US Foreign Policy Impasse Over Venezuela: Contending With Self-Inflicted Contradictions
OCTOBER 15, 2022
Former US President Donald J. Trump delivers a speech to the Venezuelan American community at the Florida International University Ocean Bank Convocation Center Monday, Feb. 18, 2019 in Miami, Florida. Photo: White House/Andrea Hanks.
By Roger D. Harris – Oct 12, 2022
The seamless official policy of the Trump and Biden administrations has been that Juan Guaidó is Venezuela’s “interim president.” The US is thusly caught in the self-inflicted fiction of having to deal with a powerless puppet because it does not accept the democratically elected Nicolás Maduro. Although Trump has at least retreated to Mar-a-Lago, Guaidó keeps on asking to be invited to the party, much to Biden’s embarrassment.
A related conundrum of its own making is the US sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry and at the same time needing the fuel. It wasn’t so long ago that Venezuela supplied the US with a significant amount of its daily petroleum consumption. Now Uncle Sam finds himself confronted with price inflation at the gas pump and the inevitability of negotiating with a government it does not recognize.
Similarly, the US is faced with an influx of Venezuelan immigrants fleeing economic conditions themselves caused by the US sanctions. “Because the US ended diplomatic relations with the Maduro government,” the New York Times reports, “Venezuelan migrants cannot be easily sent back—a key reason they are arriving at the border in waves,” in the first place.
Juan Guaidó – pretend president of Venezuela
When the US first picked the then 35-year-old US security asset as president of Venezuela, it must have come as a surprise to his constituents. A national poll showed that 81% of them did not recognize the name Juan Guaidó, who had never even run in a national election.
Guaidó had become head of Venezuela’s National Assembly in January 2019 when, in a rotational scheme, it was his party’s turn to designate that position. The US government didn’t care for the leftist Venezuelan president and vice president. So, disregarding the people’s democratic vote, the US chose to anoint the person who just became third in the leadership succession according to the Venezuelan constitution.
A measure of the US’s imperial influence, over fifty countries initially followed the US dictate and recognized Guaidó. Always more popular abroad than at home, Guaidó went on an international tour, where he was fawned upon by both US President Trump and House Speaker Pelosi. Meanwhile, the UN and a majority of the sovereign states of the world continued to recognize the Maduro government.
Currently, Mr. Guaidó is still the designated “interim president” of Venezuela for the US, although only a handful of other states still maintain that fantasy. He is no longer even a deputy in the National Assembly, obviating any constitutional claim to leadership.
Last March and June, high level US delegations visited Venezuela to meet directly with President Maduro, while snubbing the hapless Guaidó. When Biden hosted his “Democracy Summit” for the Organization of American States (OAS), also in June, Juan Guaidó was not on the guest list of hemispheric heads of state.
This October 6, nineteen countries voted to oust Guaidó’s delegation as the recognized representative of Venezuela at the OAS foreign ministers meeting; only four voted in favor. Although the vote failed to get the required 24-vote supermajority for expulsion, Guaidó’s “envoy” chose to forego attending the meeting in Lima. The Peruvian capital had previously lent its name to the “Lima Group” of anti-Venezuelan nations. But, as the current Peruvian Foreign Minister Cesar Landa noted, that group has “ceased to exist.”
New York Times counsels the US empire on how to be more efficient
William Neuman in a The New York Times opinion piece advises: “The US cannot uphold the fiction that Juan Guaidó is the president of Venezuela.” The former Times reporter and Andes region bureau chief offers to help the imperialists with their “incoherence” problem.
Noting that “the Guaidó gambit has failed and that most Venezuelans, and most of the international community, have moved on,” he states: “the fact is that Mr. Maduro is president of Venezuela and Mr. Guaidó is not.”
Neuman praises Guaidó for showing courage. And, indeed, it takes nerve for the pretend president to show his face in public. Guaidó’s championing of repressive US sanctions against Venezuela has made him profoundly unpopular. In a recent video, Guaidó gets physically roughed up by his own people on a visit to the state of Sucre.
Neuman admits that the US-backed opposition “never had a viable plan, beyond vague hopes for a military coup or for US intervention.” Although these are far from democratic forms of political expression, the former Times reporter still maintains that the opposition is the “primary political force in the country committed to democracy and the defense of human rights.”
The US has expended tens of millions of dollars to foster an opposition in Venezuela loyal to US foreign policy. But to paraphrase the nursery rhyme, “all the king’s horses and all the king’s men couldn’t put the opposition together again.” Neuman laments: “Venezuelans are fed up with opposition parties that often seem more interested in fighting with each other than in improving the country’s fortunes.”
In a tellingly truthful admission, Neuman notes: “Today, Mr. Maduro is stronger than he was three years ago, and the opposition is in disarray.”
Venezuelan government talks with the opposition stalled
At Washington’s urging, the Maduro administration had been negotiating with the opposition. But Caracas withdrew from the talks a year ago to protest the kidnapping of a Venezuelan diplomat by the US. On October 16, 2021, Venezuelan special envoy Alex Saab was abducted from his US-mandated detention in Cabo Verde and imprisoned in Miami.
The US charged Alex Saab with conspiracy to money launder. Venezuela maintains that the diplomat was procuring humanitarian supplies in legal international trade. Further, he is supposed to be protected from arrest and detention under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the US is a party.
The US wants Venezuela back at the negotiating table with the opposition. But Venezuela has made the release of Alex Saab a condition for their return. Both parties agree that Saab was instrumental in helping circumvent the crippling US sanctions against Venezuela.
Possible thawing of US-Venezuela relations
Now that inflation has soared in the US and internationally, due in part to fuel shortages driven by US-led sanctions on oil producers such as Venezuela (and Russia), Washington may be compelled to confront the blowback from its regime-change policy for Venezuela.
Starting in 2017, the US had imposed a series of increasingly draconian measures with the express intent of crashing Venezuela’s oil industry, which was the country’s primary source of income. Both direct and secondary sanctions were imposed in what amounted to an oil embargo.
Venezuelanalysis reported: “The US-led economic blockade has also seen the freezing and seizure of Venezuelan assets abroad, including oil subsidiary CITGO, 31 tons of gold deposited at the Bank of England, and a number of bank accounts.”
Recently, US oil companies such as Chevron, whose profitable concessions in Venezuela were shuttered by the sanctions, have been pressuring the Biden administration to allow them to resume operations.
The need for the US to relax sanctions to again allow Venezuela to export oil to its former largest customer became even more manifest when the OPEC+ cartel (which includes Russia) voted on October 6 to cut oil exports by two million barrels to maintain high prices by limiting supply.
The Wall Street Journal speculated that same day that the “US looks to ease Venezuela sanctions” in hopes of stimulating oil production in Venezuela. The industry publication OilPrice.Com reported, “US considers easing Venezuela sanctions to boost oil supply,” which was echoed by the Business Standard, Politico, and MarketWatch.
Nevertheless, the Biden administration has so far been quick to quash any rumors of détente. A spokesperson for the US National Security Council immediately assuaged any US congressional fears from either side of the aisle that Washington’s illegal and murderous strategy was about to end: “Our sanctions policy on Venezuela remains unchanged.”
That policy paralysis could evolve after the political pressures of mid-term US elections are past. The US may find it has to revisit its sanctions on Venezuela, which in turn could lead to dumping Juan Guaidó as “interim president” and even freeing imprisoned diplomat Alex Saab.
https://orinocotribune.com/us-foreign-p ... adictions/
Venezuela Opposition Primaries to Be Held in June 2023, Reuters Says
OCTOBER 15, 2022
Featured image: A banner with the text "Plataforma Unitaria Democratica" (Unitary Democratic Platform) being fixed on a wall of a room before a press conference. Photo: Punto de Corte/File photo.
The Venezuelan opposition primary elections may be held in June 2023, as reported by Reuters, that had consulted “two sources familiar with the matter.”
In an article published this Friday, October 14, Reuters reported that the far-right section of the Venezuelan opposition agreed to hold primary elections to elect a single candidate for the 2024 presidential elections, by the end of June 2023.
Allegedly, the decision was made by the leaders of this political sector of the opposition during a meeting in Panama, which was held earlier this week. It raised concerns among many that it was not reported by any Venezuelan news outlet until Reuters published its English language piece on the matter.
It is expected that the official announcement for the holding of the internal elections will be made by the Unitary Platform next week.
According to the sources consulted by Reuters, the 10 main opposition parties in Venezuela agreed on the date. However, the sources were not certain about what will happen to the so-called interim presidency of former deputy Juan Guaidó.
Since 2019 Guaidó has asserted everywhere that he is heading an “interim government” in Venezuela. However, three years later, he has lost most of what little international support that he had to begin with. He is losing more and more “authority” over the assets stolen from the country, as happened with Monómeros, which has recently been returned to the control of the constitutional government of Venezuela, headed by President Maduro.
Guaidó has never had any kind of authority in the Venezuelan State, or in any of its territory, and his only capital was a group of 50 countries that the US pushed to recognize him but that, according to the most recent count, has dwindled to 10. Guaidó’s access to Venezuelan assets abroad is largely thanks to Washington underhandedly granting him said assets, utilizing piracy tricks and its control over the international financial system.
Venezuelan presidential elections are scheduled to be held in 2024, as established by the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
Although President Maduro recently joked with the governor of the Miranda state, Héctor Rodríguez, about the possibility of early elections, the reality is that the National Electoral Council (CNE) has the last word on this issue. According to rules, the election will be scheduled for the month of December 2024.
Currently, several opposition leaders are campaigning throughout the country, demanding certain conditions for the internal primaries to be held.
One of them is the leader of Vente Venezuela, María Corina Machado, who does not want the electoral authority (CNE) to be involved in the primary elections at all. She is also asking that Venezuelans abroad to be allowed to vote in the US, where Guaidó’s “diplomats” control the embassy and consulates largely thanks to his big brother in Washington.
However, the CNE and its instances are part of the constitutional and historical logistics for presidential elections in Venezuela, which Machado will have to abide by if she wins the primaries.
https://orinocotribune.com/saturday-nig ... june-2023/
Venezuela Arrests US Citizen Linked to Colombian Paramilitary Terrorists
OCTOBER 15, 2022
Featured image: Venezuelan army commandos deployed in the border area with Colombia where Colombian paramilitary gangs spread chaos and violence on a regular basis. Photo: Twitter/@CEOFANB/File photo.
Venezuela detained a US citizen for his alleged links with Colombian terrorist groups, called TANCOL by Venezuelan authorities, in Apure state, bordering Colombia.
The man of US nationality identified as Michell Travis Francois was detained in Puerto Páez, Pedro Camejo municipality, in the state of Apure; according to the report of the agents assigned to the River Detachment 354 of the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB), quoted on Friday, October 14, by the Venezuelan news agency Últimas Noticias.
Military sources indicated that Francois was seized with 704,000 Colombian pesos, 20 dollars, two cell phones, two bags containing clothing, personal items, candies and drinks inside.
The Venezuelan government denounces that the so-called TANCOL (Colombian Drug Trafficking Armed Terrorists) are made up of groups of “up to 100 terrorists trained and financed in Colombia,” who seek to traffic cocaine and launch attacks against military, police, and political targets in other countries. Particularly in Venezuela, in order to remove President Nicolás Maduro from power.
In September 2020, Maduro reported the capture of a US citizen who was doing espionage work in two refineries in the state of Falcón (north).
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VENEZUELA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE REGION: WHAT IS HAPPENING?
Diego Sequera
Oct 15, 2022 , 1:53 p.m.
We are witnessing the return to the center of the action of the indirect approach (Photo: AP Photo)
After the arrival of Biden to the White House, relations between Venezuela and the United States seemed relegated to a passive-aggressive lethargy, now against the backdrop of the great global disorder, what can be inferred from the different events, actions and decisions in the matter, with its respective regional extension, that could be taking shape?
An enumeration as chaotic as the panorama could perhaps approximate some ideas with some form.
1. MIDTERM AND ANXIETY
Inflation and fuel prices; obscene and growing inequality; Democrats declaring general mobilization after the Supreme Court ruling against Roe v. Wade (the federal law that makes termination of pregnancy legal), (at least part of) the Republicans calling to arms after the FBI raid on Donald Trump's personal resort in Florida; all against Vladimir Putin; migration wars (open borders versus the wall); democracy threatened by MAGA, reactionary, retrograde white supremacism or the trans, migratory dictatorship, against white privilege, etc., all packaged by the alleged "cultural wars" on both sides where everything becomes existential, and comes to light as an apparent combat between good and evil, depending on which side is chosen.
The usual metaphor is to compare the election campaign as a horse race, to all such election cycles, but in this case, as one commentator would put it, one that "looks more like a manufactured race in which every horse is in betamethasone and the race is on its fourth billionth lap.
According to the AdImpact monitor, in this campaign cycle until the end of September, both sides have spent 6.4 billion dollars in advertising for all positions at all levels of the race (gubernatorial, congress, senate and local) on television, radio and digital ads. It is estimated that for the day of the elections, in November, the figure will rise to 9.7 billion, surpassing the electoral days of 2018 (also mid-term) and 2020 (presidential).
This busy environment, saturated with political spots around a specific number of topics, already says a lot about the urgency and the need to maintain a state of tension and attention, reinstating the label of "the most important elections of our lives ".
That atmosphere of apparent extreme mobilization, where the decisive character of the voting day of November 8 is intended to be installed, responds very little to the needs or problems that afflict the average voter, regardless of the election and the state where they live.
The narrative breeding ground enables the possibility that political actors use any number of performative elements that turn the attention on the television waves or the bits in social networks to put presumed points on presumed i's.
An example, sending flights or buses full of Latino migrants from receiving states (Florida, Texas) to the emblematic heart of Democratic states like a shipment of Venezuelans from Florida to the island of Martha's Vineyard, in Massachusetts, to turn them into a political manifesto and the same blow, demonstrate a strong and decisive hand to deal with the problem. As did the governor, and candidate for re-election in Florida, Ron De Santis.
Foreign policy actions that conflict with the domestic one are a common resource ( Pelosi in Taiwan ), as a tactic to gain attention and a few points up in the polls. In these elections, it is clear that the case of Venezuelan migration is playing a prominent role, and the cost in damage to migrant lives is irrelevant if the political effect is effective.
But, as is also demonstrable, all these sub-themes within the spectrum of the exacerbation of "culture wars" (which have a real base in the population) are hardly an incentive for other interests.
Any more or less sober analysis that follows the electoral reality points to the fact that the main issue, which crosses states, political and geographical identities in a general way, are pocketbook issues : salary, economic stability and, above all, the threat of an economic recession on the horizon .
Seen this way, any magnification that reproduces ideological borders outside of specific material elements is, precisely, a distraction mechanism from what actually keeps people on edge.
The enormous electoral showbusiness apparatus , apart from being in itself a massive circular economy mechanism, is anything but the opportunity in life to elect those who attend to the needs and urgencies of a population hit hard by the various succession crises.
And what is done and not done regarding Venezuela (especially regarding its immigration issue in the United States), will take on a special emphasis in recent weeks, in elections where, beyond the noise, it is expected that the Republicans will win. on most fronts, despite the fact that De Santis' maneuver did not have the desired impact with, precisely, the Venezuelan vote in South Florida.
2. THE PRAGMATIC AND THE URGENT
For the Biden administration, not everything is electoral, even if it is an urgency for the Democrats in government who control both legislative chambers and the executive branch. Despite the label of the "most important elections in the universe," it will be difficult for what has been done in recent weeks to change the focus of attention of the electorate, because the focus will remain on economic issues and the result is predictable.
So in this practical calculation the issue goes beyond the November 8 elections and in those terms it is the presidential ones that set the tone, and the price of fuel is one of the main ones to ensure, even if territory is lost now in November, the possibility of continuity in the White House.
It is here where the dialogues with Venezuela and its variables reappear with more zeal.
On March 7, President Nicolás Maduro in a public act announced that a meeting had taken place between his government and a high-level commission sent by the White House. The same day, at a press conference, the executive's spokesperson in Washington at the time, Jen Psaki, confirmed this .
Psaki admits that the meeting addressed the energy issue, but was more emphatic in clarifying that its purpose was focused on ensuring "the well-being" of US citizens detained in Venezuela. She emphasizes that they were "a range of topics" and that they move "through different channels". After that visit, undoubtedly as a sign of good faith, Gustavo Cárdenas and Jorge Alberto Fernández were released .
On the 10th of the same month, in another round with the media, he emphasizes the two points mentioned above, recommending that journalists not focus on the conversations, with so many issues on the table. Act normal.
Other signs manifest in May. It is made public that there were new high-level contacts, also with the opposition. Where an incipient relief to the regime of unilateral coercive measures is already prefigured. AFP gives a (consoling) role to Guaidó in this request, but no other media confirms it.
In this context, on May 17, Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde appear simultaneously on networks announcing the resumption of political dialogue. The Washington Post states that the central purpose of the visit is to encourage dialogue, frozen since October 2021.
But he inadvertently lets slip another piece of information : the Biden administration is trying to take advantage of "a closing window of opportunity" in the region ahead of the midterm elections in November, anticipating both a possible victory for the Republicans and the political shift in the region to the left (the cases of Colombia and Brazil), leaving the United States with "fewer allies" in the hemisphere.
In June two public movements take place. On June 9, the oil companies ENI (Italy) and Repsol (Spain) are authorized to resume a minimum of their operational commitments. The exports will be used to reduce Venezuela's debt with both.
The second movement , more sensitive, occurs at the end of the month, on the 28th, when Caracas receives James Story, virtual ambassador from Bogotá and lousy streamer , and Ben Carstens, White House envoy for hostage affairs, following up on the "well-being "of the detainees. The State Department swears on his mother that none of this has to do with oil.
It is an established fact that Carstens, Story, and senior National Security Council official Juan Gonzalez have led the delegations since March .
By September 15-16, Brian Nichols, assistant secretary of state and consequently the Department's highest-ranking diplomat, rants before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Washington's patience "is not infinite," and that sanctions can return.
The following day, the tendentious report of the UN Independent Verification Mission (a para-commission without powers) is published, emphasizing "the crisis" in all its dimensions, according to the taste of the "collective West", deceiving the gap, which It is more than the plain way of saying that the waters are muddy and the situation is entangled, also openly supported by Nichols himself.
In September there was no carrot for Venezuela, only a stick.
Beginning in October , the exchange of detainees between Caracas and Washington is carried out, surprising many, since the progressive restart of Chevron's operations in Venezuela is made official.
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) points out that financial resources held in US banks will also be released for the importation of food, medicine, as well as equipment for maintenance of the electrical system and water pumping.
Ali Moshiri, a former high-level Chevron manager who oversaw operations in Venezuela, said that of the 450,000 barrels a day it exports today, the figure could double in a few months and reach 1.5 million within two years.
But all those consulted for the note admit that these movements have a lot of weight, and of course what is focused on exchanges and political dialogues, has to do with the pressure imposed by the increase in energy prices, supply restrictions in the market and that relaxation "would allow multiple resources to help us lower energy prices. And where money speaks, human rights do not speak so loudly.
Regarding the illegal sanctions regime of the United States and its attenuations, the key word throughout this course, used by several spokesmen, has been "recalibrate". The last was Antony Blinken himself on October 12, conditioning "progress" in the political dialogue and the "constructive steps of the regime."
But the urgency to move faster is undeniable. Even more so in the face of the possible decision of OPEC + to establish a new cap on its production, promoted by Russia and backed by Saudi Arabia. Something that, among other things, responds to the G7's attempt to fix the price of oil acquisition.
"Unlike past energy history, the United States has no ally within the OPEC+ group," the seasoned Indian writer and diplomat MK Bhadrakumar wrote on October 11.
This sequence, seen as a whole, confirms that the exchanges between the government of President Maduro and the Biden administration have been much more dynamic. The expectorated rhythm is explained, of course, by the contrast that is established in these situations in the counterpoint of open and closed information.
And, in the latter, the lack of leaks, especially from the gringo side, perhaps speaks of the seriousness of complying, but even more so of the geopolitical urgency.
But something else also seems to be distilled: beyond the political value of "foreground" elements like the exchange of detainees, the apparent need for elections and political dialogue in themselves, it is better suggested that these two are political covers of the problem quasi existential that in itself afflicts the United States, since Venezuela, which would undoubtedly benefit, paradoxically is in a better position to wait and play with the times and political rhythms.
The recurring nuances in this arc, starting with Psaki and ending with Blinken, with the benefit of hindsight, look flimsier. As could be seen, beyond the Venezuelan situation, the energy urgency and the mid-term elections themselves operate here in that sense. This is the United States, not Venezuela.
3. REORDERING THE LANDSCAPE WITH WHAT YOU HAVE: COME WITH ME TO SEE THIS SAD HYPOTHESIS
Just as Venezuela witnesses a crescendo in the pace of modifications and adjustments, something similar could also be seen in the region, without this meaning that some leitmotifs do not persist.
Throughout 2021, and even part of 2022, the hemispheric approach of the United States in the region has been quite erratic, where notable signs cannot therefore be excluded. As a background, it seems that once again the practical (pragmatic?) in political terms seems to prevail over the urgency of affirming the exceptionalist elements, favoring the survivalist ones, for the Biden administration.
The first stop is the apparent purge of some officials and/or proconsular paladins of the Trump era, at a time when so many of them (Iván Duque, Jair Bolsonaro?) either headed or seem to be heading towards the exit door, further reducing the list of stalwarts, quite dirty and permeated by their ties to the Trump administration.
Particularly two of them. The first is the former senior director of the National Security Council, former adviser to the Treasury Department (particularly in matters of "sanctions") and recently ousted from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and structural major, Mauricio Claver-Carone.
Fired by the IDB board of governors at the end of September, Claver-Carone is accused of having had a privileged extramarital relationship with a subordinate, deciding to increase the salary of his sentimental staffer by 45%, as shown by an investigation by the The bank's ethics commission that, according to Reuters , began in April, leaving him out, as an Alpha-66 guayabera from Little Havana.
The other who is being investigated for a more or less similar situation is, nothing more and nothing less, than Luis Almagro, secretary general of the OAS and by far the most activist multilateral politician of all anti-American causes in recent times.
Despite the fact that at the close of these lines (October 14), Almagro has not been removed from his post, in this case an AP exclusive (signed by the always "diligent" Joshua Goodman) published on October 7, exposes a detailed "open secret" that had been exposing and maturing for some time in the corridors of the headquarters in Washington.
The affair between Almagro and the Mexican diplomat Marian Vidaurri, who boasted on her LinkedIn profile that she was "senior adviser" to the secretary general's office, has not only been confirmed as a "lasting romance and an open secret by some of its 600 employees ".
But by Almagro's own memoir published in 2020 and corroborated, in addition, by photographs that the journalist Anya Parampil published on The Grayzone portal , where the caramelized proximity is recorded at the Barajas airport, in Madrid, and on a flight , on a tour of the secretary general in 2019.
To further comfort those who want to see Almagro fall, the revelations were made at the very inconsequential general assembly of the OAS in Lima on October 7.
These two "revelations" of work romances and sentimental influence peddling are hardly an isolated practice of both, but rather they obey a conscious decision to "filter" their cases through high circulation agencies. Something that corresponds, rather, to a dirty political decision to get rid of two remaining Trump soldiers in the Pan-American system. A purge with schadenfreude .
But this must be contrasted with Tony Blinken 's recent tour of South America at the beginning of this month of October, limiting himself to touching three countries with progressive profiles, all on the Pacific coast of the continent: Chile, Colombia and Peru.
The exclusion of Brazil seems to be self-explanatory given the electoral context, but without a doubt with a Lula in Planalto it would have been an obligatory stop, and more because of the progressive "tune" than because of the recognition of the specific weight of the subcontinental country in the region.
In any case, a compilation of the three visits, Colombia on October 3 and 4, Chile on October 5 and Peru on October 6 and 7, with closure in the OAS assembly, establishes a particular ideological language. A more conventional tour would have incorporated countries more traditionally in the orbit like Paraguay, but the interest was within the "progressive axis" and the Pacific façade (the United States knows that its best ally in the region is the flatulent Chilean president).
And despite the fact that in the three cases there were variations on the topics of interest, such as checking the disposition of the new Colombian government, visiting Lima as host of the OAS and Chile due to commercial affinities (the bilateral turbo-FTAA in progress since the times of Bachelet) the common theme in all three was Venezuelan migration and human rights.
Superficial and insipid, like Blinken himself, it is that background theme that shines in that first movement of apparent activation of the new hemispheric rapprochement of the United States, once again it seems to become unhidden behind the discursive confetti that the background theme is, and still is , Venezuela.
4. THE RETURN OF SMART POWER?
Until now, this review seems to be leaving the best suggestion that Washington is putting order in its approach to the region. The very urgency of the global situation led him to wake up from the strange state of doze in which he found himself regarding the high points of Latin America.
Throughout the region, including Central America and the Caribbean, the pattern of interaction was still marked by the imprint and methods (somewhat naturally outdated) of the Trump administration, with its frontal, gangster and primitive backyard action.
One by one, not so sound reforms have been established but when associating the points they speak of that "recalibration" and clearing of obstacles from the past. Under that light, the rapprochement with the presumed progressive axis (with the exception of the unfortunate Argentina) seems to sweep and leave any vestige of the Lima Group under the rug.
It would also seem that a different calculation is being established in the tandem game between hemispheric needs and domestic politics, which is why actors who are already stylistically exhausted like Almagro or Claver Carone are gradually being left out of the picture. But the latter shows a sound unknown: will Juan Guaidó be the next to disappear ?
In 2012, ten years ago and when she was at her peak of glory, Hillary Clinton, then Secretary of State in the Obama administration, published an article in The New Stateman under the title "The art of smart power ", where He reviewed the challenges of the moment and his way of approaching them.
Clinton affirmed that "the new geometry of global power is becoming more distributed and more diffuse even as the challenges we face become more complex and cross-cutting." Which meant that "building coalitions of common action" are also becoming "more complicated and more crucial."
To do this, he outlined the type of relationship in several bands, with variables in favor, but also adverse in his relationship with China as an example that, despite so much change, two constants remained. In a more "interconnected and interdependent" world, a more "open, fair and sustainable" international order was necessary to promote "global peace and prosperity."
And the second, "that this order depends on the economic, military and diplomatic leadership" of the United States, which has "supported and assured it for decades." Within this new complexity, "it is no longer enough to be strong. Great powers also have to be skillful and persuasive."
Under that apparently multidimensional gaze where sticks and carrots multiply rhizomatically, there is little space left for the historical stumble and interim role that Juan Guaidó represents, the least persuasive creature in the history of the continent.
The empire, despite Biden's insane and senile drift, has become intersectional . And the intersectional, in terms of governance, is blurred with the corporate logic of the moment, the ESG principle, for environmental (environmental), social and governance (governance), and with its conceptual cousin the DEI: diversity, equity, inclusion.
Seen this way, Boric is more digestible than Piñera, Lula than Bolsonaro. It is, therefore, more profitable to channel regime change efforts in Venezuela, under that topical umbrella, down the path of the electoral alternative, where the order has already been given (and where backyard mechanisms matter).
And within this dynamic, despite being forced to give ground on sanctions (what are a few concessions when OFAC at a planetary level went from 912 to 9,421 sanctioned entities in 20 years?) but ensuring a distant plan of the unilateralist blunders of Pompeo and Bolton.
In addition to the fact that with this simple variation they believe that covering it with a green, trans and white guilt-filled package is enough to placate the anxieties of a more delusional and stupid youth, whose social movements, conscious or not, operate as allies of the turbo- emerging oligarchy.
Mrs. Hillary's art of managing complexities was accompanied by the total destruction of Libya. They go hand in hand. One of them is barely a varnish.
Of all the active files that have been dragged on since the last adventure of regime change in Venezuela, the last one that still remains with a certain degree of reorganization is the migratory one, and we are already seeing how the narrative bubble, but no less infernal for that, of the passing through the Darién now we are moving towards a policy of sponsors, although the picture is not yet complete, and we are already seeing how they attend to the surplus that tries to cross on foot through the border states of the imperial wall.
Let us add to this that the mechanisms for dialogue and electoral participation are not flat elements, but rather poisoned present where, as in some cases, as in the mobilizations against Onapre (once the true working class that moved was sifted and left in its bone reinforced energy structures).
The effort will focus, once again, on the structures of civil society as a way to channel the necessary outsider , with a new strategy in the message that seeks to rely on the electoral defeat of Barinas as a political and moral base .
We are witnessing the return to the center of action of the indirect approach. Once it is clear that the imperial update in the region, with its internal reflection in the next elections (bread for the circus), is overcome, in which the same policy of intervention and regime change continues, even more so now that multipolarity lurks
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Venezuela: OAS Vote Exposes Guaidó’s Crumbling Support
The US-backed politician has found himself increasingly out of favor among Venezuelans themselves, being met with hostile crowds during a recent tour.
By José Luis Granados Ceja
Oct 10th 2022 at 3.44pm
Embattled OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro presides over the 52nd General Assembly of the Organization of American States in Lima, Peru. (OAS / Flickr)
Mexico City, Mexico, October 10, 2022 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan opposition figure Juan Guaidó suffered a strong rebuke after 19 countries voted Thursday to oust his representation at the Organization of American States (OAS) during the regional organization’s 52nd General Assembly held in Lima, Peru.
Although the measure fell short of the necessary 24 votes to formally oust the self-proclaimed “interim government’s” representative to the OAS, only four countries opposed the motion, with the remainder of the member-states abstaining. Canada, the United States, Guatemala and Paraguay backed the hardline Venezuelan opposition. Guaidó’s team was not in attendance at the meeting in Lima.
The vote marks a dramatic shift in support from governments in the region for Guaidó, who once claimed to be the legitimate president of Venezuela and secured the backing of Washington and several of its allies in the hemisphere after declaring himself president at a demonstration in Caracas in January 2019. At the time member-states voted to give Venezuela’s OAS seat to a representative picked by the opposition-controlled National Assembly. Maduro announced his country’s exit from the organization in 2017.
After failing to make any inroads, the hardline opposition turned to increasingly erratic and dangerous plots to oust Maduro from office. In early 2019, Guaidó and his allies, including former Colombian President Iván Duque and OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro, promoted an effort to violate Venezuelan borders under the guise of delivering “humanitarian aid”. The plot was subsequently revealed to be part of a strategy by Washington and the Venezuelan right-wing opposition to attempt to embarrass Maduro on the international stage.
The former lawmaker later led a failed military coup on April 30, 2019 and subsequently funded a mercenary outfit to stage an invasion that sought to kidnap the Venezuelan president. All of the opposition’s plots ultimately proved unable to topple Maduro, who instead has seen his position strengthened, with the Socialist Party winning back control of the National Assembly in 2020 and nearly sweeping regional elections late last year.
Guaidó has increasingly found himself out of favor among Venezuelans themselves. During a recent tour in the country the former lawmaker was met with hostile crowds, with one woman tearing away his shirt before he was able to board his vehicle. Meanwhile, at another stop, his car was pelted with eggs. Venezuelans have strongly criticized the opposition figure for his support for the US-led sanctions regime that has crippled the country’s economy and led to shortages of key goods.
The vote at the OAS General Assembly marks another setback for the opposition figure who never commanded any real political power in Venezuela and has found himself with few remaining allies. With the arrival of Gustavo Petro to the presidency in Colombia and his decision to restore diplomatic and economic relations with the Venezuelan government led by President Nicolás Maduro, the Washington-backed opposition has lost critical spaces of support.
OAS head Luis Almagro, another key opposition ally, is himself in the hot seat, facing a formal probe by the organization's inspector general over allegations he carried on an inappropriate relationship with a staffer. Almagro has pledged to abstain from interfering in the investigation and has denied he was ever the woman’s supervisor or that he favored her in any employment decisions.
An OAS spokesperson said the woman at the center of the allegation, who has not been named, had a role in the organization’s Secretariat for Strengthening Democracy. During his term as secretary general, Almargro has worked closely with the Secretariat for Strengthening Democracy. Both the General Secretariat and the Secretariat for Strengthening Democracy are treated with suspicion by some regional leaders after the OAS played a key role in pushing a narrative that suggested the 2019 election in Bolivia was fraudulent.
That fraud narrative, which was later debunked, triggered the 2019 coup in Bolivia that saw Jeanine Áñez, a far right and little-known lawmaker, briefly take power in the country before being ousted in elections in 2020.
The vote by 19 countries to oust Guaidó’s representation likewise showcases the rise of the Latin American left that is resuming efforts to defend the sovereignty of states in the region. Since last year, leftist and left-of-center leaders in Chile, Colombia and Peru have replaced previous governments that were cozy with Washington.
Meanwhile, even in Washington, Guaidó is seeing his support decline. Despite continuing to claim they view the opposition figure as the “legitimate” president, the Joe Biden administration has found itself negotiating directly with the Maduro government. Washington and Caracas recently agreed to a prisoner swap and rumors continue to circulate that the US is considering handing a broader sanctions waiver to US oil corporation Chevron.
A recent opinion column in the New York Times, which has generally adopted a hostile policy toward the socialist governments in Venezuela, called for Washington to change its policy and abandon its support for Guaidó and his claim to the presidency.
In a recent interview with state-run VOA News in the wake of the OAS General Assembly, US Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian A. Nichols reaffirmed his government’s support for Guaidó and the hardline opposition. Nichols once again called for the Venezuelan government to return to talks with the opposition but abandoned previous demands for early presidential elections, instead calling for a “free and transparent” vote in constitutionally mandated elections in 2024.
Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas
https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/15619 ... 5ac15b4f7e
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The U.S. Cannot Uphold the Fiction that Juan Guaidó Is the President of Venezuela
William Neuman. New York Times. October 8, 2022
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/08/opin ... uaido.html
Mr. Neuman is a former New York Times reporter and Andes region bureau chief, and the author of “Things Are Never so Bad That They Can’t Get Worse: Inside the Collapse of Venezuela.”
When the United States arranged an exchange of prisoners with President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela last week — sending home two nephews of Mr. Maduro’s wife who had been convicted of drug trafficking in a swap for seven Americans held in Venezuelan jails — it exposed the incoherence of U.S. policy toward Venezuela.
Even as it negotiates with Mr. Maduro, the White House continues to insist that Juan Guaidó, an opposition politician, is the real president of Venezuela. The United States has no formal diplomatic relations with the Maduro government, and the embassy in Caracas has been closed since early 2019, shortly after President Donald Trump recognized Mr. Guaidó as president in an unsuccessful, long-shot bid to force Mr. Maduro from power.
It is time for the Biden administration to accept that the Guaidó gambit has failed and that most Venezuelans, and most of the international community, have moved on. The White House needs a Venezuela policy based on fact, not fiction. And the fact is that Mr. Maduro is president of Venezuela and Mr. Guaidó is not.
Accepting reality will have many potential benefits — not least to the Venezuelan opposition, which is in the midst of a turbulent effort to remake itself.
After Mr. Trump announced his support for Mr. Guaidó in January 2019, dozens of other countries followed Washington’s lead. But today, only a dwindling handful continue to recognize Mr. Guaidó as Venezuela’s president, and, like the United States, eschew direct diplomatic ties with Mr. Maduro’s government.
And that list is getting shorter.
Gustavo Petro, the newly elected leftist president of Colombia, moved quickly after taking office in August to abandon his country’s recognition of Mr. Guaidó and reopen its embassy in Caracas. That change is crucial because Colombia has long been Washington’s most important ally in South America and a key supporter of Mr. Guaidó.
Brazil, another powerful backer of Mr. Guaidó, could be next, if Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva retakes the presidency in a runoff election later this month.
Mr. Guaidó was always president in name only — he had no government and no power to act inside Venezuela. He showed courage when he defied Mr. Maduro’s repressive regime, but he never had a viable plan, beyond vague hopes for a military coup or for U.S. intervention. And he was wedded to Mr. Trump’s sanctions-heavy approach, which exacerbated Venezuela’s economic crisis.
Mr. Guaidó’s claim to an alternate presidency rested on his role as head of the National Assembly, but his legislative term ended last year, and at that point many of his supporters inside and outside of Venezuela gave up on the notion.
Today, Mr. Maduro is stronger than he was three years ago, and the opposition is in disarray.
Dropping the pretense that Mr. Guaidó is president would set U.S. policy on a rational foundation but would not be an endorsement of Mr. Maduro. It could facilitate talks with Mr. Maduro over key areas, including the wave of Venezuelan refugees entering the United States and possible changes to economic sanctions related to oil exports. A resumption of consular activities would make it possible for citizens to obtain or renew visas and passports.
One of the greatest beneficiaries could be the Venezuelan opposition, which is in a turbulent, and necessary, state of flux. The opposition has been harshly repressed by a Maduro government committed at all costs to staying in power; while the opposition has made many missteps, it is the primary political force in the country committed to democracy and the defense of human rights, and it is therefore critical to finding a solution to the country’s crisis.
Over the last two years, most mainstream Venezuelan opposition parties have been thrown into crisis, hemorrhaging activists, splitting apart in leadership squabbles or watching once-loyal voters defect.
The government has frequently stepped in to stir the pot, using the courts or electoral authorities to order the takeover of parties by substitute leadership that is considered suspect by the rest of the opposition. But in most cases, the divisions were there to be exploited.
Venezuelans are fed up with opposition parties that often seem more interested in fighting with each other than in improving the country’s fortunes.
At the same time, new parties have emerged, organizing around new leaders.
The political changes were evident in elections held last November. The opposition won a third of the mayorships around the country, after previously holding fewer than one in ten. And although the opposition won just four governorships out of 23, it received a majority of votes in all but a few states. The reason it didn’t win more governorships was that multiple opposition candidates split the vote, essentially handing victory to candidates allied with Mr. Maduro.
The lessons of November were powerful. The election showed that Venezuelans still see the ballot box as a way out of the nation’s troubles. It unmasked the weakness of the government party among voters. It demonstrated, once again, that lack of unity is the opposition’s Achilles’ heel.
And it revealed gains for the nontraditional opposition, with about half of total opposition votes going to candidates outside the coalition led by the four mainstream parties, according to Eugenio Martínez, a journalist who specializes in election analysis.
Venezuelan politics are now aimed at a presidential election that will take place in 2024.
Will the opposition come together to choose a single candidate, or will it remain divided? The United States has urged Mr. Maduro and the opposition to resume negotiations that could lead to improved electoral conditions. But who will sit across the table from Mr. Maduro’s negotiators?
So far, Washington has thrown its weight behind the Unitary Platform, a rebranded coalition led by Mr. Guaidó and the traditional parties, which is seeking to steer the choice of a 2024 candidate and which controls the team that would negotiate conditions with Mr. Maduro.
But by continuing to uphold the fiction that Mr. Guaidó is president of Venezuela, the administration makes it harder for the opposition to go through the necessary process of reforming itself. The United States must acknowledge reality — as it relates to who actually governs in Venezuela and the need for Venezuelans to fashion the opposition that they choose. That is the only way that Washington can play a constructive role in solving Venezuela’s crisis.
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