Why is the far-right winning support from the working class?
The latest dossier from the Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research addresses the need for the left in Latin America to confront neofascism rising across the region and the world
August 15, 2024 by Pablo Meriguet
This past week, the Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research launched its Dossier #79 entitled “To confront rising neofascism, the Latin American Left must rediscover itself”. In this article, we summarize the most important ideas of this document.
The dossier seeks to analyze “the advance of neoliberalism and its impact on the material conditions of the working class across the continent, and examine the ideological and cultural mechanisms of this economic model, which convinces a significant part of the working class to support a project in which they are the primary victims.” (emphasis added)
What is neofascism?
The seemingly strange connection between the right and the popular classes managed to materialize on a massive scale thanks to the upsurge of neoliberalism in the 21st century, characterized by a more radical and populist approach that the Tricontinental document defines as “neofascism”. This, they define, is “a new political, economic and cultural movement” based on several factors: the successful implantation of a neoliberal ideology (thanks to a frustrated middle class); the anti-intellectualism of the elites that rejects reason and science in favor of an apparent naturalized common sense; the production of a punitive, militaristic, racist and misogynist national identity, shaped by “good citizens” who share simple explanations of complex social processes; and the re-articulation of an anti-communist ideology supported by religious fundamentalism.
The emergence of so-called neofascism was only possible through the intentional paralyzation of left-wing social forces. This has been achieved through the elimination of a future horizon for workers that neoliberalism is not interested in forging and progressivism is not capable of elaborating.
The (almost) withering attack on the first wave of progressive governments
The document differentiates the first wave of progressive governments from the second. The first sought regional integration of the different countries, the search for popular sovereignty in defiance even of US imperialism, etc. The second wave of progressive governments, due to the current political conditions, is more fragile on these issues and is no longer capable of repeating in the same way the economic and political recipes that the first wave developed. According to the document, this weakness is expressed by the strengthening of the regional extreme right, the uberization of labor markets, the destruction of social welfare policies, the growth of US military power, and the US economic reconquest of the Latin American market.
The offensive of the alliance formed by the national ruling classes, international capital, and US governments, came hand in hand with coups d’état or political processes that weakened the governments of the first progressive wave in the region: Manuel Zelaya in Honduras (2009), Fernando Lugo in Paraguay (2012), Dilma Rousseff in Brazil (2016), Evo Morales in Bolivia (2019), imprisonment of Lula in Brazil (2018), persecution and assassination attempt against Cristina Fernandez in Argentina (2022), etc.
It is true that in each country there were local peculiarities, but in general terms, we can see a regional strategy of political-ideological offensive that sought, subsequently, a radicalization of the neoliberal processes: “The broad reorganization of the Latin American right featured many common techniques, such as a combination of legal and illegal means, and the centrality of the battle of ideas – or ‘culture war’ – within its political strategy.”
In short, the offensive was devastating for progressivism. It forced it to moderate a good part of its discourse in a defensive manner and to “manage neoliberal policies, instead of building a broad leftist project”. A good example of this is the so-called “war on drugs”, a project promoted mainly by US security agencies, to which Latin American progressivism has failed to offer an alternative.
Progressivism has more or less complied with all the strategies proposed by the United States in this regard. Indeed, one of the great weaknesses of this political tendency is citizen security, which has been used by certain politicians such as Bukele in El Salvador and Noboa in Ecuador to become more popular through a militaristic discourse. “While the right has an authoritative and punitive position on public safety and against drug trafficking, progressive parties have become hostages of electoral messaging, going along with the right’s discourse of incarceration and severe punishment because it is increasingly popular with voters” states the document.
The progressive forces have not been able to create new forms of collective organization in the face of the latest political, ideological, and media strategies of the new right wing. Even when they once again reach the government of a country, they are mostly seen as governments acting on the defensive: “The transition from a neoliberal or neofascist to a progressive government capable of advancing structural transformation is not possible without a broad base of working-class support. At this time, the conjuncture does not favor broad structural transformation. For that reason, progressive electoral projects have had a difficult time building strong popular support for their limited programs. The difficulty of building a political project of the left that can overcome the day-to-day problems of working-class existence has unmoored many of these progressive electoral projects from mass needs. This condition of being unmoored has led sections of the working class and peasantry to seek refuge under the banner of neofascism.”
Who are the most affected by neoliberal policies?
However, the main victims of these policies have always been the poorest, especially Black people, women, and LGBTQI people. In addition, workers have been deeply affected by neoliberal policies, not only economically but also in terms of their consciousness.
These policies have promoted the idea that workers can be their bosses, have greater benefits if they work on their own, have greater labor flexibility, have higher incomes, and generate an inheritance for their children. In other words, an ideological notion has been articulated in which workers lose their class consciousness as exploited workers and begin to see themselves, in a mystified way, as “entrepreneurs/bosses”, who no longer see any sense in defending labor rights if they, at some point, will be the new bosses of the companies. This generates a deep fragmentation in the working class.
Neo-fascist ideology and its media coordination
However, despite its apparent absolute pragmatism, neoliberalism is antagonistic to the vital needs of workers, generating a state of mass discontent and anguish that leads to psychological illnesses and the increased use of drugs to counteract these ills.
This is so because neoliberalism promotes, according to its ideal of the successful man, an exacerbated individualism, the stark competition among its members at the expense of leisure and culture: “Under neoliberalism, the ideas of the corporate world are imposed on all spheres of life, shaping individuals’ subjectivity. Life is now structured around the parameters of the private realm, emphasizing individualism, consumption, and the market as the primary characteristics of human relations.”
This ideological restructuring was possible thanks to the history of Latin American states, which have shown over the centuries to be incapable of benefiting the majority of the population. Neoliberalism was able to successfully take advantage of this historical distrust of states and government to generalize its anti-statist vision of a future society.
One of the fundamental aspects revealed by the document is the media coordination that has been organized and disseminated for the promotion of neofascism. For example, Silicon Valley promotes the mass dissemination of certain ideological content, and enhances surveillance capabilities on citizens, while building models of study of “users” based on their behaviors.
Moreover, the neo-fascist forces, the Tricontinental dossier states, are organized through think tanks, financed by similar organizations in the United States and Spain. This funding is intended to fragment the working class, diminish class struggle, and create social consensus among people who consume content, primarily from social networks: “In this sphere, where the business model favors a discourse of hate, social media content largely reinforces a neoliberal ideology, making use of religious fundamentalism, the theology of prosperity, and punitive. Social media is a key battleground in a culture war spurred on by neofascism and a site for efforts to bring together diverse neofascist groups from across the world. This culture war is not the spontaneous outcome of resentment and outrage from neoliberalism’s victims: it is organized, centralized, and extremely well-funded.”
Furthermore, neoliberalism has been very skillful in creating an anti-communist tendency through the exacerbation of religious fundamentalism. As Goebbels thought, it successfully creates the image of a common declared enemy: communism. And although progressive governments have nothing communist about them, any political process that does not fit within the neoliberal framework is called “communist”. This allows for simplifying politics and its diversity. This is so much so that any political tendency that wants to guarantee the role of the State in defense of rights is simply labeled as “communist”, even though a left-liberal is far from communist.
In addition, religious fundamentalism is used to combat the enemies of neoliberalism. Although this strategy is not new in Latin America, today religious values are promoted against sexual and reproductive rights through a discursive war, which has an enormous impact on people and provokes much sympathy in favor of conservative discourses. “Any questioning of this limited way of existing in the world is framed as ‘gender ideology’, provoking moral panic. Neofascists attack, condemn, and criticize as abnormal diverse models of the family. These actors promote a discourse of hate and call on society to rectify what they consider to be deviant attitudes, resulting in escalating violence against the LGBTQIA+ population.”
Forging a new alternative for the future
According to the document, what all the anti-neoliberal forces should do is reconnect the politics of the left and progressivism with the needs, pains, and desires of the poorest, especially through popular organizations in the streets and neighborhoods. In this regard, the coordinator of the Tricontinental office in Brazil, Miguel Stédile, warns that “to confront the monsters of fascism, the left needs to rediscover itself. In the face of today’s structural problems – the climate catastrophe, the migration catastrophe, and armed conflicts – the left must dare to propose equally structural solutions. Moderation and crisis management […] is not enough to make real changes.”
Finally, the Tricontinental document concludes that “Defeating the right will not be an easy task, nor will it be confined to the electoral sphere. The actions of organized social movements, whose collective values of solidarity oppose neoliberal ideology, and of governments that prioritize the strengthening of rights and policies that advance the people’s well-being, are critical to winning this struggle.”
Milei promised prosperity, yet 70% of Argentina’s population now lives in poverty
Recent reports from the Catholic University of Argentina and CELAG indicate that poverty has significantly increase during the eight months of Milei’s government
August 20, 2024 by Pablo Meriguet
Members of the Workers of the Popular Economy (UTEP) march and demand that the goverment address the food insecurity and poverty crisis. Photo: UTEP
The economic crisis in Argentina cannot be overcome despite the constant promises of the Milei government. Indeed, the right-wing libertarian president claimed, before becoming president, that deregulation of the economy (freeing prices, reducing state control over the economy, privatizing state-owned companies, etc.) would soon bring about an economic recovery in the face of the economic and fiscal crisis that the country was going through under Alberto Fernandez and his predecessor Mauricio Macri. However, Milei has been unable to implement policies that alleviate the steadily deteriorating socioeconomic conditions of the poor.
So far, the “libertarian recipe” has not delivered the results that it promised. If the economy continues on this course, not only will the poorest not see any improvements in their conditions, but the number of poor may continue to grow.
Unemployment, currency devaluation and inflation: recipe for poverty
According to a report by the Catholic University of Argentina (UCA), by the first quarter of 2024, 54.6% of Argentine families will have a monthly per capita income below 198,000 pesos (almost 210 dollars). This implies an increase in the number of poor people in Argentina by nearly 16% in just one year if we take into consideration a report by the Observatory of the Argentine Social Debt (ODSA) which stated that by the first quarter of 2023, the number of poor people was almost 39% of the population.
Poverty in Argentina is not decreasing, but quite the contrary…and alarmingly so. According to the UCA report, the worsening of the Argentine economic crisis is due to the fall in the average per capita income of families, the uncontrolled increase in the prices of the basic food basket, and the increase in unemployment (especially in the informal sector), among other factors. For example, the average income of urban workers decreased by 18.5%, and the same happened with the average salary remuneration, which fell by 20%.
As a result, thousands of people who were previously in the lower middle class, according to the report, are now below the poverty line. And those who were already living in poverty are now, under Javier Milei’s government, at risk of living worse. In Argentina, there is a dramatic increase in extreme poverty: about 16.5% of Argentines are living in extreme poverty. The most affected regions are the northeast and northwest of the country, where poverty exceeds 60% of the population. In the greater Buenos Aires metropolitan area, 56.7% of the population is poor. One of the groups that suffers the most from this crisis is children: child poverty reaches 65.4% of the youngest. The data is devastating.
According to many criteria, the UCA figures would suffice to establish that slightly more than 50% of Argentines live in poverty, although the Latin American Strategic Center for Geopolitics (CELAG) argues that to say so would be incorrect. The group of the poor should also include the 18.3% of households classified as “almost poor” since in this group there are people who barely earn a few pesos more than 198,000. CELAC argues that such an amount of money, taking into account the enormous devaluation suffered by the Argentine peso, would not place them as families belonging to the middle class, but closer to poverty. For example, 68% of households have a per capita income of 284,874 pesos (301 dollars).
According to CELAG, the true number of poor in Argentina is closer to 73.3% of the population.
This data, according to CELAG’s analysis, would overturn a long-standing national and regional economic belief that Argentina is a middle-class country. The analysis goes much further and argues that the middle class is in decline, as it is almost non-existent today. Only 16% of the population could be part of Argentina’s “mythical” middle class. Finally, just 10.7% of the population has a high income. Therefore, Javier Milei’s Argentina should be considered as a country in which nearly 75% of the population lives in poverty, and it does not seem that the situation can be reversed in the short or medium term if economic measures that harm the majority and disproportionately benefit the richest in the country continue to be applied.
The Weakness of Progressive Latin American Governments in These Precarious Times: The Thirty-Fourth Newsletter (2024)
Unwilling to accept election results in Venezuela, the OAS, led by the US, passed a resolution essentially asking the country to violate its own election laws. Many countries with supposedly centre-left or left governments have joined the US in proposals that seek to undermine Venezuelan democratic processes, a reflection of the contradictions confronting the current progressive cycle of governments and weakness of the left in Latin America today.
22 August 2024
Andry León (Venezuela), José Gregorio Hernández, 2023.
Dear friends,
Greetings from the desk of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research.
On 16 August 2024, the Organisation of American States (OAS), whose 1948 formation as a Cold War institution was instigated by the United States, voted on a resolution regarding the Venezuelan presidential elections. The nub of the resolution proposed by the US called upon Venezuela’s election authority, the National Electoral Council (CNE), to publish all the election details as soon as possible (including the actas, or voting records, at the local polling station level). This resolution asks the CNE to go against Venezuela’s Organic Law on Electoral Processes (Ley Orgánica de Procesos Electorales or LOPE): since the law does not call for the publication of these materials, doing so would be a violation of public law. What the law does indicate is that the CNE must announce the results within 48 hours (article 146) and publish them within 30 days (article 155) and that the data from polling places (such as the actas) should be published in a tabular form (article 150).
It is pure irony that the resolution was voted upon in the Simón Bolívar room at the OAS headquarters in Washington, DC. Simón Bolívar (1783–1830) liberated Venezuela and neighbouring territories from the Spanish Empire and sought to bring about a process of integration that would strengthen the region’s sovereignty. That is why the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela pays tribute to his legacy in its name. When Hugo Chávez won the presidency in 1998, he centred Bolívar in the country’s political life, seeking to further this legacy through initiatives such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA) that would continue the journey to establish sovereignty in the country and region. In 1829, Bolívar wrote, ‘The United States appears to be destined by providence to plague [Latin] America with misery in the name of liberty’. This misery, in our time, is exemplified by the US attempt to suffocate Latin American countries through military coups or sanctions. In recent years, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have been at the epicentre of this ‘plague’. The OAS resolution is part of that suffocation.
José Chávez Morado (Mexico), Carnival in Huejotzingo, 1939.
Bolivia, Honduras, Mexico, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines did not come to the vote (nor did Cuba, as it was expelled by the OAS in 1962, leading Castro to dub the organisation the ‘Ministry of Colonies of the United States’, or Nicaragua, which left the OAS in 2023). Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO) described why his country decided not to appear at the OAS meeting and why it disagrees with the US-proposed resolution, quoting from article 89, section X of the Mexican Constitution (1917), which states that the president of Mexico must adhere to the principles of ‘non-intervention; peaceful settlement of disputes; [and] prohibiting the threat or use of force in international relations’. To that end, AMLO said that Mexico will wait for the ‘competent authority of the country’ to settle any disagreement. In Venezuela’s case, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice is the relevant authority, though this has not stopped the opposition from rejecting its legitimacy. This opposition, which we have characterised as the far right of a special type, is committed to using any resource – including US military intervention – to overthrow the Bolivarian process. AMLO’s reasonable position is along the grain of the United Nations Charter (1945).
Many countries with apparently centre-left or left governments joined the US in voting for this OAS resolution. Among them are Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. Chile, even though it has a president who admires Salvador Allende (killed in a US-imposed coup in 1973), has displayed a foreign policy orientation on many issues (including both Venezuela and Ukraine) that aligns with the US State Department. Since 2016, at the invitation of the Chilean government, the country welcomed nearly half a million Venezuelan migrants, many of whom are undocumented and now face the threat of expulsion from an increasingly hostile environment in Chile. It is almost as if the country’s president, Gabriel Boric, wants to see the situation in Venezuela change so that he can order the return of Venezuelans to their home country. This cynical attitude towards Chile’s enthusiasm for US policy on Venezuela, however, does not explain the situation of Brazil and Colombia.
Pablo Kalaka (Chile), Untitled, 2022, sourced from Lendemains solidaires no. 2.
Our latest dossier, To Confront Rising Neofascism, the Latin American Left Must Rediscover Itself, analyses the current political landscape on the continent, beginning by interrogating the assumption that there has been a second ‘pink tide’ or cycle of progressive governments in Latin America. The first cycle, which was inaugurated with the 1998 election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and came to an end following the 2008 financial crisis and US counter-offensive against the continent, ‘frontally challenged US imperialism by advancing Latin American integration and geopolitical sovereignty’, while the second cycle, defined by a more centre-left orientation, ‘seems more fragile’. This fragility is emblematic of the situation in both Brazil and Colombia, where the governments of Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva and Gustavo Petro, respectively, have not been able to exercise their full control over the permanent bureaucracies in the foreign ministries. Neither the foreign minister of Brazil (Mauro Vieira) nor Colombia (Luis Gilberto Murillo) are men of the left or even of the centre left, and both have close ties to the US as former ambassadors to the country. It bears reflection that there are still over ten US military bases in Colombia, though this is not sufficient reason for the fragility of this second cycle.
In the dossier, we offer seven explanations for this fragility:
*the worldwide financial and environmental crises, which have created divisions between countries in the region about which path to follow;
the US reassertion of control over the region, which it had lost during the first progressive wave, in particular to challenge what the US sees as China’s entry into Latin American markets. This includes the region’s natural and labour resources;
*the increasing uberisation of labour markets, which has created far more precarity for the working class and negatively impacted its capacity for mass organisation. This has resulted in a significant rolling back of workers’ rights and weakened working-class power;
*the reconfiguration of social reproduction, which has become centred around public disinvestment in social welfare policies, thereby placing the responsibility for care in the private sphere and primarily overburdening women;
*the US’s increased military power in the region as its main instrument of domination in response to its declining economic power;
*the fact that the region’s governments have been unable to take advantage of China’s economic influence and the opportunities it presents to drive a sovereign agenda and that China, which has emerged as Latin America’s primary trading partner, has not sought to directly challenge the US agenda to secure hegemony over the continent;
*divisions between progressive governments, which, alongside the ascension of neofascism in the Americas, impede the growth of a progressive regional agenda, including policies for continental integration akin to those proposed during the first progressive wave.
These factors, and others, have weakened the assertiveness of these governments and their ability to enact the shared Bolivarian dream of hemispheric sovereignty and partnership.
Antonia Caro (Colombia), Colombia, 1977.
One additional, but crucial, point is that the balance of class forces in societies such as Brazil and Colombia are not in favour of genuinely anti-imperialist politics. Celebrated electoral occasions, such as the victories of Lula and Petro in 2022, are not built on a broad base of organised working-class support that then forces society to advance a genuinely transformative agenda for the people. The coalitions that triumphed included centre-right forces that continue to wield social power and prevent these leaders, regardless of their own impeccable credentials, from exercising a free hand in governance. The weakness of these governments is one of the elements that allows for the growth of the far right of a special type.
As we argue in the dossier, ‘The difficulty of building a political project of the left that can overcome the day-to-day problems of working-class existence has unmoored many of these progressive electoral projects from mass needs’. The working classes, trapped in precarious occupations, need massive productive investments (driven by the state), premised on the exercise of sovereignty over each country and the region as a whole. The fact that a number of countries in the region have aligned with the US to diminish Venezuela’s sovereignty shows that these fragile electoral projects possess little capacity to defend sovereignty.
Daniel Lezama (Mexico), El sueño del 16 de septiembre (The Dream of September 16th), 2001.
In her poem ‘Quo Vadis’, the Mexican poet Carmen Boullosa reflects on the problematic nature of pledging allegiance to the US government’s agenda. Las balas que vuelan no tienen convicciones (‘flying bullets have no convictions’), she writes. These ‘progressive’ governments have no conviction regarding regime change operations or destabilisation efforts in other countries in the region. Much should be expected of them, but at the same time too much disappointment is unwarranted.
Breno Altman: “The relationship between Lula and Chavismo has always been one of alliance and divergence”
The Brazilian journalist spoke to Peoples Dispatch about the statements from the Brazilian President regarding the situation in Venezuela
August 22, 2024 by Peoples Dispatch
Photo: Ricardo Stuckert/PR
On August 15, the governments of Brazil and Colombia announced on different channels that Venezuela should hold fresh elections or organize a cohabitation government with the far-right. This about-face came after having called for caution and to wait for the results of the investigations initiated by the Supreme Court of Justice regarding the electoral results. At the time, this had radically distanced the government of the two nations from the position of conservative and centrist leaders of the region who, following the position of the United States, recognized Edmundo González as the winner of the July 28 elections.
Brazilian President Lula stated his opinion on the solution to the political conflict in Venezuela in an interview with Rádio T, “Maduro has six more months of his mandate. If he acts with common sense, he could call for new elections, forming an electoral committee with members of the opposition and international observers.”
Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro quickly responded, rejecting calls for redo elections by his counterparts in Brazil and Colombia. He declared that “Venezuela has the sovereignty of an independent country with a Constitution, it has institutions, and the conflicts in Venezuela of any kind are solved among Venezuelans, with their institutions, with their law and with their Constitution.”
Peoples Dispatch editor Zoe Alexandra conducted an interview with Brazilian journalist Breno Altman, who lays out the context of why Brazil’s government decided to call for new elections in Venezuela.
Read the full interview below, translated from Portuguese and lightly edited for clarity:
Zoe Alexandra: Lula and Petro have defended the idea that the “electoral crisis” in Venezuela must have another way out, and that could be new elections or a “cohabitation” government. Where does this new stance come from? Was it really a surprise?
Breno Altman: The proposal is to call new elections or to set up a cohabitation government that would lead to new elections. These two proposals are not exactly new, and have been circulating for days in the dialogues between the Brazilian and Colombian governments and also in the consultations that the Brazilian government has held with the European Union and the United States.
It’s not surprising that Brazil and Colombia are trying to mediate between the opposition and Chavismo, between the United States and the European Union, on the one hand, with China and Russia on the other. This posture of mediation implies an unbridled search for a solution that could be accepted by both parties.
This is now becoming increasingly complex. There is a result in the electoral process in Venezuela that Chavismo defends, both from an institutional point of view and from the point of view of popular mobilization. What the extreme right wants is international support to try to impose its supposed victory in Venezuela.
ZA: Before the elections, we saw that Lula was already making statements critical of Maduro. How can you explain this escalation in relations? How have relations between Lula and Maduro been in the past?
BA: The relationship between Lula and Chavismo has always been one of alliance and divergence. They have always remained in the same camp of alliances and the construction of a counter-hegemonic bloc in Latin America and the world. But there have always been differences.
Firstly, because they are different processes. Chavismo represents an attempt at revolutionary change within the legality of democracy, but a revolutionary change in Venezuela, a transition of state power from the landowning classes to the working classes, the construction of a social economic system different from capitalism. At least these are the objectives clearly set out by Chavismo.
The process in Brazil is different. It’s a process that doesn’t call liberal democracy into question, much less the capitalist market economy. It is a process of change, of social and economic inclusion within this capitalist order and without breaking with the liberal democratic state, without having as its objective the transition of power from the bourgeoisie to the working classes.
This has always led to disagreements. While Chavismo has clearly always had an anti-imperialist attitude, the Brazilian government, with Lula or Dilma, had a more mediated position depending on the concrete conditions in Brazil and the strategy that was designed for those concrete circumstances. In the current period, you have a deepening of tensions because of the specific situation of the Lula government.
ZA: For many people, the fact that progressive governments took a stand against a popular government was shocking. Can you help us understand some of the internal and external dynamics which led to this development?
BA: I believe that the Lula government and President Lula are concerned about the Brazilian municipal elections scheduled for October. And he believes that defending the Maduro government will take votes away from the PT and its allied parties, especially in the big capitals, particularly in São Paulo.
We have to take into account that the logic of Brazilian foreign policy is one of active non-alignment, that is, seeking to build on negotiations with the United States, the European Union, China and Russia, seeking an intermediate situation in which it is possible to obtain advantages for Brazil, for South America. In this logic, Brazilian foreign policy avoids steps that could lead to a break in relations with the United States, although Brazil’s economic and political relations are privileged with China and other counter-hegemonic countries.
At no point does Brazil assume a position aligned with US imperialism. Nor does Brazil wish to adopt steps that would represent a break with the United States and the European Union. In this Brazilian foreign policy, which is currently underway of active non-alignment, there is also a bet that relations between South America, European governments led by social democracy, liberalism, specifically France and Germany, and also relations with the Democratic Party in the United States can help constitute and reinforce this non-aligned intermediary role of Brazil and can also help constitute an alliance that helps the Brazilian left fight the extreme right in our country.
I think that the tensions between Lula and Maduro have to do with this, that is, with the needs of President Lula’s government or the way President Lula sees these needs, to prevent a break with the United States and the European Union. From an external point of view and from an internal point of view, preventing a split, a split that would be dangerous for this broad front, for this alliance between the left and liberals that was formed to elect President Lula against Bolsonaro. Supporting Venezuela could jeopardize this broad front. President Lula is calculating that if he will openly support Venezuela, recognizing Maduro’s victory, it could also cause electoral damage.
ZA: Can you elaborate on the similarities between supporters of Bolsonaro in Brazil and those of the extreme right in Venezuela?
BA: I think that the Venezuelan far right, like Bolsonaro, is reacting to the elections and the electoral result in Venezuela in a similar way, including the one adopted by the Republican Party in the United States. In other words, it’s trying to create a situation of chaos, violence, a coup, a situation of mutiny against the electoral result. Both to try to overturn the result and to try to establish by force a government controlled by them and, at the limit, to create a permanent environment of mobilization of this extreme right to keep the extreme right permanently in action, disputing the streets, disputing the networks destabilizing the government, building itself as an alternative either by electoral means in the next moment, or as a coup alternative.
We have to understand what the extreme right is in the world today. It’s a political expression of a sector of the bourgeoisie, whether Brazilian, North American, Venezuelan or European, which promotes the liberal reforms necessary for the recovery of the rate of profit of capital at a time of structural crisis, reforms that are going to reduce wages, that are going to reduce rights, that are going to reduce public services, that are going to make labor relations more precarious, that are going to have consequences for the international division of labor.
In the case of the United States, this means closing its market to the economies of other countries. In the case of Brazil, this means the will of the Brazilian bourgeoisie or sectors of the Venezuelan bourgeoisie to insert themselves ever more deeply into the imperialist system linked to the United States. This extreme right believes that these reforms can only be carried out by reducing democracy, by reducing popular sovereignty and by building authoritarian governments, dictatorial governments, governments that break with democratic instruments.
An extreme right-wing victory in Venezuela would represent the emergence of an extremely authoritarian government, probably a dictatorship that would crush the achievements of Chavismo. That was the role of the Temer government and the Bolsonaro government after the overthrow of the Dilma government in 2016.
They have an ideological identity, a programmatic identity and they react against the electoral result in the same way. Bolsonaro, the González-Corina duo, and Trump are reacting in an anti-democratic way, provoking violence, provoking riots, trying to establish a relationship of forces that pushes the country towards a scenario of either a coup d’état or a strengthening of the role of this extreme right.
US & NATO Allies Are Considering Taking Over State-Owned Argentine Arms Manufacturer to Bolster Munitions for Ukraine
Posted on August 23, 2024 by Nick Corbishley
Desperate Times, Desperate Measures
By now NC readers are well versed on the largely self-inflicted problems the US and its NATO vassals are having keeping weapons and munitions flowing into Ukraine. Most NATO members have already stripped their cupboards bare of weapons stocks, including 155mm shells. In July, a special Reuters report admitted that “A decade of strategic, funding and production mistakes [had] played a far greater role in the shell shortage than did the recent US congressional delays of aid.”
There are many reasons for this chronic munitions shortage. As Yves explained in her preamble to a recent cross-posted article, they include “a failure of the US and its NATO allies to invest in surge capacity”, “protracted and typically porky procurement processes” and “a general distaste for dirigisme”.
Stealth Privatisation
To bolster their dwindling stocks of munitions, the US and its NATO vassals are once again looking south, to Latin America. This time they are not asking governments in the region to donate or (in the words of the Commander of US Southern Command, General Laura Richardson) “switch out” Russian military equipment to Ukraine, which has so far yielded nada de nada, but are rather seeking to buy out a state-owned arms manufacturer in Argentina, with the goal of enlisting it in Ukraine’s war effort.
The firm in question is Fabricaciones Militares, which besides manufacturing small arms, machine guns, artillery, munitions, TNT, DNT and nitorglycerin, also produces rolling stock for the state-owned rail operator Ferrocarriles Argentinos. Until recently, Fabricaciones Militares was also producing explosives for a Peruvian mining company, but in May Argentina’s Javier Milei government severed the contract. According to the Argentine news broadcaster Canal 26, a U.S. military delegation has visited the company to gauge its logistical capabilities.
The Milei government has apparently already given the go-ahead for a US or European firm to take over operations at the Argentine state-owned enterprise. Such a move would be, to put it mildly, controversial, as well as rather strange given Argentina’s chronic manufacturing problems.
As Canal 26 notes, Fabricaciones Militares is not on the government’s list of 35 state-owned companies (public ports, aeronautics, satellites, water, banking, telecommunications, energy, railway, oil, coal and education companies) earmarked for privatisation in its Law of Bases. Instead, it was included in a list of state-owned companies to be transformed into publicly listed companies. That list was featured in the government’s Decree of Necessity and Urgency (DNU), announced in December.
Once Fabricaciones Militares is listed on the stock exchange, which could apparently happen as soon as September, a US or European company could take a controlling stake in the company. In other words, this is privatisation by stealth. There are apparently already a number of interested parties. According to Eduardo Bercovich, the secretary general of the ATE union in the city of Azul, where one of Fabricaciones Militares’ biggest plants is located, the Azul plant has already received visits from delegations of two companies, including the Czech CSG Group.
“Up for Auction”
Another installation in Río Tercero was visited in July by US government personnel, reports Tiempo de San Juan:
The visit in question, by US personnel in the company of representatives of the Ministry of Defence and the Directorate of Military Manufacturing, took place outside the “traditional” channels and was denounced by the unions operating at the plant. The complaint resulted in a call for answers by representatives of Juntos por el Cambio and the Justicialist Party in the Chamber of Deputies. Although the government has not yet commented on the matter, versions are growing regarding the US taking control of military facilities that would be used to manufacture equipment for NATO troops in Ukraine.
“We understand that at Fabricaciones Militares there is a sign up saying: ‘up for auction,’ Bercovich told Canal Abierta. “For the government, the only option being considered is to turn FM into a publicly limited company and have another country manage our defence industry.” This, he said, is “extremely concerning, especially since the Milei government wants the country to join NATO as well as produce arms for Ukraine, which could get us embroiled in the war in a big way.”
As we reported in June, Milei appears to be determined to turn Argentina into the first Latin American country to send weapons to Ukraine:
“Milei is determined to take sides in international conflicts, believing that this positions him as an international leader,” says geopolitical analyst Gonzalo Fiore Viani. “Everything he does is to reinforce that image and not to advance Argentina’s national interests.”
Milei seems determined to involve Argentina not only in the escalating tensions in the Middle East, but also in the meat grinder that is Ukraine. Yesterday, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III welcomed Argentina as a new member of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (aka Ramstein Group) during his opening address at the group’s 23rd meeting. The Ramstein Group is an alliance of (mainly NATO) countries that meets monthly at the Ramstein air base in Germany to coordinate the ongoing donation of military aid to the Zelensky government…
Argentina is the first Latin American country to join the group. In an interview with CNN Español’s Andrés Oppenheimer in April, Milei even entertained the possibility of sending military personnel into the meat grinder, a proposal that enjoys the support of just 21% of the population, according to a survey by the consultant Gustavo Córdoba. Any decision to send troops would have to go through Congress first, an unnamed diplomatic source told La Politica Online.
The same is not true of sending arms. A new article by Infobae suggests that Milei wants to gift Ukraine’s (now wholly unelected) President Volodymyr Zelensky five French-made fighter jets.
As we noted at the time, the biggest flaw in the plan was that the planes in question couldn’t actually fly — in fact, hadn’t flown for years. Days later, reports began emerging of plans to send Argentine tanks to Ukraine via Germany.
“A Hostile Act”
Russia was quick to respond, which it did by describing Argentina’s offer to send the planes and/or tanks to Ukraine as a “hostile act.” Through his ambassador to Argentina, Dmitry Feoktistov, Vladimir Putin urged Milei’s administration to refrain from interfering in Russia’s conflict with Ukraine, suggesting that Argentina would be far better served maintaining its neutral stance, and that way “preserving the friendly nature of Russian-Argentine relations, which have historically been immune to political trends.”
Feoktistov said:
“The reports about the possible shipment of Argentine tanks through Germany, similar to the agreement of the planes with France, are also worrying. We have clearly and firmly communicated to Argentina that such actions will be considered hostile actions against Russia.”
Feoktistov also criticised the participation of Argentine Defence Minister Luis Petri in the Ramstein Group.
“As for the participation of the Argentine Minister of Defense, Luis Petri, in the Brussels meeting, within the framework of the Ramstein coalition, there are still no official comments from the Argentine side. The… rapprochement between Buenos Aires and Ukraine’s military patrons causes us deep disappointment.”
He also said Russia’s government had responded to Argentina’s application to become a NATO global partner with bafflement. “Frankly, we do not understand how granting this status can improve Argentina’s security.”
It is a point we’ve been making since April when the application for membership was first announced. In fact, a question one could ask about pretty much every aspect of Milei’s foreign policy and geopolitical alignment is: how does the country of Argentina benefit? (Of course, it doesn’t). How does it benefit from its government’s enthusiastic support of Israel as Israel commits war crime after war crime in Gaza –including the worst crime of all, genocide. By doing this, Milei has essentially placed a giant target on Argentina’s back — in return for what?
How does Argentina benefit from its government’s decision to permit the installation of US military personnel along the Paraná-Paraguay Waterway, Argentina’s longest river system, upon which roughly 80% of all its exports travel? Or from the establishment of a joint US-Argentine naval base in Ushuaia, on the southern tip of Tierra de Fuego, granting US Southern Command significant influence over this key entry point to Antarctica? Or from distancing itself from its two closest trade partners, Brazil and China? Or from sending an ever larger chunk of its gold reserves to London, where it can be seized by any one of the country’s myriad unpaid creditors?
Or proposing to splash $100 million on Argentina’s Secretariat of State Intelligence at a time when it is slashing spending for public education, health care, pensions, public works, social spending and just about everything else? Said proposal was unanimously rejected by Argentina’s Congress, with even former President Mauricio Macri’s PRO party blasting the idea of spending $100 million on state intelligence and security at a time when “there is no money,” especially given the lack of transparency regarding how the money would be spent.
But I digress. Back to the main event.
As happened months earlier with Ecuador, another country whose US-aligned government offered to send weapons to Ukraine under the seeming impression that Russia would not retaliate, it didn’t take long for the Milei government to rectify its position. Just two days after Putin’s warning, Argentine presidential spokesman Manuel Adorni explicitly ruled out the possibility of “providing any kind of military support” to Ukraine, in response to a question raised about Russia’s warnings:
“We are not going to provide any type of military support. Yes, of course, we are going to offer humanitarian support, logistical support in terms of humanitarian issues and what is called the demining of the territory. But we are not going to interfere in any way in the war.”
Now, rather than handing Ukraine weapons, the Milei government is looking to give up Argentina’s arms manufacturers for the cause. And apparently Putin won’t notice or care.
But how much use will they be if the Milei government is already stripping Fabricaciones Militares of some of its key workers? Communiques offering early and voluntary retirements have already begun arriving in the staff’s inboxes. Many of the workers laid off will have skills and knowledge that will be difficult to replicate. Bercovich, the union man at Fabricaciones Miilitares, gives the example of one worker who has received more than 1,000 hours of training on how to make explosives.
“That [sort of knowledge] takes years to instil… but all the government wants to do is get rid of state workers.”
Which brings us neatly all the way back to Yves’ point about Western governments’ general distrust of dirigisme (state control of economic and social matters) making it so much harder for them to keep up with Russia’s munitions production. In the case of the Milei government, it is not so much general distrust that it feels toward dirigisme; it is unmitigated hostility.
Leftists or Right-wingers in camouflage
Originally published: Resumen: Latinoamericano and the Third World on August 29, 2024 by Hedelberto López Blanch (more by Resumen: Latinoamericano and the Third World) (Posted Sep 04, 2024)
Every day it is proven that some characters who have come to power in Latin America under the propagandistic cloak of projecting leftist positions have only been disguised, or rather infiltrated, to favor the United States in its goal of maintaining political and economic control in the region.
The most recent case is that of Chilean President Gabriel Boric who, supported by a large part of the people and especially the students, triumphed in the 2021 elections under the aura of having progressive ideas as opposed to his ultra-right-wing opponent José Antonio Kast.
Boric founded in 2018 Convergencia Social one of the parties that make up the Frente Amplio and played his part in reaching a constitutional referendum in October 2020 after the violent student repressions launched by then President Sebastián Piñera.
Since his inauguration as president in March 2022, he has been moving closer to U.S. positions in the region, especially against progressive governments.
Like, in mid 2023 he lashed out against Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, calling him a “dictator” and of repressing his people while calling on the OAS to impose sanctions against Managua.
His apology for former right-wing president Sebastián Piñera after his death in an accident in February 2024 was truly shameful.
In a speech before the National Congress he stated “We bid farewell to a politician who, from his convictions and ideas, served his country with love and worked tenaciously to see it grow and progress. This allows me to affirm that Sebastián Piñera was a man who always put Chile first, who never let himself be carried away by fanaticism or rancor. All of us who are in politics should take note of these virtues”.
Let’s remember that before the increase of public transport fares in 2019, Piñera ordered the police forces to repress the demonstrations that resulted in 45 young people killed, hundreds of wounded, thousands of detainees who suffered humiliations and rapes in the regime’s prisons. The carabineros, in addition to firing tear gas, fired pellet guns into the faces of the young people, causing 545 to lose the sight of one or both eyes.
Now, following the U.S. policy towards Venezuela to try to eliminate the example of sovereignty it represents for the region, Boric openly launched himself against Caracas by emphasizing that “the Superior Court of Justice finishes consolidating the fraud. Maduro’s regime obviously welcomes with enthusiasm its sentence, which will be marked by infamy. There is no doubt that we are facing a dictatorship that falsifies elections, represses those who think differently. The dictatorship of Venezuela is not the left. It is possible and necessary a profoundly democratic continental left that respects human rights regardless of the color of those who violate them”.
While Venezuela gives opportunities to its citizens and increases social programs, Chile, with an extensive list of human rights violations, joins Washington and the OAS to try to overthrow the Bolivarian government.
Another example that cannot be left unnamed is that of Ecuador’s Lenin Moreno, who under the guise of being a loyal member of the Alianza País Party and that he would work for the welfare of his people as his predecessor, Rafael Correa, had done, changed after winning the elections in 2017.
His relations with the United States appeared immediately and were strengthened in 2019 with visits to Quito by Thomas Shannon, former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, David Hale, former Deputy Minister for Political Affairs, Mike Pence, former Vice President, and Mike Pompeo, former Secretary of State. In February 2020, Moreno traveled to Washington where he was received with full honors by Donald Trump with whom he signed several agreements.
In his almost four years of misgovernment, he left Ecuador in a deplorable economic-social-health crisis, coupled with institutionalized corruption, high poverty and unemployment rates, and a huge debt contracted with the International Monetary Fund. The damage done to the progressive forces of the region was incalculable.
In view of these examples, it will be necessary to observe now if other governments that have recently come to power with a progressive halo, follow the path of Boric or Moreno and turn their backs on their peoples and Latin American integration.
As José Martí said: “A minute on your feet is worth more than a life on your knees”.
Secret Chats Expose Decade of US Meddling in Ecuador
September 4, 2024
Compilation image showing armed police. Photo: The GrayZone.
Exclusive interviews and leaked messages reveal how a key ally of the US weaponized the fight against corruption and criminal organizations to selectively prosecute Ecuador’s heads of state, viciously persecuting Rafael Correa and his Revolución Ciudadana movement on flimsy evidence, while delaying investigations into much graver crimes allegedly committed by his successors.
Recently-leaked secret chats obtained by The Grayzone expose how Ecuadorian prosecutor Diana Salazar leaked information to a subject of an ongoing investigation, undermining the prosecution of associates of Ecuador’s current and previous US-aligned presidents, and acted hand-in-glove with the United States government, which essentially selected and controlled prosecutions from Washington.
The shocking revelations of corruption and US meddling in the geopolitically-crucial South American nation have been largely ignored by the US government and corporate media outlets.
A full transcript of this Grayzone documentary by Oscar Leon follows:
“Invading and occupying a country has historically come at a high cost, both financially and in terms of human lives. However, in the 21st century, where asymmetrical warfare prevails, dominating a nation can be achieved through more subtle means. Enter lawfare—an easier and less costly method of steering a key country in the geopolitical chess game.
Despite presiding over Ecuador’s decline from a country with functioning institutions to what some now call a narco-state, Attorney General Diana Salazar has recently been leading what many critics describe as a ‘witch hunt’ against the left-leaning Revolución Ciudadana Movement, under the guise of fighting corruption and narco-trafficking.
While a handful of instances of corruption during Revolución Ciudadana’s decade in power are well-documented, a number of high-profile cases fail to hold up under legal scrutiny. Meanwhile, major cases of corruption and narco-trafficking involving right-wing politicians who support global corporate interests have largely been ignored by the press and quietly ushered into impunity by authorities. The narrative propagated by media conglomerates, which are owned by those with clear stakes in the geopolitical battle, reinforces this bias—a factor that has helped the right-wing win the cultural and electoral battles.
As general elections approach, Attorney General Salazar now faces a trial in Congress. Salazar has publicly labeled the judicial action a ‘narco-trial,’ alleging that unspecified cartel-linked interests are behind the case. This narrative has gained traction in mainstream media, influencing electoral calculations.
The trial was brought on in part by newly-leaked secret chats, obtained by The Grayzone, which were written on an app known for deleting messages after a single viewing. The messages show Salazar leaking information to a subject of an ongoing investigation, refusing to prosecute associates of Ecuador’s current and previous US-aligned presidents, and acting hand-in-glove with the United States government.”
Are presidents being prosecuted selectively?
A.G. Salazar had a hand in cases involving the last 3 former presidents of Ecuador — cases that not only have decided the fate of those politicians but also the political destiny of the entire country. The following questions illustrate the disparity in treatment A.G. Salazar dispensed to each one of these cases.
Was the Correa case a solid case?
In April 2020, former President Rafael Correa was held responsible for up to a billion dollars in damages to the state and received a lifetime ban from holding political office. He was also sentenced to eight years in prison. This case marked a turning point in Ecuador’s political landscape, particularly because, despite the numerous legal battles against him, Correa has been consistently projected to win any election he participated in.
On May 3, 2020, Attorney General Diana Salazar unveiled charges against 26 officials from the Correa administration in a case comparable to a RICO indictment. Salazar argued that a well-organized structure had been collecting bribes in exchange for political favors and government contracts. While the evidence appeared to suggest the existence of such a structure, it did not conclusively link it to Correa himself.
The charges against the former president ultimately centered on the concept of “psychic influx” and a $6,000 loan he took and later repaid using party funds. This led to outrage on both sides, given that “Psychic influx” is a legal concept that did not previously exist in Ecuadorian law. To many, this charge highlighted the lack of sufficient evidence to prove Correa’s guilt. And to others, rather than a “slam dunk case,” it was seen as a weak argument from the prosecution.
In July 2024, allegations surfaced that behind the scenes, numerous judges had come under pressure to convict Correa. Wilman Terán, a high-profile judge who sentenced Correa, testified under oath at a National Assembly hearing that Attorney General Salazar’s envoys had repeatedly pressured him to secure a guilty verdict. Today, Rafael Correa remains exiled in Belgium, and is barred from running for political office in Ecuador. His movement has lost the last three elections.
Why is Lenin Moreno’s case taking so long?
The General Attorney’s office presented 225 pieces of evidence in the case of corruption and embezzlement against former president Lenin Moreno, who steered Ecuador away from the Latin American left and into the US orbit. In the process, Moreno broke numerous promises he’d made to the electorate, which elected him as leftist, but quickly found he governed from the right.
After Lenin Moreno oversaw Ecuador’s withdrawal from UNASUR, a now-dissolved Latin American organization of countries created as a counterweight to the US-dominated Organization of American States, he surrendered Julian Assange to British authorities, and imposed a program of austerity on behalf of the IMF — undoing a decade of social progress in the process.
Along the way, he also appointed Salazar as Attorney General. Critics from the Revolucion Ciudadana movement allege that now she’s paying back the favor by shielding Moreno from any prosecution, an assertion that’s bolstered by Salazar’s close links to the U.S. Embassy. A.G. Salazar is at the heart of the interagency cooperation agreements on many fronts, signed by former president Lasso and ratified by current President Noboa.
Ecuador went from zero cooperation and arguably independence from US influence under Rafael Correa, to signing a number of treaties that give US agents and military total freedom to move around and build anything, anywhere in the country, with total immunity before local courts, over the next decade.
Contrasting with the agency and effort clearly put into the Correa case, the Moreno case moves along much more slowly. Despite abundant and almost definitive evidence of a similar network of corruption against Moreno, and bribes up to 76 million dollars, his case has been noticeably delayed by legal technicalities.
In fact one of the grounds for the political trial against A.G. Salazar is -Non-compliance with Article 442 of the Penal Code in the INA Papers or Sinohydro case- This article requires intervention until the conclusion of the process. The grounds for the charge indicate that there was no intervention for more than two years and three months after the complaint was filed.”
After 2 more years of investigation by the G.A. Office, and despite charges presented for bribery against Moreno and some of his family members, none of the 25 suspects were detained.
The case is suspended for the next few years, while legal information is sent by Spain. At the time of production of this documentary in August 2024, It is unclear whether any of the suspects will go to trial.
Moreno is also accused of crimes against humanity, for the crimes committed in the repression of the 2019 Indigenous and trade unions protests. The man who filed charges, then Ombudsman Freddy Carrion, subsequently became a victim of lawfare himself, who was held under preventative detention by Salazar and the Moreno government for 3 years.
In Carrion’s case, A.G. Salazar was demanding a sentence of 20 years for an accusation of “having the intention to grope”, eventually a panel of female judges denied Salazar’s demands and freed Carrion, after condemning him to the 3 years that Carrion had already served.
Freddy Carrion, former Ombudsman
Freddy Carrion: “At the time I was appointed as Ombudsman, Diana Salazar was the official candidate of Lenín Moreno and Mrs. María Paula Romo for the position of Attorney General. When I denounced them for crimes against humanity, I did so against then-President Lenín Moreno and Mrs. María Paula Romo, who was the Minister of Government and Police.
Undoubtedly, no one ever forgave me for that, especially Mr. Moreno, who was President of the Republic, and Mrs. Romo herself, who controlled the police. There was a relationship between Attorney General Diana Salazar, the prosecutor, and the government, given that the prosecutor had been placed in that position by Moreno. My case was a favor to them in return for Attorney General Salazar’s appointment.” (MOVE)
The power, especially the government of former President Lenín Moreno, along with his henchmen—because they deserve no other name—such as María Paula Romo, then Minister of Government, and Osvaldo Jarrín, then Minister of Defense and commander of the National Police, will never forgive me because I denounced them for crimes against humanity.
Crimes against humanity are imprescriptible. They are timeless. This obviously puts them in a very delicate situation both politically and globally.
In March 2021, I reported them to the State Attorney General’s Office for crimes against humanity. The protests in October 2019 caused immense suffering for Ecuadorian families when several people died due to acts of extrajudicial execution. We cannot forget this. The Public Force conducted very violent actions against the workers.”
FC: “About 11 people died, six of them due to extrajudicial executions, and 20 people lost an eye due to the violent actions of the State.
VO: Shooting protesters in the eyes was and still is a trend, in many countries around the world, police forces have been caught intentionally aiming for protesters’ eyes.
It was determined that the State had a practice or policy of systematic repression effectively aimed at causing harm to those people who were exercising social protest. There was a specific objective and a specific population. That led us to establish the Commission for Truth and Justice that we created in the Ombudsman’s Office.”
VO: The 2019 protests represented a social explosion in response to the reality that the Ecuadorian government had turned sharply to the right, even though it had been elected on a left-wing platform. Lenín Moreno effectively betrayed his voters by implementing a fiscal austerity plan that ended a decade-long period of social investment.
FC: They were trying to send a message to any public authority: if you proceed to report acts of crimes against humanity or any serious violation of human rights, the same thing would happen to you as it did to the ombudsman. That is why they put me in prison.”
VO: “The fact that Carrión spent three years in jail under preventive detention, with no option for bail and without a sentence, clearly runs counter to any notion of rule of law. It’s possible that without the help of his wife, lawyer Prescilla Schettini, who pressured authorities and public opinion, Carrión’s case would still be unresolved.
Priscila Schettini, lawyer, author
Priscila Schettini: “I always knew that my husband was innocent.
We have had evidence, accessed the case file, and reviewed all the documents available. There are videos demonstrating that documents were forged by the Attorney General of the State, Diana Salazar of Ecuador, and that police reports were altered in complicity with the Prosecutor’s Office. High-ranking officers, such as Generals Luna and Tania Varela, who were present on the day of the events, were involved in setting up this situation.
The former government minister, Gabriel Martínez, was aware of this from early in the morning. Additionally, the former secretary of the Presidency, Mr. Jorge Walter, informed one of the officers that they had the full support of the government to bring down the former Ombudsman and remove him from office.
Moreover, we have encountered complicity on the part of the National Court of Justice, one of the highest courts in the country. Out of 21 available judges, I believe 20 have already acted on this case.
While working on the case, we discovered that judges are appointed at the discretion of the president of the National Court, who controls their schedules and assigns judges to secure specific outcomes in various sentences or resolutions.
As a result, we see a completely selective and politicized judicial system.
For telling the truth, speaking out, and fighting for Freddy’s innocence, even the Attorney General Diana Salazar herself requested measures against me from a judge to silence me.”
VO: “On November 28, 2023, Salazar leaked reserved information to the public, including the address for the Carrion-Schettini family home. They were both protected under the local witness protection program, and their location was strictly a secret, yet Salazar published it, and a number of attacks on the home followed.”
PS: “They took hidden photographs of me. They have intimidated me, lynched me in the media, and physically attacked me. I have filed more than 13 complaints with the Prosecutor’s Office, and to date, none have been resolved.
They entered my house. They have fired shots outside my home, men with guns broke into our house, shattered my car window, assaulted me, and pointed a gun at me. All of this is part of a campaign to silence me and Freddy.
VO: Carrión claims that President Moreno, and the powerful geopolitical and economic interests behind him, played a key role in keeping him in jail under preventive detention.
Carrión believes this happened because, as Ombudsman, he witnessed firsthand what he deemed a witch hunt against the Alianza País or “Correísta” movement, and in some cases, he began taking action to defend them.”
Freddy Carrion: “The price I had to pay was imprisonment for three long years in a completely unjust manner, Óscar. With a lot of pain and suffering for me and my family, I found myself completely separated, silenced, and locked in prison.
VO: After leaving the presidency, Moreno traveled to the US. However, when evidence of his corrupt deals was presented in Ecuadorian Courts, the United States allowed Moreno to leave. He now resides in Paraguay under the protection of Ecuadorian diplomatic status.
The upcoming political trial against A.G. Salazar also accuses her of inaction in the case, alleging that she allowed “impunity for the perpetrators and obstructed justice for the victims of state violence.” Another charge is for her role in the incarceration of Freddy Carrion, saying:
“The prosecutor’s omission has allowed the fabrication of a case, and deprivation of liberty of an innocent person.”
Did Salazar save neoliberal banker Guillermo Lasso from narco trafficking charges?
VO: Over the last decade, as the Ecuadorian state was weakened by austerity policies, international criminal cartels took over key areas of the government like ports, security forces, courts, and jails. The country operates with U.S. dollars and exerts minimal control over many institutions, making it a paradise for cartels—not just for sending drugs to the rest of the world but also for laundering its illicit profits.
This rise of criminal structures and narco operations could only have been possible with state complicity at the highest levels. Lenín Moreno and Attorney General Salazar were instrumental in dismantling the Revolución Ciudadana Government. As a consequence, many Ecuadorian state institutions focused on social investment and oversight were shut down or defunded, leading to the collapse of the criminal justice system, which has been ongoing since 2019.
In April, a letter from members of the U.S. Congress to President Biden highlighted evidence suggesting that an anti-narcotics investigation in Ecuador, known as the ‘León de Troya’ case, was halted due to government pressure. In fact, Rodney Rengel, the police officer in charge of the case, was discharged from the force as a disciplinary measure and had to go incognito to protect himself and his family after receiving death threats.
Anderson Boscan: So this is important, the Lasso government initiated a disciplinary process against you. I would suppose that the Noboa government would stop that disciplinary process. Did they?.
Rodney Rengel, former police detective: No, they turned their backs on me. The Ecuadorian State turned its back on me. I am still underground, waiting for some protection for my family at least. This case has taken so much from me, my career, my home, it was a high price to pay, for investigating this case and telling the truth.
Anderson Boscan: What does your case tell your former detective colleagues from the anti drug task force?
Rodney Rengel: “Uff, it tells them to look the other way, to be silent and not tell anything if they ever find somebody powerful during a drug investigation, to better step aside, because they can also be prosecuted and fired over it.”
VO: Rengel’s investigation exposed the business dealings of individuals close to former President Lasso with the Albanian Mafia, or Balkan Mafia Cartel—a drug trafficking organization that had prevailed over other groups and gained control of cocaine trafficking routes to London and the rest of Europe.
The ‘León de Troya’ case initially investigated links between Danilo Carrera, Lasso’s brother-in-law, and businessman Rubén Cherres with Dritan Gjika, a local Balkan Mafia boss who remains at large despite various alleged efforts by authorities to dismantle his organization.
However, recent reports revealed that sources within the Attorney General’s office had tipped off the Balkan Mafia about a planned raid in Spain. Local authorities still allow many companies known to be owned by Gjika to operate to this day.
Given that these cartels are closely linked to the same criminal bands the government is theoretically at war with, these incidents raise serious questions about the Ecuadorian government’s sincerity in prosecuting its ‘war on crime.’
In a strange twist of events, Attorney General Diana Salazar downgraded the charges in the ‘León de Troya’ case from narco-trafficking to organized crime, in a case where many powerful figures, including former President Guillermo Lasso, were involved.
Salazar also opened a second case, named ‘Pampa,’ using the same evidence. But she ultimately only prosecuted low and mid-level operators from the Balkan Mafia and the state, most of whom are still at large and operating. These cases provided a window into a possible political manipulation of justice.”
Rengel: “I don’t understand why an investigation that started as a narco trafficking case, was then diverted as a influence peddling case, and then a new case, “pampa” was opened, about narco trafficking.
Why were some of the suspects in the case separated from others in the “Encuentro” and “Pampa” cases? Like Guillermo Lasso’s brother in law and others like him to be put in the organized crime case, with lower sentences.
And A.G. Salazar then placed other low level operators in the narco trafficking case, with tougher sentences. She divided the suspects and divided the investigations. But both investigations came from the exact same case, the “Leon de troya” case.”
VO: “Ronny Aleaga, a former congressman and former personal friend of Attorney General Salazar, is now a fugitive who sought refuge in Venezuela to escape what he calls ‘political persecution and certain death in an Ecuadorian prison.’
The “Aleaga Leaks” provide a deeper look at how Attorney General Salazar shielded neoliberal banker and former President Guillermo Lasso from a significant narco-trafficking case involving the Balkan Mafia, Mexican cartels, and the Ecuadorian state.
Ronny Aleaga is accused by Attorney General Diana Salazar of being part of an organized crime structure. According to the accusation, Aleaga worked with Leandro Norero, a drug trafficker who was recently murdered in prison.
If the accusations are proven true, Aleaga would have acted as a political operator for a criminal organization that infiltrated Ecuador’s democratic institutions and political parties. This infiltration allegedly reached congressmen from both the right-wing Social Christian Party and the left-wing Revolución Ciudadana movement.
Salazar and Aleaga had a close friendship for years, and Aleaga claimed he recorded their communications using a second phone, for ‘insurance purposes.’ These recordings, verified and notarized by Digital Forensics Now, a data forensics agency based in Florida, contain fifteen hundred chats from the Confide app.
The “Aleaga Leaks” revealed some of the darkest secrets of power, including the geopolitical manipulation of justice systems to influence local politics.”
Rony Aleaga, former Congressman, Revolucion Ciudadana
Rony Aleaga: “In September 2023, before the second electoral round in Ecuador, [Salazar] had to prosecute the León de Troya case for drug trafficking and she changed the criminal offense, [from Narco trafficking to] organized crime and influence peddling, which has nothing to do with with what happened, it is a milder crime, for relatives of then President of the Republic, Guillermo Lasso, who were being accused.
She changed the criminal type of the case. But not only that, she said “I am not going to process [Lasso’s entourage] now because of the [2023] elections I am not going to benefit the [Citizens Revolution].”
VO: The following are some of the chats with Attorney General Salazar recorded by Aleaga. When asked about the chats, Attorney General Salazar stated that her “attention will not be diverted from the cases,” but she did not explicitly deny the veracity of the chats. The Attorney General’s Office refused to use the chats as evidence in any case, questioning the credibility of the forensics agency and the chain of custody of the evidence.
“Because there is no narco trafficking there. There is no narco trafficking in “Leon de Troya”. Influence peddling. In fact, I am going to process this one, after the elections, to avoid helping [Revolucion Ciudadana]. Guillermo Lasso knows this.”
RA: “Imagine a General Prosecutor taking that approach at that moment, in a political issue, when what the Prosecutor’s Office has to do is to investigate crime and punish those allegedly responsible or guilty of that crime, She did not do so.”
VO: Austerity policies imposed for almost a decade have crippled parts of the state, creating areas outside state control. These neglected areas have become breeding grounds for criminal bands working with multimillion-dollar narco cartels like the Sinaloa Cartel, CJNG, and the Albanian Mafia.
This rise of criminal structures and narco operations has only been possible with state complicity, at the highest levels.
RA: “Attorney General Diana Salazar changed the criminal charges because it involved the relatives of the sitting president, allowing these criminal gangs to become entrenched in Ecuador.
They have allowed these mafias to become entrenched. The León de Troya case clearly links the Albanian mafia and the former Minister of Agriculture, Bernardo Manzano, who is closely connected to the current President Daniel Noboa. Manzano, a senior executive of the Noboa Corporation, opened quotas for banana exports to Europe during his tenure.
And do you know who benefited from those quotas? Ghost companies associated with the Albanian mafia. These companies purportedly export bananas, but European ports frequently find drugs hidden in Ecuadorian banana shipments, including those from President Noboa’s own companies.”
The case is also troubling for Attorney General Salazar, as she is believed to have either alerted Aleaga or, at the very least, maintained close contact and shared confidential information with one of the main suspects of a case under her jurisdiction.
Luckily for you didn’t dare asking me anything about the judge. Because, otherwise, I would have prosecuted you.
Because they asked you to tell me. To “The black girl” who allegedly was your lover.
Are you willing to go to jail? Because I am trying to avoid that.
The DEA knows everything, that is the problem. We have to include everything in the investigation. We cannot skip anything.
Do you have a police escort now? Pay attention, your police escorts log your every move.
Don’t worry. I am telling you what we are finding. Until I found elements and told him “leave”.
Trust me.
VO: Aleaga claims that he was able to escape the country because A.G. Salazar tipped him off, right before his arrest warrant was signed.
Influencing elections to defend U.S. interests
VO: On August 9th, 2023, presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio was murdered as he was leaving a political rally, just days before the general election. Up to that point, the election had a clear leader: Luisa Gonzales, from the Revolución Ciudadana Movement, who was leading by 12 points and on the brink of winning in the first round with more than 50% of the vote.
Before his assassination in 2023, suspicions that presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio was on the US payroll were confirmed. As the Grayzone reported in 2021, he was one of many social leaders and journalists who had received NED funds for over a decade in a bid to prop up the Correa government’s opposition. Aleaga’s leaked messages could provide first hand confirmation of it.
Immediately after the murder, mainstream TV news and right-wing politicians began blaming the Revolución Ciudadana Movement and Rafael Correa for the killing. The movement never recovered in the polls and lost the election.
Responsibility for the murder seemed to fall on Los Lobos, the enforcement arm of the Balkan Mafia. Eight suspected killers were immediately apprehended, but all of them were promptly murdered once they were, somehow, placed in a prison controlled by …Los Lobos.”
“They want Rafael Correa’s head.”
“Imagine, they murdered Fernando Villavicencio, who, according to [A.G. Diana Salazar]’s words, was an informant for the United States government. This is why they offered, in a historical reward, $5 million. The US ambassador and the secretary of state both offered $5 million for information leading to the capture of Villavicencio’s murderers.”
“What is more, [the Americans] were going to take the suspects to NY, because they killed an informant of the US Government”
That is why [the Americans] are hurt. They wouldn’t do as much, not even for me.
I don’t work for them, [Villavicencio] did.
“But watch out, it was the Los Lobos criminal band who killed Villavicencio.
There is a task force from the European Union, investigating Albanians.
This is heavy. There are 3 FBI offices investigating this. 3 offices. Their technology is stunning.
It is all about phones. That is why there’s so much information. They want Rafael Correa’s head.
They say [Revolucion Ciudadana] is rising in the pools. Yes Rafael Correa. [The Americans] know that if [Revolucion Ciudadana] wins the elections, all the [bilateral treaties] are dead.
Rony Aleaga
“This occurred with the complicity and involvement of the United States ambassador. During a dinner at the embassy with the Attorney General, they already knew and discussed who the murderers were, specifically the Los Lobos criminal group. Yet, they did not publicly reveal this information while there was a media lynching against the political organization Revolución Ciudadana, accusing us [for the killing].”
I was told on Monday night, in the U.S. Ambassador’s Residence. As soon as I left, I asked an Attorney from my office, Attorney General’s Office, to begin working, cooperating with [the Americans], but the suspects got killed.
VO: Despite knowing who had killed Villavicencio, A.G. Salazar kept it to herself, to allow for the media narrative of blaming the murder on Revolucion Ciudadana to spread.
“Ecuador’s State Attorney General, Diana Salazar Méndez, has been the precursor of political persecution. She has acted like a bishop in a macabre game of chess, utilized to persecute all the political adversaries of the right, which has taken over Ecuador at this moment.
“I am going to Washington DC. For real, this is at a really high level. For Maduro, the investigation is for narco trafficking.”
But this was not the first time A.G. Salazar had directly influenced an election. In 2021, right before the election, Salazar traveled to Colombia and publicly announced that Revolución Ciudadana’s presidential candidate Andrés Arauz had received money from the ELN, a Colombian guerrilla group.
These accusations quickly faded after Arauz lost the election. A lawsuit was eventually filed by Arauz against Francisco Barbosa, the Colombian A.G., after experts demonstrated that the evidence used in the public accusation was false.
Taking over the entire judicial system?
Using chats from the phone of deceased drug lord Leandro Norero as evidence, Ecuador’s Attorney General Diana Salazar presented a series of extensive anti-corruption cases, resulting in the detention of dozens of judges and judicial workers. At first glance, this appeared to be a much-needed measure for a justice system riddled with corruption. But could it be that this case was also used as a tool to eliminate rivals, seize control, and secure key positions of power within the three branches of the state on behalf of U.S. interests?
As always, it depends on who you believe. Consider Wilmer Terán, a former judge in charge of the “bribes case” against former President Correa, who was detained by orders of A.G. Diana Salazar in the context of a massive case involving 900 people.
Teran presented his own chats with Mayra Salazar, some sectors of the assembly demanded an investigation because “These cases could lead to crimes of influence peddling, procedural fraud, embezzlement, conflict of interest and direct interference in the Judicial Council.”
Terán had crossed one of A.G. Salazar’s operators, Judge Walter Macías, whom Terán, then Chair of the Judiciary, had disciplinarily discharged.
Despite many judges vouching for him, and even an official letter from the Judicial Council supporting Terán and calling the massive operation a “political coup against the judicial branch,” Terán’s home was raided, and he was sent to solitary confinement in a maximum-security prison.
When a competent panel of judges ruled on a motion to transfer Terán to a lower security-level prison “where he can have the conditions to work on his defense,” their office was raided, and they were accused of corruption as well. Terán had recently come forward under oath in Congress to detail how Salazar pressured him and others by sending emissaries to obtain a guilty verdict for Correa.
Currently, Salazar awaits the beginning of her political trial. Knowing she has the political alliances and votes to avoid any meaningful sanction, she stands firmly in control of the Attorney General’s office while publicly labeling her political adversaries as “narcos.”
It is fairly unprecedented to have an A.G. exert such influence over the three branches of the state—raiding judges’ homes at will, opening investigations into political opponents that remain open for years with no clear cause until one is found, and influencing elections. The power of an Attorney General, supported by the political right, the U.S. Embassy, and the media, has taken control of Ecuadorian politics.
The Movement Towards Socialism Expels the Bolivian President
Posted by Internationalist 360° on September 5, 2024
Cuba en Resumen
The Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) faction, which supports former Bolivian president Evo Morales (2006-2019), decided to “definitively expel” from the party the current president, Luis Arce (photo), and his vice, David Choquehuanca. In an expanded national meeting held last Tuesday in Villa Tunari, Morales ratified the decision taken by the MAS militancy, arguing that the behavior of both is no longer compatible with the principles of the party.
“The behavior of Lucho-David is no longer that of a militant. Yesterday such repression to the Ponchos Rojos, who are only asking that their union headquarters be respected. Instead they face repression, injuries and taken by the police. I think that the expulsion of the political instrument is justified,” said Morales while reading the conclusions of the expanded meeting in Villa Tunari, central zone of the Tropic of Cochabamba, one of the main coca-growing areas of the country and the political stronghold of the former president, who is seeking re-election.
As Morales recalled, the idea of expelling Arce and Choquehuanca had already been supported months ago during a meeting in the coliseum of La Coronilla, in Cochabamba. However, on that occasion, Morales chose not to include the expulsion in the final conclusions, hoping that there was still a possibility of reconciliation within the party. “I thought I could still come back, and nothing would beworse,” he admitted.
Arce and Choquehuanca, argued the majority faction of MAS in its resolution, were expelled “for having betrayed the Bolivian people and the Process of Change; for not making organic life in the Instrument; for having betrayed the Homeland by allowing the return of the North American operative arms such as the CIA, DEA and USAID; for converting to neoliberalism; for having destroyed the economy (…); for viciously repressing the original indigenous peasant movement and converting the headquarters into police posts”.
After the expulsion, the MAS militancy ratified Morales as president of the party and proclaimed him “sole candidate” for the 2025 elections. Now it remains to be seen if the Bolivian justice recognizes the validity of the congress in which this decision was taken, something that was previously rejected.
Tuesday’s meeting between the “evista” sectors also called for a walk on September 17 from the town of Caracollo, in the Andean region of Oruro, to La Paz to demand the Government to meet their demands, among them, the validation of the MAS congress held in 2023, where Morales was elected as the party’s authority. The former president said that “the time has come to meet the people respect” and announced that the march will arrive to La Paz on September 23 to hold a “great meeting” or concentration.
Morales promised other measures of force in case the Arce government insists on its position. “If the government does not respond (…) a national road blockade is justified,” warned the former president.
Arce, for his part, has also tried to run Morales out of the presidential race with different mechanisms. “Before those who bet on hate, lies, violence and confrontation between Bolivians seeking to convulse the country for electoral ambitions, our response will always be more work and management in favor of the Bolivian people,” he published on Tuesday, after his expulsion was confirmed.
In addition, this week Arce informed that he will insist on holding a referendum to consult the citizens whether they agree or not to modify the Constitution to establish that presidents and vice presidents can only be reelected once, even if the terms are discontinuous, something that “evismo” sees as one more trick to prevent Morales’ return.
Currently, article 168 of the Magna Carta, sanctioned during Morales’ first presidency, establishes that the term of office of President and Vice President “is five years, and they can be reelected only once in a continuous manner”. This leaves open the possibility of reelection in discontinuous mandates”.
Arce and Morales have been confronting each other for many months. One of the strongest clashes occurred last June, when a faction of the Army installed a tank in front of the Government headquarters under the threat of a coup d’état, which led to cross accusations between the former president and the current president.
Milei vetoes pension increase and doubles down on repression
The brutality of Milei’s far-right government has been put on display with the heavy handed repression doled out to elderly pensioners in the country who have been protesting for an increase in their pensions
September 05, 2024 by Pablo Meriguet
Pensioners have been protesting to demand an increase to their pensions amid rampant inflation. Photo: Susi Maresca / Marcha
On Monday September 2, the President of Argentina, radical right-winger Javier Milei, vetoed a law that had already passed the first level of the Legislature, and that sought to increase pensions and retirement benefits given the rampant inflation in the country.
Milei, who has implemented significant budget cuts, affirmed that he decided to veto the law because if it were to be implemented, the fiscal accounts would suffer an imbalance, which would lead to the need to increase taxes or increase the public debt.
The law seeks an 8.1% increase in the pensions received by pensioners from the State, as well as a new way to update the monetary needs of pensioners according to the loss of purchasing power they suffer as part of the long-lived economic crisis. In this sense, it was proposed that the payment of pensions be automatically updated according to monthly inflation.
According to several testimonies, the current pensions are no longer enough for the elderly to buy the required food and medicines which have increased in price as a consequence of inflation. The law that had already been approved in the Legislative was vetoed by the ultra-liberal President, who stated that this was nothing more than an “act of demagogic populism” that could put the younger generations at risk of incurring greater debt, increasing inflation and increasing poverty.
The opposition declared that it would continue to seek approval from the legislature. Now they need two-thirds of the votes of the National Congress in order to keep it alive.
According to several politicians opposing Milei’s government, pensioners have lost almost 45% of their purchasing power despite the bonuses offered by the State to the elderly. In fact, Milei has just offered a new 70,000 pesos bonus for pensioners and pensioners (about USD 70), although it doesn’t seem that these measures would help sustain a precarious economic situation.
The minimum monthly pension is worth 225,000 Argentine pesos (about USD 231), while it is estimated that between essential food and basic services, an Argentine must pay about 291,000 pesos (about 300 dollars). In 2024, Argentina suffered cumulative inflation of 87%, while year-on-year inflation is at 263%.
State repression of pensioners
Faced with the government’s refusal, several social organizations and groups of pensioners came out to demonstrate against the presidential veto. The response of the repressive forces was swift. They fired tear gas at the protesters and beat opponents of Milei’s government with batons, many of whom were elderly and dealing with sickness and disability.
The harsh repression caused injuries to more than 27 people, two of whom had to be taken to a hospital for treatment. In declarations to TN, the deputy of the Left Front (Frente de Izquierda) Christian Castillo harshly criticized a large number of police officers and their repressive attitude against the pensioners’ demonstration: “We do not know why they organized this operation with the Federal Police today, since the pensioners mobilize around the Congress every week. They repressed [everywhere]. A whole show by [Secretary] (Patricia) Bullrich to defend a veto denying 17,000 pesos a day to pensioners, which is the cost of one croissant a day. But the veto is going to be defeated!”
Nancy Yulan, one of the demonstrators, expressed in this regard that, “We still have injured comrades who are trying to recover from the tear gas that the Federal Police and the City Police shamelessly poured on their faces. There is a comrade who has a wound in her face with ten stitches.”
The economic situation has become critical for many elderly people, even putting their lives at risk. According to Eugenio Semino, Ombudsman for the Elderly of Buenos Aires, “The elderly in Argentina have to choose every day between eating or buying medicine. In the group of elderly people, a humanitarian crisis has been going on for many months. That is to say, the situation in terms of economics and health has generated not only the loss of quality of life of the sector but also the loss of lives themselves.”
However, Milei’s neoliberal prescriptions do not contemplate increasing public spending in his crusade to reduce the size of the State and thus decrease the fiscal deficit. Furthermore, Milei has opted for police repression instead of negotiation in all cases where increased spending and state participation in the economy are required. However, to this day, his controversial measures are not structurally improving the country’s economic situation, and has plunged the poorest and most unprotected, such as the elderly, into a situation of despair.
No Country for Old Men (or Women): Pensioners in Argentina Bear Brunt of Milei’s Hardcore Austerity
Posted on September 13, 2024 by Nick Corbishley
Cloaked in a flimsy veil of libertarianism, neoliberalism is not just alive and well in Argentina; it is more virulent and rapacious than ever.
Freedom is on the advance in Javier Milei’s Argentina, as perfectly illustrated in the video below of state security forces beating up pensioners in the street and blasting them with pepper spray and tear gas. Every Wednesday for the past two weeks, thousands of pensioners have congregated outside Congress to protest the rapid loss of purchasing power of their pensions, as the Milei government’s economic shock program continues to, quite literally, bite.
“They are killing us,” one elderly lady cries. “Why? We are just pensioners. One of these brutes just punched an old lady.” In the same video, another grandmotherly protester is asked if she is afraid of the violence , to which she responds:
Afraid? If you are afraid, it paralyses you (NC: otherwise put, “Fear is the mindkiller”). You have to fight for your rights. Lots of blood has flowed for those rights.
“They take more and more money from us instead of taking it from those who have more. The rich are forgiven taxes and evaders are called heroes,” Victor Amarilla, a 72 year old retired bus driver who has to work part time as a doorman to make ends meet, told El País. “We mobilized last Wednesday, we are here today and we will return next Wednesday. We are not going to leave the streets because we come to fight to be better and at the same time we fight for our children and our grandchildren.”
The spark for this latest wave of anti-government protests was Milei’s decision on September 2 to veto an 8.1% increase in public pensions that had already been approved by a large majority in the legislature. The reform sought to partially alleviate the effects of the crushing fiscal adjustment imposed by the Milei government’s hardcore austerity measures as well as the country’s triple digit inflation. According to the Argentine Institute of Fiscal Analysis (Iaraf), roughly one-third of the entire fiscal adjustment is being borne by Argentina’s pensioners.
“The payment of pensions was the budget item most affected by the very heavy cuts in public spending by the government of Javier Milei: almost one out of every three pesos that the public administration stopped spending was the result of paying retirees less,” says Gabriel Puricelli, an analyst at the Public Policy Laboratory. “Milei decides to veto, at the cost of continuing to immediately harm retirees, most of whom are below the poverty line.”
Recent surveys place the poverty rate in Argentina at around 50%-57%. Many of those affected are retirees. From the Spanish online newspaper El Diario:
In Argentina, the majority of retirees, more than five million of them (out of a total of seven million national pensioners), receive the minimum pension of 234,000 pesos (around 221 euros) plus a bonus of 70,000 pesos (66 euros) to bring it closer in line with the basic food basket. According to the latest report from the Center for Argentine Political Economy (CEPA), by keeping the value of the bonus frozen since March, minimum pensions suffered a cut equivalent to 52,000 pesos (49 euros).
With the hike vetoed by Milei’s supporters in Congress, the minimum payment would have risen to 316,000 pesos, which in and of itself was already insufficient… So far this year, official inflation has clocked in at 87%, according to data from the National Institute of Statistics and Census (Indec).
Lower Inflation, But at What Price?
That is certainly an improvement on the situation Milei inherited nine months ago, for which he and his government deserve some credit. Monthly inflation was around 4% in August, compared to 25% in December 2023. Annual inflation was “down” to 236.7%, following four consecutive months of disinflation. But prices are still rising at the fastest rate in the Western hemisphere, including Venezuela, and the collective cost of trying to tame inflation is becoming unbearable for many.
But Milei shows little sign of budging. For him, the only way to lower prices is to bring the fiscal budget back into the black after spending roughly two years in the red.
“If the State does not spend more than it collects and does not resort to [debt] issuance, there is no inflation. It’s not magic.”
This is one area in which Milei has most definitely kept his word. To achieve his precious “zero deficit” target, he has applied the harshest fiscal adjustment program in living memory, slashing 35% of state spending year over year in one fell swoop. One way he has done that is by closing entire government departments and laying off tens of thousands of state employees. By June, 25,000 public workers had lost their jobs while another 75,000 are reportedly under review.
The Milei government has also withdrawn many of the public subsidies that allowed the millions of people living on or close to the edge to at least eke out an existence. The results speak for themselves: between December 2023 and August 2024 the monthly cost of basic services and utilities (electricity, natural gas, water and public transportation) surged almost five fold, from 30,000 pesos per household ($30, by the official exchange rate) to 143,000 ($148), according to the IIEP Observatory of Rates and Subsidies carried out by University of Buenos Aires-Conicet.
Granted, $148 dollars may not seem like much from an advanced economy-perspective but for an Argentine on a minimum salary of 262,432 pesos, it represents 54% of their gross income.
That’s not all: the government has also withdrawn subsidies on medicines, whose prices have been rising above the rate of inflation — not just for the past nine months but for the past four years! A study by the journal Medicina found that “across 360 essential medicines tracked between December 2020 and January 2024, prices increased by a median (IQR) of 1051% (923%-1174%), exceeding cumulative inflation of 849%, with a notable acceleration in price increases since October 2023. Pension benefits during that time increased by 455% under the standard adjustment formula and by 744% when including the one-off bonuses.”
The upshot of all of this is that more and more elderly people are having to choose between buying food, medicines or paying for basic utilities.
“The elderly in Argentina have to choose every day between eating or buying medicine,” said Eugenio Semino, Ombudsman for the Elderly of Buenos Aires. “The elderly in Argentina have to choose every day between eating or buying medicine… [A] humanitarian crisis has been going on for many months. In other words, the situation in terms of the economy and in terms of health has generated not only loss of quality of life among the elderly, but the loss of lives themselves.”
Or as Elon Musk sees it:
Milei is bringing prosperity to Argentina
Neoliberalism Repackaged
One of Lambert’s two simple rules of neoliberalism is “Go Die!” (the other being “because markets”), which is ironic since the one thing neoliberalism refuses to do is curl up and die.
In Argentina, a repackaged version of neoliberalism is being applied, cloaked in a flimsy veil of libertarianism. While millions of Argentines — and probably many more millions of Milei fans around the world — want to believe that Milei’s policies represent a sharp departure from the past, the reality is that this has all been seen and done before — just not quite in such a rapid, aggressive way.
As Michael Hudson said last year in one of his podcasts with Radhika Desai, neoliberalism is far from dead despite all the triumphant eulogies. What it seeks is to make the government invisible or actually disappear in reality:
Neoliberalism advocates an economy without government regulation, with no social protection against fraud or exploitation or predatory impoverishment, no usury laws. They’re against consumer protection. They’re against the ability of debtors to use bankruptcy, which is why Biden made sure that students could not wipe out their student loans through bankruptcy, to free themselves from debt.
So neoliberalism, basically, it’s a dynamic of economic polarization. Neoliberalism is a way in which they can justify why the economy is getting more and more unequal, as if this is a perfectly natural thing, a survival of the fittest, and is really a road to efficiency. And in that sense, neoliberalism is a point—this requires a point of view. It’s an ideology. You could almost say it’s the new religion because it’s a new moral value.
Instead of religion saying we’re for mutual aid and we want to uplift the population as a whole, neoliberalism is saying greed is good, Ayn Rand is good, we want to be free from government, free from government regulation, so the rich can do whatever they want to get rich. And if they do get rich, it’s because they’re productive, not because there’s any exploitation. So neoliberalism is really a cloak of invisibility for all of the problems that we’re seeing today.
The same day Milei vetoed the retirement mobility law, he told, in brutal frankness, the corporate bigwigs gathered at a big business lobby event that: “We came to shrink the State to enlarge your pockets.” There were no soothing words for the SMEs that are bearing the brunt of the crumbling consumption and slumping economic activity wrought by Milei’s adjustment policies. Instead, he lashed out at social justice ideas and Argentina’s labor laws.
One issue Milei isn’t speaking much about is taxation. As part of his libertarian schtick during the presidential campaign, Milei described taxation as a form of state violence, saying he would rather cut off an arm than raise taxes. And people bought it, just like they bought his schtick about burning down the central bank, replacing the Argentine peso with the dollar and getting rid of the “political caste”, many of whom he ended up inviting to join his cabinet.
Once in power, however, Milei not only hiked import and export taxes; he reimposed income tax on Argentina’s lowest earners. He also increased the so-called PAÍS tax, which imposes a 35% surcharge on purchases of foreign currency with the aim of deterring such transactions. Taxation, it seems, is only an act of violence when imposed on the rich, for while Milei’s government refuses to allow Argentina’s most impoverished pensioners to enjoy even a meagre rise in their pension income, it has halved wealth taxes for the richest Argentines.
“Today, the rich pay less in taxes, while they have the luxury of giving lessons on austerity and morality to millions of Argentines who are not making ends meet,” Cristian Girard, the director of the Buenos Aires Collection Agency (ARBA), tells El Economista. “The government celebrates while describing retirees who demand an improvement in their income as ‘fiscal degenerates’.”
What’s more, it appears that the reduction in taxes for the super rich will exert more of a fiscal drain on the government’s finances than the proposed rise in pensions. This is all perfectly in keeping with traditional neoliberal practice. As Lambert wrote in his decade-old article on expressing neoliberalism as simple rules, “the rules do not apply to those who write the rules… or in the world of the 0.01%.”
“Hijos de Puta”
Is it any surprise that pensioners are up in arms? On Wednesday, thousands once again gathered outside the Congress, where a vote was to be held by opposition deputies seeking to override Milei’s veto, for which they needed a two-thirds majority. But unfortunately they couldn’t get it. When the protesters gathered outside the Congress learnt the vote had failed, things got ugly fast, reports Página 12:
When the result of the vote was known in the street (the deputies ratified the veto of the mobility law), the tense calm that had been felt since early was broken. “Hijos de puta! Hijos de puta!” was the rallying cry, as the crowd’s rage was unleashed against the fences that blocked the circulation of Rivadavia Avenue. Retirees and militants banged pots and pans, key chains and whatever was at their disposal against the metal plate. The fence gave way. Suddenly, the air around the Congress was filled with fumes and became unbreathable, as in so many other marches – practically all of them – this year.
The police advanced from Callao. It sprayed rubber bullets and in less than five minutes evicted the demonstrators, who retreated as best they could towards Corrientes. The chase continued for hours. The government had two causes of celebration: inside the enclosure it had ratified the adjustment on pensions (not without the help of the caste) and outside it had once again deployed an iron fist to maintain “order”, as the Casa Rosada had warned it would in its previous meeting.
This is the other face of Milei’s “libertarian” government: the hankering for order and repression. This, it seems, is a job the State can be trusted to deliver, especially with Patricia Bullrich serving as Ministry of Security. As I warned in November just after Milei won the elections, once the inevitable protests, strikes and pickets begin, following the first wave of spending cuts, privatisations and mass job losses, the crackdown is almost certain to be brutal, especially given the number of people in the Milei government with family, emotional, and material ties to the former military dictatorship.
But as the clashes escalate, the government risks alienating a growing section of its support base. After all, millions of Milei voters have parents or grandparents that are being impacted by the pensions crisis.
The government managed to more or less maintain its relatively high levels of public support through the autumn and winter, largely because many voters have had enough of the status quo and want a meaningful change in the underlying political and economic dynamics. Many of the economic problems Argentina is currently suffering are partly the result of years of mismanagement by successive governments.
As NC reader Vao pointed out in a previous post, people are tired of the ossified social structures. They want policies that “cut through the bureaucracy, eliminate government inefficiency, and boost the economy.”
For that reason, many want to continue giving Milei the benefit of the doubt. But if the clashes with the pensioners persist, or grow, this could turn out to be a tipping point. In a recent poll, 63% of respondents, who presumably include some Milei supporters, said they opposed Milei’s veto of the pension hike. No less important, public disapproval of the government’s management of the economy appears to be on the rise, reaching 49.5% in September, up from 45.7% a month earlier.
This is hardly a surprise given how many small businesses are struggling as consumption and economic activity remain anemic. Output in the manufacturing industry suffered a 21% year-on-year decline June. Almost 200,000 jobs were destroyed in the government’s first five months alone.
On the other side of the ledger, monthly inflation is considerably lower (though it appears to have hit a fairly solid floor) and the Milei government has registered successive fiscal and balance of payment surpluses, though the latter is mainly the result of households and companies buying far fewer imported goods. All of these “accomplishments,” while important, especially for an economy as dysfunctional as Argentina’s, have come at huge social and economic cost. With Milei seemingly determined to maintain his zero fiscal deficit at just about any price, public dissatisfaction seems set to grow in the coming months.
Neoliberalism is liberalism is libertarianism sans all the freedom bullshit. As long as there is great disparity of wealth there can be no freedom except for the holders of that wealth.
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."
Students, professors, and admin workers call for resistance against Milei’s attacks on public universities
Several associations of students and workers in Argentine universities have called on their members and supporters to take to the streets against the plan of Javier Milei’s government to reduce the budget of university institutions.
September 23, 2024 by Peoples Dispatch
Rally on September 12 to demand the Argentine Senate pass the university financing bill. Photo: CONADU Historica
Students, professors, and workers at universities in Argentina are preparing for several weeks of mobilizations and work stoppages to protest Milei’s announced veto of the University Financing Law which seeks to allocate much needed funds to universities. The university community has called for a strike on September 26 and 27 and a national mass mobilization on October 2 in cities across the country, in Buenos Aires, people will march to the National Congress. Trade unions and social organizations from across sectors will also join students, professors, and university workers to defend public, free, and quality education in Argentina and once again protest against Milei’s neoliberal austerity plan which has impacted all working people in Argentina.
On Thursday, September 12, the Argentine Senate approved a law that updates the amount of money universities should receive to maintain optimal functioning; this includes slightly improving the budget allocation to cover current expenses for teaching, research, and administrative functioning. According to the law, the budget increase would be only 0.14% of GDP.
Despite this, the neoliberal government of Javier Milei, which has already done everything possible to reduce fiscal spending even at the expense of education, has announced that it will veto the law. Indeed, according to some official sources, the government plans to offer only 3.8 billion pesos to the national universities, when in fact, according to the National Interuniversity Council (CIN), at least 7.8 billion pesos are required for the country’s universities to operate properly.
According to Víctor Moriñigo, president of the CIN and rector of the University of San Luis, “there is no certain intention of adjusting teaching and non-teaching salaries [to the current economic situation] to at least equalize the situation of loss [of purchasing power] in the face of inflation. The only certainty that emerges from this budget [proposed by Milei] is that teachers and non-teachers in 2025 will have the same salaries as today, not even considering inflation, which was estimated at 18%.”
Argentina’s student unions and associations have reached a historic agreement and unity to carry out the mobilization planned for the beginning of October. Carlos De Feo, the general secretary of the National Federation of University Teachers (CONADU), told Página 12, that such agreement exists precisely because Milei’s neoliberal plan not only intends to affect specific universities but it seeks to transform the country’s public educational model into one without funding and of poorer quality.
The National Federation of University Professors – Historic (CONADU), the Trade Union Front of National Universities, and the Argentine University Federation, made up of dozens of student associations and movements, have been mobilizing for the last months for the University Financing Law to be passed by the legislature and had called for a national strike of the university community on April 23 this year in defense of public higher education. Now they are calling for mobilizations to defend the law from Milei’s veto. They will be holding a press conference on September 24 to inform about their upcoming actions.
23 de abril #MarchaNacionalUniversitaria
A la Universidad Pública la defendemos entre todas y todos. pic.twitter.com/dFhIO3Kur1
— CONADU Histórica (@CONADUHistorica) April 24, 2024
In a rally organized by these same platforms on September 12 to call for the Senate to approve the bill, Francisca Staiti, General Secretary of CONADU Histórica stated: “This anarcho-capitalist [Milei] is a benefactor…of the big fortunes, he is the benefactor of the big companies, and that is the model that we have to fight from here, from the university, extending our arms in unity, with massiveness, with organization…Embracing all the university and pre-university teachers throughout the country, who are also demonstrating today, extending this embrace to everyone; we are going with greater organization and greater unity because if this president, in the face of the approval of the law, vetoes it, we will be in the streets.”
Southern Command on the charge against China and Russia in Latin America
Sep 20, 2024 , 3:37 pm .
The head of the United States Southern Command, General Laura Richardson, announced a Marshall Plan for Latin America focused on countering the influence of China and Russia in the region (Photo: United States Southern Command)
Laura Richardson, head of the US Southern Command, recently called for a new "Marshall Plan" for Latin America to address the growing influence of Russia and China in the region.
Speaking at the Aspen Institute's annual security forum, which has become one of the most reactionary and belligerent spaces in the post-World War II geopolitical landscape, he said: "I firmly believe that we need a Marshall Plan for the region."
His call is in line with the ideological principles that have characterized the forum for decades.
Richardson's call reflects the United States' deep concern about the obvious loss of geopolitical and economic influence in Latin America. Although he presented the proposal at the forum as an effort of "humanitarian aid" and economic reconstruction, in essence it is an attempt to counter the growing presence of emerging powers of the multipolar world in the region.
The general's rhetoric about the "serious economic recessions" caused by the pandemic was used as a mechanism to justify a program of economic and political intervention, similar to the expansionist efforts of the United States during the Cold War. As with the Marshall Plan, presented as a supposedly selfless effort to rebuild Europe after the war, the intention is to reconfigure Latin American socioeconomic structures with the aim of restoring American hegemony.
China's growing influence, through its Belt and Road Initiative, and strengthening trade relations with Russia, offer alternatives to the partnership framework with Washington, the real motive behind this move.
"And we don't have those kinds of tools in our arsenal. How can we help? I firmly believe that we need a Marshall Plan for the region or, what is the same, an economic recovery act like the one in 1948, but in 2024, 2025," he told the audience of the Aspen Security Forum, senior national security officials, legislators and key representatives of the defense and technology industries.
Richardson's assertion that "economic security and national security go hand in hand in this hemisphere" explains why it is from that military area that such statements are made, which would have to come, in any case, from the branches of the State Department.
It is clear that for the United States, military security is an extension of economic security and strategic interests; therefore, Latin America is considered a territory to be controlled.
The insistence on combining the economic with the military is based on a narrative that criminalizes economic cooperation relations between Beijing and Latin American states.
"If [the Belt and Road] is to do good in the hemisphere, then I'm all for it. But it makes me a little suspicious when it comes to critical infrastructure [...] deepwater ports, 5G, cybersecurity, energy, outer space."
Consistent with the latest U.S. National Security Strategy guidelines , SOUTHCOM characterizes its geopolitical rivals as agents of global challenges that demand urgent attention.
In this context, Latin America and the Caribbean are seen as strategic points whose protection is considered essential against networks of "transnational threats" that the United States uses as justification for its actions.
In fact, at the forum, the Commander of the Southern Command accused China and Russia of benefiting from "transnational criminal organizations" that operate in various illicit activities on the continent: "From drug and human trafficking to illegal mining, logging and fishing in the southern areas."
In the case of Venezuela and its geopolitical allies, accusations related to these elements become a recurring resource .
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, senior adviser to the Quincy Institute, questions the logic of this strategy that places the military at the center of American foreign policy.
"We should ask ourselves why it is the military that is calling the shots when it comes to raising the real issues. Where are the diplomats? Is this just another argument for putting more military eyes and resources in the region?" asks Vlahos.
The lack of U.S. attention to Latin America is another weakness Richardson exposed. The scarcity of high-level visits creates a vacuum that China exploits, he says.
According to her, regional leaders do not see American investment. In contrast, "all they see are Chinese cranes and Belt and Road Initiative projects."
"So what I would ask of all of you and everyone you know is that I need more visitors in the Western Hemisphere. I need more visitors in the Caribbean. I need more visitors in Central America. I need more visitors in South America," he said at the forum.
His call is not aimed at establishing constructive collaborations, but is part of a project characterized by blackmail, opportunism and threats .
This policy relegates offers of cooperation to the background, while emphasizing the instrumentalization of sanctions as a central tool to shape the behavior of nations that are reluctant to align themselves with U.S. interests.
In Latin America, Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua are the targets of this pressure, evidence of the coercive nature of US foreign policy.
China and Latin America: a mutually beneficial relationship
In contrast to the US vision of geopolitical competition, Beijing is proposing global cooperation, as reflected in its latest Communist Party Congress . It seeks to strengthen economic openness by promoting a new paradigm of collaboration at the highest level, as well as greater integration into the global governance system.
Its approach is based on international synergy, a multipolar order and inclusive economic globalization.
Mention should also be made of the new concept of Russian foreign policy , adopted on 31 March 2023, which focuses on cooperation with non-Western states. The document particularly highlights the intention to deepen mutually beneficial relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, including military cooperation, to help these countries cope with pressure from the United States.
This approach is presented as Russia's response to the escalation of Western coercive economic policy, and expresses the need to create "global trade, monetary and financial systems" that counteract the abuse of "monopolistic or dominant positions in certain areas of the world economy."
In Latin America, China's economic and trade strategy focuses on access to raw materials and agricultural goods, opening markets for goods and services, and cooperation in infrastructure and energy, with a particular focus on key resources such as lithium.
Beijing is seeking to increase its presence in the region, just like the United States, but with the enormous distance of doing so through mutually beneficial agreements. Such a perspective is defined in the " Policy Document on Latin America and the Caribbean ", published in 2016, as an update of the original document from 2008.
In practice, the trade relationship is characterised by a significant concentration on certain products and countries. According to the European Union Institute for Values Studies , 70% of Latin American exports to the Asian country are made up of five products – including oil – and 90% of these come from Brazil, Chile, Peru and Venezuela.
This relationship has intensified in 2023 with the signing of important agreements with other countries in the region, including trade agreements with Ecuador and Brazil, and key agreements with Argentina and Nicaragua.
As for Venezuela, during President Nicolás Maduro's last tour of China, 31 cooperation agreements were signed in different areas. Relations between the two countries were elevated to a Foolproof and All-Weather Strategic Partnership.
In this context, Venezuela's decision to forge autonomous relations, in line with China's proposal for non-interference and collaborative development, places the South American nation as a fundamental element in Washington's strategy of containment against Beijing and other emerging powers that challenge the established unipolar order.
Such urgency translates into an escalation of the militarized approach, a constant in US foreign policy towards the region, but now observed with greater frequency and manifested in interventions, pressures and coercion with the aim of maintaining control over a territory vital to its geopolitical interests.
Applying/Misapplying Gramsci’s Passive Revolution to Latin America
October 17, 2024
Photo composition showing Antonio Gramsci’s face with butterflies and flowers. Photo: La Tinta
By Steve Ellner – Oct 10, 2024
The second wave of progressive Latin American governments that began with the election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico in 2018 does not have the aura of excitement surrounding the first, dating back to Hugo Chávez in 1998. It is not only characterized by pragmatism, but lacks the slogans and banners of radical change associated with Chávez and Evo Morales. As stated by former Bolivian vice president Álvaro García Linera in the face of challenges from an aggressive right, the second-wave left “turned up to the fight in an already exhausted state.”
It is no small wonder the criticisms formulated by leftist detractors of these progressive governments, known as the Pink Tide, have become increasingly severe. Over recent years, these critics have analyzed Pink Tide governments through the lens of Antonio Gramsci’s concept of “passive revolution,” as have leftist analysts of other governments that began as progressive and then moved in a rightist direction, such as that of post-apartheid South Africa and those associated with African socialism and Pan-Arabism. In broad strokes, passive revolutions occur in revolutionary situations, often in the context of uneven development, in which a strong state grants concessions to the popular sectors, but ends up taming them and derailing the revolutionary process while, to varying degrees, modifying capitalist relations.
The critique of Pink Tide governments is strengthened by the setbacks that followed the electoral triumphs of López Obrador, Alberto Fernández in Argentina (2019), Luis Arce in Bolivia (2020), Gabriel Boric in Chile (2021), and Pedro Castillo in Peru (2021). Such setbacks include the overthrow and imprisonment of Castillo in 2022, the virtual schism in Bolivia’s ruling Movimiento al Socialismo—largely due to the competing presidential aspirations of Arce and Morales, and the election of Trump-admirer Javier Milei in Argentina. The most recent problem area is the Venezuelan presidential elections of July 28, the results of which have not been adequately clarified, and the subsequent two days of violence in popular neighborhoods, which demonstrated that the Chavistas are not the dominant force that they were in previous rounds of disturbances. I maintain that in spite of these discouraging developments, the Pink Tide is far from being a lost cause, and that Pink Tide movements continue to be anti-imperialist strongholds in a world in which the far right has made ongoing inroads.
Some of the harshest critics of the Pink Tide’s second wave were zealous admirers of the first, particularly in the case of Chávez, in contrast to Nicolás Maduro. This is largely because the initial momentum of the second wave was so short-lived, especially compared to that of the first, which was driven by a series of dramatic breakthroughs, including Chávez’s return to power after the coup staged on April 11, 2002; his proclamation that he was a socialist at the World Social Forum in January 2005; the definitive defeat of the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas proposal at the Summit of the Americas in 2005; and the partial nationalizations of hydrocarbon industries by Chávez, Morales, and Argentine president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.
Nevertheless, developments in the twenty-first century lend themselves to the point of view that current Pink Tide governments, with all their limitations—including concessions to private capital—play a progressive role. Two compelling facts stand out. First, Pink Tide governments have directly challenged U.S. interventionism, which has become more blatant in Latin America in the second wave than at the outset of the first wave. Second, due to the extreme political polarization in Latin America, as elsewhere in the world, the leading alternatives to the Pink Tide are extreme rightist, if not semifascist, movements aligned with Washington.
That said, the Pink Tide today hardly embodies the revolutionary spirit that Chávez unleashed two decades earlier. A distinction needs to be made between critical support for the Pink Tide and the passive revolution analysis that gets translated into frontal opposition to those governments. The critical support position views Pink Tide governments as basically progressive, but, at the same time, contested territory in which the middle classes, capitalists, and popular sectors often weigh in heavily. That position takes into account the fact that the political adversary of those governments consists of reactionary domestic forces, including the dominant fractions of the local capitalist class, backed by U.S. imperialism. The position of critical support converges with that of social movements, which, for the most part, have supported the Pink Tide in moments of political crisis, without renouncing their autonomy. In contrast, the framework of passive revolution lends itself to the view that the end result of the Pink Tide phenomenon, which is torn with contradictions, is the restoration of the old order and, to put it bluntly, the selling out of those who lead the process.
The passive revolution concept put to the test
In different Pink Tide countries, renowned scholars on the left have analyzed the governments of their respective countries in the framework of the theory of passive revolution. Once having adopted this framework, they all reach the conclusion that Pink Tide leaders have turned their backs on the banners that catapulted them to power. Three major examples include Carlos Nelson Coutinho, who has been described as “Brazil’s leading Gramscian,” Luis Tapia in Bolivia, and Maristella Svampa of Argentina.
Some passive revolution writers deny that Pink Tide governments have any redeeming qualities. For them, the Pink Tide’s passive revolution constitutes “a step backward,” or a revolution betrayed. Some of them have accused those who defend the Pink Tide of “capitulation” or, even worse, of being commissioned by those governments. The well-known Uruguayan writer and activist Raúl Zibechi, who also embraces Gramsci’s writing, quotes a resident of a Rio de Janeiro favela as saying the main problem is “the complementarity between the center-left governments that destroy the movements and the right-wing ones that destroy the social façade of the state—a perfect combination.”
Other passive revolution writers present a more nuanced interpretation of the concept, but also end up denying the basically progressive nature of Pink Tide governments. Massimo Modonesi, the scholar who has done the most to apply the framework of passive revolution to twenty-first-century Latin America, points out that by the transformismo of passive revolution, Gramsci meant “doses of renovation and conservation” that play out as a dialectical relationship. The end product is not a return to a previous state, since “progressive restoration is not a total restoration.” Alluding to the Pink Tide, Modonesi warns against “ignoring the importance of the current transformations [or] disqualifying a group of governments—some more than others—that are encouraging processes that are to a significant extent anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist.” Another Marxist scholar who has written extensively on passive revolution and Latin America, Adam David Morton, observes that Gramsci’s intention was “open ended,” and that fatalism needs to be avoided at all costs.
In their analyses of the Pink Tide, however, none of these writers come close to striking a balance between the “progressive” and “restoration” components of passive revolution. They recognize what only the most aggressive adversaries of the Pink Tide deny: namely, the accomplishments of progressive Latin American governments in the area of social programs. But, according to them, this positive side is more than offset by a negative side. Modonesi writes that the social measures “not only do not guarantee the proper and durable means for the poor to achieve their welfare but…they operate…as powerful devices for cronyism and the construction of political loyalties.” He adds that the measures are, in effect, a “top-down construction of passivity,” which is part of a process “overseen by the “dominant classes that…incorporates certain demands of the subalterns in order to demobilize their movement.”9 Another writer on the left who avoids simplistic notions regarding passive revolution, Jeffery Webber, concludes an article on Morales’s presidency: “In the revolutionary/restorative dialectic of passive revolution, I have demonstrated on multiple levels the determining tendency of restoration, of preservation over transformation.”
Although in theory the outcome of passive revolutions is not predetermined, in the case of the Pink Tide, Modonesi, Webber, and other passive revolution theorists view it as largely a foregone conclusion. Modonesi points to the beginning of the second decade of the century as a turning point, after which “the passive element…became characteristic, distinctive, decisive and common.” He adds, “in the context of these passive revolutions…groups or entire sectors of popular movements were co-opted and absorbed by conservative forces, alliances, and projects.”11 The use of the terms “project” (as in “project of demobilization,” “project of restoration,” and “Rafael Correa’s project”) and “the new order” by passive revolution writers to describe limited or meager concessions by Pink Tide governments to the popular sectors is somewhat misleading. In many cases, these concessions should be seen not as an “elite-engineered” process, but part of a leftist strategy to buy time in situations of crisis, and thus need to be contextualized, rather than considered a finished product based on a preconceived project. The magnitude of the imperialist threat to Pink Tide governments should enter into the equation but many passive revolution writers on Latin America attach little importance to it, if any at all. According to their line of reasoning, V. I. Lenin’s New Economic Policy could have been classified at the time as a passive revolution, and the Communist no-strike policy during the Second World War could have been viewed in the same vein.
The prevailing situation, in which Pink Tide governments have reached power, is dynamic. The state in those countries is clearly more akin to a “battleground” of competing social forces, as theorized by Nicos Poulantzas, than to a vertical structure with economic and political elites securely sitting at the top. Characterizing the Pink Tide governments as the demobilizers within the context of a passive revolution does not tell the whole story. In an article prior to Morales’s overthrow in 2019, Webber wrote: “There is a molecular change in the balance of forces under passive revolution, gradually draining the capacities for self-organization and self-activity from below through co-optation, guaranteeing passivity to the new order.”
However, subsequent events proved that passive revolution was not an ideal framework to understand Bolivian political developments. The social movements that had clashed with the Morales government over specific issues united first with his Movimiento al Socialismo party to force the right-wing government to hold elections, and then ended up supporting the socialist party’s presidential candidate, Arce. The endorsement of Arce by the intransigent Felipe Quispe, Morales’s arch social movement rival, symbolized the convergence of social movements and the Pink Tide. This scenario is a far cry from the clear-cut divide between a Pink Tide state that is increasingly subservient to bourgeois interests, versus autonomous, if not antistatist, movements from below, as envisioned by passive revolution writers.
Events in Brazil also call into question the applicability of the passive revolution concept to the demobilization of social movements under Pink Tide governments. William Robinson, for instance, defines passive revolutions as situations in which “dominant groups undertake reform from above that defuses mobilization from below for more far-reaching transformation.” Robinson and other Pink Tide critics on the left point to the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) as a paradigmatic example of an autonomous social movement that has staunchly criticized Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s former government in the area of land distribution. Some of these critics, including passive revolution scholar Coutinho, favored a complete break with Lula and his Workers’ Party and praised the Socialism and Liberty Party, the leaders of which were expelled from the Workers’ Party in 2004 for being too far to the left.18 Nevertheless, the passive revolution paradigm, which highlights co-optation and demobilization cannot explain why the MST, in the context of the extreme polarization driven by the government of Jair Bolsonaro, forcefully pushed for Lula to be the left’s candidate in the 2022 presidential elections. In doing so, the MST vetoed the proposal for a more centrist anti-Bolsonaro alliance. The Socialism and Liberty Party supported the same position.
The co-optation of social movement activists, which is the cornerstone of the passive revolution theory applied to Latin America, is more complex than what passive revolution theorists claim. In Argentina, for instance, many members of the generation of youth protesters who forced neoliberal president Fernando de la Rua to resign in 2001 joined social movements such as La Cámpora, created by Néstor Kirchner (and headed by his son), and the Movimiento Evita created by his successor, Cristina Kirchner de Fernández. Pink Tide detractors both on the left and the right painted the pro-Kirchner social groups as lackeys of the president. But these activists saw themselves in a different light. Rather than “bureaucrats,” those who entered the state sphere considered themselves to be “militants” in a public space “under dispute.” In fact, they represented a leftist faction within Kirchnerism that served to counter the more conservative currents within the Peronist movement.
García Linera, whom Webber criticizes for advocating a strategy of stages based on relative stability rather than ongoing transformation, characterizes the relations between Pink Tide governments and social movements as one of “creative tensions.” The term, in some cases, exaggerates the degree of creativity and underestimates the degree of conflict. Elsewhere I have pointed to cases of sectarianism by Pink Tide governments toward leftists outside the governing party and toward social movements, which, as Poulantzas posits, play a fundamental role in revolutionary transformation—especially when it is by peaceful means.
Nevertheless, a distinction needs to be drawn between social movements, like the MST, that are critically supportive of progressive governments and intransigent movements that continuously clash with Pink Tide governments. In line with their praise for the latter, passive revolution writers and other Pink Tide detractors on the left highlight social movement leaders who have run for president against Pink Tide candidates. Pinpointing these leaders to shed light on the resistance to the process of passive revolution may not be the best choice. Among them are Quispe of Bolivia in 2005, Luis Macas of Ecuador in 2006, and Alberto Acosta of Ecuador in 2013, each of whom received 2 to 3 percent of the vote. Yaku Pérez, the Ecuadorian anti-Pink Tide Indigenous leader, appeared to break this pattern in the first round of the presidential elections in 2021, garnering 19 percent of the vote, but he then secured the election of conservative banker Guillermo Lasso in the second round by refusing to endorse the progressive Pink Tide candidate Andrés Arauz. Pérez went on to run in the 2023 electoral contests and pulled in a mere 4 percent, as opposed to the 48 percent that the Pink Tide presidential candidate received in the second round.
Passive revolution writers also overstate their case when they allege that Pink Tide governments have done more to further the interests of global capitalism than conservatives and that this feat has been recognized by the apologists of the established order. Webber writes: “With hindsight… it seems Morales has been a better night watchman over private property and financial affairs than the Right could have hoped for.” He also quotes the Financial Times as saying that Morales’s rhetoric of “mouthing off at capitalists and imperialists…provided political cover for closer alliances with the country’s private sector.” As a result, in the words of Robinson, many “Pink Tide states were able to push forward a new wave of capitalist globalization with greater credibility than their orthodox and politically bankrupt neoliberal predecessors.” Webber, Modonesi, and other passive revolution writers attribute “the eventual close of the progressive period” beginning in 2015 to the Pink Tide’s retrograde policies.
It is hard to believe, however, that imperialism views the Pink Tide with any degree of approval. If it does, how can one explain the devastating sanctions imposed on Venezuela and Nicaragua and the well-documented role of the U.S. Justice Department in the jailing of Lula? Of course, that is just the beginning of a nearly endless list of Washington initiatives, including coups and attempted coups, aimed at undermining the Pink Tide. Modonesi and Morton flatly reject the claim that the concept of passive revolution, which has been associated with countries as dissimilar as Communist China and Argentina under Juan Perón, has been overextended. In response to the observation of Trotskyist activist and scholar Alex Callinicos that passive revolution is an example of “concept stretching” as it has “come to take on an infinity of meanings,” Morton asserts that “passive revolution is alive and kicking.” He characterizes the position defended by Callinicos as “deeply anti-historicist.”
Nevertheless, one fundamental difference between the historical cases analyzed by Gramsci and the Pink Tide phenomena calls into question the applicability of passive revolution to twenty-first-century Latin America. Gram sci derived his concept of passive revolution from his interpretation of the Risorgimento (Italian unification) in the latter half of the nineteenth century and Italian fascism in the 1920s. Karl Marx developed the similar concept of Bonapartism, which is sometimes invoked by passive revolution writers and other leftist critics of the Pink Tide on the basis of France’s experiences under Napoleon I and Napoleon III. The four cases occurred in the context of combative social and political movements in revolutionary environments. But the dominant leaders of all four did not come from solid revolutionary or leftist backgrounds by any rational definition of the term. This context cannot be brushed aside, because it had a direct bearing on the outcome of the process. Indeed, Gramsci recognized the importance of the trajectories of passive revolution leaders. He wrote: “A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise ‘leadership’ before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power).… It seems clear from the policies of the [Resorgimento] Moderates that there can, and indeed must, be hegemonic activity even before the rise to power.”
The Pink Tide settings tell a different story. In contrast to the four cases analyzed by Marx and Gramsci, most (though not all) of the leading figures in Pink Tide governments were previously immersed, and, in some cases, played major roles in popular struggles, and participated in left wing social and political movements. Lula, Morales, and Maduro emerged from worker struggles; Gustavo Petro in Colombia and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front leaders who came to power in El Salvador participated in guerrilla movements; López Obrador, Gabriel Boric (Chile), and Xiomara Castro de Zelaya (Honduras) played leading roles in massive mobilizations against neoliberalism; Chávez, through his brother Adán, was associated with a split-off Communist guerrilla faction that attempted to recruit military officers; and the Fifth Republic Movement, which launched Chávez’s presidential candidacy in 1997–1998, was largely led by leftists, including Maduro. The very fact that the top leaders of these Pink Tide movements prior to reaching power were committed to far-reaching socioeconomic change, if not socialism, points to a far differ ent dynamic and outcome than in the case of the Risorgimento and fascist movements analyzed by Gramsci. Most importantly, Pink Tide parties were more likely to be subject to internal contradictions and conflicts, and the process was less likely to be linear than in the two Italian cases.
The structure and superstructure of the passive revolution
Passive revolution writers view Pink Tide governments as having succumbed to global capitalism, in the process giving up their relative autonomy vis-à-vis powerful interest groups. The envisioned model as it relates to the Pink Tide is based on an all-pervasive global capitalist structure, as opposed to government policies (the superstructure) that are at best timidly progressive and have been watered down by the co-optation of militant social movement activists, repression, and corruption. Passive revolution writers argue that the structure is wedded to so-called “neo-extractivism,” in which the local economy and the global economy dovetail more than ever before. According to this concept, Latin American governments took advantage of the primary commodities boom (for example, unprocessed raw materials, hydrocarbons, and soybeans) by increasing the export of those products at the expense of the industrial progress that had previously been registered. Webber points out that some of the benefits of extractivism filter down to the popular sectors, but these “relatively petty handouts run on the blood of extraction,” resulting in an increasingly “repressive state (even with a left government in office) on behalf of capital, as the expansion of extraction necessarily accelerates what David Harvey calls accumulation by dispossession.” Svampa, who adheres to the passive revolution thesis as applied to Kirchnerism in her native Argentina, calls this strategy the “commodities consensus,” as both leftist and rightist governments converge in prioritizing commodity exports and the windfall revenue derived from them.
Not only do passive revolution writers belittle the importance of the Pink Tide’s welfare programs, but also its strategy of economic diversification through the cultivation of new economic partners both in the region and worldwide. Some of them conflate Brazil’s economic initiatives abroad with U.S. imperialism. They also view the asymmetry between Pink Tide governments and China as a replica of traditional imperialist relations between metropolises and satellites, a relationship that the governments of the latter uncritically accept. In this context, China is viewed as increasingly becoming just one more major imperialist power. As Robinson puts it, “the emerging centers in this polycentric world are converging around remarkably similar ‘Great Power’ tropes [that are] especially jingoistic.”
This analytical focus on the structure of global capitalism at the expense of factors related to the superstructure begs for closer examination. The underlying argument of passive revolution writers is that the Pink Tide’s performance needs to be theorized from a Marxist perspective on the basis of class interests. Given the Pink Tide governments’ failure to even attempt to lessen dependence on the export of primary commodities, and given their undeniable ties with certain capitalist groups, then the superstructure in the form of Pink Tide policies must be nothing more than a mere echo of the capitalist structure. Their conclusion is simple and obvious: there is not much progressive about Pink Tide governments.
But facts are facts, and if there are discrepancies between the facts and theory, it is the latter that needs to be revised. Proving that the policies of Pink Tide governments were progressive in fundamental ways would, at the least, poke holes in the theory of passive revolution applied to Latin America and, more seriously, would expose it for being reductionist. In that case, the underlying assumption that the structure of Pink Tide countries consists of a largely undifferentiated bloc taking in both transnational capitalists and the dominant domestic bourgeoisie would be open to question, and it would be necessary to view the state in those countries as a battleground of conflicting social forces (à la Poulantzas), rather than an instrument of the dominant bourgeoisie. In short, the plausibility of the passive revolution theory applied to Latin America hinges on the characterization of Pink Tide policies as serving the interests of capitalism, with nothing much more than crumbs for the popular sectors.
Just how progressive are progressive Latin American governments?
Foreign policy, more than any other realm, clearly defines Pink Tide governments as progressive, without exception. Indeed, the divide between the foreign policy of all Pink Tide governments and that of centrist and rightist ones could not be starker. Take the case of Israel’s 2023 invasion of Gaza and the issue of Palestine. Lula’s falling out with Washington occurred after his recognition of Palestinian statehood in 2010, after which other Pink Tide governments followed suit. After Israel’s recent invasion of Gaza, the Pink Tide governments of Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Boliv ia, Nicaragua, Chile, and Honduras accused Israel of committing genocide, and most withdrew ambassadors from Tel Aviv (or threatened to do so). Nearly all have harshly criticized the United States for its support of Israel (though Mexico’s position was surprisingly more restrained). In contrast, the centrist and rightist governments of Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina (under Milei) supported the Israeli invasion of Gaza; the latter announced its intentions of moving the nation’s embassy to Jerusalem. Also consider the U.S. sanctions against Cuba and Venezuela. In October 2023, the Pink Tide presidents of Colombia, Honduras, Venezuela, and Mexico were instrumental in passing a resolution at a Latin American summit of twelve nations in Palenque, Mexico, denouncing the sanctions. None of the conservative South American nations attended the meeting. In contrast, at the height of the conservative backlash against the Pink Tide in 2017, the ad hoc “Group of Lima,” consisting of over a dozen Latin American nations, was established in order to push for regime change in Venezuela. Similarly, the progressive banner of Latin American unity and integration—which for over a century challenged the prevailing hemispheric-wide, U.S.-dominated pan-Americanism—split the continent along ideological lines. Pink Tide governments promoted the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). The most radical, ALBA, which was founded by Chávez and Fidel Castro, lost three key members when Pink Tide governments were overthrown in Honduras, Bolivia, and Ecuador. When the Pink Tide returned to power in Bolivia, it rejoined ALBA, a move that Xiomara Castro is also considering. In contrast, the conservative and rightist governments in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru suspended their membership in UNASUR in 2018. The following year, the anti-Pink Tide president of Ecuador, Lenín Moreno, dislodged the organization from its headquarters in Quito. The vicissitudes of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) tell a similar story. The position of Latin American governments on Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) follows the same pattern. After assuming the presidency in 2023, Lula prioritized the strategy of opening BRICS to new members with the aim of revitalizing Third Worldism and avoiding a revival of the bipolarity of the first Cold War, with BRICS serving as a front for Russia and China. He also calls for a BRICS currency equivalent to the euro and with “different criteria” for its lending than that of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). BRICS status as a cornerstone of Lula’s foreign policy contrasts with Bolsonaro’s lethargy on the international front. It also contrasts with Milei’s decision to cancel Argentina’s membership in BRICS, which had been lobbied for by his predecessor, Pink Tide president Alberto Fernández.
Robinson’s analysis of BRICS, like passive revolution writing on Latin America in general, subsumes progressive initiatives like these into the structure of global capitalism and its imperatives. A case in point is the measures and proposals coming from BRICS to sidestep the dollar for international transactions. Robinson points out that China’s proposal for a world currency issued by the IMF would “help save the global economy from the dangers of continued reliance on the U.S. dollar.” He adds that implementing ideas along these lines, even though they “clash with the G7… would have the effect of extending and contributing to the stabilization of global capitalism and…further transnationalizing the dominant groups in these countries.” Although the argument is plausible, Robinson makes no mention of the fact that the BRICS currency plans will undermine Wash ington’s nefarious system of international sanctions, which are predicated on the supremacy of the dollar and have wreaked havoc on the economies of Cuba, Venezuela, and many other nations. His statement that the upshot of the currency proposal would be the “stabilization of global capitalism” is thus incomplete in that it ignores, or plays down, the importance of providing breathing space to countries committed to socialism. Other progressive positions assumed by BRICS are also viewed as mere by products of jockeying by globally oriented capitalists of the Global South for a greater voice in world affairs. The way Robinson frames the issue, Pink Tide actions in favor of popular causes appear to be of limited significance because those governments have been incorporated into the web of an unjust global capitalist system. Robinson, for instance, recognizes and approves of the BRICS stand on Palestinian rights and other issues with an eye toward achieving a “more balanced inter-state regime.” But, he adds that the multi polar system “remains part of a brutal, exploitative, global capitalist world in which the BRICS capitalists and states are as much committed to control and repression of the global working class as are their Northern counterparts.”35 In other words, for Robinson, the transnational economic system trumps everything else. He says in order to understand the BRICS phenomenon, it is necessary to go beyond “surface phenomena” involving the tensions and conflict of “inter-state dynamics” in order “to get at the underlying essence of social and class forces in the global political economy.” All this leaves little room for placing pragmatic politics in favor of popular and national interests (for instance, transferring technological skills from the Global North to workers in the South) at the center of analysis. After all, the end result is the BRICS capitalist class’s “greater integration into global capitalism and heightened association with transnational capital,” and making the system of global capitalism more ratio nal.36 Robinson’s framing fails to take into account the rationale behind alliances between the popular sectors and fractions of the bourgeoisie in certain circumstances in countries of the Global South. More specifically, Robinson’s approach leaves little room for giving serious consideration to Maduro’s claim that concessions to private capital are part of a defensive strategy designed to weather the effects of the debilitating sanctions imposed by Washington, not to mention a world in which the right has gained the upper hand. Robinson, his extensive and valuable research into “transnational capital” notwithstanding, fails to empirically demonstrate why these leftist strategies should be relegated to the category of superficial “superstructure” divorced from the structure, as opposed to being placed at center stage along with global capitalism. It is disturbing that Robinson and other BRICS critics on the left repeatedly accuse those who view that bloc in a positive light (or those who have a favorable view of China) as running the risk of becoming “cheerleaders” for global capitalists of the South. That is to say, support for Lula and BRICS gets translated into cheerleading for capitalists. The use of the term “cheerleaders” inadvertently lends itself to a binary outlook (the “you are with us or against us” nonsense) reminiscent of the first Cold War, when the left was accused by the self-styled center-left of siding with the enemy. In those days leftists were, in effect, told you have to criticize forcefully the enemy bloc (the “Communists,” of course) since otherwise you were accused of being a “dupe,” a “fellow traveler,” or worse. Those on the left who praise Brazil under Lula or the rest of the Pink Tide, or China for that matter, should not feel obliged to formulate criticisms of those nations just to demonstrate their credentials as non-“campist” revolutionaries.
Discarding passive revolution—but in favor of what?
In the world that emerges from the passive revolution writing analyzed in this article, autonomous social movements are pitted against global capitalism, with not much in between. The state in Pink Tide countries is so wedded to the so-called transnational capitalist class and to the extractivist model that the end result of its “project” of demobilization and co-optation of reformers and leftists is a forgone conclusion. I believe this analytical framework is counterproductive in that it blurs important issues that need to be rigorously analyzed and debated on the left. Most important, the progressive politics of Pink Tide governments cannot be played down or relegated to a category of secondary importance. At the root of the issue is the perennial debate among Marxists over structure and superstructure. Is the structure, global capitalism, the principal focus in the analysis of nonsocialist progressive governments like the Pink Tide, as claimed by passive revolution writers on Latin America, determining all else? Or is the relationship between structure and superstructure in these countries more complex (as Louis Althusser argued), with no simple cause-and-effect relationship?
One basic fact overlooked by Pink Tide detractors on the left is the quarter-century duration of the phenomenon, and the large number of countries that it comprises, in the context of relentless resistance backed by imperialist powers. This, in itself, is a historic accomplishment. The sheer number of complex issues surrounding these experiences, with evidently no easy answer, is an even weightier factor, countering the thesis that the Pink Tide is moving in a predictable direction favorable to global capitalism. The following are several of these knotty issues that demonstrate the complexity of the Pink Tide phenomenon, the unpredictability of its final outcome, and the need for a debate on the topic free of conceptual blinders.
First, there are Pink Tide programs that are not resounding successes but that cannot be considered failures with regard to the goal of achieving structural change. It is necessary to make a distinction between Pink Tide policies that point in the direction of far-reaching change, such as the creation of spaces for popular participation, as opposed to token programs amounting to public relations ploys. The significance of the former cannot be written off because of their limited effectiveness or for not having succeeded in replacing existing institutions of the old order.
Examples include the numerous cooperatives and communes established in Venezuela and organs of participation in political decision-making in Brazil, Uruguay, and elsewhere, all of which involved large numbers of participants.38 Along these lines, Chris Gilbert, in his study of Venezuela’s communal movement, writes “I am delighted by the headway made by the red flag in this commune [El Maizal] because it points to the persistence of very ‘red’ elements in the so-called Pink Tide.”
Social movements play key roles in promoting popular participation. Prominent scholars of social movements have long underlined the importance of “friendly” governments in stimulating their growth.40 The observation is particularly applicable to Pink Tide countries that were previously characterized by brutally repressive regimes and where the far right, if it returns to power, will undoubtedly repress social protests in ever more extreme forms. These variables raise the issue of how to judge governments (like that of Lula) that encourage social movements while not satisfying their more ambitious demands, such as land redistribution.
Second, defensive strategies sometimes succeed from a political viewpoint, but other times fail miserably. Maduro’s defensive strategy of concessions to the private sector, for instance, was successful in that it allowed him to weather a Washington-backed right-wing offensive. The opposite occurred with former president Cristina Fernández de Kirch ner’s endorsement of the presidential candidate Sergio Massa (rather than youthful social movement leader Juan Grabois) as a means to placate centrists, resulting in the election of Milei. Whereas Minister of the Economy Massa was held responsible for the nation’s triple-digit inflation, Grabois promised to revitalize the Peronist movement, which, he pointed out, was lacking in any kind of political project.
Third, China, with its success in combating extreme poverty and promoting economic growth, serves as an inspiration for Pink Tide movements in their rejection of U.S.-imposed neoliberal formulas. But is China a good role model for the Pink Tide in its attempt to achieve far-reaching change, as some Latin American leftist champions of “market socialism” contend? Certainly, an economic model that takes in many large-scale capitalists cannot be labeled as pure socialism. Pink Tide governments, however, have been characterized by multiclass alliances in which the capitalist class is divided between a minority sector lending various degrees of support to the progressive government and the majority fractions aligned with the right. The alliances with business groups are “tactical”—as opposed to strategic alliances with the so-called “national anti-imperialist bourgeoisie,”as envisioned by the Communist International a century ago. These are tactical because they are fragile and not based on far-reaching goals, and because the capitalist allies are the first to defect when the going gets rough, as occurred in Brazil in 2016 and Bolivia in 2019.
The Argentine Marxist economist Claudio Katz calls these complex, contradictory relationships “antagonistic cooperation,” in which the capitalists of the South, in spite of their “increasing transnationalization,” have “not destroyed their local roots,” and “remain…in competition with the corporations based outside the region.” The thesis of anti-Pink Tide writers, including the passive revolution ones, that the Pink Tide has capitulated to global capitalism belies the intensity of these tensions and the “antagonistic” component of the relations. Robinson, for instance, recognizes tensions but minimizes their confrontational aspect. Thus, he claims that the BRICS countries, far from challenging global capitalism, are seeking integration into the system and a greater decision-making voice within its framework.
Fourth, there is the possibility that at a given moment Pink Tide governments can move significantly to the left, similar to what happened in Mexico under Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s. The existence of leftist factions within Pink Tide movements, the radicalness of its rank and file, and its legacy of struggle heightens the probability of such a scenario. Another factor enters into play. As the historic leader of Brazil’s MST João Pedro Stédile recently stated, with the deepening of the crisis of world capitalism the Latin American left—including the Pink Tide—is likely to progress from anti-neoliberalism (or what he calls the “neo-developmental, progressive project”) to anticapitalism.
These and other issues are bound to impact leftist strategy and as such call for open-ended discussion. Passive revolution writing on Latin America, however, concludes that the revolutionary component of the Pink Tide phenomenon has exhausted itself, and that those governments are now inextricably tied to global capitalism and its dominant class fractions. With such an outlook, the richness and uniqueness of Pink Tide experiences are left behind.
The second wave of Pink Tide governments is more moderate than the first, but the extreme opposition of their Washington-supported, right-wing adversaries has not eased. International sanctions imposed on Venezuela and Nicaragua; lawfare used against Pink Tide leaders in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Argentina; and the 2019 coup in Bolivia, coupled with the U.S. nurturing of right-wing opposition elements, are not to be ignored. That imperialist aggression has not diminished against the Pink Tide runs counter to the central argument of passive revolution writers that those governments have turned their backs on the social movements that brought them to power. For passive revolution writers, Latin America is moving toward an ever clearer divide between the forces of global capitalism, including governments across the political spectrum that adhere to the “commodity consensus,” on the one hand, and social movements, on the other. In this sense, passive revolution theory has been a poor predictor of what is taking place. The region is much more than states obedient to the dictates of global capitalism pitted against robust, completely autonomous, globally supported social movements backed by revolutionaries on the far left. In Latin America, there is a strategically important middle ground between global capitalism and social movements, a space that is occupied by Pink Tide governments and movements—whose future direction is far from predictable.
Does resisting US imperialism make ALMO 'progressive. While certainly to his credit he is otherwise a liberal nationalist, preferring Mexican capitalists to those from the US.
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."
U.S. Reinforces Control Over Peru
Posted by Internationalist 360° on October 18, 2024
La Línea
The then Peruvian Minister of Defense, Jorge Chávez Cresta, together with General Laura Richardson, head of the Southern Command (Photo: Ministry of Defense of Peru).
On June 7, 2021, a political earthquake occurred in Peru. A political outsider, the rural teacher Pedro Castillo, was elected president of the Republic with the promise of transforming a political and economic system built on great abysses among the Peruvian population.
The first measure taken by this popular government was the initiative of Foreign Minister Héctor Béjar to leave the Lima Group with a view to weakening the regime change operation in Venezuela initiated by the United States. The foreign minister’s sovereign decision would cost him his job. Just fifteen days after taking office, he was dismissed by Congress.
This act of geopolitical bravado in a country where submission to imperialism traditionally reigns was to be the last of Pedro Castillo’s months in office. Permanently attacked by the legislative, judicial, economic and media powers, the president abandoned the foreign policy front to career diplomats who reproduced the traditional lines of his predecessors.
However, this initial transgression was not to Washington’s liking. Despite not having bad relations with the government of Pedro Castillo, uncertainty about what might happen led the empire to precipitate the fall of the Peruvian professor.
The participation of the United States in the coup against Castillo on December 7, 2022 is evidenced by the active agenda of then Ambassador Lisa Kenna in the days prior to the coup. That week the official met with former Minister of Defense Nicolas Bobbio, the president of Congress Williams Zapata, former Attorney General Patricia Benavides, among other key figures in the conspiracy.
Once the coup was consummated and Dina Boluarte was sworn in as president, the United States, through a telephone call from the head of the State Department, Antony Blinken, was the first country to recognize her as president.
Since the beginning of Dina Boluarte’s administration, the weight of the United States on Peru has been significantly strengthened.
Former Ambassador Lisa Kenna, Chargé d’Affaires John McNamara and the recently appointed Ambassador Stephanie Syptak-Ramnath held and continue to hold weekly meetings with ministers, high commanders of the armed forces and police, as well as authorities of the Congress, the Judiciary or directors of autonomous institutions such as the National Jury of Elections. The performance of the U.S. embassy transcends the limits of diplomatic behavior between sovereign countries, which constitutes a clear interference.
During these almost two years of Boluarte’s government, the United States has reinforced its presence and control over Peruvian territory through permanent coordination with the National Police and the Armed Forces. Thus, in March 2023, just a few months after the coup against Castillo, the Ministry of the Interior and the U.S. embassy established a commitment to cooperate on urban security and the fight against drug trafficking. This agreement included the visit of Todd Robinson, Undersecretary of State for the Bureau of Counternarcotics Affairs, who met with the Minister of the Interior, Victor Torres, to schedule “training” for the Peruvian police and to eradicate 25,000 hectares of coca leaf crops.
In the area of defense, activity has been greater.
On May 19, 2023, the Peruvian Congress approved Legislative Resolution 4 766, which authorizes the deployment of U.S. troops in Peru. Since that date, 1,500 U.S. Army troops have been operating on Peruvian soil for training, joint maneuvers, territorial deployment and covert operations. In December 2023, Congress voted to extend the U.S. military occupation until December 2024.
In September 2023, Dina Boluarte held a meeting with U.S. Special Advisor for the Americas Chris Dodds. Dodds’ visit was aimed at strengthening the Alliance for Economic Prosperity, a strategy promoted by the United States in an attempt to counteract Latin American integration and reinforce the free market in the region. It is worth remembering that in January 2023, a few days after Castillo’s dismissal, Boluarte added Peru to this initiative, which has the support of only 11 countries out of the 35 in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The same month, on September 17, 2023, General Laura Richardson met with Peru’s Minister of Defense, Jorge Chávez, to discuss security cooperation.
The meeting was attended by the head of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, General Manuel Gomez, senior commanders of the armed forces and the commanders of the Peruvian air force, navy and army. Chargé d’Affaires to Peru, John McNamara, also participated in the talks. General Richardson also visited the Naval Medical Research Unit SUR (Namru Sur), a U.S. biolaboratory located in the Peruvian jungle. This unique scientific unit is one of three in the U.S. Navy worldwide. The Namru Sur team works on infectious disease research and surveillance.
In October 2023, one month after Richardson’s visit, Special Operations Command South, the unit that controls all Special Operations Forces within US SouthCom, conducted an exercise with the Peruvian Joint Task Force. During the training, a variety of equipment was used for the activities: from 7.62mm M240L machine guns to FN SCAR assault rifles, as well as Accuracy International AW and Knight’s Armament M110 SASS precision rifles.
Also in October 2023, Peru’s defense minister, Jorge Chavez, met with then White House senior advisor for Latin America, Juan Gonzalez, as well as the deputy assistant secretaries for the Western Hemisphere at the State and Defense departments,Mark Wells and Daniel Erikson, the then President of the Council of Ministers, Alberto Otarola, and announced the cooperation of the Peruvian Air Force with their U.S. counterparts to grant them control of Peruvian airspace, under the pretext of the fight against drug trafficking.
As a result of these meetings, Juan Gonzalez declared that the United States “considered the presence of Dina Boluarte at the APEC summit in November 2024 to be important”, which implied that they would not support Boluarte’s vacancy or dismissal.
Already in 2024, members of the U.S. Space Force visited Peru in the framework of the creation of a spaceport within the base of “El Pato”, Talara, in the north of the country, home of Petroperu’s refinery. This spaceport would operate under a concession to the United States for an initial period of 20 years, which reinforces the military control that the northern country maintains over Peruvian territories and aerospace sovereignty.
Containing China’s influence
Peru is a geopolitical battleground between the United States and China. For years it had been a model of ultra-liberalism where Washington knew no commercial rival. However, trade between China and Peru went from US$704.6 million in 2000 to US$36.7 billion in 2023. For the past decade, China has been Peru’s largest trading partner. Chinese companies focus on mining, energy and now infrastructure. Despite having governments aligned with the United States since the fall of General Velasco, China has managed to control strategic sectors of the Peruvian economy.
Faced with such a scenario, Washington has deployed its political influence to contain the Chinese advance. In November 2023, the United States expressed concern that China is gaining control over critical parts of Peru’s infrastructure, including the entire electricity supply to Lima and the mega-port of Chancay, a port hub that will link South America with Asia.
A source close to the Boluarte government told the Financial Times that “Chinese capital has acquired electricity, mining and other companies. Geopolitically speaking, U.S. concerns would be justified”.
For his part, Gonzalo Ríos Polastri, deputy general manager of Cosco Shipping Ports Chancay Peru -a joint venture whose majority shareholder is the Chinese public company Cosco Shipping-, said that China’s investment in Chancay is “100% commercial”, and added: “This is an investment by private companies according to the rules of the market.It may have different geopolitical readings, but it is not an investment that has any kind of implication for national security.” If Ríos Polastri’s defense is part of a free trade framework, it cannot hide Washington’s discomfort with the construction of the port of Chancay.
Everything indicates that the Peruvian government will remain ambivalent about the mega-port and Chinese investments. While it is true that Boluarte was received in Beijing by President Xi Jinping in July 2024, some sectors of her own government tried to pressure or collapse the project without the appointed president preventing it or setting a geopolitical course for her government.
Precisely, in April 2024 there was an attempt to exert pressure through the National Port Authority (APN), which sued Cosco Shipping following a consultation by the Olaechea law firm, whose portfolio of clients includes important American companies such as Blackrock, JP Morgan or General Electric. The maneuver sought to take away from China the exclusivity of port services within the facilities of the port of Chancay..
It is important to mention that the National Port Authority depends on the Ministry of Transportation, whose Minister Raul Perez is married to Isaura Delgado Brayfield, an American national and manager of the American Chamber of Commerce in Peru, which integrates 580 companies from that country. Within the executive there is no cohesive geopolitical vision, a reality that allowed this exercise of pressure.
Illustrative of the positions adverse to the port of Chancay within the government are the statements made by Peru’s ambassador in Washington, Alfredo Ferrero, who in June 2024 told Bloomberg: “One hundred percent of Lima’s electricity is Chinese-owned, many of the copper mining projects are also Chinese. This country will have the largest port in South America. That is the objective situation and the United States has noticed it. But it is not enough to realize it, it is necessary to act”.
In this interview, the ambassador urges US investors to invest in the port of Corio – in the south of the country – because “it would be a port that would serve as a counterweight to the Chinese Chancay project ”.
More recently, in June 2024, Jana Nelson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Peru’s Minister of Defense Walter Astudillo, and the head of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, General David Ojeda, organized the Bilateral Defense Working Group to promote defense cooperation and port security.
The United States also had representatives from its major ports attend an event sponsored by the Peruvian government to discuss port security issues.This active performance on the subject comes just a few months after the inauguration of the Chancay port hub.
Likewise, in September 2024, the U.S. Ambassador highlighted the meetings held with the BlackRock investment fund and Peruvian authorities to discuss their investments in the ports of Matarani and Salaverry in southern Peru, in a campaign that seeks to lower the profile of the port of Chancay and establish direct competition for the export of minerals and soybeans to Asia.
Also noteworthy is the visit to Lima of Carlos Días Rosillo, former Director of Public Policy at the White House during Donald Trump’s term, currently Director of the Adam Smith Center for Economic Freedom, who met with the Chief of Advisors of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Aldo Prieto. During his stay, the former official gave a workshop at the University of Lima and gave an interview on a private channel. In both, he attacked China: “With the effort of the United States to bring companies that for many years went to China, there is an enormous opportunity for Peru and for Latin America from the economic and national security point of view”, he declared in front of the students.
Finally, he highlighted the campaign on the so-called “illegal fishing from China”. In September 2024, the National Society of Artisanal Fishing of Peru (Sonapescal) warned about the indiscriminate activity against squid (or giant squid) by the Chinese fleet, without authorization to enter the Peruvian coast, claiming that “China has been able to greatly reduce its costs because they have been systematically allowed to enter Peru to do logistical work without complying with national regulations”. This news was widely reported in the Peruvian press and by politicians who have already proposed investigative commissions.
Since 2023, in the framework of the multinational exercise Resolute Sentinel 2023, members of the Peruvian Navy, through the National Maritime Authority and the U.S. Forces, carried out joint action flights with the objective of identifying a “foreign fishing fleet” dedicated to squid fishing, and confirmed that these are operating outside the 200 nautical miles of the Peruvian maritime domain.
It is worth noting that since 2017 the US Security Strategy warned about the need to “maintain the freedom of the seas to ensure the security of its country and its allies”.Since that time, the fight against illegal fishing has become for the Southern Command a tool for intervention and control of the maritime domain of the Western Hemisphere. In her recent tours in Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Peru, Laura Richardson emphasized the fight against “illegal fishing”, mainly Chinese, on the Pacific coast of South America.In Peru, not only the government but also the media and politicians of all ideological persuasions have bowed to the imperial and sinophobic vision put forward by the United States.
On September 27, 2024, the government issued Decree 014-2014 with the objective of reinforcing satellite monitoring of foreign vessels in Peruvian territorial waters. This measure was agreed with through the Chinese embassy in Peru, but continues to cause controversy in Congress.While Peru has every right to reinforce its sovereignty and control its maritime border, the emergence of an intense media campaign on the issue coincides with the preparations for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum and the arrival of Xi Jinping in Lima.A “strange” coincidence given that the problem has persisted for many years.on through
On the other hand, we cannot forget that it is former Navy officials who are associated with China in the Chancay port project. Several former chief admirals are now the visible figures of the joint venture created to build and manage the future port hub. For their part, their counterparts in Parliament are ardent supporters of this new infrastructure and of the partnership with China. In other words, the Navy is in charge of patrolling and guarding the maritime border against possible attacks by Chinese vessels, while high-ranking officials of this institution do business with the Asian power. A conflict of interests that the recent campaign is determined to make problematic.
The president-designate is at a crossroads. Sinking into a crisis of legitimacy, an economic crisis and a crisis of governance, she owes her permanence in power to a corrupt pact with Congress and unconditional alignment with the United States. However, this triple crisis has driven international investors away from the Inca country.Their only way out is to try to get closer to China to reactivate economic cooperation between the two countries.A very risky exercise of political acrobatics, which could have consequences on the end of his mandate or his judicial future.
All powers attached to the United States
Currently, the influence of the United States transcends relations with the Executive, and encompasses all branches and institutions of government.
In the judicial sphere, for example, on April 2, 2024, the director of the National Coordination of Specialized Prosecutors for Corruption Crimes met with FBI Special Agent Alejandra Sanchez, coordinator of the FBI’s Transnational Anti-Corruption Program.While the country was learning about the “rolexgate” scandal, this meeting evidenced more the interest in strengthening the pressure tools against future leaders than in eradicating corruption..
Likewise, the diplomatic services in Washington maintain continuous relations with the National Board of Justice, or the electoral power, both with the National Office of Electoral Processes.. The U.S. Embassy is the only diplomatic mission in Peru to have this sustained agenda of interference in the public powers.
The mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga, of the conservative Renovación Popular party, has increased the capital city’s cooperation with the U.S. embassy.In his first months in office, he has promoted the participation of diplomatic personnel in the implementation of “common pots”, food aid organizations located in the poorest areas of the city. With the geolocation of their headquarters and the distribution of food, Washington was able to forge ties of cooperation and control with the social leaders of Lima’s shantytowns.
Regarding the relationship with Congress, in March 2024, congressmen received a delegation of their U.S. counterparts to sign a cooperation agreement that, in practice, allows the foreign country to meddle in the internal affairs of the country. According to the U.S. embassy, this agreement will allow the U.S. to “support transparency, the rule of law and promote free and fair elections” in the South American country.
The president of the Peruvian Congress, Alejandro Soto, described the agreement as a “strategic alliance”. Both neoliberal parliamentarians and the supposedly “anti-imperialist” Peruvian left were present at the signing ceremony.
A month later, in April 2024, through Legislative Resolution 6672, Congress ratified the agreement between Peru and the United States signed by the Boluarte government that allows the United States to intercept and shoot down light aircraft in total freedom.
Under the pretext of the fight against drugs, Washington extends its dominion over Peruvian airspace.
Alignment with U.S. foreign policy
Appointed as president by the powers that organized the coup against Castillo, Boluarte holds the record of unpopularity in the region. Only 5% of the population supports her, mainly in the wealthy classes of the country. The massive and polyclassist rejection led her to negotiate her survival with the ultra-right sectors in Congress, with the private mining sector and agro-exporters, as well as diplomatically with the United States.
This is reflected in Peru’s position on the world scene, where it aligned itself with Washington’s position on the massacre that Israel is committing in Gaza, on the elections in Venezuela or with respect to the war in Ukraine.
In the case of Venezuela, Peru was the first country to recognize Edmundo Gonzalez as president after the July 28 elections. An extremist position that was later corrected to stop taking diplomatic initiative and follow the steps taken by the State Department. Likewise, while Israel continues to generate war and death in West Asia, the satellite countries of the United States took advantage of the UN General Assembly to sign a communiqué condemning the constitutional government of Venezuela. Peru joined the 30 countries that strictly adhere to Washington’s foreign policy in the region.
In the case of the war in Ukraine, initiated while Pedro Castillo was president, Peru had to be more cautious. As soon as the coup against Castillo was consummated, SouthCom. requested Dina Boluarte deliver part of the Armed Forces’ armament of Russian origin to Ukraine. Since the times of the patriot general Juan Velasco Alvarado, Peru has had a lot of Russian and/or ex-Soviet military material, in all its military components and, particularly, in the air force. The military was not willing to risk spare supply chains in case the political power decided to support Ukraine and be a cobelligerent against Russia.
However, in October 2024, the Minister of Defense, Walter Astudillo, requested a credit of 3.5 billion dollars to renew the Peruvian Air Force fleet with 24 multirole fighters: 20 single-seat and 4 twin-seat. The country currently has Mirage 2000P/DP fighters, acquired new from France in 1982, and, above all, MiG-29S/SMP Fulcrum C and Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot. The U.S. company Lockeed Martin and the Swedish Saab would be leading the preferences of the Peruvian government.In the same month, Peru received a donation from the United States of nine UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters that will add to or replace the Russian or ex-Soviet helicopters currently in possession of the Peruvian Air Force.
The purchase of the aircraft and the delivery of the helicopters will be a major geopolitical turning point as the country would no longer depend on the Russian supply chain, and would make it more dependent on Atlanticism and the West.
A country under control, for now
With the fall of Castillo, the United States took advantage of Boluarte’s misrule to reinforce its presence and control over a strategic country in South America.Peru has borders with five countries of the continent, enjoys enormous natural resources and fresh water.An important point: it is the second largest producer of cocaine, which offers a pretext for interference in the name of the fight against drug trafficking.
Castillo’s unexpected rise to power demonstrated a flaw in the political system of Washington’s best student in the region. The enormous inequalities and the economic crisis make the people of Peru aspire to structural changes as well. It was for this reason that the United States decided to strengthen its hegemony and, at the same time, try to contain the growing influence of China in the country. Thanks to the current government, they succeeded for now. At least until the next electoral surprise.
Blackouts and Foreign Military Bases: The Neoliberal Proposals of Ecuador’s Noboa
Posted by Internationalist 360° on October 18, 2024
Peoples Dispatch
The neoliberal program of Daniel Noboa’s government has not been able to offer concrete solutions in the face of crisis (Photo: Presidencia de la República del Ecuador)
While Ecuadorians endure power outages of more than 10 hours, the government proposes the installation of foreign military bases.
If there is a buzzword in Ecuador, it is “crisis.” Everyone points out that most economic, political, and even ideological relations are in “crisis.” This perpetual state of defenselessness undoubtedly allows the emergence of a specific social phenomenon: social passivity and fear in the face of uncertainty. As the Canadian writer Naomi Klein explained, it is also the key to the implementation of new models of capitalist accumulation.
Ecuador is currently facing three fundamental crises: an electrical crisis, an economic crisis (which is aggravated by the previous one), and a security crisis. In the face of this, the neoliberal program of Daniel Noboa’s government has not been able to offer concrete solutions, but rather has speculated with actions that are not usually successful.
The fact is that neoliberalism, so defended by the politicians in power, shuns strong public investment, centralized coordination of the different functions of the state, and sovereign decision-making on security, economy, and foreign policy. In times of serious internal upheaval, neoliberalism is unable to offer effective solutions.
Ecuador in the dark worsens the economic crisis
Ecuador is going through a severe energy crisis that is plunging Ecuadorians into 10-hour blackouts. Local news reports are constantly informing about the enormous economic losses the country is suffering: a reduction in production of up to 40%, layoffs of workers, and closures of businesses are just some of the consequences of a country that, according to the Central Bank of Ecuador, registers an economic contraction of 2.2% during the second half of 2024. In short, the country “does not see the light at the end of the tunnel.”
Months ago, his own Secretary of Electricity informed Noboa that hard times were coming and that urgent measures had to be taken; the President decided to ignore her, fire her, and initiate a lawsuit against her. Ecuador, during the neoliberal governments of Moreno and Lasso, did not continue with the hydroelectric construction plan projected during the Correa administration, so there is no short or medium-term solution to the energy crisis. Some experts point out that the blackouts could last until March of next year, something that would devastate the national economy.
Noboa’s passive solution has been the contracting of barges that are not generating the promised number of megawatts effectively and the rationing of electricity. The previous and current governments did not repair the hydroelectric plants in time and many of them are in danger of being damaged, even permanently. For the time being, Colombia has decided to stop selling electricity to Ecuador. The outlook is bleak.
Some politicians comment that the way the government is solving the crisis is due to its ineptitude in public administration. However, others suspect that something “darker” is being planned behind the crisis. According to such speculations, the poor management of the crisis is aimed at privatizing the hydroelectric sector in favor of the country’s oligarchic groups. Faced with an absent state, several neoliberal ideologues propose that the only solution is to hand over the administration of the hydroelectric park to large private companies. This would be in the same neoliberal policy line followed by the President and most right-wing political parties in Ecuador, and quite successfully promoted by the IMF and the World Bank.
Foreign military bases
However, the energy crisis is not the only problem that Ecuadorians are facing. The supposed Phoenix Plan of the Noboa government (which some politicians say never existed except as an election campaign slogan) does not seem to be able to eliminate organized crime, as the president himself promised during the campaign.
According to Noboa, if Ecuadorians gave him their support in the last referendum (in which several questions on security were asked and he received resounding popular backing) there would be a marked improvement in the fight against crime. And while homicide rates have dropped slightly, some experts say it is more likely due to the relocation of gangs to new sectors of the country, so they no longer have the need to confront each other so directly and openly. Despite this, the data does not match the “securitized” promises of Noboa, who needs a popularity bump ahead of the 2025 elections.
Perhaps that is why Noboa insists on his anti-sovereignty plan to bring foreign military bases to Ecuador, a matter that is prohibited by the Constitution in Article 5. Hence, the Executive intends to reform the Constitution to achieve his goal and play a little with the popularity that such a decision may bring him in the face of the next elections. The truth is that Ecuadorians are tired of insecurity, and any well-promoted solution could seem optimal and even attractive, even though, in this case, such a proposal contradicts a Constitution that was overwhelmingly approved by the popular vote.
On October 15, the Constitutional Court (CC) qualified as pertinent the proposal of the Executive to partially amend the Constitution, eliminating Article 5, which states “The establishment of foreign military bases or foreign installations for military purposes will not be allowed. It is prohibited to cede national military bases to foreign armed or security forces.” The Secretary of Communication, Irene Velez, informed that thanks to the endorsement of the CC, the President will send the proposal to the Legislative in the next few days. After that, the legislators will have to comply with a series of steps to qualify the question proposed by the President.
For now, there seems to be a consensus among the right-wing parties to reform the constitution in this aspect, even among those who are currently opposed to Noboa’s government, such as the Social Christian Party. For its part, the Citizen Revolution, party of former President Correa, opposes the proposal, considering it a “demagogic” plan to improve the image of the president and not to solve the security problems of the country. For her part, Lucia Posso, an independent legislator, said, “We have no light. The concern of the industrialists, of the small businesses, is that their activities are paralyzed and the blackout schedules are not respected. That is the problem in Ecuador, not the [foreign military] base.”
After passing through the National Assembly, the consultation will return to the CC which, if deemed appropriate, will be consulted in the next presidential and legislative elections of 2025. Some think that the question could be part of the second electoral round, in which Ecuadorians will choose their president between the two most-voted candidates of the first round. This could mean that Noboa, if he reaches the ballot, is a very valuable resource in the face of a second round that will surely be very close.
People of Ecuador Speak Out: Government Is Responsible for Electricity Crisis
October 23, 2024
Two persons cross a street while cars pass by them, during one of the regular blackouts in Quito, Ecuador. Photo: El Nacional.
The massive power cuts in Ecuador continue to cause havoc and are becoming more serious each time. The country is experiencing several crises simultaneously, but the electricity blackout is the one causing the most discomfort to the citizens, as well as to the government of President Daniel Noboa, a US born right-wing neoliberal corporate businessman who is giving away the country’s resources while the people sit in the dark.
Scheduled power outages in Ecuador began on September 23. Since then, sectors of all the cities in the country have been without electricity from six to ten hours a day, including industrial areas. The power outage has been attributed to a severe drought in Ecuador’s main rivers that has lowered water levels in the dams serving the hydroelectric power plants. More than 70% of Ecuador’s electricity comes from hydroelectric power plants, affected by the worst drought in the last 60 years in the country.
In the capital Quito, the drinking water service is at risk and the city has declared an emergency. On October 3, 2024, Quito Water Company (Epmpas) declared an emergency after recognizing that blackouts of up to 10 hours a day have exceeded its capacity to guarantee the continuity and availability of the drinking water supply.
In this situation, nobody seems to be able to hold on to the office of the Ministry of Energy. It is an institution with only 432 employees and a budget of $69 million. In just 11 months of the Noboa government, the entity has had four ministers: two full ministers and two ministers in charge. They have had to deal not only with the intense drought and the problems of the electricity sector but also with political pressures within the presidency.
“Inexperience in crisis management and lack of transparency in communication on behalf of the government makes citizens hold Daniel Noboa responsible for the blackouts and all the erratic decisions that his government has taken,” the newspaper La Hora reported.
“Thegovernment’s actions to mitigate the energy and water crises seem to have arrived late,” the newspaper continued. “In September, Minister Arturo Felix Wong said that there would be no blackouts. Then, the former minister of Energy and Mines, Antonio Gonçalves, announced nighttime blackouts. Now, however, power outages are up to 14 hours a day and are occurring without any schedule.”
At the beginning of October, Gonçalves resigned from the Ministry of Energy. In his place, Noboa appointed Inés Manzano, minister of Environment, who made her debut by applying neoliberal measures that affect the population in the midst of the crisis. “This week is critical,” she stated, and announced the end of the electricity subsidy to the mining companies and ruled out renting a floating power plant despite the urgent necessity of solutions.
In this context, President Daniel Noboa public appearances have lessened, while internally his government has turned more chaotic. The events and tours to different parts of the country to deliver credits and inaugurate public works have diminished due to the new cycle of prolonged blackouts.
“This is a government that has become addicted to the digital conversation,” La Hora pointed out. “Its current narrative has generated a broad negative sentiment in social media, where President Noboa has been identified as ‘the one responsible for the crisis.’”
Daniel Naboa has only been in politics since 2021 before being gifted the presidency by his father, banana baron Álvaro Noboa, the richest person in Ecuador with assets over $1 billion, and the rest of the US-supported parasitic oligarchy.
A survey conducted by the agency Content Manager Ecuador revealed that, from 6:00 p.m. September 22 to 6:00 p.m. September 23, 2024 (local time), more than 27,000 posts on social media voiced a condemnation of the blackouts, including allusions to the president as the most responsible for the crisis.
The lack of solutions for businesses and the lack of information for provincial governments are another example of the administrative incapability of the ministers and the government. Meanwhile, the people are plunged into despair without immediate and lasting solutions, and without hope that the government will empathize with the reality of Ecuadorians.
Roadblocks Erected Throughout Bolivia in Protests Against Arce Government
October 23, 2024
Boulders placed on a road. Photo: De Raíz.
In Bolivia, the government of Luis Arce is confronted by the protests of peasants and workers, who are carrying out massive roadblocks. The pressure measure, which began five days ago, already affects four of the nine departments of the country and continues to expand.
The government’s strategy of containment and delegitimization of this mass action, a strategy that was led by the minister of the presidency, Marianela Prada, and the minister of government, Eduardo del Castillo, did not yield results. Both authorities took on the task of minimizing the scope of the protest, stating that it was only seeking to protect Evo Morales. Later, the government combined this line of communication with police repression that, for the moment, is limited and focused only on some of the blockades—those with fewer people, since it is very risky to do so where crowds have gathered.
The majority of the protesters are peasants; they have been joined by workers from various mining cooperatives and residents of low-income peri-urban neighborhoods. Their list of demands is related to the deterioration of the national economic situation, as they ask the government to control the prices of basic products, which have become more expensive in the last year, especially processed foods that come from outside the country. This inflationary effect originates in the shortage of dollars (imports are paid for with this currency), which doubled the exchange rate. If today, the official exchange rate is still seven bolivianos per US dollar, a parallel exchange market has emerged that sells them for up to 14 bolivianos per dollar. Too much difference.
Another pressing issue is the shortage of gasoline and diesel, which the state buys abroad at international prices, but sells in Bolivia at subsidized prices. This generates a growing fiscal expenditure that unbalances the national economy, and which Luis Arce could not resolve by gradually lifting this subsidy, as President Gustavo Petro did in Colombia. Arce chose to leave the decision to a popular consultation, which could not even be convened.
Added to this is the social defense of these sectors of Evo Morales, against whom eight criminal proceedings were initiated by order of President Arce. The peasant and popular protest supports him, calling the persecution to which he is being subjected unjust, because Evo has maintained himself for decades as a mass leader. This could be verified three weeks ago, when a march led by Morales arrived in the city of La Paz, the seat of government, gathering hundreds of thousands of people.
Curiously, after this march that validated his political stature, the government activated (or reactivated) the complaints, accompanying them with a sustained campaign, in the media and on social networks, to discredit the former president. However, apart from the media scandal, the government did not achieve any real judicial progress: an arrest warrant was announced that was later judicially annulled. It was said that there would be a migration alert so that Morales would not leave the country, but this was later denied, indicating that it was not viable. All of this ended up reinforcing the legal argument of Morales’ lawyers, who have described these criminal actions as “lawfare”: judicial persecution for political purposes.
For now, there is no sign of dialogue between the government and the peasants.
23 de abril #MarchaNacionalUniversitaria
