China

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Re: China

Post by blindpig » Wed Jul 18, 2018 3:59 pm

China doesn’t want a trade war, but it isn’t afraid of one
After reaching a bilateral agreement, the U.S. lashed out, imposing new tariffs on Chinese imports

Author: Gabriela Ávila Gómez | informacion@granma.cu

july 18, 2018 11:07:41

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Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping. Photo: Reuters

BEIJING.–The United States appears to be increasingly isolated and bereft of global allies thanks to the cavalier attitude of President Donald Trump, and his “Make America Great Again” policy.

The tycoon-turned-President’s attacks have not only been launched against the by now “historical enemies” of the U.S. – to put it one way – like Cuba and Venezuela, but he has lashed out without distinction against Canada, Germany, and France.

Some of the most talked-about episodes during the year and a half of his administration in Washington have been Trump’s statements about the construction of a wall on the border with Mexico (and that country bearing the cost), the alleged – never proven – “sonic attacks” suffered by U.S. diplomatic personnel on Cuban soil; and more recently, the withdrawal of his support for the joint communiqué of the G-7 Summit, held in Canada, with comments addressed to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, whom he described as “dishonest and weak.”

The list of U.S. “targets” also features China, a country on which it imposed a series of tariffs, despite the fact that a short time ago the two countries held a series of negotiations at the highest level in an effort to minimize their “big differences” regarding economic matters.

During the aforementioned talks, the Asian giant’s news agency Xinhua reported that “The two sides agreed that a sound and stable China-U.S. trade relationship is crucial for both, and they are committed to resolving relevant economic and trade issues through dialogue and consultation.”

But Washington continues to demonstrate that dialogue is not its cornerstone, and under the pretext of “intellectual property theft” announced it was imposing 25% tariffs on a list of Chinese goods worth approximately 50 billion dollars, which went into effect this July 6.

Trump stated: “The United States can no longer tolerate losing our technology and intellectual property through unfair economic practices.”

The announcement was accompanied by a warning: if the East Asian nation imposed trade restrictions, more tariffs would be imposed.

However, this is nothing more than a frontal attack on China, which through a statement from its Foreign Ministry noted that the U.S. had damaged bilateral interests, made abrupt changes, and unleashed a “trade war.”

“China doesn’t want a trade war. However, confronted by such a short-sighted act that hurts both the U.S. itself and others, China has no choice but to fight back forcefully, to firmly safeguard the interests of the nation and its people,” Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang stated.

In response, the government of Xi Jinping announced it was imposing tariffs on 659 U.S. goods, whose value amounts to 50 billion dollars.

Tariffs on 545 U.S. products, worth around 34 billion dollars, took effect from July 6, while the effective date of the remaining tariffs is yet to be announced.

Speaking to Latin American reporters on the issue, Zhao Kun, division director of the Department of National Economy of China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), noted that while her country doesn’t want to wage such a battle, “We are not afraid of it, faced with any decision there will be a counterattack to match.”

Zhao stressed that China advocates trade globalization, and that protectionism is a double-edged sword that in the end will also end up harming U.S. interests.

The NDRC official noted that China will be temporarily affected by the move, but in the long term the national economy will be able to support itself thanks to internal consumption, an engine for development. “We have great confidence in the development of our country and we are optimistic,” she concluded.

The Asian giant launched its “Made in China 2025” plan a few years ago, which aims to turn the nation into a technological leader on a global scale, competing with powers such as the U.S., Germany, and Japan.

Among the achievements so far are the first Chinese-made passenger jet (the C919), and its first high-speed bullet train.

This is one of the most significant reasons why the Trump government decided to impose tariffs on the robotics, aerospace, and automotive industries. On the other hand, goods such as cell phones and televisions were not affected, at least for now.

http://en.granma.cu/mundo/2018-07-18/ch ... aid-of-one

Come on Donny, tariffs on TVs & cells, that'll show 'em. Who needs bread & circuses anyways?
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Re: China

Post by blindpig » Tue Jul 31, 2018 7:57 pm

Militants Threaten China's OBOR Initiative in Myanmar
Militants in northern Myanmar have once again put China's One Belt, One Road initiative on hold. It should come as no surprise that Anglo-American history played a direct role in their creation, and currently fund and back networks supporting them.

July 3, 2018 (Tony Cartalucci - NEO) - The BBC has mounted a recent propaganda campaign aimed at once again placing pressure on Myanmar's military, within a wider effort to drive a wedge between Myanmar and China.

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Amid an already ongoing and deceptive narrative surrounding the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar's southwest state of Rakhine, attention is now being focused on the nation's northern state of Kachin.

Nick Beake of the BBC produced a narrative aimed at intentionally preying on the emotions of viewers. The report revolved around alleged hardships suffered by Kachin villagers fleeing from a supposed government offensive. The report was absent of any context or evidence and was based entirely on hearsay from alleged villagers Beake claims to have interviewed.

Beake would conclude that his report represented the "first eyewitness accounts of the Burmese military targeting civilians in their latest offensive in Kachin State." And supposed eyewitness accounts were all Beake presented. At one point Beake's report even cited third-hand reports of torture and rape - stories fleeing villagers claimed they had only heard from others, but did not directly witness themselves.

The only specific death Beake cited was of a man of military age he claims was killed during the supposed fighting. Beake avoided mentioning whether the victim was a Kachin fighter or a civilian caught in crossfire.

The BBC's Nick Beake makes little mention of the actual conflict and no mention at all that Kachin militants are among the most heavily armed and well organized in the divided nation of Myanmar.

And while the BBC report briefly claims that Kachin militants "have been fighting for independence for decades," it never mentions the central role the British government itself played in creating Kachin militant groups during World War II to protect their colony, how Kachin militants played a role in resisting Myanmar's bid for independence, and the role these militants have played in preventing Myanmar's progress forward as a unified nation ever since.

Manufacturing Crisis, Foiling Chinese Interests

The BBC report and an uptick of sudden concern over Kachin State come at a time when Beijing has been working to foster peace deals to end the chaos unfolding along its border with Myanmar.

An April 2017 article in Foreign Policy titled, "China Is Playing Peacemaker in Myanmar, but with an Ulterior Motive," would include a revealing subtitle:
Beijing is trying to end the long-running conflicts along its border with Myanmar — but only because it can't exploit the region's resources at will anymore.

While Foreign Policy attempts to cast doubts on China's motivations, it inadvertently reveals that Kachin militants and their conflict with Myanmar's military are impeding Chinese interests, providing an essential clue as to who the fighting benefits and who is likely encouraging and enabling it.

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Foreign Policy makes mention of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy coming to power and and the role that Suu Kyi herself played in protesting and obstructing Chinese-led infrastructure projects - including dams, roadways, ports, and pipelines - in Myanmar. Foreign Policy fails to mention the decades of US-UK funding that created and propelled Suu Kyi's government into power.


Foreign Policy does claim however (emphasis added):
In 2015, elections raised up the Nationwide League for Democracy, an opposition party led by Aung San Suu Kyi, though the military retained control of important ministries and substantial influence in the parliament through a new constitution. Instead of a client state on its southwestern border, China had to deal with a government that was keen to find great powers to balance Beijing’s influence.
Of course, those "great powers" being referred to reside in Washington, London, and Brussels. And despite hopes that Myanmar would bend entirely before the West, it appears that many deals are still being pursued by Beijing and there are still receptive parties in Myanmar working to meet Beijing half way.

Conveniently, Kachin militants have renewed fighting along China's borders, threatening to complicate development projects in ways mere politics cannot. Foreign Policy would admit:
China’s hopes to restart the [Myitsone] dam were complicated by a resumption of fighting between the KIA and Myanmar’s military after a cease-fire had broken down after two decades in 2011, shortly before the dam was put on hold. The instability has often closed the border and threatened China’s huge business interests in timber, gold, and jade.
Repeated claims that Myanmar is now a "democracy," and that China must answer to protests and opposition to their projects, sidesteps the fact that opposition to Chinese projects is anything but "democracy" in action. Those behind these protests are funded and directed by US and UK government organizations.

Foreign Policy even cites one - the Kachin Development Networking Group (KDNG) - but fails to disclose its foreign funding. KDNG is mentioned in a US State Department cable disclosed by Wikileaks titled, "Burma: Grassroots Opposition to Chinese-Backed Dam in Northern Burma." The cable also admits (emphasis added):
An unusual aspect of this case is the role grassroots organizations have played in opposing the dam, which speaks to the growing strength of civil society groups in Kachin State, including recipients of [US] Embassy small grants.
KDNG general secretary Steve Naw Aung would make a point about China's close relationship with Myanmar's military and the resistance to Chinese-led projects from the new - and very much US-UK-backed - government headed by Suu Kyi.

This is why more recent reports like Nick Beake's BBC segment often insist atrocities are carried out solely by Myanmar's military with Suu Kyi's government portrayed as a helpless onlooker. Similar narratives have been applied to violence carried out against Myanmar's Rohingya minority, despite the most violent and aggressive forces assaulting Rohingya communities are drawn from Suu Kyi's support base - not the military.

The Foreign Policy piece reveals how Kachin militants may still yet be persuaded by China to choose peaceful development over conflict driven by whatever promises have been made by the "great powers" likely underwriting their cause, or at the very least, trying to encourage it. Foreign Policy makes mention that beyond infrastructure projects like dams and natural resource extraction - China also seeks to create transit routes through Myanmar to both India and to the Bay of Bengal.

It is no coincidence that conflicts closely minded, even openly cultivated by the US, UK, and other European governments have erupted and now burn precisely in the path of these planned transit routes.

Routes to India pass through contested Kachin State. Routes to, and a port facility on the Bay Bengal so happen to be located in Rakhine State, the heart of the ongoing Rohingya crisis.

Kachin Militants - An Anglo-American Time Bomb

The Irrawaddy - a media platform funded by the US government via the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) - wrote a 2012 article titled, "Memories of WWII Run Deep for KIO [Kachin Independence Organization]."

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In it, the article admits that Kachin fighters formed part of the British Empire's colonial army. It also mentions the strategy of divide and rule used by the British, stating (emphasis added):
Prior to the outbreak of World War II, the Kachin, along with the Karen and Chin ethnic groups, comprised the overwhelming majority of local troops who served in Britain’s Burmese colonial army, a force that also consisted of Gurkha from Nepal and Punjabi troops from India. The Kachin and the other groups were all considered trusted “martial races” by the colonial authorities. In contrast, Burma’s colonial army had few if any members of the Burman majority, a deliberate policy of divide and rule whose legacy is still felt in the country today.
The article also mentioned the US government's role in training factions of Kachin fighters during World War II, stating (emphasis added):
Although the KIO did not begin its armed insurrection against Burma’s government until 1961, more than 16 years after the end of World War II, a good portion of the founding leadership of the KIO, including the group’s first head Zau Seng (no relation to the aforementioned major), were veterans of the Second World War who were trained in guerrilla fighting as part of Detachment 101 operated by the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a predecessor of the CIA, or under a similar group organized by Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE) called the Kachin levies.
As revealing as this is - it still enables Western governments and media to claim Kachin fighting after the World War was done on their own accord. However, a revealing history is laid out by Kachinland News in a piece titled, "The Biography of Du Kaba Lahpai Naw Seng (Part III)," which published part of a British officer's speech to his Kachin fighters at the conclusion of World War II.

The officer stated (emphasis added):
You endured many hardships displaying extraordinary stamina and perseverance. Due to this, you have vanquished the more powerful, better-equipped Japanese troops despite having much less manpower. Defeating the Japanese is just the beginning of your legacy. Now to protect and safeguard the recaptured lands, we will begin creating all-Kachin Battalions.
Of course, this "safeguarding" was being done on behalf of the British Empire as a means of re-consolidating control over British Burma. Those "all-Kachin Battalions" would eventually be formed and would form the foundation of Kachin militant groups now fighting in Myanmar today.

An All Too Convenient Conflict

It is clear that Kachin fighters were formed as part of the British Empire's strategy of maintaining control over Myanmar - then called Burma - and it was clear that the British saw Kachin fighters as a means of consolidating power after World War II concluded.

It is also confirmed that the US has funded fronts in Kachin to impede Chinese-led development projects - development US diplomats themselves admit the region desperately needs and are not receiving from either the government of Myanmar itself, or from Kachin "freedom fighters" who amass wealth for themselves and leave nothing behind for the rest of Kachin State's population - according to another Wikileaks-disclosed US cable.

While evidence is scarce concerning what sort of backing Kachin fighters may or may not be receiving from Washington and London today, their representatives are revealed to be in contact with US diplomats in neighboring Thailand in the northern city of Chiang Mai.

Recent fighting all too conveniently spoils Chinese efforts to move projects forward. It also places additional pressure on Myanmar's military at a time when the US seeks to cut back or co-op its power in favor of the Suu Kyi government Washington and London spent millions of dollars over decades placing into power.

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Regardless of who is encouraging and enabling Kachin fighters today, the BBC and other Western media organizations are clearly coordinating their narratives to leverage the conflict against both Myanmar's military and in a bid to impede Chinese-led development.

Should sufficient traction be made, the stage the BBC and other media organizations are setting with their familiar "humanitarian" narratives, will soon be occupied by Western governments and Western-funded fronts seeking to displace Chinese interests in northern Myanmar and setting back its wider, regional One Belt, One Road initiative.

Understanding the US desire to impede the rise of China reveals what appear to be otherwise disparate conflicts as linked together, both within Myanmar itself, and across Southeast Asia as a whole. Once this is understood, it is easy to decipher emerging conflicts as they unfold - especially as the Western media attempts to leverage them to suit Western interests.

Beijing can be expected to continue seeking peace along its borders in order to move long-delayed projects forward. In the coming weeks and months, China's patience and resilience will be put to the test by the West's capacity to both create chaos, and wring from it a sense of order more to its liking.

Tony Cartalucci, Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer, especially for the online magazine“New Eastern Outlook”.

http://landdestroyer.blogspot.com/2018/ ... l?spref=tw

Gotta watch this guy but this seems legit.
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: China

Post by blindpig » Sat Aug 04, 2018 10:10 pm

Chinese Sinopec suspends oil import from US
Beijing, Aug 4, IRNA – China's major oil giant has paused importing oil from the US due to escalation of trade war between the two countries, a Chinese daily reported on Saturday.


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China’s largest refiner, Sinopec, is suspending new orders of US oil fearing the new tariffs on US energy products that will make the crude more expensive, South China Morning Post reported citing a source close to the company.

A source close to Unipec, the trading arm of Sinopec, has told Reuters that the company has not placed order to buy oil from the US at least until October.

China in retaliation of the US tariffs increase has put US energy products on a list of 25 percent tariff.

The decision is contrary to what the Chinese oil consumer had said earlier. It was expected that Unipec increase its oil imports from the US triple the amount it bought last year.

'The absence of China, the largest buyer of U.S. crude after Canada, has partly weighed on U.S. spot crude prices, making them more affordable for other buyers in Asia,' Reuters reported.

The decrease in the US oil import by China comes a few months after Washington pressed its allies to halt oil imports from Iran by November. The US President Donald Trump has decided to pull out of the nuclear deal and tighten the sanctions noose on Iran economy.

Beijing, however, declined to stop imports from Iran, dealing a blow to US efforts to isolate that nation, the Hong Kong-based daily said.

http://www.irna.ir/en/News/82990646

"Trade wars are easy to win." A twofer at that.
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Re: China

Post by blindpig » Mon Aug 13, 2018 11:29 am

China 2013
by Samir Amin
(Mar 01, 2013)
Topics: History , Marxism , Stagnation
Places: Asia , China

Samir Amin is director of the Third World Forum in Dakar, Senegal. His books include The Liberal Virus, The World We Wish to See, and The Law of Worldwide Value (all published by Monthly Review Press). This article was translated from the French by James Membrez.
The debates concerning the present and future of China—an “emerging” power—always leave me unconvinced. Some argue that China has chosen, once and for all, the “capitalist road” and intends even to accelerate its integration into contemporary capitalist globalization. They are quite pleased with this and hope only that this “return to normality” (capitalism being the “end of history”) is accompanied by development towards Western-style democracy (multiple parties, elections, human rights). They believe—or need to believe—in the possibility that China shall by this means “catch up” in terms of per capita income to the opulent societies of the West, even if gradually, which I do not believe is possible. The Chinese right shares this point of view. Others deplore this in the name of the values of a “betrayed socialism.” Some associate themselves with the dominant expressions of the practice of China bashing1 in the West. Still others—those in power in Beijing—describe the chosen path as “Chinese-style socialism,” without being more precise. However, one can discern its characteristics by reading official texts closely, particularly the Five-Year Plans, which are precise and taken quite seriously.

In fact the question, “Is China capitalist or socialist?” is badly posed, too general and abstract for any response to make sense in terms of this absolute alternative. In fact, China has actually been following an original path since 1950, and perhaps even since the Taiping Revolution in the nineteenth century. I shall attempt here to clarify the nature of this original path at each of the stages of its development from 1950 to today—2013.

The Agrarian Question
Mao described the nature of the revolution carried out in China by its Communist Party as an anti-imperialist/anti-feudal revolution looking toward socialism. Mao never assumed that, after having dealt with imperialism and feudalism, the Chinese people had “constructed” a socialist society. He always characterized this construction as the first phase of the long path to socialism.

I must emphasize the quite specific nature of the response given to the agrarian question by the Chinese Revolution. The distributed (agricultural) land was not privatized; it remained the property of the nation represented by village communes and only the use was given to rural families. That had not been the case in Russia where Lenin, faced with the fait accompli of the peasant insurrection in 1917, recognized the private property of the beneficiaries of land distribution.

Why was the implementation of the principle that agricultural land is not a commodity possible in China (and Vietnam)? It is constantly repeated that peasants around the world long for property and that alone. If such had been the case in China, the decision to nationalize the land would have led to an endless peasant war, as was the case when Stalin began forced collectivization in the Soviet Union.

The attitude of the peasants of China and Vietnam (and nowhere else) cannot be explained by a supposed “tradition” in which they are unaware of property. It is the product of an intelligent and exceptional political line implemented by the Communist Parties of these two countries.

The Second International took for granted the inevitable aspiration of peasants for property, real enough in nineteenth-century Europe. Over the long European transition from feudalism to capitalism (1500–1800), the earlier institutionalized feudal forms of access to the land through rights shared among king, lords, and peasant serfs had gradually been dissolved and replaced by modern bourgeois private property, which treats the land as a commodity—a good that the owner can freely dispose of (buy and sell). The socialists of the Second International accepted this fait accompli of the “bourgeois revolution,” even if they deplored it.

They also thought that small peasant property had no future, which belonged to large mechanized agricultural enterprise modeled on industry. They thought that capitalist development by itself would lead to such a concentration of property and to the most effective forms of its exploitation (see Kautsky’s writings on this subject). History proved them wrong. Peasant agriculture gave way to capitalist family agriculture in a double sense; one that produces for the market (farm consumption having become insignificant) and one that makes use of modern equipment, industrial inputs, and bank credit. What is more, this capitalist family agriculture has turned out to be quite efficient in comparison with large farms, in terms of volume of production per hectare per worker/year. This observation does not exclude the fact that the modern capitalist farmer is exploited by generalized monopoly capital, which controls the upstream supply of inputs and credit and the downstream marketing of the products. These farmers have been transformed into subcontractors for dominant capital.

Thus (wrongly) persuaded that large enterprise is always more efficient than small in every area—industry, services, and agriculture—the radical socialists of the Second International assumed that the abolition of landed property (nationalization of the land) would allow the creation of large socialist farms (analogous to the future Soviet sovkhozes and kolkhozes). However, they were unable to put such measures to the test since revolution was not on the agenda in their countries (the imperialist centers).

The Bolsheviks accepted these theses until 1917. They contemplated the nationalization of the large estates of the Russian aristocracy, while leaving property in communal lands to the peasants. However, they were subsequently caught unawares by the peasant insurrection, which seized the large estates.

Mao drew the lessons from this history and developed a completely different line of political action. Beginning in the 1930s in southern China, during the long civil war of liberation, Mao based the increasing presence of the Communist Party on a solid alliance with the poor and landless peasants (the majority), maintained friendly relations with the middle peasants, and isolated the rich peasants at all stages of the war, without necessarily antagonizing them. The success of this line prepared the large majority of rural inhabitants to consider and accept a solution to their problems that did not require private property in plots of land acquired through distribution. I think that Mao’s ideas, and their successful implementation, have their historical roots in the nineteenth-century Taiping Revolution. Mao thus succeeded where the Bolshevik Party had failed: in establishing a solid alliance with the large rural majority. In Russia, the fait accompli of summer 1917 eliminated later opportunities for an alliance with the poor and middle peasants against the rich ones (the kulaks) because the former were anxious to defend their acquired private property and, consequently, preferred to follow the kulaks rather than the Bolsheviks.

This “Chinese specificity”—whose consequences are of major importance—absolutely prevents us from characterizing contemporary China (even in 2013) as “capitalist” because the capitalist road is based on the transformation of land into a commodity.

Present and Future of Petty Production
However, once this principle is accepted, the forms of using this common good (the land of the village communities) can be quite diverse. In order to understand this, we must be able to distinguish petty production from small property.

Petty production—peasant and artisanal—dominated production in all past societies. It has retained an important place in modern capitalism, now linked with small property—in agriculture, services, and even certain segments of industry. Certainly in the dominant triad of the contemporary world (the United States, Europe, and Japan) it is receding. An example of that is the disappearance of small businesses and their replacement by large commercial operations. Yet this is not to say that this change is “progress,” even in terms of efficiency, and all the more so if the social, cultural, and civilizational dimensions are taken into account. In fact, this is an example of the distortion produced by the domination of rent-seeking generalized monopolies. Hence, perhaps in a future socialism the place of petty production will be called upon to resume its importance.

In contemporary China, in any case, petty production—which is not necessarily linked with small property—retains an important place in national production, not only in agriculture but also in large segments of urban life.

China has experienced quite diverse and even contrasting forms of the use of land as a common good. We need to discuss, on the one hand, efficiency (volume of production from a hectare per worker/year) and, on the other, the dynamics of the transformations set in motion. These forms can strengthen tendencies towards capitalist development, which would end up calling into question the non-commodity status of the land, or can be part of development in a socialist direction. These questions can be answered only through a concrete examination of the forms at issue, as they were implemented in successive moments of Chinese development from 1950 to the present.

At the beginning, in the 1950s, the form adopted was petty family production combined with simpler forms of cooperation for managing irrigation, work requiring coordination, and the use of certain kinds of equipment. This was associated with the insertion of such petty family production into a state economy that maintained a monopoly over purchases of produce destined for the market and the supply of credit and inputs, all on the basis of planned prices (decided by the center).

The experience of the communes that followed the establishment of production cooperatives in the 1970s is full of lessons. It was not necessarily a question of passing from small production to large farms, even if the idea of the superiority of the latter inspired some of its supporters. The essentials of this initiative originated in the aspiration for decentralized socialist construction. The Communes not only had responsibility for managing the agricultural production of a large village or a collective of villages and hamlets (this organization itself was a mixture of forms of small family production and more ambitious specialized production), they also provided a larger framework: (1) attaching industrial activities that employed peasants available in certain seasons; (2) articulating productive economic activities together with the management of social services (education, health, housing); and (3) commencing the decentralization of the political administration of the society. Just as the Paris Commune had intended, the socialist state was to become, at least partially, a federation of socialist Communes.

Undoubtedly, in many respects, the Communes were in advance of their time and the dialectic between the decentralization of decision-making powers and the centralization assumed by the omnipresence of the Communist Party did not always operate smoothly. Yet the recorded results are far from having been disastrous, as the right would have us believe. A Commune in the Beijing region, which resisted the order to dissolve the system, continues to record excellent economic results linked with the persistence of high-quality political debates, which disappeared elsewhere. Current projects of “rural reconstruction,” implemented by rural communities in several regions of China, appear to be inspired by the experience of the Communes.

The decision to dissolve the Communes made by Deng Xiaoping in 1980 strengthened small family production, which remained the dominant form during the three decades following this decision. However, the range of users’ rights (for village Communes and family units) has expanded considerably. It has become possible for the holders of these land use rights to “rent” that land out (but never “sell” it), either to other small producers—thus facilitating emigration to the cities, particularly of educated young people who do not want to remain rural residents—or to firms organizing a much larger, modernized farm (never a latifundia, which does not exist in China, but nevertheless considerably larger than family farms). This form is the means used to encourage specialized production (such as good wine, for which China has called on the assistance of experts from Burgundy) or test new scientific methods (GMOs and others).

To “approve” or “reject” the diversity of these systems a priori makes no sense, in my opinion. Once again, the concrete analysis of each of them, both in design and the reality of its implementation, is imperative. The fact remains that the inventive diversity of forms of using commonly held land has led to phenomenal results. First of all, in terms of economic efficiency, although urban population has grown from 20 to 50 percent of total population, China has succeeded in increasing agricultural production to keep pace with the gigantic needs of urbanization. This is a remarkable and exceptional result, unparalleled in the countries of the “capitalist” South. It has preserved and strengthened its food sovereignty, even though it suffers from a major handicap: its agriculture feeds 22 percent of the world’s population reasonably well while it has only 6 percent of the world’s arable land. In addition, in terms of the way (and level) of life of rural populations, Chinese villages no longer have anything in common with what is still dominant elsewhere in the capitalist third world. Comfortable and well-equipped permanent structures form a striking contrast, not only with the former China of hunger and extreme poverty, but also with the extreme forms of poverty that still dominate the countryside of India or Africa.

The principles and policies implemented (land held in common, support for petty production without small property) are responsible for these unequalled results. They have made possible a relatively controlled rural-to-urban migration. Compare that with the capitalist road, in Brazil, for example. Private property in agricultural land has emptied the countryside of Brazil—today only 11 percent of the country’s population. But at least 50 percent of urban residents live in slums (the favelas) and survive only thanks to the “informal economy” (including organized crime). There is nothing similar in China, where the urban population is, as a whole, adequately employed and housed, even in comparison with many “developed countries,” without even mentioning those where the GDP per capita is at the Chinese level!

The population transfer from the extremely densely populated Chinese countryside (only Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Egypt are similar) was essential. It improved conditions for rural petty production, making more land available. This transfer, although relatively controlled (once again, nothing is perfect in the history of humanity, neither in China nor elsewhere), is perhaps threatening to become too rapid. This is being discussed in China.

Chinese State Capitalism
The first label that comes to mind to describe Chinese reality is state capitalism. Very well, but this label remains vague and superficial so long as the specific content is not analyzed.

It is indeed capitalism in the sense that the relation to which the workers are subjected by the authorities who organize production is similar to the one that characterizes capitalism: submissive and alienated labor, extraction of surplus labor. Brutal forms of extreme exploitation of workers exist in China, e.g., in the coal mines or in the furious pace of the workshops that employ women. This is scandalous for a country that claims to want to move forward on the road to socialism. Nevertheless, the establishment of a state capitalist regime is unavoidable, and will remain so everywhere. The developed capitalist countries themselves will not be able to enter a socialist path (which is not on the visible agenda today) without passing through this first stage. It is the preliminary phase in the potential commitment of any society to liberating itself from historical capitalism on the long route to socialism/communism. Socialization and reorganization of the economic system at all levels, from the firm (the elementary unit) to the nation and the world, require a lengthy struggle during an historical time period that cannot be foreshortened.

Beyond this preliminary reflection, we must concretely describe the state capitalism in question by bringing out the nature and the project of the state concerned, because there is not just one type of state capitalism, but many different ones. The state capitalism of France of the Fifth Republic from 1958 to 1975 was designed to serve and strengthen private French monopolies, not to commit the country to a socialist path.

Chinese state capitalism was built to achieve three objectives: (i) construct an integrated and sovereign modern industrial system; (ii) manage the relation of this system with rural petty production; and (iii) control China’s integration into the world system, dominated by the generalized monopolies of the imperialist triad (United States, Europe, Japan). The pursuit of these three priority objectives is unavoidable. As a result it permits a possible advance on the long route to socialism, but at the same time it strengthens tendencies to abandon that possibility in favor of pursuing capitalist development pure and simple. It must be accepted that this conflict is both inevitable and always present. The question then is this: Do China’s concrete choices favor one of the two paths?

Chinese state capitalism required, in its first phase (1954–1980), the nationalization of all companies (combined with the nationalization of agricultural lands), both large and small alike. Then followed an opening to private enterprise, national and/or foreign, and liberalized rural and urban petty production (small companies, trade, services). However, large basic industries and the credit system established during the Maoist period were not denationalized, even if the organizational forms of their integration into a “market” economy were modified. This choice went hand in hand with the establishment of means of control over private initiative and potential partnership with foreign capital. It remains to be seen to what extent these means fulfill their assigned functions or, on the contrary, if they have not become empty shells, collusion with private capital (through “corruption” of management) having gained the upper hand.

Still, what Chinese state capitalism has achieved between 1950 and 2012 is quite simply amazing. It has, in fact, succeeded in building a sovereign and integrated modern productive system to the scale of this gigantic country, which can only be compared with that of the United States. It has succeeded in leaving behind the tight technological dependence of its origins (importation of Soviet, then Western models) through the development of its own capacity to produce technological inventions. However, it has not (yet?) begun the reorganization of labor from the perspective of socialization of economic management. The Plan—and not the “opening”—has remained the central means for implementing this systematic construction.

In the Maoist phase of this development planning, the Plan remained imperative in all details: nature and location of new establishments, production objectives, and prices. At that stage, no reasonable alternative was possible. I will mention here, without pursuing it further, the interesting debate about the nature of the law of value that underpinned planning in this period. The very success—and not the failure—of this first phase required an alteration of the means for pursuing an accelerated development project. The “opening” to private initiative—beginning in 1980, but above all from 1990—was necessary in order to avoid the stagnation that was fatal to the USSR. Despite the fact that this opening coincided with the globalized triumph of neo-liberalism—with all the negative effects of this coincidence, to which I shall return—the choice of a “socialism of the market,” or better yet, a “socialism with the market,” as fundamental for this second phase of accelerated development is largely justified, in my opinion.

The results of this choice are, once again, simply amazing. In a few decades, China has built a productive, industrial urbanization that brings together 600 million human beings, two-thirds of whom were urbanized over the last two decades (almost equal to Europe’s population!). This is due to the Plan and not to the market. China now has a truly sovereign productive system. No other country in the South (except for Korea and Taiwan) has succeeded in doing this. In India and Brazil there are only a few disparate elements of a sovereign project of the same kind, nothing more.

The methods for designing and implementing the Plan have been transformed in these new conditions. The Plan remains imperative for the huge infrastructure investments required by the project: to house 400 million new urban inhabitants in adequate conditions, and to build an unparalleled network of highways, roads, railways, dams, and electric power plants; to open up all or almost all of the Chinese countryside; and to transfer the center of gravity of development from the coastal regions to the continental west. The Plan also remains imperative—at least in part—for the objectives and financial resources of publicly owned enterprises (state, provinces, municipalities). As for the rest, it points to possible and probable objectives for the expansion of small urban commodity production as well as industrial and other private activities. These objectives are taken seriously and the political-economic resources required for their realization are specified. On the whole, the results are not too different from the “planned” predictions.

Chinese state capitalism has integrated into its development project visible social (I am not saying “socialist”) dimensions. These objectives were already present in the Maoist era: eradication of illiteracy, basic health care for everyone, etc. In the first part of the post-Maoist phase (the 1990s), the tendency was undoubtedly to neglect the pursuit of these efforts. However, it should be noted that the social dimension of the project has since won back its place and, in response to active and powerful social movements, is expected to make more headway. The new urbanization has no parallel in any other country of the South. There are certainly “chic” quarters and others that are not at all opulent; but there are no slums, which have continued to expand everywhere else in the cities of the third world.

The Integration of China into Capitalist Globalization
We cannot pursue the analysis of Chinese state capitalism (called “market socialism” by the government) without taking into consideration its integration into globalization.

The Soviet world had envisioned a delinking from the world capitalist system, complementing that delinking by building an integrated socialist system encompassing the USSR and Eastern Europe. The USSR achieved this delinking to a great extent, imposed moreover by the West’s hostility; even blaming the blockade for its isolation. However, the project of integrating Eastern Europe never advanced very far, despite the initiatives of Comecom. The nations of Eastern Europe remained in uncertain and vulnerable positions, partially delinked—but on a strictly national basis—and partially open to Western Europe beginning in 1970. There was never a question of a USSR–China integration, not only because Chinese nationalism would not have accepted it, but even more because China’s priority tasks did not require it. Maoist China practiced delinking in its own way. Should we say that, by reintegrating itself into globalization beginning in the 1990s, it has fully and permanently renounced delinking?

China entered globalization in the 1990s by the path of the accelerated development of manufactured exports possible for its productive system, giving first priority to exports whose rates of growth then surpassed those of the growth in GDP. The triumph of neoliberalism favored the success of this choice for fifteen years (from 1990 to 2005). The pursuit of this choice is questionable not only because of its political and social effects, but also because it is threatened by the implosion of neoliberal globalized capitalism, which began in 2007. The Chinese government appears to be aware of this and very early began to attempt a correction by giving greater importance to the internal market and to development of western China.

To say, as one hears ad nauseam, that China’s success should be attributed to the abandonment of Maoism (whose “failure” was obvious), the opening to the outside, and the entry of foreign capital is quite simply idiotic. The Maoist construction put in place the foundations without which the opening would not have achieved its well-known success. A comparison with India, which has not made a comparable revolution, demonstrates this. To say that China’s success is mainly (even “completely”) attributable to the initiatives of foreign capital is no less idiotic. It is not multinational capital that built the Chinese industrial system and achieved the objectives of urbanization and the construction of infrastructure. The success is 90 percent attributable to the sovereign Chinese project. Certainly, the opening to foreign capital has fulfilled useful functions: it has increased the import of modern technologies. However, because of its partnership methods, China absorbed these technologies and has now mastered their development. There is nothing similar elsewhere, even in India or Brazil, a fortiori in Thailand, Malaysia, South Africa, and other places.

China’s integration into globalization has remained, moreover, partial and controlled (or at least controllable, if one wants to put it that way). China has remained outside of financial globalization. Its banking system is completely national and focused on the country’s internal credit market. Management of the yuan is still a matter for China’s sovereign decision making. The yuan is not subject to the vagaries of the flexible exchanges that financial globalization imposes. Beijing can say to Washington, “the yuan is our money and your problem,” just like Washington said to the Europeans in 1971, “the dollar is our money and your problem.” Moreover, China retains a large reserve for deployment in its public credit system. The public debt is negligible compared with the rates of indebtedness (considered intolerable) in the United States, Europe, Japan, and many of the countries in the South. China can thus increase the expansion of its public expenditures without serious danger of inflation.

The attraction of foreign capital to China, from which it has benefitted, is not behind the success of its project. On the contrary, it is the success of the project that has made investment in China attractive for Western transnationals. The countries of the South that opened their doors much wider than China and unconditionally accepted their submission to financial globalization have not become attractive to the same degree. Transnational capital is not attracted to China to pillage the natural resources of the country, nor, without any transfer of technology, to outsource and benefit from low wages for labor; nor to seize the benefits from training and integration of offshored units unrelated to nonexistent national productive systems, as in Morocco and Tunisia; nor even to carry out a financial raid and allow the imperialist banks to dispossess the national savings, as was the case in Mexico, Argentina, and Southeast Asia. In China, by contrast, foreign investments can certainly benefit from low wages and make good profits, on the condition that their plans fit into China’s and allow technology transfer. In sum, these are “normal” profits, but more can be made if collusion with Chinese authorities permits!

China, Emerging Power
No one doubts that China is an emerging power. One current idea is that China is only attempting to recover the place it had occupied for centuries and lost only in the nineteenth century. However, this idea—certainly correct, and flattering, moreover—does not help us much in understanding the nature of this emergence and its real prospects in the contemporary world. Incidentally, those who propagate this general and vague idea have no interest in considering whether China will emerge by rallying to the general principles of capitalism (which they think is probably necessary) or whether it will take seriously its project of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” For my part, I argue that if China is indeed an emerging power, this is precisely because it has not chosen the capitalist path of development pure and simple; and that, as a consequence, if it decided to follow that capitalist path, the project of emergence itself would be in serious danger of failing.

The thesis that I support implies rejecting the idea that peoples cannot leap over the necessary sequence of stages and that China must go through a capitalist development before the question of its possible socialist future is considered. The debate on this question between the different currents of historical Marxism was never concluded. Marx remained hesitant on this question. We know that right after the first European attacks (the Opium Wars), he wrote: the next time that you send your armies to China they will be welcomed by a banner, “Attention, you are at the frontiers of the bourgeois Republic of China.” This is a magnificent intuition and shows confidence in the capacity of the Chinese people to respond to the challenge, but at the same time an error because in fact the banner read: “You are at the frontiers of the People’s Republic of China.” Yet we know that, concerning Russia, Marx did not reject the idea of skipping the capitalist stage (see his correspondence with Vera Zasulich). Today, one might believe that the first Marx was right and that China is indeed on the route to capitalist development.

But Mao understood—better than Lenin—that the capitalist path would lead to nothing and that the resurrection of China could only be the work of communists. The Qing Emperors at the end of the nineteenth century, followed by Sun Yat Sen and the Guomindang, had already planned a Chinese resurrection in response to the challenge from the West. However, they imagined no other way than that of capitalism and did not have the intellectual wherewithal to understand what capitalism really is and why this path was closed to China, and to all the peripheries of the world capitalist system for that matter. Mao, an independent Marxist spirit, understood this. More than that, Mao understood that this battle was not won in advance—by the 1949 victory—and that the conflict between commitment to the long route to socialism, the condition for China’s renaissance, and return to the capitalist fold would occupy the entire visible future.

Personally, I have always shared Mao’s analysis and I shall return to this subject in some of my thoughts concerning the role of the Taiping Revolution (which I consider to be the distant origin of Maoism), the 1911 revolution in China, and other revolutions in the South at the beginning of the twentieth century, the debates at the beginning of the Bandung period and the analysis of the impasses in which the so-called emergent countries of the South committed to the capitalist path are stuck. All these considerations are corollaries of my central thesis concerning the polarization (i.e., construction of the center/periphery contrast) immanent to the world development of historical capitalism. This polarization eliminates the possibility for a country from the periphery to “catch up” within the context of capitalism. We must draw the conclusion: if “catching up” with the opulent countries is impossible, something else must be done—it is called following the socialist path.

China has not followed a particular path just since 1980, but since 1950, although this path has passed through phases that are different in many respects. China has developed a coherent, sovereign project that is appropriate for its own needs. This is certainly not capitalism, whose logic requires that agricultural land be treated as a commodity. This project remains sovereign insofar as China remains outside of contemporary financial globalization.

The fact that the Chinese project is not capitalist does not mean that it “is” socialist, only that it makes it possible to advance on the long road to socialism. Nevertheless, it is also still threatened with a drift that moves it off that road and ends up with a return, pure and simple, to capitalism.

China’s successful emergence is completely the result of this sovereign project. In this sense, China is the only authentically emergent country (along with Korea and Taiwan, about which we will say more later). None of the many other countries to which the World Bank has awarded a certificate of emergence is really emergent because none of these countries is persistently pursuing a coherent sovereign project. All subscribe to the fundamental principles of capitalism pure and simple, even in potential sectors of their state capitalism. All have accepted submission to contemporary globalization in all its dimensions, including financial. Russia and India are partial exceptions to this last point, but not Brazil, South Africa, and others. Sometimes there are pieces of a “national industry policy,” but nothing comparable with the systematic Chinese project of constructing a complete, integrated, and sovereign industrial system (notably in the area of technological expertise).

For these reasons all these other countries, too quickly characterized as emergent, remain vulnerable in varying degrees, but always much more than China. For all these reasons, the appearances of emergence—respectable rates of growth, capacities to export manufactured products—are always linked with the processes of pauperization that impact the majority of their populations (particularly the peasantry), which is not the case with China. Certainly the growth of inequality is obvious everywhere, including China; but this observation remains superficial and deceptive. Inequality in the distribution of benefits from a model of growth that nevertheless excludes no one (and is even accompanied with a reduction in pockets of poverty—this is the case in China) is one thing; the inequality connected with a growth that benefits only a minority (from 5 percent to 30 percent of the population, depending on the case) while the fate of the others remains desperate is another thing. The practitioners of China bashing are unaware—or pretend to be unaware—of this decisive difference. The inequality that is apparent from the existence of quarters with luxurious villas, on the one hand, and quarters with comfortable housing for the middle and working classes, on the other, is not the same as the inequality apparent from the juxtaposition of wealthy quarters, middle-class housing, and slums for the majority. The Gini coefficients are valuable for measuring the changes from one year to another in a system with a fixed structure. However, in international comparisons between systems with different structures, they lose their meaning, like all other measures of macroeconomic magnitudes in national accounts. The emergent countries (other than China) are indeed “emergent markets,” open to penetration by the monopolies of the imperialist triad. These markets allow the latter to extract, to their benefit, a considerable part of the surplus value produced in the country in question. China is different: it is an emergent nation in which the system makes possible the retention of the majority of the surplus value produced there.

Korea and Taiwan are the only two successful examples of an authentic emergence in and through capitalism. These two countries owe this success to the geostrategic reasons that led the United States to allow them to achieve what Washington prohibited others from doing. The contrast between the support of the United States to the state capitalism of these two countries and the extremely violent opposition to state capitalism in Nasser’s Egypt or Boumedienne’s Algeria is, on this account, quite illuminating.

I will not discuss here potential projects of emergence, which appear quite possible in Vietnam and Cuba, or the conditions of a possible resumption of progress in this direction in Russia. Nor will I discuss the strategic objectives of the struggle by progressive forces elsewhere in the capitalist South, in India, Southeast Asia, Latin America, the Arab World, and Africa, which could facilitate moving beyond current impasses and encourage the emergence of sovereign projects that initiate a true rupture with the logic of dominant capitalism.

Great Successes, New Challenges
China has not just arrived at the crossroads; it has been there every day since 1950. Social and political forces from the right and left, active in society and the party, have constantly clashed.

Where does the Chinese right come from? Certainly, the former comprador and bureaucratic bourgeoisies of the Guomindang were excluded from power. However, over the course of the war of liberation, entire segments of the middle classes, professionals, functionaries, and industrialists, disappointed by the ineffectiveness of the Guomindang in the face of Japanese aggression, drew closer to the Communist Party, even joining it. Many of them—but certainly not all—remained nationalists, and nothing more. Subsequently, beginning in 1990 with the opening to private initiative, a new, more powerful, right made its appearance. It should not be reduced simply to “businessmen” who have succeeded and made (sometimes colossal) fortunes, strengthened by their clientele—including state and party officials, who mix control with collusion, and even corruption.

This success, as always, encourages support for rightist ideas in the expanding educated middle classes. It is in this sense that the growing inequality—even if it has nothing in common with inequality characteristic of other countries in the South—is a major political danger, the vehicle for the spread of rightist ideas, depoliticization, and naive illusions.

Here I shall make an additional observation that I believe is important: petty production, particularly peasant, is not motivated by rightist ideas, like Lenin thought (that was accurate in Russian conditions). China’s situation contrasts here with that of the ex-USSR. The Chinese peasantry, as a whole, is not reactionary because it is not defending the principle of private property, in contrast with the Soviet peasantry, whom the communists never succeeded in turning away from supporting the kulaks in defense of private property. On the contrary, the Chinese peasantry of petty producers (without being small property owners) is today a class that does not offer rightist solutions, but is part of the camp of forces agitating for the adoption of the most courageous social and ecological policies. The powerful movement of “renovating rural society” testifies to this. The Chinese peasantry largely stands in the leftist camp, with the working class. The left has its organic intellectuals and it exercises some influence on the state and party apparatuses.

The perpetual conflict between the right and left in China has always been reflected in the successive political lines implemented by the state and party leadership. In the Maoist era, the leftist line did not prevail without a fight. Assessing the progress of rightist ideas within the party and its leadership, a bit like the Soviet model, Mao unleashed the Cultural Revolution to fight it. “Bombard the Headquarters,” that is, the Party leadership, where the “new bourgeoisie” was forming. However, while the Cultural Revolution met Mao’s expectations during the first two years of its existence, it subsequently deviated into anarchy, linked to the loss of control by Mao and the left in the party over the sequence of events. This deviation led to the state and party taking things in hand again, which gave the right its opportunity. Since then, the right has remained a strong part of all leadership bodies. Yet the left is present on the ground, restricting the supreme leadership to compromises of the “center”—but is that center right or center left?

To understand the nature of challenges facing China today, it is essential to understand that the conflict between China’s sovereign project, such as it is, and North American imperialism and its subaltern European and Japanese allies will increase in intensity to the extent that China continues its success. There are several areas of conflict: China’s command of modern technologies, access to the planet’s resources, the strengthening of China’s military capacities, and pursuit of the objective of reconstructing international politics on the basis of the sovereign rights of peoples to choose their own political and economic system. Each of these objectives enters into direct conflict with the objectives pursued by the imperialist triad.

The objective of U.S. political strategy is military control of the planet, the only way that Washington can retain the advantages that give it hegemony. This objective is being pursued by means of the preventive wars in the Middle East, and in this sense these wars are the preliminary to the preventive (nuclear) war against China, cold-bloodedly envisaged by the North American establishment as possibly necessary “before it is too late.” Fomenting hostility to China is inseparable from this global strategy, which is manifest in the support shown for the slaveowners of Tibet and Sinkiang, the reinforcement of the U.S. naval presence in the China Sea, and the unstinting encouragement to Japan to build its military forces. The practitioners of China bashing contribute to keeping this hostility alive.

Simultaneously, Washington is devoted to manipulating the situation by appeasing the possible ambitions of China and the other so-called emergent countries through the creation of the G20, which is intended to give these countries the illusion that their adherence to liberal globalization would serve their interests. The G2 (United States/China) is—in this vein—a trap that, in making China the accomplice of the imperialist adventures of the United States, could cause Beijing’s peaceful foreign policy to lose all its credibility.

The only possible effective response to this strategy must proceed on two levels: (i) strengthen China’s military forces and equip them with the potential for a deterrent response, and (ii) tenaciously pursue the objective of reconstructing a polycentric international political system, respectful of all national sovereignties, and, to this effect, act to rehabilitate the United Nations, now marginalized by NATO. I emphasize the decisive importance of the latter objective, which entails the priority of reconstructing a “front of the South” (Bandung 2?) capable of supporting the independent initiatives of the peoples and states of the South. It implies, in turn, that China becomes aware that it does not have the means for the absurd possibility of aligning with the predatory practices of imperialism (pillaging the natural resources of the planet), since it lacks a military power similar to that of the United States, which in the last resort is the guarantee of success for imperialist projects. China, in contrast, has much to gain by developing its offer of support for the industrialization of the countries of the South, which the club of imperialist “donors” is trying to make impossible.

The language used by Chinese authorities concerning international questions, restrained in the extreme (which is understandable), makes it difficult to know to what extent the leaders of the country are aware of the challenges analyzed above. More seriously, this choice of words reinforces naive illusions and depoliticization in public opinion.

The other part of the challenge concerns the question of democratizing the political and social management of the country.

Mao formulated and implemented a general principle for the political management of the new China that he summarized in these terms: rally the left, neutralize (I add: and not eliminate) the right, govern from the center left. In my opinion, this is the best way to conceive of an effective manner for moving through successive advances, understood and supported by the great majority. In this way, Mao gave a positive content to the concept of democratization of society combined with social progress on the long road to socialism. He formulated the method for implementing this: “the mass line” (go down into the masses, learn their struggles, go back to the summits of power). Lin Chun has analyzed with precision the method and the results that it makes possible.

The question of democratization connected with social progress—in contrast with a “democracy” disconnected from social progress (and even frequently connected with social regression)—does not concern China alone, but all the world’s peoples. The methods that should be implemented for success cannot be summarized in a single formula, valid in all times and places. In any case, the formula offered by Western media propaganda—multiple parties and elections—should quite simply be rejected. Moreover, this sort of “democracy” turns into farce, even in the West, more so elsewhere. The “mass line” was the means for producing consensus on successive, constantly progressing, strategic objectives. This is in contrast with the “consensus” obtained in Western countries through media manipulation and the electoral farce, which is nothing more than alignment with the requirements of capital.

Yet today, how should China begin to reconstruct the equivalent of a new mass line in new social conditions? It will not be easy because the power of the leadership, which has moved mostly to the right in the Communist Party, bases the stability of its management on depoliticization and the naive illusions that go along with that. The very success of the development policies strengthens the spontaneous tendency to move in this direction. It is widely believed in China, in the middle classes, that the royal road to catching up with the way of life in the opulent countries is now open, free of obstacles; it is believed that the states of the triad (United States, Europe, Japan) do not oppose that; U.S. methods are even uncritically admired; etc. This is particularly true for the urban middle classes, which are rapidly expanding and whose conditions of life are incredibly improved. The brainwashing to which Chinese students are subject in the United States, particularly in the social sciences, combined with a rejection of the official unimaginative and tedious teaching of Marxism, have contributed to narrowing the spaces for radical critical debates.

The government in China is not insensitive to the social question, not only because of the tradition of a discourse founded on Marxism, but also because the Chinese people, who learned how to fight and continue to do so, force the government’s hand. If, in the 1990s, this social dimension had declined before the immediate priorities of speeding up growth, today the tendency is reversed. At the very moment when the social-democratic conquests of social security are being eroded in the opulent West, poor China is implementing the expansion of social security in three dimensions—health, housing, and pensions. China’s popular housing policy, vilified by the China bashing of the European right and left, would be envied, not only in India or Brazil, but equally in the distressed areas of Paris, London, or Chicago!

Social security and the pension system already cover 50 percent of the urban population (which has increased, recall, from 200 to 600 million inhabitants!) and the Plan (still carried out in China) anticipates increasing the covered population to 85 percent in the coming years. Let the journalists of China bashing give us comparable examples in the “countries embarked on the democratic path,” which they continually praise. Nevertheless, the debate remains open on the methods for implementing the system. The left advocates the French system of distribution based on the principle of solidarity between these workers and different generations—which prepares for the socialism to come—while the right, obviously, prefers the odious U.S. system of pension funds, which divides workers and transfers the risk from capital to labor.

However, the acquisition of social benefits is insufficient if it is not combined with democratization of the political management of society, with its re-politicization by methods that strengthen the creative invention of forms for the socialist/communist future.

Following the principles of a multi-party electoral system as advocated ad nauseam by Western media and the practitioners of China bashing, and defended by “dissidents” presented as authentic “democrats,” does not meet the challenge. On the contrary, the implementation of these principles could only produce in China, as all the experiences of the contemporary world demonstrate (in Russia, Eastern Europe, the Arab world), the self-destruction of the project of emergence and social renaissance, which is in fact the actual objective of advocating these principles, masked by an empty rhetoric (“there is no other solution than multi-party elections”!). Yet it is not sufficient to counter this bad solution with a fallback to the rigid position of defending the privilege of the “party,” itself sclerotic and transformed into an institution devoted to recruitment of officials for state administration. Something new must be invented.

The objectives of re-politicization and creation of conditions favorable to the invention of new responses cannot be obtained through “propaganda” campaigns. They can only be promoted through social, political, and ideological struggles. That implies the preliminary recognition of the legitimacy of these struggles and legislation based on the collective rights of organization, expression, and proposing legislative initiatives. That implies, in turn, that the party itself is involved in these struggles; in other words, reinvents the Maoist formula of the mass line. Re-politicization makes no sense if it is not combined with procedures that encourage the gradual conquest of responsibility by workers in the management of their society at all levels—company, local, and national. A program of this sort does not exclude recognition of the rights of the individual person. On the contrary, it supposes their institutionalization. Its implementation would make it possible to reinvent new ways of using elections to choose leaders.

Acknowledgements
This paper owes much to the debates organized in China (November–December 2012) by Lau Kin Chi (Linjang University, Hong Kong), in association with the South West University of Chongqing (Wen Tiejun), Renmin and Xinhua Universities of Beijing (Dai Jinhua, Wang Hui), the CASS (Huang Ping) and to meetings with groups of activists from the rural movement in the provinces of Shanxi, Shaanxi, Hubei, Hunan and Chongqing. I extend to all of them my thanks and hope that this paper will be useful for their ongoing discussions. It also owes much to my reading of the writings of Wen Tiejun and Wang Hui.

Notes
↩ China bashing refers to the favored sport of Western media of all tendencies—including the left, unfortunately—that consists of systematically denigrating, even criminalizing, everything done in China. China exports cheap junk to the poor markets of the third world (this is true), a horrible crime. However, it also produces high-speed trains, airplanes, satellites, whose marvelous technological quality is praised in the West, but to which China should have no right! They seem to think that the mass construction of housing for the working class is nothing but the abandonment of workers to slums and liken “inequality” in China (working class houses are not opulent villas) to that in India (opulent villas side-by-side with slums), etc. China bashing panders to the infantile opinion found in some currents of the powerless Western “left”: if it is not the communism of the twenty-third century, it is a betrayal! China bashing participates in the systematic campaign of maintaining hostility towards China, in view of a possible military attack. This is nothing less than a question of destroying the opportunities for an authentic emergence of a great people from the South.
Sources

The Chinese Path and the Agrarian Question
Karl Kautsky, On the Agrarian Question, 2 vols. (London: Zwan Publications, 1988). Originally published 1899.

Samir Amin, “The Paris Commune and the Taiping Revolution,” International Critical Thought, forthcoming in 2013.

Samir Amin, “The 1911 Revolution in a World Historical Perspective: A Comparison with the Meiji Restoration and the Revolutions in Mexico, Turkey and Egypt,” published in Chinese in 1990.

Samir Amin, Ending the Crisis of Capitalism or Ending Capitalism? (Oxford: Pambazuka Press, 2011), chapter 5, “The Agrarian Question.”

Contemporary Globalization, the Imperialist Challenge
Samir Amin, A Life Looking Forward: Memoirs of An Independent Marxist (London: Zed Books, 2006), chapter 7, “Deployment and Erosion of the Bandung Project.”

Samir Amin, The Law of Worldwide Value (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2010), “Initiatives from the South,” 121ff, section 4.

Samir Amin, The Implosion of Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, forthcoming in 2013), chapter 2, “The South: Emergence and Lumpendevelopment.”

Samir Amin, Beyond US Hegemony (London: Zed Books, 2006). “The Project of the American Ruling Class,” “China, Market Socialism?,” “Russia, Out of the Tunnel?,” “India, A Great Power?,” and “Multipolarity in the 20th Century.”

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The Democratic Challenge
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https://monthlyreview.org/2013/03/01/china-2013/

RIP Samir Amin
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Re: China

Post by blindpig » Sun Sep 16, 2018 2:00 pm

Correcting the record on China and Africa
By Ian Goodrum | chinadaily.com.cn | Updated: 2018-09-03 15:25

Image
An aerial photo of China-built Brazzaville cable-stayed bridge in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, June 10, 2018. [Photo/Xinhua]

In 1971, when the People’s Republic of China’s United Nations status was put to a vote, it was newly independent African countries who provided the crucial majority and ensured China was able to take its rightful seat on the UN Security Council. Thanks to the goodwill of its “African brothers”, as Chairman Mao Zedong called them, China could finally join the global family of nations. With that vote — and with the Communist Party of China’s earlier support for liberation struggles across the continent — an unbreakable bond between China and Africa was forged.

Which is why it should come as no surprise Africa plays an important role in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This enormous project includes $60 billion in development aid, primarily geared toward sorely needed infrastructure. The aim of the BRI is to give a leg up to historically exploited regions of the world and bring them into the global economy through new trade and supply routes.

Yet ever since the initiative was announced in 2013, there has been an ongoing campaign to paint it in the most negative possible terms. Some in the United States and elsewhere in the West have gone so far as to label it a “new colonialism” or “imperialism” — despite their countries’ own complicity in the colonialism of the past and the imperialism of the present.

We should expect even more ignorant condemnation as the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation gets underway in Beijing this week. I imagine keyboards are clacking away in preparation for the latest anti-China media blitz. Ignored in these fiery missives is what Africans themselves think of the relationship; polling shows favorability toward China is high, and African international students now prefer a Chinese higher education over one from any other country with the exception of France. Strangely, the African people and their governments don’t seem to think they’re being colonized. You’d figure they would know what it looks like.

The simple fact is trustworthy judgments about colonialism don’t come from colonizers. The people of Africa deserve the right to choose their own development path, and having experienced crisis and stagnation despite “assistance” from the West, they are now taking a different approach with China’s help. China knows all too well what it’s like to be under the yoke of an oppressor, and builds foreign aid packages with that brutal, recent history in mind.

But this isn’t a brand new strategy — it goes back decades. In 1964, then-Premier Zhou Enlai announced China’s “Eight Principles for Economic Aid” during a visit to Ghana. The principles lay out the country’s philosophy plainly; topping the list is a commitment to “equality and mutual benefit” when providing aid.

So of course China counts on the countries it assists to become valued trade partners. “Mutual benefit” is a stated objective, not some hidden secret. People who think they’re making a bold proclamation by revealing China expects a return on investment should investigate before they speak: the first principle also says China “never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms.”

And it’s true that at first glance, Chinese aid to Africa lags behind international bodies like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These are organizations who’ve earned a reputation for low interest rates and heavily concessional lending. But with those creditors, there’s a catch — a big, economy-crashing catch.

As lenders of last resort, the IMF and World Bank are able to impose a litany of conditions on any would-be borrowers. These conditions include privatization of pension funds, shrinking the state sector and the reduction or elimination of subsidies for staple goods. Essentially, if a country wants money from these multinational organizations, it is forced to undergo an austerity regime that smothers development in the crib and leaves its people languishing in poverty — exactly where it was before, only now with a heavy debt burden and an economy fully open to exploitation by neocolonial powers.

It’s hardly a coincidence that from 1984 to 1990, a period when these “structural adjustment programs” were at their peak, the “Third World” transferred an estimated $178 billion in wealth to Western commercial banks. Wholesale looting of entire continents was made possible by this policy; the key difference between development aid from the West and China is China imposes no such conditions on its lending. Countries are able to continue governing themselves as before, and if they choose to reform they do so freely. “No strings attached” assistance has been a centerpiece of Xi’s rhetoric in state visits to Africa, and that promise is undoubtedly a big reason why Africa trusts China. Not coincidentally, aid without conditions is Zhou’s second principle.

China’s recent history also presents an appealing route for African countries looking to clamber their way out of underdevelopment. Through its system of state-led reform and strict controls on foreign entry, China has been able to use markets as a mechanism for growth while deploying resources with the kind of efficiency only feasible through central planning. This has led to a stratospheric rise in GDP and wages across the board, culminating with China taking its current position as the world’s second-largest economy.

Africa doesn’t have to follow the Chinese example to the letter, but China’s historic poverty reduction and rapid infrastructure building hold plenty of interest for nations who’ve spent decades trying to advance their economies and improve living standards. I defy anyone who has taken a ride on a Chinese high-speed train not to want a similar railway network in their country.

Some in the West will squawk about “colonialism” while denying their own countries’ roles in Africa’s subjugation. Better not to pay them any mind; the results speak for themselves. China is helping the continent toward a better future, while each new statement from the White House shows the US is little more than a fair-weather friend. After all, would a true ally say the unprintable things President Donald Trump has about the African continent?

The author is a copy editor with chinadaily.com.cn.

The opinions expressed here are those of the writer and do not represent the views of China Daily and China Daily website.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201809/0 ... 8948f.html
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Re: China

Post by blindpig » Mon Sep 17, 2018 3:14 pm

What about the Uyghurs?
15 september, 2018 by stalinsmoustache

I begin with a caveat: for more than six months I have not read corporate (sometimes called ‘western’) news sources. Instead, I read more reliable and in-depth sources, for reasons I have explained elsewhere. I find corporate news sources given to selective sensationalism, in which they select a few items, give them a twist and distort them, so as to produce a sensationalist account that does violence with the facts, fits into a certain narrative and attracts a certain readership (some ‘western’ Marxists among them). It is like a toxic drip into the brain, with which I can well do without.

By word of mouth and from reliable sources, I have heard that it has become fashionable in some quarters to switch from the ‘vegetarian between meals’ (Dalai Lama) and focus on the Uyghurs, mostly concentrated in Xinjiang province in the far western parts of China. Supposedly, the whole of the Uyghur minority is kept under what some call a ‘police state’. The reason why is never articulated, except perhaps the inherent evil of the Communist Party of China.

Let us have a look at the facts.

To begin with, there is the simple historical question. Xinjiang was incorporated into the Chinese state in the 1750s and eventually became a full province in 1884, marking the western border of the Chinese state under the Qing. Obviously, Xinjiang has been part of China for centuries.

Further, for some international critics, the claim that radical Muslim Uyghurs are involved in terrorism is a smokescreen for the suppression of the Uyghur. But let us see how selective the terminology of ‘separatism’ and ‘terrorism’ is. From one perspective, the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001 is ‘terrorist’, while the efforts by some in Tibet and Xinjiang are peaceful and ‘separatist’, seeking independence. In short, any attack on western sites are ‘terrorist’, but any attack in other parts of the world – whether China or Russia or Syria – are ‘separatist’. From another perspective, the attempted suicide attack on a China Southern flight in 2008, threats to attack the Beijing Olympics in 2008, a car ramming in Tiananmen Square in 2013 and the deadly knife attack in Kunming railway station – all perpetrated by Uyghur radical Muslims – are ‘terrorist’ acts. To add a twist to all this, the Chinese government typically uses a three-character phrase, “separatism, extremism and terrorism,” which indicates that they see a continuum and not an either-or relation.

Third, it is clearly not the case that the whole of the Uyghur minority nationality is engaged in separatism, extremism and terrorism. I have encountered a good number of Uyghurs who assert strongly and passionately that they are Chinese and decry the small number of their nationality who engage in terrorist activities. The fact is that a very small number of Uyghurs, influenced by radical Islam, have engaged in terrorist activities. By far the vast majority of Uyghurs see themselves as part of China and seek to contribute positively to it.

Fourth, a crucial feature of Chinese sovereignty is the resistance to all forms of foreign interference. This approach to sovereignty arises from the anti-colonial struggles of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in which Chinese independence from semi-colonialism developed a strong sense of the need to prevent foreign intervention. (It also influences China’s dealings with other countries, in which it avoids any effort to change political, economic and social patterns.) Thus, there has been a profoundly negative effect from the CIA’s intervention in Tibet in the 1950s, funding the Dalai Lama and inciting the ill-fated uprising in 1959, in which tens of thousands of Tibetans died and the Dalai Lama and his entourage fled to India. CIA operations wound up in the 1970s, only to be replaced with western propaganda, funding and organisation – especially by the United States’ National Endowment for Democracy that carries on the work of the CIA – of protests in Tibet, all of which are based on a particular interpretation of ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’. These activities have also focused on Xinjiang, with the added dimension of a distinct increase in influence from Islamic radicalism from further west in the 1990s. The discovery of Uyghurs training with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, or links with militant groups in restive parts of Pakistan, as well as various radical fronts focused on Xinjiang and passing weapons, explosives and militants along drug routes, made it clear to the Chinese government that another form of foreign interference had arisen. All of these efforts are seen as profound challenges to Chinese sovereignty.

Fifth, it is asserted by some that Uyghurs are subjected to facial recognition cameras, social credit systems and political arrest. Let us set the record straight. Facial recognition cameras, first developed reliably in China (as with so much technological innovation these days) are used for the sake of social security – a fundamental feature of Chinese culture. I am told that some corporate media reports make much of the fining of jaywalkers. This is laughable. If the Chinese devoted their valuable time and energy to this pursuit, billions of fines would be given every day, for the Chinese love to jaywalk. Instead, facial recognition cameras are used for more serious purposes: criminal networks; fugitives from justice; or terrorist cells.

Social credit: the best example is a recent announcement on a high-speed train. The announcement stated that if you had not bought a ticket and did not contact the conductor as soon as possible, it would reflect negatively on your social credit record. In other words, the system is geared to ensuring conformity with the laws of the land.

Arrest for political purposes: this is usually framed in terms of ‘prisoners of conscience’, who are supposedly subjected to ‘brain-washing’ techniques. Again, let us deal with the facts. China has abolished re-education labour camps, although it could be argued that in certain circumstances (international interference) that they can be a good thing. Instead, a central feature of high-school and university is ‘ideological and political education’. This entails being taught the basics of Marxism, socialism with Chinese characteristics, and now Xi Jinping Thought. All worthwhile subjects that need to be taught well. And all Chinese people – including the 55 minority nationalities and even theological colleges – must study such subjects

Sixth, some sources – such as the ‘Human Rights Watch’ (affiliated with the US state department) trot out a standard ‘western’ approach to ‘human rights’. This tradition typically focuses on civil and political rights, such as freedom of political expression, assembly, religion and so on. In an imperialist move, this specific tradition of human rights is assumed to be universal, applying to all parts of the globe. Because some Uyghurs are denied Muslim practices, expressions of anti-Chinese sentiment, and subjected to ideological and political education, this is deemed to be a violation of ‘human rights’.

The problem here is that such an approach systematically neglects alternative approaches, such as the Chinese Marxist one. This tradition identifies the right to economic wellbeing as the primary human right. So we find that in relation to Xinjiang, Chinese sources have identified the deep root of the problem as poverty. Thus, when unrest in Xinjiang rose to a new level in the 1990s (under foreign influence), much analysis and policy revision followed. The result was two-pronged: an immediate focus on comprehensive security (which is a core feature of Chinese society at many levels); and a long-term effort to improve economic conditions in a region that still lagged behind the much of eastern China. Not all such incentives have been as successful as might have been hoped, with the various nationalities in Xinjiang – not merely Uyghur, but also including Han, Hui, Kazak, Mongol and Kirgiz – benefitting at different levels. The most significant project to date is the massive Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2014. Although its geographical scope is much vaster than the western parts of China, the economic effect is already being felt in these parts. In light of all this It is reasonable to say that there has been a marked improvement in the economic wellbeing of all those who live in these and other regions, such as Yunnan and Guizhou. The basic position is that if people see that their living conditions have improved, they will more willingly see themselves as part of the greater whole

The outcome: in the short-term the Chinese government has instituted various measures to ensure that the terrorist attacks of 2008, 2013 and 2014 do not happen again. The fact that they have not happened in the last few years is testimony to the effectiveness of these measures. In the long-term, previous policies to develop Xinjiang economically have been assessed and found wanting, so a whole new approach has been developed in terms of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Finally, we should be aware of the deeper level of the ‘preferential policy [youhui zhengce]’ in relation to all of the 55 minority nationalities in China. Since its revision in the 1990s (after careful studies of the breakup of the Soviet Union), the policy has developed two poles of a dialectic. On the one hand, autonomy of the minority nationalities was to be enhanced, in terms of economic progress, language, education, culture and political leadership. On the other hand, China’s borders were strengthened as absolutely inviolable. Secession is simply not an option. A contradiction? Of course, but the sense is that for the vast majority of the nationalities, it is precisely the benefits of increased autonomy that has led them to appreciate being part of China.

https://stalinsmoustache.org/2018/09/15 ... e-uyghurs/
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Re: China

Post by blindpig » Tue Sep 18, 2018 1:39 pm

US Decries Chinese High-Speed Rail in Laos

Image

China’s plans to build high-speed rail connecting Kunming in its Yunnan province with the rest of Southeast Asia are already underway. In the landlocked nation of Laos, tunnels and bridges are already under construction.

The United States has, in general, condemned China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) sweeping infrastructure programme, with US and European policy circles accusing Beijing of what they call “debt trap diplomacy.”

Quartz in an article titled, “Eight countries in danger of falling into China’s “debt trap”,” would claim:

Beijing “encourages dependency using opaque contracts, predatory loan practices, and corrupt deals that mire nations in debt and undercut their sovereignty, denying them their long-term, self-sustaining growth,” said US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on March 6. “Chinese investment does have the potential to address Africa’s infrastructure gap, but its approach has led to mounting debt and few, if any, jobs in most countries,” he added.

The report continued, stating:

Some call this “debt-trap diplomacy“: Offer the honey of cheap infrastructure loans, with the sting of default coming if smaller economies can’t generate enough free cash to pay their interest down.

While nations should protect themselves from the dangers of being indebted to foreign interests, the US and supposedly international institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are hardly innocent of wielding debt as a geopolitical weapon themselves.

However, while some of China’s projects may be questionable, others offer tangible benefits not only for China, but for the regions they will be interlinking.

Laos’ Escape from Colonial Shadows

The real concern in Washington, London and Brussels is regarding infrastructure projects that are successful, bringing profit and benefits to both Beijing and partner nations, allowing them to collectively move out from under centuries of Western primacy.

Before Chinese investment picked up in Laos, the capital of Vientiane was diminutive even compared to nearby Thai provincial capitals. The sports utility vehicles of US and European nongovernmental organisations could be seen driving through the small city’s streets, some of which were unpaved. Banners bearing the UN logo encouraged local residents to turn off their lights, making an already eerily dark capital even darker at night.

Campaigners funded by Western capitals attempted to obstruct earlier projects, including dams that would have created energy, expanded industrialisation, provided jobs and boosted the economy.

Over the past decade, Chinese investment has seen highways built across Laos connecting its isolated capital with its neighbours. Vientiane has seen not only an uptick in Chinese investment, but from Vietnam and Thailand as well.

The completion of a high-speed rail network connecting Kunming, China to Singapore, and passing through Vientiane, Laos, will bring even more people, goods and investments into the nation.

US Offers Only Complaining as Alternative

The US State Department’s Radio Free Asia (RFA) media front in a special titled, “China’s Fast Track to Influence: Building a Railway in Laos,” attempts to leverage America’s favourite soft power tools, namely “human rights” and “environmental issues” along with warnings of debt to cast doubts on the project.

The article claims:

The railway – which will eventually run from Kunming in southwestern China through Laos, Thailand, and Malaysia to Singapore – is a key component of China’s signature global infrastructure plan, the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative.

China is now the top investor in Laos, and Chinese companies are pouring billions of dollars into Special Economic Zones, dams, mines, and rubber plantations. Beijing hopes the aid and investment will draw the landlocked Southeast Asian nation, a former French colony with close ties to its communist mentor state Vietnam, into Beijing’s orbit.

The article also claims:

“[Laos was] left with no real alternative but to accept large-scale Chinese investment in infrastructure, even if it meant accepting the economic and political influence that comes with it,” researcher Michael Hart wrote in the Dec. 20, 2017 issue of World Politics Review. “The risk of rebuffing Beijing was too great, as sustained growth and faster development are vital to ensure the legitimacy of the ruling party.”

The supposed alternative to Chinese-built infrastructure and real, tangible progress, of course, is for Laos to continue hosting US and European NGOs attempting to create parallel institutions to run the nation with before eventually replacing the ruling political order in Vientiane with a US and European-backed client state.

Even as Laos begins to irreversibly exit from under the shadow of the West’s colonial past, the US and Europe are unable to offer any significant projects that actually provide Laos with an alternative route toward real economic progress.

RFA’s article attempts to scrutinise government compensation for residents displaced by the project and point out supposed environmental issues tied to the railway, two vectors the US has often used to impede development in nations worldwide to prevent economic progress and competition to US preeminence.

The US media is also attempting to encourage fears of a China it claims in the near future will overstep its bounds and trample its neighbours.

While China will undoubtedly win significant influence in Laos and reap benefits from its infrastructure projects across the region, other nations across Southeast Asia will as well.

The sort of primacy achieved by Europe and the US across Asia before the World Wars will be difficult, if not impossible for China to duplicate. While China does possess a powerful economy and is constructing a formidable military, the disparity in economic power and military might in the region today is not comparable to that which existed between Western colonial powers and their subjects in the past.

The technological divide that had previously granted the industrialised West its advantage over the rest of the underdeveloped world has been bridged. The same technology China is now using to drive its manufacturing and high-tech industries are also being leveraged by other developing nations across Asia offering competition as well as a regional balance of power.

This exposes the real fears Washington is currently dealing with, not a China transforming into a regional or global hegemon and threat, but a multipolar Asia that is no longer subjected to US hegemony or threats.

Joseph Thomas is chief editor of Thailand-based geopolitical journal, The New Atlas and contributor to the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.


https://journal-neo.org/2018/04/23/us-d ... l-in-laos/

NEO can be questionable but this don't stink. The thing about criticism of China on environmental grounds is that it blithely ignores the rapine of capitalism.

What really pisses Western capital off is that Chinese loans are very low to zero interest and their bloodsuckers can't compete with that. I can see the tweet "UNFAIR!"
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Re: China

Post by blindpig » Tue Sep 18, 2018 4:44 pm

Most Of What We Hear About China Is Red Scare, Yellow Peril Propaganda
Western news outlets have been repeatedly slandering China, using a tried and true combination of Cold War cliches and Orientalism. What's true, what's false, and what's their agenda?

With an ongoing trade war, tensions rising in the South China Sea, and the growing esteem of President Xi Jinping, China has been the subject of a significant amount of our twenty four hour news cycle. If, like me, you've subjected yourself to any of it then let me be the first to say: I'm sorry. Also, you've been lied to.

The outpour of completely baseless, biased, and unresearched horror stories is astonishing. Tales of aggressive military expansion, neocolonialism, torture, human rights violations, and massive unrestrained surveillance systems have made headlines again and again. Besides the obvious hypocrisy of decrying the very same things these companies praise western countries for doing, what's most concerning about these stories is their glaring inaccuracies. To help unmask Sinophobia and propaganda in the media, let's take a closer look at some stories which have made headlines recently.

"Big data meets Big Brother as China moves to rate its citizens"
China's social credit system, unveiled June 14, 2014, has made a lot of headlines recently as the government moves to implement it in its entirety across the whole country. Thousands of articles have been written comparing the system to Black Mirror and 1984, crying over Chinese citizens with bad social credit having been denied access to schools and transit. And, indeed, these half-truths sound horrifying and tyrannical. What is left out, however, is that social credit is determined exclusively by a citizen's business practices. Unlike in the US where unethical companies like Bain Capital are allowed to buy, gut, and ruin companies before declaring bankruptcy for profit, in China, bad business is punished. Hou Yunchun, former deputy director of the development research center of the State Council, said: "If we don't increase the cost of being discredited, we are encouraging discredited people to keep at it." Further, discredited people have full and equal access to all public services, including public schools and public transit. They can only be barred from using luxury travel options such as first-class flight and access to private schooling. Zhi Zhenfeng, a legal expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said: "How the person is restricted in terms of public services or business opportunities should be in accordance with how and to what extent he or she lost his credibility." Minor offenses only yield minor punishments, major offenses, major punishments. "Discredited people deserve legal consequences," Zhi continued. "This is definitely a step in the right direction to building a society with credibility." Companies known to be in violation of the law and ethical business practices have also been publically exposed by the government. This is all part of China's ongoing anti-corruption campaign.


"Muslims forced to drink alcohol and eat pork in China’s ‘re-education’ camps, former inmate claims"
Omir Bekali, a Uighur, a minority from the autonomous region Xinjiang, made headlines across the world after he came out with a shocking and bizarre story of hellish re-education camps where Muslims were allegedly forced to drink alcohol and eat pork. He claims also to have been shackled and beaten. His account is brutal and depicts a world of harassment, religious and ethnic discrimination, and slightly milder torture than the methods used on prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. His vivid and emotional account would likely inspire real international outrage if even a single person reported anything remotely similar. The story is nonsense. He claims to have been kidnapped, tortured, and forced to violate Islamic code of conduct and yet not one person besides Mr. Bekali has reported so much as Islamophobic harassment by Chinese authorities in Xinjiang, or anywhere else for that matter.

Xinjiang is home to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, a violent separatist group of religious extremists who have killed over 100 in multiple terror attacks across the region. Uighur Islamic extremists have been found among the ranks of ISIS and have vowed to "make your [China's] blood flow in rivers, by the will of God." These extremists claim to be oppressed by the Chinese government despite enjoying regional autonomy, receiving significant developmental aid from Beijing, and China's ongoing policy to promote religious freedom and harmony. In China, freedom of religion is protected in the constitution, anti-Islamic content was recently banned in social media, and Islam is experiencing a revival.

Bekali's account is completely without foundation in reality. He directly contradicts himself in other interviews, like this one from the Daily Mail. The account here is even more outlandish and tells of farcical chanting and hourly oaths of loyalty to the Communist Party. This particular account puts ol' Joe McCarthy himself to shame with its overuse of tired, Cold War era anti-communist cliches. The entire story, which was largely reported on, seems to be wholly false. Xinjiang's GDP has grown steadily at a rate far exceeding the national average and Uighur members of the Communist Party have expressed the growing desire for unity between Xinjiang and China, as well as among the regions many ethnicities and religious groups.

"Emperor Xi Jinping: China enters a new era under just one leader"
This racist, rambling tirade by News.com Australia's Jamie Seidel is perhaps the most egregious, orientalist thing I've ever read. When talking about the amendment to the Chinese constitution which abolished term limits, he sarcastically writes: "The glory of [the] Middle Kingdom will be restored again." He also describes Xi Jinping as an emperor and makes countless references to imperial China (or, rather, his image of imperial China which is basically just an amalgam of every traditional Asian stereotype). This is Orientalism. Rather than writing about this modern nation as a modern nation, Seidel prefers to crack jokes and reduce China to an inaccurate and racist caricature. This same Orientalism is mirrored in articles like those by the BBC and CNN, among others, which talk of "heirs" and "emperors"; and is especially evident in the constant reference to the DPR of Korea as "the hermit kingdom."

The reality is that China has democratized. Term limits were added to the constitution after the chairmanship of Deng Xiaoping to ensure that the massive economic reform that was underway would not become stagnant or stalled under one leader. It ensured that China's leadership would be focused on the present conditions, rather than future elections. With the reforms having proven an objective success, and China's efforts now focusing on the move towards socialism, there is no longer a need for such an undemocratic and arbitrary amendment. There will still be elections and Xi Jinping still is not guaranteed a third term. Plenty of western leaders have been serving for a lot longer with a lot less support, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel who is currently in her fourth consecutive term.

"Eight countries in danger of falling into China’s “debt trap“
Chinese influence overseas has been questioned again and again, often by the same people who consistently support western military adventures overseas. The above article by Quartz laments the plights of Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, the Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. What a tragedy it is that they must be subjected to infrastructure and factories at the hands of powerful and super forgiving Chinese developers. It is a testament to Quartz reporter Tim Fernholz's shamelessness and hypocrisy that he readily admits that the US' largest military base in Africa is in Djibouti, one of the countries supposedly at risk of falling into Chinese "imperialism." He says this in the same sentence which attacks Chinese involvement in the nation. Only an aggressively ignorant western chauvinist could write that Chinese airports are a threat but American soldiers aren't. One can only imagine the indignation Fernholz would feel if China began "waging a massive shadow war" in Africa like the US has been doing. One has to ask, is Fernholz aware of this? Is the great reporter aware of the colonial taxes Frances continues to impose on the African nations they once directly colonized? Why, Mr. Fernholz, are roads, schools, and power plants the big danger?

These are just a handful of the mass of vitriolic propaganda aimed at China. And that's just from private companies. The US Embassy in China claimed to have been the target of "sonic attacks." These unexplained science fiction weapons China's supposedly using against Americans sound eerily similar to those the US Embassy claimed to have been attacked within Cuba which were determined to be completely made up.

So why the lies and the slander? Why all the hate? Perhaps they're overcompensating. China’s president, Xi Jinping, is undoubtedly one of the most brilliant statesmen of the 21st century. And over 80% of Chinese polled said they supported him, had faith in their government, and were optimistic about their country’s future. By contrast, optimism has been severely lacking across Europe, Canada, Australia, and the United States. The crisis of confidence in the United Kingdom resulted in one of the longest hung parliaments in British history, with the hugely unpopular Theresa May just barely clinging onto her majority. Even the monarchy is becoming increasingly unpopular. Two-thirds of the population said they didn’t care about the Royal Wedding, a huge decline since the last one. It seems that the royal family's obscene waste of taxpayer money has finally caught up to them. The violent removal of homeless people before the wedding didn't help endear them much either. “Fuck the Royals” parties were held in pubs across the country. In Spain, when large portions of the population aren’t trying to secede, the government is struggling to deal with a growing labor movement which held mass protests this May Day. In France, the May Day protesters were decidedly more hardcore, clashing with riot police. And when protesters aren't setting cops on fire, they're burning effigies of President Emmanuel Macron in protest against his uneconomic reforms which resulted in the loss of over 120,000 jobs. Justin Trudeau can't stop embarrassing himself every time he steps outside of Canada. Julia Gillard leads the most unpopular government Australia's had in forty years. And I don't think I even have to mention how much people hate Donald Trump both inside and out of the US.


Image
I mean just look at these idiots...


The truth is, they're afraid. China has beaten the West at its own game. The emerging superpower has outpaced and outdone them. They have a larger, more educated workforce, a more robust economy built on actually producing things, and a plan for the future. The West doesn't seem to have a plan for the present. As China marches toward the horizon, united and prosperous, so we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past, unable to afford basic necessities like food and rent.

https://www.theodysseyonline.com/most-w ... propaganda
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Re: China

Post by blindpig » Wed Sep 26, 2018 4:38 pm

Spotlight: China's white paper "quite effective" in outlining its trade stance: experts
Source: Xinhua| 2018-09-26 18:57:10|Editor: Lu Hui

by Xinhua writer Yang Shilong

NEW YORK, Sept. 25 (Xinhua) -- The white paper just released by China on its trade friction with the United States has been "quite effective" in defending the legitimacy of its positions on trade and innovation while highlighting U.S. trade bullying and intimidation, experts said.

"The Facts and China's Position on China-U.S. Trade Friction," released on Monday, outlines the Chinese government's response to criticisms leveled against the world's largest developing country by the United States, including those with respect to the perceived trade imbalance, the subsidy policy and alleged intellectual property theft.

The key message is that China's trade and investment policies and practices are "anchored in international law and economic reason" and that China "stands ready for principled win-win compromise on this basis," Sourabh Gupta, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Institute for China-America Studies, said in an interview with Xinhua via email on Tuesday.

However, the same cannot be said of Washington, Gupta said.

"Its attempt to re-write the rules of law and reason in its economic intercourse with China on the basis of unilateralism, protectionism and self-centeredness is an abdication of global public goods responsibilities and poses a grave threat to the international economic order," he said.

The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has leaned heavily towards unilateralism and tried to use coercion in its trade negotiations with China to get what it wants, while China has said it is willing to negotiate on an equal basis but rejected unilateralism. China has also made it clear that it will adhere to the policy of reform and opening-up to further develop its economy.

Gupta said the white paper released by China is well-timed.

The white paper was released at a time when unilateral tariffs on an additional 200 billion U.S. dollars worth of goods imported from China took effect. China responded in a steadfast but measured way by subjecting about 60 billion dollars worth of U.S. imports to retaliatory tariffs.

Gupta said that the explicit purpose of China in releasing the White Paper is to offer a "robust defense" of its liberalization policies and practices since its accession to the World Trade Organization, and challenge Washington's narrative "head-on" on topics ranging from the bilateral goods trade deficit to so-called "fair trade" and alleged intellectual property rights infringements.

"By detailing the U.S.' own hypocritical set of policies that discriminate against Chinese goods and investments and run afoul of international law, the intent is to apply the adage 'the best defense is a good offense,'" he said.

Gupta said the document also serves the purpose of sending a "signal that China has not got -- and will not get -- weak-kneed in the face of unjust and escalatory U.S. trade enforcement actions."

"If there were expectations in Washington that China would bow to pressure because U.S. has more items on which it can impose tariffs, then those expectations are misplaced. China is prepared to play the long game with the U.S. until such time that its international legal rights as well as its right to development is respected," he said.

Zhu Zhiqun, a professor of political science and international relations at Bucknell University, said it is necessary for China to release the white paper and "set the record right" as the trade friction keeps escalating.

It shows that China hopes the United States will "fully understand China's position" before going to the negotiating table, thus laying a sound foundation for the next round of negotiations, he said.

"Of course, the key is that the U.S. is willing to talk about resolving differences through rational consultation on an equal basis, instead of coercing China to accept the unilateral requirements and conditions set by the U.S.," Zhu added.

Stephen Roach, a senior fellow at Yale University's Jackson Institute for Global Affairs known for advocating effective communication between China and the United States, said the white paper as a response of China to U.S. accusations is "long overdue."

The former chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia even went on to suggest that it is helpful to include a ranking of issues that "are most important -- and least important -- in driving a wedge between the U.S. and China."

"I think this white paper is quite effective in offering a detailed response by China to U.S. charges and counter-charges," he said.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-0 ... 494448.htm
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Re: China

Post by blindpig » Wed Sep 26, 2018 10:36 pm

New CPC rules to expel members who express support for bourgeois liberalization online
By Cao Siqi Source:Global Times Published: 2018/9/25 21:53:39
Members of the Communist Party of China (CPC) will be expelled from the Party if they openly adhere to bourgeois liberalization online, according to the newly revised regulations on Party disciplinary action that will take effect in October.

The CPC Central Committee published the revised regulations in August and most of the new provisions added touch on punishments for violations of political discipline, especially disloyalty to the Party's central committee and corrupt behavior.

The circular not only sets a bottom line for Party members' political disciplinary actions, but also imposes stricter requirements on their online behavior.

Those who support the position of bourgeois liberalization and oppose the Party's decisions on reforms and opening-up through online platforms will be expelled from the Party.

Meanwhile, those who speak out against the Party's major principles online will be warned. And those who distort the Party's policies and damage the unity will be expelled from the Party.

"For a long time, cyberspace has become the major battlefield of ideology construction. The revised regulations aim to tighten the management of Party members, whose Party spirit was loose previously," Su Wei, a professor at the Party School of the CPC Chongqing Municipal Committee, told the Global Times on Tuesday.

The regulations also won support from many Party members. "The rules are needed. Along with the rapid development of the internet, the Party's management of its members' views should also extend to the new platform," a Beijing-based Party member surnamed Li told the Global Times on Tuesday.

Su noted that "then-Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping firmly opposed bourgeois liberalization.

Some Party members would bring up bourgeois liberalization after seeing the problems like corruption, or the gap between rich and poor after the implementation of reform and opening-up."

Others include those who have betrayed their faith to the Party inside but would remain unwilling to discard their identity as a Party member, he said.

The regulations were also met with online questions over limits to people's freedom of speech.

In response, Su argued that one should obey the Party's rules if they decide to join the organization.

Li said that "Party members can ask questions and express their views on the Party's decisions but cannot sing a different tune in public. Those who spread political rumors should be expelled from the organization."

During the first half of 2018, 302,000 cases were filed by China's discipline inspection and supervision organs and 240,000 people were punished, including 28 provincial-level officials.

In the latest case, an official surnamed Yang from the Dongtou district of Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province was warned by the Party for expressing inappropriate views on a school's parents WeChat group in March 2017, being the district's first CPC member to be punished for improper remarks online, according to the website of Zhejiang's disciplinary watchdog.

When Party members are expelled, they are not allowed to return to the Party in five years.

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1120889.shtml

Them goddamn capitalist roaders are at it again...

Only a fool argues against party discipline.
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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