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Post by blindpig » Mon May 27, 2019 1:57 pm

The primaries, the Europeans and the restructuring of the Italian political framework


The PD primaries, held last March 2, were an event that certainly left those in Italy ideally placed in the anti-capitalist, socialist and communist camps cold. And yet, a fact that is anything but secondary in the Italian political landscape. With a million and seven hundred thousand voters, a leader elected with 70% of the votes, according to the large area press, it was "a great democratic moment".

Triumphalism and propaganda rhetoric aside, it must be emphasized, however, that the bet of the call to the primaries promoted by the apparatus has succeeded. Especially considering a party, the democratic party, largely discredited in the eyes of public opinion, also considering its past government. A party, moreover, torn apart by the internal clash, which is essentially about which line to apply to better serve the interests of financial capital.

A party that has managed to mobilize its base, however, by electing a new secretary to express the "left" consortium of a party that is actually a liberal and technocratic right wing. This fact will undoubtedly determine a restructuring of the political framework in the medium term. In fact, Zingaretti's statement gave the electorate's collective imagination the idea of ​​a concrete alternative to the yellow-green government: the "center-left". In fact, a pseudo-left proposal , but one that has shown itself to be still attractive, to be in the field.

It cannot therefore be liquidated, it is something to be questioned about. This is certainly an opportunist repositioning, in order to break away from the Renzian season. But it is also a trap, for the formations that are to the left of the PD. In fact, the call of the forest of the so-called center-left will be felt in all its force in the coming months. And it doesn't matter if thanks to this alliance device, every reference to what should characterize a true left, or a profound social upheaval in the interests of workers, has been lost over time.

Moreover, the attempt to consolidate yet another pole centered around the Democratic Party will legitimize itself on the classic appeal to the useful vote. On the logic of the least worst, since in the face of a government with reactionary traits, the prospect of a respectable centrist government formed by the so-called "competent" appears to be the one where the hopes of the electorate today in opposition are anchored.

The right to guide the League - the party of the most conservative and selfish component of the national bourgeoisie - is certainly at ease with this dynamic. He can only look at it with pleasure at the restructuring of the opposing camp, if it is the direction of a comfortable re-proposition of bipolarity. A dynamics that liquid the anomaly grillina to vent the protest, a third permanent pole as sterile opposition.

The Five Star Movement is in fact in a deep crisis of consensus since it is in government. The League, from navigated strength, dominates the debate, weakening the ally, obliged to chase after an agenda that is not his. It is not inconceivable that the movement would expect the right occasion to break away from governmental responsibilities, which objectively go beyond its political capabilities and perhaps its original intentions. The Five Stars will return where they were born, to dominate the area of ​​discontent in society and the media; while traditional forces will occupy the institutions. And in this division of labor, all the political spaces that can be practiced for a long time will be consumed. We will thus have an Italian armored capitalism, which will walk on the safe tracks of double liberalism: the nationalist of the extreme right and the cosmopolitan one of the liberal right.

And we come, finally, to the mournful notes: or rather to the place that occupies a socialist, communist and anti-capitalist pole in this context. In reality this pole does not exist, and it seems to have no place. The recent vicissitudes related to the formation of lists and coalitions for the European countries prove it. Instead, there is a pulverized galaxy of groups and parties, associations and movements, companions without organization. Many are also found to suffer the "left turn of the PD" and mobilizations in which there are workers, pensioners and popular classes ready to look at the Democrats, while others look at the Five Stars.

If the return of bipolarity is therefore a possible outcome, in the logic of things though perhaps not immediately, it is instead all too easy to foresee that these European elections will sanction the disappearance of the radical left and the communists from the Italian electoral landscape. Together with the disappearance of the themes of the left and communists from the national discourse - in the absence of a subject and instruments capable of propagating them - ultimately the total inability to affect real processes will be sanctioned.

The alternative forces seem to start again from less than zero. A minimum platform for representing the interests of work seems more necessary than ever, to be able to configure a small but at least visible popular front of resistance to the current offensive and revive the fire of the capital / labor conflict. U n front that is based on minimal bases, but with long-term planning that "takes away" forever from the compulsion to chase the last electoral cartel arrived on the scene (which will promptly melt the day after the elections) or irrelevant isolation. A process that should go in parallel with that of indispensable unification in a single party of the various communist parties and groups (ie Marxists and Leninists) that exist. An essential step, to which there is no alternative if we really want to return to being incisive one day: and it would still be nothing compared to what we should do, but it would already constitute a pole of attraction for other scattered and lost Marxists.

All this while those who have clear ideas, capital and its reference parties, are unfortunately capable of mobilizing the masses for the interests of an increasingly restricted oligarchy.

* This article is taken from my speech in the Radio Guerrilla Pill dedicated to the PD primaries, available here " Guerrilla Radio in Pills: The primary explained well " along with the other Pills and Episodes produced so far by the Guerrilla Radio Editor . ... -italiano/

Google Translator's Italian seems a bit rusty.
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Re: Italy

Post by blindpig » Tue May 28, 2019 1:28 pm

Bergamo, the new mother fired: immediate strike by all 230 factory workersBergamo, the new mother fired: immediate strike by all 230 factory workers

Workers on strike in front of the gates (Photo by )

Reggiani Macchine employees protest for the decision that affects a 30-year-old woman who has just returned from maternity leave

26 May 2017
"All on strike, immediate and sudden. The 230 employees of Reggiani Macchine di Grassobbio are at the gates to protest against the dismissal of a colleague and to support the negotiations that Fim Cisl and Fiom Cgil are holding with the company, for less than 18 months absorbed by the American group Efi and specialized in the production of printing machinery ". This is the note from the unions that denounce the episode that would have happened in the Bergamasco factory that produces machinery for printing and processing for the textile industry.

Neomamma fired in Bergamo, Agazzi (Fiom): "Here people are numbers"


The workers left the factory and found themselves on the street. The dismissal, for the company "for justified objective reason and suppression of the job" - report the workers' representatives - concerns "a 30 year old woman, recently returned from maternity leave". The worker in question returned to work about nine months ago, and since then - tell union sources - "there has never been a real attempt to relocate it". Then the communication, which struck her, "identified as an excess".

Bergamo, woman fired after maternity leave. Clash between company and unions


"The workers - continues the note of Fim and Fiom - are worried above all by the modalities and the labor relations that the property has adopted for some time, and ask for the withdrawal of the dismissal and the restoration of a system of correct relations". The fear of workers is that the new American property wants to usher in an "easy", "American" system - they say - to deal with labor issues.

However, from the company they reject the
accusations. The general manager of Reggiani, Adele Genoni, excludes that the dismissal is connected to the maternity of the employee and explains that "despite the attempts it was impossible to relocate her". "A specific case - says the manager - because we were not able to integrate the person into another function. Motherhood has nothing to do with it. On the contrary, we launched an initiative aimed precisely at supporting women in the company". ... 166453024/

Google Translator

Imagine US workers striking for such reason. You'll have to imagine, cause class consciousness got some catching up to do in these parts,
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Re: Italy

Post by blindpig » Mon Jun 15, 2020 1:15 pm

Capitalist reconstruction and the "economic miracle" at the beginning of the post-war period


With this essay by G. Carocci we conclude the overview on the history of Italian capitalism, which has embraced the first century of history of our country since its foundation: from its origins , to liberal Italy , to the fascist regime . In this chapter Caroccianalyzes with clarity the events that after the Second World War constituted what was yet another hairpin of the development of capitalism in Italy. In this case, the reconstruction and all that it entailed in economic and political terms: from the acquiescence of the communists who in the name of the strategy of "progressive democracy" let themselves be swallowed up by bourgeois parliamentarism, leaving every initiative to the class enemy; the Christian Democracy which laid the foundations for the bourgeoisie's resurgence of power and the extension of its hegemony among the masses, coercive power and hegemony that had been shaken by the war and the Resistance against the fascist regime. From frustration with the lack of economic reforms demanded by the masses, to the resurgence of the bosses' power which, again,

The bourgeoisie, as this essay clearly highlights, could thus operate its Gattopardesco regime change by showing itself, where the contingent conditions required it, now heir to the worst liberal Italy, now to the fascist one, all conditioned largely by subjection against US imperialism which has closely watched over the construction of the Republic born from the denial of the Resistance. The narration stops in the early 1960s, before Tambroni's reactionary breakthrough attempt and then the subsequent attempt by the so-called "center-left"; however, enough time to see the path on which Italy's politics and economy had been channeled.

De Gasperi was the Christian Democrat leader who, with skill and energy, was able to resist the most crudely clerical and reactionary pushes of the Vatican, and, together, he knew how to contain the renewed push of the Resistance, make his party the gathering center of conservatives and traditionally dominant forces, and to return to them, albeit in new ways, political and economic power. De Gasperi's main strength was the confidence that the Americans placed in him. It is no coincidence that he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in that Bonomi cabinet of December 1944 which, after the warning signs of the previous months, marked the beginning of the political involution of the Resistance, and that he held the office continuously until February 1947, that is, for the whole period during which the peace treaty negotiations took place between Italy and the winning powers. And it is indicative the different and greater consideration that, in the second half of 1945, the American representative in Rome showed towards De Gasperi compared to what he showed towards the president of the board, Parri.

De Gasperi constantly affirmed that internal politics should be subordinated to the decisive reasons of foreign policy, in practice, that his efforts to weaken the communists were aimed at obtaining better conditions in the peace treaty and in the matter of supplies and economic aid . In the negotiation for the peace treaty, Italy's main opponent was Communist Yugoslavia, supported by the USSR, with its territorial claims on Venezia Giulia. The United States, on the other hand, which was now the leading power of the capitalist West, preferably supported Italy, to which it assigned an important role in the Western anti-Russian strategic system. In addition, the United States was the only power capable of providing large economic aid and to facilitate the recovery of the Italian industry.

In reality, despite the undoubted consistency of these arguments and despite the ability with which the Christian Democrat leader was able to present them to public opinion, De Gasperi's diplomacy constituted perhaps the greatest example in the whole history of Italy of subordination of the foreign policy to domestic politics, to exploit the incipient tension in Russian-American relations to weaken the Italian communists and, since they were their allies, the socialists. It was a diplomacy which, in some respects, was exactly the opposite of the fascist one. Both fascist diplomacy had been directed, at least up to Hitler's enslavement, to seek initiative and autonomy in a dynamic context, as much aspost-fascist diplomacy was passive registration of American directives. In other respects, however, post-fascist diplomacy was an updated continuation of the fascist one, to the extent that it aimed to subordinate Italy's foreign policy to that of a great imperialist power. In particular, the diplomacy of De Gasperi and his successors was close, albeit with much greater emphasis and one-sidedness, to that of the Grandi era, when Italy's goal had been to present itself as "first of the class" to the American government and finance.

Shareholder Parri, one of the top leaders of the Resistance, presided over the first ministry of liberated Italy between June and December 1945. It was the ministry that more than any other wanted to draw inspiration from the charge of moral renewal expressed by the Resistance, the only one that endeavored to keep in mind some aspects of the new shadowed state in the CLN. The first months of the Parri government were also the only period during which Togliatti seriously considered the opportunity to implement some incisive economic and social reforms, such as land reform and a law on factory management boards. But Parri was unable to implement the reforms, and already by the end of September the failure of his government attempt began to loom. It fell following the opposition of the conservatives, manifested openly by the Liberal Party and subtly by De Gasperi, and because the subtle opposition of De Gasperi was joined by that, even more subtle, of Nenni and, in the end, of Togliatti himself. The latter, realistically assessing the political weakness of the attempt by Parri, once again intended to put the alliance with the Catholic masses before that with the CLN.

But if De Gasperi, Nenni and Togliatti played Parri, it was then De Gasperi, uninterruptedly chairman of the board from December 1945 to August 1953, who played Togliatti and Nenni. To achieve the weakening of the leftist De Gasperi began in December 1945 giving ample space to the presence in the government of the social communists and, at the same time, presenting a clearly conservative program, modeled on that of the liberals. In other words, De Gasperi casually reversed, in practice, the definition he liked to give of Christian Democracy: not already a center party that moved to the left, but a center party that moved to the right. Perhaps decisive for the final victory of the line carried out by De Gasperi was the decision not to confer on the Constituent Assembly, elected on June 2, 1946, the legislative power, and the decision to refer to a popular referendum - and not to the assembly constituent - the choice between monarchy and republic (on June 2 the measurement republic prevailed). The Constituent Assembly, devoid of legislative power, was unable to introduce reforms in the economy, in society, in the state. The choice between monarchy and republic referred to the referendum allows the Christian Democrats to maintain an agnostic attitude. This was a fact of great importance in determining the character of the Catholic, conservative and interclassist party. In fact, if the Christian Democrats had openly chosen the republic, he would lose his potential monarchist voters, and conservative votes would split between Christian Democracy and a monarchist party that would rise to his right. If, on the other hand, the Christian Democrats had openly chosen the monarchy, it would have largely lost its popular base and above all its interclassist character (Baget-Bozzo).

The main goal of De Gasperi until the first half of 1947 was to exploit the presence in the government of the communists and to expel them when their presence no longer constituted a useful cover in the negotiations for the peace treaty (which was signed in February 1947) and a useful support to insert in the constitution the recognition of the Lateran Pacts (which was done in the following March). Another consideration that led De Gasperi to oust the social-communists from the government was the opportunity to recover the conservative electorate of the ordinary man's movement from the government, which reached the apogee of its strength at the end of 1946. Furthermore, the split Social Democratic, carried out by Saragat in January 1947 within the Socialist Party, offered De Gasperi a minimum of coverage on the left. However, it cannot be ruled out that De Gasperi proposed to maintain collaboration with the communists in the government until the constitution was finalized. But this latter objective was not of such importance as to impose itself on others and to induce De Gasperi to fight hard to resist the growing anti-communist pressure exerted on him by the Vatican, the Americans and Confindustria. Indeed, as far as the Americans are concerned, the pressure came from De Gasperi. Vatican pressure had started since June 1946, in the aftermath of the institutional referendum. The pressures of the Americans were simultaneous with the enunciation, in March 1947, of the Truman doctrine, with which the cold war was born, and were accompanied by the veiled threat which, if the Communists had not been removed from the government, Italy would have been excluded from the aid of what was then the Marshall Plan. Apparently this was the decisive element that led De Gasperi to remove the communists from the government. The same thing happened in the same weeks in France.

In the face of the American attitude, which was part of a world strategy, marginal importance, although not to be overlooked, in developing De Gasperi's decision had the attitude of Togliatti. The latter, probably not to disappoint the growing discontent of the popular masses, had for some time adopted an attitude of harsh opposition against the government, in which, however, his party was participating. In May 1947 the social-communists were expelled from the government and some liberals were called to take part in it personally, including Einaudi, the greatest exponent of the economic program based on deflation and the pre-eminence of the private sector over the public sector. However, until December 1947, that is, until the end of the work for the constitution, a particular relationship continued between the Christian Democracy on the one hand and the two large parties of the left on the other. The constitution was in fact the result of a compromise between these three parties, cemented by traditional liberal ideology and, above all, by anti-fascism. The validity of the compromise has not diminished due to the fact that, within it, there were changes of position, dictated by changes in the power relations between the Catholic alignment and what is commonly called Marxist. At first the social-communists, who did not foresee the expulsion from the government, were substantially critical of the aspects of the constitution, especially wanted by the Catholics, intended to slow down the shareholders' meeting and strengthen its guarantees (in particular the regional system). But, after the expulsion from the government, they considered positively the whole guarantee system.

In December 1947, the work of the constitution ended, the particular relationship between Christian Democracy and the social-communists also ended. De Gasperi allied himself with the secular minor parties (the Social Democrat, the Republican and the Liberal) and took care to contain the thrusts, always present in the Catholic world and in the Vatican, towards the clerical right; but above all he took care to exert constant pressure on the two large parties of the left and their union, the CGIL, not hesitating, in order to achieve this aim, to sabotage the application of the guarantee rules provided for by the constitution (constitutional court and regions) and to prepare in 1953 a new majority electoral law (the "scam law," as the leftists called it) that should have practically marginalized the opposition from the system,

In essence, De Gasperi aimed to create a type of state that came as close as possible to the old liberal oligarchic state(of course in the context of a reality marked by the active presence of the masses). It is indicative, in this regard, the low sensitivity of De Gasperi for the problems of the party, which for him was nothing more than a group of notables supported by the organizational apparatus of the church. We have already compared the majority of Christian Democrat government to the majority of Giolittian government. This comparison, if justified by the fact that Giolittian liberalism, although separate from the caesura of fascism, is chronologically the closest to degasperian liberalism, does not however take into account the fact that De Gasperi aimed to create a concentration of bourgeoisie, middle classes and peasants essentially anti-worker, while Giolitti had considered, especially in the first part of his period, the workers' movement is one of its privileged interlocutors. [...]

In some respects De Gasperi even seemed to relate to the historical right, to the tendency to privilege the coercive function of the state, to direct the country from above, with a rigid formula of government (centrism), intended more to exclude than to absorb in the parliamentary majority forces present in the country. What made this formula of government possible was anticommunism, which turned out to be an aggregating cement of different forces stronger than the transformism of Depretis and Giolitti had been. But if anti-communism had this "positive", aggregating function, which somehow made De Gasperi's majority of government analogous to that of the historical right, the limits were also analogous, that is, a sort of political Malthusianism that prevented the two majorities (of the historical right and De Gasperi) from gradually adapting to the growing demands of the country. [...]

The left current [of the DC, ed], headed by Dossetti, was formed in December 1946 to react to De Gasperi's increasingly clear tendency intended, in a more or less close or distant perspective, to oust the left from the government. The leftist current, on the other hand, declared itself a staunch supporter of the collaboration between the three mass parties. [...] Later a part of the left underwent a transformation, whose greatest exponent was Fanfani. Between 1954 and 1959 these, as secretary of the Christian Democracy, no longer aimed so much at reforms as at the actual creation and strengthening of the party, intended as a bureaucratic-led mass organization and clientele base. Thus was born in Christian Democracy a second, decisive way of obtaining consensus in the country,ed ]

Perfectly homogeneous to De Gasperi's model of state was the economic policy of the ministries chaired by him after the removal of the social-communists, a policy that aimed to overcome the post-war crisis, inflation and the budget deficit only with the restriction of credit and of investments. This policy weakened the bargaining power of the unions, favored the middle classes and the peasants and paved the way for the great electoral victory of April 18, 1948 [a victory that nowadays even the reactionary historiography and the press admit to be the result of fraud and foreign interventions, of the CIA : h ttps: // ... 1.35749190 ,ed.] Compared to the previous political elections of June 2, 1946 for the Constituent Assembly, Christian Democracy advanced from 35% to 48.5%, the social-communists moved back from 40% to 31%.

For the left, the day of April 18 was the confirmation that Togliatti's policy had overestimated the electoral consistency of the social-communists, who were less strong than the Christian Democrats. It was the definitive crisis of the progressive democracy program, which the Communist Party had to abandon to curb the conservative offensive. After April 18 De Gasperi also prepared, for the facade, a program of reforms, necessary to modify the state inherited from fascism and to apply the republican constitution: reform of the public administration, of the school, tax, agrarian, regional system. But only two excerpts from this program were implemented, destined to remain asphyxiated: the Segni agrarian reform and the so-called Vanoni tax.There was no room for reform in a program that pursued the restoration of classical capitalism . For similar reasons, Saraceno's four-year plan for 1948-1952 was dropped and the previously mentioned CGIL work plan was rejected. The conservative offensive was singularly favored not only by the capitalist restoration but also, during the 1950s and especially in their second half, by an exceptionally favorable international economic situation, which began with the Korean War, from which those economies were able to profit particularly, like the German and the Italian, which had been rebuilt after the war, leaving the bosses the greatest freedom.

The Italian industry moved after the German one but had a growth of proportions such as never before. Between 1950 and 1961 the average annual increase in national income was 6.1%, exceeded in the capitalist West only by Germany with 7.5%. Real per capita income tripled in Italy between 1861 and 1961, but more than half of the increase is concentrated in the decade 1951-1961. The financial aid provided by the United States with the Marshall Plan, even if accepted by the Italian government with thrifty caution for fear of breaking the deflationary and restrictive framework, curbed some negative effects of the latter and relieved the Italian and European economy from that lack of capitals that had so deeply troubled her since the First World War.

It was an extensive industrial development, favored by the "pulling" foreign market and by the great elasticity of the internal labor force market; a development in which not only all types of industries found their place, especially those that worked for export - from large concentrations to a myriad of medium and small companies - but also income. In particular, the income from urban building areas which, linked to construction, had a significant propulsive function. Another type of income that, improperly, is usually assimilated to income, that provided by public spending through subgovernment and bureaucratic patronage, found ample margins to proliferate, individually facilitated by the ruling ruling party, such as Fanfani organizing, which became the main link in a triangle made up of the state, public companies and large private companies. In principle, public spending should no longer have served as much to support the private sector, which was walking on its own thanks to the exceptional economic situation, but rather to finance objectives of a social nature or intended to remove imbalances. In practice, however, the dominant privatism rendered these interventions inefficient, the main real purpose of which was to finance the ruling class, and in particular the Christian Democratic party, for patronage and electoral purposes.

The political-social consequence of the economic boom was , unlike what had happened in the years immediately following 1896, not so much a relatively autonomous growth of a new business class as a concentration of the middle classes around the dominant groups, an alliance of the profit with urban property income and with unproductive public spending for clientele purposes, an alliance made by compressing wages and accentuating worker exploitation, but also extending employment. The main cause of the lack of autonomy of the new entrepreneurial class was the central role that the state continued to play, as at the time of fascism, in promoting development, dominated by private groups who came to exercise public power.

The economic boom overturned, in many if not all aspects, Togliatti's hypothesis of a concentration of the middle classes and the working class. Mass consumerism was established in Italy which tended to integrate the working class into the middle classes under the deluge of cars and household appliances. The middle classes, at least those of the central-northern regions, ceased to feel excluded from the traditional agreements between industrialists and workers, to pay the price; and they felt far more involved in industrial development than in the past. Of course this referred only to a part of the middle classes, to the modern ones, administrators of the services required by the development. This type of integration did not refer to the part of the middle classes, traditionally large in Italy, not inserted or not inserted with a positive function in the production system, nor did it refer to students. However, the middle classes not included in the production process, widespread especially in the South, found room for integration in the system thanks to public spending for clientele purposes.

The monopolies affirmed their ability to integrate, at least tendentially, the whole of society, to give them the model of their authoritarian substance. If Fascism had been a kind of shortcut to achieve similar results to a much greater extent, his hypothesis now became less suitable for the country, which no longer seemed to need this shortcut.Compared to the fascist twenty years, the country had grown both economically and politically: economically, because the monopolies seemed able to integrate the masses, with the certain determining force of the state, but not in the ways and to the extent that this force had assumed in fascism; politically, because, thanks to Christian Democracy, there was now a conservative party capable of obtaining the consent of the masses without having to subvert the political order and suppress all freedoms. In the past, the traditional complaints of conservatives over the predominance of parliament over the executive, of minorities over the majority, of parties over the state had resulted in fascism, that is, in the subversion of parliament and the liberal regime.A conservative reactionary design capable of using and mastering subversion became possible, without having to follow the path of the subversive reaction, which the past proved risky, to the end.

Although the exceptional economic growth seemed to solve all the problems, in reality these were only temporarily put aside and, around 1960, they reappeared, magnified by the same development. It was and is a series of "bottlenecks" that have their basis in the dualism of the Italian economy, in the accentuated height difference between the expanding and stagnating sectors, between the private and public sectors, between industry dynamic that produces also for export and the stagnant one that produces only for the internal market, between industry and agriculture, between the North and the South. These were and are, in part, problems common to the whole capitalist and industrialized world. But the lacerating nature of the boom was particularly violent in Italy because it was accentuated by the economic and social imbalances typical of our country. Think of the southern question. Think about thatmassive public intervention, rigidly subordinated to the private sector, exalts the dualism between monopolies and small and medium industry, together with territorial imbalances ; and that these negative effects of public intervention are greater the more intense the development (they were greater in 1915-1918 and in 1954-1962 than during Fascism).

We said that the middle classes have integrated into the consumer industrial society; and we also said that this integration was not without limits. The main of these limitations, which generates strong social tensions, is perhaps the one caused by the imbalance between the growing schooling and the inability of the system to provide adequate schools for students and adequate jobs for graduates and graduates. This slows down the integration of the middle classes and indeed contributes to creating a state of frustration which, as we know, has a rich past in Italy. Furthermore - we said - one of the channels of integration of the middle classes into the system has been public spending for clientele purposes. The integration of the middle classes, for this aspect, occurred by accentuating their parasitism.

The boom of the 1950s did not concern agriculture. In 1950-1961, while the average annual increase in national industry income was 7.6% and that of the tertiary sector was 7.5%, that of agriculture was only I% (Saracen) . At the root of the imbalance is the fact that trade and industry prices have risen more than agricultural prices. The gap between industrial prices and agricultural prices that began in the two decades between the two wars continued, accentuating. Furthermore, the costs of commercial intermediation (sometimes a real income, which aligns alongside that of urban areas and bureaucratic ones) affect agriculture much more than it does industry. In the context of an agriculture in crisis and unable to modernize and rationalize, the rapid exodus from the countryside (the percentage of farmers on the active population fell from 40% to 20% between 1951 and 1961), which increased labor costs and caused the abandonment of many lands, is was a further, fundamental element of crisis. The agrarian crisis and the exodus from the countryside have particularly affected the hilly areas of the whole peninsula and the South as a whole. Even in the South there has been an escape from the countryside to the cities. But here the exodus from the countryside has taken the traditional form of emigration. The agrarian crisis and the exodus from the countryside have particularly affected the hilly areas of the whole peninsula and the South as a whole. Even in the South there has been an escape from the countryside to the cities. But here the exodus from the countryside has taken the traditional form of emigration. The agrarian crisis and the exodus from the countryside have particularly affected the hilly areas of the whole peninsula and the South as a whole. Even in the South there has been an escape from the countryside to the cities. But here the exodus from the countryside has taken the traditional form of emigration.

However, even in emigration there was a novelty of great importance because, in large part, the migratory flow was no longer directed abroad but, especially after 1960, in the industrial cities of northern Italy. In this respect, emigration has ceased to be a net loss of the nation's resources. But it has also ceased to be a useful valve to ease social tensions and create a greater availability of land for the farmers left in the South; on the contrary, it has accentuated the imbalances between North and South, contributing to the chaotic and congested growth of the northern cities, and also contributing to making a desert of large parts of the South. Perhaps never as in the last twenty years has the South played, in the economy of the state unitary, a dual role: dynamic in the short term, in the long run. In a first phase it favored the development, supplying the northern industry with manpower; in the following phase it became, as never before, "the major bottleneck that stands in the way of the development of the whole country."

The usual phenomenon that the modernization of the North accentuates the disintegration of the South has been repeated on a larger scale because it undermines the old social relationships without creating new ones. It is no coincidence that the mafia has experienced two periods of particular diffusion: after the advent of the historical left in power in the last century [19th century, ed.] and, to a much greater extent, in the present day, in which the new forms taken, the poor sense of the state of the Christian Democratic ruling party and perhaps the intertwining with political forces interested instrumentally in the reactionary subversion have allowed it to spread even at the level national. The reality of a tumultuous and unbalanced development, "pulled" by industry, contrasted with the pattern of gradual and balanced development, in which the growth of industry was associated and followed by the expansion of the internal market. The ancient southern evil of peasant pressure on land has disappeared, but the consequence of that evil, namely immobility, has remained: not so much the immobility of a patriarchal and backward society as the immobility of a desert,

As we have already mentioned, at the beginning of the 1950s, the Christian Democrats made a partial agrarian reform to cut the wings of the peasant movement in the South (moreover already outflowing) and drive the Communists out of their conquered positions. The agrarian reform had a heavy political cost for the Christian Democrats because it temporarily made them lose the electoral sympathies of the southern conservatives, apparently the cause of the failure of the "scam law" in 1953. But the agrarian reform, while definitively eliminating the traditional power of the landowners, already put in crisis by the war, has not been able to create a new vital class of peasant owners and has actually started the premise of the accentuated social disruption caused then by the "economic miracle. "It is precisely on this lack of renewal that Christian Democracy has leveraged to regain its positions of power. The organization of the Christian Democratic Party by Fanfani after 1954 was a significant fact that concerned the South. Christian Democracy has recreated the clientelary system, broken in previous years by the peasant movement, on new foundations, whose main elements are no longer the notables but the party and its bureaucracy (more widespread in the South than in the North), the sub- government and the Cassa del Mezzogiorno.

Since then the South has returned to being, according to tradition, more tied than the North to the ruling party; and, when he made the frond or the opposition, this was on the right, although the left wing was practically absent from the southern Christian Democracy. Since then the South has ceased to be, as it had been for some years after 1945, the subject of political debate in a perspective of democratic renewal, and, as in the time of liberal southernism, it has returned to being a simple object of that debate, a problem to be addressed with more or less effective interventions from above. It was a question of intending to become aware of the national nature of the southern question, in the sense that the lack of development of the South is now holding back the development of the North. It was treated and it is, in intention, to prepare a set of public interventions capable of curbing and reversing the traditional spontaneous trend of market forces, for which economic growth is concentrated in the North and translates into an impoverishment - absolute or relative - of the South; to create in the South an industrial base capable of offering work to those who do not find it in agriculture and capable of setting in motion an autonomous market-based development mechanism (Saraceno).

For this purpose (and for the purpose of consolidating the positions of power of the Christian Democrats) a special body was set up in 1950, the Cassa del Mezzogiorno. But this, until the early sixties, was limited to doing, while strengthening it, the traditional public works policy to improve or create the so-called infrastructures. The increased public interventions in favor of the South resulted in a benefit above all for the North, because the additional demand for industrial products, caused by public spending in the South, transferred this to the North (Saraceno). The imbalance between North and South, instead of decreasing, has increased.

Source: Giampiero Carocci, History of the Unification of Italy to the present , Feltrinelli, Milan, 1975

Introduction and editing by Luscino ... opoguerra/

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Re: Italy

Post by blindpig » Mon Jun 29, 2020 4:21 pm

The question of the petty bourgeoisie, the workers and the tasks of the communists


by editorial staff

1) The state of the art of the communist question in Italy
The formation of a communist party, in which to bring together the vanguard of the working class, which manages to exert a real influence on the subordinate classes and on society as a whole, can be considered today as the fundamental task of the Italian communists. At different levels, it is a need felt by all organizations, groups and parties that refer to the communist historical experience.

A task certainly to be related to the historical development of the international workers' movement, which has been in profound reflux since 1989 and in general to the capitalist restructuring of the 1970s. This reflux translated into the progressive submission of the proletariat to capitalism - evident today, at the moment in whose large groups of workers seem to have almost completely introjected the values ​​of the class enemy - facilitated by the reformist line promoted by the most important western communist parties since the end of the Second World War, up to the landing at the shores of the first social democracy, and of the "social -liberalism ”or third way then (during the 90s).

In Italy in particular, the task of creating a communist party in step with the times assumes great importance if the events of the workers' movement are kept in mind, especially from the turning point in Bolognina and from the dissolution of the communist experience organized in the center-left governments until the subsequent marginalization and pulverization.

The defeat of revolutionary Marxism and with it workers was certainly a supranational process, favored by the development of the imperialist phase of post-70s capitalism, triggered by the capitalist restructuring and the emergence of the new "globalized, generalized and financialized" monopolistic groups (Amin [ 1]) of the financial capital that dictates the law through the ubiquitous "financial markets". This process has left heeling and ininfluence in our ranks, difficulties of all sorts for those who today try to rebuild the threads with a history made of defeats, but also of great victories, and which however continues outside the West, in a vital and creative in countries that lead anti-imperialist struggles and seek to develop despite US unilateralism and hegemonism.

This situation gives rise to innumerable debates and controversies, both on the international positioning with respect to contemporary socialism, in particular the Chinese one on the one hand; both on internal strategy, where one of the most heard questions regards who the party should speak to at this stage, and who its interlocutors are on the other. All in a conjuncture where the petty bourgeois revolt seems to be the protagonist of discontent and the workers of Italy sensitive to the conservative sirens of the sovereign branch or immersed in generalized apathy.

There is debate as to whether everything should focus on a pure class line, or open to the petty bourgeoisie (the craftsman, the merchant, the VAT number) objectively oppressed by the domination of monopoly capital.

We will try with this short article to clarify the issue and make our contribution to the debate.

2) Class structure of Italian society
Imperialism, i.e. industrial and banking monopolistic capitalism linked to the dynamics of globalized financial capital (whose accumulation and operating center is Wall Street, and which relies on supranational institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, WTO, EU-ECB, NATO) is the predominant element in Italian society, as in every western society, and the force that most determines its development. In this context, the aim that the ruling classes set out to achieve from the 1990s on was to conform states and capitalist societies to the renewed demands of financialized monopoly capital. It was a new modernization, which was essentially a viable liberal restoration without resistance after the fall of the USSR. Specifically:

Accession to the EU is a piece of this inevitable modernization, as a large center of dependent accumulation, but with autonomous and competitive ambitions (as far as possible), from Washington, and as an extended area of ​​implementation of the new liberal policies, no longer confinable to the level of individual European states. The highest levels of economic concentration and capitalist centralization occur in this period and, thanks to these dynamics, the internationalization of the Italian top groups is successfully completed (FCA, Ferrero, Unicredit, Intesa etc). The Italian bourgeoisie therefore stabilizes its monopolies and takes its place at the big table on the chessboard of the capitalist West.

It finds itself faced with large non-monopolistic national enterprises, medium enterprises and small diffused production, typical of the Italian manufacturing fabric since the economic boom, as gregarious but often recalcitrant forces . It therefore supports the mature and internationalized capitalist class, a class of local capitalists and an extended small bourgeoisie of traders, artisans, professionals, and a high-end (middle class) white collar and urban wage-working class. Upper bourgeoisie which, on the other hand, can count on the almost unconditional support of a metropolitan "intellectual" class which benefits from imperialist income - while retaining "progressive" beliefs - and is often linked to the liberal-democratic currents of the bourgeois "left".

The extension of this property class, small and medium, and the lower compactness of the monopolistic bourgeois class [2] , makes their claims an extremely important element in the political life of the country (and almost always in a reactionary sense, starting from from fascism). The relative weakness of the bourgeoisie in the face of the tasks of imperialist modernization requires compromises and constant attention to the petty bourgeoisie that is pauperizing. The latter has the feeling of losing the social status that it enjoyed when the economy "was doing well", and suffers from the comparison with the suffering of today due to its inability to take advantage of the extreme internationalization and financialisation of the system.

The usual dynamics of these clashes within the Italian property classes is usually resolved in the substantial solidarity of interests between privileged groups. A solidarity to the bottom, where the ruling class, expression of the mature and imperialist bourgeoisie, grants: evasion, subsidies and low wages - which, moreover, it also takes advantage of - to keep afloat the activities of medium production and small commerce. This dynamic marks the relative backwardness of the Italian system compared to other western capitalist countries.

Hence a chronic permanent depression of the productive forces, all at the expense of the majority of workers, with little hope and no prospect other than emigration, gradual impoverishment, precariousness, misery and unemployment. The working class is annihilated. Objectively fragmented as everywhere in the West, following the innovations and restructurings of the 70s (when the incipient technological revolution was used by the ruling classes to allow outsourcing, subcontracting, relocations; inverse process to factory centralization so far characteristic of historical capitalism), and subjectively no longer aware of its role.

2.1 Who are ours ?
What have been the effects of these processes on the Italian social structure, on the classes from which and for whom a subject capable of representing them in the struggle for their emancipation should arise? Without going into a detailed sociological analysis, but aware of the need to draw a faithful picture of the situation, we can try, using the latest Istat data and some analyzes already produced on the matter, to outline the contours of a precise reference block.

Out of 60 million inhabitants in our country, the demographic structure is divided roughly as follows:

0-14 years: 13.5%, 8 million

15-64 years: 64%, 38.5 million

65 years and over: 22.5%, 13.5 million [3]

Always Istat points out that the prevailing trend in the population is aging. The first indication that comes from the data is that of the 38.5 million in working age there are 25 million employed, of which more than 19 million are employees while the independent ones are about 6 million [4] .

Within the fixed-income dependent working population and largely at low wages (lower than in the rest of Europe, both in the private sector and in the public administration) we can identify, following the groupings of the Istat table , macro- branches that each bring together approximately 25% - more than four million employees each - of total employee work:

1) The extractive and manufacturing industry, a place of the "working class" in the classical sense, and we could say Fordist; agricultural buildings and workers and laborers

2) The salaried service for private services: wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, transport and storage, accommodation and restaurant services.

3) The salaried employee of public services: in particular social security, education, health and assistance

4) The remaining 25%, in our breakdown, results from an aggregate of service activities, ranging from artistic and entertainment, to the repair of household goods, to scientific and technical activities, information and communication services, financial, insurance and real estate activities.

Next to this mass of subordinate workers we have, then, an audience of 6 million independents which include the different layers of the ownership classes, from large and medium entrepreneurship, to small employers, to traders, professionals, real autonomous. A sociologically disparate reality, but very important and politically influential, numerous and which tends to act as a block.

On the European scene, Italy ranks third in terms of the incidence of independent work on total employment (22.9 percent in 2018), after Greece and Romania, and well above the European average (15, 3 percent). [5]

The numbers in detail of these 6 million independent are these:


As can be seen, among them professionals and self-employed (first of all traders) together together, in 2019, about 3.3 million people, while instead the real capitalists, together with professionals and traders who exploit labor waged, they are 1.4 million. [6]

Lastly, in view of the recent changes in the world of work, the subordinates and exploited, false self-employed para-subordinates, VAT numbers fall instead:

figures that have subordination constraints more typical of dependent work. [...] "partially self-employed", which amounts to 338 employees. The distribution of the employed by sector of economic activity clarifies even more the specificity of the partially self-employed, who have greater implications in the sectors of services to families and people, health and social assistance, education and public administration and transport and storage. . […] In the South, higher portions of partially self-employed (compared to pure self-employed) are estimated between home and remote salesmen and call center operators. In the North there is a greater presence of bricklayers, drivers of heavy vehicles and trucks, porters and workers in charge of moving goods. [...] The tripartite division of self-employment therefore shows coexistence,of a more vulnerable group of independent and uncertain professional identity, which is in many respects closer to subordinate work than to independent work. Among the most relevant aspects, the weight, among the partially self-employed, of the female component and of the younger workers, that is of two traditionally fragile categories in the labor market, should be underlined.

Instead, the number of professionals is growing, in particular without employees. They are 1 million 233 thousand, about 300 thousand more than 15 years ago. They are all those workers in the field of consultancy, research, information, who often carry out activities with a high intellectual content, often young people, who in the last few years have put themselves on the market and, by choice or necessity, are not employed by employees. none, but they work with a supply relationship with the various customers. Similar to these are the collaborators, coordinated and continuous, but they are decreasing. [6]

Just as this pocket of subordination is hidden among the independent or autonomous, which is analogous to dependent work, similarly among the employees there is a layer of high-level wage earners who are assimilable to the capitalists in that they represent their functionary and share their interests: "Modern workers aristocracies, public or private, manual or intellectual who are" [8] . Directors, administrators and managers, superior cadres, in the statistics reported as wage earners, but in reality a particular layer of privileged beneficiaries of the system, with a material and ideological situation that leads them to think and act as capitalists. Those with the highest remuneration and the most senior positions in companies are themselves part of the upper middle class of business as shareholders and investors.

However, this cross-section would be incomplete if we did not consider that we have spoken so far of the so-called active population. What is remarkable of the Italian figure, however, is the mass of inactive people who reach a population of 13 million people, as shown in the graph below:

Source: ... mv95mvz6xo

Without a doubt, in addition to the students, within this category we count the countless exploited illegal workers and other invisible ones. In this further graph we can have more precise knowledge of it, bringing out a very interesting fact:

Source: ... zyewmoq2yo

If the students and pensioners, which together amount to about 6 and a half million, are separated from the 13 million inactive, they remain just as many which in fact constitute the data, this real yes, of unemployment in Italy - in spite of the accounting somersaults and the scarce typical transparency of bourgeois surveys - providing a complete picture. In addition to the 2.4 million real unemployed (i.e. only those who are registered in the official job placement lists) there are another 6.5 million unemployed who are expertly expunged from the statistics and who in fact bring real unemployment in Italy close to 9 million .

2.2 Employment relationships
But what is the situation within the labor relations of this mass of workers ?

The first indication we have from this very broad overview is that the industrial proletariat tends to be a minority, this is due to the tertiarisation that characterizes advanced capitalist economies. However, it is still an ever-present and central nucleus: it is necessary to consider that Italy is still a manufacturing country and that a large part of this outsourcing consists "in the outsourcing of many services: those that were provided within industrial companies, today they are mainly produced by specialized companies classified as "tertiary" " [9] .

The second is that the wage-worker of services (to companies and individuals, public and private, the "tertiary") is a growing development basin of the contemporary working class: drivers, railroad workers, nurses, warehouse workers, teachers, educators, employees of the large distribution, commerce and catering, public employees etc ). All these categories contribute to filling the ranks and defining today's proletariat, which is at first sight more composite than the "old".

In short, we are faced with a diverse working class within it, where the wage workers of the services come to join the mainly industrial proletariat of factory and numerically in decline, at least in the West. They objectively support each other since these professional figures are increasingly related to the classic worker, in the methods of management and organization of the work they undergo, in work processes managed according to managerial methods marked by the private individual in increasingly harsh conditions. Furthermore, flexible and precarious contracts are used in public services no less than in the private sector: the proliferation of fixed-term contracts and other types of contracts is the general trend of our time, especially in Italy. In short, contemporary capitalism tends to produce widespread precariousness.

In numerical terms, if almost 14.9 million permanent workers are employed, the remaining 3 million are temporary workers " [10] and precarious workers, the latter component with a general trend towards growth. We can draw an excellent glimpse of the situation from a pertinent investigation made at the time by the collective Clash city worker [11] . An inquiry that offers us a real photograph of a fragmented and scattered contemporary proletariat, where large companies with tens of thousands of workers have given way to large production complexes, linked by subcontracting and outsourcing systems. Countless supply companies, subcontractors, temporary employment agencies and small pseudo-independent companies have developed around large companies.

Photograph of a working class struggling with the integral internationalization of companies , in which it becomes more international as it increasingly comes into contact with multinationals that settle in the territories, as well as the classic national companies which fight exclusively in and for the internal market.

Finally, a photograph of a working class invested by a growing integration between manual and intellectual work , thanks to information and communication technologies, which develop at unprecedented speeds, in the context of a production process that requires ever increasing technological knowledge in various sectors; this tendency is generalized and the distinction between workers and employees becomes weak and often arbitrary, to the extent that all workers are incorporated into production:

thanks to the changes that took place in the work process and in the company organization, the distinction between workers and employees loses more and more meaning as worker work becomes more and more intellectual work and that of employees increasingly mechanical and alienating. This also translates into a lower differentiation of the respective wages [12] .

To complete this quick excursus, it is necessary to consider the approximately two million "chronic" unemployed people reviewed by official statistics, which when added to the ten million "inactive" indicated above, gives us the measure of the true reserve army available to the capitalists in the country-system Italy . These, together with the overwhelming majority of the 19 million wage workers, as seen, and the new pseudo-independent exploited, form a basin of more than 30 million people who are, in disparate conditions and systemic crisis, subject to subordinate employment relationships, parasubordinated, of real slavery (hired labor and gig economy) and ultra-precarious exploitation. To this we must support pensioners, victims in turn of violent anti-social counter-reforms, underway in Italy and Europe [13].

A completely voiceless mass, and often a mass of maneuver for the reactionary or liberal adventures of the parties of the bourgeoisie, which, without going to investigate the numbers in detail, we have seen accounts for a small numerical minority and which however occupies, indeed monopolizes, the whole spectrum of political representation, economic, media and hegemonic power.

3) Strategy: our tasks
Therefore, given the results of the class struggle, the social structure given and the state of the movement of the workers and the communist parties, it seems clear that the task of the communists is to get to know and have a link with the dependent work, to seek in it its reason to be and the social block of (re) departure . With a global vision that unifies: these are the struggles of the workers of Ilva, the protests in the health or school sectors, the struggles of the laborers, the employees of the large-scale distribution and trade, logistics, the anger of the precarious and the exploited from online platforms (we think in particular of the riders), of the worries of the employees of multinationals who cut costs and restructure by laying off, and of the professionals of intellectual and artistic activities, often precarious and poorly paid; of all those who work for a salary, and that concerns how we have seen something like 19 million people, classified in the main branches indicated above: industry, private services and public services.

It is a one and only working class. Our main task is to unite and bring out a new class consciousness among these workers. From this point of view, one of the essential questions is: "to move the bulk of the workers out of apathy", ie the trade union question; ie make sure that a movement of workers takes effect (similar to the French one, to say [14]). Only in a wide and varied sea of ​​workers' protagonism it is in fact possible to develop a policy of unity of the sectors of the work that meet and recognize each other in their common interests and as subordinates fighting against a common enemy for emancipatory purposes. And, speaking of protagonism, positive signals come precisely from that part of foreign workers often, and superficially, indicated as a passive tool - through an unprejudiced use of the concept of industrial reserve army - to weaken the claims of the salaried workers: think of the recent workers' strike, an event that is certainly not without precedent, however neglected by the media. [15]

Secondly, and only secondarily, there is the discourse of knowing how to speak "to other classes" for example the petty bourgeoisie that proletarizes itself, that is, small traders and craftsmen, small entrepreneurs etc. The discussion with these subjects must however be in a perspective of trying to impose the hegemony of the proletariat on them, and not the other way round. In short, our task is not to represent their class instances. In case - strong of an in-depth analysis, of the investigation, of a platform representing workers, and capable of speaking in their name and with a certain influence on them - you will have to go to meet him to make it clear that their fate depends on the fight against the capitalist system. Try to make them understand that the liberation of workers is also liberation for them,

In this perspective, the direction of the process, of the propaganda cannot be entrusted to the petty bourgeois interests, which in certain perspective cannot be delivered to the reaction, but to make hegemony we must first recreate the conditions of our legitimacy, the lost link with the world of work. Our proposal moves in this connection. Only then can we think of social alliances. The working class can do them only when it "exists", that is, it is at the head of the movement with a unified purpose and will and can exercise an ideological and practical hegemony over the adjoining classes.

In short, the primary objective of the communists should therefore be the expansion of their consensus and their ability to manage among the ranks of the working class and the question of social alliance with the petty bourgeoisie is secondary at this stage. In other words, if unifying, representing and taking root is an immediate practical political task; taking into consideration the world of the petty bourgeoisie is a medium-long term theoretical task. The communists must not preclude anything, they must be able to act dialectically among the masses. Recreating the link with the workers (i.e. raising the level of class consciousness) is the main front. As in war, there is always a main front and one, or more secondary. The relationship with the petty bourgeoisie is one of these, which dialectically must also be linked with all the other secondary fronts, even if the workers' front is always the one that must have the pre-eminence.

There is a "hierarchy" of interests that necessarily come into conflict in certain contexts of struggle. In order not to get lost, we must always look to the main front. This configuration of struggle can and must change when and if the class struggle of the subordinates and their political subjectivity has developed, and the main enemy will be correctly identified: the financial capital of the monopolies, and a capable social alliance will be built to isolate the ruling class of capitalists and their lackey officials. Only in this sense can it be said that authentic perspectives for a revolution in the West will have opened.

[1] S.Amin , La loi de la valeur mondialisée: Valeur et prix dans le capitalisme, 2013; S.Amin, The implosion du capitalisme contemporain, 2012; ... ile-2.html

[2] Cf. our historical series on Italian capitalism available here ... l-secondo- war /

[3] Istat table, Population residing on 1st January: ... IS_POPRES1# ;

[4] Istat table, employment by branches of activity ;

[5] Istat, ANNUAL REPORT 2019, The situation of the country: ... le2019.pdf

[6] Crf

[7] Istat, ANNUAL REPORT 2019, The situation of the country: ... le2019.pdf

[8] ... QMsyyz1A_8

[9] ... o-i-nostri

[10] ... o-i-numeri

[11] ... o-i-nostri

[12] ... o-i-nostri

[13] ... in-france/

[14] Podcast, "The awakening of the class struggle in France": ... in-francia

[15] ... azione-or- they will follow- others -mobilitation-of-the-invisible-1628.html ; ... -di-nardo/ ... comunisti/

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Re: Italy

Post by blindpig » Thu Sep 03, 2020 12:47 pm

Cut of parliamentarians: a defense of the indefensible


by Davide Clementi

After the postponement linked to the COVID19 emergency, on 20 and 21 September the Italians will be called to approve or reject the constitutional reform on cutting the number of parliamentarians .

Strongly desired by the Five Star Movement but approved by all major political parties - from the League to the Democratic Party, from Italia Viva to Fratelli d'Italia, with only 14 no and 2 abstentions - the 'Fraccaro reform' , from the name of the pentastellato undersecretary who proposed it, gives a clear cut to the elected representatives of the Italian Parliament: minus 230 in the Chamber, for a total of 400 deputies, and minus 115 in the Senate, for a total of 200 senators. The reform drastically changes the numerical representation ratio: each elected to the Chamber will have to represent over 150,000 inhabitants (previously 96,000); each elected to the Senate will instead represent over 300,000 (previously about 188,000).

According to its supporters, the main reason for the approval of the reform is the savings it will entail for the state coffers: on '' we read [1] of a saving of one billion in two terms, therefore in 10 (theoretical ) years. We are therefore talking about 100 million a year, equivalent to savings of € 1.67 per inhabitant of the Republic. Less optimistic estimates [2] describe savings of 81.6 million per year (€ 1.36 per inhabitant). In any case, we are talking about savings that amount to between 0.005% and 0.007% of the annual budget of the Italian state, as stated by the Edward Scissorhands of Italian public accounts, Carlo Cottarelli [3] .

Taking into account the servant when in question is that institution that represents, at least abstractly, the will and interests of citizens only confirms that hegemony of money and the rigidity of public accounts to which even the self-proclaimed friends of the people against liberalism they are tied like a dog is tied to its master's leash.

Parliaments - in Italy and in the world - are in severe crisis . A long crisis, inflamed by a multiplicity of factors and situations that are also very distant from each other.

The United Kingdom is back from three years of rebounds, postponements, rebounds on the Brexit issue, with a Parliament of a constitutional monarchy (without a written constitution) continually hostage not only to governments that are anything but strong and stable [4] , but also of the traps he posed from time to time for not respecting the vote of the British in the referendum on leaving the European Union .

In France, the approval of the highly contested pension reform wanted by President Macron through the mechanism of art. 49 paragraph 3 of the Constitution [5] , which allows the government to override the parliamentary vote on a provision for which it is feared that there is no majority willing to approve it. A very strong popular reaction , longer than that of May 1968, and 72% of the French who consider Macron an "authoritarian" [6] were not enough to prevent the use of an exceptional tool to curb the anger of the French.

And what about the European Parliament , the only body directly elected by European citizens that does not even have the power to propose regulations but only to approve or reject, on an equal footing with the Council of the European Union [7] , what it is submitted by the European Commission, which has a monopoly on legislative initiative?

The Italian Parliament is no exception: since the beginning of the XVIII Legislature - the current one - 32% of the laws approved are laws converting decree-laws [8] , [9] or instruments that the Constitution justifies for "reasons of necessity and urgency "and of direct competence of the Government; 36% is instead dedicated to ratification laws, or laws that approve or authorize the ratification of international treaties.


Our Parliament produces less and less, more and more for the benefit of bodies not elected by citizens [10] and, it is right to reiterate it, worse and worse: flag laws such as the law on civil unions or "security decrees" are composed in an inorganic way, between articles, paragraphs, letters, numbers, which often refer to laws which in turn refer to others, regardless of that principle of clarity of the normative texts which the legislator has tried to adhere to in art. 13-bis l. 400/1988 and present in the same Parliamentary Regulations [11] .

Parliament - and therefore the parliamentarians, often maliciously accomplices - has been progressively stripped of the centrality that is typical of a parliamentary republic like ours.

Those who make odd comparisons between our system and those with much lower numbers of parliamentarians - such as, for example, the Congress of the United States of America - carry out a false operation: the United States is a federal republic, where a very wide range of powers is entrusted to the fifty parliaments of the states as well as to the federal Congress.

In Europe, with the exception of the European Parliament itself - 1 MEP for every 657,371 inhabitants - the country that has the highest parliamentary / population ratio is Germany, also a Federal Republic, with 1 MEP every 104,109: Italy would finish in second place place on the podium of European countries, with 102,800 inhabitants represented for each parliamentarian, positioning ourselves globally just below Malaysia and just above Mali.

It is not a question of a simple rebound of numbers, of a competition between who has more and who has less: democracy, consistently with the constitutional dictate, would aim at the effective participation of citizens in the political, economic and cultural life of the Country.

It is now clear that citizens cannot participate in the economic life of the country : the trade union is increasingly prone to the employer counterpart, preventing in the beginning any type of management of the productive systems by workers, stifling innovative forms of social struggles, silencing every soul of revolt and strike. Culture remains the shell of the ruling class alone, with media - television channels, newspapers, publishers, radio - increasingly centralized in the hands of large companies controlled by highly influential financial and industrial groups.

For those who adopt a Marxist point of view, Parliament remains, in a moment of general retreat of the proletariat and the working class, the only and last instrument capable of acting as a sounding board for those who do not have the economic instruments - and therefore the media - in order to express the first dissent. It is no coincidence that the entire Italian media world has paved the way for a vast and now prevalent public opinion which, for decades, has been in favor of a reduction in the number of parliamentarians, fueling the idea of ​​a "caste" of satraps privileged, well- fed and richly paid and with no other function than that of gorging themselves and plotting to the detriment of the common citizen and the honest entrepreneur.

Well, if many of these impressions can be accepted due to the growing media exposure of inept and incapable parliamentarians, their reduction in number will not only in no way remedy the problem of the quality of the elected representatives - their morality - but rather risks making that component of unconscious people catapulted to Montecitorio or Palazzo Madama to the detriment of those few able to worthily represent the interests of the reference social group.

The constituent legislators, mindful of the fascist experience, had the aim of allowing political representation as broad and real as possible: we should remember the attempts to constantly update the number of parliamentarians to the ratio of 1 to a hundred thousand inhabitants by some constituents, including which the same president of the drafting committee of the Constitution Ruini [12] . We will have to wait for the constitutional law 2/1963 to put a point on the question of the number, set at 630 for the Chamber (1 for every eighty / one hundred thousand inhabitants) and 315 for the Senate (1 for every one hundred and eighty thousand).

It is clear that the current constitutional reform - which, unlike that of Renzi in 2016 and the others in the past, will present a single question - will lead to a redefinition of the boundaries of the electoral colleagues in the Chamber and Senate, inevitably resulting in an increase in size of constituencies with three indirect effects :

1) The raising, especially in the Senate of the Republic, of the natural (or implicit) barrier threshold, which will be much higher than the 3% envisaged by the legal threshold, surreptitiously introducing a very selective system of political or territorial minorities present in a territory [13] .

2) The parliamentarian will have to be linked to a larger, more populous constituency which will encompass more densely populated urban areas and more depopulated rural areas. It is clear that, from the point of view of electoral campaigns and parliamentary action, the largest pool of votes capable of ensuring re-election will be privileged instead of the more meager and already marginalized one.

3) The territorial dimension will also determine an increase in the costs of electoral campaigns, further exacerbating the personalization and mediatization of political confrontation.

These effects do not have a decisive impact on the constitutional architecture. The reform only serves to update the Constitution in response to the party class that voted the reform law with a very large majority. This clean break does not fit, despite the unrealistic declarations of majority and opposition exponents, in the framework of a more articulated plan for the reform of the bourgeois state, perceived as essential by many and continually aborted by the voters. What makes the constitutional update regressive from the point of view of the conflicting social forces is the further erosion of the mechanism of classical parliamentary representation in a framework of general incapacity of actors, even if other than state bodies, ofexperiment and create new modes of political responsibility, direct and indirect, also alien to the main form of the liberal-democratic regime.

This reform does nothing but make clear the stiffening the liberal-democratic regime is facing: political parties, all expressions of the ruling classes, must close ranks and reduce the infiltration of dissent which could, even remotely, undermine the taken on the state. With a view to a return to conflict, the socialist and communist forces should restart, once they have reconnected themselves to the reality of the exploited, a political experimentation that goes beyond the mere electoral rite to which we are accustomed and which has contributed to making the diaspora communist an Italian theater made up of characters looking for seats.

Parliamentarism, in the words of Lukacs, should only be a "tactical problem" [14] of the class struggle of the proletariat. Parliament, the instrument originally most suited to the bourgeoisie to maintain the fiction of representing "all the people", has ended up being the heart of a liturgy coveted and sought after by communists and socialists reduced to abjuring the conflictual nature of their political proposal , instead embracing compromising and pacifying positions with the bourgeoisie in command.

While on the one hand we cannot help but fight against parliamentarism, on the other hand the reconstruction of a unitary front is of primary importance that puts at the center the theoretical and practical development of new forms of political expression , of productive and social organization, capable of to reverse the present state of affairs. Only then will it be possible to look with detachment on parliament as the tactical tool that it is. Until then we must try to defend him, even at the cost of sharing a battle with the devil or, worse, with Emma Bonino. ... fendibile/

Google translator
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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