeches is that a " transitional justice " would avoid the persecution of Chavismo, it would be a sophistication of the expressions of hate with which they seek to "soften" the voting base of Chavismo, and also officials, for the alleged handover of power.
These narrative devices show the tension that exists between different opposition actors regarding the intention to dispose of Chavismo's right to exist. Although some spokespersons and opinion leaders try to transfer this tension to Chavismo, phrases like "We are going to win and we are going to get paid!" issued by María Corina Machado are eloquent, they denote that "transitional justice" is, in reality, a path of revenge and fascism.
Interview with José Pimentel, Venezuelan Peasant Leader and Land Defender
Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° on MAY 25, 2024
William Camacaro
We had the opportunity to meet with an iconic leader of the Venezuelan campesino movement in the city of San Carlos, Cojedes, Venezuela. José Pimentel is a well-known defender of land rights. For this reason Pimentel has been the target of at least three assassination attempts by large landowners.
While there is no consensus on the true number, it said that hundreds of peasants in Venezuela have been assassinated for defending their legally sanctified rights to the land they work. Some estimate that more than 500 peasants have been murdered for their compliance with the land law, while not a single person behind these assassinations is in prison.
One of the lands recovered by the Cojedes farmers under the leadership of Pimentel was a farm called El Charcote, a 12,950 hectare plot that Agroflora, a subsidiary of the Vestey Group, claims to own. The Vestey Group is a multinational corporation (founded by Lord Vestey, the 56th richest person in the UK) that owns 13 farms in Venezuela alone, as well as land across the entirety of South America.
In an article published in the New York Times on January 10, 2005, journalist Juan Forero mentions how productive that farm was long before the farmers took it. What the journalist does not mention is that all the production from that farm went directly to London and that all the products were organic. The “owners” of the farm, seeing that they were going to be expropriated, proceeded to kill its cattle and sell the meat in the UK while destroying the farm’s infrastructure. That same article accuses Venezuelan peasant leader José Pimentel of being an “invader”.
The last attack on Pimentel’s life was in the cafeteria of the National Land Institute (INTI) in the capital of the Cojedes state, San Carlos. In that last attack, he received several bullets in the chest and two shots in the head. His crying daughter told us that he had lost brain mass. After awakening from a months-long coma, Pimentel couldn’t speak or recognize his friends. He could not even sit on his bed. Three years after that terrible attack, I met with Pimentel expecting to see him in a wheelchair and struggling to speak. My surprise was to see a talkative, coherent man who waved his arms vigorously in the air, who drives his car without any type of device, who walks only with a cane and still organizes occupations of vacant land.
Pimentel has always said that the land is for those who work it. He adds that despite everything, “We cannot leave Maduro alone! We must shelter him and protect him! The revolution cannot die.”
José Pimentel is one of many anonymous heroes of the Bolivarian Revolution. His legacy will not be forgotten.
Organizing Ranchers in the Venezuelan Llanos: The Pancha Vásquez Commune
Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° on MAY 25, 2024
Chris Gilbert, Cira Pascual Marquina
Milk production is an important part of the economy at the Pancha Vásquez Commune. (Rome Arrieche)
This latest installment in the Communal Resistance Series takes us to the Pancha Vásquez commune in Apure State in the Venezuelan plains region [Llanos]. The Venezuelan Llanos are legendary for their rich cultural heritage and spectacular landscapes, but it is also rife with political and social contradictions. These include issues relating to land ownership, Indigenous rights and dispossession, and spillover from neighboring Colombia’s internal conflict.
Located on the outskirts of Elorza, in the southwest of the state, Pancha Vásquez is a huge commune in terms of territory. The commune comprises fourteen communal councils, three of which focus on agriculture, while eleven are dedicated to cattle rearing. The lands in this vast territory are mostly in the hands of small to mid-sized producers who take pride not only in their equestrian traditions and folklore but also in the special role that Elorza played in Hugo Chávez’s biography. That is because, as a young officer, Chávez was stationed in Elorza from 1985 to 1987 and sharpened his political vision there.
In this three-part series, we will explore the history and productive activities of the Pancha Vásquez Commune as well as the way it has addressed problems induced by the US blockade.
Gerardo Ramírez is a cattle rancher and spokesperson for the Pancha Vásquez Commune | Hugo Calzadilla is the local historian and a member of the Pancha Vásquez Commune | José Araque is a communal parliamentarian at Pancha Vásquez Commune, and is a meat, milk, and cheese producer | José Calzadilla is a beekeeper in the Pancha Vásquez Commune | Juan Fernández is a communal parliamentarian for Pancha Vásquez Commune and one of its founders | Petra Cedeño is a cattle rancher and parliamentarian at Pancha Vásquez Commune | Rigoberto Contreras is the coordinator of a Milk Collection Center inside the Pancha Vásquez Commune | Róger Rodríguez is a cattle rancher in the Pancha Vásquez Commune (Rome Arrieche)
The Commune’s Long Historical Roots
Successful communes in Venezuela usually emerge out of a long history of struggles. Here the communards in the Pancha Vásquez territory tell us about the region’s legacy of resistance and rebellion.
INDIGENOUS CONTEXT
Hugo Calzadilla: Before the colonization, the Indigenous peoples living here were the Cuiba and the Pumé. Most of them were violently displaced towards the Capanaparo River [to the South of Elorza] by Spanish settler colonialists.
Many of our stories and myths and some of our traditions can be traced back to the Pumé and Cuiba peoples. Even the commune, the idea of living collectively, is linked to their cosmovision.
However, mainstream culture lives with its back turned to our Indigenous heritage and is blind to the history of outright violence against the Indigenous peoples who inhabited this land. As recently as 1966 there was a massacre of Indigenous people in Apure state, in Hato La Rubiera.
These stories had an impact on Chávez when he was stationed here. He learned about the massacre and about persistent violence against Indigenous peoples from a revolutionary priest called Gonzalo de Jesús. Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution fought for justice, but reparations for the Indigenous peoples of the Llanos are still a pending task. A revolution is never finished.
Hugo Calzadilla: Going back to the so-called “beginning,” these lands were first colonized by Justo de Granada, who founded a town called San José de Arichuna in 1774, which later became known as Elorza.
The colonization went hand in hand with Christianization of the Indigenous peoples. In fact, what we now know as the “Fiestas de Elorza” [local festivities held yearly on March 19] can be traced back to the days when the Indigenous peoples would be forcefully baptized and made to honor Saint Joseph. Everything has its dark side and its bright side: the Fiestas de Elorza are a rich expression of our culture, but we can trace their origin back to settler colonialism.
Until 1866, the Colombia-Venezuela frontier followed the Arauca River. What we now know as Elorza – this town on the south side of the river and celebrated worldwide for its music – was a border settlement for much of its history. The Colombo-Venezuelan border was redrawn some 160 years ago: Apure expanded southward into what was formerly Colombia, and in exchange, Colombia received the Guajira Peninsula.
One last historical snippet: Elorza takes its name from José Andrés Elorza, one of the leaders of the “Bravos de Apure” [Apure Braves]. The “Bravos” were the horsemen who ran Spanish general Pablo Morillo and his troops out of these lands. Their protracted struggle against the colonizers was crucial to our country’s independence.
PANCHA VÁZQUEZ, THE REAL DOÑA BÁRBARA
Hugo Calzadilla: Born Francisca Vásquez [1878-1931], “Pancha” was a local landowner, a woman who held her own in a patriarchal world. This historical figure, always surrounded by tales and myths, inspired Rómulo Gallegos’ 1929 novel Doña Bárbara, which is considered the greatest Venezuelan novel of the 20th century.
Pancha married Pedro Emilio Carrillo and had a son also known as Pedro Emilio. Widowed at an early age, she took control of the large cattle ranch she inherited. Pancha “ruled” [mandaba] with an iron fist and became hugely successful. We are still learning about the vast number of estates she owned. However, it’s known that she died with at least 50,000 hectares to her name and was said to own piles of gold.
Pancha Vásquez’s life is a story of success, tragedy, and misogyny.
Let me tell you one of the tragedies-become-legend that defined her life. Pancha’s only son was killed by a bizarre animal that she always kept by her side. Legend has it that the animal was half-bull and half-horse and a proxy of the devil!
My uncle witnessed the death of young Pedro Emilio, and informed Pancha of his death. When she heard the news, all she said was: I told him that he should not touch that bull! She didn’t shed a tear.
Perhaps Pancha Vásquez was a ruthless person, but she worked hand in hand with the cattle hands and forged her own path in a patriarchal world. We named the commune after her because of her strength and independence.
The Pancha Vásquez Commune covers some 84 thousand hectares. That land is distributed among 1200 families, most of them small to mid-sized producers. (Rome Arrieche)
The Commune and Its History
The Pancha Vásquez Commune is one of the most consolidated communal initiatives in Venezuela’s plains region. Here we explore the commune’s origins and its forms of self-government.
Petra Cedeño: This commune is composed of 14 communal councils. Its main activity is cattle rearing, mostly dual-purpose for both meat and dairy production. However, three of those 14 communal councils, the ones on the banks of the Arauca River, focus on agriculture. They produce corn, yuca, and plantain.
Additionally, fishing is also a part of our communal economy. As you can see, ours is a diversified and very productive commune.
Juan Fernández: We began organizing back in 2006 when the communal councils were being developed. These democratic grassroots spaces were the foci of revolutionary activity. Four years later, in 2010, when Chávez began to talk about the commune, five communal councils founded what we now know as the Pancha Vásquez Commune. Eventually, nine more communal councils joined.
In 2014, we finally were able to register the commune. The process wasn’t easy: when you build a project that challenges constituted power, you encounter many roadblocks. Chávez, however, had already predicted that this would happen, so we knew that we had to be persistent.
The commune took the name of Pancha Vásquez by majority vote. The argument was that she had been an energetic and combative woman. Because she was a big landowner and not a woman of the pueblo, I was not too keen on the proposal… but that’s how democracy works!
Petra Cedeño: This is mostly a commune based on cattle-raising. Because of the large and open terrain we inhabit, all of us are very far apart from each other. That’s why, when Chávez began to talk about the commune as a space for bringing people closer together, we seized the idea.
Building a commune isn’t easy, but ours has become the key organizational force in the territory. Pancha Vásquez has brought us closer together: now we recognize and appreciate each other, understand what we have in common, and organize ourselves to address common problems.
SOCIAL PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE
Juan Fernández: The land is privately owned at Pancha Vásquez, which limits our capacity to act as a commune. We now have the Collection and Distribution Center, a social property enterprise, but Chávez emphasized that non-private communal production is key to transforming society. Developing it is perhaps our most important pending task.
Just beyond the commune’s perimeter, but within the commune’s “punto y círculo” [Chávez’s conceptualization of a strategic area of influence], there is a great deal of underused state-owned land. We have requested that the INTI land institute transfer some land to the commune, but it hasn’t happened yet. Inside the state apparatus, some factions support the commune, while others favor “strategic alliances” with the private sector.
There’s another ranch inside the commune’s perimeter that is ripe for appropriation for the commune. A few years ago, an irregular armed group had a tract of land there. Fortunately, the National Antidrug Office [ONA] took action against them. Since then we have requested that the land be ceded to the commune, but we are still waiting for a decision on the matter. It would be fitting that it become communal land.
For us, the commune represents the future. The commune is not just a part of the project of building a better and more just Venezuela; it’s the beating heart of that project. That’s why the struggle to put some of the land in our commune under social property, and to obtain the resources to build communal enterprises is so important. Communal hegemony is crucial, but it won’t happen with ideas alone.
We live in a world where capitalism organizes everything – in contrast to the commune, which is Chávez’s legacy and our collective strategy. Even in the most difficult times, the commune has been a lifeline. We should never forget that!
SELF-GOVERNMENT
Juan Fernández: Self-government is about people solving their day-to-day problems together. At Pancha Vásquez, we don’t want to be dependent on state institutions. At times we cooperate with them, and other times we demand their support. We believe that a significant portion of Venezuela’s oil rent should go to the communes, because communes represent the only way out of the capitalist trap.
In this commune, we aspire to build a relationship of cooperation with the government in which no one dominates. However, inside our territory, the commune is in charge.
What drives our efforts? The people, the communards, and the commune’s spokespeople who work tirelessly without any personal gain.
Of course, a commune isn’t a paradise. At Pancha Vásquez, we work hard, organize, and support each other, but problems do arise. Recently, we acquired a “Super-Duty” truck through an agreement with the Ministry of Communes. Some people wanted to use the truck for personal benefit.
The assembly – the highest authority in the commune – wasn’t about to let that happen, but solving the problem took months. The process was painful, but it also proved that the commune can address issues: we had to recall three spokespeople whose role was auditing and two others from the communal bank. It wasn’t easy but we were able to solve the problem collectively.
Now the truck is in the commune’s hands and it’s one of our main collective assets.
Petra Cedeño: A commune is a space where people discuss their problems, reflect on solutions, and organize a roadmap to achieve collective goals. It’s the community governing itself, as Chávez said!
The main problem we have as producers is getting our production to market and making sure that we don’t sell at a loss. These lands are vast and the roads are often in poor condition, making transportation a real problem. This is all compounded by the fuel shortages that the US blockade generates.
Once we identified that transportation was a key problem, it became clear that the commune needed a collection and distribution center to shorten distances.
We will discuss the Pancha Vásquez Collection and Distribution Center more fully later on, but I want to mention that we’ve been able to carry out that project with very limited funding from the Ministry of Communes, on the one hand, and a lot of work and sacrifice from Juan Fernández and other communards, on the other.
In its two refrigeration rooms, local producers can store meat or cheese until the sale is concluded. Why is that important? That way the producers are no longer forced to sell to intermediaries immediately at the prices they impose. Instead, a producer can wait a few days (or months, in the case of cheese) until market conditions are optimal.
A communal assembly at the Pancha Vásquez Commune. (Rome Arrieche)
Two Communal Leaders: Juan Fernández and Petra Cedeño
Despite being assembly-based spaces, functioning communes generally depend on a vanguard organizational group and specific cadres who fulfill leadership roles. Here, we tell the stories of two key figures in the Pancha Vásquez Commune.
Juan Fernández: My commitment to this land and the people who care for it can be traced back to my father, Ramón Rafael Fernández. He was a cattle herder, a hardworking man with integrity, who was deeply cherished by the community. He was always solidarious.
He raised his children to be hardworking and honest. My father didn’t go to school, but he worked hard and made sacrifices so that we could receive a good education. He first sent me to study in Biruaca [in Apure state], then Mérida. Finally, I went to college in Barinas. As a student, I became interested in politics, read Communist Party documents, and learned about the Chinese communes.
While my father didn’t identify as a leftist, he truly loved humanity and was very solidarious with everyone in the community. He used to say that people getting together to solve problems is the only solution.
My father died in 2008. Remembering him still brings tears to my eyes.
My father trained and educated me, but I was also shaped up by Comandante Chávez. Chávez emphasized the principle of solidarity and urged us to prioritize collective needs over individual ones. If my father was (and is) my moral guide, Chávez was my political mentor.
Now, as I dedicate my life to building the commune, I can say that I have had two fathers. I deeply mourn their loss, but in my own way, I continue on the path they laid out.
Petra Cedeño: This is a man’s world. There are very few women ranchers here and in the commune, I’m one of only two female parliamentarians.
I learned the trade from my father, who is a rancher in Biruaca.
On our ranch, we have around 250 dual-purpose cows, along with pigs, chickens, guinea fowl, and turkeys. Cheese is our primary product. In the summer, we produce about 18 kilos of cheese daily, but that goes up to 30 kilos during the rainy season.
Tending to a ranch is not for the faint of heart, but I enjoy the work. I enjoy working with people and making things work. That is what drew me to the commune. We live and work in a vast plain. Many of our ranches are far from each other; we have no phone coverage and many people don’t have electricity, so we learn about the world through the radio. But that is not enough! For me, the commune is about bringing us together, listening to each other, and solving very real problems.
That’s why my home has become a sort of communal headquarters. When people need a letter of endorsement from the communal council or from the commune, they come to my place and we figure it out.
First and foremost, I’m a problem solver. I enjoy working with and for the community. I want to see our commune prosper and our production grow. I dream of the day when everyone who is not yet committed to the commune will join it!
Cattle herding is in the epicenter of the Pancha Vásquez Commune. (Rome Arrieche)
Production
Apure’s vast plains are ideal for rearing livestock. When you look at the landscape, the flatlands are punctuated by large samán trees and herds of both cows and water buffalo.
FUNDAMENTALS
Juan Fernández: The economic basis of the commune is dual-purpose cattle [for milk and meat], although there are three communal councils on the margins of the Arauca River dedicated to agriculture. They produce corn, yuca, plantain, and topocho [a small plantain].
We estimate that there are about 60,000 heads of cattle in the commune, although we don’t have a livestock census. Most of our producers are small to mid-sized ones, but there are four “hatos” [large cattle ranches], each with 10,000 heads of cattle or more.
Chávez often talked about the importance of communal property and collective production for building a new socialist model. Our commune has no communal land, so we are working with that goal in mind. I’m sure we will succeed because we are really stubborn.
We do have, however, the recently built Pancha Vásquez Collection and Distribution Center, which is a social property enterprise. The Distribution Center just opened its doors [March 2024], but it will be very important for the commune.
A RANCHER
Gerardo Ramírez: Our family-run production unit focuses on raising cattle – both buffalo and cows – for milk and cheese production. I used to grow corn, rice, and watermelon, but not anymore. Purchasing agricultural inputs became very difficult.
We currently have 80 heads between cows and buffalo. This is a low number for us: not too long ago 137 heads were stolen. Irregular armed groups are penetrating the Colombo-Venezuelan frontier and rustling cattle. In the past five years, our production has fallen by about 50%. First, sanctions made access to the inputs for raising livestock very difficult; then came the fuel shortages. You get the picture: the situation isn’t easy.
However, we won’t give up! I wasn’t born yesterday. I’m not from here but from Táchira, though I’m staying here for good. This land is beautiful and productive. Moreover, our commune offers a space to solve our problems. However, we really need the local and regional governments to address some of the problems that we have.
On our end, we’re working to boost production. Chávez once told us that buffalo would become the “black gold” of the Venezuelan Llanos. He was right: buffalo are far more resilient and productive. While there may be less demand for the meat right now, it’s actually very good, and buffalo milk is far richer in fat. As we speak, we are growing our buffalo herd. Many other ranchers are doing the same.
A BEEKEEPER
José Salomón Calzadilla: I learned about beekeeping from Father Gonzalo de Jesús about 25 years ago. Father Gonzalo was the same man who became Chávez’s spiritual mentor when he was posted in Elorza.
Beekeeping is a fascinating blend of science and nature, with each hive being an intricate and efficient world. These lands are good for honey production, but climate change is affecting our output. We used to produce about 500 kilos of honey every month during the dry season, but now it’s down to 400 kilos due to climate change.
We work with African bees. I bought the nucleus colony in Acarigua [Portuguesa state] many years ago. Now I have reached a point where I don’t need to purchase any inputs. If one is patient and learns the trade, the bees will do the rest!
In addition to beekeeping, I maintain a conuco [subsistence plot] where I grow corn, yuca, and beans, mostly for family consumption. Most producers in the commune do the same thing.
A TOBACCO GROWER
José Araque: My main production is chimó [chewing tobacco], although my family also has 70 heads of cattle.
Growing and processing tobacco is a meticulous process that combines agricultural skill with careful curing. First, the tobacco leaves are hand-harvested and sun-dried. Then, after finely chopping the tobacco leaves and mixing them with ashes, the product is cooked and reduced to develop rich flavors and the right texture. The whole process can take several weeks.
Diversifying production is important. Chimó-making was nearly a lost trade here, but it’s a viable, if labor-intensive, alternative. Producing a good batch is satisfying, and there is a market for it!
Cheese-making (Rome Arrieche)
A GOAT AND SHEEP BREEDER
Róger Rodríguez: “La Pradera,” my family farm, spans 175 hectares. Here, that is considered a small to mid-sized ranch. Due to the blockade, the past few years have been very difficult, so we have seen our herd significantly reduced.
This is why I’m working to diversify our production. I don’t want to be a monoproducer: if I’m growing animals to sell cheese or meat, I should be able to ensure the whole supply chain, from breeding the animals to making the feed. If I can produce the food for my herd in La Pradera, I’ll be less dependent on the market, creating a “virtuous circle,” which is one of my goals at the moment.
I now have a small herd of sheep and goats. They are robust animals. They can endure droughts, and we can surely feed them out of our farm. Our goal is to build up the herd and focus on artisanal cheese-making.
To further diversify, I also have pigs. I have been shifting away from conventional feed to producing my own feed for them. During the mango season, I throw mangos and corn cobs into a metal drum and let them ferment for about three months. Mango trees are very productive. The output is a product that is almost as efficient as commercial feed.
Finally, when it comes to diversification, the conuco is also key. This is not a new practice: our grandparents passed it on to our parents, who in turn passed it on to us. In itself the conuco is the most diversified agricultural form that I know of, and it kept us alive during the worst of the blockade. In our conuco, we grow everything from corn to plantains.
THE COMMUNAL MARKET
Juan Fernández: The Pancha Vásquez Commune includes three riverside communal councils. The members of those communal councils mostly engage in agriculture, and they launched a project called the Communal Market.
The Communal Market was born under the aegis of a powerful slogan: A day without intermediaries! Every Saturday, the campesinos gather to sell their produce directly to the folks from the José Andrés Elorza Commune [an urban commune in Elorza]. In so doing, they are breaking free of the yoke of the intermediaries, who exploit both the producer and the consumer.
However, the market has been dwindling due to fuel shortages, making it hard for campesinos to bring their produce to the market… And so, intermediaries are reemerging in our local economy.
We have learned some lessons from this situation: we all know that the intermediary, the so-called middleman, is not an ally of the producer. We took an important step toward freeing ourselves from the intermediaries’ exploitative practices by creating the Pancha Vásquez Collection and Distribution Center.
MILK COLLECTION CENTER
Rigoberto Contreras: The “El Reencuentro” Milk Collection Center, in the heart of the Pancha Vásquez Commune, opened its doors in 2012. In our municipality, milk production is key, so ensuring that our producers have an accessible place to deliver their dairy production is super important.
We have a 3000-liter cooling tank, with daily intake ranging from 900 liters in the dry season to 2600 liters during the rainy season. You could say that the Milk Collection Center is now a space run by and for “free and associated producers.”
It works like this: producers are paid 47 cents per liter for cow milk and 64 cents for buffalo milk if they deliver to the center. They get slightly less when we ourselves have to fetch the milk from the farms.
Overall there is a general shift away from cows to buffalo because buffalos are more robust. During the past year or so we have seen a general upward trend in milk production due to this shift.
We have had ups and downs in the production and collection of milk since the blockade began. On the one hand, when it was very hard to get fuel, getting the milk to the collection center was difficult. On the other hand, many herds dwindled.
Finally, we faced another problem up until 2021. Until then, we paid milk producers in bolívares, but rampant hyperinflation made it hard for them. Now the payment is regular and in dollars, which is an incentive for producers to bring their milk here.
Juan Fernández: From a legal standpoint, the Milk Collection Center is a private enterprise, but it is run as a network of freely associated producers. Our goal is to convert it into a Social Property Enterprise [EPS] linked to the commune.
We want it to become an EPS for three reasons. First, we are committed to communal property. Second, because the Milk Collection Center is technically a private enterprise, state institutions are not inclined to support it. Third, Agroflora, the enterprise that purchases the milk, sets the rules without consulting us. By contrast, communal administration would give us more leverage to negotiate rates and request state funding.
In short, we are always pushing in the direction of the commune, which is the space that opens a window to the new world.
THE LIMITS OF "THE TRANSITION" IN A POST-28J SCENARIO
May 22, 2024 , 1:45 pm .
Two months before the presidential elections are held, the opposition's discourse is one of absolute confidence that they will win the elections (Photo: File)
We recently warned that a sector of the opposition was trying to install the idea that a political transition was approaching in Venezuela, assuming as a fact the electoral defeat of President Nicolás Maduro, after the elections on July 28, thereby They would be generating great expectations in their voters that could lead to scenarios of political violence, as has already been experienced in previous days.
To expand on what has already been stated, we propose to systematize and detail the elements that are laying the groundwork for realizing said plan.
TRIUMPHALISM
With two months to go before the presidential elections, the opposition's discourse is one of absolute confidence that they will win the elections. There is not even talk about what the campaign will be like to achieve the greatest number of votes, but rather about the "controlled" way in which they will receive power from a "resigned" government.
For this reason, we say that we are trying to establish the idea that, after 28J, there can be no other scenario other than the beginning of a post-Chavist era, the drawing of a postcard without political conflicts, in harmony, with social freedoms, with a thriving economy without sanctions, in which Chavismo is seen as a bad dream or an overcome trauma.
However, to even begin to reach that point, the most important requirement must first be met: winning the presidential elections and for the candidate who claims to embody the figure of "the transition" to prevail because that is what the disqualified person "decided" to do. María Corina Machado. Let us remember that, since the primaries of the Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD) were held in October 2023, it has been said that "the transition" has already " begun ", even though a minimal portion of the electoral roll has participated.
There has also been an attempt to project that Machado, holder of the witness of "victory", can transfer her power to others. She previously did it with Corina Yoris and, now, it is the turn of the PUD candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia.
The triumphalism of that sector is inexplicable if we take into account that there is a deep division and several anti-Chavista candidates participate, dividing the opposition vote.
With these enormous expectations, there is no doubt that a scenario of political violence justified by that sector of drained frustrations is being created once what was promised so much is not fulfilled. Similar scenarios have already been experienced in the past. It happened with the mobilizations "to Miraflores" in 2002, in 2013 when Henrique Capriles Radonski irresponsibly called to "unload the arrechera", and also the promise to go "to the end" after the 2023 primaries.
THE INTERNAL PANORAMA
Currently there is no talk of taking care of the vote but of "the transition", and everything indicates that the PUD organization and other internal political partners are aimed at protecting that victory that is practically "assured."
The speech "until the end" becomes a declaration of war when the disabled woman repeats ad nauseam that "this is the moment" and "there is no turning back" and "we must go out and defend what belongs to us", all accompanied by of an epic fight between good and evil.
"And the visits they have been making, especially factors related to Vente Venezuela, would be aimed at organizing post-electoral violence, as President Nicolás Maduro and the leadership of the Bolivarian Revolution have denounced," we warned in the last installment.
For this purpose, the "comanditos" are being organized , led by María Corina Machado's party, with a view to achieving "change in Venezuela." They are made up of a minimum of 10 people and overlap under the image of the popular when they claim to be made up of housewives, athletes, condominiums, motorcycle taxi drivers, university promotions, among others.
The PSUV has on multiple occasions denounced Vente Venezuela for paying motorists to generate violence and thus cover up the failure of its failed candidacy. Likewise, President Maduro has exposed the destabilizing plans of the Vente Venezuela party.
THE INTERNATIONAL FRONT
We have already said that the upcoming elections on July 28 will be one of the most monitored events in the world given that, previously, the government and the opposition had established dialogue guidelines to search for a way out of the crisis.
In that sense, a special coverage was made - as a psychological operation - assuming that the figure of María Corina Machado represents an unprecedented political phenomenon that attracts the attention of experts, only comparable to the emergence of Commander Hugo Chávez in 1998, so " the eyes of the world watch in amazement" in this new "epic of national liberation.
The support of sectors of the traditional Ibero-American right grouped in IDEA, which have a certain influence in regional media, together with the sponsorship that American congressmen have given to the figure and "leadership" of the aforementioned, configure a scenario conducive to the amplification of allegations of electoral fraud. These actions could lead to a new attempt to revive the Lima Group—with another façade suited to the times—as was warned in a previous note .
Furthermore, without having participated in the process, the disqualified person has assumed herself as an integral part of the Barbados Accords, with which they have tried to condition the July elections under the threat that if the opposition's forecast is not met, new measures will be applied. rounds of US sanctions against the country. It was already seen at the end of January, when the Supreme Court of Justice ratified her disqualification, and immediately the United States government revoked the OFAC license regarding Venezuelan gold.
The conjugation of these elements described constitutes the complete board of the possible scenario that would seek to chaoticize the country after the 28J elections, where the conditioning is present, the ignorance of the Venezuelan institutions, as well as the international political and media front on the part of said sector.
Venezuela Records 7% Economic Growth in First Quarter of 2024
MAY 25, 2024
Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro speaks at an official event in Corporación Venezolana de Guayana Cabelum, Ciudad Bolívar, Bolívar state, May 24, 2024. Photo: Correo del Orinoco.
Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro reported that the Venezuelan economy grew by 7% in the first quarter of 2024 compared to the same period in 2023. Moreover, the country has experienced 11 quarters of continuous economic growth.
During an official event held at the headquarters of the state-owned aluminium company, Corporación Venezolana de Guayana (CVG) Cabelum in Ciudad Bolívar, Bolívar state, on Friday, May 24, President Maduro stated that in the first four months of 2024, Venezuela registered the lowest inflation in the last 12 years, “and we are going to improve, to absolutely control the inflationary issue with economic growth and exchange rate stability.”
He added that the economic growth forecast for 2024 is higher, so “I believe that this year, we are going to break a record of economic growth with more than 8%, as well as a growth of the gross domestic product.”
President Maduro also condemned the illegal unilateral coercive measures imposed by the United States and applauded by the oligarchy, which cost the Venezuelan GDP $642 billion from 2015 to 2021.
“With those resources, how many houses could we have built in addition to the ones we have already built?” President Maduro asked. “How many schools, high schools, how many universities? Despite that economic damage, we have recovered this country with good policies, good practices, and with a lot of economic strategy that has resulted in recovery, improvement, and continuous growth.”
He also announced that tax collection increased by 78% during the first four months of 2024, compared to the same period of 2023.
“We are on the right track,” he said. “The tax that is collected is invested in the 1×10 Good Government program, in the Great Mission Venezuela Woman, the Great Mission Venezuela Youth, the Great Hugo Chávez Equality Mission, the Great Mission Grandfathers and Grandmothers of the Homeland, in repairing schools and high schools, and investing in the economy.”
Similarly, in the banking system, credit has grown 81% between April 2023 and April 2024, while deposits—measured in their equivalent in USD—rose by 58% during the same period.
Regarding the exchange system, President Maduro stated that “in the last seven months, the price of the dollar has been the most stable since 2012.”
The president also reported that from April 2023 to April 2024, non-traditional exports have experienced a continuous growth of 11%.
He also stated that CVG Cabelum has signed various agreements aimed at increasing production, which will allow it to reach 90% of its capacity from the current 55%.
Moreover, Venezuela is currently recording the highest supply indexes of the last 30 years, with quality products made in Venezuela.
Regarding the Local Supply and Production Committees (CLAP), President Maduro stated that they now supply 100% nationally manufactured products to 7.2 million families every month.
The Agricultural Stock Exchange, which started operating in 2022, currently has $281 million “moving through its system and being converted into productive investment.”
President Maduro emphasized that Venezuela is moving towards a new diversified economic model “with 18 engines of the economy that are growing harmoniously and satisfying the needs of the people, generating the necessary wealth to invest in the recovery of social rights through the Great Missions of the new generation.”
“Amid the criminal blockade, we are growing in a miraculous way with diversification of production,” he stated.
He also highlighted the need to build “a new model of efficient management by workers’ socialism.” In this regard, he stressed the leading role of the Workers’ Productive Councils in promoting the nation’s economic development.
“We have to consolidate the path of recovery and economic growth,” he said.
