Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Sun Jan 26, 2025 1:26 pm

Accommodating Trump
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 01/26/2025

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Desperately and without the slightest subtlety, European countries, including Russia and Ukraine, are trying to adapt quickly to the new ecosystem and adapt their discourse to accommodate Donald Trump's positions and avoid offending the new president, whose erratic decisions are often guided by personal impressions and relationships and are susceptible to abrupt change. Denmark, which has unexpectedly found itself the first country whose territorial integrity is threatened by the new US administration, has tried to anticipate problems by offering the United States a greater presence in the desired territory of Greenland and more military access to the territory, where it already has a base. However, judging by the outcome of the first direct communication between the two governments, the offer has not been enough. The Financial Times describes a “horrible” call, with threats, as a “cold shower.” “Before, it was difficult to take him seriously. But I think he is serious and potentially very dangerous,” says one of the anonymous sources cited by the newspaper. Another adds that Denmark is already “in crisis mode.” In an attempt not to upset an ally, the Danish government has denied “the assessment of the call made by the anonymous sources.” Despite everything, the pressure on Denmark, a NATO ally, continues and Donald Trump has insisted that “in the end, the Danes will give in.”

The Danish action is a reflection of the steps being taken by both NATO and other European countries. Volodymyr Zelensky understood long ago that his speech had to be modified to introduce the idea of ​​a just peace , a construct that implies peace only if Ukraine achieves its maximalist objectives (unacceptable for Russia except in conditions of being militarily defeated), but which has been enough to convince Donald Trump that he seeks an end to the war. Just a few hours after the Ukrainian president mocked and seriously distorted the terms negotiated during the Istanbul process in 2022, the American leader again stated that “Zelensky is ready to negotiate an agreement. He would like to end this,” he said.

This week, Volodymyr Zelensky has been more explicit than usual in referring to the kind of diplomacy he expects from the White House. The Ukrainian president has insisted that he wants to achieve peace this year, but only if it is done “fairly,” which implies a series of concessions that Ukraine expects, not from its Russian enemy, but from its allies. ““Ending the war should be a victory for Trump, not Putin,” he told Bloomberg, adding that without strong and irreversible security guarantees from the United States and Europe, a ceasefire could allow Russia to rearm and renew its offensive. “The only question is what security guarantees and I honestly want to have understanding before the talks,” he said,” The Kyiv Independent wrote this week, citing the Ukrainian president’s interview with Bloomberg . Adding the obligatory phrase that he wants to achieve peace “this year,” Zelensky insisted that what matters is the terms that Ukraine can achieve in the negotiations, which, as the Ukrainian leader has insisted, must take place first with the United States, then with the European countries and finally with Russia.

Terms are also more important than speed for Russia. “I would like to understand what the US will base its move towards an agreement on,” Sergey Ryabkov said on Friday. Referring to the words of Keith Kellogg, who has given himself three months to achieve peace or negotiations – his terms have never been clear, which does not give much confidence in the existence of some kind of action plan to achieve the goal – the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation added that “if he is guided by the signals we have heard in recent days, it will not work in 100 days or more. If there is more realism in his policy, then perhaps a certain process will begin, the pace of which is also difficult to predict today.” Russia seems to be aware that there are no necessary bases for a diplomatic agreement between the two countries to be possible and also that Donald Trump’s knowledge of war is frankly limited. In just five days in office, the US president has given varying casualty figures and has embraced the failed strategy of sanctions to automatically force Russia to stop fighting. Bringing down the price of oil, as Trump claims, would require extreme action by OPEC, which would affect not only Russia but also the United States, risk destroying the economies of countries like Saudi Arabia and creating chaos in the global energy market.

Despite the threats, the rewriting of the war based on an imaginary script and the clear absence of a concrete idea on which to build a diplomatic process, Russia is also trying to get closer to Donald Trump. It does so through its president, who on Friday highlighted the good working relationship that both maintained during the time they were in power, and even adopting one of the current American leader's conspiracy theories. "I cannot disagree with him that if he had been President, if he had not been robbed of victory in 2020, perhaps the Ukraine crisis that arose in 2022 would not have occurred. Although it is known that Trump, during his first term as President, also imposed a significant number of restrictions, the most at that time, against Russia. I do not think that it was a decision that corresponded to the interests not only of Russia, but also of the United States itself," said Putin, who prefers not to remember that Trump's policy in his first term was exactly the same as that of Obama-Biden. Moreover, it was the Republican president who delivered Ukraine's first offensive weapons, the coveted Javelin anti-tank systems. In his negotiations with Russia, for which Trump sent the hawk Kurt Volker, then part of the John McCain Institute, the American position was also markedly similar to the times of Victoria Nuland.

The bad experience with Joe Biden, who simply refused to negotiate, and the Trumpist stance towards NATO make it more likely that Russia will be able to reach an agreement with Donald Trump than with his predecessor. The Republican administration, especially the one who will be the Deputy Secretary of Defense, does not see NATO as a tool for the expansion of democracy and Western values, something that is not a priority for the current White House, but as a guarantee that there will not be a counter-hegemonic bloc in Europe, that is, against the United States. Although European countries and the Democratic Party insist that the war is the expression of Russian imperialism, hungry for more territory, the positions of Moscow and kyiv show that it is not about land but about the security architecture. Obtaining entry into NATO or the continued presence of troops from the Alliance is the priority for kyiv, which considers this aspect more important than its territorial integrity. From the Russian perspective, stopping NATO expansion and obtaining a US commitment to Ukraine's neutrality has been the main goal since spring 2022. At that time, Russia was willing to give up virtually all territorial expansion gained since the invasion (with the exception of Donbass) in exchange for Ukrainian neutrality and security guarantees for both countries.

Russia’s willingness to negotiate on the basis of the Istanbul communiqué (albeit taking into account the current situation) points to the same objective. The perception, perhaps mistaken, that Donald Trump is more receptive to this argument is the main reason for the flattery of Donald Trump despite the threats of sanctions, manipulations about who refuses to negotiate - Zelensky has not revoked the decree that makes dialogue with Vladimir Putin illegal - or even the historical comment with which the American president accompanied his post ordering Russia to stop the war. Russia - not the Soviet Union - helped, according to Trump, the United States to win the Second World War and not the other way around, a comment that, under other conditions, would have been considered unacceptable to Moscow, but which, on this occasion, the Kremlin has preferred to ignore. Trump has also been forgiven for the words with which the American president has called the war “ridiculous”. Russia and Ukraine have also taken a similar stance on this, and Bankova has preferred to avoid commenting on Donald Trump's latest statement, which has placed part of the blame for the outbreak of the war on Zelensky and insisted that he is "no angel."

Not alienating Donald Trump now means accepting threats, putting up with offensive comments and even leaving the door open to concessions that are considered unacceptable as long as this means gaining a favourable opinion from the US president. For Ukraine, it all comes down to achieving de jure or de facto adhesion to the Western security architecture, while for Russia, the objective is exactly the opposite. Although to achieve this, Kiev and Moscow are opting for the same communication strategy, seeking accommodation, a path that NATO has also taken, which has shown an even more servile and desperate attitude, and has even offered to subsidise the US military industry in exchange for Washington continuing to provide Ukraine with weapons to continue the war.

Google Translator

******

From Cassad's telegram account:

Colonelcassad
On the topic of expectations of peace and negotiations, it is worth remembering that in the US, in Europe and here, many defense orders for the military-industrial complex are calculated until 2026-2027. It is under this time frame that the war is partially paid for. At the same time, given that defense lobbyists in the West have a much more serious influence on the state apparatus than in our country, it is the Western military-industrial complex that is primarily not interested in ending the war, since this promises a reduction in profits from the ongoing high-intensity military actions that are devouring huge resources that require systematic renewal. And first of all, this concerns the American military-industrial complex, which not only earns money, but also finally ties the European military-industrial complex to itself, which is not able to satisfy all requests on its own.

***

Colonelcassad

Night strikes on enemy targets

On the night of January 25-26, 2025, Russian troops launched a combined attack on key military, energy and logistics infrastructure facilities in Ukraine. Key targets in Vilkovo, Starokostiantyniv, Dnepropetrovsk and Sumy were hit , which impacts the enemy's operational capabilities.

— Vilkovo, Odessa region (23:40 25.01 – 02:15 26.01.2025)
As a result of the raid by 12 attack drones, the territory of the old port of Dunaysky was hit , where units of the 18th detachment of the Ukrainian Navy's marine guard and the 181st battalion of the 122nd territorial defense brigade were stationed .

The facility was also used as a base for the deployment of unmanned boats used by the enemy to attack Crimea and Black Sea Fleet facilities .

— Recorded damage:
• Four UAVs struck the administrative building of the naval guard headquarters - the facility was completely destroyed .
• Eight UAVs attacked the port infrastructure, damaging the berthing facilities , warehouses and maintenance hangars .

— The Danube ports are an important part of the logistics of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the supply of sabotage units carrying out attacks on Russian targets in the Black Sea.

— Starokostiantyniv, Khmelnytskyi region (02:10 - 02:40 01/26/2025) At least six hits on infrastructure facilities were recorded
on the territory of the Starokostiantyniv airfield , which is the base of the 7th Tactical Aviation Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces . The airfield is actively used for basing tactical aircraft, as well as for the combat use of GBU-39 SDB and AGM-88 HARM supplied by the West. — Confirmed damage: • Two barracks buildings housing aviation engineers and technical personnel were completely destroyed . • The airfield’s radio systems were disabled , including the AN/MPN-14K mobile control complex . • Taxiways and airfield lighting equipment were damaged, making it difficult to conduct night flights. — Dnepropetrovsk, Dnepropetrovsk region (23:15 01/25/2025) Strike on a nodal substation 330 kV Dneprovskaya caused serious damage to the facility, which caused interruptions in the power supply to the region.

— Consequences of the impact: • The TDTN-200000/330/110
autotransformer was completely destroyed , depressurization of the oil tank caused an oil leak and subsequent fire. • The 330 kV outdoor switchgear was disabled , including Siemens 3AP1 FG gas-insulated switches and TFZM-110 current transformers . • The 330 kV Dneprovskaya - Krivoy Rog and Dneprovskaya - Zaporozhye lines were de-energized , which led to disruptions in the operation of industrial facilities in the region. — The substation is a key hub for distributing electricity for the metallurgical and defense sectors of Ukraine. — Sumy, Sumy region (01:18 26.01.2025) The strike hit the Rovesnik training center , which was used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces as a training base for enemy units under the guidance of foreign instructors from Great Britain, France and Israel before being sent to the Kursk direction. — Confirmed damage: • The roof of the main educational building was destroyed. • The facade structures and interior of the building were damaged. — The facility was one of the key training centers for reserve units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. — As a result of the impact of electronic warfare systems , the Ukrainian attack drone lost control and crashed in the Druzhba park near the Sumy regional administration , damaging the building's glazing. @don_partizan

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

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Trump Raises Heat on Russia with Belligerent New Threats
Simplicius
Jan 24, 2025

<snip>

So with nothing major changing, and Ukraine’s collapse only accelerating, Ukraine needs some big internal change to have any hopes of surviving this year. And the only thing capable of producing that is of course mobilization of the 18-25 cohort.

Now there have been increasing reports about this happening soon:

This AP article notes that:

Ukraine is in the final stages of drafting recruitment reforms to attract 18- to 25-year-olds who are currently exempt from mobilization as it looks for ways to bolster its fighting force, the battlefield commander recently appointed to the President’s Office said.

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https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war- ... 047833756e

Ukrainian Rada member Roman Hryschuk complains that a new law has created a loophole to allow the mobilization of ‘previously exempted’ students and teachers:

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Students and teachers may begin to be mobilized as early as this summer, says Rada deputy

▪️MP Grishchuk stated that the new Cabinet of Ministers resolution leads to uncertainty in the position of teachers in the summer and the possibility of students being called up for service during the holidays.

▪️According to the document, students and postgraduates can receive a deferment for 1 semester, but not more than 6 months.

➖ "According to this resolution, the deferment is granted until the end of the academic year, that is, May-June. What then will happen to teachers in the summer months? The same risks apply to students themselves."

RVvoenkor


Meanwhile, Rada member Goncharenko reports even advanced NATO AD Iris-T technicians are being mobilized to the front, such is the manpower drought:

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This was followed by reports even a Lvov military band is being press-ganged:

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A new British Times piece summarizes all of these issues:

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https://www.thetimes.com/article/dee8f4 ... 4c673ed4ed

It notes:

More US weapons would be welcome in Kyiv, which has complained about the West’s grudging approach to military aid. However, that promise is accompanied by a US demand that Ukraine extend conscription to include men aged 18 to 25. For President Zelensky that would cross a red line. He has protected his country’s youngest men from a conflict that is draining its limited manpower. Draft dodging is rife as war-weariness takes hold. Extending the call-up could be politically fatal.

As a further demonstration of Ukraine’s loss disparity, another exchange of dead bodies has occurred with a reported 49 Russian bodies to a jaw-dropping 757 Ukrainian ones:

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You’ll recall I previously deep-dived these exchange reports here, proving they are real and even recorded in Ukrainian sources.

Last time the ratio ended up at:

Russian losses: 331
Ukrainian losses: 2,790
Ratio: 8.43 to 1


With the new numbers, we are at:

Russian losses: 380
Ukrainian losses: 3,547
Ratio: 9.34 to 1


That’s almost a 10:1 kill ratio.

This is interesting given the new NYT article:

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https://archive.ph/9ARej

Which reveals:

Calculating the scale of the casualties, and therefore the war’s trajectory, is difficult: The information is a state secret in both countries. The Ukrainian government has been especially secretive, restricting access to demographic data that could be used to estimate its losses.

Western intelligence agencies have been reluctant to disclose their internal calculations of Ukrainian casualties for fear of undermining an ally. American officials have previously said that Kyiv withholds this information from even the closest allies.


The most hilarious part of the article states that Russia is suffering higher losses than Ukraine, but the gap in manpower between the two continues to rise, with Ukraine “only having 250,000 men on the frontline”, and Russia 400,000+. How can the side which is taking much higher losses possibly be pushing the manpower gap further in its favor? Well, according to the Times’ sophistic calculations it merely comes down to Russia’s higher recruiting power—sure. If Ukraine was winning and morale was high, it wouldn’t be suffering a recruitment crisis. But Ukraine is losing—why? Because it’s taking far higher losses; logic prevails.

<snip>

A last important article alarmingly laments that Kiev has lost its major drone advantage:

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https://www.yahoo.com/news/trump-assume ... 47097.html

It says Russia has been jamming their drones with increasing effectiveness. What’s interesting about that is how it ties into the recent screed penned by a Ukrainian officer, which lambasts Ukraine’s fatal over-reliance on drone tech, and how it has gradually eroded the importance and value of regular grunt infantry, which are now treated as second class soldiers:

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(More at link.)

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/tru ... ussia-with

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Twenty years on… how the U.S.-backed Orange Revolution set Ukraine on the path to war with Russia

January 24, 2025

The resource of history is there to help resolve the Ukrainian conflict. Are Trump and his aides prepared to learn and act accordingly?

U.S. President Donald Trump was inaugurated this week for a second non-consecutive term in the White House, and among a whirlwind of executive orders, he highlighted that ending the conflict in Ukraine would be a priority for his administration.

He may not achieve a resolution within 24 hours as he had promised during his election campaign, but he is showing a welcome preparedness to try.

Fair play to Trump. At least, he is willing to engage diplomatically with Russia – unlike his predecessor, Joe Biden, and Democrat presidential contender Kamala Harris. The Biden administration recklessly escalated the war in Ukraine to the point where a disastrous nuclear confrontation with Russia was greatly at risk. Unlike the Washington establishment, Trump is not encumbered with an insulting attitude toward Russian President Vladimir Putin or the Russian people.

However, if Trump is serious about ending the three-year war in Ukraine, then his administration will need to show an understanding of the roots of the conflict. Admittedly, such an understanding might be a big ask given the type of hawkish figures in Trump’s cabinet and the abundance of historically illiterate Russophobes in Washington.

This week marked another presidential inauguration. Twenty years ago, on January 23, 2005, Viktor Yushchenko became president of Ukraine on the back of the U.S.-sponsored Orange Revolution. This article by Odessa-born journalist Petr Lavrenin provides a detailed overview of the events and sinister consequences. Consequences that led to the present conflict in Ukraine and the potentially catastrophic tensions between the United States and Russia.

That Ukrainian election two decades ago was just one of several so-called color revolutions in the former Soviet Union countries where U.S. finance and intelligence were deployed covertly to win elections for pro-Western parties, thereby making trouble for neighboring Russia.

Ukraine was always a prized target for U.S. imperialism to turn it into a cat’s paw against Russia, as Cold War strategists like Zbigniew Brzezinski had keenly recommended.

The forerunner of events in Ukraine was the Rose Revolution in 2003 in Georgia. The Western-backed candidate Mikhail Saakashvili won power and immediately oriented the former Soviet republic towards the European Union and NATO. That color revolution is still playing out today where Western-backed opposition parties are contesting the election of the Georgian Dream party at the end of last year, whose victory was based on a platform of seeking friendlier relations with Russia.

In a similar pattern of foreign interference, the Ukrainian presidential election in 2004 was won by pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovich. The result was thrown into controversy by the U.S.-backed Orange Revolution mobilized to support rival Viktor Yushchenko. Purportedly, civic society groups financed by U.S. American International Development (USAID, a well-known front for CIA funding) and billionaire pro-Western investor George Soros pitched tents and occupied government buildings in Kiev until the Western-backed candidate Yushchenko won the day through public disturbances and a subsequent election run-off. There is a clear echo of the tactics in Georgia today to overturn the election of the Dream party.

As Lavrenin’s article makes clear, the inauguration of Yushchenko was a fateful turning point for Ukraine. The new president emerged to be something of an imposter, implementing controversial policies that were divisive and inflammatory. The former central banker promptly turned the country into an enemy of Russia. He shed his previous image of a moderate and unifier to embark on policies of polarizing and alienating large sections of Ukrainian society. (Echoes of incumbent expired president Zelensky who reneged on his peace campaign after his election in 2019.)

With Yushchenko’s dubious rise to power, there then followed a years-long program of repressing Russian culture and language, glorifying Nazi collaborators, and orientating Ukraine for NATO and EU membership.

Yushchenko’s policies caused his popularity to plummet. He eventually lost the presidential election in 2010 to his former rival Viktor Yanukovich.

However, the radical nationalist politics, rehabilitation of Nazi elements and Russophobia that Yushchenko had unleashed would surge again in 2014 in the guise of the Maidan Revolution to violently overthrow the Yanukovich government. Yanukovich had slowed the dynamic towards NATO and EU membership and sought a more balanced relationship with Moscow.

The 2014 CIA-backed coup brought to power Petro Poroshenko (a former member of the Yushchenko government) and subsequently the former comedian Vladimir Zelensky. Poroshenko and Zelensky reinforced the policies of suppressing Russian cultural identity and turning the country into a NeoNazi staging post for NATO hostility towards Russia. The hostility buried peace initiatives like the Minsk Accords that Moscow had endorsed in 2014 and 2015.

The path to proxy war against Russia can be traced back to the Orange Revolution that the CIA had engineered in 2004, resulting in the inauguration of Viktor Yushchenko 20 years ago this week.

As Lavrenin writes: “By the time of the 2010 presidential election, Ukraine was deeply divided on cultural, linguistic, and national issues. A ticking time bomb had been set into motion back in 2004 when Yushchenko’s team chose to support radical nationalists and Neo-Nazis. This strategy granted him a tactical victory but ultimately led the country to a strategic defeat.”

One would think that President Trump should have an open mind about the nefarious interference in elections by the U.S. intelligence apparatus and Washington’s deep-state forces. After all, he has repeatedly complained that his own election campaigns in 2016, 2020 and 2024 were actively opposed by deep-state enemies. If these forces are capable of sabotaging U.S. elections, what more would they do in foreign nations?

This week, Trump also said he would release all classified state papers related to the assassinations of President John F Kennedy in 1963, the latter’s brother and former presidential candidate Robert F Kennedy, and civil rights campaigner Martin Luther King, both in 1968. The implication is that Trump is aware that U.S. deep-state actors were involved in these killings.

Thus, Trump seems to have an open mind about the sinister culpability of the U.S. political establishment in foreign and domestic matters.

If he genuinely wants to resolve the conflict in Ukraine and create a lasting peace with Russia, then Trump and the best of his advisors can study the documented history leading up to the war. He might then appreciate that Russia’s criticism of NATO expansionism and its destabilization of Ukraine is entirely valid and must be remedied.

For a robust peace to succeed, it must be based on an equally robust premise of justice, honesty, and respect.

Trump can also avail of independent-minded diplomats like former U.S. ambassadors Jack Matlock and Chas Freeman and scholars like Professor John Mearsheimer, among others, who all deplored the baleful policy of NATO expansionism in general and through Ukraine in particular as a recipe for conflict with Russia.

The resource of history is there to help resolve this and other conflicts. The question is: are Trump and his aides prepared to learn and act accordingly?

In the coming months, it will become clear if Trump can assert a more diplomatic policy for peace with Russia or if he is just another tool of American imperialism that is irrevocably wired for war against Russia – and any other perceived rival.

https://strategic-culture.su/news/2025/ ... th-russia/

Mr Trump didn't go to Washington to learn. He already knows it all, summed up as 'America 1st'. Trainwreck commin'...

******

Brief report from the front, January 25, 2025

The enemy cannot contain the advance of the Russian Armed Forces even with the involvement of reserves. Report by Marat Khairullin with illustrations by Mikhail Popov.
Zinderneuf
Jan 25, 2025

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ЛБС 10.11.24=Line of Combat Contact November 10th, 2024. ЛБС 01.01.25=Line of Combat Contact January 1st, 2025. Участок Продвижения=Area of Advancement.

Russian troops continue to expand the territory of the bridgehead on the right bank of the Oskol River. After the liberation of the settlement of Zapadnoe, assault detachments of the Russian Armed Forces began to advance in the direction of the settlement of Kutkovka, having secured a position north of the P79 highway, which runs from the settlement of Dvurechnaya (Dvorichna) to Kupyansk and further to Borovaya (Borova) and Izyum. There are reports that movement is also going in the direction of the settlement of Doroshovka. Our military is advancing despite stubborn resistance from the enemy, who has transferred reserves from the Sumy region to the area.

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ЛБС 16.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 16th, 2025. Зона Продвижения=Zone of advancement.

In the Pokrovsk area, units of the Russian Armed Forces are attempting to gain a foothold in the area of ​​road N32 (Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka) east of the interchange. In order to delay the advance from our side, the enemy blew up the overpass, thus creating rubble. On the other hand, this indicates that he could no longer use it as a protected position due to the proximity of combat clashes.

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ЛБС 15.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 15th, 2025. Зона Активности=Zone of activity.

On the left flank of the Pokrovsk area, after securing the territory of the agricultural farm and ventilation shaft in the area of ​​the settlement of Kotlino (Kotlyne), the fighters of our units began to probe the enemy's defense, conducting attacks not only in the direction of the Pokrovskaya mine, but also in the direction of the E 50 highway (Pavlograd-Pokrovsk, colored in Pink).

In the settlement of Udachnoe, the enemy is gradually being pushed through the territory of the settlement from the east. At the same time, our forces are trying to bypass it, expanding the control zone south of the road in order to exert pressure on the enemy in Udachnoe on the largest possible area, stretching out its forces.

In the Novoandreevka area (the southern part of which was already under our control), assault troops advanced along the ravine north of it and, putting pressure on the enemy from two sides simultaneously, drove them out of the settlement. Active clashes are taking place in the vicinity of the neighboring settlement of Srebnoe (Sribne). West of Petropavlovka, our units continue to move towards the Pokrovsk-Andreevka road, attacking the enemy dug in at their strong points.

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ЛБС 31.10.2024=Line of Combat Contact October 31st, 2024. ЛБС 30.11.2024=Line of Combat Contact November 30th, 2024. ЛБС 01.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 1st, 2025. Зона Продвижения=Zone of advancement.

The Kurakhovsky pocket continues to shrink. Our armed forces have entered the settlement of Dachnoe and are advancing in its northern part. At the same time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are under strong pressure from the east and southeast. The enemy is being pushed back further and further in the southern part of the pocket (north of the settlement of Sukhie Yaly), where our forces have already consolidated their positions along the ravine that runs west of the settling ponds. The enemy has a strip of land in the fields that is open to fire from our side.

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ЛБС 20.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 20th, 2025. Участок Продвижения=Area of Advancement.

In Velikaya Novosyolka (Velikaya Novosyolka), its southern part came under the control of our units. The fighters installed a flag in the hospital area not far from the bridge (or rather the crossing over its remains). In the central part of the village, the area around the school and stadium has been cleared of the enemy. The fighting has shifted to the Mokrye Yaly River and to the northwest of the settlement. At the same time, the enemy was driven completely out of the area of Velikaya Novosyolka north of the Kashlagach River.

https://maratkhairullin.substack.com/p/ ... anuary-6d9

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Aleksandro-Kalinovskoe direction: advance of the Russian Armed Forces in Dzerzhinsk and fighting in Shcherbinovka
January 25, 2025
Rybar

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In the Aleksandro-Kalinovsky direction, Russian troops continue to destroy pockets of resistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Dzerzhinsk. At the moment, battles are being fought for control over the Toretskaya mine , which is already half controlled by the Russian Armed Forces.

Also during the week, evidence was received confirming significant success in the village of Krymskoye , located near the mine and closely adjacent to the development of Dzerzhinsk . In fact, the enemy remained to be driven out of only a few streets of the village.

In the western part of the city, the Russian Armed Forces have completely occupied the Khimkolonka microdistrict , but the waste heaps are still partially under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In neighboring Shcherbinovka, the assault forces are gradually expanding their control zone in the northern direction.

At the same time, the civilian population of Gorlovka suffers greatly from enemy shelling and drone strikes . The enemy constantly attacks buses and cars of civilians, and as the complete liberation of Dzerzhinsk approaches, the intensity of artillery shelling increases.

https://rybar.ru/aleksandro-kalinovskoe ... erbinovke/

Liman direction: successes in the Makeyevka area and repelling attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Ivanovka
January 25, 2025
Rybar

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In the Liman direction, in the last two weeks, Russian troops have managed to expand the bridgehead on the right bank of the Zherebets River in the Makeyevka area, occupying a forest belt on the approaches to the dominant height 185.3 and driving the enemy out of the fortified area to the north.

In Terny, fighting is taking place on the southern outskirts, where the Ukrainian Armed Forces are using armored vehicles to shell Russian positions. Russian troops continue to attack in the direction of Kolodezi from Ivanovka on the right bank of the Zherebets .

In this area, the Russian Armed Forces have recently managed to advance several kilometers in a westerly direction, repelling at least four attacks by Ukrainian forces in the direction of Ivanovka .

In the Serebryanskoye forestry, Russian troops some time ago occupied several strongholds west of Dibrova - this is evidenced by published footage from the scene.

https://rybar.ru/limanskoe-napravlenie- ... ivanovkoj/

Google Translator

*****

First F-16 spotted on the front
January 25, 21:02

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F-16s fly in the Zaporizhia direction

Last week, two flights of F-16 fighters were recorded in the south of the Ukrainian-occupied territory of Zaporizhia Oblast. The planes flew in the direction of Polohivskyi district, turned around and flew back.

The exact takeoff area is unknown. However, there are only a few airfields capable of accommodating F-16s. Most likely, the route was as follows: the F-16s flew in advance from Poland to an airfield in Ivano-Frankivsk or Lutsk.

From there, they could have moved to Ozerny in Zhytomyr Oblast or Vasylkiv in Kyiv Oblast. Vasylkiv, by the way, is one of the first airfields modernized for American aircraft.

From there, they could easily fly to Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts, practice flight routes, the use of several jump bases and simulated strikes on Russian cities.

Until now, F-16s were rarely seen in eastern Ukraine. Previously, they were regularly recorded in Western Ukraine, occasionally flying into the Mirgorod area. Last week, they were operating in Zaporizhia.

And, most likely, these were training flights to practice the scenario of their use in combat. Since the transfer of the fighters, they have not been used for their intended purpose. And now the question is: why did they appear now?

https://t.me/rusich_army - zinc

The recent strikes on Vasilkov are, among other things, a hunt for F-16s, but so far only 1 Polish MiG-29 has been caught there (the machine received significant damage)

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9632223.html

On marksmanship training for combating UAVs
January 25, 19:15

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On marksmanship training for combating UAVs

Our fighters were visited by the champion of Russia, master of sports in practical rifle shooting - Anna Taranosova ( https://t.me/saiganarus)!

(Videos at link.)

Despite the workload of our guys, we allocated time for them to practice shooting and develop skills in working with a 12-gauge shotgun. The guys from the squads "Timso ( https://t.me/SpNAhmatTimso) ", "Aid ( https://t.me/iamsniper) ", "Taliban ( https://t.me/+SKcdZxpPoZozOGIy) " of the Russian Guard, related units of the Ministry of Defense worked.

These skills will be useful not only during combat missions, but also in the fight against FPV drones, which are becoming more common on the battlefield.

Working with a drone requires quick reaction and accuracy, and the ability to shoot a gun significantly increases the chances of success. Organizer of training "Lynya ( https://t.me/Lunay14) "

https://t.me/SpNAhmatTimso/53 - zinc


1. Firstly, we immediately see a healthy athlete, not a neutral lover of white flags. Appreciate athletes with a civic position.

2. Secondly, training personnel to shoot at drones seems to be a more promising form of training an infantryman than recommendations to play "naval figure freeze" in the expectation that the drone operator will not notice the fighter.

3. Of course, this requires not only additional marksmanship training, but also an increase in the supply of 12-gauge rifles to the army, which is objectively lacking.

4. Of course, it is best when there is working electronic warfare, but electronic warfare is not always available, and with the development of fiber-optic drones (and in the future with machine vision), electronic warfare will not be able to protect a soldier in any way - only himself and his comrades.

5. It is also necessary to think through the tactics of small air defense and mobile air defense groups. Because shooting at drones increases the chances of survival, but does not look like a full-fledged solution to the existing problem of insufficient tactical air defense in the fight against small drones.

https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152425 - zinc

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9631815.html

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Mon Jan 27, 2025 12:40 pm

Trumpism's first decisions
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 01/27/2025

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“Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Friday halted spending on most existing foreign aid grants for 90 days. The order, which surprised State Department officials, appears to apply to funding for military aid to Ukraine,” Politico said in an article on Saturday that gave rise to all kinds of speculation about what kind of assistance was to be halted and the practical implications of this new policy. The order from the new head of US diplomacy responds to the beginning of a phase of study of these costs abroad to assess which of these causes and actions are in line with the new America First foreign policy adopted by the White House. “According to the document to which Politico has had access , Rubio’s directive, issued to all diplomatic and consular posts, requires department officials to issue “stop-work orders” on almost all “existing foreign aid grants.” Its entry into force is immediate,” the media specified. The outcome of the review, with the cancellation and resumption of certain programs, will be as decisive in understanding the intentions of Donald Trump's foreign policy team as the names he has put forward to manage it.

According to Politico , which provides information that has not been refuted or denied by other media, there are two exceptions to the order to stop foreign spending: Israel and Egypt, two very important countries for the US projection in the Middle East and that will not see their military assistance limited or called into question. In the case of Israel, it is also representative that Donald Trump has lifted the pause on the supply of 2,000-pound bombs, the only weapon whose delivery had been temporarily suspended by Joe Biden in the framework of the war of annihilation and absolute destruction of Gaza. The announcement of these exceptions and the clearly preferential treatment of these two countries, especially Israel, demonstrates US priorities and the hierarchy of interests shown by the new administration. Despite its attempt to match Israel both in the militarization of society and in its relationship with the United States, Ukraine has not managed in these almost three years of Russo-Ukrainian war to raise its importance for Washington in such a way that it is perceived as a priority allied country whose assistance cannot be questioned.

“The new directive means that no new steps will be taken to disperse aid funding to programs already approved by the US government, according to three current and two former officials familiar with the new directive,” Politico added , insisting that the order goes beyond the presidential decree that provided for halting new grants, although it left open the possibility of stopping aid based on previously appropriated funds. That would be the most dangerous scenario for Ukraine, since the previous administration had sought to protect Kiev from a possible suspension of new aid by committing existing funds to ensure that they were available and thus ensure that funding would continue for at least a few months regardless of a possible policy change by Donald Trump. Fears that Trump might “abandon Ukraine” had caused European countries and the Biden administration to look for a way to “Trump-proof” aid to Kiev, something that would be in question if Politico’s suggestion came to pass.

However, even in the document reviewed by the American media there are nuances and room for interpretation and “it provides for some exceptions. It specifies that foreign military funding for Egypt and Israel will continue and allows for emergency food aid and “legitimate expenses incurred before the date of this” guidance “under existing awards.” At some points, it also says that decisions must be “consistent with the terms of the relevant award.” “A current State Department official, as well as two former Biden administration officials, said the pause appears to halt aid to key allies such as Ukraine, Jordan and Taiwan,” the media warned.

This is the part of the information that was quickly questioned. There is no doubt that the Trump administration hopes to cut spending on foreign assistance, not only to limit costs, but with a strong ideological component of favoring certain causes over others. However, practically from the moment the Politico article was published , other sources contradicted the terms, especially in the case of Ukraine. The fastest outlet was Voice of America on its Ukrainian-language service. Ostap Yarysh, the outlet’s Pentagon correspondent, stated that “several sources tell me that it is about the FMF (Foreign Military Financing) program. Last year, Congress pledged $1.6 billion for it and these funds were exhausted in May. The pause does not yet apply to the other two programs: PDA and USAI.” According to this version, only one of the three assistance programs to Ukraine would have been suspended, specifically the one whose funds had already been exhausted.

However, the publication of articles about the concern over the funding for Ukraine continues, and yesterday the Financial Times wrote that “US officials are pushing to remove Ukraine from Rubio’s list of frozen funds.” “We do not yet know whether this request will be approved in whole or in part, but for the moment there are positive signs from Washington,” USAID says, according to the newspaper. The aim is to continue all assistance to Ukraine, which currently depends on foreign subsidies to support its army, but also to feed part of its population. The war takes up more than half of the Ukrainian budget, which is unviable without foreign contributions, and which significantly limits the State’s capacity to pay salaries and pensions and alleviate the extreme poverty that the military scenario implies, with part of the population internally displaced.

At his press conference with Moldovan President Maia Sandu, Zelensky sought to put an end to speculation and confirmed that military aid is still flowing. “As for aid restrictions, I am not ready to give details for now,” he said, adding that “I know that there are some 90-day restrictions on humanitarian programs and we have to examine the details. I am focusing on military assistance, which, thank God, has not been suspended.” According to Reuters , humanitarian aid to Ukraine is confirmed to be one of the items that has indeed been suspended, prompting a reaction from USAID officials.

Despite the uncertainty, all the data indicate that the United States has suspended only part of its aid to Ukraine for three months, including that which helps the most vulnerable population suffering from the ravages of war to survive. However, military aid does not seem to have been suspended, which guarantees that, despite the obvious difficulties it is experiencing, Ukraine can continue to defend itself on the front. Donald Trump's ability to implement his plan to achieve peace by force depends on this funding , an idea that requires more pressure on Russia - through the continuation of the military scenario and also the economic war - and to guarantee that Ukraine maintains its military position. Even so, the suspension of part of the humanitarian aid and the doubts about the continuation of military assistance must be understood, above all, as a tool to put pressure on European countries, on which Donald Trump has insisted that the economic burden of the war and the assistance and acceptance of refugees and migrants must fall. Plans for how the Trump administration intends to achieve its goal of stopping the war remain unclear, but it is clear that the United States is seeking to reduce the costs of its indirect involvement in the conflict and funding of aid. This involves leaving the bulk of the cost of the war, state maintenance and reconstruction once the conflict is over in the hands of the European powers, which already seem to have resigned themselves to footing the bill for the change in the US administration's stance.

https://slavyangrad.es/2025/01/27/31439/

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From Cassad's Telegram account:

Colonelcassad
Kursk Bulge 2.0. - why the Fearless call the battles that are currently taking place in the Sudzhan border area

so To carry out the operation on the Kursk Bulge, the Germans concentrated a group of up to 50 divisions, which received the latest weapons. The fascists and their military equipment were destroyed by the grandfathers and great-grandfathers of the Fearless, who are defending their homeland in the Sudzhan border area today.

In the 21st century, the neo-Nazis who seized power in Kiev also abandoned their elite units, armed with Western equipment, to die on Russian soil. They were pushed to do this by Western politicians, whose ancestors were notorious Nazis.

Fritz von Scholz served in the ranks of the SS Viking Division.
Waldemar Baerbock studied the works of Hitler and was an "unconditional Nazi .
Mykhailo Khomyak (grandfather of the former head of the Canadian Foreign Ministry in 2024, H. Freeland) was a Ukrainian collaborator.
Mykhailo Duda is a Ukrainian nationalist who joined the OUN at the age of 16.

However, the GV "North", like our ancestors almost 80 years ago, not only prevented the enemy from breaking through deep into the country, but also repeated the feat of their grandfathers, grinding down the elite forces of neo-Nazis. During

the "Kursk adventure", the following lost their combat capability:
- units of the Ukrainian special forces, including those disguised as RDCs;
- battalions from the 80th, 82nd, 92nd and 95th assault and dozens of mechanized brigades, as well as territorial defense forces;
- detachments of foreign mercenaries from Colombia, France, Poland and English-speaking countries.

We also took the time to calculate the total losses of the enemy at the moment:
- over 55,000 people;
- 4,757 units of equipment, including :
▪️tanks - 293;
▪️BMP-226;
▪️BTR – 189;
▪️BBM - 1527;
▪️MLRS and field artillery guns – 401;
▪️Mortars – 389;
▪️vehicles - more than 1557.

Today, all the expanses of the Sudzhan border are simply strewn with military equipment destroyed by the Northerners. Our specialists do not have time to pull out the "Leopards" and "Abrams" from the battlefield so that domestic engineers could thoroughly study their structure, and the residents of Russia could see them at various exhibitions of captured equipment.

As a result of the defeat of the Wehrmacht forces on the Kursk Bulge, more favorable conditions were created for confronting Nazi Germany in other parts of the front.

Like our ancestors, the Fearless pulled back the enemy's elite, facilitating the liberation of Donbass and preventing provocations in the southern parts of the front.

Today, the maddened Zelensky and his retinue blame the failures on Ukrainian colonels and generals, who are transferred from one position to another almost every month.

During the Great Patriotic War, G.K. Zhukov wrote the following about what was happening in Germany after the Battle of Kursk:

"Irritated by the failures and extremely large losses, Hitler, as he always did in such cases, shifted all the blame for the failure of the offensive operation "Citadel" (in German historiography - the Battle of Kursk) onto the heads of his field marshals and generals. He removed them from their posts, replacing them, in his opinion, with more capable ones ..."

In an atmosphere of secrecy, the Supreme Command Headquarters, even during the offensive operations of the Battle of Kursk, issued Directive No. 30168 of 16.8.43 on the offensive of the Central Front in the general direction of Konotop, Nizhyn, Kiev.

The victory on the Kursk Bulge and the subsequent strategic offensive according to the plan of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943 marked the completion of a radical turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

It is too early to sum up the results of the Battle of Kursk 2.0. However, the Fearless Warriors of the North will undoubtedly do everything in their power to repeat the feat of their ancestors, and the invasion of the Sudzhan borderland, as during the Great Patriotic War, became the beginning of the end of the neo-Nazi regime.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

***

Colonelcassad
📍Summary of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation (as of January 27, 2025)

— Units of the North group of forces in the Kharkov direction inflicted defeat on the formations of the motorized infantry brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the territorial defence brigade in the areas of the settlements of Velyki Prokhody and Vovchansk in the Kharkov region.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine lost up to 15 servicemen, three field artillery guns and an ammunition depot .

— Units of the West group of forces improved their tactical situation. They inflicted defeat on the manpower and equipment of three mechanized, assault brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and a territorial defence brigade in the areas of the settlements of Redkodub, Kutkovka, Kupyansk, Zagoruykovka, Glushkovka, Boguslavka, Zeleny Gai, Kopanki in the Kharkov region, Kolodezi and Yampol in the Donetsk People's Republic.

The enemy's losses amounted to 355 servicemen, seven pickups and five field artillery guns. Three ammunition depots were destroyed.

— Units of the "Southern" group of forces occupied more advantageous lines and positions. They defeated formations of three mechanized, assault, airmobile brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and two territorial defense brigades in the areas of the settlements of Seversk, Vasyukovka, Orekhovo-Vasilevka, Chasov Yar, Konstantinovka, Dachnoye and Ulakly of the Donetsk People's Republic.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine lost up to 250 servicemen, an infantry fighting vehicle , two cars and two field artillery guns. Two ammunition depots were destroyed . — Units of the "Center" group of forces continued to advance into the depths of the enemy's defense. Defeated the manpower and equipment of five mechanized, motorized infantry, and Jaeger brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, two National Guard brigades, and a National Police brigade of Ukraine in the areas of the settlements of Dzerzhinsk, Baranovka, Shevchenko, Slavyanka, Yasenovoe, Novoelizavetovka, and Andreyevka of the Donetsk People's Republic. The enemy lost up to 610 servicemen, four combat armored vehicles, seven cars, and six field artillery guns. — As a result of decisive actions by units of the "East" group of forces, the settlement of Velyka Novosyolka of the Donetsk People's Republic was liberated . Defeated were the formations of the tank, mechanized brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the National Guard brigade in the areas of the settlements of Bogatyr and Vremyevka of the Donetsk People's Republic. The enemy's losses amounted to over 160 servicemen,
tank , four vehicles and four field artillery pieces, including a Polish-made 155mm self-propelled artillery unit "Krab" .

— Units of the "Dnepr" force grouping inflicted losses on the manpower and equipment of two coastal defense brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and a territorial defense brigade in the areas of the populated areas of Prydniprovske and Antonovka in the Kherson region.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 35 servicemen, four vehicles and an ammunition depot.

— Operational-tactical aviation , strike unmanned aerial vehicles , missile troops and artillery of the Russian Armed Forces force groupings inflicted losses on the infrastructure of military airfields, production workshops and storage depots for unmanned aerial vehicles, a Ukrainian Armed Forces fuel base, as well as concentrations of enemy manpower and equipment in 149 areas.

— Air defense systems shot down four US-made HIMARS multiple launch rockets and 64 aircraft-type unmanned aerial vehicles.

Since the start of the special military operation, the following have been destroyed: 652 aircraft, 283 helicopters, 41,571 unmanned aerial vehicles, 590 anti-aircraft missile systems, 20,858 tanks and other armored combat vehicles, 1,510 multiple launch rocket system combat vehicles, 21,010 field artillery pieces and mortars, and 30,830 special military vehicles.



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Reality hits home: “Ukraine is running out of Ukrainians,” says US Secretary of State
By Eugene Doyle
Jan 25, 2025

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Back at the very start of the war retired US Ambassador Chas Freeman, an eloquent critic of many aspects of his government’s international conduct, warned that the US was prepared “to fight to the last Ukrainian”. Some want to prove him right. Others want to save the remaining young men of Ukraine.

The US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz suggested this week that Ukraine isn’t trying hard enough. The Trump administration continues the Biden administration’s pressure campaign to get Ukraine to drop the conscription age to 18. Despite finally admitting that the Russians can’t be beaten, they want to send younger and younger men to the slaughter. Why?

“If the Ukrainians have asked the entire world to be all-in for democracy, we need them to be all-in for democracy. We need to see these manpower shortages addressed,” says Waltz.

In other words, the Americans want the Ukrainians to literally put more skin in the game – skin that is currently attached to the bodies of a couple of hundred thousand Ukrainian youths whom the US want drafted, quickly trained and thrown at the battle-hardened, better-equipped Russians.

Waltz told Fox last week, “They have real manpower issues. Their draft age is 25 years old, not 18. I don’t think a lot of people know that. They could generate hundreds of thousands of new soldiers.”

Right. There’s the problem: the Ukrainians just haven’t been trying hard enough. More skin, please, More blood, please. More guts. No one can definitively say what the total number of dead and injured is on the Ukrainian side – some estimates say it is approaching 1 million. Tens of thousands are hobbling around minus limbs thanks to landmines. Which would help explain why the average age of a Ukrainian soldier is now 42 years old and why the US has been pressuring Ukraine for months to drop the draft age.

In an interview with Ukrainian news outlet TSN on January 19, General Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of Ukrainian forces, said that current mobilisation efforts were insufficient to meet the needs of the Armed Forces. The air force had even been depleted to fill frontline infantry positions. The problem is Ukraine is running out of willing recruits; a majority of the population want peace now. According to US Gallup polling more than half want their government to open negotiations. This is a dramatic reversal from two years ago when 75% of Ukrainians in the west of the country thought fighting should continue.

Armchair Putin-haters in the West are baying for more Ukrainians to hit the frontlines but such a move is hugely unpopular in Ukraine. Mothers have seen enough of war to know what fate awaits their sons, some fresh from school, who would be given rudimentary training and then rushed to the front line. Even Western media outlets, like Deutsche Welle, are showing footage of parents, sisters and older friends fighting conscription gangs who are manhandling unwilling young men into vans.

I saw footage last week of parents seeing their 17-year-olds onto trains to get them out of Ukraine before they hit 18 – the current age at which males are no longer legally allowed abroad. Since the war broke out millions of Ukrainians – perhaps 10 million – have fled the country, most will likely never return. A recently published CIA report stated that Ukraine has the highest mortality rate and the lowest birth rate in the world. Mental health is also a cause for serious concern in any war zone.

To rebuild in the longterm Ukraine needs births, and that requires healthy young men and women. The United Nations Population Fund made clear in a recent report that recovery for Ukraine hinges on peace. It said there is an urgent need for comprehensive recovery strategies focused on human capital and socioeconomic reform.

Staring down the barrel of another lost proxy war the Pentagon and the mainstream media are flailing to cobble together a narrative that will be swallowed by the populations of the West who were told, “That man Putin cannot stay in power” and “The Russians must be driven out of Ukraine”. This from Time Magazine earlier this month:

“But in rallying the world to the fight, the implication Biden embedded in his own goals was that defending Ukraine against Russia is not the same as defeating Russia. So it is not surprising if that goal remains far from Zelensky’s reach.”

Did that make sense to you? Verily, the new narrative is still a work in progress. And while the scribes workshop narratives young men are sent to die – for no valid reason whatsoever. Each passing day without peace will see more territory slip into Russian hands and, given the enormous sacrifice in blood and treasure that Russia has paid to end NATO expansion and protect ethnic Russians in the east, that territory will be off the table in any eventual negotiations.

Incoming Secretary of State Marco Rubio struck a much more realistic tone in a recent hearing in Washington: “I think it should be the official position of the United States that this war should be brought to an end. The truth of the matter is there is no way Russia takes all of Ukraine and there is no way that Ukraine will push [Russia] back to where they were on the eve of the invasion, given the size dynamic.

“The problem Ukraine is facing is not that they are running out of money – they are running out of Ukrainians.”

The US position on Ukraine shifted some months ago from “victory” to putting it in the strongest possible negotiating position with Russia. Both sides need ‘leverage’ so, according to US strategy, doomed gambits like the Kursk incursion or driving increasingly young men into uniform are necessary for Ukraine to have ‘leverage’.

The very real danger is that the red-line positions of the different sides – US, EU, Russia and Ukraine – may be incompatible with each other and the outcome then has to remain in the hands of the warriors rather than the diplomats. That will spell demographic disaster for whatever is left of Ukraine.

Russia will not accept NATO membership for Ukraine, will insist on its return to neutrality, and wants long-term agreement on security arrangements for Europe. Ukraine and the US will likely refuse to formally concede the loss of Crimea and other oblasts. Ukraine needs security guarantees against Russia renewing its attacks. The ethnic Russians and other minorities who remain inside Ukraine want guarantees of rights denied to them by the ethnic Ukrainian regime in Kiev. Hatred and distrust seethe on all sides. These are tough nuts to crack.

But at least the idea of talking is coming back into fashion. Snubbing, shunning, denigrating and refusing to talk have been the trademarks of US “diplomacy” in recent years, so I’ll give the last word to Marco Rubio who is the first American official I have heard from in a long time who seems to believe in diplomacy rather than bombs and bombast:

“This war has to end. It will require bold diplomacy. There will have to be concessions made – by the Russian Federation but also by Ukraine and the United States.”..

https://johnmenadue.com/reality-hits-ho ... -of-state/

******

Image

President Trump 2.0 and a Ukrainian Peace
by Gordonhahn
January 24, 2025

Freshly inaugurated US President Donald Trump may be on the wrong track in his pursuit of a Russo-Ukrainian peace agreement that he claimed repeatedly during the presidential campaign he could achieve on his first day in the White House. Although Trump seems to be well-intentioned and has become more sanguine about the ease of resolving the NATO-Russian Ukrainian War in the face of the very harsh realities of the conflict he hopes to resolve, he continues to set unrealistic expectations. Moreover, he is making policy decisions on the basis of faulty data—always a product of bad outcomes. Garbage in means garbage out. It appears he is already being misled, wittingly or not by advisors or US intelligence, and this will likely disable his efforts to conclude a Ukrainian-Russian or any US-Russian agreement or treaty. This demonstrated by the statements made by President Trump and members of his new administration, which features not a single serious Russia or Ukraine expert.

To be sure, President Trump is operating with one foot solidly planted on the ground; he has acknowledged the validity of Russia’s core concern which provoked Russian President Vladimir ‘Putin’s unprovoked invasion’ or SMO—NATO’s efforts to expand to Ukraine. This may signal that he sees NATO expansion to Ukraine at least to be the main cause of the Ukrainian war. It is of crucial importance to getting the Russians onboard any agreement and providing a some footing for the beginning and perhaps success of peace talks that the both the US and Russia, both Trump and Putin see eye to eye on the main root cause of the conflict—the central reason why Putin decided to declare the SMO. Trump’s statement resonates with Putin’s call for solutions that remove the “root causes” of the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War foremost among them in Moscow’s view is NATO expansion.

However, other statements coming from Trump and his administration are less than helpful and cause for concern. The US president’s other most revealing statement since becoming president to date came in a tweet – the practice of tweeting was an unfortunate feature of Trump’s first term and apparently will survive into the second – in which he threatened to escalate the U.S. and Western sanctions war on Russia in the event Putin fails to sign a peace agreement with Ukraine and pile on ‘taxes and tariffs’. This unfortunate tweet comes without the White House having made any concrete proposals, as far as we know, to the Kremlin. Russians do not react well to threats or disrespect.

Trump’s recent claim that “we” have figures for those “killed” in the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War, which he relayed as 1million Russians killed and 700,000 Ukrainians killed, was as far from reality as Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskiy’s penchant for constructing alternative realities and likely originates from Ukrainian-supplies ‘data.’ Trump may have confused ‘killed’ for ‘casualties,’ as I know of no source claiming such high numbers of killed, but even this still leaves the figures distant from the real world. Actual figures are more like just over 1 million Ukrainian casualties and some 4-500,000 Russian casualties. That Trump is getting such bad advice is deeply troubling. Trump is no foreign policy wonk and can easily be manipulated by ‘expert advice’ in this area, much as he was during his first term regarding the COVID virus. Bad advice on Russia and the Ukrainian war is particularly dangerous. In this particular case, it is leading Trump to believe that Russian war losses are so high that Putin to some degree very much wants, even desperately needs an end to the war. The above problems are also true with regard to Trump’s claim in the same tweet that Russia’s economy “is failing,” an issue I have addressed recently (https://gordonhahn.com/2025/01/23/can-r ... e-ukraine/).

To be sure, Putin and almost all Russians did not want and do not like this war against a country where many have friends and relatives and historical, cultural, social, and economic ties run deep. But being guided by the belief that Russians as a whole and Putin separately are desperate to end this war is to misread Russian and its culture, particularly its strategic culture. This has nothing to do with ideas such as ‘in Russia life is cheap’ with the political leadership and military command comfortably throwing Russian lives away in crude ‘human wave’ attacks and the like. No, Russia is conducting the war on the basis of sophisticated military strategies and tactics. More importantly, Russian strategic culture values security vigilance against foreign threats, especially those emanating from the West, and therefore Russians are willing to sacrifice to protect their country. This is deeply engrained in Russian thought, literature, music, the general culture, political culture, strategic culture, and even the social sciences. It is informed by historical experience: the Polish- and Vatican-organized invasions and occupation of Russia sparking and punctuating the ‘Smuta’ or Time of Troubles; the invasion by Napoleon Bonaparte’s European-wide ‘Grande Armee’; German Kaiser Wilhelm’s ‘color revolution’ in Russia by way of bankrolling Russia’s revolutionaries, in particular Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks and the Western interventions in World War I and the Russian Civil War; and the Nazi invasion, occupation, and genocide. Besides realist security concerns provoked by NATO expansion, this history is the central driver during the last three decades behind Russia’s opposition to NATO expansion [see Gordon M. Hahn, The Russian Dilemma: Security, Vigilance, and Relations with the West from Ivan III to Putin (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2021)]. This is especially true concerning Ukraine, which served as an invasion route for both the Polish sponsored Russian opposition army in the Smuta and Nazi Germany’s Wermacht in World War II. Neighboring Belarus, of course, was transgressed by both the troops of Napoleon and Wilhelm.

To be sure, Trump made an important nod in this tweet relevant to Russia’s security culture and vigilance sensibilities when he noted ‘Russia’s’ contribution to the defeat of Nazism. Unfortunately, this nod was tainted by Trump’s claim that ‘Russia helped the U.S. win’ World War II. But the positive effect was perhaps wholly mitigated by Trump’s clumsy claim that the USSR merely ‘helped the U.S. win’ World War II. Russians naturally have taken great umbrage at this idea. When by the time Americans took to the shores of Normandy in the war, the Soviets – most of them Russians – had already suffered some 15 million military and civilian casualties, perhaps more. Some two-thirds of the Nazi Wehrmacht was deployed against the USSR. Further evidence that Trump is getting some faulty advice on matters related to Russia, its politics, and history is that in this same statement he asserts the Russians (Soviets) lost 60 million people in this war they call the ‘Great Patriotic War’ (the war against Napoleon is called the ‘Patriotic War’). In fact, the standard, almost unanimous Russian, Soviet, and Western view has been that 27 million Soviets, civilian and military combined, perished in that war, though some recent research has led some Russian scholars to raise that figure as high as 40 million. Still, Trump’s 60 million is far off the mark.

Most importantly, however, is that the approach to starting peace talks that Trump has been signalling thus far leaves much to be desired. Niether ‘Twitter diplomacy’ (with egregious mistakes in the text no less) nor ultimata will be appreciated by Putin. The Russian president understands Trump’s peculiar bargaining style and bombastic rhetorical habits and has been careful to talk around Trump’s overstatements and threats, rather than confront them in his comments (https://t.me/SolovievLive/309676).

Moreover, there is a great danger in overstating Russian suffering in the present conflict. It translates into overestimating Putin’s and the Russians’ desire or need to end the war. Russians feel they are winning the war and are confident they will win. They are willing to fight a long war to do so, as they see NATO’s presence in Ukraine as an existential threat that must be extinguished. In turn, Trump’s underestimation of all this will lead to a gross calculation of the extent to which the Kremlin will drive a hard bargain and is unwilling to move to any significant degree off of its clearly and repeatedly stated negotiating positions and key war aims as it continues to accelerate its march to the Dnieper river and western Ukraine. Trump’s special envoy for the Ukrainian war, Gen. Keith Kellogg, reportedly has floated the idea of a ten- or twenty-year hold on any Ukrainian accession to NATO. There is no way in lieu of an unlikely Russian defeat in the war and/or an equally unlikely ‘color revolution’ that Moscow will ever accept Ukraine’s membership in NATO. This is true whether it is Putin or his successor, with whom Trump is negotiating. The Ukrainian War has been nothing less and really nothing more than a war over the issue of NATO expansion; hence, NATO’s ongoing desperate efforts to back Kiev, despite the long odds of victory over Russia without an all-out war effort by all of NATO’s members. Make no mistake; this would mean World War III or, as Russians will see it, the Greatest Patriotic War against yet another in the history of aggressive Western alliances attacking Russia. No ten-, twenty-, fifty-, or perhaps even a one hundred-year moratorium on Ukraine’s NATO membership will satisfy Moscow. Ukrainian neutrality encoded in a legal binding treaty as well as Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporozhia, and Kherson – perhaps even Ukrainian and Western recognition thereof – are Russia’s mandatory, minimalist positions.

As was the case with the April 2022 Istanbul agreement scuttled by the West, there may be some wiggle room on de-nazification and particularly demilitarization – Russia’s two other officially stated demands and goals of Putin’s ‘special military operation.’ For example, demilitarization of Ukraine can be limited in reducing the number of Ukrainian armed forces, by regulating the locations where Ukrainian troops can be deployed perhaps by way of a demilitarized zone. Putin reportedly hopes to see a 80 percent reduction in the size of the Ukrainian army, but this may be achieved by attrition during the present and future fighting that will be prolonged by Western and Ukrainian refusal to sit down at the negotiating table and then the difficulties in arriving at any agreement. De-nazification will be another tough nut for the negotiations to crack, as Zelenskiy’s failure to protect Ukraine ultranationalists and neofascist could lead them to block any agreement, perhaps by force and even by coup. The same may be true to a lesser extent of demilitarization.

There is a contradiction in Trump’s stated belief in Putin’s urgent need to make peace. On the one hand, Trump states that Putin will ‘destroy Russia’ if he fails to conclude a peace agreement. On the other hand, he states he will continue indeed deepen the West’s current sanctions policy intended precisely to strangle Russia, thus demonstrating again that it is the West that seeks to destroy Russia – in Russian minds and understandably so – having provoked the war and now intent on punishing Russia in order to deal her a ‘strategic defeat’. This makes the Ukrainian war an existential conflict, and one that will be suffered quite long and in the face of most if not all economic hardships the West may seek to inflict on Russian citizens. Indeed, any economic assault initially at least will only cement the support of the elite and population for Putin and the SMO, catalyzing Russia’s traditional inclination to aspire to solidarity or wholeness [see Gordon M. Hahn, Russian Tselostnost’: Wholeness in Russian Thought, Culture, History, and Politics (London: Europe Books, 2022)]. Second, sanctions have had a minimal effect on Russia’s economy, and there is little left to sanction. He mentions sanctioning Russian goods sold in the US, but there are virtually none. This means that Trump will be focusing on secondary sanctions, which will hurt third countries, including likely European allies, who continue to buy Russian oil and gas through the dark market of Russia’s shadow fleet. Another Trump threat — driving down oil prices — will likewise harm the economies of U.S. allies and that of the U.S. itself.

It will be extraordinarily difficult – perhaps a bridge too far – to get the West, particularly the American public and Senate, to support a treaty agreement that effectively terminates NATO’s aspiration to take Ukraine if not other states in Russia’s sphere of influence and cedes Crimea and the noted four Ukrainian eastern and southern regions to Russia. A caveat regarding the latter may be that Russia’s further advance into other regions of Ukraine will make it clear to Americans (and Europeans) that return of the first five regions taken by Russia is impossible, and in order to save Ukraine from further Russian conquest a peace treaty must be signed as soon as possible. Russian forces are already in and advancing deeper into Kharkiv (Kharkov), Sumy, and Mikolayiv (Mikolaev) regions and are soon to cross into the key industrial region of Dnipro (Dnepropetrovsk). By summer the entire territory of at least one of these four regions is likely to be added to Russia’s inventory and by year’s end likely all four. Therefore, the West and Ukraine will need to make compromises on other issues to return these newly occupied regions to Kiev’s fold. Here I put aside the possibility of the collapse of both the Ukrainian army and state this year.

Finally, there will need to be a two-track structure to any talks, because Moscow’s central demand – an end to NATO expansion – is not likely to be limited to Ukraine. Moldova and Georgia remain NATO ‘target states.’ Moreover, any end to NATO expansion to Ukraine, not to mention to Moldova and Georgia, will require a new security architecture for Europe and western Eurasia (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, and perhaps Armenia and Azerbaijan as well). The West has been pressuring the less anti-Russian Georgian leadership so that it turns against Moscow as Ukraine did in 2014. Moldova has a serious stateness problem in the breakaway republic of Transdniestr, which poses a problem similar to that Crimea and Donbas have posed for Ukraine. Armenia has recently turned to the West, after Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine prevented Moscow from protecting Armenia against Azerbaijani aggression. With the arrival of new weapons, such as Oreshnik, and redeployments of weapons by both sides during the war, new limits on deployments such as those negotiated by the US and USSR under the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty abandoned by both Moscow and Washington in recent years and new nuclear arms control and anti-ballistic missile treaties will be needed to stabilize the situation. These issues will need to be negotiated separately and are likely to take much longer to resolve than an already exceedingly complex Russo-Ukrainian peace treaty.

Finally, I should not ‘talk about the Ukrainian war without (discussing) Ukraine.’ It may take a change in leader to have successful negotiations. Zelenskiy’s interest in ending the war is minimal, since there will be many questions from Ukrainian ‘left’ (democrats and socialists) and even the right (nationalists, ultranationalists, and neofascists) about why Zelenskiy chose to abandon the 2022 Istanbul agreement and got to war with Russia. In any elections he will be hard-pressed to win. Since he has had his security services investigate ex-president Petro Poroshenko, ex-commander of Ukraine’s armed forces, Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhniy, and others for treason on the basis of no evidence, he is unlikely to find an accommodating, compromise-willing opposition. Moreover, the ultranationalists and neofascists steadfastly oppose any and all negotiations with the ‘moskals’ and will likely move against Zelenskiy should he seek peace. In the end, Zelenskiy may lose far more than a reelection campaign.

Ukraine’s road to the negotiating table will be a dangerous one, and with the army on the verge of collapse some period of chaos could further complicate starting or maintaining the negotiating process. So there is a long road ahead before Ukraine sees any peace; 100 days will not suffice either for concluding a Ukrainian peace or for putting back together the European security architecture that NATO expansion without and against Russia and the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War it spawned.


https://gordonhahn.com/2025/01/24/presi ... ian-peace/

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Is Trump positioning for a ‘no-deal’ with Russia -- or not?
Alastair Crooke, 23 Jan 2025
Conflicts Forum
Jan 23, 2025

Trump’s rhetoric about Russia having lost 1 million men in the Ukraine conflict is not just nonsense -- the real number not even reaching 100,000 -- but his resort to it underlines that the usual meme of Trump being just woefully misinformed is looking less and less plausible.

After touting the 1 million Russian deaths, Trump then suggests that Putin is destroying Russia by not making a deal. Adding (seemingly as an aside), that Putin may have already made up his mind ‘not to make a deal’.

Instead, in a curiously disinterested way, Trump remarks that negotiations would depend entirely on whether Putin is interested or not. He further claims that Russia’s economy is in ruins, and most notably says that he would consider sanctioning or tariffing Russia, if Putin does not make a deal. In a subsequent Truth Social post, Trump writes, “I’m going to do Russia, whose Economy is failing, and President Putin, a very big FAVOR”.

This -- plainly said -- is a narrative of an entirely different order: No longer is it his Envoy Kellogg or another team member saying it; it is Trump’s own words as President. Trump answers a journalist’s question ‘Would [he] sanction Russia’ should Putin not come to the negotiating table? To which he responds, “that sounds likely”.

What, we might ask, is Trump’s strategy? It seems more as though it is Trump that is preparing for a ‘no deal’. He must be aware that Putin repeatedly has made plain that he is both interested and open to talks with Trump. There is no doubt about that.

Yet Trump subsequently contradicts the ‘loser discourse’ in yet another apparent after-thought: “I mean … it’s a big machine so, eventually things will happen …”.

Here he appears to be saying that the Russian ‘big machine’ ultimately will win. Russia will be a winner -- and not a loser.

Maybe Trump is thinking simply to let the dynamics of the military ‘trial of strength’ play out. (If that is his thinking, he cannot utter such sentiment out loud – explicitly – as the Euro-élites would sink even further into a pathological tailspin).

Alternatively, were Trump to be seriously seeking productive negotiations with Putin, it is certainly not a good way to start by being deeply disrespectful towards the Russian people -- depicting them and President Putin as ‘losers’ who desperately need a deal; whereas the reality was that it was Trump who earlier had touted getting a deal within 24 hours. His disrespect will rankle -- not just with Putin -- but for most Russians.

The ‘loser narrative’ simply will stiffen Russian opposition to a Ukraine compromise.

The backdrop is that Russia in any case collectively eschews the idea of any compromise that “boils down to freezing the conflict along the line of engagement: that will give time to rearm the remnants of the Ukrainian army, and then start a new round of hostilities. So, that we have to fight again, but this time from less advantageous political positions”, as Professor Sergei Karaganov has noted.

Moreover, “the Trump administration has no reason to negotiate with us on the terms we [Russia] have set. The war is economically beneficial to the US … and [possibly] also to removing Russia as the powerful strategic support of America’s main competitor ― China”.

(Paywall with free trial.)

https://conflictsforum.substack.com/p/i ... -a-no-deal

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Media Changes Narrative as the Ukrainian Proxy War is Coming to an End

The Economist reports that "Russia is slicing through Ukrainian defences" and Ukraine is subsequently "struggling to survive".[1] Across the Western media, the public is prepared for defeat and painful concessions in future negotiations. The media is changing the narrative as reality can no longer be ignored. Russia's coming victory has been obvious since at least the summer of 2023, yet this was ignored to keep the proxy war going.
We are witnessing an impressive demonstration of narrative control: For more than two years, the political-media elites have been chanting “Ukraine is winning” and denounced any dissent to their narrative as “Kremlin talking points” that aim to reduce support for the war. What was “Russian propaganda” yesterday is now suddenly the consensus of the collective media. Critical self-reflection is as absent as it was after the Russiagate reporting.

Similar narrative control was displayed when the media reassured the public for two decades that NATO was winning, before fleeing in a great rush with dramatic images of people falling off an airplane.
The media deceived the public by presenting the stagnant frontlines as evidence that Russia was not winning. However, in a war of attrition, the direction of the war is measured by attrition rates – the losses on each side. Territorial control comes after the adversary has been exhausted as territorial expansion is very costly in such high-intensity warfare with powerful defensive lines. The attrition rates have throughout the war been extremely unfavourable to Ukraine, and they continuously get worse. The current collapse of the Ukrainian frontlines was very predictable as the manpower and weaponry had been exhausted.
Why has the former narrative expired? The public could be misled by fake attrition rates, yet it is not possible to cover up territorial changes after the eventual breaking point. Furthermore, the proxy war was beneficial to NATO when the Russians and Ukrainians were bleeding each other without any significant territorial changes. Once the Ukrainians are exhausted and begin to lose strategic territory, it is no longer in the interest of NATO to continue the war.

Narrative Control: Weaponising Empathy
The political-media elites weaponised empathy to get public support for war and disdain for diplomacy. The Western public was convinced to support the proxy war against Russia by appealing to their empathy for the suffering of Ukrainians and the injustice of their loss of sovereignty. Yet, all appeals to empathy are always translated into support for continued warfare and dismissing diplomatic solutions.
Those who disagreed with NATO’s mantra that “weapons are the way to peace” and instead suggested negotiations, were quickly dismissed as puppets of the Kremlin who did not care about Ukrainians. Support for continued fighting in a war that cannot be won has been the only acceptable expression of empathy.
For the postmodernists seeking to socially construct their own reality, great power rivalry is largely a battle of narratives. The weaponisation of empathy enabled the war narrative to become impervious to criticism. War is virtuous and diplomacy is treasonous as Ukraine was allegedly fighting Russia’s unprovoked war with the objective of subjugating the entire country. A strong moral framing convinced people to deceive and self-censor in support of the noble cause.
Even criticism of how Ukrainian civilians were dragged into cars by their government and sent to their deaths on the frontlines was portrayed as supporting “Kremlin talking points” as it undermined the NATO war narrative.
Reporting on high Ukrainian casualty rates threatened to undermine support for the war. Reporting on the failure of sanctions threatened to reduce public support for the sanctions. Reporting on the likely US destruction of Nord Stream threatened to create divisions within the military bloc. Reporting on the US and UK sabotage of the Minsk agreement and the Istanbul negotiations threatens the narrative of NATO merely attempting to “help” Ukraine. The public is offered the binary option of adhering either to the pro-Ukraine/NATO narrative or the pro-Russia narrative. Anyone challenging the narrative with inconvenient facts could thus be accused of supporting Moscow’s narrative. Reporting that Russia was winning was uncritically interpreted as taking Russia’s side.
There are ample facts and statements that demonstrate NATO has been fighting to the last Ukrainian to weaken a strategic rival. Yet, the strict narrative control entails that such evidence has not been permitted to be discussed.
The Objectives of a Proxy War: Bleeding the Adversary
The strict demand for loyalty to the narrative conceals unreported facts that US foreign policy is about restoring global primacy and not an altruistic commitment to liberal democratic values. The US considers Ukraine to be an important instrument to weaken Russia as a strategic rival.
RAND Corporation, a think tank funded by the US government and renowned for its close ties with the intelligence community, published a report in 2019 on how the US could bleed Russia by pulling it further into Ukraine. RAND recognised that the US could send more military equipment to Ukraine and threaten NATO expansion to provoke Russia to increase its involvement in Ukraine:
“Providing more U.S. military equipment and advice could lead Russia to increase its direct involvement in the conflict and the price it pays for it… While NATO’s requirement for unanimity makes it unlikely that Ukraine could gain membership in the foreseeable future, Washington pushing this possibility could boost Ukrainian resolve while leading Russia to redouble its efforts to forestall such a development”.[2]
However, the same RAND report recognised that the strategy of bleeding Russia had to be carefully “calibrated” as a full-scale war could result in Russia acquiring strategic territories, which is not in the interest of the US. After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the strategy was similarly to keep the war going as long as there were not significant territorial changes.
In March 2022, Leon Panetta (former White House Chief of Staff, US Secretary of Defence, and CIA Director) acknowledged: “We are engaged in a conflict here, it’s a proxy war with Russia, whether we say so or not…. The way you get leverage is by, frankly, going in and killing Russians”.[3] Even Zelensky recognised in March 2022 that some Western states wanted to use Ukraine as a proxy against Russia: “There are those in the West who don't mind a long war because it would mean exhausting Russia, even if this means the demise of Ukraine and comes at the cost of Ukrainian lives”.[4]
US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin outlined the objectives in the Ukraine proxy war to as weakening its strategic adversary:
“We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can't do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine…. So it [Russia] has already lost a lot of military capability. And a lot of its troops, quite frankly. And we want to see them not have the capability to very quickly reproduce that capability”.[5]
There have also been indications of regime change or the destruction of Russia as wider goals of the war. Sources in the US and UK governments confirmed in March 2022 that the objective was for “the conflict to be extended and thereby bleed Putin” as “the only end game now is the end of Putin regime”.[6] President Biden suggested that regime change was necessary in Russia: “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power”. However, the White House later walked back Biden’s these dangerous remarks.
The spokesperson of Prime Minister Boris Johnson, also made an explicit reference to regime change by arguing “the measures we’re introducing, that large parts of the world are introducing, are to bring down the Putin regime”. James Heappey, the UK Minister for the Armed Forces, similarly wrote in the Daily Telegraph:
“His failure must be complete; Ukrainian sovereignty must be restored, and the Russian people empowered to see how little he cares for them. In showing them that, Putin’s days as President will surely be numbered and so too will those of the kleptocratic elite that surround him. He’ll lose power and he won’t get to choose his successor”.[7]
Fighting to the Last Ukrainian
Chas Freeman, the former US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs and Director for Chinese Affairs at the US State Department, criticised Washington’s decision to “fight to the last Ukrainian”.[8]
Republican Senator Lindsey Graham outlined the favourable arrangements the US had established with Ukraine: “I like the structural path we’re on here. As long as we help Ukraine with the weapons they need and the economic support, they will fight to the last person”.[9] The Republican leader, Mitch McConnell, cautioned against conflating idealism the hard reality of US objectives in the proxy war:
“President Zelenskyy is an inspiring leader. But the most basic reasons for continuing to help Ukraine degrade and defeat the Russian invaders are cold, hard, practical American interests. Helping equip our friends in Eastern Europe to win this war is also a direct investment in reducing Vladimir Putin’s future capabilities to menace America, threaten our allies, and contest our core interests.… Finally, we all know that Ukraine’s fight to retake its territory is neither the beginning nor end of the West’s broader strategic competition with Putin’s Russia”.[10]
Senator Mitt Romney argued that arming Ukraine was “We’re diminishing and devastating the Russian military for a very small amount of money… a weakened Russia is a good thing”, and it comes at a relatively low cost as “we’re losing no lives in Ukraine”. Senator Richard Blumenthal similarly asserted: “we’re getting our money’s worth on our Ukraine investment” because “for less than 3 percent of our nation’s military budget, we’ve enabled Ukraine to degrade Russia’s military strength by half… All without a single American service woman or man injured or lost”.[11] Congressman Dan Crenshaw agrees that “investing in the destruction of our adversary’s military, without losing a single American troop, strikes me as a good idea”.[12]
Retired US General Keith Kellogg similarly argued in March 2023 that “if you can defeat a strategic adversary not using any US troops, you are at the acme of professionalism”. Kellogg further explained that using Ukrainians to fight Russia “takes a strategic adversary off the table” and thus enables the US to focus on its “primary adversary which is China”. NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg also argued that defeating Russia and using Ukraine as a bulwark against Russia “will make it easier” for the US “to focus also on China… if Ukraine wins, then you will have the second biggest army in Europe, the Ukrainian army, battle-hardened, on our side, and we'll have a weakened Russian army, and we have also now Europe really stepping up for defense spending”.[13]
In Search of a New Narrative
A new victory narrative is required as a NATO-backed Ukraine cannot realistically defeat Russia on the battlefield. The strongest narrative is obviously to claim that Russia has failed in its objective to annex all of Ukraine to recreate the Soviet Empire and thereafter conquer Europe. This narrative enables NATO to claim victory. After Ukraine’s disastrous counter-offensive in the summer of 2023, such a new narrative was indicated by Ignatius in the Washington Post, where he argued the measurement of success is the weakening of Russia:
“Meanwhile, for the United States and its NATO allies, these 18 months of war have been a strategic windfall, at relatively low cost (other than for the Ukrainians). The West’s most reckless antagonist has been rocked. NATO has grown much stronger with the additions of Sweden and Finland. Germany has weaned itself from dependence on Russian energy and, in many ways, rediscovered its sense of values. NATO squabbles make headlines, but overall, this has been a triumphal summer for the alliance”.[14]
Sean Bell, a former Royal Air Force Air Vice-Marshal and Ministry of Defence staffer, argued in September 2023 that the war had significantly degraded the Russian military to the point it ‘no longer poses a credible threat to Europe’. Bell therefore concluded that “the Western objective of this conflict has been achieved” and “The harsh reality is that Ukraine’s objectives are no longer aligned with their backers”.[15]
The Ukrainian proxy has been exhausted, which ends the proxy war unless NATO is prepared to go to war against Russia. As NATO is preparing to cut its losses, a new narrative is required. As the narrative changes, it will soon be permitted to call for negotiations as a display of empathy for the Ukrainians.

[1] The Economist, ‘Ukraine is now struggling to survive, not to win’, The Economist, 29 October 2024.
[2] RAND, ‘Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Ground’, RAND Corporation, 24 April 2019, p.99.
[3] L. Panetta, ‘U.S. Is in a Proxy War With Russia: Panetta’, Bloomberg, 17 March 2022.
[4] The Economist. ‘Volodymyr Zelensky on why Ukraine must defeat Putin’ The Economist, 27 March 2022.
[5] G. Carbonaro, ‘U.S. Wants Russia 'Weakened' So It Can Never Invade Again’, Newsweek, 25 April 2022.
[6] N. Ferguson, ‘Putin Misunderstands History. So, Unfortunately, Does the U.S.’, Bloomberg, 22 March 2022.
[7] J. Heappey, ‘Ukrainians are fighting for their freedom, and Britain is doing everything to help them’, The Telegraph, 26 February 2022.
[8] A. Maté, ‘US fighting Russia ‘to the last Ukrainian’: veteran US diplomat’, The Grayzone, 24 March 2022.
[9] A. Maté, ‘US, UK sabotaged peace deal because they ‘don’t care about Ukraine’: fmr. NATO adviser’, The Grayzone, 27 September 2022.
[10] M. McConnell, ‘McConnell on Zelenskyy Visit: Helping Ukraine Directly Serves Core American Interests’, Mitch McConnell official website, 21 December 2022.
[11] R. Blumenthal, ‘Zelenskyy doesn’t want or need our troops. But he deeply and desperately needs the tools to win’, CT Post, 29 August 2023.
[12] L. Lonas, ‘Crenshaw, Greene clash on Twitter: ‘Still going after that slot on Russia Today’’, The Hill, 11 May 2022.
[13] T. O’Conner, ‘So, if the United States is concerned about China and wants to pivot towards Asia, then you have to ensure that Putin doesn't win in in Ukraine’, Newsweek, 21 September 2023.
[14] D. Ignatius, ‘The West feels gloomy about Ukraine. Here’s why it shouldn’t’, The Washington Post, 18 July 2023.
[15] S. Bell, ‘The West remains committed to Ukraine's counteroffensive - but there's scepticism over Zelenskyy's ultimate objectives’, Sky News, 9 September 2023.

This article includes some excerpts from my book: “The Ukraine War and the Eurasian World Order”

https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen/status/1883392252338135247
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Tue Jan 28, 2025 12:55 pm

Four scenarios and one destination
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 01/28/2025

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Last weekend, Russian troops captured the town of Velyka Novosyolka. Partly because of the importance of the advance, much faster than in the case of Chasiv Yar, for which Russia has been fighting for months, or even Toretsk, a battle that is expected to end in days, if not hours, and also to prevent Ukraine from denying the facts, Russian troops staged their victory with fireworks. Key to supply and communications on the southern front, the loss of Velyka Novosyolka does not imply a deep break in the front, but it does make it more difficult for Ukraine to defend the southern territories, where its position is increasingly complicated. The profound Ukrainian and media disinterest in Donbass has facilitated the task of minimising the importance of the loss of ground in the east - which has always been justified by the tagline of the enormous Russian casualties, whether real or imaginary - and not even the closure of the coke mine on which Ukrainian metallurgical production depends or the loss of the main lithium deposit, which Kiev intends to use in the future for its economic recovery, are being properly assessed. The battle for Velyka Novosyolka, excessively close to the border of an oblast that is a priority for Ukraine and where images of the construction of trenches are already being published, has slightly broken this dynamic and has caused more concern than the Russian progress in Donetsk and Lugansk.

Despite the slow pace of movement on the front and the rhetoric of exaggerating Russia’s problems to no end while obscuring Ukraine’s – made all the more serious by its complete dependence on foreign subsidies, which are now being called into question – even the most pro-Ukraine media now accept that the situation is perilous. “In matters of national survival, Ukraine awaits President Trump’s decision like a wounded gladiator awaits the twist of an emperor’s thumb: though not yet broken, the struggling nation is certainly on its knees. On the battlefield, the outlook has never been so bleak. Russian troops seized six times more Ukrainian territory in 2024 than in 2023. More than half the territory Ukraine captured in its surprise autumn incursion on Kursk has since been ceded,” wrote The Times last Sunday , recalling the retreat at the front and economic and industrial difficulties as the main arguments, to which it added the usual reproach of the refusal to recruit young people between 18 and 25 years old.

In this situation, the article presents four possible scenarios that, compared to those presented in previous years, are noticeably less optimistic. In 2022, international relations expert Alexander Graef presented the possible options for resolving the war between eternal war, ceasefire, Russian consolidation and Ukrainian victory. In March 2023, with the Ukrainian ground counteroffensive that was to definitively give the initiative to kyiv's troops having failed, the British Royal United Services Institute updated the possible scenarios to include that of a Russian victory. This possibility was considered unlikely, as was also a Ukrainian victory. Between these two extremes were two intermediate scenarios: “a chess game that ends in a draw and where there is no victorious outcome”, that is, a more or less active eternal war, and that of an agreed peace in which Ukraine would probably be forced to reverse the order of priorities and be content with achieving its security objectives at the cost of part of the lost territories.

“If Russia decides to press ahead with the war and shun negotiations, then, if it breaks away from American support, Ukraine may end up broken and militarily defeated,” The Times now writes , presenting the most pessimistic, though plausible, of the four scenarios it sees as possible. To the possibility of a Russian victory, the possibility of Ukrainian collapse is added. “Almost as bad as the first possible outcome is the second, in which, in the absence of a negotiated settlement or American support, Ukraine surrenders and sues for peace from a position of weakness in order to secure a bad peace deal that leaves the country divided and an uncomfortable government established in Kiev: a victory for Russia, and a clear defeat for Ukraine and its Western allies.”

“The third involves a ceasefire. If it is part of a transitional phase leading to a final settlement, a peace agreement and a real end to the war, it could lead to regional stability and the survival of Ukraine, surrounded by economic and security guarantees,” it goes on to describe the possibility of a ceasefire that does not lead to a final agreement. “The crucible of Ukrainian hope,” The Times concludes , “would involve the United States empowering Ukraine to participate in peace talks from a position of strength, leading to an agreement that guarantees Ukraine a sovereign and economically viable future, with security guarantees to protect it from further Russian threats.”

Since the consolidation of the front line following the Russian withdrawal from kyiv and the defeats at Kharkiv and Kherson in the autumn of 2022, when the idea of ​​a Russian victory was eliminated from all possible scenarios and Ukraine began to demand arms and financing in search of a victory that until then was impossible to imagine, the objective of kyiv's partners has been to achieve the fourth scenario: to strengthen Ukraine as much as possible, to weaken the Russian Federation militarily and economically and to accept negotiations only when kyiv is in a position to impose terms on Moscow. Despite attempts at offensives, tightening sanctions and even permission to use Western heavy weapons on Russian territory - a clear red line until just a few months ago - the West has not succeeded in getting Ukraine to regain the initiative it lost when it underestimated Russia's ability to defend the Zaporozhye front and take advantage of Ukraine's wear and tear.

The arrival of Donald Trump has not meant a change of policy but rather the recognition, on the part of a political sector that wishes to focus on the rivalry with China, of the American lack of interest in the situation in Europe, which has ceased to be the priority theatre of political and economic confrontation that it was in the Cold War. Trump's candidacy has not hidden this lack of interest in Ukraine and Europe in general and, in his first days at the head of the American administration, he has reaffirmed his objectives: to achieve a short-term ceasefire, a negotiation to end the conflict and achieve a strong increase in European economic involvement so that the EU is left to bear the costs of the war and, above all, of the reconstruction.

The suspension of humanitarian aid and development programmes, the limitation of the privileged access situation of migrants from Ukraine to the United States or the negative comments made by Donald Trump about Volodymyr Zelensky - to whom, as Lula da Silva already did, he places part of the blame for the outbreak of the war - are added to the appointment of Keith Kellogg (who last year presented an action plan with the aim of achieving a negotiation) to manage Ukrainian policy in a series of steps that show the desire of the White House to end the war in Ukraine. To these gestures we must add another that was known this weekend, the presence of a Ukrainian envoy at the inauguration of Trump and Vance on January 20. It is not Zelensky or his right-hand man, the powerful green cardinal Andriy Ermak, but David Arajamia, leader of the president's party in the Rada and, above all, head of the Ukrainian delegation in the negotiations in Istanbul. His presence indicates Washington’s interest in resuming negotiations, possibly on the basis of what was already done in Istanbul in the spring of 2022. That was the recommendation of two experts, Samuel Charap of the Rand Corporation and Sergey Radchenko, a professor at Johns Hopkins University, who had access to the working documents and were able to see how far Russia and Ukraine went in search of an agreement before Kiev gave up diplomacy in favour of continuing to fight for a complete victory. Arajamia was the person who led the Ukrainian negotiations at the time and he is also the one who confirmed that there was a willingness to reach an agreement on the part of Russia, which already at that time made it clear that it did not prioritize the territorial issue – Moscow was willing to abandon practically all the territories gained since February 2022 – but that of security.

This aspect, which is also the top priority for Ukraine, is one of the central elements of a proposal that has been published in the last few hours by the Ukrainian media and that could correspond to a draft agreement that the US administration is working on. “At the moment we have no confirmation of the authenticity of this “plan”. Perhaps it is really a plan drawn up by Trump’s team, or perhaps it is some kind of “apocryphal” one drawn up on the basis of the “Kellogg plan” published last year before the US presidential elections. There are indications that point to both the first and the second option. However, given the great public attention that the issue of a peaceful solution arouses, we have decided to publish it,” Strana wrote . The lines outlined in the document are consistent with both the positions that David Arajamia has shown in the past and with the words of Donald Trump and some men in his entourage in recent weeks. The idea actually shows the points that are gradually becoming consolidated as the most probable options taking into account the balance of power and those that have been raised by the current US president or his National Security team. The leaked plan would imply a ceasefire during which Ukraine would continue to have US assistance, which would require the revocation of the decree that prohibits negotiations with Vladimir Putin. From there, the separation line would act - except in the Kursk region, which would be evacuated by Ukraine - as a de facto border . Kiev would not give up the lost territories, but they would remain under Russian control. The proposal also raises the defense of the rights of the Russian-speaking population and the Orthodox Church linked to the Moscow Patriarchate, the prompt accession of Ukraine to the European Union and the neutrality of the country, points present in the Istanbul agreement. Unlike at that time, the current agreement would not require Ukraine to reduce its army.

Under this agreement, or a similar one, Russia could claim to have prevented NATO expansion and acquired territories, but in exchange for losing Ukraine, which would be consolidated as a country under the influence and tutelage of the West. In exchange, Moscow would have to bear tariffs on its trade with the EU, which would be used as war reparations in the reconstruction of the country, and armed peace would continue to mean having to defend a front capable of following the same path as Minsk did. Kiev, for its part, could boast of having achieved the survival of the country and its entry into the European family , although it would not achieve security guarantees as robust as it currently hopes for. However, unlike the Istanbul agreement, which was presented by the sector close to Poroshenko as an approach that left Ukraine defenseless, the proposal that the Ukrainian media are currently publishing, has the benefits that those same representatives granted to Minsk, the capacity to rearm and turn the country into a fortress. This last point, which would foreshadow an uncertain future, is the part that makes this plan most credible.

The war is currently pointing to a weakening of Ukraine, which is nevertheless still capable of avoiding the collapse of the front. Russia, although stronger than in previous years, has not yet been able to achieve even its minimum objective, control of the entire territory of Donbass. Heading towards an eternal war or an inconclusive end that will perpetuate a status quo that involves enormous mobilizations of human and material resources, negotiations can only take place if the maximalisms present until recently in the discourses of Russia and Ukraine and also in that of the European Union, the only one of the parties that has not yet moderated expectations, disappear.

https://slavyangrad.es/2025/01/28/cuatr ... n-destino/

Google Translator

******

From Cassad's Telegram account:

Colonelcassad
⚡️Summary of the Russian Ministry of Defence on the progress of the special military operation (as of 28 January 2025)

— Units of the North force group in the Kharkiv direction defeated formations of the motorised infantry brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the territorial defence brigade in the areas of the settlements of Liptsy and Vovchansk in the Kharkiv region.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 25 servicemen, an armoured combat vehicle and two cars. Two field artillery guns and an ammunition depot were destroyed. — As a result of decisive actions by units of the West force group, the settlement of Dvurechnaya in the Kharkiv region was liberated. Defeat was inflicted on the manpower and equipment of the tank, two mechanized, assault brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and two territorial defence brigades in the areas of the settlements of Topoli, Zapadnoye, Peschanoye, Lozovaya, Kopanki, Zeleny Gai, Krasnoye Pervoye in the Kharkiv region, Makeyevka in the Luhansk People's Republic, Yampol, Grigorovka and Ivanovka in the Donetsk People's Republic. The enemy lost up to 330 servicemen, four armored combat vehicles, including two US-made M113 armored personnel carriers, and six cars. Four field artillery pieces, including three Western-made ones, two electronic warfare stations, and two ammunition depots were destroyed. — Units of the Southern group of forces occupied more advantageous lines and positions. They defeated formations of two mechanized, an assault brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and two territorial defense brigades in the areas of the settlements of Verkhnekamenskoye, Yantarnoye, Zelenovka, Opexovo-Vasilevka, Chasov Yar, and Dachnoye of the Donetsk People's Republic. The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 220 servicemen, two US-made HMMWV armored combat vehicles, three cars, and a US-made 105-mm M119 gun. An ammunition depot was destroyed. — Units of the Center group of forces continued to advance into the depths of the enemy's defenses. Defeated the manpower and equipment of four mechanized brigades, a motorized infantry brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, two brigades of the National Guard and a territorial defense brigade in the areas of the settlements of Shcherbinovka, Dzerzhinsk, Lysovka, Krymskoye, Zverevo, Novoelizavetovka, Vozdvizhenka, Yasenovoye, Novovasilevka and Kotlino of the Donetsk People's Republic. The enemy lost up to 600 servicemen, two tanks, two armored combat vehicles, including a US-made Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, seven vehicles and a field artillery gun. - Units of the Vostok group of forces continued to advance deep into the enemy's defenses. Defeated were the formations of a mechanized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, a National Guard brigade and a territorial defense brigade in the areas of the settlements of Bogatyr, Vremivka and Rivnepil of the Donetsk People's Republic. The enemy's losses amounted to over 115 servicemen, a tank, two vehicles and four field artillery pieces, including one piece of Western manufacture.

— Units of the Dnepr group of forces inflicted losses on the manpower and equipment of the mechanized brigade, the coastal defense brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the territorial defense brigade in the areas of the settlements of Stepnogorsk, Novopokrovka, Rabotino in the Zaporizhia region, Antonovka in the Kherson region and the city of Kherson.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost more than 40 servicemen and three vehicles.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

******

Brief report from the front, January 27, 2025

After taking Velikaya Novosyolka, our soldiers can move both north and west. Report by Marat Khairullin with illustrations by Mikhail Popov.
Zinderneuf
Jan 27, 2025

Image
ЛБС 15.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 15th, 2025. Зона Активности=Zone of activity.

In the Pokrovsk sector, the Russian Armed Forces liberated the settlement of Zelenoe, the Ministry of Defense of our country announced on January 26. Our troops continue to break through to the settlement of Chunishino (Chunyshyne) along the railway. In the area of ​​the settlement of Zverevo (Zvirove), the activity of the fighting has decreased at the moment. But in the area of ​​Kotlino and Udachnoe, their intensity is only increasing.

From the area of ​​the settlement of Kotlino, Russian units are carrying out attacks in several directions at once: in the direction of the Pokrovskaya mine, to the north in the direction of the E50 highway from Pavlograd and have begun to probe the enemy's defense along the railway in the direction of Pokrovsk itself. Our military is pressing Udachnoe from the east and from the south. There are successes in advancing in the settlement.

Image
ЛБС 31.10.2024=Line of Combat Contact October 31st, 2024. ЛБС 30.11.2024=Line of Combat Contact November 30th, 2024. ЛБС 01.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 1st, 2025. Зона Продвижения=Zone of advancement.

They have also pressed the defense of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the settlement of Nadezhdovka (Nadiivka), where over the past week, our soldiers have been systematically clearing the enemy street by street. Probably, now our attention will be on Kotlyarovka.

There is also movement along the line of settlements located west of the settlement Yasenovoe. Our troops have expanded the control zone south of Novoelizavetovka and are fighting in the area of ​​the settlement Sribnoe.

Our soldiers are also breaking through the defense in the area of ​​the settlement Andreevka. Having advanced from the area of ​​Petropavlovka, the advance groups broke through to the settlement and consolidated their positions in the northeastern part. At the same time, the extended stronghold northeast of Andreevka was practically cleared. Securing these positions allows us to increase pressure on the enemy dug in in the village.

In the area of ​​the settlement Dachnoe, Russian troops are gradually advancing both in the settlement itself and attacking further south, dislodging the enemy from the stronghold equipped near the forest belts southwest of the town. In fact, these are the last fortified positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kurakhovo pocket. The enemy, holding them, is trying to somehow stretch our forces, preventing us from concentrating all our attention on the Andreevka-Konstantinopol (Kostyantynopil) fortified area. Which, however, does not help them much, given the latest events.

Image
ЛБС 20.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 20th, 2025. Участок Продвижения=Area of Advancement.

On the left flank of the Donetsk direction, the actions of units of the 5th Tank Brigade, the 36th Army, and the 40th Marine Brigade liberated the settlement of Velyka Novosyolka.

Image
ЛБС 31.10.2024=Line of Combat Contact October 31st, 2024. ЛБС 01.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 1st, 2025. Продвижение после предыдущей сводки=Progress since the previous summary.

This was the last large fortified area of ​​the enemy in this area. Taking it makes it possible to develop offensive actions in several directions: to the north in the direction of the settlements of Komar and Bogatyr (just north of where the top of the map cuts off), in order to act in concert with the units advancing on Pokrovsk, and (or) to the west in the direction of Zaporozhye, going into the rear of the Ukrainian Armed Forces positions.

Image
Продвижение ВС РФ* (01.7.2024-27.01.2025) *Сведения Приблизительные=Advance of the Russian Armed Forces* (July 1st, 2024 to January 27th, 2025) The information is approximate.* ЛБС 01.7.2024=Line of Combat Contact July 1st, 2024. ЛБС 02.8.2024=Line of Combat Contact August 2nd, 2024. ЛБС 27.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 27th, 2025.

https://maratkhairullin.substack.com/p/ ... anuary-396

*******

Ukraine - Organizational Chaos, Commanders Fired

The unusual combat organization of the Ukrainian army is taking its toll.

In a classic military hierarchy Corps, Divisions, Brigades and Battalions each have their own staff and responsibilities. The Ukrainian army is using a more flexible but also chaotic structure of Operational Units with less control. The results are unnecessary losses on the battle field.

After the Maidan coup the Ukrainian government designated the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk areas held by separatists as the Anti-Terrorist Operation Zone (ATO) and put it under the control of the Ukrainian secret service SBU.

In 2018 this changed:

On 20 February 2018, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko changed the status of the ATO zone from an anti-terrorist operation to "taking measures to ensure national security and defense, and repulsing and deterring the armed aggression of the Russian Federation in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts".
This allowed the Ukrainian military to take charge of the zones instead of the Ukrainian secret service SBU. As such, the ATO was renamed to JFO zone (Joint Forces Operation (Ukrainian: Операція об'єднаних сил, ООС, romanized: Operatsiya ob'yednanykh syl).

The Commander of the Joint (or 'Combined') Forces Operation is also the commander of the Khortytsia Operational-Strategic Group which is directing the war against Russian forces in eastern Ukraine.

The Operational-Strategic Group (OSUV) commands several Operational Tactical Groups (OTUs), each with their local areas of responsibility. Several brigades and/or battalions get temporarily assigned to each Operation Tactical Group to fulfill its tasks.

This scheme is largely seen as ineffective:

Operational Tactical Groups (OTUs) and Operational Strategic Groups (OSUVs) are temporary military administrative bodies created specifically to command troops within combat zones and adjacent areas. These entities lack formal legal attributes such as correspondence addresses, contact details, or designated military unit numbers. Their structure is flexible, with authority limited to units operating within their respective zones of responsibility. In contrast, the established Operational Commands (OCs) focus on broader responsibilities, including the manning, training, and ensuring the combat readiness of their assigned units.

In simple terms, Operational Commands are responsible for preparing troops, while units deployed to a combat zone are transferred to an OTU or OSUV, which plan and coordinate their combat operations. This division often causes conflicts at both tactical and strategic levels. OTUs and OSUVs do not oversee the condition of the troops; they assign tasks based solely on operational needs, treating units as abstract entities on paper. When a unit loses its combat effectiveness, it is returned to its Operational Command for recovery and reorganization.


Operational-Strategic Groups as well as Operational Tactical Groups lack the staff and dedicated resources to fight their battles. They have little control over their assigned units which also continue to receive orders from their Operational Command. Units thus lack a clear line of reporting.

The commander of the Joint Forces and the Khortytsia Operational-Strategic Group is in a very hot seat. He is responsible for the successes and failures in eastern Ukraine while lacking control over his assigned resources and the means to influence those.

Sudden unceremoniously changes in that position have happened frequently with the latest announced just yesterday.

Zelensky replaces commander of Joint Forces Operation - Interfax, Mar 15 2022

KYIV. March 15 (Interfax-Ukraine) - Eduard Moskaliov has been appointed the new commander of the Joint Forces Operation, and its previous commander, Oleksandr Pavliuk, is the new head of the Kyiv regional military administration, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said.
...
Gen. Maj. Eduard Moskaliov, a professional, has been appointed the new commander of the Joint Forces Operation," Zelensky said in his video address on Tuesday.
---
Zelenskyy fired commander of joint forces - Ukrainska Pravda, Feb 26 2023

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has fired Eduard Moskaliov from the post of commander of the joint forces.
Source: President’s decree on the President's website
Quote: "To fire Eduard Mykhailovych Moskaliov from the position of commander of the joint forces."
---
Recently dismissed Joint Forces Commander says he found out about his dismissal from news headlines - Ukrainska Pravda, Feb 11 2024

Serhii Naiev, Commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, has indicated that he learned about the presidential decree on his dismissal from the mass media on 11 February.
---
Zelensky appoints 4 new high-level military commanders - Kyiv Independent, Feb 11 2024

President Volodymyr Zelensky announced four high-level military appointments on his website on Feb. 11, including the commanders of the Ground Forces, Territorial Defense Forces, the Combined Forces, and the Airborne Assault Forces.
...
The Combined Forces will be headed by Lieutenant General Yurii Sodol, former head of Ukraine’s marine corps since 2018.
Zelensky dismissed former Airborne Assault Commander Maksym Myrhorodskyi and former Combined Forces Commander Serhii Naiev.

---
Zelensky Replaces AFU Joint Forces Commander Amid Criticism and Military Failures - Kyiv Post, Jun 24 2024

Late night on Monday, June 24, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Lieutenant General Yurii Sodol as the Commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) Joint Forces with Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov.
...
Sodol had been the Joint Forces Commander since February 2024. His tenure faced criticism from military observers.
Activist Serhii Sternenko called his appointment a "personnel disaster," and People's Deputy Mariana Bezuhla blamed him for failing to defend Kharkiv Oblast from a Russian incursion in mid-May.

Earlier on Monday, June 24, Bohdan Krotevych, Chief of Staff of the Azov National Guard Brigade, has formally requested the State Bureau of Investigation (DBR) to investigate Lieutenant General Yuri Sodol, the commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

---
Ukraine's ​​Andrii Hnatov to head Khortytsia Operational Strategic Group soon - Ukrainska Pravda, Jun 26 2024

Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov, the new commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, will replace Lieutenant General Yurii Sodol as the Head of Khortytsia Operational Strategic Group.
---
Ukraine replaces commander of eastern front after Russia captures another town - Reuters, Jan 26 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy replaced the commander of the eastern front, the most heated battlefield of the Ukraine war, after Russian forces captured another strategic town there.
Brigadier-General Andriy Hnatov was replaced as the battlefield commander in the east by Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi, overall commander of ground forces, who will keep his previous duties. Hnatov was given a role overseeing training and communications.


Eduard Moskaliov lasted 11 month. Serhii Naiev lasted 12 months. Yuri Sodol was fired after 4 months. Andrii Hnatov had 7 month.

How Mykhailo Drapatyi, now in a double role, is supposed to better handle the chaotic organization is beyond me.

Posted by b on January 27, 2025 at 16:36 UTC | Permalink

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2025/01/u ... .html#more

*******

Military State Administration of Dnipropetrovsk Region

Image

January 26, 23:02


In connection with the events at the front, the question of the need to create a military-civil administration of the Dnipropetrovsk region to establish processes on the territory of the new region wishing to hold a referendum and join Russia will soon arise.

There are 4 kilometers left after bypassing Udachny before the creation of the MCA of the Dnipropetrovsk region
. Actually, and before the start of the first ground battles in the Dnipropetrovsk region since the beginning of the SVO.
Zelensky's Kursk adventure certainly contributed to this.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9634920.html

(The march to Odessa continues apace...)

Ukrainian Armed Forces Drone Strategy
January 26, 18:57

Image

Ukrainian Armed Forces Drone Strategy

Against the backdrop of Trump's decision to suspend ( https://t.me/rt_russian/228226 ) foreign aid, the Zelensky regime has once again stepped up its campaign of air-to-air drone strikes on Russian territory. UAVs have become the main type of weapons for Ukraine, as other weapons have either been knocked out or their numbers are steadily declining. And if the US turns off the tap on military supplies, drones will become the only thing Ukraine will be able to fully use on the battlefield.

Kiev is simultaneously declaring its "own production of drones" — but is this really true?

At the end of last year, the enemy announced ( https://lenta.ru/news/2024/10/01/shmyga ... ntsa-goda/ ) plans to produce/purchase/receive from 1.2 million to 1.5 million drones of various types in three months, most of which are FPV drones. For these purposes, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense plans to distribute UAH 2.5 billion between the brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. And this is where the most interesting part begins.

The main external sources of modern drones for Ukraine are NATO countries, as well as the purchase of various Chinese quadcopters through third countries. But due to China's export restrictions ( https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... war-effort ) in relation to Ukraine, some NATO countries are beginning to actively develop their own production.

In addition, a network of workshops and workshops for the assembly of FPV drones of various types has been deployed on the territory of Ukraine, which are massively supplied to the troops. But there is a subtlety. Kiev would not have found its own money for this, and for a long time everyone wondered who was paying for such investments. The answer turned out to be simple: $1.5 billion was secretly invested in drone production in Ukraine ( https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/17/us/p ... pport.html ).

Apparently, the United States knew for sure that by scaling up the use of FPV drones, the Ukrainian Armed Forces would try to compensate for the lack of anti-tank systems, as well as to hamper the offensive activity of the Russian Armed Forces in key areas.

As in the past year, FPV drones are an important part of the tactical defense of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in most areas. And in the future, the stake on this type of weapons will increase, especially with a reduction in the supply of artillery systems and anti-tank weapons.

In addition, quadcopters play an important role, putting serious pressure on the tactical defense/offensive zone of the Russian Armed Forces and on the logistics of our troops. Here it is worth highlighting first of all drones of the “Baba Yaga” type, which, as a rule, are also purchased and assembled on the basis of agrodrones for spraying chemicals.

In order to strike the territory of the Russian Federation, the enemy has launched mass production of aircraft-type kamikaze drones and is regularly working on improving them, trying to compensate for the lack of classic strike weapons. However, given that 95% of components for Ukrainian drones are produced ( https://forbes.ua/ru/news/95-komponenti ... 2024-25010 ) in China and Europe, and eight European countries are helping Kiev with the production of UAVs, there is no point in talking about any independence of Ukraine even in this matter.

It is also highly likely that Kiev's Western sponsors assemble a certain percentage of the drones used not on the territory of Ukraine, but in the nearest border areas - Romania and Poland, in order to avoid Russian missile strikes on production facilities. Kiev receives finished products, practically ready for use.

(c) specially for RT

https://t.me/c/1686844692/7163 - zinc

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9634544.html

Points of the "Trump plan"
January 27, 12:50

Image

Regarding the published "Trump plan" that is allegedly being considered by the Trump administration and denied in Ukraine.

1. Ban on Ukraine's admission to NATO and declaration of its neutrality.

2. Ukraine's accession to the EU by 2030, post-war reconstruction of the country falls on Europe's shoulders.

3. Ukraine does not reduce its army, the US continues post-war modernization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

4. Russia's sovereignty over the occupied territories is not officially recognized, but Ukraine refuses any attempts to return them.

5. Part of the sanctions against Russia are lifted immediately after the signing of peace and another part within three years, depending on Russia's compliance with the parameters of the agreement.

6. Export of Russian energy resources to Europe is resumed, but is subject to a duty, which will be used to restore Ukraine.

7. Autumn elections in Ukraine must be held with the participation of parties "advocating for the defense of the Russian language and peaceful coexistence with Russia." Persecution of the Russian language and the church is stopped.

8. The introduction of a European peacekeeping contingent into Ukrainian territory after the end of the conflict is left to the discretion of the parties.

These theses can only partially suit Russia.
There are questions regarding points 2,3,4 and 8.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9635769.html

No Deal.

Any other scenario and Zelensky will end up in a coffin
January 27, 10:52

Image

Trump Jr. on Zelensky's hysteria over possible negotiations between Trump and Putin.

P.S. Recently, as part of the continuation of his hysteria, the cocaine Fuhrer stated that the ban on negotiations with the Russian Federation concerns everyone except him.
At the same time, Russia does not consider him legitimate to discuss, much less sign, anything with him.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9635383.html

Google Translator
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Wed Jan 29, 2025 12:51 pm

Economic benefits of war and peace
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 01/29/2025

Image

Donald Trump's lack of interest in the war in Ukraine, which he perceives as a Biden war that must end in order to reduce his presence in Europe and focus on China, an opponent that truly worries him, has been evident since the now president announced his intention to run for president again. And although his speech has been slightly modified after the elections, more exalted in the forms but less ambitious in the ease with which he was going to achieve peace, the intentions remain the same. While waiting for the plan with which Donald Trump hopes to achieve peace to be finalized, everything indicates that it will be built on the basis of the Kellogg-Fleitz proposal published last summer by the America First Policy Institute .

At a time when the old world is dying and the new one has not yet been born, all sides are trying to convince Donald Trump with their arguments and looking for a striking speech to get the attention of the president, in whose hands lies the decision of when, how and with whom the negotiating tables will take place. From similar positions and in a newspaper owned by one of the technology oligarchs that Trump wants to get closer to in this term, Jack Keane, retired general, and Marc Thiessen, a regular conservative columnist, affirm that “to guarantee a lasting peace, we must continue to arm Ukraine, but without asking American taxpayers to foot the bill.” The two keyboard warriors, with a long career in think-tanks linked to the American military-industrial complex, the first a member of the neocon Institute for the Study of War and the second of the reactionary American Enterprise Institute, add their grain of sand to the argument that it is necessary to continue supporting Ukraine, although in exchange for economic benefit. “It is time to transform kyiv from a recipient of aid into a consumer of defense,” they say openly, adopting the idea that every move by Washington in foreign policy must have a tangible counterpart in the form of benefits.

A few weeks ago, Thiessen had already addressed Trump directly in one of his articles, asking him whether he would prefer Ukraine’s mineral resources to fall into the hands of Russia or China, a consequence he believed possible in the event of Ukraine’s defeat. These natural resources, which have been exaggerated by both Ukraine and its biggest hooligan , Lindsey Graham, are also part of the argument of the current article, which seeks to convince Donald Trump of the need to maintain the flow of economic aid to ensure Ukraine’s security, but above all, so that the United States can benefit. “The time has come for a lasting peace,” argue the authors, who start from Trump’s words in which he stated that Volodymyr Zelensky wants to reach an agreement, although the Ukrainian president’s statements openly contradict Donald Trump’s perception.

“Regardless of what happens at the negotiating table, the United States will need to supply arms to Ukraine for many years to come,” they continue, explaining that “if Putin resists Trump’s peace efforts, the president has promised to increase US military support for Ukraine to force the Russian leader to the negotiating table.” That is the basis of the Kellogg-Fleitz plan, which in reality seems to have been modified to introduce sanctions, tariffs and, above all, the threat of saturating the market with American oil in order to drastically lower the price of oil and thus make the Russian economy unable to support the continuation of the war. This option would entail the risk of destabilizing the world energy market and also making fracking, through which the United States obtains a significant part of its extractions, unviable. Even so, it seems more realistic than the naive perception that increasing the supply of arms will succeed in changing the dynamics of the front, perfectly consolidated in trench warfare with slow but sustained movements in favor of Russia.

But even beyond the war, the authors interpret that “after peace is achieved, kyiv will need American weapons to deter Russia from resuming hostilities when Trump leaves office.” The authors not only assume that he will be able to achieve the end of the conflict – something he failed to do in his first term, when he was dealing with a less complex and easier-to-resolve conflict – but they also assign him the role of guarantor of a peace that is still far away. “Trump can provide these weapons without further burdening American taxpayers,” they stress, insisting on the poor state of the Ukrainian industrial base and recalling that “assistance is not charity” but that “Ukraine has been and remains a national security interest for the United States.”

“During the 2024 campaign, Trump proposed the idea of ​​lending Ukraine money to buy American weapons,” they write, recalling the words of the then candidate: “Do it like this: Lend them the money. If they get it, they pay us back. If they don’t, they don’t have to pay us back.” “In fact, Ukraine can pay us back,” they conclude, before presenting their proposal, a plan so simple that it only has two points. Although the example is allies who buy weapons with their own funds – the authors do not remember that, sometimes, like Israel, they do so in part thanks to American subsidies – it is not even presented as a possibility that, after the economic recovery, Ukraine, one of the poorest countries in Europe before the Russian invasion, will be able to sustain its military purchases. “Do we want Putin to receive these funds?” they say, referring to the Russian assets seized by the European Union. “Or do we want the majority of it to go to the United States to buy weapons for Ukraine while rebuilding our defence industrial base?” they add, demanding that Belgium and other European countries transfer these funds to an account from which Ukraine could acquire the military equipment necessary for its defence. The proposal is not only a repetition of what Volodymyr Zelensky already proposed, who demanded the delivery of those 300 billion dollars to acquire American weapons, but it is also what Joe Biden tried, unsuccessfully, to achieve. At the risk of alienating the current president by admitting that the proposal is a carbon copy of one from his predecessor, the authors do not mention this detail and focus on the reproaches against the European countries, which they propose that Donald Trump put pressure on without realising the message that the theft of Russian assets would send to other actors, China above all, about the reliability of the European financial system. “Trump should tell allies reluctant to use frozen Russian assets for this purpose that he does not care where the money comes from, that if they do not want to use Russian money, they can replace it with their own funds obtained from their taxpayers.” “Using frozen Russian assets to produce such weapons is a win-win solution: Ukraine gets the weapons and the United States gets the money, while Russia would bear the cost of Putin’s aggression,” they conclude, not caring what the consequences would be for the financial system of their European allies.

“Although the war has devastated its economy, the country is sitting on some $26 trillion in untapped natural resources: oil, gas, essential minerals, and rare earth metals,” they add, presenting the second option, using the country’s mineral wealth to compensate the United States for future arms flows. “Ukraine’s mineral and hydrocarbon resources can be used as collateral for loans to purchase American defense equipment, allowing Kiev to provide for its own defense,” they say, going on to present two options by which Ukraine could use these riches to obtain weapons: “we can supply arms to Ukraine through a Lend-Lease program similar to the one the United States used to arm Great Britain during World War II” or “Ukraine can also purchase American weapons using another existing program: Direct Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Loans, such as those we provide to U.S. allies and partners around the world.” In both cases, the proposal is to further increase Ukraine's already worryingly high external debt, although this time jeopardizing control over natural resources that could enable future economic growth and independence.

“In order not to shift the costs to the American taxpayer, the structure of such an agreement could be negotiated so that Ukraine would guarantee these loans with its vast natural resources,” they conclude, again repeating the main objective of the proposal: the economic benefit of the proxy.
https://slavyangrad.es/2025/01/29/benef ... de-la-paz/

Google Translator

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From Cassad's Telegram account:


Colonelcassad
⚡️Summary of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation (as of 29 January 2025)

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation continue to conduct a special military operation.

- Units of the North group of forces in the Kharkov direction inflicted losses on formations of the motorized infantry and assault brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the areas of the settlements of Liptsy and Volchansk in the Kharkov region.

The enemy lost up to 30 servicemen, an armoured combat vehicle, a car and two field artillery guns.

- Units of the West group of forces improved their tactical situation. Defeat was inflicted on the manpower and equipment of the tank, mechanized, assault brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the National Guard brigade in the areas of the settlements of Topoli, Lozovaya, Zeleny Gai in the Kharkov region and Grigorovka in the Donetsk People's Republic.

The enemy's losses amounted to 320 servicemen, a tank, three combat armored vehicles, including two US-made M113 armored personnel carriers, eight cars, six field artillery pieces, including two Western-made ones, and two Nota electronic warfare stations. Three ammunition depots were destroyed.

- Units of the "Southern" group of forces occupied more advantageous lines and positions. Formations of two mechanized brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and two territorial defense brigades were defeated in the areas of the settlements of Verkhnekamenskoye, Yantarnoye, Orekhovo-Vasilevka and Chasov Yar of the Donetsk People's Republic.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces' losses amounted to 220 servicemen, three combat armored vehicles, five cars, and two field artillery pieces.

- As a result of active actions, units of the "Center" group of forces liberated the settlement of Novoyelizavetovka of the Donetsk People's Republic.

The manpower and equipment of three mechanized brigades, a Jaeger brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and a National Guard brigade were defeated in the areas of the settlements of Andreevka, Novopavlovka, Udachnoye, Shcherbinovka and Tarasovka of the Donetsk People's Republic.

The enemy lost up to 520 servicemen, a tank, seven armored combat vehicles, including two US-made M113 armored personnel carriers, seven cars, five field artillery guns and an American AN/TPQ-37 counter-battery radar.

- Units of the "East" force group continued to advance deep into the enemy's defenses. Defeat was inflicted on formations of a mechanized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, a marine brigade and a territorial defense brigade in the areas of the settlements of Razliv and Konstantinopol of the Donetsk People's Republic.

The enemy's losses amounted to over 135 servicemen, a tank and four field artillery guns, including one gun of Western manufacture.

- Units of the Dnipro group of forces inflicted damage on the manpower and equipment of the mechanized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the territorial defense brigade in the areas of the settlements of Mala Tokmachka in the Zaporizhia region and Antonovka in the Kherson region.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine lost more than 50 servicemen and four vehicles.

- Operational-tactical aviation, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, missile troops and artillery of the groups of troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation inflicted damage on the infrastructure of military airfields, production workshops, storage warehouses and assembly sites for unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned boats, as well as concentrations of enemy manpower and equipment in 156 districts.

- Air defense systems shot down 165 aircraft-type unmanned aerial vehicles.

- Since the beginning of the special military operation, a total of 652 aircraft, 283 helicopters, 41,800 unmanned aerial vehicles, 590 anti-aircraft missile systems, 20,887 tanks and other armored combat vehicles, 1,510 multiple launch rocket systems, 21,041 field artillery and mortar guns, and 30,878 special military vehicles have been destroyed

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

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Servility and Political Mimicry by Ukraine’s Comprador Elites as They Face Military Defeat
Posted by Internationalist 360° on January 27, 2025
Dmitri Kovalevich

Image

The Ukrainian political elite has always been famous for its skills in mimicry. Many started out as Soviet functionaries, then became pro-Russian politicians. Today, most are flirting with far-right Ukrainian nationalism and neo-Nazism. More than coincidentally, Zelensky is a mimic and comedian by profession. The dictionary definition explains that “a comedian is someone who entertains audiences using many techniques, one of which is mimicry and impression.”

In the second half of January 2025, Ukrainians are observing how the battered country’s political and military leaders and economic elites are eager to bow to the whims of the new president of the United States and are hoping that officials of the new Trump-led administration in Washington will treat them kindly. Their rhetoric is accordingly shifting, becoming ruder and harsher as they seek to adapt and adjust to the new master of the White House. It is reminiscent somewhat of the behavior of courtiers and lackeys in France during the 17th century whenever a change of monarch was in the air.

French newspaper Le Monde noted on January 17 that Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelensky (whose electoral mandate as president of coup Ukraine expired ten months ago) now imitates Trump’s foul language and mannerisms when speaking English as he flatters and compliments the new president of the United States elected in November 2024.

Zelensky used his new style in a recent interview with US podcaster Lex Fridman. The interview was directed to a largely U.S. audience and it did not go over well in Ukraine, as Zelensky frequently resorted to using foul and insulting language directed at the leaders of the Russian Federation. He also directed criticism against those in the West who would criticize his administration. His performance was something not seen before and was likely encouraged by the technocrats surrounding him, thinking that it would appeal to Trump and his handlers.

“This [the obscenities] were necessary,” Ukrainian political scientist Oleksiy Koshel affirmed to a Ukrainian news outlet on January 6. “This is actually one of the last opportunities to use media to reach Trump, his electorate, and his handlers, just two weeks before his inauguration.” But the same report also cites Koshel cautioning, “On issues of corruption, either Zelensky’s presidential team or the one that follows will need to talk to our Western partners not only in the language of emotion and slogans but also in the language of concrete steps against corruption, with an action plan backed by laws. That language will be much better received.”

Koshel also noted that Western media is reporting that Zelensky has never once thanked former US president Joseph Biden for all the military and financial assistance provided to Kiev by the Biden administration. Zelensky said on January 16 that he is ultimately disappointed with the Biden administration because of delays in weapons supplies and financing, as well as past refusals prior to the Russian military intervention begun in 2022 to tighten certain sanctions against Russia.

Ukrainian economist Oleksiy Kushch explains that representatives of aid-receiving, liberal NGOs in Ukraine operating in the sphere of the US Democratic Party are now deleting past anti-Trump posts. He says they continue to gnash their teeth against Republicans and conservatives in general, simultaneously growling and wagging their tails. “Like a dog that doesn’t know what to expect: a blow with a stick or a piece of sausage,” Kusch writes.

Ukrainian legislator Alexander Dubinsky (a former member of Zelensky’s party) wrote on Telegram on January 16 that ever since 2014, one of the key tasks of the liberal elites in Ukraine who supported past-president Petro Poroshenko (2014-2019) and then Zelensky after that has been to silence and destroy any among their elite ranks who might advocate normalization of relations with Russia. Zelensky, in his opinion, dialed up the hate to the maximum, using all the punitive mechanisms available to the Ukrainian state to squeeze out of media, politics, and business any opponents of the course that was rapidly leading to war. “Anyone who allowed himself or herself to question the suicidal nationalist course and the violent severance of cultural, economic and social ties with the Russian Federation was labeled an ‘agent of the Kremlin’ and covered in mud by a bunch of hand-me-down, foreign aid-receiving ‘patriots’.”

The Ukrainian ruling class benefits from prolonging as long as possible the military hostilities with Russia and related martial law and compulsory conscription. All this and more has made many of them rich during the past three years. But much of the Ukrainian military hierarchy is now telling legislators that it is desirable to end the war in the first half of this year. Strana.ua reports on Telegram on January 17 that legislator Anatoliy Burmich recently met with personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and was told by them in no uncertain terms that the war should end soon. He was told that military assistance from the West was inadequate for continuing to prosecute a war. Burmych expressed hope that the war would soon be ended by a compromise.

Another Ukrainian legislator, Maryana Bezuglaya, also from Zelensky’s party, writes a contrarian viewpoint on January 16. “The war will continue until one of the sides surrenders. I wish you could open this post in one year’s time and say I was wrong, but reality must be viewed with eyes wide open.”

Zelensky told a meeting in Warsaw on January 16 with displaced Ukrainians that they should ignore the politicians and other voices talking about holding national elections in Ukraine. He restated his argument voiced earlier in January that elections for the head of state and the Rada (national legislature) can only take place after the end of the ‘hot stage’ of war with Russia has finished and on condition that Ukraine is in a strong military position. He advised to “unscrew the heads of those politicians who still continue to engage in talk of elections”. Thus is revealed in ugly detail his plan to remain an unelected dictator of Ukraine, a country promoted by Western media and governments as being a ‘model of democracy’.

The Ukrainian analytical channel Rubicon on Telegram summarizes the situation, “A frankly inverted picture has developed in Ukraine. All the attributes of despotisms are introduced into Ukraine using declarations of fealty to Western values: From sealed borders to beatings of defenseless military conscripts. This leads, in turn, to cognitive dissonance in government and disruption and disorder in the entire political system.”

Tymoshenko joins the chorus

Yuliya Tymoshenko, prime minister of Ukraine from December 2007 to March 2010 and one of the leaders of the ‘color’ revolution in Ukraine during that time, is also trying to sidle up to the new US administration. In mid-January, Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg canceled a planned visit to Kiev until certain issues (unnamed in media reporting) are clarified. Tymoshenko rushed to meet Kellogg in Paris, joining him at a conference of Iranian counter-revolutionaries (who have long been backed by the Western powers). There, she joined the chorus, lashing out against Iran and calling for ever-more sanctions against the country, no doubt buoyed by the recent success of the regime change war waged by the Western powers against Syria since 2011.

For her Ukrainian audience, Tymoshenko is criticizing what she rhetorically calls Ukraine’s transformation into a colony of the West. “Ukraine has become the first and only country in the world where its own constitutional court is composed of unknown international players,” she laments.

Tymoshenko cannot deny the dependent and subordinate status that has been voluntarily accepted by the ruling elite of Ukraine that came to power in the coup of February 2014. She was an enthusiastic supporter of the coup, but today reads well the negative mood in the country towards the war with Russia. Hence her adoption of rhetoric purportedly criticizing the sad evolution of events since 2014 through which Ukraine has become a vassal of the Western powers.

Coup Ukraine as a vassal of Britain

On the eve of Trump’s inauguration, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer hurriedly arrived in Kiev to conclude a ‘100-year pact’ of assistance to Ukraine. The very name ‘100-year pact’ causes a great deal of skeptical comments in Ukrainian society because people here are entirely unsure about tomorrow. Any talk of ‘plans’ for the next 100 years can only bring forth a chuckle. Commentators in Ukraine recall the mutual aid treaty agreed between Great Britain and Poland in March 1939. That treaty did nothing to help Poland a mere six months later when Germany invaded and World War II began.

Warsaw was liberated from Nazi occupation in January 1945, but not by the British army or those of its Western allies. The city was liberated by the Red Army of the Soviet Union and allied partisan forces in Poland. The liberation cost some 100,000 lives of the Red Army and allied Polish forces.

Ukrainian political scientist and historian Kost Bondarenko commented on January 16 about this newest agreement between Kiev and the government in London. “Regarding the signing of this ‘100-year agreement’ between Ukraine and Great Britain, I can say as a historian that nothing is more short-term than ‘100-year’ or ‘eternal’ treaties. Imagine that Britain had signed a certain treaty with a certain country 100 years ago, in early 1925. Since that time, Britain has had five monarchs and 24 prime ministers, survived World War II and seven economic crises, lost most of its remaining colonies, and ceased to be an empire. Are there any treaties signed by London in 1925 or before that have not lost their relevance?”

In the new agreement, Britain pledges to provide Ukraine with military assistance in 2025 equivalent to US$6.6 billion and $3 billion equivalent each year after that “for as long as necessary”. In exchange, British investors ate to secure a status of ‘preferred investment partners’ in Ukraine’s energy industry, extraction of essential minerals, and ‘environmentally friendly’ steel production, according to the Ukrainian weekly magazine Dzerkalo Tyzhnya. The magazine cites Ukraine’s ambassador to London Valeriy Zaluzhnyy as a source. He is the former commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Here in plain view, one sees the plans by capitalists in Britain to take over Ukrainian minerals and natural resources.

The British government will also study the possibility of placing military bases and other military infrastructure in Ukraine. Zelensky announced further on January 15 that the ‘100-year’ agreement with the UK contains secret clauses. Zelensky’s words were received with bewilderment in Ukraine because, as usual, he and his administration have not disclosed the content of such secret clauses.

Former Ukrainian legislator and radical nationalist Igor Mosiychuk claims that Ukraine is becoming a vassal of a new, hoped-for British Empire. “Do you know who created the original British Empire, friends?”, he writes. “It was the East India Trading Company, which siphoned resources from India and other colonies in order to nourish the island of Britain. It now seems that the ‘East India Company’ is rising from the dead, with its tentacles reaching for the natural energy resources of our motherland. Having broken out of economic and political dependence on Moscow, Zelensky is preparing Ukrainians to kiss the boots of a new master.”

The Telegraph newspaper in Britain reported on January 17 that the British government is also now discussing the formation of a special regiment of Ukrainians in the British army. Such an initiative would assist London in gaining returns from its military aid to Kiev and, conveniently, it would help solve the recruitment crisis of the British army. A parallel is now being drawn with the ‘Gurkhas’ (ethnic Nepalis) who served in the British colonial army and took an active part in suppressing past, anti-colonial revolts in India.

In fact, the Ukrainians now being forcibly conscripted may be viewed as analogous to the colonial troops that France and Britain always used extensively in European and colonial wars during the 19th and 20th centuries, Africans and Indians, among many others, were cajoled or kidnapped into British military units and thrown into the trenches.

Forcibly conscripted Ukrainians have already deserted from military training camps in France. Perhaps the military authorities in Western countries will block future desertions by encircling their training camps for Ukrainians with barbed wire?

Ukraine’s comprador elite against Ukrainians

The Ukrainian political elite has always been famous for its skills in mimicry. Many started out as Soviet functionaries, then became pro-Russian politicians. Today, most are flirting with far-right Ukrainian nationalism and neo-Nazism. More than coincidentally, Zelensky is a mimic and comedian by profession. The dictionary definition explains that “a comedian is someone who entertains audiences using many techniques, one of which is mimicry and impression.”

Ukrainian publicist Serhiy Datsyuk says the Ukrainian elite has done nothing but plunder the country’s people and resources for the past 30 years, and Ukrainians are beginning to recognize this across the board. He writes, “It is very difficult to destroy half of the country’s population in 30 years, but we managed. This shows that we Ukrainians don’t need Ukraine, and therefore no one else needs it, either. Our elite has robbed the country of resources and infrastructure and did not give a damn about the people.” In his opinion, it is pointless to ‘save’ Ukraine under Western tutelage because the country is in freefall and there is nothing left to save in such a format. The creation of external enemies, that is, the ‘Russians’, has been just another excuse for the authorities to relieve themselves of responsibility.

In January, a statement by Vitaliy Portnikov, a well-known Ukrainian journalist and a columnist of the US-funded Radio Liberty, emphasized the class division of society which has only intensified during the war. His words resonated widely in Ukrainian society. According to him, the very essence of a Western-inspired ‘democratic’ society is that the poor should perish while the rich should prosper.

“Now we are hearing from the people that legislators should go to war and only then will they, the people, go too. No, people, you don’t understand. This is a ‘democratic’ state, and in such a state, the lot of the common man is to die for his country. If we want aristocrats to die for the state, we must recognize this feudal country and then act as occurred during the Great French Revolution.”

Earlier Ukrainian nationalists in their ideological works divided Ukrainians into ‘warriors’, of which they considered themselves to be a part, and ‘sheep’, in the form of ordinary workers and farmers. This ideology was the cornerstone that underlay the pro-Western desires of Ukrainian nationalists to rule the country. However, the realities of the clash with the Russian army are leading to a revision of these basic attitudes. The nationalist, pro-Western ‘warrior’ elite is afraid to be at the front. It prefers to attack the Russian army using the bodies and lives of forcibly conscripted farmers and other disenfranchised.

The Western media is nothing but cynical before this reality. It admires the ‘heroism’ of Ukrainians. But in their vast numbers, Ukrainians no longer wish to fight and are trying to flee from the concentration camp that their armed forces and the entire country have become. In a grim irony (and tragedy), Western countries are now supplying Ukrainian border guards with modern drones to track and catch fugitives at the country’s borders seeking real freedom… by fleeing a country that has become little more than a warmaking vassal of Western imperialism.

https://libya360.wordpress.com/2025/01/ ... ry-defeat/

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Is Trump positioning for a “no-deal” with Russia – or not?

Alastair Crooke

January 28, 2025

The idea of inflicting “strategic defeats” on Russia has been a cornerstone of U.S. policy for so long a time that it transcends party lines

Trump’s rhetoric about Russia having lost 1 million men in the Ukraine conflict is not just nonsense (the real number not even reaching 100,000), but his resort to it underlines that the usual meme of Trump being just woefully misinformed is looking less and less plausible.

After touting the 1 million Russian deaths, Trump then suggests that Putin is destroying Russia by not making a deal. Adding (seemingly as an aside), that Putin may have already made up his mind ‘not to make a deal’.

Instead, in a curiously disinterested way, Trump remarks that negotiations would depend entirely on whether Putin is interested or not. He further claims that Russia’s economy is in ruins, and most notably says that he would consider sanctioning or tariffing Russia, if Putin does not make a deal. In a subsequent Truth Social post, Trump writes, “I’m going to do Russia, whose Economy is failing, and President Putin, a very big FAVOR”.

This – plainly said – is a narrative of an entirely different order: No longer is it his Envoy Kellogg or another team member saying it; it is Trump’s own words as President. Trump answers a journalist’s question ‘Would [he] sanction Russia’ should Putin not come to the negotiating table? To which he responds, “that sounds likely”.

What, we might ask, is Trump’s strategy? It seems more as though it is Trump that is preparing for a ‘no deal’. He must be aware that Putin repeatedly has made plain that he is both interested and open to talks with Trump. There is no doubt about that.

Yet Trump subsequently contradicts the ‘loser discourse’ in yet another apparent after-thought: “I mean … it’s a big machine so, eventually things will happen …”.

Here he appears to be saying that the Russian ‘big machine’ ultimately will win. Russia will be a winner – and not a loser.

Maybe Trump is thinking simply to let the dynamics of the military ‘trial of strength’ play out. (If that is his thinking, he cannot utter such sentiment out loud – explicitly – as the Euro-élites would sink even further into a pathological tailspin).

Alternatively, were Trump to be seriously seeking productive negotiations with Putin, it is certainly not a good way to start by being deeply disrespectful towards the Russian people – depicting them and President Putin as ‘losers’ who desperately need a deal; whereas the reality was that it was Trump who earlier had touted getting a deal within 24 hours. His disrespect will rankle – not just with Putin – but for most Russians.

The ‘loser narrative’ simply will stiffen Russian opposition to a Ukraine compromise.

The backdrop is that Russia in any case collectively eschews the idea of any compromise that “boils down to freezing the conflict along the line of engagement: that will give time to rearm the remnants of the Ukrainian army, and then start a new round of hostilities. So, that we have to fight again, but this time from less advantageous political positions”, as Professor Sergei Karaganov has noted.

Moreover, “the Trump administration has no reason to negotiate with us on the terms we [Russia] have set. The war is economically beneficial to the U.S. … and [possibly] also to removing Russia as the powerful strategic support of America’s main competitor ? China”.

Professor Dmitri Trenin similarly predicts that,

“Trump’s bid to secure a ceasefire along Ukraine’s battle lines will fail. The American plan ignores Russia’s security concerns and disregards the root causes of the conflict. Meanwhile, Moscow’s conditions will remain unacceptable to Washington, as they would effectively mean Kiev’s capitulation and the West’s strategic defeat. In response Trump will impose additional sanctions on Moscow. Despite strong anti-Russian rhetoric, U.S. aid to Ukraine will decrease, shifting much of the burden onto Western European nations”.

So why cast Russia as contemptible ‘losers’, unless this forms Trump’s strategy for walking away from the Ukraine issue? If a clear-cut U.S. ‘victory narrative’ seems beyond reach, then why not invert the narrative?‘Mission accomplished’ being obstructed solely by Russia’s ‘loser streak’.

This inevitably leads to the question of what is the meaning – exactly – of the return of America’s “most famous criminal defendant to the White House”, and his promise of a “revolution of common sense”?

“There is no doubt that it is revolutionary”, Matt Taibbi argues:

“Trump galvanized [income mal-distribution] resentment, creating a political Sherman’s march that left institutional America smouldering. The corporate press is dead. The Democratic Party is in schism. Academia is about to swallow a giant bottle of bitter pills, and after the executive orders signed Monday: a lot of DEI instructors will have to learn to code” [i.e., will be unemployed].

Yes, Taibbi observes,

“it makes me nervous to see a murderer’s row of censorious CEOs (particularly Bezos, Pinchai, and the repulsive Cook) sitting in front of Trump, together with other Wall Street luminaries … nonetheless, if the deal was support for Trump in exchange for platforms going back to being merely self-interested profit-gobblers, I’ll take it over the previous cabal. The Wall Street Journal was probably closest to capturing the essence of that idea of the event with yesterday’s header, “The New Oligarchy is a Vast Improvement on the Old””.

Yet to many Russians, however, the impression left by Trump’s ‘loser’ discourse is that ‘nothing changes’ – the idea of inflicting ‘strategic defeats’ on Russia has been a cornerstone of U.S. policy for so long a time that it transcends party lines and is implemented regardless of which administration occupies the White House. And today, a new impetus is apparent – as Nikolai Patrushev warns, Moscow expects Washington artificially to foment friction between Russia and China.

Steve Bannon however, in his usual florid language, goes some way to explain the conundrum of a revolutionary Trump and his disappointing ‘loser discourse’.

Bannon warns that Ukraine risks becoming ‘Trump’s Vietnam’, should Trump fail to make a ‘clean break’, and allow himself to be sucked deeper into the Ukraine war. “That’s what happened to Richard Nixon. He ended up owning the war and it went down as his war – not Lyndon Johnson’s”, Bannon noted.

Bannon “advocates ending America’s all-important military aid to Kyiv, but fears his old boss is going to fall into a trap being set by an unlikely alliance of the U.S. defence industry, the Europeans and even some of Bannon’s own friends, whom he argues are now misguided”.

Bannon’s underpinning premise was made clear during his Zoom call with Alex Krainer. He confirmed that Trump and his team will go on the offensive from day one in office: “The days of thunder begin on Monday”. Bannon wasn’t talking about Trump going on the offensive against the Chinese, Iranians or the Russians, however. Trump and his team are preparing to take on the “they””.

“They”, in Bannon’s words, “are the people who control the world’s most powerful empire and, elections or no elections, democracy or no democracy, they will not voluntarily relinquish their privileges and the control: there will be a fight”.

Yes, the ‘real war’ is the domestic one — not that against Russia, China or Iran, which could become diversions from the main battle.

For comparative purposes, were Trump’s aim truly to agree a negotiated Ukraine ‘compromise’, we need to contrast his rhetorical blatant ‘loser’ jibe with that of John F. Kennedy’s attempt, 59 years ago, to break the cycle of mutual antipathy that had frozen relations between East and West since 1945. Stung by the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Kennedy wanted to break an ossified paradigm. Kennedy – like Trump – sought to ‘End Wars’; to be recorded in history as a ‘peace-maker’.

In a speech at the American University in Washington on 10 June, 1963, JFK praised the Russians. He spoke of their achievements in science, the arts and industry; he saluted their sacrifices in the Second World War where they lost 25 million people, one-third of their territory and two-thirds of their economy.

It was no exercise in empty rhetoric. Kennedy proposed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty – the first of the arms-control agreements of the 1960s and 1970s.

Well, there may be inklings of a Bannon-inspired tentative ‘clean break’ beginning – as Larry Johnson notes:

“The Pentagon reportedly has fired or suspended all personnel directly responsible for managing military assistance to Ukraine. They will all face an investigation into the use of U.S. budget money.

“Laura Cooper, the Pentagon’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, has already resigned, marking the beginning of what some see as a strategic pivot. Cooper was a key figure in overseeing $126 billion in military aid to Ukraine. Her departure, coupled with what appears to be a housecleaning of Pentagon staff tied to Kiev’s war effort, casts doubt on whether Ukraine will continue to enjoy the open spigot of U.S. weapons and funding it received under Biden.

“The restructuring also casts a shadow over the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, which under Lloyd Austin had expanded into a 50-nation coalition supporting Kiev”.

The U.S. has reportedly withdrawn all applications to contractors for logistics through Rzeszow, Constanta and Varna. At NATO bases in Europe, all shipments to Ukraine have been suspended and closed. This falls under Trump’s Executive Order halting global U.S. assistance for 90 days – pending an audit and cost-benefit analysis.

Meanwhile, Moscow and China are duly preparing against the prospect of diplomatic re-engagement with the now President Trump. Xi and Putin held a 95 minute video call a few hours after Trump’s impromptu news conference in the Oval Office – Xi gave Putin the details of his conversation with Trump (which was not timed to coincide with Trump’s inauguration, but rather had been scheduled in December).

Both leaders appear to be sending a common message to Trump — i.e., the alliance between China and Russia is not ephemeral. They are united in common cause to work jointly to assert their respective national interests. They are willing to talk to Trump and engage in serious negotiations. Yet, they refuse to be bullied or threatened.

Nikolai Patrushev, Adviser to Putin and member of Russia’s Security Council, gave the Russian context to this video call between the two leaders:

“For the Biden administration, Ukraine was an unconditional priority. It is clear, [Patrushev says], that the relationship between Trump and Biden is antagonistic. Therefore, Ukraine will not be among Trump’s priorities. He cares more about China”.

Pointedly, Patrushev warned:

“I think Washington’s disagreements with Beijing will worsen, and the Americans will inflate them, including artificially. For us, China has been and remains the most important partner with whom we are connected by relations of privileged strategic cooperation”.

“As for the Russian line in relation to Ukraine, it remains unchanged. It is important for us that the tasks of the Special Operation are solved. They are known and have not changed. I believe that negotiations on Ukraine should be conducted between Russia and the United States without the participation of other Western countries”.

“I want to emphasize once again that the Ukrainian people remain close to us: brotherly and bound by centuries-old ties with Russia, no matter how much Kiev propagandists obsess with ‘Ukrainianness’ claim to the contrary. We care about what is happening in Ukraine. It is especially disturbing [therefore] that violent coercion to neo-Nazi ideology and ardent Russophobia destroy the once prosperous cities of Ukraine, including Kharkiv, Odessa, Nikolaev, Dnipropetrovsk”.

“It is possible that in the coming year Ukraine will cease to exist altogether”.


https://strategic-culture.su/news/2025/ ... ia-or-not/

******

Brief report from the front, January 28, 2025

The Ukrainian Armed Forces no longer expect to hold on to Chasov Yar. Report by Marat Khairullin with illustrations by Mikhail Popov.
Zinderneuf
Jan 28, 2025

Image
ЛБС 10.11.24=Line of Combat Contact November 10th, 2024. ЛБС 01.01.25=Line of Combat Contact January 1st, 2025. Участок Продвижения=Area of Advancement.

The Russian Defense Ministry announced that as a result of decisive actions by units of the Zapad group of forces, the settlement of Dvurechnaya (Dvorichna) has been liberated. The capture of this settlement has further strengthened our bridgehead on the right bank of the Oskol. Expanding the bridgehead along the river provides more opportunities for establishing crossings and saturating it with equipment for further offensive actions.

South of Dvurechnaya, our forces continue to press in the direction of Doroshevka. There are reports that in the area of ​​Zapadnoe, they managed to get beyond the P79 highway. West of Doroshevka is the settlement of Monachinovka, which is very important from a logistical point of view, where two supply routes for the Ukrainian Armed Forces converge.

The advance in the area of ​​Zapadnoe also plays a role in the formation of a support area for the subsequent exit to the dominant height north of Kupyansk, located in the area of ​​Kandrashevka (Kindrashivka).

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ЛБС 02.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 2nd, 2025. Продвижение, Зона активности=Advance/Zone of Activity. (The opposing forces are in different layers, like a layer cake, with alternating layers of control.)

Fighting continues in Chasov Yar in the northwest of the city. At the same time, our troops are moving ever further south to the Dneprovsky pond area, building up forces effectively in the rear of the Ukrainian Armed Forces units that have dug in near the high-rise buildings. In the high-rise buildings themselves, our troops are gradually advancing in their southern quarters and have begun active combat operations in the high-rise buildings west of the refractory plant. Reports have begun to appear that the enemy has begun to leave the quarters in small groups, leaving the main forces there for now to hold back our troops for at least some time. Even the enemy does not see any possibility of holding on to the city.

The forest area in the southwest of the Novy microdistrict is also gradually being cleared of the enemy. Having previously secured a foothold in the territory of a children's camp, our assault groups have advanced further west and taken control of the so-called "Bunker." This is a fortified structure with helicopter pads located nearby, which has housed the Ukrainian Armed Forces command post since the ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation). Fighting has also intensified in the south of the area. Our units are pressing in the direction of the settlement of Stupochki.

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ЛБС 01.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 1st, 2025. Участок Активности=Area of Activity.

In Toretsk, the Russian Armed Forces are advancing towards the settlement of Krymskoe, which has almost completely come under our control. Increasingly active clashes are taking place on the territory of the Toretskaya mine. The actions of Russian forces are aimed not only at the industrial site, but advance groups have already begun to enter the waste heaps of this mine. It is reported that almost the entire city is under the control of our troops. There are separate pockets of resistance, located mainly on the northern outskirts of the city.

https://maratkhairullin.substack.com/p/ ... anuary-963

******

Putin on peace talks with Ukraine
January 28, 21:01

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Putin on peace talks with Ukraine.

1. Negotiations with Ukraine began at the beginning of the Central Military District, Moscow offered Kiev to "leave" the LPR and DPR, and then there would be no hostilities.
2. In the spring of 2022, Russia withdrew troops from Kiev, although it understood that deception on the part of Ukraine was quite possible. Russia was deceived for decades. Nevertheless, for reasons of preventing bloodshed and a serious war, we nevertheless agreed to this and began withdrawing troops from Kiev at the end of March.
3. In 2022, Moscow received signals from Kiev that it would fight to the last Ukrainian. The West persuaded Kiev to continue the war.
4. Zelensky is now an illegitimate leader and cannot lift his own ban on negotiations with the Russian Federation, but if desired, there are ways to do this. You can negotiate with anyone, but Zelensky, due to his illegitimacy, cannot sign anything.
5. Lawyers must confirm the legitimacy of those people whom Kiev will authorize to sign a possible agreement with Moscow.
6. Everything will end in 1.5-2 months if Ukraine runs out of "sponsorship money and cartridges". Ukraine's sovereignty in this sense is zero.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9638734.html

On the progress of the battles for the liberation of Chasy Yar
January 29, 15:06

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On the progress of the battles for the liberation of Chasy Yar

Today I watched a video from RT ( https://t.me/rt_russian/228500 ) about the combat work of the Akhmat Shustry volunteer special forces group in the forest area south of the Novoye microdistrict in Chasov Yar.

The old Chasovyarovets camp, located in the Donnaya Balka forest area, has long been a major fortified area of ​​the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which drank a lot of blood from Russian army units during the battle for Chasov Yar. During the summer campaign, the above-mentioned forest was literally teeming with enemy personnel, electronic warfare systems and equipment. Hexacopters and FPV drones were launched from there, and the operators themselves used well-prepared shelters that saved them from artillery strikes.

Entering the forest (in the slang of the direction it was also called the "southern faggot forest") at the time of the summer campaign was practically impossible due to the convenient location of the forest itself behind the "Seversky Donetsk-Donbass" canal, which was also a serious fortified area of ​​the enemy - a huge number of fortified positions were dug along the canal line, the defeat of which was difficult due to the specifics of their location under the canal pipe (by the way, the pipe itself was actively used by units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to move out of sight of UAVs).

At a certain point, the attack aircraft managed to break the enemy's defense in this section of the canal, after which the fighting moved to the outskirts of the forest. Since the Armed Forces of Ukraine at that time began to lose city blocks and there was a complication in the supply and evacuation from the "southern faggot forest", the number of enemies there significantly decreased - instead of them, the Armed Forces of Ukraine began to more actively use strike FPV, in which, unfortunately, they do not experience a shortage.

As the city blocks "fell away" and the assault groups entered the forest, we managed to push through the remnants of the enemy's defense, and the "icing on the cake" was the assault on the buildings of the "Chasovyarovets" camp, shown in the RT report. In the summer, this camp had a powerful electronic warfare system, which did not allow our units to conduct reconnaissance properly. Perhaps one of the city's defense PPUs was located there (although the main ones were in the five-story block until about September, after which the garrison leadership had to change its location due to frequent FAB of the area).

I would like to congratulate our colleagues on taking an important fortified area, which at one time caused us a lot of problems. There will be more to come, the fall of Chasy Yar is just around the corner, and after taking control of the city, certain opportunities for further work will open up for us.

We continue to work in this direction.

t.me/project_nd - zinc

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9640074.html

DeepSeek about SVO
January 29, 13:18

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The hyped Chinese neural network DeepSeek that crashed the American stock market by a trillion dollars about the best Russian generals in the war in Ukraine.
One person on the list will definitely make you smile.

The best Russian generals during the Northern Military District (as of 2025)

Below are the key military leaders whose actions had a significant impact on the course of hostilities in the Northern Military District zone. The information is based on the analysis of operations and public assessments of experts.

1. Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev

Key achievements:
Led the assault on Avdiivka, a strategic fortified area of ​​the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which had been defended since 2014. The operation included a breakthrough through sewer collectors and the encirclement of the enemy 114.
Led the offensive on Pokrovsk, Kurakhovo, and Selidovo, which allowed the country to approach the borders of the Dnipropetrovsk region.
Commanded the Center group, which liberated more than 4.5 thousand square kilometers of territory in 2024.

2. General Mikhail Teplinsky

Role:
Commander of the Southern Group of Forces, responsible for key operations in the South Donetsk direction.
Under his leadership, successes were achieved in the encirclement of Vuhledar, where the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost the 72nd Brigade
. He received high marks from colleagues and privates for his tactical flexibility and resource management.

3. General Sergey Surovikin ("Armageddon")

Features:
Known for his tough tactics and effective use of artillery.
In 2024-2025, he carried out missions outside of Ukraine, including operations in Africa, which emphasizes his strategic importance.
Previously, he participated in organizing the defense in the Kharkov direction, where the troops managed to push the Ukrainian Armed Forces away from the Belgorod region.

4. General Timur Ivanov

Context:
Despite criminal prosecution on suspicion of fraud, experts note his contribution to the logistics and supply of troops.
Participated in the planning of operations in the early stages of the Central Military District, including organizing the supply of equipment and ammunition.

5. Colonel General (name not specified)

Operations of the Vostok group:
Led the capture of Vuhledar, which the Ukrainian Armed Forces had turned into an "impregnable fortress."
Used operational encirclement tactics, which led to the defeat of elite Ukrainian units.

Key success factors:

Encirclement tactics: Using "cauldrons" to block enemy forces (e.g. Vuhledar, Avdiivka)

Hypersonic weapons: Using Oreshnik missiles to strike critical Ukrainian Armed Forces targets, such as the Yuzhmash plant.

Coordination with other branches of the armed forces: Combining aviation, artillery, and infantry in operations near Chasovy Yar and Pokrovsk.

Forecasts for 2025:

General Mordvichev may lead the Russian advance to the Dnieper.
The role of hypersonic systems and drones is expected to increase, which will require commanders to adapt their tactics.

The neural network threw it together in about 3 minutes.
You can use it for free here https://www.deepseek.com/
Neural networks will soon kill the market for writing essays and short articles to order. A few more years and that's it.
On the other hand, the value of good original texts will increase.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9639919.html

Google Translator
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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blindpig
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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Thu Jan 30, 2025 2:11 pm

Dialogue through the media
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 01/30/2025

Image

In 2019, the arrival to power of Volodymyr Zelensky, who had largely defeated the hated Petro Poroshenko, with whom communication had become practically non-existent, brought a certain dose of optimism to Moscow, which for a short time had the feeling of having a new interlocutor with whom it would be possible to negotiate. Zelensky had won the elections by presenting himself as the antithesis of Poroshenko, whom he had mocked for his repeated promises to recover Crimea and whom he had criticised for his nationalist drift, and who had promised to repeal the laws that the Russian-speaking population considered most discriminatory. The fine words about repealing the laws that regulated the use of the language, created specifically to progressively remove the Russian language, which is the vehicular language in much of the country, were forgotten in the electoral campaign once the votes of that part of the population had been obtained. Instead of limiting the effects of this nationalist legislation, President Zelensky displayed the authoritarianism that still haunts him and continued down this path, becoming less and less different from his former rival.

Russian disappointment was most evident when it became clear that Zelensky was not going to take the Minsk agreements seriously either, and despite the declaration of the Normandy Format summit, in which Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia renewed their commitment to the roadmap, the Ukrainian president confirmed to his French and German allies his intention not to implement what had been agreed. That was the last summit in which both Putin and Zelensky participated in person. The Normandy Format was shelved or limited to the level of ministers or advisors until the breakdown in February 2022. There is no indication that there was direct communication between the presidents during the negotiation process in Istanbul, and the summit of heads of state in which both were to ratify the agreement that Medinsky and Arajamia believed they had in April 2022 never took place. The end of the diplomatic route, which condemned the war to escalation and to increased suffering, destruction and misery for the population and the country, also meant silence between the two countries, which during this time have negotiated indirectly through mediators and with a dialogue limited to certain economic issues (such as the agreement on the export of grain from the Black Sea) or humanitarian issues (the exchange of prisoners of war or the bodies of soldiers killed at the front).

Despite the lack of contact, the last few days have shown a cross-communication between the two presidents that could practically be considered a negotiation and that is taking place through the media. Wars have always had a communication component and the current situation lends itself even more to using the media to demand, offer or negotiate. The immediacy in the distribution of messages and the ease of response makes this diplomatic game and psychological warfare a dialogue in real time and that is currently increasing thanks to the nervousness caused by the possibility that a negotiation is about to begin. Both capitals have made it clear that they are willing to tolerate any comment or outburst from Donald Trump or each of his questionable statements about the war - among which the figures of casualties that he provides stand out, completely different each time he tries to argue that the parties must achieve peace - in order not to alienate the most important person in this process and to obtain preferential treatment from the current tenant of the White House. The two presidents have spoken out this week showing the opinion that Donald Trump is the right person to achieve peace and have directed their reproaches at Joe Biden. In Russia, the end of the lack of communication that Biden's presidency entailed has been welcomed. In Ukraine, Zelensky has highlighted the former president's "mistakes": the absence of the United States in Europe or his administration's refusal to impose "preventive sanctions."

By magic, Russia has forgotten that the communication not only did not disappear completely, but that a call from the Russian Federation's defense minister to alert his American counterpart of Ukraine's plans - which were never made public, but were serious enough to provoke US action and the leak that such plans existed - led to the White House intervening to give orders to stop the possible attack. And Ukraine has also forgotten that Biden and Blinken's argument in 2022 was precisely that imposing preventive sanctions was not going to act as a deterrent but quite the opposite, since Russia would have nothing to fear since sanctions had already been imposed on it before invading the neighboring country. In its attempt to gain Trump's favor, Ukraine is willing to demonize who has been its main supplier in recent years.

The dangerous proximity of the start of ceasefire negotiations, the main proposal of Trumpist politics for the war in Ukraine, has caused concern and a proliferation of statements. Unlike Zelensky, who continues to publish daily videos offering the population a vision of the war that is scarcely credible and increasingly removed from reality, Vladimir Putin's statements on the situation in what Russia insists on continuing to call the special military operation have generally been scarce. Both presidents, as well as the populations of Russia and Ukraine, are aware of their opponent's demands and red lines. Today, Putin and Zelensky are betting on achieving their security objectives - contradictory to each other, since Russia demands Ukraine's withdrawal from NATO while Kiev requests rapid accession or the presence of NATO troops in the country - above territorial ambitions, which judging by the presidents' statements, would probably not pose a major obstacle when it comes to negotiations.

The negotiations do not even have a set date, nor any concrete objectives set out on a temporary roadmap, so the current fight lies in who will participate in this process. The most literal of European leaders, Pedro Sánchez, stated last week that nothing could be resolved “about Ukraine without Ukraine” or “about Europe without Europe”. However, the blunt position of Donald Trump, whose authoritarianism exceeds that of Putin and Zelensky, points to a personal negotiation in which the president of the United States, accustomed to not delaying processes and demanding what he seeks by means of force and threats, will try to impose the terms. The reality on the ground and the proxy nature of the war make it inevitable in the mindset of the American leader that the negotiation will take place directly between Washington and Moscow, a formula that Moscow also considers favourable. After all, Ukraine also preferred, during the war in Donbass, to negotiate with an external actor or indirect participant, Russia, rather than with the other party in the war.

“He wants to manipulate the desire of the US president to achieve peace,” Zelensky said, referring to the Russian statements. The euphoria over Trump’s actions towards Russia and the threat to lower the price of oil to make the Russian economy unviable do not hide the concern over statements in which the US president has placed part of the blame for the outbreak of the war on his Ukrainian counterpart. The leak of plans involving the concession of territories to Russia and Trump’s mention of NATO, describing the Russian perception of danger due to the expansion of the Alliance towards its borders, provoked the anger of Ukraine, increased by the statements of Vladimir Putin, who has insisted on the illegitimacy of Zelensky. In a recent interview, the Russian president offered to negotiate, but recalled that the mandate of the Ukrainian president expired last year without the authorities trying to repair the situation. Vladimir Putin has previously opened the door to negotiations with Ruslan Stefanchuk, the speaker of the Rada, whose term of office has not expired and whose legitimacy is therefore not in question.

Beyond the mention of a lack of legitimacy, Putin’s comments that “if he wants to participate,” he will also appoint people to do so, have rankled Ukraine by suggesting that the Ukrainian president’s presence is irrelevant. Dependent on its foreign allies to continue fighting and to pay salaries and pensions, kyiv is at the mercy of its partners in any potential negotiations as well and will be forced to accept Donald Trump’s terms – perhaps with the help of EU countries or perhaps not, that too will be up to the US president – ​​a situation Russia refers to when it downplays the Ukrainian president’s participation.

“Today, Putin has once again confirmed that he is afraid of negotiations, afraid of strong leaders, and doing everything possible to prolong the war,” wrote Zelensky, the president who by decree banned negotiations with Vladimir Putin’s government and leader of the country that refused to implement the only peace agreement ever signed in this war and who in 2022 unilaterally broke off negotiations that seem likely to be discussed again this year. At this stage of the war, only Zelensky perceives himself as a strong leader and accusations that it is Russia that does not want to negotiate are credible only to Donald Trump, who in his alternative vision of history prefers to see reality through a lens that manipulates facts to suit the needs of the script. For the American president, who does not see NATO as a tool with which to expand American soft power but as an overly extensive security alliance in an uninteresting territory, it is easy to see Russian security complaints as acceptable. But as a man who takes particular pleasure in winning where his opponents have not, the need to put pressure on Putin is as basic as his willingness to blame Biden for the war. This is where Trump’s manipulations about who wants to negotiate and who doesn’t come in, but also his willingness to concede to Putin on important parts of his security concerns.

https://slavyangrad.es/2025/01/30/dialo ... os-medios/

Google Translator

******

From Cassad's telegram account:

Colonelcassad
⚡️ Summary of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation (as of 30 January 2025)

— Units of the North force group inflicted defeat on the formations of the motorised infantry and airborne assault brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of ​​the settlement of Volchansk in the Kharkiv region.

The enemy lost up to 50 servicemen, an armoured personnel carrier, three vehicles and a field artillery gun.

— Units of the West force group improved their tactical situation. Defeat was inflicted on the manpower and equipment of three mechanized brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, two territorial defence brigades and a National Guard brigade in the areas of the settlements of Peschanoye, Zagryzovo, Zagoruykovka, Kutkovka, Putnikovo and Kurilovka in the Kharkiv region.

The enemy's losses amounted to more than 320 servicemen, two armoured combat vehicles, 10 vehicles, eight field artillery guns, including three produced by NATO countries. An ammunition depot was destroyed.

— Units of the "Southern" group of forces took up more advantageous lines and positions. Defeat was inflicted on formations of two mechanized, airmobile brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and a territorial defense brigade in the areas of the settlements of Seversk, Dronovka, Verkhnekamenskoye and Chasov Yar of the Donetsk People's Republic.

The losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine amounted to 175 servicemen, two vehicles and a field artillery gun. An ammunition depot was destroyed.

— Units of the "Center" group of forces continued active offensive operations. Defeat was inflicted on the manpower and equipment of three mechanized, motorized infantry, airmobile brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and a National Guard brigade in the areas of the settlements of Dzerzhinsk, Druzhba, Nelepovka, Novopavlovka, Shcherbinovka and Andreyevka of the Donetsk People's Republic.

The enemy lost up to 550 servicemen, two armored combat vehicles, six vehicles and two field artillery guns.

— Units of the Vostok group of forces continued to advance deep into the enemy's defenses. Defeats were inflicted on formations of two mechanized brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a marine brigade, and a territorial defense brigade in the areas of the settlements of Novosilka, Razliv, Volnoye Pole of the Donetsk People's Republic, and Novodarovka of the Zaporizhzhia region.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 125 servicemen and three vehicles. Five field artillery guns were destroyed, including one produced by NATO countries.

— Units of the Dnepr group of forces defeated the manpower and equipment of a mechanized brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and a territorial defense brigade in the areas of the settlements of Antonovka, Tokarevka of the Kherson region, and Kamenskoye of the Zaporizhzhia region.

The enemy lost up to 55 servicemen and two vehicles.

Over the past six months, monthly sanitary and irreparable losses of manpower of the Ukrainian Armed Forces have consistently amounted to about 50 thousand people and higher (January 2025 - 51,960 people, December 2024 - 48,470 people, November 2024 - 60,805 people, etc.).

At the same time, the number of recruits in the training centers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, even taking into account the “activation” of the TCC throughout Ukraine, has barely reached 30 thousand people per month for about six months, who are sent to the line of combat contact without appropriate training, which leads to a reduction in the number of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

About 100 thousand Ukrainian servicemen, according to official data, voluntarily left their military units and went on the run.

The changes in legislation prepared under pressure from Western countries by the Kiev regime to reduce the age of mobilization from 25 to 18 years are the only way for Zelensky to delay the cascading collapse of the front in Donbas for a few more months.

Night strikes on enemy targets

On the night of January 29-30, 2025, Russian troops carried out pinpoint strikes on Ukrainian military and logistics infrastructure facilities , including a UAV control radar in Chernihiv, an oil storage facility and ship repair base in Izmail, and a military logistics warehouse in Poltava Oblast .

Chernihiv (20:05, 01/29/2025) The strike
hit a radio-electronic reconnaissance and surveillance facility deployed on the territory of the Kolos gardening association . According to radio intercepts, the facility housed a western radar that monitored airspace and controlled attack drones . - The UAV command station was destroyed , which led to the loss of control over some of the long-range drones. - White and blue flashes were recorded , indicating damage to the radar's antenna and hardware complex and its power supplies. - The facility's power system, including backup generators and communications systems , was completely disabled . Immediately after the strike, Ukrainian media began distributing videos of burning residential buildings , but analysis showed that it was likely debris from a downed Ukrainian air defense drone that hit private homes . Izmail, Odessa region (04:10–05:20, 30.01.2025) The attack damaged key logistics and military facilities that supply the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the Danube port. MERITYTIME WAY LLC The facility was used to store fuel and lubricants arriving from the EU via Romania . A 5,000 m³ tank containing residual petroleum products was completely destroyed , causing a fire . The fuel supply and distribution system, critical for supplying military equipment and mobile units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces , was damaged . LLC "Ship repair company "Dunaisudnoservis" The company was one of the repair bases for unmanned boats used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine for attacks on Crimea and the facilities of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation . Shipbuilding shops that carried out technical maintenance of attack boats were seriously damaged . Three armored vehicles were destroyed at the site of the damage.

, painted in camouflage colors. According to preliminary data, these could have been vehicles of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine employees responsible for technical support of operations with naval UAVs.

Rioholding LLC A grain warehouse containing about 1,000 tons of corn was hit . The facility was used as part of a logistics chain related to food supplies, including for military needs . Poltava region (23:50, 01/29/2025) A logistics warehouse of the Armed Forces of Ukraine , disguised as an agricultural enterprise of FG Obolon-Agro, was hit . The facility served as a military logistics hub used to store ammunition, military property and weapons intended for transfer to the Kharkov and Kursk directions . The warehouse premises were completely destroyed , which is confirmed by secondary detonations after the strike. Results of the work of the Ukrainian air defense As a result of the work of the Ukrainian air defense, damage to civilian infrastructure, as well as the death of civilians, were recorded. Sumy - an attack drone lost control as a result of being hit by a mobile air defense fire group and dived into a 10-story residential building on Heroyiv Krut Street, 68/1 . - One person died , nine were injured , including a child. - The outer wall of the building was destroyed from the 5th to the 7th floors within one entrance. - Two more apartment buildings and 23 cars were damaged . - More than 100 people were evacuated , the building was recognized as unsafe . Izmail - as a result of debris hitting Pridunayskaya Street, damage to two private houses was recorded , one person was injured . @don_partizan

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

******

SCOTT RITTER: Trump’s Doomed Plan for Ukraine
January 28, 2025

“The Hard Way” — Special Envoy Keith Kellogg’s proposed oil-price manipulations targeting Russia would actually devastate U.S. oil production and the U.S. economy.

Image
Zapolyarnoye oil and gas condensate field in Okrug, Russia, in the Arctic, December 2021. (Chursaev13, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 4.0)

By Scott Ritter
Special to Consortium News

“I’m not looking to hurt Russia,” President Donald Trump recently declared in a statement he posted on his TruthSocial account. “I love the Russian people, and always had a very good relationship with President Putin.”

Trump, however, comes from the school of “hard love,” where punishment is applied to achieve the desired results.

And punishment was on Trump’s mind as he expressed his love and admiration for the Russian people and their leader, Vladimir Putin.

“I’m going to do Russia,” Trump wrote, “whose Economy is failing, and President Putin, a very big FAVOR. Settle now, and STOP this ridiculous War! IT’S ONLY GOING TO GET WORSE.”

The odd use of capitalization aside, one would imagine that if you are in the business of expressing your love in a public fashion, you might want to make sure that your facts align with the reality of that for which you’ve declared amorous intent.

Otherwise, you will find yourself living in a fantasy world of your own construction, populated not by your ostensible paramours, but rather figments of your imagination.

If you’re sincere about doing the Russian people and Vladimir Putin a “big FAVOR,” you might want to make sure it’s a favor they want to receive.

Calling the Russian economy “failing” considering the plethora of data showing it is anything but that, probably isn’t the best way to start date night.

“If we don’t make a ‘deal,’ and soon,” Trump threatened, “I have no other choice but to put high levels of Taxes, Tariffs, and Sanctions on anything being sold by Russia to the United States, and various other participating countries.”

“We can do it the easy way,” Trump warned, “or the hard way.”

Image
Trump taking his second oath of office, administered by Chief Justice John Roberts in the Capitol rotunda, on Jan. 20. (Wikimedia Commons, Public domain)

But what happens if Russia, like any jilted lover, opts for the “hard way”?

In short — nothing good for the United States or Trump.

First and foremost, any “deal” Trump puts on the table has to be realistic. In short the Russians must believe that they will be in a better position taking the deal than they would be turning it down (something Trump, ostensibly a master negotiator, should know).

The “deal” that Trump is putting on the table, however, is a non-starter.

There have been recent reports in the media about the existence of a “100-day Peace Plan.”

According to these reports, the proposed agreement prevents Ukraine from becoming a member of NATO, instead of officially declaring itself to be neutral. The agreement would open the door for Ukraine to become a member of the European Union by 2030, and tasks the EU with taking responsibility for post-war reconstruction.

There would be no “demilitarization.” Rather, Ukraine would maintain its army at its present size and continue to receive military support from the U.S. and NATO. Ukraine would need to likewise cede territories occupied by Russia to Russia and recognize the sovereignty of the Russian Federation.

But there are many elements of this “leaked” plan which simply ring false — such as linking finalization of the plan to May 9 — Victory Day, one of the most important holidays on the Russian calendar. This year May 9 will celebrate the 80th anniversary of the Allied Victory — the Soviet victory — over Nazi Germany.

The chances of Vladimir Putin sullying this solemn occasion by buying into a peace “deal” which allows the Banderist nationalists — whose ideology and history are closely linked with Nazi Germany — to survive after Putin declared “de-Nazification” as a primary goal for the Special Military Operation are slim to none.

Kellogg’s ‘Peace Plan’

What we do know is that Donald Trump’s designated special envoy for Ukraine — retired Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg — has floated a “peace plan” to the president which has been apparently well received. The elements of this plan are drawn from a paper Kellogg authored back in the spring of 2024 — a paper as nonsensical and lacking in fact-based argument as one could imagine.

The core elements of this plan involved the establishment of “normal” relations with Russia and its president — basically stopping the Russophobic demonization that was prevalent during the Biden administration.

Once the U.S. and Russia were talking again, to then open negotiations with both Russia and Ukraine about bringing an end to the conflict.

The “carrot” for Russia included postponing Ukraine’s membership in NATO for 10 years, allowing Russia to retain the Ukrainian territories it currently occupies and gradually lifting sanctions to lead the way to the normalization of relations with the United States — all subject to the conclusion of peace agreements acceptable to Ukraine.

For Ukraine, the “deal” offered both continued military assistance from the U.S. and NATO and bilateral security guarantees. While Ukraine is not required to officially recognize Russia’s control over the conquered territories, it would need to refrain from changing the status quo by force.

If Russia refused to cooperate, the U.S. would impose crippling sanctions.

And if Ukraine refused the “deal,” the U.S. would cut off all military aid.

This “deal,” while never formally expressed, had been hinted at before and after Trump’s electoral victory in November 2024.

And it took no one with any insight into Russia’s goals and objectives regarding the Special Military Operation by surprise when Russian President Vladimir Putin summarily rejected this “deal” in an answer to a media question on Dec. 26, 2024.

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Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Russian President Vladimir Putin in November 2024. (Alexei Nikolskiy, RIA Novosti, President of Russia)

Three days later Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov likewise threw cold water on the Kellogg “peace plan,” declaring that Russia was “not happy with the proposals made by members of the Trump team to postpone Ukraine’s admission to NATO for 20 years and to station British and European peacekeeping forces in Ukraine.”

The Hard Way

But what exactly does “the hard way” mean?

According to Scott Bessent, Donald Trump’s new Treasury secretary, the answer lies in ratcheting up sanctions on the Russian oil industry. “I will be 100 percent on-board for taking sanctions up” that target the major Russian oil companies, Bessent said during his Senate confirmation hearing.

But Bessent will be working against a history of the U.S. and its European allies overselling sanctions as a tool to tear down the Russian economy (the opposite, in fact, has happened.) Moreover, given Russia’s status as a leading oil producer, any successful application of sanctions could have a negative economic impact on the U.S.

This is something that seems to have escaped the attention of Keith Kellogg, Trump’s “peace deal” guru. Noting that, under the Biden administration, the United States and its allies imposed a cap of $60/barrel on Russian oil (the market price for oil hovers around $78/barrel), Kellogg observed that, despite this, “Russia earns billions of dollars from oil sales.”

“What if,” Kellogg mused during an interview on Fox News, “you lower the price to $45 a barrel, which is essentially the breakeven point?”

The question is, “breakeven point” for whom?

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Scott Bessent in December 2024. (Senator Ted Cruz, Wikimedia Commons, Public Domain)

The concept of “breaking even,” when it comes to Russia, has two separate fiscal realities. The first is what the price of oil needs to be for Russia, which is heavily dependent upon the sale of oil for its national economy, to balance its national budget.

This number is assessed to be around $77/barrel for 2025. Let there be no doubt — if the price of oil dropped to $45/barrel, Russia would face a budget crisis. But not an oil production crisis. You see, the second “breakeven point” for Russia is the cost of production of a barrel of oil, which currently is set at $41/barrel.

Russia would be able to produce oil without any interruptions if Kellogg were able to achieve his goal of cutting the price of oil to $45/barrel.

To achieve the goal, Trump would have to get the Saudis onboard the oil-price-manipulation bandwagon.

The problem is the Saudis have their own “breakeven point” realities. To balance its budget, Saudi Arabia needs oil to be selling at around $85/barrel. But the cost of oil production in Saudi Arabia is very low — hovering around $10/barrel.

Saudi Arabia could simply flood the market with cheap oil if it wanted.

So could Russia.

How about the United States?

The Permian Basin, in West Texas, accounts for all of the U.S. growth in oil production since 2020.

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Active Permian Basin pumpjack near Andrews, Texas, in 2009. (Zorin09, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 3.0)

In 2024, for new wells to be profitable in the Permian Basin, the breakeven point was around $62/barrel. For existing wells, this number was around $38/barrel.

If drilling were to stop in the Permian Basin, U.S. oil production would decline by 30 percent over the course of two years.

In short, if Keith Kellogg were to successfully implement his “plan” to cut the price of oil to $45/barrel, he would effectively destroy the U.S. oil economy.

And if you destroy the U.S. oil economy, you destroy the U.S. economy.

Russia can ride out $45/barrel oil far longer than the U.S. can.

Donald Trump would do well to pay the wildcat oil producers of the Permian Basin — the ones who have sunk everything they own into a business venture that hinges on the promise of $78/barrel for the foreseeable future, and ask them how they feel about $45/barrel oil.

The bottom line is that if Keith Kellogg and Donald Trump made such a trip, they’d quickly understand the errors of their way.

Because if Donald Trump opts to go the route of “the hard way” with Russia, the consequences for him and the American people will be among the hardest imaginable.

https://consortiumnews.com/2025/01/28/s ... r-ukraine/

******

Brief report from the front, January 29, 2025

Russian forces are building a perimeter around the village of Andreevka. Report by Marat Khairullin with illustrations by Mikhail Popov.
Zinderneuf
Jan 29, 2025

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ЛБС 16.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 16th, 2025. Зона Продвижения=Zone of advancement.

In the north of the Pokrovsk sector, Russian units advanced from the area of ​​the settlement Baranovka through forest plantations to the northwest and approached the settlement of Vodyanoe 2, which they had previously approached from the southwest. On the territory of this settlement (rather small), there is a processing plant, in the buildings of which the Ukrainian Armed Forces have equipped positions and shelters.

On the left flank of the Pokrovsk sector (no map today), fierce battles continue in the area of ​​the settlements of Kotlino (Kotlyne) and Udachnoe, where our units are pushing through the enemy's defensive structures.

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ЛБС 01.10.2024=Line of Combat Contact October 1st, 2024. ЛБС 31.10.2024=Line of Combat Contact October 31st, 2024. ЛБС 01.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 1st, 2025. Продвижения=Progress/advancement.

The Russian Ministry of Defense made a statement about the liberation of the settlement of Novoelizavetovka by units of the "Center" group of forces. To the west of it, our troops are finishing clearing Nadezhdovka (Nadiivka), from which they are starting to press in the direction of Kotlyarovka.

South of Nadezhdovka, active assault operations are underway in the area of ​​the settlements of Novoandreevka and Srebnoe (Sribne). Our troops had previously approached the latter from the south along the ravine, and have now advanced towards it from the north. There are reports that the advance groups have entered the settlement, having secured a foothold in the buildings on its outskirts. The offensive is also developing north of the settlement of Andreevka. Russian forces are building a perimeter around this settlement, which is very important for the defense of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and are increasing pressure on the enemy from several directions. In Andreevka itself, intense fighting is taking place in the eastern and northeastern parts.

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ЛБС 31.10.2024=Line of Combat Contact October 31st, 2024. ЛБС 30.11.2024=Line of Combat Contact November 30th, 2024. ЛБС 01.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 1st, 2025. Зона Продвижения=Zone of advancement.

In the settlement of Dachnoe, fighters from our units are advancing in the north of the village. They have also managed to advance and secure a foothold in its southeastern part.

https://maratkhairullin.substack.com/p/ ... anuary-df6

*******

And again a UAV raid, and again not without consequences
January 29, 2025
Rybar

Image

Ukrainian forces have once again launched a large number of drones into Russian border and rear regions. More than 130 drones were destroyed last night.

More about the raid
In the Smolensk region, Ukrainian formations attempted to hit the Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant near Desnogorsk . No damage was recorded on the ground in the vicinity. Two power units of the plant are operating in normal mode, and the third has been undergoing scheduled work for two weeks.

In the Nizhny Novgorod region, as a result of the attack, a fire broke out on the territory of the SIBUR-Kstovo enterprise in the Kstovo industrial zone. Fire crews of the Russian Emergencies Ministry extinguished the fire, there were no casualties among the personnel. The LUKOIL-Nizhegorodnefteorgsiintez complex , located nearby, could also have been damaged .

The air defense activity was also noted at a much greater distance from the border with the so-called Ukraine – in the Leningrad region, a drone was destroyed in the Vsevolozhsk region on the shore of Lake Ladoga .

In addition, restrictions on the entry and exit of aircraft were introduced at Pulkovo Airport for several hours. Similar measures were taken at night at Kazan International Airport , and some time ago flights were suspended in Murmansk due to the threat of a UAV attack.

The largest number of drones were destroyed over the Kursk and Bryansk regions , where several devices were shot down by officers of the regional special forces unit of the Russian Guard. And in the Tver region, 29 UAVs were shot down on approach to Andreapol and Toropets . The latter had previously been the target of a raid in September, when a GRAU warehouse was struck .

Against the backdrop of the lack of success for the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the front, pro-Ukrainian resources continue to take revenge in another direction, repeatedly attacking Russian oil and gas sector facilities.

Unfortunately, the problems remain the same. As Two Majors rightly noted , some officials have taken a denial stance, calling the outright attacks on industrial and energy facilities "falling debris."

Instead of strengthening air defense, saturating critical infrastructure facilities with air defense systems and mobile rifle groups, it is much easier to simply call everything a template phrase and not think about a solution.

But the problem won't go away. The enemy has set up production capacities and can afford to attack our territories daily. Moreover, Ukrainian formations and their curators see the impact of these raids on our economy.

https://rybar.ru/35440-2/

(Like Johnny Unitas said, the best defense is a good offence.)

Are the Ukrainian Armed Forces preparing for a new missile attack?
January 29, 2025
Rybar

Image

Today, Ukrainian aircraft took off en masse from several airfields in the central and eastern parts of the so-called Ukraine. In total, at least 6-7 MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters were spotted in the air , as well as at least one F-16 fighter .

A missile threat was introduced for the southern territories of Russia, and the Crimean Bridge was closed, but no strikes followed. Nevertheless, the flight routes of the fighters were characteristic of the launch of cruise missiles at Russian territories, as indicated by several signs.

The aircraft took off from four airfields at once: MiG-29s and Su-27s took off from Cherkassy , ​​Mirgorod and Kanatovo , and F-16s from the Vasilkov airfield . They all flew towards Dnepropetrovsk and the southern part of the Kharkiv region, after which some turned around, and some disappeared from radar near Dnepropetrovsk, possibly landing at a local airfield.

This route is used when launching cruise missiles at the eastern part of Crimea , the Crimean Bridge , Krasnodar Krai and Rostov Oblast . Those that returned to Mirgorod most likely served as cover and simulated the launch of decoys.

As for a possible landing in Dnepropetrovsk, that's what Su-24M did during strikes last year. They refueled and then flew back to the departure airfield. At the same time, Su-24M bombers did not take part in today's training. But during the last launches over the Kursk region, they took off from the Cherkassy airfield , which was involved in the event today.

In any case, there have been no missile strikes for a long time, so it cannot be ruled out that the attack is a preparation for a massive raid, especially given the nature of the actions of the Ukrainian air force. We do not rule out that the Su-24Ms will either fly to Cherkassy before the strike, or land after the missile launch, and the F-16 will provide cover.

And right now in Crimea and Sevastopol an air threat has been declared, which indicates the presence of cruise missile carriers in the air.

https://rybar.ru/vsu-gotovyatsya-k-novo ... noj-atake/

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"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Fri Jan 31, 2025 2:44 pm

Independent press and foreign funds
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 01/31/2025

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In December 2022, an essay by Volodymyr Ishchenko published by New Left Review made a special impression , in which he claimed “Ukrainian voices” when it came to reporting and analysing the conflict. The origin of the controversy provoked by the Ukrainian sociologist now resident in Germany was precisely the definition of these voices, among which he included not only the correct Ukrainians , but also claimed the Soviet and Russian-speaking legacy that has been an important part of the country's development in its years of independence. Recognized until 2014, this trace of closeness to Soviet culture, equated with Russian culture in a widely generalised exercise of simplification, caused great rejection by the establishment close to the ideological line implemented in the country since Maidan marked a turning point from which progress has only been made in a nationalist key. Ishchenko's claim was based on the coverage of the Ukrainian and international media, which presented a uniform view of the Ukrainian population, who were credited with the same opinion whether they were near or far from the front, in Ukraine or outside it. Of course, there was no attempt in the media to represent the opinion of the population on the other side of the front. Eight years of the "occupied territories" discourse had done their job, and there was no need to ask whether the population of Donbass or Crimea was in favour of kyiv, supported the Russian invasion, or, despite not wanting to return to kyiv's control, were not in favour of Moscow's military action in the territories beyond the borders of Donbass.

More than two years after that controversial test, which did not cause a stir for displaying any kind of radicalism but for minimally distancing itself from the war consensus of trying to erase any present or past link with the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation or Russian culture in the broad sense, the situation has not changed much. Zelensky continues to insist on unity as Ukraine's main asset despite the fact that three territories have been outside of its control for almost eleven years and thousands of local people have fought in the Donbass armies for years or are now doing so as part of the Russian forces. Reducing the Donetsk and Lugansk armies to Russian occupation - despite the fact that, as academics such as Ivan Katchanovski have shown, a large part of the members of these militias were always local population - has served in these years to avoid the need to ask that population what its opinion was. Until now, assuming the support of the population under Ukrainian control and abroad, it has been easy for Ukraine and its Western allies to pretend that the Ukrainian citizens on the other side of the front were also defending Kiev, are manipulated by Kremlin propaganda or are simply not taken into account. The difficulties have increased now that even Western polls do not show the majority opinion of the Ukrainian population living in the territories under kyiv control to continue the war to the end, which beheads a significant part of the Ukrainian discourse. Not only are there thousands of Ukrainian citizens fighting against the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the other side of the front, but even those who have remained in the country and in the territories under state control are losing the desire for a complete victory and are displaying more realistic opinions.

In the task of constructing the discourse, the role of the press has been essential. Over the past eleven years, it has been popularizing the idea of ​​a Ukraine conceived to be the antithesis of Russia in both its linguistic and cultural model. Presented as a war of national liberation or even equating the current struggle with the decolonization of third world countries in the 1960s, Ukraine has boasted of fighting for its independence. This required breaking ties that had existed for centuries, both in social and familial aspects, as well as cultural and linguistic ones. The radicalization of the media in defense of a more Ukrainian Ukraine , that is, of a Ukrainization in the nationalist sense, began before the victory at Maidan, but gained greater momentum as newly created media or previously consumed only by a part of the country gained a privileged status. Ukraine has repeatedly boasted of its media independence, an aspect that has been used to great lengths to differentiate itself from the Russian Federation, where the Kremlin controlled all media and any independent or uncomfortable journalist was eliminated or forced into exile. The cognitive dissonance was clear from the moment the state allowed – or perhaps encouraged – attacks by the extreme right on media owned by oligarchs previously considered pro-Russian and accused of thought crimes. The broadcast of a Soviet film was enough for the channel's facilities to be besieged by members of the extreme right armed with grenade launchers. The harassment of Anatoly Sharii in Spain or the murder of Oles Buzina also show that there are not so many differences between what is criticised in Russia and what is practised in Ukraine these years.

Donald Trump's coming to power has meant, among other things, the suspension of foreign subsidies. Following the lobbying work of international and Western non-governmental organisations, Marco Rubio has already announced the resumption of funds for humanitarian aid, the most basic assistance for the most vulnerable population on the planet. The aim of the suspension is not only to save costs, although this is one of the main arguments, but to check whether these payments to different international actors are a way of advancing the interests of the United States. In other words, the State Department's job is to check whether the transfers are ideologically correct and in line with the new policy of the White House. It is clear that the reduction of assistance to the Palestinian population is a fait accompli, as it will be in other cases where the causes are not particularly in line with the ideology and interests of the new US administration.

In the case of Ukraine, the cuts have not been slow to cause alarm. Contrary to what has been reported by several media outlets, Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that, “thank God,” military supplies continue. However, Ukraine is not at the top of Donald Trump’s hierarchy of interests. Unlike Israel and Egypt, the two priority countries whose funding remains unchanged, the United States has suspended State Department programs and contributions to kyiv. These include USAID grants that in this decade had been the fundamental basis for financing a large part of the complex of non-governmental organizations and pressure groups. Civil society, largely demobilized – with the exception of the far right – has been supplanted by these organizations that were financed from abroad, mainly from Washington.

“We can only say that by suspending these programmes, the country may significantly lose its influence in a number of places and may increase its influence in favour of China and other countries, including Russia itself,” said Mikhail Podolyak after learning of the suspension of aid. The message of Andriy Ermak’s adviser is devoid of any subtlety and seeks to achieve the resumption of subsidies under the premise of maintaining soft power. If it is not the United States that supports civil society , it will be another country, perhaps an opponent, argues Podolyak. Donald Trump’s intention in the Ukrainian case has been made clear and he has constantly stated that it is necessary for European countries to bear the costs of the war, reconstruction and the situation in general. This also includes financing groups that exercise soft power.

In fact, in Ukraine it is not only civil society, i.e. the numerous groups that present themselves as representatives of the Ukrainian population or that lobby for more weapons and the maintenance of the war regime, but the media itself. As the Strana daily wrote just a few hours after the order to stop the delivery of USAID funds abroad was carried out, “several major Ukrainian media have appealed to their readers with a request for financial support due to the suspension of American subsidy programs.” These include Ukrainska Pravda , the leading newspaper of the Ukrainian establishment , and also those that, like Hromadske, were born as a way of renewing the media space in the Western style.

“Almost 90% of Ukrainian media survive on subsidies,” says Oksana Romanyuk, director of the Institute of Mass Information. “I translate this into plain language: 90% of Ukrainian media were controlled by the West thanks to subsidies. Media independence and freedom of expression, you say?” Bondarenko wrote,” Strana says, reflecting the reality of the independent media universe in Ukraine, which after ten years of continuous and constant institutional support from abroad, cannot survive if funding disappears. This has been the source of Ukrainian voices since Maidan .

https://slavyangrad.es/2025/01/31/la-pr ... tranjeros/

Google Translator

******

From Cassad's Telegram account:

Colonelcassad
Chronicle of strikes on the territory of Ukraine on January 30-31, 2025

Yesterday, day and night, the Aerospace Forces and missile forces struck targets in the Donbas, in the Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Kherson regions (the entire range of weapons), Brovary in the Kyiv region, Zhitomir, Kremenchuk, Chernihiv, Cherkassy, ​​Dnepropetrovsk, Poltava, the cities of Illichevsk and Belgorod-Dnistrovsky in the Odessa region, Svitlovodsk in the Kirovograd region, Starokostiantyniv in the Khmelnytsky region, Kyiv and Odessa regions (Geraniums/Gerberas).

Chronology of strikes:

January 30, 2025
• 10.10 Liman Donbas - explosions. UMPK.
• 11.05 Donbas Sumy region border area - explosions. UMPK.
• 11.15 Kharkiv Kholodnohirsky district - explosion. Lightning/Kub-2.
• 11.15-11.30 Slavyansk/Konstantinovka Donbass - series of explosions. UMPK.
• 12.00 Kramatorsk - explosions. UMPK.
• 12.25 again in the Kholodnohirsk district of Kharkov. Lightning.
• 13.25 Sumy region - explosions. UMPK. Border area.
• 14.00 Kharkov region - explosions. UMPK. North of the region.
• 14.20 Sumy region - explosions. UMPK. Border area.
• 14.55 Kharkov region - explosions. UMPK+MLRS. North of the region.
• 14.55 there was an MLRS strike on the north of the Kharkov region.
• 16.40 outskirts of Sumy - explosion. OTRK.
• 16.55 Donbass Pokrovsky district - explosions. UMPK.
• 17.15 Kharkov - explosion. Lightning.
• 17.35 drone strike in Korabelny district of Kherson - explosion.
• 17.55 Dnipropetrovsk region - explosions. UMPK.
• 18.05 Kherson, more explosions.
• 18.15 Lightning continues to play tricks on Kharkov - explosion.
• 18.30 Sumy region, border area and northern Donbass - explosions. UMPK.
• 19.45 Sumy region - explosions. UMPK. Border area.
• 19.45 Kharkiv region - explosions. MLRS. North of the region.
• 20.50 Donbass, a series of explosions in the area of ​​Konstantinovka and the city of Liman. An Iskander-M flew at its target in Liman.
• 21.50 Sumy region - explosions. UMPK. Border area.
• 22.00 Krasnopolye, Sumy region - explosion. Geranium/Gerbera.
• 23:00-23:55 Donbass - explosions. 2 UMPK strikes.

January 31, 2025
• 00:25 outskirts of Poltava - explosion. Geranium/Gerbera.
• 00:55 Dnepropetrovsk - explosion.
Geranium/Gerbera. • 01:05 Svitlovodsk, Kirovograd region - explosion.
Geranium/Gerbera. • 02:10 Belgorod-Dnistrovsky, Odessa region -
explosion. Geranium/Gerbera. • 02:45 Ilyichevsk, Odessa region - explosions. Geraniums
/Gerberas. • 02:50 Brovary, Kyiv region - explosion. Geranium/Gerbera.
• 03:10 Kremenchuk - explosion. Geranium/Gerbera.
• 03:15 Chernihiv - explosion. Geranium/Gerbera.
• 03.30 Ilyichevsk, Odessa region - explosion. Geranium/Gerbera.
• 04.05 Cherkassy - explosion. Geranium/Gerbera.
• 04.10 Kyiv and Odessa regions - explosions. Geraniums/Gerberas.
• 04.25 Zhitomir, Cherkassy - explosions. Geraniums/Gerberas
. • 04.50 Zhitomir again - explosion. Geranium/Gerberas.
• 05.15 Sumy - explosion. Geranium/Gerberas.
• 05.20 Donbass Slovyansk - explosions. UMPK .
• 05.25 outskirts of Kyiv, Starokostiantyniv, Khmelnytskyi region - explosions. Geraniums/Gerberas.
• 05.30 Donbass Kramatorsk - explosions. UMPK.
• 05.55 Starokostiantyniv, Khmelnytskyi region - explosions. Geraniums/Gerberas .
• 06.45-07.10 Starokostiantyniv, Khmelnytskyi region, more explosions. Geraniums/Gerberas.

****

Colonelcassad
0:12
The border with Transnistria in the Odessa region has been fortified with a ditch,

a fence and anti-tank barriers. Large-scale fortifications have appeared on the border of Ukraine with Transnistria in the Odessa region, including a ditch, a fence with barbed wire and anti-tank barriers. These measures are reportedly aimed at preventing illegal border crossings.

The author of the video published online commented on the situation:

"Deliberators who really want to cross the border - one net, two ditches, and you're in Transnistria."

However, the new fortifications make such a crossing virtually impossible.
@anna_news

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

******

SITREP 1/29/25: Ukraine's Mass Drone Heave Conceals Spreading Foundation Cracks
Simplicius
Jan 29, 2025

In the absence of any other effective requital, Ukraine has continued carrying out record-breaking drone attacks on Russian territory. There were another two nights of dozens if not hundreds of drones which have triggered debate—particularly from the pro-UA propagandist side—on whether Ukraine is finally breaking through to the ‘singularity’ point wherein production of cheap drones will begin consistently overwhelming Russian defenses, and ability to do anything at all.

Scores of cities experienced the drone incursions, though most were shot down—but still various facilities were hit, most notably a large Ryazan refinery that is claimed to have processed 5% of all Russian oil: (Video at link.)

Ryazan oil refinery processed 13.1 million metric tons (262,000 barrels per day), or almost 5% of Russia's total refining throughput in 2024.

It produced 2.2 million tons of gasoline, 3.4 million tons of diesel, 4.3 million tons of fuel oil and 1 million of jet fuel, according to a source-based data.


And another Lukoil one in Nizhny Novgorod at 56.111826782750065, 44.150536106619995, described as one of Russia’s largest, with a claimed 6% of Russian oil passing through it: (Video at link.)

Russia: Giant oil refinery struck by Ukrainian drones in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod region. It had a refining capacity of 17 million tons per year, accounting for over 6% of Russia's total refining output. Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez is located 800km from Ukraine.

Ukrainians rejoice and post graphics like this one to imply these refineries are taken out permanently:

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Of course we know in reality most of them are repaired and back up and running from within days to weeks or less. Others end up taking much less damage than assumed, for instance this recent hit on an Engels base fuel storage area which was sold by Ukrainians as some kind of “total devastation” which ‘starved’ the base’s Tu-95s from being able to fly missions:

Image

As usual, the damage was much lighter than claimed.

Even so, we don’t have to cope and assume all the damage is small. It’s clear Ukraine’s attacks are fairly successful and Russia has its hands full in trying to defend the near daily drone onslaught. At the same time, Russia too is hitting Ukrainian infrastructure on a daily basis: there was another withering string of attacks just the past few days in a row, and this gets little news airplay anymore due to its banal nature. Even if we assume Russia and Ukraine are going blow for blow on an even scale, it’s clear that Ukraine’s infrastructure will attrit first; “the fat man gets thinner, while the thin man dies.”

It’s no shock that as Ukraine’s conventional capabilities evaporate, the country is left with no other choice than to pour all resources into things they can manufacture en masse and at scale in small, undetectable, underground DIY workshops, which drones are ideal for. Anything larger than drone production typically requires far greater logistics and energy consumption footprints, which are detected and targeted by Russian long range missile strikes. But drones are suited for a very ‘distributed’ and stealth-style manufacturing process.

In fact, just today a Ukrainian drone honcho said that school children should be made to assemble the AFU’s drones for this very reason: (Video at link.)

🇺🇦🤡The founder of the company for the production of EWs "Aura" suggests that drones in Ukraine should be assembled by children in schools, because Russian missiles can fly at large production facilities, but the Russians will not shoot at children. I.e. suggests using children as human shields.

"It is necessary that FPV-drones collected at labor lessons in schools, hide them in basements, garages - so we will ensure mass. Because if you build a large workshop, it (Russian missiles) will quickly fly there", - said Alexei Polonchuk.


But getting back to the significance of it all.

Ukraine’s ramp up in strikes on Russian oil infrastructure is obviously meant to herald this greater overall Western shift to “forcing Putin into negotiations” by crashing the Russian economy to a point where the continuation of the war would be untenable. You can see this as a coordinated shift in the collective West’s tactics, as many of the recent ‘think pieces’ being churned out from Western pundit mills have all suddenly begun to center around hamstringing Russian energy as the last ditch effort to stop the Russian military juggernaut.

As stated, we’re not going to cope and lie here, and pretend there is no danger whatsoever, and all Ukraine’s attacks are totally fruitless shams like many analysts in the pro-Russian commentariat claim. There are some troubling signs, like this unverified report from a Russian source from earlier today:

China and India stopped buying oil from Russia under contracts for delivery in March. The reason for this is the increase in the cost of freight for tankers that have not yet been affected by US sanctions, writes Reuters with reference to traders. The premium of Russian ESPO crude oil increased by $3-5 per barrel compared to ICE Brent, while freight rates for an Aframax tanker en route to China increased "by several million dollars." Not profitable.

Recall that one of Trump’s secret plans was reportedly to scare India and China into dumping Russian energy by way of the sanctions threat. This is only the beginning for now, the West in accordance with Ukraine will only continue ramping this up, so there are certainly dangers ahead to continue tracking.

Not to mention other reports that Ukraine has ramped up attempts to hit Russian nuclear plants:

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https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/ ... one-attack

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https://www.france24.com/en/europe/2025 ... facilities

Air defence systems destroyed a drone attempting to strike a nuclear power facility in the western region of Smolensk bordering Belarus, Governor Vasily Anokhin said on the Telegram messaging app.

The Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant, the largest power generating plant in Russia's northwest, was working normally, RIA state news agency reported, citing the plant's press service.


Of course, to think this would cause Putin to capitulate and end the war, even in the worst case scenario, is foolish—that’s simply not going to happen. But that also doesn’t mean there’s no overall dangers for the Russian economy should Ukraine and the West continue scaling up the overwhelming drone saturation capabilities, along with the potential upcoming Trump-led clamp downs on Russian energy.


In the meantime, on the actual front lines, things continue going in the predictable direction. Latest from the Economist:

Image
https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/0 ... -crumbling

Weaving a make-believe tale of ‘uncountable Russian losses’ driving Ukraine’s front collapse, the above article does intersperse some grim insights:

The Russian tactics are not dynamic, but are causing Ukraine no end of bother. Put simply, Russia has the infantry and Ukraine does not. Issues with mobilisation and desertion have hit Ukraine’s reserves hard.

“We struggle to replace our battlefield losses,” says Colonel Pavlo Fedosenko, the commander of a Ukrainian tactical grouping in the Donbas. “They might throw a battalion’s worth of soldiers at a position we’ve manned with four or five soldiers.” The brigades that make up the Donbas frontline are consistently understaffed, under pressure, and cracking. The front line keeps creeping back.

“We no longer have tactics beyond plugging holes,” says “Kupol,” the nom de guerre of a now-retired commander, who up until September led a brigade fighting in eastern Donbas. “We throw battalions into the chaotic mess and hope we can somehow stop the grind.”


Image

It’s stunning how low-intelligence the typical Western press reader must be to devour wholesale such absurd prima facie contradictions day in and out in each article, like: “Russia is sustaining far more losses, but Ukraine keeps retreating, has no troops left, etc.”

Behind the scenes, as always, the mood appears to be different. GUR head Budanov sparked a firestorm of controversy this week when in a closed door session he reportedly intimated that Ukraine faces existential collapse within six months, if negotiations don’t start:

Image

Full report from an attendant:

‼️🇺🇦🏴‍☠️ Ukraine may cease to exist if there are no serious negotiations by summer — GUR chief Budanov in the Rada

▪️Budanov told deputies about the threat to Ukraine's existence if peace talks do not begin before the summer, writes "Ukrainska Pravda".

▪️Recently, a closed meeting was held in the Rada, where the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported to the leaders of parliament and factions on the real state of military affairs.

▪️"At first, the General Staff representatives told a lot, confusingly, but very interestingly. Then there were other different reports. But the answer that I remember most was Budanov's. Someone asked him how much time we had. And Kirill, with his cold smile, said: "If there are no serious negotiations before the summer, then very dangerous processes for the very existence of Ukraine may be launched," one of the meeting participants told the publication.

▪️"Everyone looked at each other and fell silent. Probably, everything needs to work out," the deputy summed up, "a little confusedly."

▪️Yesterday, the media reported on a "plan to end the war by summer" that has been actively discussed by the Ukrainian elite recently.

RVvoenkor


This led to various Ukrainian figures quickly jumping in to rug-sweep the above as “taken out of context”, or some other excuse: (Video at link.)

Budanov's statement about the threat to Ukraine's existence is taken out of context, said Ukrainian MP Dunda.

He reminded that the publication of data from a secret meeting is prohibited, and commenting on such issues interferes with national security. And those who disseminated this information must be held accountable.


Budanov himself tried to awkwardly dismiss the controversy with a cryptic ‘joke’ or parable, which only served to fortify the likelihood of his dire statement in question: (Video at link.)

I suppose the parable is meant to describe the futility of trying to disprove crass rumors.

It’s clear that behind the scenes Budanov knows the real score: the AFU is in a grave, existential spiral.

Complaints from the front persist—here from Ukraine’s 79th Brigade, reporting how 20% of personnel remain after repeated meat assaults:

Image

A new WaPo piece had an interesting blurb where an ‘anonymous aide’ claimed that Ukraine military financing was in fact halted by Trump—though confusion still swirls around this issue:

Image
https://archive.ph/jTfXJ
One Russian report:

Kiev is pleading with the EU and the US to urgently replace the frozen US aid. The scale of problems faced by Ukrainian grant-eaters after the ban on USAID work for 90 days is greater than it seems at first glance: "we weren't prepared for this." Ukraine's media outlets are 90% fed from the United States, and this funding was covered up for them. Further normalization of the processes can occur only in 3-6 months, so Kiev is urgently negotiating with Brussels, they are begging the Europeans to quickly throw them grants so that the flow of lies from Kiev does not stop.

(Much more at link.)

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/sit ... mass-drone

*******

Going home. Foreign mercenaries began to disappear en masse from the Armed Forces of Ukraine
.
Ukrainian public pages report on the mass exodus of foreign mercenaries from the "International Legion" of the country's armed forces. They complain about inadequate leadership decisions and low morale in the army. If recently there were about 40 thousand people, today this number is estimated at several thousand.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba said back in February 2022 that 20 thousand militants from 52 countries of the world had joined the International Legion. Former adviser to the head of the Presidential Office (administration) Alexey Arestovich * noted in December last year that by that time there were already 40 thousand people.

However, now their number has dropped sharply. Some Ukrainian public pages write that there were problems with financing. According to others, mercenaries complain about inadequate orders from the command to carry out so-called meat attacks - unprepared attacks without support and equipment, during which the units suffer heavy losses. In addition, foreigners talk about low morale in the Ukrainian army.

Foreign Legion. Arestovich announced the number of mercenaries in the Ukrainian army
According to the Resident Telegram channel, there are several thousand mercenaries left in the Armed Forces of Ukraine today. These include both volunteers and employees of private military companies. But more and more countries are recalling their soldiers on leave, especially the French and German ones.

Immediately after the outbreak of the conflict, the International Legion was quickly created. This indicates that Ukraine was preparing for hostilities. It includes the "Polish Volunteer Corps", the "Normandy Brigade", the "Dudaev Battalion" and other units. There are many Latin Americans who came from poor countries in the hope of earning money. According to open information, mercenaries receive $500 per month and $3,000 for participating in hostilities.

As the mercenary prisoners of war said, their main gathering point was in Poland. There they provide instruction and training. After that, foreigners are usually sent to the Lviv region to the Yavoriv training ground. And from there they are distributed among the detachments.

Many mercenaries buy their own equipment and even weapons themselves. They said that the Ukrainian Armed Forces offered them clothes from killed Ukrainian soldiers.

They also know and are aware that Russian units prefer to kill mercenaries on the spot rather than burden themselves with their capture.

French “geese” have fun. Mercenaries of the Ukrainian Armed Forces prefer bars to trenches and prefer to fight from a distance rather than in close combat.

Foreign mercenaries often appear in military reports. Recently it was reported about the murder of the Austrian convinced neo-Nazi Richard Schermann . His grandfather fought on the side of Bandera. The Austrian was liquidated in the Zaporozhye region.

There are mercenaries from exotic countries. So, on the same day in the same Zaporozhye region, the Japanese special forces soldier Koto Ono was killed . He was an officer in his homeland and decided to fight for Ukraine. However, he did not have time - he was destroyed by a powerful Russian attack.
.
https://aif.ru/politics/world/gou-houm- ... m_inject=1

Posted by: berthold | Jan 30 2025 16:45 utc | 1

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2025/01/u ... l#comments

******

Ukraine’s chief army psychiatrist arrested on $1m corruption charge
January 30, 2025
By Laura Gozzi, BBC, 1/21/25

Ukraine has detained its army’s chief psychiatrist for alleged “illegal enrichment” charges related to earnings of more than $1m (£813,000) accrued since the start of Russia’s invasion in February 2022.

In a statement, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) said the man sat on a commission deciding whether individuals were fit for military service.

The SBU statement did not name him – however, a man called Oleh Druz was previously identified as the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ chief psychiatrist.

The SBU said he owned three apartments in or near Kyiv, one in Odesa, two plots of land and several BMW luxury cars, and investigators searching his home also found $152,000 (£124,000) and €34,000 in cash.

The statement said the man did not declare the property, which was registered in the name of his wife, daughter, sons, and other third parties.

He now faces ten years in jail for the alleged charges of illegal enrichment and making a false declaration.

Druz was implicated in a similar case in 2017 which saw him fail to declare two SUVs and several properties, leading him to be suspended.

Ukraine has long battled endemic corruption.

In May, a Ukrainian MP was charged with embezzling £220,000, while in 2023 more than 30 conscription officials accused of taking bribes and smuggling people out of the country were sacked in an anti-corruption purge.

Last year, the Ukrainian parliament voted to abolish military medical commissions after several officials were accused of accepting bribes in exchange for issuing exemptions from military service.

https://natyliesbaldwin.com/2025/01/ukr ... on-charge/

******

The war threw Ukraine back 100 years
January 31, 13:44

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New US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the war in Ukraine.

1. Ukraine has been set back 100 years; its energy grid is destroyed. And how many Ukrainians have left Ukraine and are now living in other countries? They may never come back.

2. There is one lie - we were told that Ukraine would not only defeat Russia, but destroy it, throwing it back completely to the borders of 2012 or 2014, to Crimea and other territories. But the reality is this: for a year and a half, Ukraine has been asking for funding to maintain a stalemate, protracted conflict.

3. The president's position is that this is a protracted conflict and it needs to be ended. And it needs to be ended through negotiations. In all negotiations, both sides have to give up something.

4. If you look around the world, I would say that in many cases our adversaries are stronger than ever, and have become stronger in the last four years. Of course, Russia does not consider itself weaker than it was four years ago. They now control territory that they did not have when Donald Trump left office.

This is the price of giving up Istanbul, which is beneficial for Ukraine. Any further conditions will be much worse for what remains of Ukraine.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9644102.html

Google Translator

Russia has paid and should give up nothing. Yankee go home!
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Sat Feb 01, 2025 1:06 pm

A "danger" for Europe
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 01/02/2025

Image

“It is always interesting to see what provokes moral panic and what does not. The possible resumption of Russian gas supplies to Europe once the war is over does. Press gangs looking for Ukrainian men on the streets or the American demand to send young Ukrainians to the front do not. Trump’s territorial claims are mostly met with dissociation. It is too grim to even think about it,” wrote Russian opposition journalist Leonid Ragozin on Thursday, referring to an article published by the Financial Times on the possibility of a hypothetical resumption of Russian gas trade in Europe when the war is over. “European authorities are debating whether to resume sales of gas via Russian pipeline to the EU as part of a possible deal to end the war with Ukraine, according to people familiar with the discussions,” the newspaper said, although peace talks have not even begun yet, and success is not, given the precedents of this conflict, a certainty. However, European countries, which judging by Donald Trump's attitude and words will not play a significant role in the attempt to resolve the conflict, seem more concerned about the possibility of an uneasy peace than about the continuation of the war.

“I can only hope that European leaders learn the lesson of Russian aggression against Ukraine and that they push for the decision to never restore gas pumping through this pipeline,” said this week the president of Poland, one of the most belligerent countries and willing to see Ukraine continue to die – and kill – for the common goal of destroying Russia. “I think that the Nord Stream pipelines must be dismantled,” added Duda, who insisted that “this pipeline poses a very big threat to Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, but also to other Central European countries.” The danger of continental economic relations causes panic that this communication will once again become a political dialogue. The danger of this pipeline was fundamentally the access of the main industrial power of the continent, Germany, to a cheap and reliable source of energy directly, avoiding the ability of countries like Poland or Ukraine to decide when a client should receive the product they have purchased. Nord Stream also posed a threat to the United States, which is so eager to gain weight in the European energy market that Donald Trump, whose objective is no different from that of Joe Biden or Barack Obama, has threatened to impose tariffs on European Union countries if they do not increase their purchases of American liquefied natural gas.

Since 2014, the United States has led the lobbying group that includes the Baltic states, Poland and Ukraine – and which other countries have joined since 2022 – to replace Russian gas and oil with other energy sources that ideologically fit Washington’s geopolitical interests. In green Europe, the fact that liquefied gas that has to be transported from across the Atlantic has a larger carbon footprint than closer gas has been overlooked, and even the ecological damage caused by the attack on Nord Stream, for which Poland’s current foreign minister publicly thanked the United States, has been avoided. Until February 2022, Nord Stream was a risk for Ukraine, which feared losing the lucrative revenues that allowing Russian gas to pass through its national territory entails. The danger that Duda warns about is not only imaginary, but also reveals the intentions of those who raise it. Ukraine already acts as a wall separating Europe in terms of the gas market since it decided not to renew the existing transit contract between the Ukrainian and Russian national companies, so the only risk that a gas pipeline that would cost multi-million euros to repair can pose is the existence of a remote possibility of resuming commercial relations between Germany and Russia, a danger for Ukraine only in a zero-sum game in which the benefit for one ally means the loss for another. Duda's position is clearly simply seeking a complete continental break-up, creating a Western Europe isolated from the rest of the continent and in which countries like Germany would have to permanently and definitively give up one of the bases of the competitiveness of their industry.

Both Germany and the United States, Europe’s protector who announced that there would be no Nord Stream 2 if Russia invaded Ukraine, have made it clear that there will be no resumption of Russian gas transit through pipelines for the duration of the war. Although not as quickly as Washington and its main European allies (Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic countries) would like, the EU has taken steps to avoid addiction to cheap Russian energy, whose price and availability were a benefit that is now seen as a serious detriment. The increase in imports of Russian liquefied natural gas, cheaper than American gas, cannot compensate for the fall to zero of gas distributed through Nord Stream and the Ukrainian transit system. The loss of access to what was the main source of energy for its industry is one of the causes of the stagnation of the German economy, something that leaders more aligned with Washington than with any European capital do not perceive as a danger.

“The resumption of the debate on gas sales has unsettled some American exporters of liquefied natural gas who are looking to sign long-term supply agreements with European companies. According to two of them, they fear that any resumption of Ukrainian transit could make their products less competitive,” writes the Financial Times , making it clear that the danger Duda warns of is simply the possibility of losing the benefits that certain actors hope to gain from the current war and its geopolitical consequences. “The EU’s stated goal is to eliminate all Russian fossil fuels from its energy system by 2027. Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen will present a plan to achieve this goal in March,” recalls the article, describing a commitment whose only logic is political and which would involve replacing the most accessible and cheapest energy with renewable energy, but also with hydrocarbons imported from more distant places, among which the American ally stands out. Every war has economic causes and consequences and in this one there is no need to hide the objectives. The 465,000-tonne methane leak from the Nord Stream explosion is the perfect symbol for the current European reality. Germany, which has opted to remain silent because it cannot blame an enemy for the attack, has not even succeeded in getting Poland to comply with the arrest warrant for a suspect of involvement in the incident. Perhaps Poland sees allowing a suspect in an act of international terrorism to escape as a way of reducing the risk for Germany, one of the countries that, according to the Financial Times , is considering resuming trade with Russia.

The list of countries includes Slovakia and Hungary, as expected, given that they are the countries most affected by the cut-off of Russian gas through Ukraine decided by the Zelensky government. “There is pressure from some of the large member states regarding energy prices and this is one of the ways to get them to go down,” said a European official quoted by the newspaper, adding that “three of the officials who have been informed of the talks insist that the idea has been defended by some German and Hungarian officials, with support from other capitals that see it as a way to reduce European energy costs.”

The resumption of Russian gas trade in the EU is not feasible at the moment and may remain so for an indefinite period after the conflict is over. However, it is significant that the issue has already been raised and is perceived as a risk. Germany may not want to forever mortgage the viability of its industry to the willingness of the United States to supply energy, which will always be more expensive than Russian energy, not least because Washington will not encourage German industry, a potential rival, to increase its productivity. Poland and other European countries are there to prevent this danger.

https://slavyangrad.es/2025/02/01/un-pe ... ra-europa/

Google Translator

******

From Cassad's Telegram account:

Colonelcassad
Summary of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation (as of February 1, 2025 ) Main points:

- The Russian Armed Forces hit the infrastructure of military airfields of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as storage sites and preparation sites for the launch of UAVs;

- The Russian Armed Forces carried out a group strike on gas and energy infrastructure facilities that ensure the operation of Ukrainian military-industrial complex enterprises.

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 320 soldiers in the area of ​​responsibility of the West group;

- Russian air defense systems shot down 10 HIMARS projectiles and 108 Ukrainian UAVs in one day;

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 220 servicemen in one day in the area of ​​responsibility of the South group;

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost over 130 servicemen and a Leopard tank in the area of ​​responsibility of the East group.

▫️Units of the "East" group of forces continued to advance into the depths of the enemy's defense. Formations of two mechanized brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and three territorial defense brigades were defeated in the areas of the settlements of Novopetrovske in the Dnipropetrovsk region, Zelenoye Pole, Rivnepil, Dneproenergia and Razliv in the Donetsk People's Republic. The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost over 130 servicemen, a Leopard tank made in Germany, an armored combat vehicle and a car. Four field artillery pieces were destroyed, including a 155 mm self-propelled artillery unit "Caesar" made in France.

▫️Units of the Dnepr group of forces defeated the manpower and equipment of two coastal defense brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the areas of the settlements of Primorskoye, Novoandriyevka, Pyatikhatki in the Zaporizhzhya region and Antonovka in the Kherson region.

The enemy lost up to 40 servicemen, four vehicles and an electronic warfare station.

▫️ Operational-tactical aviation , strike unmanned aerial vehicles , missile forces and artillery of the groups of troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation damaged the infrastructure of military airfields, storage sites and preparation sites for launching unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as concentrations of manpower and equipment of the armed formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 156 districts.

▫️ Air defense systems shot down 10 US-made HIMARS multiple launch rockets and 108 aircraft-type unmanned aerial vehicles.

▫️In total, since the beginning of the special military operation, the following have been destroyed: 652 aircraft, 283 helicopters, 42,095 unmanned aerial vehicles, 590 anti-aircraft missile systems, 20,984 tanks and other armored combat vehicles, 1,511 multiple launch rocket systems, 21,100 field artillery pieces and mortars, and 31,097 special military vehicles.

***

Colonelcassad
Chronicle of strikes on the territory of Ukraine from January 31 to February 1, 2025

At night, the Aerospace Forces and Missile Forces carried out a combined missile strike with ground-based cruise and ballistic missiles, plus Kh-31P missiles were used. The main targets were airfields and air defense areas of the enemy.
Also yesterday, during the day and at night, the Aerospace Forces and Missile Forces struck targets in the Donbas, Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Kherson regions (the entire spectrum of weapons), Odessa, Cherkassy, ​​Voznesensk, Pavlograd, Mirgorod, Kremenchuk (Iskander M and K), Kiev and Chernihiv (Gerani/Gerberas).

Chronology of strikes:

January 31, 2025
• 08.15 outskirts of Starokostiantyniv, Khmelnytskyi region - explosion. Geranium.
• 09.10 Brovary - explosion. Geranium.
• 10:00 Chernigov - explosions. Gerani.
• 11:50 Kramatorsk - explosions. Tornado-S.
• 12:25 Sumy region and Donbass - explosions. UMPK.
• 13:05 Donbass Konstantinovka - explosions.
• 16:55 Sumy region border area - explosions. UMPK.
• 17:55 Sumy region - explosions. UMPK. Border area.
• 17:45 Donbass Pokrovsky district - explosions. UMPK.
• 18:25 Kupyansk, Kharkiv region - explosions. UMPK.
• 17:50 18:00 18:15 Zaporizhia region - explosions. 3 strikes by UMPK. Malaya Tokmachka and the outskirts of Orekhov.
• 20:11 Mykolaiv region - explosion. Cruise missile.
• 20.20 Odessa - explosions. OTRK.
• 20.55 Odessa, more explosions. In the center.
• 21.05 Odessa, another explosion.
• 22.25, increased activity was noted on strategic aviation frequencies.
• 22.30 Donbass - explosions. UMPK.
• 23.10 Voznesensk - explosion. Cruise missile.

February 1, 2025
• 01.40 outskirts of Odessa - 2 explosions of the Kh-31P.
• 01.40 Voznesensk, Nikolaev region - 2 explosions. Iskander-K. 2 cruise missiles hit the airfield simultaneously with the strike on air defense positions in Odessa.
• 01.45 Pavlograd - explosion. Probably Iskander-K
• 01.46 Kremenchuk - explosion. probably Iskander-K.
• 01.55 Akhtyrka, Sumy region - explosion. Iskander-M. Explosion in the airfield area.
• 01.55 Cherkassy - 2 explosions. Missiles - type unspecified. Explosions in the airport area. Probably Iskander-K.
• 01.57 Mirgorod - explosion. Iskander-M. Explosion in the airbase area.
• 02.05 Poltava region - 2 explosions. It is not yet clear where it landed.
• 02.07 Sumy region - explosion. Iskander-M.
• 02.25 Kiev and Zaporozhye explosions. Geraniums/Gerberas.
• 02.30 Kiev suburbs - explosions. Geraniums/Gerberas.
• 02.40 Zlatopol, Kharkiv region - explosion. Geranium/Gerbera.
• 02.40-03.05 Zaporozhye - more than 10 explosions. Geraniums. The city lost power and a fire broke out. One of the largest UAV attacks on a city.
• 03.20 Odessa outskirts explosions Geranium.
• 03.30 Chernigov outskirts - explosion. Geranium.
• 05.15 Dnipropetrovsk region - explosion. Geranium/Gerbera.
• 06.00 Ozernoye, Zhitomir region - explosion. Geranium/Gerbera.
• 06.30-06.40 Kharkiv region - explosions. OTRK
• 07.00 Zhitomir and Starokostiantyniv - explosions. Geranium/Gerbera
• 07.10 Zhitomir explosions again. Geranium/Gerbera.

***

Colonelcassad
Forwarded from
South Tower
Divers of the Russian Emergencies Ministry continue to survey the Black Sea waters in the emergency zone

. More than 955 kilometers of coastline are surveyed daily.

In the Black Sea waters:

more than 6,244 sq. km surveyed, more than 265 sq. km in 24 hours;
50,195 sq. m treated with sorbent ;
more than 177 thousand tons collected in total;
more than 136 thousand tons removed to a temporary storage site.

In Sevastopol, 165 km of coastline between the villages of Laspi and Andreyevka are being surveyed. More than 611 tons of contaminated sand and soil have been collected and removed.

Government of Sevastopol

In addition:

1. The amount of fuel oil emissions has decreased.
2. The number of contaminated seabirds has decreased.
3. Wave divers helping with beach cleaning and bird cleaning make a significant contribution.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

******

CIA/NYT Remove North Korean Troops From Ukraine's Front Line

After three months of intense propaganda the CIA decided to bury an Ukrainian disinformation scheme and announced to 'pull North Korean troops off the front line'.

Well. How did North Koreans get to the front line in the first place?

On October 14 the former president of Ukraine Vladimir Zelinski initiated an information-operation designed to increase support for Ukraine. He alleged, without evidence, that Russia planned to involve North Korea into the war.

U.S. financed media outlets in Ukraine soon propped up these rumors by citing 'sources in Ukraine’s special services'. More anonymous 'sources' chimed in and soon there was talk of 3,000 soldiers from North Korea joining the fight. There was however zero evidence that anything like was ever planned or happened.

I thus remarked:

I regard the whole claim of North Korean troops in Russia as a fake news story and I am sure that most experts will follow me in that judgment.

However, today U.S. media manage to play up the nonsense:

Why North Korea is sending soldiers to the Russian front lines - Washington Post
Sending solders to help Russia’s war effort against Ukraine could earn valuable foreign currency for Kim Jong Un’s regime and bolster their strengthening ties.
...

I do not believe that any politician or military in the west will believe that nonsense which is again solely sourced to Ukrainian military intelligence claims. But there is clear campaign by the Ukrainian government to make the issue stick. What is its hope? To induce South Korea to send its forces to fight North Koreans on the Ukrainian border with Russia?


A few days later it emerged that the whole Ukrainian 'North Korea' information-operation was based on a U.S. plan:

At the time of writing the above I did not know that the idea for this campaign came from RAND, the Pentagon's think tank which often proposes strategic ideas. In a commentary about Russian/North Korean and Chinese cooperation published on October 11, three days before the start of Zelenski's campaign, a RAND analyst wrote:

What Should the United States Do?
Given the differences in the objectives of Russia, China, and North Korea, the United States should be mounting major information operations against these three countries to highlight their differences and fuel distrust among them.
...
[T]he United States should recognize that North Korean military advisors are supporting Russian use of North Korean military supplies in occupied areas of Ukraine.
...
This new cooperation between Russia and North Korea is hardly a signal of a budding long-term alliance and U.S. information campaigns could help speed its demise.

Just three days later the Military Intelligence of the Ukrainian army, headed by General Budanov, started to 'leak' claims to the Ukrainian press about North Korean troops in Russia.


Since launching the first rumors of 1,500, then 3,000 North Korean soldiers in Russia the CIA trained head of the Ukrainian military special service General Budanov increased the number from hot air to 11,000 North Korean soldiers.

But even NATO denied to have any knowledge of such a force.

As I summarized at that time:

Shortly after RAND proposed a U.S. information operation campaign around the theme of North Korean soldiers in Russia the Ukrainian military intelligence service under CIA trainee Budanov started to spread rumors of North Korean soldiers soon to fight on the Russian side. The numbers claimed by Budanov have since steadily increased. South Korean intelligence, also associated with the CIA, and U.S. media have joined the campaign. The chair of the House Intelligence Committee is milking the campaign to make political points.
Evidence that was supposed to support the claims has been exposed as being fake. The whole story is thus based on nothing but 'intelligence' rumors which are following a RAND proposed script. Don't fall for it.


The story continued to grow through repetition. Media quoted each other with each adding bits of bullshit from their usual 'security sources'. What failed to turn up though was evidence.

After being repeatedly questioned about the lack of evidence for their claims, Ukrainian politicians presented their solution:

Today the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Rustem Umerov, has given a hint how Ukraine will handle this issue (machine translation):

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov confirmed the words of the head of the National Security and Defense Council's Center for Combating Disinformation, Andriy Kovalenko , that the first "small-scale fighting" had already taken place between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and North Korean soldiers, and the Koreans had suffered losses.
...
Umerov also said that the Russian Federation disguises Koreans as Buryats, so the dead and prisoners must be identified before Ukraine calls the number of enemy losses.


Buryats are a Mongolic people in Siberia who are part of the Russian Federation. Many of them have joined the well paid ranks of Russian forces. Umerov's plan was thus obvious:

As soon as some Buryat soldier of Russia will turn up dead, the Ukrainian military will present him as a disguised North Korean soldier. Some black and white photos will be found of a similar looking person in North Korean uniform ...
"There is your prove. Now send soldiers and weapons." will Umerov say.


There have since been several attempts by Ukrainian special services to reinforce their media campaign. Russian passports from dead Russian soldiers were presented as 'fake documents' carried by 'North Koreans'. They even captured a Buryat:

On Oct. 28 (local time), Jonas Ohman, head of the Lithuanian NGO Blue/Yellow, which provides aid to Ukraine and its military, informed local media outlet LRT, stating, “The first encounter between a Ukrainian unit we support and North Korean soldiers occurred on the 25th in Kursk. To my knowledge, all of the North Korean soldiers, except for one, were killed. The surviving soldier was found carrying identification as a Buryat.”
Other 'evidence' included hand written letters, allegedly by North Korean soldiers, written in South Korean type and style.


Even Wikipedia had to admit:

As of January 2025, there has been no independent confirmation of the Buryat Battalion's existence [,allegedly consisting of soldiers from North Korea,] outside of Ukrainian sources.

The nonsense of this scheme has become too obvious.

Now the CIA, with the help of the New York Times, is shutting it down.

The 'North Korean soldiers' are leaving the battlefield the same way they came - ever unseen.

North Korean Troops No Longer Seen on Front Lines Fighting Ukraine (archived) - New York Times, Jan 31 2024
North Korea sent its best troops to aid Russia in its war against Ukraine. But after months of suffering severe losses, they have been taken off the front line.

North Korean soldiers who joined their Russian allies in battle against Ukrainian forces have been pulled off the front lines after suffering heavy casualties, according to Ukrainian and U.S. officials.

The North Korean troops, sent to bolster Russian forces trying to push back a Ukrainian offensive inside Russia’s borders, have not been seen at the front for about two weeks, the officials said after requesting anonymity to discuss sensitive military and intelligence matters.


Well - that sentences is formally correct. But it would be even more precise to say that 'North Korean troops have not been seen at the front - since ever.'

The CIA/NYT can't go there (yet). They still add to the stupid claims:

Many of the soldiers are among North Korea’s best-trained special operations troops, but the Russians appear to have used them as foot soldiers, sending them forth in waves across fields studded with land mines to be mowed down by heavy Ukrainian fire.

Well, where are the pictures and videos of North Korean troops 'sent forth in waves' and 'mowed down by heavy Ukrainian fire'?

In a war where every ground move is surveilled by dozens of drones how come there is not even one video that shows evidence of such a scene?

For now the RAND/Ukraine (dis-)information campaign of 'North Korean' soldiers fighting Ukraine has been shut down. U.S. 'officials' however keep the door open to relaunch it at a convenient time:

The American officials said the decision to pull the North Korean troops off the front line may not be a permanent one. It is possible, they said, that the North Koreans could return after receiving additional training or after the Russians come up with new ways of deploying them to avoid such heavy casualties.

Maybe a month, a year, or ten from now we will be again told about these imagined 'enemies' from North Korea which unite with Russians to 'fight us'.

Posted by b on January 31, 2025 at 14:48 UTC | Permalink

Comments

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2025/01/c ... .html#more

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Remember Ukraine’s “Diia” Digital Governance System? Russian Hackers Brought It Down in December, and It Is Still Partly Down
Posted on January 31, 2025 by Nick Corbishley

The Zelensky government’s “state in a smartphone” model of digital identity and governance, once a source of pride and inspiration for other countries, has become a source of derision.

Regular NC readers are by now no strangers to Ukraine’s “state-of-the-art” Diia (Ukrainian for “action”) digital governance and identity system. For those who are, a quick recap: In December 2022, we reported that Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky government was trying to digitise just about everything it could, including most government services and bureaucracy, even against a backdrop of war, rolling blackouts and internet outages:

Ukraine may be suffering a rising wave of rolling power blackouts and internet outages as the proxy war between Russia and NATO intensifies, but that doesn’t seem to have crimped the Zelensky government’s ambitions to transform the country into a digital wonderland. In the past week alone, Ukraine’s central bank unveiled plans for a digital E-hryvnia and Kyiv signed a digital trade agreement (yep, they do exist) with the United Kingdom.

USAID Funding

In January 2023, Samantha Power, speaking at Davos, the then administrator of Washington’s soft power arm, USAID, heralded Diia as “a great anti-corruption tool” and unveiled US government plans to replicate the “success” of Ukraine’s e-governance app in other countries around the world — including, presumably, the United States itself. As the promotional video below shows, Diia was developed “with support from USAID”.

(Video at link.)

Ukraine’s digitisation of government services predated the conflict with Russia, but in the eternal spirit of never letting a good crisis go to waste, it was significantly expanded once the hostilities began.

The purpose of Diia was not just to digitise public services but to automate, outsource and privatise them, as Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation and Deputy Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov Fedorov told the WEF’s 2021 class of Young Global Leaders, of which he is a graduate:

The Government needs to become as flexible and mobile as an IT company, to automate all functions and services, significantly change the structure, reduce 60% of officials, introduce large-scale privatisation and outsourcing of government functions. Even in customs. Only such a Government will be able to bring about quick and bold reforms to rebuild the country and ensure rapid development.

Then, in May 2023 we picked apart a shamelessly gushing article by the United Nations Development Programme, another financial backer of Diia, about Ukraine’s accelerating war-time digital transformation:

Despite being plunged into war, Ukraine is forging ahead with a comprehensive re-think of how business is conducted, and how Ukrainian people interact with each other and with their government.

“We are building the most convenient digital state in the world — without corruption, without bureaucracy, absolutely paperless, and open for everyone,” Ms. Ionan [Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Digital Transformation] says.

The online portal and a mobile application for public services is called Diia, which is Ukrainian for ‘action’.

It aims to move all public services online, cover the entire country with internet access, close the gender and generational gaps in digital literacy, and make Ukraine the most welcoming country in the world for IT companies.

Inconvenient Consequences

That dream has withered already. Ukraine cannot muster much of a welcome for IT companies given that not only is it on the verge of losing its NATO-led proxy war against Russia while also suffering regular nationwide blackouts but large parts of its Diia system are down after being hit by a massive Russian cyber attack in early December. It is as yet unclear how much of the data held on the system has been compromised. But needless to say, the consequences for Ukrainian citizens appears to be anything but convenient, as Kyiv Independent reports:

At the start of December, Ukrainians suddenly found themselves unable to sell cars, file legal claims, or register marriages through the state’s recently digitized government registries.

The Justice Ministry on Dec. 19 formally announced that a Russian hack had taken a laundry list of critical government databases that had been put under the Justice Ministry offline. The databases contain sensitive information from property ownership to biometric data to tax records.

Relevant Ukrainian offices quickly called it an act of war from Russia. “The information space is one of the key directions of the enemy’s attacks,” wrote the State Communications Service, the national cybersecurity agency, in a statement provided to the Kyiv Independent…

XakNet, a hacking group previously tied to Russian intelligence, took credit for the attack, posting on Telegram data they claim to have hacked from the Ukrainian civil registry. The hackers claimed to have deleted at least some of the registry data…

XakNet hackers also claimed to have destroyed backup data in servers in Poland. In its message the hacker group mocks Ukraine’s government, saying: “It’s very telling to store government data on foreign storage — that’s what independence Ukrainian-style looks like, apparently.”

A December 20 article published by RBC Ukraine suggests that the impact of the cyberattack on the basic functioning of the Diia app was extensive, with over 20 of the app’s services left “temporarily unavailable, including worker reservations, business registration, online marriage registrations, property ownership services, vehicle re-registration, ‘eRestoration’, ‘eHousing,’ and many others.”

Given the Zelensky government’s ambition to do away with all old-fashioned, paper-based bureaucracy in its mad rush to create the perfect paperless state, it would be interesting to know whether it left in place analogue backups for these bureaucratic processes.

Ukraine’s Justice Ministry recently insisted that all of its state registries were ready to operate but that access to some registers was still limited, as their data still needs to be updated. Access to government services through the Diia app would be available in the near future, it said on Jan. 20 — over six weeks after the initial cyber attack. On January 23, UNN reported that it is now once again possible to obtain a preferential mortgage and change your place of residence online through the Diia app.

“We are working to restore all services in the app and on the portal,” said Fedorov.

Crumbling Public Trust

But the hack is likely to further undermine public trust in the Zelensky government. As even the New York Times reported recently, the high popularity that the Ukrainian president enjoyed in the early days of the Russian invasion, with an approval rating of about 90 percent, has dipped badly in recent months. Of course, given that Zelenksy’s government has cancelled elections for as long as the war goes on, this doesn’t matter much.

But Ukraine’s reputation as a pioneer in digital governance is also under fire. For the first time since the Diia system’s launch in February 2020, media in the country and abroad are beginning to question the wisdom of digitising government services so quickly and then centralising the system and data into a single digital portal under the control of just one government department, the Ministry of Justice. What was once a source of pride for the government is fast becoming a source of derision.

Just six months ago, the industry publication Biometric Update reported that Diia was continuing to attract all the right sort of attention, especially from US-based organisations. Ironically, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a highly influential Washington-based think tank, even touted Diia as an example of how digital public infrastructure can make government registries resilient against crises like war. Last week, Biometric Update reported that Russia’s hack of Diia had revealed “flaws in the system”.

In its article, the Kyiv Independent warned that the hack posed a major informational threat, highlighting how vulnerable government and Ukrainians’ personal data is to cyber attacks:

In pushing to digitize its services quickly, the government also may have taken shortcuts that opened the door to digital onslaughts. Attacks of these kinds also erode public trust in the government, experts say.

The core problem, as (cybersecurity specialist and frequent coordinator of Ukrainian hackers, Karla) Wagner, diagnoses, was the pace at which Ukraine rewired systems ranging from passports to tax payments into a single digital portal, all under the auspices of the Justice Ministry, in order to show positive results to foreign observers.

Presumably this is in reference to Diia’s armies of financial backers, including USAID, the UN Development Programme, the Swedish government, and the European Union, as well as the US tech giants that were closely involved in its roll out, including Amazon Web Services, Apple and Google. As Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation and Deputy Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov proudly admitted in December 2022, Google is effectively running (or at least was) large parts of Diia:

“Google services have become our infrastructure. The tools provided by the company allowed the Government to function quickly and efficiently despite the shelling and constant threats of cyber attacks. In addition, Google ensures protection and security of Ukrainians’ data and promotes development of our entrepreneurs.”

That protection and security has now been seriously compromised. As the Kyiv Independent article notes, hackers can often find backdoors in IT systems left open to governments, as revealed by a series of legal battles to compel Apple to extract data for US intelligence agencies. According to Wagner, one of the main reasons for Diia’s vulnerability to outside attacks was the widespread corner cutting that took place amid the mad rush to get the system up and running, presumably so that it could then be wielded as an example to the world:

“It was very, very, very, very, very fast progress,” says Wagner. “And any IT project that has the heat on to make fast progress will cut corners where needed and save resources where needed with the best of intentions, which is meeting the deadlines and satisfying the requirements. (That) created not only a long string of vulnerabilities but also over-centralization in tech admin infrastructure.”

When Diia was attacked, exposing the myriad flaws in Diia’s security architecture, a system touted for its speed and convenience suddenly stopped working — for well over a month — and became extremely inconvenient. As Kyev Independent reports, questions are now being asked about just how Russian agencies could use the hacked information:

The hack “provides opportunities for Russian intelligence to obtain additional information about Ukrainian military and civilian government employees, and identify vulnerable or otherwise suitable people in Ukraine who can be recruited or coerced into conducting espionage activities and sabotage,” analysts at cybersecurity firm Flashpoint wrote in a comments to the Kyiv Independent.

“However, more likely uses of such information include conducting future cyberattacks on other organizations in Ukraine using the information from public registries for reconnaissance, identity theft, social engineering, doxxing, harassment, and crafting convincing phishing emails,” Flashpoint wrote…

Mykyta Knysh, who formerly worked in cybersecurity for Ukraine’s security services, the SBU, and currently runs the hacking collective “HackYourMama,” says the agencies involved should have known better.

“I understand that the Justice Ministry doesn’t necessarily have to have this kind of expertise, but the State Office of Security and Communications, the Digital Transformation Ministry, the SBU — they should have that expertise,” says Knysh…

“At the beginning of the full-scale invasion we realized that Ukraine’s digital infrastructure was overly centralized, according to the old Soviet model,” says Wagner. “Centralization and single points of failure are a well-known anti-pattern. And it’s highly vulnerable”…

Knysh is especially concerned that authorities provided no details on the hack, citing “a whole monopoly on what they are saying.” Given that hackers re-use hacking techniques, he was concerned for other nations.

This, surely, is the most important point. As noted at the beginning of this article, both USAID and the UN Development Programme have been working around the clock to export Ukraine’s Diia model to other countries around the world that are struggling with corruption and transparency issues. In its 2023 promotional piece on Diia, the UNDP announced that “Diia is ready to go international”, and that Ms. Ionan, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Digital Transformation, “is eager to share Ukraine’s knowledge and resources with the world.”

A slightly closer look at the UNDP article reveals why the UN agency is so enthusiastic about Diia. In small print under one of the photos is this disclosure:

“The UNDP, with funding from Sweden, supported the development of 23 e-services, which were launched by the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine on the Diia app and portal.”

Meanwhile, Samantha Power, speaking at Davos in 2023, said that she saw Diia as part of a broader effort to help democratic reformers around the world deliver for their people, adding that countries would be selected accordingly. From Axios:

“We want to look at the bright spots, at the countries that are committed to transparency and an anti-corruption agenda, that are bucking the global trends,” Power said. She noted that Moldova’s reformist government has already expressed interest in Ukraine’s e-governance approach.

Power also hopes to partner with countries in the global south. Given the current “economic headwinds,” even leaders who are working to clean up corruption and improve governance may struggle to improve the lives of their citizens, she said. An app that allows citizens to file taxes or access birth certificates without waiting in line for hours could be one tangible improvement, she argued.

Once held up an example to the world, Diia should now serve as a clear warning to governments of all stripes and, more important still, global citizens: these digital governance systems, and the data they harvest and hold, are not secure. In a time of growing state-to-state conflict, rolling out easily compromised systems of digital governance and digital identity needlessly puts the basic security of those countries at serious risk.

Back in 2022, Kyiv signed a digital trade agreement (yep, they do exist) with the United Kingdom. The DTA included a provision for collaborating on digital identity. Fast forward to today, the UK’s Keir Starmer government is intensifying its push to launch a digital identity system, including by implementing digital IDs for age verification in pubs and clubs this year. In recent weeks, the propaganda to support the roll out of digital IDs in the UK has kicked into gear. And the main selling points, as always, are speed and convenience.

Security issues, by contrast, are being widely ignored despite the UK government’s long, chequered history with IT projects. What the Starmer government isn’t telling UK residents in its digital ID PR campaign is that many of its current IT systems are dangerously lacking in basic cybersecurity. This is the damning conclusion of a new report by National Audit Office (NAO), which found that the government is so far behind on its 2022 target to harden systems against cyberattacks by 2025 that it is unlikely to achieve the target even by 2030.

Of the 228 legacy systems that were analysed, 28% were red-rated, meaning they posed a high likelihood of operational and security risks occurring. The remaining 72% were not red-rated but still presented a risk, the report said.

“We have seen too often the devastating impact of cyber-attacks on our public services and people’s lives,” said Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, MP and chair of the Public Accounts Committee. “Despite the rapidly evolving cyber threat, government’s response has not kept pace. Poor coordination across government, a persistent shortage of cyber skills, and a dependence on outdated legacy IT systems are continuing to leave our public services exposed.”

The NAO report, said Clifton-Brown, should serve as a wake-up call to government to get on top of this pernicious threat. But instead, the UK government, like the Zelensky government in Ukraine, is in too much of a rush to expand its digital public infrastructure while playing little more than lip service to security concerns.

But not all governments in Europe are quite so blasé about IT systems security. As we suggested in early December, fear of hybrid war with Russia is one of the reasons why some of northern Europe’s governments appear to be rethinking the wisdom of abandoning cash and embracing a fully digitised economy. The Daily Telegraph even published an article warning that “Going Cashless Risks Playing Straight into Putin’s Hands.” Perhaps (and this is probably wishful thinking on my part) Russia’s recent hack of Diia will have a similar sobering effect on Europe’s plans to unleash eminently hackable digital governance and ID systems.

https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2025/01 ... -down.html

*****

Why Volodymyr Zelensky is merely the latest in a long line of puppet leaders

Ian Proud

January 31, 2025

Zelensky only remains in power with the support of western nations that prop up his exorbitant and unwinnable war.


The United State in particular, but also the United Kingdom, have shown a penchant for helping puppet leaders cling to power since the end of World War II. Zelensky is just the latest in a long list.

Great powers going back over the centuries have worked hard to install compliant leaders in other, weaker states, often with the intention of preventing a bigger rival gaining a foothold.

Zelensky wasn’t necessarily installed by western governments. The project to recreate Ukraine in a western liberal clothing had already started in February 2014 with the overthrow of former President Viktor Yanukovych. Pliable president Petro Poroshenko was as warmly welcomed in western capitals as Zelensky has been since 2022. After his election in 2019, there were serious questions in the UK government about whether to take Zelensky seriously as a political player. He didn’t stamp down on endemic corruption, as he’d promised. He wasn’t any more democratic or more liberal than his predecessors in the role.

That changed radically when war started in Ukraine in February 2022. As one commentator put it war cast aside the dark clouds over Zelensky and allowed him to pivot into a manufactured role as the ‘heroic wartime president and global symbol of defender of the free world’. Certainly, for the first six months of the war, that image worked well for Zelensky and he has an enduring appeal even today among western political figures and in the mainstream media.

But as time has gone by, Zelensky has revealed himself as having feet of clay. He is not obviously a democratically minded liberal, having been unelected since March 2024 when Presidential elections were meant to take place.

His government appears just as corrupt as every other Ukrainian government since the downfall of the Soviet Union. A poll in 2023 suggested that 77% of surveyed Ukrainians saw Zelensky as responsible for corruption.

He has known for a year and a half that Ukraine could not win a war against Russia, a realisation that sparked the sacking of popular ex-Military chief Valeriy Zaluzhniy when he pointed this out in a widely reported interview.

And yet Zelensky has done everything in his power to continue the war, to press gang western states to offer more war fighting support and to maintain an immovable objection to engaging in direct talks with Russia to end the fighting.

With Trump now in power, Zelensky has in recent days tried to finesse and walk back his position on talks. However, to many impartial outside observers, the reason behind Zelensky’s position can only have been driven by two considerations.

A wilful hope that NATO may eventually be drawn into a fight with Russia that Ukraine can’t win on its own.

A belief that, even without NATO intervention, western powers will continue to prop up his government with external aid.

As NATO has at no time looked remotely likely to join the fight against Russia directly, that leaves Zelensky looking like yet another puppet leader who will do anything to cling to power, until he is abandoned by his western sponsors.

Puppet leadership is a lucrative business. Your country will receive billions of dollars in aid from those countries that sponsor your existence. Your every word will be clung to by journalists from sponsoring countries, desperate to believe you are the second coming of Christ in liberal democratic white robes. Crowds will gather to applaud you and stare in wonderment at your awesomeness when you visit their countries. As you are a friend, you won’t be criticised for corruption and bad leadership, in the way that enemies are so criticized. The main problem is that you are dispensable, and when your time is up, you will either be exiled, sidelined, jailed or assassinated.

Let’s look at some examples.

Nguyen Van Thieu was the former Army officer who rose to power in South Vietnam after the CIA-back coup that toppled Ngo Dinh Diemh in 1963. Serving as President from 1967 until 1975, shortly before North Vietnam’s capture of Saigon, his most notable achievement was in overseeing a government of monumental corruption. Even in the 1960s and 70s, the small country received an average of $1.5bn each year from the U.S., around 15% of its GDP. Much of that was pocketed by corrupt officials in Thieu’s government. But he said what the Americans wanted to hear and held up South Vietnam as a bulwark against the communist north. Until it became clear that the U.S. didn’t have the political will at home, nor the military skill in theatre to beat North Vietnam, whereupon Thieu fled the scene and established himself in opulent exile in Taipei.

Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan is a more modern manifestation of the U.S.-imposed puppet leader, after his ascent to become President of Afghanistan in 2002 following the Taleban’s defeat. Of course, Afghanistan has a modern history of modern superpowers installing puppet regimes, and this was also true of the Soviet Union’s installation of Mohammed Najibullah in 1986, after a bloodless coup. Widely hailed as Afghanistan’s saviour by the western media and politicians, Karzai oversaw a government characterised by unprecedented levels of graft and corruption. Afghanistan received billions of dollars in western handouts that it was not able to absorb as a result of which, according to the Washington Post, about ‘forty percent of the money ended up in the hands of insurgents, criminal syndicates or corrupt Afghan officials’. Karzai was toppled in elections in 2014 and is now a largely forgotten figure in the annals of western puppet theatre.

While not a puppet leader in the conventional sense, Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar is a classic example of a foreign opposition type figure lionised by western, particularly British, diplomats, given the historical colonial link to the country formerly called Burma. Educated in Oxford, married to a brit (now deceased) she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990 for winning an election in Myanmar that was promptly stamped out by the military. When I joined the UK diplomatic service in 1999, the South East Asia Department headed fixated on her wellbeing constantly, seeing her as the only true leader of her country. Having spent years under house arrest, Aung San Suu Kyi finally won a landslide general election in 2015. She visited the UK in 2016, and I joined hordes of adoring British diplomats greeting her in the grand colonial quadrangle of the Durbar Court in King Charles Street. Softly spoken with a demure elegance, she was Prime Minister of Myanmar during an alleged genocide against Muslim Rohingyas in the west of the country, staunchly defending her military’s actions. She is now under house arrest having been convicted of possibly trumped up charges of corruption by the still powerful military and may never be free again. But western adoration has faded, and she seldom makes it into the UK media.

Benazir Bhutto, beautiful, glamorous, Harvard and Oxford educated Prime Minister of Pakistan twice in the Eighties and Nineties, was known by the UK Foreign Office to be woefully corrupt. And yet she was feted as a global superstar of western liberal democratic values because she spoke our language. Her assassination by suicide bomber in 2007 silenced lingering questions about her legacy. Although her husband Asif Ali Zardari – about whom the UK Foreign Office harboured grave misgivings about alleged corruption – is the President of Pakistan right now.

It is clear today that Volodymyr Zelensky only remains in power with the support of western nations that prop up his exorbitant and unwinnable war. When that ends, as it surely will, history suggests that he will face the same fate of those puppets that came before him; either exiled, sidelined, imprisoned or assassinated.

https://strategic-culture.su/news/2025/ ... t-leaders/

Can Trump make a peace deal with Putin?

January 31, 2025

Looks at proposals being reported. But any deal must be based on addressing the roots of conflict.

U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly said he wants to open talks with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, to end the war in Ukraine. Trump has spoken about the urgency of bringing the conflict to a peaceful conclusion. Fair enough.

For his part, President Putin has magnanimously reciprocated, saying he is ready to engage in talks with Trump.

So far, so good. At least the American side is no longer encumbered with the stupid intransigent, hostile mentality of the Biden administration, which refused to have any diplomatic contact with Russia.

Russia, for its part, has always been willing to negotiate a genuine way to not just end the conflict but to avoid future conflict. Before the war in Ukraine erupted three years ago in February 2022, Moscow put forward a comprehensive proposal for a security treaty in Europe in December 2021. The proposal stipulated that the U.S.-led NATO military alliance desist from aggressive expansion on Russia’s borders and, in particular, for Ukraine never to be a member of NATO. Those proposals were rejected out of hand by the U.S. and its European partners.

At the earliest stage of the Ukraine conflict, in March 2022, Russia negotiated a potential peace settlement with the Kiev regime in Istanbul, only for that proposal to be rejected by Washington and its British surrogate. The result has been three years of bloodshed and destruction, with millions of Ukrainian casualties and refugees. Ukraine has been destroyed thanks to the intransigence of its NATO sponsors.

If diplomacy is the art of making politics work then anything is possible. Opening talks is at least a start to exchanging ideas and demands to bring the conflict to an end and stop it from spiraling into a catastrophic global war between nuclear powers.

President Trump says he wants to end the conflict. But does he understand what the conflict is really about? If a problem is not correctly defined, then a solution is elusive.

Trump has a showman style of doing politics. He bragged about ending the war in Ukraine within 24 hours of being elected. Now he is talking about ending it in 100 days.

There are some positive indicators of good intentions. Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban said this week that he believed the Trump administration is determined to do a peace deal.

Trump’s pick for Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, told senators during confirmation hearings for the post that her “priority would be to support President Trump’s efforts to get Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table.” (She may not be confirmed, however.)

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in an interview this week, repeated his calls for the war in Ukraine to end. In a telling comment, Rubio said the onus was on Russia and Ukraine to make compromises.

Here’s where the problems emerge. The Trump administration seems to think that a resolution is a matter for two sides – Russia and Ukraine – and that the U.S. is acting as a mere peace broker instead of being the instigator.

This was reflected in Trump’s own recent comments when he boorishly and stupidly warned Russia that if it did not come to the negotiating table, he would impose crippling sanctions on the Russian economy.

Trump is delusional if he thinks he can bully Russia or threaten the Russian economy. Such a fatuous attitude is out of order and counterproductive.

The fact is the American and European sanctions against Russia have already failed. Russia’s economy has strengthened by being more independent and developing new trade relations with the rest of the world. It is now ranked 4th in the world, above Germany and other European nations.

More importantly, Russia is decisively winning the war in Ukraine despite the colossal arming of the Kiev regime by the U.S. and its NATO partners. Ukrainian military lines are crumbling amid mounting losses. Even the Western media are reporting on the disarray and mass desertion of Ukrainian soldiers.

The notion that Russia can be pressured to the negotiating table by the Trump administration is a fallacy and a serious misconception about the nature of the conflict.

Furthermore, the two parties that need to negotiate are not the corrupt puppet regime in Kiev and Russia. It is the United States and Russia. The U.S. is a party to this war, not a peace broker.

If Trump’s administration is serious about making a peace deal, then it will have to be understood that the United States must accept Russia’s terms.

A mere ceasefire and freezing the hostilities in Ukraine, which is what Trump aides are touting, is far from adequate as a solution.

As we pointed out in our editorial last week, the conflict in Ukraine has deep roots in the imperialist machinations of the U.S. and its NATO proxy toward Russia. The history of this goes back decades, not just a few years.

Only by addressing the root causes of the conflict can an authentic peaceful resolution begin.

Russia’s terms have been adumbrated clearly for a long time. The United States and its NATO war machine need to respect Russia’s national security interests. The security treaty that Moscow proposed in December 2021 is a basis for negotiation.

So too are the realities on the ground. Russia’s new territories of Donbass, Kherson, Zaporozhye, as well as Crimea – all historic lands of Russia – are not negotiable.

Neither is Russia’s insistence that Ukraine can never be part of the NATO alliance.

If Trump can get his head around those big-picture geopolitical and historic issues, then maybe a deal can be made.

But the signs are that Trump and his administration have no understanding of the systemic problem. And even if Trump did gain an iota of understanding, it is doubtful that the American imperialist deep state will permit him to negotiate.

The problem goes way beyond individuals and their whimsical, egotistical notions. The problem of war and peace emanates from the inherently violent nature of the American state as it has evolved over the last century.

Russia’s searing experience of betrayal by the Western powers and the depth of political intelligence among its people and leadership will mean that blustering Trump hasn’t got what it takes to deliver an adequate deal.

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Sun Feb 02, 2025 1:29 pm

Months, not years
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 02/02/2025

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Ending the war in Ukraine should be “a matter of months, not years,” said General Keith Kellogg, the person appointed by Donald Trump as the person in charge of fulfilling the Republican president’s campaign promise, in his last appearance on Fox News, the television channel favoured by Trumpism. The phrase confirms that the White House is working to achieve the start of negotiations that will lead to a ceasefire in Ukraine and also the responsibility that the former military man has taken upon himself in accelerating the events in pursuit of the objective. However, and despite the headline-making power that the statement implies, it is necessary to understand the context in which those words were uttered.

On Friday, Donald Trump again referred to the need to achieve an end to the war through negotiations. Asked by the press, the US president replied that he did not want to say anything about whether he had already spoken with Vladimir Putin. At the beginning of the year, the press assumed that there had been a telephone call between the two presidents, a contact that was denied by the Kremlin and responded to with silence from the White House. Although discretion is not one of his greatest virtues, Trump insists on confirming only that his team - without specifying whether it was National Security Adviser Waltz, Secretary Rubio or Kellogg himself - has already begun contacts with the Russian Federation. The way in which the process is being carried out indicates that any negotiation will be carried out by the United States and not by Ukraine.

On the other hand, the speed with which Trumpism has acted in other scenarios and the apparently null diplomatic progress on the Ukrainian issue remind us of the complexity of achieving the end of this conflict that Trump believed he would resolve in less than the hundred days that Keith Kellogg has given himself to “see where we are, without a ceasefire or a permanent peace.” Once again, the general’s words can be misleading, since there is no hint of confidence in his speech in a plan that is still unknown if it exists. The Trump administration arrived at the White House with a clear plan in several of the aspects that it considers key, fundamentally the border and trade. Without any delay, the machinery was set in motion to detect, detain and expel thousands of migrants, while by decree or press conference, Trump has already announced tariffs on products from Mexico, Canada and China and threatens the EU with a similar action if it does not agree to acquire a greater quantity of American hydrocarbons.

In foreign policy, even before taking office, the current president's team participated and was possibly key in the pressure exerted on Israel so that Tel Aviv would accept the ceasefire that it had been rejecting for months. On Friday, Richard Grenell traveled to Venezuela just a few hours after the need to resume dialogue with the government of Nicolás Maduro was mentioned. Trump's envoy for hot zones got what he wanted, freeing six Americans imprisoned in the country. Venezuela, for its part, also achieved its objective of opening some kind of dialogue with a country capable of imposing a blockade similar to that of Cuba and doing so without having to deal with Marco Rubio, whose position in Latin America is going to be much tougher. These are just two examples of tangible actions that have occurred in the first two weeks of Trump's presidency and that contrast with the lack of progress in achieving the beginning of contacts between Russia and Ukraine in search of a negotiation.

A pro-Ukrainian media outlet claimed yesterday that “Kellogg is moving the goalposts” to delay the date of resolution of the conflict by one day first, then one hundred days later, and now years. Lacking the gift of gab, Kellogg tried to present on Fox News a position of trust in President Trump due to his business background and his ability to reach agreements, but he was not able to even outline how to achieve a resolution to a conflict that both countries consider existential. In his appearance on Fox News , in which he insisted that the resolution of the conflict “cannot be like Afghanistan and last four years,” the general did not try to extend the deadlines, but rather insist on the need to resolve the situation in the short term. Among the possible scenarios, Kellogg mentioned one hundred days in which, in his opinion, although always without saying how, it would be feasible to achieve a ceasefire that would allow negotiations to continue, as well as to have already achieved peace. “I would like to see a countdown of 100 days and understand where we are,” Kellogg said, offering little hope for achieving the goal he says is possible.

Judging by his speech, which never gave the impression of having the necessary information to describe the president’s plans, the United States is relying on the tool of pressure. According to Reuters , Trump’s team is still debating whether to seek a ceasefire to later negotiate or a negotiation to move directly towards a resolution. The Kellogg-Fleitz plan, which may have been the reason the general was appointed to the post, understood that this pressure should be produced using the supply of arms as an incentive and threat. Ukraine would receive more weapons if Russia refused to negotiate, while this flow would stop if it was Kiev that refused to participate in the mandatory negotiation process ordered by the White House. Kellogg now explicitly calls for “reading between the lines” regarding the pressure that the United States intends to exert on both Russia and Ukraine to stop a war that, according to Kellogg, offers the figure of one million dead or wounded soldiers, “numbers worthy of the Second World War.” The words of Mike Waltz, who has more weight in the Trump administration than Kellogg, whose position was announced as unpaid, on sanctions and the president's repeated mention of forcing the reduction of the price of oil to make it impossible for Russia to continue fighting point to a change in the way in which pressure is to be exerted on Moscow. The main shortcoming of the Kellogg-Fleitz plan was precisely the use of the flow of arms as a tool of pressure, since, in practice, it implied an increase in the amount of war material supplied to kyiv and, consequently, greater possibilities of continuing the war.

On the other hand, the facts have shown that the increase in war supplies to kyiv has not served as an incentive for Russia to stop the war, but rather for Moscow to reaffirm its position, something that can also be extended to the sanctions, which have caused a feeling of grievance and aggression in the Russian population that has achieved greater unity instead of the intended destabilization. Hence, there is no credible optimism in Kellogg's words, in Trump's hopes of applying the sanctions in such a way that they have the effect they have not had so far, or, of course, in the simplistic view of the facts held by the White House foreign policy team. Trump has insisted that Zelensky wants to reach an agreement with Russia, something that contrasts with his daily statements, while both Waltz and Kellogg have affirmed that European countries have also adhered to the American position of seeking peace. Unlike Ukraine, which is beginning to adapt its discourse to the possibility of negotiation, European countries and the European Union are the last bastion of the belief that it is necessary to continue fighting as long as necessary .

This catchphrase, so often used in Europe and by the previous US administration, has been the target of criticism from Marco Rubio, who has called it dishonest to suggest that Ukraine could recover Crimea and has defined the war as a stalemate, has criticized Biden for the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, which “gave Putin the perception that the United States was in decline,” and has stated that “the future of the nation is on the line” due to the destruction and the exodus of millions of people who may never return. According to the Secretary of State, negotiations are an objective necessity and that “both sides will have to make concessions,” a logical conclusion considering that everything indicates that the war is heading for an inconclusive end in which neither Russia nor Ukraine will be able to dictate the terms. Even so, Rubio’s words have caused anger in Ukraine and have been responded to by Dmitro Kuleba, former Minister of Foreign Affairs who, unlike those currently in the Government, can afford the luxury of criticizing the United States. “There was no stalemate in Ukraine and there is none now. Russia has been slowly advancing, capturing new towns and cities at enormous cost to its military. This is happening today because of the suspension of US aid, insufficient EU support and Ukraine’s inability to produce or acquire more weapons,” Kuleba wrote, reproaching Western allies and blaming them for the territorial losses currently suffered by Ukraine.

And in a speech that is no different from that of Zelensky and his entourage, the former minister added that “Putin only makes concessions when he feels cornered, not when he receives signals that he is invincible and that supporting Ukraine was a mistake.” The Russian offer of March and April 2022 - withdrawal of practically all captured territories in exchange for withdrawing from NATO - shows that his words do not correspond to reality. However, they are the basis of his argument, with which he concludes that, “the Secretary's intentions to end the war are commendable, but the approach presented helps Russia end it in its favor. If Russia wins in Ukraine, its allies - China, Iran and North Korea - will be emboldened, creating global crises that will require many more American resources. The cost of stopping Russia now is much lower than the cost of containing a strengthened Russia and its allies in the future.” In other words, the negotiated peace that is now being proposed, which would mean freezing the front and renouncing NATO but not Western assistance, is understood as a peace favourable to Russia, a victory that China, the People's Republic of Korea and Iran would use to destabilise the world. According to this scenario, the war must continue until a favourable resolution is achieved for Ukraine, an opinion that continues to dictate the policy of the Ukrainian government, despite Trump's statements.

https://slavyangrad.es/2025/02/02/meses-no-anos/

Google Translator

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From Cassad's telegram account:

Colonelcassad
📍Summary of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation (as of 2 February 2025)

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation continue to conduct a special military operation.

Units of the North group of forces in the Kharkov direction inflicted losses on formations of the motorized infantry and airborne assault brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the areas of the settlements of Liptsy and Volchansk in the Kharkov region.

The enemy lost up to 20 servicemen, two vehicles and four field artillery guns.

Units of the West group of forces improved their tactical position. Defeat was inflicted on the manpower and equipment of five mechanized and tank brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the areas of the settlements of Kondrashovka, Kolodeznoye, Kislovka, Monachinovka in the Kharkov region and Makeyevka in the Luhansk People's Republic.

The enemy's losses amounted to 295 servicemen, three combat armoured vehicles, 11 vehicles, a multiple launch rocket system, and four field artillery guns. Two ammunition depots and an electronic warfare station were destroyed .

Units of the "Southern " group of forces occupied more advantageous lines and positions. Formations of two mechanized brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and two territorial defense brigades were defeated in the areas of the settlements of Ulakly, Belogorovka, Verkhnekamenskoye and Chasov Yar of the Donetsk People's Republic. The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 200 servicemen, two vehicles, a multiple launch rocket system and seven field artillery guns, including two produced by NATO countries. Four ammunition depots were destroyed . Units of the "Center" group of forces continued active offensive actions. The manpower and equipment of two mechanized , two Jaeger brigades , an assault regiment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the assault brigade "Lyut" of the National Police of Ukraine were defeated in the areas of the settlements of Dzerzhinsk, Druzhba, Lysovka, Nadezhdinka, Shevchenko, Uspenovka, Andreyevka and Kotlino of the Donetsk People's Republic. The enemy lost up to 515 servicemen, a tank, six Armored combat vehicles, ten automobiles and six field artillery pieces, including one produced by NATO countries.

Units of the "East" force group continued to advance into the depth of the enemy's defenses. Formations of five mechanized , airborne assault brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and a marine brigade were defeated in the areas of the settlements of Veseloye, Burlatskoye, Razliv, Razdolnoye, Rivnopil, Novosilka of the Donetsk People's Republic and Kalinovskoye of the Dnipropetrovsk region. The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost over 140 servicemen, a tank, two armored combat vehicles and two automobiles. Five field artillery pieces were destroyed, including one produced by NATO countries. Units of the "Dnipro" force group defeated the manpower and equipment of a mechanized brigade and two coastal defense brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the areas of the settlements of Rabotino, Primorskoye of the Zaporizhzhya region and Antonovka of the Kherson region. The enemy lost up to 60 servicemen, three vehicles, three field artillery guns and two electronic warfare stations. An ammunition depot was destroyed. Operational-tactical aviation , strike unmanned aerial vehicles , missile troops and artillery of the Russian Armed Forces groups damaged the infrastructure of military airfields, fuel storage facilities used in the interests of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as concentrations of manpower and equipment of the Ukrainian armed formations in 153 districts. Air defense systems shot down a US-made HIMARS multiple launch rocket system and 44 aircraft-type unmanned aerial vehicles. In total, since the beginning of the special military operation, the following have been destroyed: 652 aircraft, 283 helicopters, 42,139 unmanned aerial vehicles, 590 anti-aircraft missile systems, 20,997 tanks and other armored combat vehicles, 1,513 multiple launch rocket systems, 21,129 field artillery pieces and mortars, and 31,127 special military vehicles.

***

Colonelcassad
On the missile strike on Sudzha from the Russian Ministry of Defense:

On February 1, the Ukrainian Armed Forces committed another war crime by launching a targeted missile strike on a boarding school in the city of Sudzha.

The launch of enemy missiles from the Sumy region was recorded by Russian air defense systems.

This provocation is aimed at distracting world public opinion from the atrocities of the Kiev regime, which were committed in the village of Russkoye Porechnoye in the Kursk region.

The strike by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on a civilian facility once again demonstrated the terrorist, inhuman nature of those who are in power in Kiev.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

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Ukraine’s Western Borders Are Unlikely To Change After The Conflict Ends
Andrew Korybko
Feb 01, 2025

Image

Two recent developments revived speculation about this long-running political fantasy coming true.

Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) chief Sergey Naryshkin’s proposal to organize a conference of historians from his country, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia to discuss Ukraine’s potential future division once again stoked speculation about its western borders changing after the conflict ends. This was followed shortly afterwards by Romanian populist Calin Georgescu, who won the first round of last year’s presidential election before it was scandalously annulled, laying claim to part of Ukraine too.

In his words, “The path to something like this is inevitable. Ukraine is a fictional state... the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The world is changing. Borders will change... If borders change, where are we? We have an interest in Northern Bukovina. We have Budjak, we have Northern Maramures, the former Transcarpathia... there are still Hungarians.” This sequence of events reminded some observers of Interfax-Ukraine’s report from November about Russia’s alleged plans to trifurcate Ukraine.

They cited their country’s intelligence community to claim that the first part would include the full incorporation of the four Ukrainian regions that joined Russia in September 2022; the second would stretch up to the former Polish and Romanian borders, host Russian troops, and be Russian-friendly; while the third would be “disputed” between Ukraine’s neighbors. It’s this final part that would supposedly be divided by Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania with Russia’s encouragement.

That probably won’t happen though for the reasons that were explained in the preceding hyperlinked analysis, which elaborated upon this earlier one here from January 2024 that addressed such claims by Hungarian and Romanian populists at the time. They boil down to none of these countries, especially Poland, wanting a significant Ukrainian minority (including violent radicals) within their borders. They also don’t want to ethnically cleanse them either nor would the US approve of this even if some tried.

The same factors would remain in force even amidst the hypothetical deployment of Western peacekeepers to Western Ukraine, which is far-fetched in any case since Russia isn’t expected to agree to this nor is Trump expected to extend Article 5 guarantees to them and risk a hot war over this issue. If it ever happens, then the most that they might do is carve out spheres of economic influence there for their respective countries, but this could be preempted by mandating the creation of mixed battalions.

For example, the US could demand that Poles mix with Germans and Romanians with French, with each non-neighboring country’s peacekeepers serving as an obstacle for each neighboring country’s ones in the unrealistic event that the latter order their forces to annex parts of Western Ukraine. Not that any of them would dare to defy the US by doing so, but this could still be implemented for reassuring local Ukrainians that none of their neighbors have such intentions, thus reducing the risk of insurgency.

Seeing as how Russia hasn’t captured an entire region in nearly three years of fighting, there isn’t any credible basis for speculating that it’ll plant its boots on the NATO frontier, so the only relevant variables for the scenario of Ukraine’s Western borders changing are the previously mentioned ones. The recent prediction by Putin’s senior aide Nikolai Patrushev that Ukraine might not exist by the end of the year is also unlikely to unfold since the US has every reason to ensure the existence of at least its western half.

Trump is a businessman who won’t let his country’s nearly $200 billion worth of funding to Ukraine go to waste without at least keeping everything up to the Dnieper under the US’ de facto control, in pursuit of which he could make it clear to Putin that he’ll dramatically escalate if Russian forces cross the river. A mutual understanding on this could then lay the basis for a grand deal over Ukraine that might take the form of the compromises that were proposed at the end of this analysis here.

While Russia is unable to influence Western Ukraine’s future, it might be able to influence what happens in the “Trans-Dnieper” region north of its new regions and east of the river, which could become a demilitarized zone controlled by non-Western peacekeepers as described here. This is the only part of the country that might see significant changes after the conflict ends, but even that’s questionable since the US might not agree to it or could demand unacceptable concessions from Russia first.

Nevertheless, the point is that speculating about the future of Ukraine’s “Trans-Dnieper” region would be a better use of observers’ time than speculating about Western Ukraine’s, the latter of which will likely retain its borders and isn’t expected to have any special regime imposed upon it. To be sure, those same borders are indeed artificial exactly as Georgescu noted, but they also form an integral part of the US’ anti-Russian containment project that it has no reason to divvy up with others even if they wanted it.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/ukraines ... n-borders-

The US ain't got the 'goods' to significantly up the ante in the field without stripping standing forces at home, which seems unlikely given Sinophobia.

It would be sweet to see Poland saddled with Galacia...

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Sergey Poletaev: Russian forces advance on seven key positions: These battles will determine the fate of the conflict
January 31, 2025
By Sergey Poletaev, RT, 1/22/25

Over the past month, the Russian military has advanced along seven directions in Donbass and Kursk Region, with significant progress reported in key areas. The Kurakhovo operation in the western part of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is nearing completion, while Russian forces are beginning to encircle the Pokrovsk urban agglomeration, further north. What follows is a detailed account of recent developments.

Kursk Region: Kiev’s failed attack

In late 2024, Moscow’s forces significantly reduced the Ukrainian military’s foothold in Kursk Region — part of ‘old Russia’ — mitigating threats and preventing the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) from advancing toward strategic locations like Lgov and Rylsk. The strategy of attrition warfare has kept this section of the front relatively static.

On January 5–6, approximately three Ukrainian battalions launched an attack on the settlement of Berdin. However, Russian troops detected their preparations early and executed counterattacks in the directions of Russkoye and Cherkasskoye, liberating Russkoye Porechnoye. Another counterattack targeted Malaya Loknya.

Photographic evidence indicates that a Ukrainian battalion was destroyed near Berdin, marking one of the AFU’s largest operations since the disastrous 2023 counteroffensive. Despite their efforts, the Ukrainian column failed to penetrate Russian minefields.

The front line remains stable following these engagements, with no signs of an imminent large-scale Russian push. Instead, attrition tactics are likely to persist until Ukrainian resources are depleted or a retreat is ordered.

Toretsk and Chasov Yar: First steps toward Konstantinovka

Months of intense fighting for Toretsk and Chasov Yar in Donetsk have started to yield results. By mid-January, Russian forces had captured a fire-retardant factory in Chasov Yar, followed by the city center, including the city council building, by January 20. The western part of the city remains under Ukrainian control, but these gains position Russian forces closer to Konstantinovka, a major target with a pre-war population of 75,000. But in order to advance in this direction, the Russian army needs to expand the area of control along the Seversky Donets-Donbass canal.

In Toretsk, Russian forces captured the Tsentralnaya mine, the city center, and multiple residential areas. The AFU retains control over the Toretskaya mine and parts of Krymskoye in the northeast. Securing Toretsk allows Russian troops to move towards Konstantinovka, which is 10–11 km further along the railway line.

However, operations in these areas face challenges. In Chasov Yar, supply routes via the Seversky Donets-Donbass canal are problematic due to the canal’s depth, which reaches up to ten meters in places. Meanwhile, Toretsk’s dense urban development and challenging terrain complicate Russian advances. Despite these hurdles, progress in these sectors marks steady, albeit incremental, gains.

Pokrovsk-Mirnograd: Encirclement in Progress

Pokrovsk is emerging as a focal point for Russia’s next major offensive following the Kurakhovo operation. The strategy appears to follow a familiar pattern: encircling the city, establishing fire control over supply routes, and depleting the Ukrainian garrison’s resources.

The southern flank of Pokrovsk was formed after the capture of Selidovo in late October 2024. This area also serves as the northern flank of Kurakhovo. Indicators suggest that Pokrovsk and Mirnograd — together forming an urban area of over 100,000 people — will be targeted as a single entity.

In January, Russian units advanced toward the Pokrovsk–Mezhevaya highway in the south and the village of Vozdvizhenka in the north, cutting off the Pokrovsk–Konstantinovka highway. These maneuvers are initial steps toward encircling Pokrovsk and Mirnograd while demonstrating the potential for a broader offensive that could extend into the Dnepropetrovsk region for the first time since 2022.

Kurakhovo: The final phase of the operation

The Kurakhovo operation began on October 1, 2024, with the capture of Ugledar. On January 6, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the liberation of Kurakhovo and its extensive industrial zone. Russian troops entered the western part of the industrial zone around New Year’s Eve, facing minimal resistance as the weakened Ukrainian garrison abandoned its positions.

Over the course of three months, Russian forces systematically surrounded the city from three sides, establishing fire control over supply lines and forcing the AFU into retreat. The flanks extended 10–15 km west, encircling Ukrainian forces outside fortified urban and industrial zones.

The operation is not yet complete, however. The capture of Andreevka and Konstantinovka is essential to stabilize the front line and fully secure this strategic area.

Broader Strategic Observations

Russian advances over the past month highlight a methodical approach characterized by encirclement, resource depletion, and steady territorial gains. While operations in Toretsk and Chasov Yar underscore the challenges of urban combat and logistical constraints, progress in Pokrovsk and Kurakhovo demonstrates the effectiveness of Russia’s offensive strategies.

The capture of Kurakhovo and advances toward Pokrovsk and Mirnograd could pave the way for operations extending into Dnepropetrovsk for the first time since 2022, potentially altering the strategic landscape.

As the conflict continues, the effectiveness of Russia’s strategy — coupled with its ability to manage logistical and operational challenges — will play a decisive role. For now, the focus remains on consolidating gains, securing supply lines, and preparing for the next phase of operations.

https://natyliesbaldwin.com/2025/01/ser ... -conflict/

Leonid Ragozin: Biden’s Ukraine disaster was decades in the making
January 31, 2025
By Leonid Ragozin, Al Jazeera, 1/18/25

President Joe Biden is about to wrap up what many perceive as a disastrous presidency. His departure from the White House could potentially mark a turning point in both the Russia-Ukraine conflict and in the three decades of poorly thought-out Western policies which resulted in the alienation of Russia and the collapse of its democratic project. But that hinges on the incoming President Donald Trump’s ability not to repeat the mistakes of his predecessors.

It is Russian President Vladimir Putin who decided to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but the ground for this conflict was prepared by US securocrats in the 1990s. Back then, Russia had just emerged from the dissolution of the USSR much weaker and disoriented, while the Russian leadership, idealistic and inept as it was at the time, worked on the assumption that full-blown integration with the West was inevitable.

Decisions made at that time triggered confrontation between Russia and the West which arrived at its logical climax during Biden’s presidency.

The problem was never the eastward expansion of NATO – a security pact created to confront the Soviet Union – and the European Union per se, but Russia’s exclusion from this process.

Crucially, this approach set Ukraine on the course of Euro-Atlantic integration while Russia was kept out of it – creating a rift between two nations closely linked to each other by history, economic and interpersonal relations. It also precipitated Russia’s securitisation and backsliding on democracy under Putin.

This outcome was never pre-destined and it took relentless efforts by American securocrats to bring it about.

One of the lost chances for a different path was the Partnership for Peace programme, officially launched by the Clinton administration in 1994. It was designed to balance the desire of former Warsaw Pact countries to join NATO and the crucial goal of keeping Russia on board – as a major nuclear power and a new democracy with a clearly pro-Western government.

Russia joined it but, as the American historian Mary Sarotte writes in her book Not One Inch, this useful framework was derailed at its inception by a small number of securocrats in Washington.

She specifically talks about “the pro-expansion troika”, consisting of Daniel Fried, Alexander Vershbow, and Richard Holbrooke, who pushed for an aggressive expansion of NATO, disregarding protests from Moscow.

Sarotte also mentions John Herbst as the author of a later report on unofficial promises of NATO’s non-expansion made to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev which, as she suggests, shaped the US policy of ignoring Russia’s complaints about NATO expanding all the way to its borders for decades to come.

The unreflective arrogance and triumphalism that these securocrats embody can also be seen in Biden himself who back then was a prominent member of Congress. In a 1997 video, he mocked Moscow’s protests against NATO expansion by saying that Russia would have to embrace China and Iran if it kept being intransigent. He clearly assumed it to be an absurd and unrealistic scenario back then – believing, perhaps, that Russia had no choice but to stay in the Western orbit. But it turned out exactly along the lines of what he thought was a smart joke.

In his hawkish politics on Russia, Biden found a willing partner in the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. It is hardly a coincidence that Zelenskyy’s massive U-turn on relations with Russia started as Biden took office.

The Ukrainian president had been elected on the promise that he would end the simmering conflict that began with the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. He met with Putin in Paris in December 2019 and the two agreed to a ceasefire in the Donbas region, which both sides had largely respected, reducing the number of deaths to near zero.

But once Biden set foot in the White House, Zelenskyy ordered a clampdown on Putin’s Ukrainian ally Viktor Medvedchuk, while simultaneously launching loud campaigns for Ukraine’s NATO membership, the return of Crimea, as well as for the derailing of the Russo-German Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project.

Two factors may have played into Zelenskyy’s decisions. Azerbaijan’s victory over Russian-backed Armenian forces in the fall of 2020, achieved largely thanks to Turkish Bayraktar drones, gave hopes that high-tech warfare against Russia could be successful. The other factor was that in December 2020, polls showed Medvedchuk’s party ahead of Zelenskyy’s.

Just a few days after Biden’s inauguration, Zelenskyy gave an interview to American outlet Axios in which he famously asked his US counterpart: “Why Ukraine is still not in NATO?” This was followed by an op-ed with the same question in the title by Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, published by Atlantic Council – a think tank that gets much of its funding from the US government and Pentagon contractors.

Unsurprisingly, some of the same personalities that shaped US policies towards Russia in the 1990s also egged on the Biden administration to adopt aggressive policies that contributed to making the invasion happen.

On March 5, Fried, Vershbow and Herbst, along with three others, published a report in the Atlantic Council with a list of recommendations for the Biden administration with regard to Ukraine and Russia. These boiled down to pressuring Putin by escalating on every front – from offering NATO membership plan to Ukraine to derailing Nord Stream 2 and “enhancing security” in the Black Sea.

Three weeks after that publication, Putin began deploying troops on the Ukrainian border, embarking on 11 months of hair-raising brinkmanship. This period saw the British warship HMS Defender entering what Russia had declared its territorial waters off the coast of occupied Crimea in June, the US starting secret supplies of weapons to Ukraine in September and finally the US and Ukraine announcing a strategic partnership in November – a move that amounted to casus belli in the eyes of Kremlin hawks.

It was around that time that Putin began preparing for the invasion in earnest before eventually triggering it in February 2022. The resulting war is now approaching its third anniversary.

Despite massive Western backing, Ukraine suffered terrible losses and gained nothing from challenging Putin to a fight. The war has brought Ukraine to the brink, causing a massive refugee crisis, economic collapse, social disintegration and ever-growing death toll.

If peace in Ukraine is achieved this year, it will likely be along the lines of the failed Istanbul agreements of 2022, which envisioned an Austria-styled neutral Ukraine with limits on the size of its army. Russia will likely insist on keeping much of the territory that it gained as punishment for Ukrainian intransigence. This will technically constitute a defeat for Ukraine, but it will be a clear win for the Ukrainian people, who have borne the brunt of this war, as well as for the rest of the world.

It will also be a major defeat for the securocratic class which has been pushing for a new standoff with Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The aggressive pursuit of expansion at the expense of Russia has clearly failed as a strategy. It is time for Western policymakers to do some soul-searching on how to reverse the situation and start a slow drift back towards rapprochement with Moscow.

This is not about absolving Putin’s government from accountability for the crime of aggression as well as war crimes committed by Russian troops. It is about removing conditions which caused Russia’s transformation into a militarised dictatorship and ending a conflict which will keep propping up Putin’s regime for as long as it lasts.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

https://natyliesbaldwin.com/2025/01/leo ... he-making/

That last paragraph better describes Ukraine, the writer reveals himself as another butt-hurt Russian liberal. Kind of delusional too as we all know that the fix was in on Minsk 2 before the ink was dry.

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Point To Be Made ...

... again. Even such a moron as Blinken possibly did get a famous one-liner from military art that the victory in war is defined by achieving political objectives of said war. E.g. the political objective of NATO's war against Russia through its best proxy ever, 404, was simple--to inflict military defeat on Russia, which, in conjunction with sanctions from hell creates a massive suffering and humiliation and, hence, Putin's "regime" falls, Russian fifth column comes to power, Russia is broken up and the US and its European jackals get their hands on Russia's resources. After that the West squeezes China and the full global control is achieved.

Keep in mind, all this was predicated on VSU taking (they were already pre-deployed for that) LDNR, defeating possible Russian attempt at relieving defeated LDNR militias and ... what a plan. But that is the POINT--Pentagon and clowns from London MoD and other NATO "experts" DID consider military defeat of Russian Army in LDNR. In fact, that WAS the plan. Here, I want to stress it, where I and Scott diverge--this IS how it was briefed in the White House. And here is an interesting quip today:

In an interview on Sirius XM’s The Megyn Kelly Show on Thursday, Rubio reiterated US President Donald Trump’s willingness to find a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine crisis, saying that Trump believes the conflict “needs to end now.” “It needs to end to a negotiation. In any negotiation, both sides are going to have to give something up,” Rubio stated. Even a growing number Democrats who vowed to support Kiev for “as long as it takes” under the previous administration of US President Joe Biden “would now acknowledge that what we have been funding is a stalemate, a protracted conflict, and maybe even worse than a stalemate, one in which incrementally Ukraine is being destroyed and losing more and more territory,” the secretary of state said. “What the dishonesty that has existed is that we somehow led people to believe that Ukraine would be able not just to defeat Russia, but, you know, destroy them, push them all the way back to what the world looked like in... 2014,” Rubio added.

This is a critical admission because it wasn't "somehow"--this was a belief which permeated Washington as a whole, including those people in CIA and Pentagon who spent 7 years preparing VSU for "defeating" Russia and who planned this whole catastrophe. And that brings fore this point about "American way of war", same as it goes to infamous "Prigozhin Mutiny" and other "operational" tricks NATO exercised against manifestly weak and inferior opponents and whose whole operational culture is built around turkey shoots with near impunity. I can only say--study the REAL history of WW II, not the BS which is being taught in the US military academies--that will be a good start. Don't hold your breath though.

http://smoothiex12.blogspot.com/2025/01 ... -made.html

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Transcript of 29 January WION interview

Reading over the questions and my answers in this interview, I am obliged to say mea culpa: I followed the well trodden path of professional interviewees and delivered my thoughts on the subject without specifically answering the well crafted questions posed by the WION presenter. Given the encouraging words of Mr Chanana at the end, I will try to play fairer in future. Only one faux pas on WION’s part: I am actually in Brussels, not Berlin.

Transcript submitted by a reader

WION, Shivan Chanana: 0:00
The conflict with Ukraine will end in a month or two at max if Kiev is out of ammunition. This is the latest statement which is coming from the Russian President Vladimir Putin. He then even went on to add that Ukraine has zero sovereignty, and they will not exist even a month if their ammunition stops.

Now Putin also said that Russia is open to peace talks with Ukraine, but not with Zelensky. Does Russia want a Ukraine without Zelensky? Is Zelensky harmful for peace in Ukraine? To discuss this further with me on Game Plan, I’m being joined by Dr. Gilbert Doctorow, who’s joining me from Berlin. He’s an international affairs analyst, an author and historian. Dr. Doctorow, thank you so much for joining me on Game Plan. Can the Russia-Ukraine conflict end in a month? And will the Trump administration stop weapons to Ukraine?

Gilbert Doctorow, PhD: 0:47
First of all, I’d like to congratulate you, WION, for covering or watching the interview which Mr. Putin gave last night. It’s an unusual interview. It was in his limousine as he was traveling from Moscow to Samara where he had speaking engagements. And seated next to him, was the reporter Pavel Zarubin, who has been the reporter of the two most important statements that Putin has made about the war, going back six months. Now, this interview was important for the reasons you mentioned. They set out, he set out a brief timeline of what the first negotiations for peace looked like in March, April, 2022.

1:33
And I insist that there’s a lot of relevance [of] that timeline, to what is about to happen now, the most important fact being that at the insistence of the Ukrainians, the Russians in good faith pulled back their forces from Kiev. They were surrounding Kiev at the time. This is just after they had arrived there from Belarus, where they were stationed before the start of the military intervention. They pulled them out in good faith so that the Ukrainians did not feel that they were under duress when entering into the negotiations.

2:11
And that has relevance to the situation today and what preconditions Mr. Putin made in June of last year for the opening of negotiations, namely the pullback of Ukrainian forces from the four provinces that Russia has integrated into its federation. And so it is very timely. As regards Mr. Zelensky, Putin made it clear that Russia does not consider him to be a legitimate president, that his time expired and according to the Ukrainian constitution, there is no provision for his stay in office to have been extended. Therefore, according to the constitution, the legal representative of Ukraine would be the Speaker of the Rada, of the parliament.

But that is a detail. The main point is that Mr. Zelensky is illegitimate. He is not an appropriate signatory to any peace negotiations that may be conducted. And his signature on the document would not be valid for purposes of the enforcement of that treaty. Therefore, it is senseless to pursue to proceed with him.

WION: 3:25
Dr. Doctorow, you know when Putin says that he is open to peace talks with Ukraine, but not with Zelensky, that there is a distinguishment which has been there. You’ve elaborated on it in your first response. He’s open to peace but not with Zelensky. Does Russia want Ukraine without Zelensky? Is that more in Russia’s favor?

Doctorow:
Oh absolutely. Not just because of the legal technicality that his signature on a document would be invalid, but because he stands for a regime which the Russians want to see off. He stands for a neo-Nazi-controlled government. That has been the position taken by Mr. Putin from before the war.

This was the issue of dispute with German Chancellor Scholz when he visited Moscow at the very critical point, the start of this war, that he laughed, Chancellor Scholz laughed at the remarks by Putin that this was a neo-Nazi regime. Well, indeed it was. And these statements were made once again a couple of days ago when the Russians were commemorating the liberation of Leningrad, the breaking of the blockade, and when they were making the remarks on Holocaust Day, which was being celebrated at the same time in Auschwitz, that this regime in Kiev is neo-Nazi and that they refuse to accept a rise of fascism and Nazism in Europe.

5:15
So the problem essentially is not between Russia and Ukraine. From this statement it seems Russia’s issue is with Zelensky and Zelensky’s ties with the Western nations. Now of course with the change in government in the US, perhaps that equation is bound to change.

But at this point, I also want to get into the internal dynamics within the European Union. Ukraine’s refusal to continue the agreement of gas transit to Europe since the beginning of this year, the first January, it is putting a lot of pressure especially on Eastern European countries. Andrei Danko, deputy speaker of Slovakia’s parliament, said that Zelensky’s politics, and I’m quoting here, his politics is “harmful for Europe”. I wanted to ask you, sir, is Zelensky harmful for peace in Ukraine? And is he harmful for Europe?

Doctorow: 6:04
Well, let’s not put this strictly in personal terms of Mr. Zelensky. He’s not standing by himself. He has around him an entourage of these the same people who surrounded the president, the newly-appointed president, after the coup d’état in February 2014. These are the same people. These are extremists. They are extremist nationalists. They are pursuing an identification of Ukraine as a single-culture country, a culture of the West Ukraine, in point of fact.

And this is unacceptable as a way forward for what was a country that had many different languages and ethnic groups and nationalities in fact, within its borders. So it’s not just Mr. Zelensky, though he has in the last three years been the personification of everything that is wrong about Ukraine.

WION:
Finally, Dr. Doctorow, a lot of nations within Europe, and they have only increased in number in recent months or as the war has progressed, they have leaned towards re-establishing or strengthening their ties with Russia. Do you feel the Russia-Ukraine war has brought the entire EU in the eye of the storm, which is pushing more nations to stand out, stick their neck out and say, “We don’t want this with Russia, we want good ties, it is advantageous for us to keep indulging and keep engaging with Russia, and we need to now distance ourselves from this war which is enveloping us as well.”

Doctorow: 7:47
Well let’s put the numbers in perspective. There are 27 member states in the EU. Of those, only two, Hungary and Slovakia, have come out in the manner you described, opposing now for good, substantial economic reasons, the continuation of sanctions, which actually they passed for a variety of reasons which we don’t have time to discuss.

But these two countries have opposed the continuation of sanctions on Russia. They have looked for re-establishing something like normality in dealing with the big neighbor to the east, for the sake of their own economic welfare, not because they are sympathetic to Mr. Putin. That is an irrelevancy that is introduced by Western propagandists.

8:34
But the EU as such has big internal fissures. Germany itself, going into the elections of the 23rd of February, has very big internal discussion and differences of opinion between the leading party, the Christian Democrats, headed by Mr. Merz, and the fast-rising party, the Alternative for Germany, that is opposed to the present war, to the present sanctions on Russia, not for any, because of any particular sympathy for Mr. Putin the man or for Russia as a nation, but for their own material benefit, which has been greatly harmed by the policy of sanctions that were initiated by the United States and were taken up by the European Union after the MH17 crash. This is a situation that has to be addressed.

WION: 9:36
Dr. Gilbert Doctorow, thank you so much for joining me on Game Plan. It’s always a pleasure speaking with you. You always back up your answers with context and perspective and of course, historical documentation along with that with dates and events that have happened in the past drawing parallels, which always brings reason to your arguments and your statements. Thank you so much. Always a pleasure speaking with you. Would love to have you on the show again.

Doctorow: 9:57
Oh, my pleasure.

https://gilbertdoctorow.com/2025/02/01/ ... interview/

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Burns in the SVO zone
February 1, 18:11

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Weekly author's column;
Head of the project "Tactical Medicine Courses" with the call sign "Latvian" ( https://t.me/tacticalmedicinecourses )
Especially for the Colonelcassad channel ( https://t.me/boris_rozhin )

Burns in the special military operation zone: specifics of injuries and assistance algorithm.

In the SVO zone, burns are becoming one of the most severe and common types of injuries, combining physical suffering with a high risk of complications. They are caused not only by explosions of ammunition and fires, but also by the use of incendiary mixtures, contact with hot elements of equipment, as well as secondary factors - for example, clothing catching fire from shrapnel. According to Russian military hospitals (2023), up to 15% of sanitary losses are associated with burns, and 40% of them are severe (III-IV degree) or combined category, when thermal damage is combined with mechanical wounds or contusion.

First aid for burns in combat conditions requires adherence to strict protocols, since errors on the spot lead to infection, sepsis or hypovolemic shock. On the battlefield, doctors and soldiers act according to the principle of "cool, close, evacuate":

1. Cooling - stopping the effect of temperature (knock down the flame, move away from the heat source) and cooling the burn area with clean water or special gel wipes for 10-15 minutes, if the situation allows.

2. Closing the wound - applying non-adhesive bandages (for example, wax or gel coatings) to protect against contamination. The use of ointments or folk methods (oil, potatoes) is strictly prohibited.

3. Pain relief - administering analgesics (ketorolac, nefopam) to prevent pain syndrome, which in case of extensive burns develops in 60% of victims in the first minutes.

Burns of the respiratory tract from inhaling hot air or smoke are especially dangerous. Their symptoms — hoarse voice, soot in the mouth, facial swelling — require immediate intubation or conicotomy to prevent asphyxia. According to statistics, such injuries increase mortality by 2.5 times, especially if assistance is delayed by more than 20 minutes.

Infections are the main enemy of burn patients. In conditions of unsanitary conditions and mass contamination of wounds, the risk of sepsis reaches 45-50%. Prevention includes early administration of broad-spectrum antibiotics (ceftriaxone, vancomycin) and antiseptic treatment. However, in the SVO zone, up to 30% of cases are complicated by resistant bacterial strains (MRSA, Pseudomonas aeruginosa), which requires the use of reserve drugs such as tigecycline or colistin.

Evacuation of burn patients is associated with risks. Hypothermia due to loss of the skin barrier, dehydration and shaking during transportation aggravate the condition. Hypothermic blankets, infusion solutions (Ringer's, physiological) and monitoring of vital functions are used for stabilization. According to the Frontline Medics Foundation, the introduction of vacuum mattresses and portable heaters has reduced mortality during evacuation by 25%.

The long-term consequences of burns in the SVO zone — cicatricial contractures, psychological trauma, disability — remain an underestimated problem. Only 10% of victims get access to reconstructive surgery or rehabilitation in the first six months, the rest wait for years. This highlights the need not only to save lives, but also to ensure the quality of survival — a task that goes beyond tactical medicine, but without which victory loses its meaning.

Burns in the SVO are not just a medical challenge, but a test of humanity. Every burned skin, every scar reminds: war leaves traces that do not heal even after the ceasefire. And if first aid can be provided according to an algorithm, then recovery requires much more — time, resources and humanity, which are so lacking under the whistle of shells.

(c) "Latysh"

P.S. On weekends, educational articles by a military doctor about the features of practical military medicine in the SVO zone will now be published on a regular basis in TG and LJ

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9646822.html

Google Translator

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The denouement of the energy crisis in Transnistria: Russian loan, EU grant and resistance from Chisinau
February 1, 2025
Rybar

Moldova was finally forced to make a temporary compromise with Transnistria and let gas into the unrecognized republic. Let us recall that earlier in the PMR they announced that they were planning to conclude contracts for gas supplies (naturally, Russian) through companies from Hungary .

The European Commission announced the allocation of a grant of 64 million euros to overcome the energy crisis in the region.

The first tranche of 30 million euros is divided into two parts: 20 million to the Moldovan state company Energocom for the purchase of 3 million cubic meters of gas on the European exchange for Transnistria and the Moldovan State District Power Plant , which generates electricity for both banks.

The Moldovan company Energocom will spend another 10 million euros on purchasing gas for Moldova itself.

Moldova will receive the second tranche of 34 million euros to support the state budget.

Russia is also providing a loan to the Transnistrian company Tiraspoltransgaz , with the help of which the PMR authorities will be able to pay for gas supplies to the Moldovan state company Energocom.

Initially, the PMR wanted to conclude a transit contract with another company, but the Moldovan authorities stated that only their company could supply gas to the PMR. Because of this, the solution to the problem was delayed.

Such support will allow Pridnestrovie to provide itself with gas for 10 days , as well as maintain pressure in gas pipelines. Then, it is expected that PMR will be able to receive gas through Hungarian companies.

At the moment, the situation is turning in favor of Transnistria and there are clearly prospects for the return of “blue fuel” supplies to the republic.

However, the position of Chisinau is again indicative , where after the announcement of the grant from the EU they did not want to help Transnistria and even said that the gas purchased with this money was allegedly irrational to use for the Moldovan State District Power Plant.

Instead, the Moldovan authorities demanded that Tiraspol buy expensive electricity from Romania. Chisinau backed down after the European Commission explained the procedure for using the grant.

Moreover, Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean stated that Chisinau will help Transnistria only so that it itself does not remain without electricity from Romania, since the Isaccea-Vulcanesti-Chisinau power line passes through the Moldovan State District Power Plant in Transnistria.

Thus, Moldova was finally forced to make concessions in overcoming the energy blockade of Transnistria, not to mention that the demands for the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in exchange for gas and financial aid also evaporated. After all, Transnistria still has a lever of influence in the form of a piece of power transmission line, which is so important for Moldova.

We believe that the offices of the presidents of Moldova and the so-called Ukraine are clearly unhappy with the developments, since the energy blockade of the PMR was conceived by them in order to seize the region.

https://rybar.ru/razvyazka-energetiches ... kishineva/

Finnish Special Forces' Sabotage Operations – How Finland Is Stepping Up Its Activity in the Northern Regions
February 1, 2025
Rybar

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A very curious exercise, Ruske-2025/1, began in northern Finland on January 30 and will last until February 5. What is interesting is that there is practically no information about it in open sources, meaning that the Finns have decided not to tell the public about it for now.

It involves “elite” units by Finnish standards, such as the high-readiness Jaeger Brigade “Lappi” and the special forces regiment “Utti”, as well as the Finnish border forces. In total – about 1,000 military personnel, 100 units of equipment, including NH-90 and MD-500 helicopters.

The objectives of the exercise are even more interesting: special forces practice covert movement in tundra conditions, search for enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups, landing from helicopters, and organizing interaction with territorial defense units and resistance groups.

All this is carried out on the Inari-Sevettiyarvi line near the Murmansk region. Part of the training will take place on the ice of Lake Inariyarvi .

The Finns are consistently training to conduct special operations against Russia. The similarity of nature and climate with the Russian northern regions makes such exercises even more indicative in the context of Finland's position in the Alliance's plans.

If anyone has forgotten, last November Finnish special forces, including the same Utti regiment, were already practicing the deployment of a sabotage and reconnaissance group into the Karelian forests . Now the Murmansk region is in the crosshairs . This time the Finns are bringing in some kind of "resistance" and territorial defense units, practicing a guerrilla warfare option.

https://rybar.ru/diversionnye-operaczii ... -regionah/

NATO Practices Strikes on Kaliningrad Region
February 1, 2025
Rybar

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In addition to NATO's increased activity on Russia's southern borders, it is also worth adding that things are not calm in the north either. On January 30, NATO aircraft carried out another operation near the Kaliningrad region , and the goal was a little less - practicing missile strikes .

Aircraft from NATO's Baltic Sea Air Policing mission, as well as other Alliance members including Norwegian and Dutch F-35As, supported by NATO E-3As and RAF RC-135s, conducted a strike training exercise on key targets in the Russian semi-exclave.

How did the operation go?
The RC-135V and E-3A carried out reconnaissance and targeting of Russian targets, patrolling around the Kaliningrad region. Dutch F-35As and Italian Typhoons provided air cover.

At this time, two pairs of Typhoons of the German Air Force and F-35As of the Norwegian Air Force carried out an approach to the area of ​​a simulated strike with cruise missiles and guided bombs on the Kaliningrad region.

The targets, judging by their route, were the Chernyakhovsk airbase , a naval base, air defense positions, as well as missile and artillery weapons depots.

Of course, such training has been conducted before, but recently the activity around the Kaliningrad region has been growing very strongly and quickly. Aviation and drones are circling around the clock, and the number of Alliance troops in the Baltics is growing.

Against the backdrop of the Baltic Sentinel mission that has begun, the goal of which is a de facto blockade of Russia, such maneuvers near our territory look extremely alarming, and it is necessary to work out possible options for countering NATO in the region.

https://rybar.ru/nato-otrabatyvaet-udar ... j-oblasti/

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"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Mon Feb 03, 2025 1:05 pm

Elections, diplomacy and security guarantees
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 03/02/2025

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Excluding Ukraine from the dialogue between the United States and Russia would be “very dangerous,” Volodymyr Zelensky said in an interview with AP , in line with the current European argument that a possible normalization of the continental situation is a risk. If the mere fact of beginning to think about a future resumption of hydrocarbon trade between the European Union and Russia has been pointed out as a danger, what could be said about the possibility of a peace that does not imply guaranteeing each and every one of the demands of Ukraine and the most bellicose countries on the eastern flank ? Despite the nervousness that any mention of peace provokes in Kiev and Brussels, the complexity of the conflict, the difficulties of Trumpism in understanding it and certain doses of lack of coordination and incompetence that make it impossible for even those who should lead the diplomatic process to say whether there really is a plan make it highly unlikely that the feared peace will come in less than a hundred days. Hence the emptiness of Zelensky's words every time he refers to the idea of ​​a quick end to the war, a phrase designed to avoid being perceived by the US president as an obstacle to peace and which is generally accompanied by a series of demands that necessarily imply delaying the process.

“I think that first of all [we should] hold a meeting with him and that is important. And that is, by the way, something that everyone in Europe wants,” Zelensky said, referring to “a common vision of a quick end to the war,” the American agency writes, insisting on the order in which the Ukrainian president wants a process to take place over which his ability to control is practically zero. “After the conversation with Trump, “we should move on to some kind of format of conversation with the Russians. And I would like to see the United States of America, Ukraine and the Russians at the negotiating table. … And, to be honest, a voice from the European Union should also be there. I think that would be fair and effective. But how will it turn out? "I don't know," AP adds , reflecting in Zelensky's words what Ukraine's preferences are: a negotiation with the United States in which the terms that will be passed on to Russia are determined and in which Moscow meets not only with Ukraine, but with the United States and the European Union.

“Ukraine’s nearly three-year-old war is at a crossroads. Trump has promised to end the fighting within six months of taking office, but the two sides are far apart and it is unclear how a ceasefire agreement would materialize. Meanwhile, Russia continues to advance slowly but steadily along the front, and Ukrainian forces suffer from severe manpower shortages. Most Ukrainians want a pause in the fighting to rebuild their lives. The country faces near-daily Russian attacks on homes, and attacks on electrical systems have plunged entire cities into darkness,” AP writes , describing a situation that contrasts with Ukraine’s idea of ​​continuing to fight until it achieves a position of strength in the negotiations. Weakness on the front and the country’s complete dependence on its foreign partners to sustain the state and the armed forces has led Zelensky to appeal to another kind of strength.

The Ukrainian president's words reflect his fear of finding himself in conditions comparable to those of the Normandy Format, in which one side of the war, Donbass, had no presence and was represented by Moscow, whose population was not suffering from the conflict and was willing to accept conditions more favourable to Ukraine than those accepted by Donetsk and Lugansk. Zelensky wants the main asset that this format offered him: to negotiate with the support of his partners or for them to be the ones who, with the presence of Ukraine, negotiate on behalf of kyiv, as happened in Belarus during the long night that led to the Minsk agreements.

“They can have their own relations,” Zelensky said of US-Russian contacts, “but talking about Ukraine without us is very dangerous for everyone.” According to Reuters , one plan the Trump administration is reportedly considering would be to negotiate a ceasefire with Russia that would allow elections to be held in Ukraine, with Russia ultimately negotiating a resolution to the war with a legitimate government in Ukraine. This approach would drag out the process for months, given the chaos of population displacement currently in Ukraine and the negotiations Kiev would have to conduct with its allies to allow millions of people abroad to vote, and would play into the hands of the side currently on the defensive. Ukraine would have time to strengthen itself without worrying about possible Russian advances, which would be held up throughout the electoral process awaiting negotiations with no guarantee of success. The idea, which evokes memories of the offensives of the People's Republics of Donbass halted by order of Russia in favour of the negotiation of the two Minsk agreements that Ukraine systematically breached, would be favourable to Ukraine, although not necessarily to Zelensky. On Saturday, Ukrainian-Canadian academic Ivan Katchanovski insisted that the electoral prospects of the current president would be bleak in a minimally free electoral process, something uncertain given the conditions of war and absolute control of the Zelensky circle over the political structures. Commenting on this scenario, Russian opposition journalist Leonid Ragozin wrote that Trump's team sees Zelensky as an obstacle to peace and added that Russia would only accept the ceasefire prior to an electoral process if parties such as Medvedchuk's - which in 2021 was ahead in the polls of voting intention, which provoked a campaign of harassment and destruction orchestrated from the President's Office - had the opportunity to participate, something highly unlikely. In other words, as in 2014 and 2015, Russia would be required to stop an offensive in favour of a future negotiation that would bring it under reinforced economic sanctions and in which it would have to confront Ukraine, the European Union and the United States. Only the perception that Donald Trump can be given a real commitment – ​​in writing, not like the promises obtained in the 1990s by Mikhail Gorbachev – can get Moscow to accept, under current conditions, a plan on these terms.

But it is not only Russia that may be reluctant to the proposal put forward by Reuters . Judging by Zelensky's words, Ukraine is not ready to accept any negotiations. The current president's obsession remains with negotiating with his allies post-war conditions that would make negotiations with Russia practically meaningless. Everything indicates that Ukraine would agree to freeze the war on the existing front, leaving the territories outside its de facto control in Russian hands, after obtaining the security guarantees it demands from its partners. "Without security guarantees from Ukraine's allies, Zelensky said, any agreement reached with Russia would only serve as a precursor to future aggression. NATO membership, a long-standing desire of Kiev that Moscow categorically rejects, remains Zelensky's main option," AP writes, without specifying that Trump also seems to rule out the possibility of NATO accession and that other countries, including Germany, are also opposed to it.

The second option is to bring in a large peacekeeping contingent, an idea that the Ukrainian president says in the interview he is working on with Emmanuel Macron, its main proponent. “I said in the presence of the two leaders,” Zelensky said, referring to his meeting with Donald Trump in the presence of the French president, “that we are interested in it as part of the security guarantee, but not as the only security guarantee.” Ukraine appears to be more supportive of a large package of Western weapons, i.e. missiles, installed in Ukraine than of a European military force, which, according to Zelensky, would not have the necessary strength without the United States. “Putin is not afraid of Europe,” Zelensky said last week.

kyiv's preference remains for NATO membership, which the Ukrainian president describes as "the cheapest security guarantee that Ukraine can receive, the cheapest for everyone." "It will be a signal that it is not Russia that has to decide who should be in NATO and who should not, but the United States that decides," said Zelensky, for whom the certainty that NATO admission means the continuation of the war is a detail that does not need to be taken into account. "I think it would be a great victory for Trump," added the Ukrainian president, perfectly aware of what the real priorities are.

https://slavyangrad.es/2025/02/03/elecc ... seguridad/

Googler Translator

*****

From Cassad's Telegram account:

Colonelcassad
📍Summary of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation (as of 3 February 2025) Main:

The losses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of ​​the Center group of forces in one day amounted to 520 soldiers and 5 armored vehicles;

- Russian air defence systems shot down 4 Hammer aerial bombs, 7 HIMARS shells and 199 Ukrainian drones in one day;

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 300 soldiers in one day in the area of ​​responsibility of the Western group of forces;

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 220 soldiers in the area of ​​responsibility of the South group;

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 105 soldiers in one day due to the actions of the North and Dnepr groups;

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost over 150 soldiers in one day due to the actions of the East group.

▫️Units of the Dnepr group of forces defeated the manpower and equipment of the mechanized, infantry brigades and three coastal defense brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the areas of the settlements of Malye Shcherbaky in the Zaporizhia region, Dneprovskoye and Otradokamenka in the Kherson region.

The enemy lost up to 70 servicemen, eight vehicles and two field artillery guns. An ammunition depot was destroyed .

▫️ Operational-tactical aviation , strike unmanned aerial vehicles , missile forces and artillery of the Russian Armed Forces groups have damaged an energy facility supporting the operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the infrastructure of military airfields, production workshops, storage areas and preparation sites for the launch of unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as concentrations of enemy manpower and equipment in 146 areas.

▫️ Russian Aerospace Forces fighter aircraft shot down a Su-27 aircraft of the Ukrainian Air Force.

▫️Air defense systems shot down four French-made Hammer guided aerial bombs , seven US-made HIMARS multiple launch rockets , and 199 aircraft-type unmanned aerial vehicles, including 124 outside the special military operation zone.

▫️In total, since the beginning of the special military operation, the following have been destroyed: 653 aircraft, 283 helicopters, 42,338 unmanned aerial vehicles, 590 anti-aircraft missile systems, 21,007 tanks and other armored combat vehicles, 1,513 multiple launch rocket systems, 21,190 field artillery pieces and mortars, and 31,149 special military vehicles.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google translator

******

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The Empty Tank: Is Demise of the Ukrainian Army Near?
by Gordonhahn
February 2, 2025

U.S. President Donald Trump is apparently intent on achieving peace at a rapid pace, having set a 100 day window for accomplishing this exceedingly complex political task. Aside from such a time table’s lack of realism, there are other factors that will render its soon out of date. Primary is the deteriorating state of the Ukrainian army’s capacity to hold back the powerful Russian armed forces now arrayed against it. The front may suffer a catastrophic collapse before Trump’s presumed deadline, giving Russia an even greater upper hand in talks.

The collapse of Ukraine’s defense fronts along all or nearly the entire line of combat – which stretches from Kherson just north of Crimea to the east, then north through Donetsk to Kharkiv and Sumy – appears imminent. Some fronts may hold longer but are unlikely to survive 2025. All last year, Russian territorial gains and, for the most part of the year, Ukrainian casualties have increased with each passing month, as I predicted would be the case over a year ago (https://youtu.be/P_MJi5H6HKU?si=rxRiaE0EglSgbclw at the 1:00:45 mark). The territorial advance now is accelerating at an ever more rapid pace and could lead to major breakthroughs to the Dnepr (Dnieper) River at any time now.

At the same time, the state off the Ukrainian military is disastrous. The military mobilization passed and being carried out this year with such a debilitating effect on the economy and society is failing to replace current losses at the front with completely inexperienced recruits with low to no morale (www.youtube.com/watch?v=r8yMTGKURYU). There are reportedly no more volunteers, and by spring some Ukrainian officials report the situation will be irretrievable. Moreover, almost all new recruits are old or unmotivated, The Economist reports (https://ctrana.one/news/475629-nekhvatk ... omist.html).

Commanders at the front, such as commander of the drone battalion of Ukraine’s 30th mechanized brigade, confirm that the 2024 mobilization has been an absolute failure, and there are now too few men to replace battle losses (https://ria.ru/20250113/mobilizatsiya-1 ... 7753fbda13). The mobilization that does occur is carried out by harsh, frequently violent measures. Verkhovna Rada deputy Aleksandr Bakumov from Zelenskiy’s own ‘Servants of the People’ party declared in session that mobilisation in Kharkiv Region is coerced, resembling filtration of Ukrainian population (referring to practice of detaining, beating, and torturing citizens of occupied areas in an ostensible search for fighters and collaborators), with exits from the city blockaded by ‘recruitment’ press gangs and lawyers of mobilized men get beaten. Small businesses are undergoing mass closures because of lack of workers willing to go outside for fear of being pressed into the army. Others have reported falsification of data to justify recruitment (https://ctrana.one/news/478468-v-verkho ... enija.html and https://x.com/leonidragozin/status/1881280945644605814). There are numerous reports and videos of violence being used by recruitment gangs. In addition, many men are fleeing the country in greater numbers in order to avoid Ukraine’s desperate and draconian forced mobilization measures, sometimes at great risk to their lives and to sociopolitical stability. Most recently, Western governments have reportedly been pressuring Kiev to extend the mobilization to the age cohort of 18-25, which would bring a near catastrophic demographic collapse to a population already depleted by some 30 percent because of war deaths and emigration (https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war- ... 819cc5618f). Even the recrutiment centers themselves are attempting to avoid the draft. When Rada deputies proposed closing the personnel shortage by creating a brigade from among the mobilization gangs, the chairman of the mobilization centers claimed there were not enough of them to form full brigade (https://ctrana.one/news/475129-v-ttsk-o ... front.html). Low numbers of volunteers and failed mobilization are creating distoritions in force structure. ‘Zombi-brigades’ or ‘paper brigades’ are partially-manned units merely called brigades in order to impress Western donors and facilitate corruption for commanders who seize the salaries designated for non-existing personnel (https://ctrana.one/news/476359-bezuhlaj ... skaja.html).

The large number of desertions from the Ukrainian military, a phenomenon wholly ignored in the Western media for three years, were revealed finally in November to have exceeded 100,000 since the war began (https://apnews.com/article/deserters-aw ... 363c9e5ea0). This would amount to perhaps more than 10 precent of the Ukrainian army at its present size, given Zelenskiy’s recent claim it numbers 800,000 (https://t.me/stranaua/183652). Moreover, more than half those desertions occurred in the first ten months of 2024 alone (https://apnews.com/article/deserters-aw ... 363c9e5ea0). This is already desertion on a massive scale and includes mass desertions (https://www.ft.com/content/9b25288d-825 ... b00ad8a03f; https://ctrana.one/news/476730-zhurnali ... v-vsu.html). Military blogger Yurii Butusov, Servants of the People deputy Maryana Bezuglaya, and others reported late last year on the desertion of an entire 1,000-man brigade trained in France immediately upon their arrival at the front. This may have been a case of commander’s unsuccessful attempt to form what are called ‘zombi-brigades’ (https://ctrana.one/news/476748-jurij-bu ... skaja.html and https://ctrana.one/news/476359-bezuhlaj ... skaja.html). Indeed, military personnel have questioned the recent practice of creating new brigades when existing ones are woefully undermanned, apparently suspecting the corruption scheme lurking behind this practice (https://ctrana.one/news/474755-v-vsu-ob ... chikh.html). One Ukrainian commander told a Polish newspaper that sometimes in battle there are more deserters than killed and wounded (https://t.me/stranaua/180095).

Desertions are one symptom of lax discipline and especially low morale increasingly plaguing the Ukrainian army. Commanders are reporting that 90 percent of their troops on there frontlines are new, coercively mobilised men (https://ctrana.news/news/475190-v-vsu-s ... -ttsk.html; https://t.me/rezident_ua/25314 (video); and https://ctrana.one/news/476730-zhurnali ... v-vsu.html). Sources in the Ukrainian General Staff report similarly (https://ctrana.one/news/476708-kuda-isc ... oldat.html). Thus, desertions are accompanied by unauthorised retreats, which are increasing in frequency. For example, hundreds ran from battle at one point last autumn in Vugledar (Ugledar) before it fell (www.ft.com/content/9b25288d-8258-4541-81b0-83b00ad8a03f). Vugledar was once a solid stronghold, which in 2023 Russian forces stormed tens of times with no results. Ukrainians soldiers are refusing to carry out operational orders because they amount to suicide operations and are beginning to surrender as whole units, in one case nearly a full battalion (e.g., 92nd Combat). Indeed, refusals to follow orders or undertake counteroffensive measures are increasing. In one recent case, the Azov Brigade’s chief of staff, Bogdan Koretich, accused a Ukrainian general of such poor command that he was described of being resonsible for more Ukrainian war dead than the Russians, forcing his removal (www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/06/24/7462293/). At lower levels, commanders are being fired in large numbers (https://strana.news/news/467266-itohi-8 ... raine.html). One reason for the disintegrating discipline and morale is that there is no relief for troops, as there is no long term ‚demobilization‘ or time away from the front other than that coming from episodic brief rotations of troops—a consequence of insufficient troop numbers. Soldiers and their relatives have been lobbying for well over year for a law on demobilization that would routinize long rotations for troops to visit home, but no such law is visible on the horizon. Such would likely lead to a fatal troop shortage and the Ukrainian army’s full rout on the battlefield.

However, perhaps the main problem in the Ukrainian army, as in the rest of the Ukrainian state and society, is corruption. It is endemic and omnipresent in arms production and procurement, mobilization (draft evasion by bribe), purchasing of leave and absence from the front, and manning brigades. One Ukrainian Defense Minister told a journalist that the problem is „catastrophic“ (https://ctrana.one/news/476708-kuda-isc ... oldat.html). Independent Rada deputy Anna Skorokhod claims that only 15 percent (!) of servicemen on the personnel roles are serving at the front, with large numbers either non-existent (dead souls) in service or having bribed their way into hiding somewhere in the rear (https://ctrana.one/news/476708-kuda-isc ... oldat.html).

This is how Ukrainian officers describe the mass-scale of corruption in the army. Ukrainian army captain: “Due to false reports about the presence of personnel, the commanders of the directions receive false information. And they operate with ‚dead souls‘, developing combat plans. For example, somewhere the Russians have broken through a section of the front, the commander gives an order to a certain brigade to send a battalion with an attached group to reinforce. In fact, the battalion has been gone for a long time, its number is no more than a company — some have bought off their way to the rear or deserted. As a result, there is nothing to close the breakthrough, because of the threat, the flanks of neighboring brigades begin to crumble.”

Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff source: „If we take how many Russian troops we have at the front on paper, then if the Russians have an advantage in numbers, it is less than twofold. But that is on paper. In practice, the situation is different. Let’s imagine a separate section of the front. According to the papers, there are 100 people on our side, and 150 on the Russian side. That is, the enemy’s advantage is insignificant. With such numbers, it is quite possible to keep the defense. But during a real battle, the situation is radically different. At most 40 of our 100 people participate in it. And often even less. The rest are deserters, who simply refuse to fight, and the like. And Russians have 140-145 out of 150 people going into battle. In total, the advantage has already more than tripled. Why does this situation exist? Our army was initially based on a core of volunteers, ATO veterans, and highly motivated soldiers who went into battle without coercion and took the initiative. Russians had a big problem with motivation from the very beginning. But they worked on this issue and gradually created their own military-repressive system of coercion. And it works by sending soldiers into battle and stopping cases of insubordination and desertion. We did not create anything like this. And I doubt that we are even capable of creating such a system. Our state system is too weak and too corrupt for this. And now that the volunteers have died, died of injury, or simply burned out, and the army is being replenished with fake conscripts who have close to zero motivation, there are no ways to force them to fight. A separate problem is the quality of the command staff and the combat management system. There are also very big failures here, because many experienced commanders died and a worthy replacements do not always come after them.” (https://ctrana.one/news/476708-kuda-isc ... oldat.html).

This is state of corruption, low morale, and incapacity reminiscent of the late, recently collpased Syrian army of Bashir Assad.

This sort of Ukrainian army along with its collapse comprise multiple threat to both the Maidan regime and Ukrainian state beyond that posed the advancing Russian army. I wrote some time back: “With the front collapsing and the army on the verge of dissolving, Zelenskiy’s post-Maidan regime is deeply divided and in danger of dissolution, which could bring state collapse, internecine warfare, and widespread chaos” (https://gordonhahn.com/2024/12/10/the-s ... revisited/). The troops of a collapsed Ukrainian army will become a force that can sow chaos and/or be marshalled by a military or civilian leader towards the execution of a coup and perhaps a neofascist revolution or by peripheral and local figures to establish separate fiefdoms. Recall that during the Maidan demonstrations, leaders in Lvov and elsewhere first broached the idea of separating from then Yanukovych-controlled Ukraine. After the Maidan revolt and Yanukovych’s overthrow, it was Crimea and Donbas that moved towards separatism. Trump and his counterparts in Moscow, Kiev, and Brussels will need to make peace expeditiously in order to achieve a peace that avoids the long standoff and prospects for a new war in Ukraine that will be inherent in any unilateral, Russian imposed peace and Ukrainian capitulation and/or conquest as well as the danger of state collapse that could precede a Russian all-out victory. Indeed, it appears only Trump’s rapid peace can preempt the Ukrainian army’s full rout and collapse and save what remains of the Ukrainian state.

https://gordonhahn.com/2025/02/02/the-e ... army-near/

I do not see how a overwhelming Russian victory will mean another war, quite the opposite...

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Ian Proud: Russia races for Ukranian mineral wealth before a potential ceasefire
February 1, 2025 natyliesb
By Ian Proud, Responsible Statecraft, 1/24/25

Russia has spent the past five months swallowing up ever bigger tracts of Ukrainian coal, lithium, and uranium in the Donbass. Yet Western politicians still cling to the belief that they will be able to tap these resources to repay Ukraine’s ever mounting pile of debt. This is economic madness.

In the summer of 2024, most Western politico-military commentators were predicting that Russia was focussed on storming the strategically important military hub of Pokrovsk in Donetsk. Russian troops had advanced slowly, inexorably westward in a straight line following the bloody attritional battle for Avdiivka which was captured in February 2024.

But from August, Russian tactics shifted. First from the south of Donetsk they stormed Vuhledar, literally translated as “Gift of Coal,” a site of significant reserves, capturing it on October 1. That opened the way to swallow up large swaths of land in the south. Following the apparent encirclement of Velyka Novosilka in the past two days, one of Ukraine’s three licensed blocks of extractable lithium is now within short reach in Shevchenko.

Russian armed forces skirted Pokrovsk, instead battling through Selydove and in a straight line for about 20 miles, capturing a Uranium mine in a village called Shevchenko (not the same Shevchenko where the lithium is located). In recent weeks, Russian forces have taken Ukraine’s most important mine for coking coal in Pishchane and two related coking coal shafts in Udachne and Kotlyne. Together, these mines alone had produced the coking coal for 65% of Ukraine’s steel production. There are now fears that Ukrainian steel production could plummet to 10% of its prewar level in 2025.

Since President Trump was elected in November, and the prospect of an enforced ceasefire grew brighter, Russia’s advance has progressively accelerated. Today it is on the verge of completing its capture of the coal-rich bastion of Toretsk, the only town on the line of contact that hadn’t moved since 2014.

That’s bad news for Ukraine, not just because of a potential loss of further territory.

Prior to the crisis in Ukraine starting in late 2013, the extractives sector accounted for over a third of total exports, with agricultural products a third of that value. Today, the situation has been flipped, with agriculture by far the largest export sector.

By capturing every coal, uranium, and lithium mine that they can, Russia is cutting off an important source of Ukrainian wealth. Ukraine faces deeper current account deficits as its agriculture sector is unable to make up the difference for lost exports of minerals, especially with President Zelensky wanting to give away Ukrainian grain to Syria.

Fitch ratings has predicted Ukraine will record current account deficits of 6.5% of and 5.7% of GDP respectively in 2024 and 2025.

As I have pointed out before, with Ukraine still cut off from international lending markets because of its junk sovereign credit rating, that means the only way it can make up the difference is foreign aid or loans from foreign governments. With debt now about 100% of GDP, Ukraine has had to dip into the domestic bond market.

However, as Ukrainian banks are largely state owned, that amounts to borrowing from itself. Ukraine’s central bank governor has denied that the country will need to print money in 2025 to keep the lights on. If it does, hyperinflation and a collapse of the hrynia will beckon, rendering Ukraine’s debt impossible to pay, at which point Western governments will need to bail the country out.

Fear not, though, as Western politicians have a cunning plan to repay Ukrainian debt. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) has been outspoken this year in saying that Ukraine could pay back U.S. loans with its mineral wealth. He first raised this in a CBS interview in February 2024 as Congress worked hard to unlock former President Biden’s $61 billion aid package to Ukraine. He repeated this position one month later in Kyiv. Standing beside President Zelensky, he said, “they’re sitting on trillion dollars of minerals that could be good for our economy.”

A month later, Congress passed the long-delayed $61 billion U.S. aid package to Ukraine. That included just $9 billion in forgivable loans, short of the two-thirds Sen. Graham had hinted at in February.

Nonetheless, it marked another step on the road towards shouldering more debt onto Ukraine in the belief that this might one day be repaid in Ukrainian uranium, lithium, and other bountiful minerals. This was solidified by the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan of $50 billion agreed in June 2024, to which the United States contributed $20 billion at the end of 2024.

During this same period, the shift in focus towards Ukraine giving up its natural resources to secure Western aid gathered steam. In October 2024 when President Zelensky unveiled his so-called victory plan, giving up Ukraine’s natural resources became codified. He claimed that Ukraine would sign an agreement with the U.S., EU and others that would allow for use of Ukraine’s natural resources, which were worth “trillions of dollars.”

Just last week, shortly before President Trump’s inauguration, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer penned a “100-year partnership deal” between the United Kingdom and Ukraine. While the document has yet to be made public, 10 Downing Street said that it would cement the UK as “a preferred partner for Ukraine’s energy sector, critical minerals strategy and green steel production.”

US and UK politicians see great potential profit in accessing Ukraine’s wealth when war finally comes to an end, with Forbes Ukraine valuing minerals at $14.8 trillion.

However, just over half of that is located in the four eastern Ukrainian regions that Russia has occupied and where it gains new ground each day.

Back in August, in a typically foul-mouthed tirade, former Russia President Dmitry Medvedev took to his Telegram channel, among other things, to pillory Sen. Graham, who he called a “fat toilet maggot.” He continued, “To get access to the coveted minerals, the Western parasites shamelessly demand that their wards wage war to the last Ukrainian… ‘You’ll have to pay off your debts very soon. Hurry up, dear friends!’”

Leading European politicians still urge Ukraine to continue its war using credit in the hopes it might be repaid with a stock of natural resources that Russia captures with ever greater speed and covetousness. That is the economic equivalent of Russian roulette with a fully-loaded revolver that President Putin is gladly pointing at us.

President Trump’s efforts to end this madness can’t come soon enough.

https://natyliesbaldwin.com/2025/02/ian ... ceasefire/

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Kiev's Existential Trajectory: Western Tone Shifts Again

And we discuss the outlook on a future beyond Ukraine's coming defeat.
Simplicius
Feb 01, 2025

The tone around Ukraine continues to shift. It was imperceptible at first, but has since reached a point where utterance of previously unspeakable things is a commonplace cry of alarm. For a long time, yellow press flacks tried desperately to couch Ukraine’s collapse as merely the need for a breather, or deceptively spinning it on Russia or Putin’s desire for peace talks, owing to high losses and a putative inability to achieve goals.

But now, everywhere you look, for the first time the omerta has been lifted: outlets are openly—albeit still in hushed tones—admitting that Ukraine not only faces some vague ‘defeat’, but total capitulation to Russia. Even before, when at times such an outcome was hinted at, the full ramifications of the word were left intentionally open-ended, as if in hopes the reader would not yet assume the worst, but perhaps imagine Ukraine’s “collapse” was merely some localized event. What’s changed now is they are openly defining it: this is the second major report in days which quite directly says: If things continue as they are, Russian tanks will roll through both Kiev and Lvov, full stop.

I bring you, the Hill’s latest:

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A brief point summary before discussing:

Russia Will Seize Kiev and Lviv in 2026 If US Stops Aid, — The Hill

▪️"Without US support, Russia will move forward in 2025 because Kyiv will run out of weapons.

▪️ By 2026, Ukraine will lose effective air defense, allowing Russia to conduct continuous large-scale bombing.

▪️Ukrainian troops will continue to fight, but will most likely collapse by the end of the same year, which will allow Russia to capture Kyiv and then advance to the NATO border,” the publication fears.

▪️"Then Russia will rebuild its combat units, use Ukraine's resources to strengthen its capabilities, deploy its forces along NATO's border, and be ready to attack outside Ukraine by 2030."


First, the author tries to guilt trip the Western readers into believing that far more of their hard-earned tax money will have to be wasted on military expenditures if Ukraine loses the war:

Analysis conducted at the American Enterprise Institute has determined that Russia defeating Ukraine would cost American taxpayers an additional $808 billion over what the U.S. has planned to spend on defense in the next five years. This is about seven times more than all the aid appropriated to the Pentagon to help Ukraine since Russia’s 2022 invasion.

This estimate is based on a scenario in which the U.S. stops providing aid and the resulting Russian victory requires us to adapt our military capabilities, capacity and posture in order to maintain our security. The study then uses the Defense Futures Simulator to estimate the spending required to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russia in Europe, while also preventing further conflict by emboldened adversaries in the Pacific and the Middle East.

The most eyebrow-raising part is the source of the above “estimate” happens to be the named ‘Defense Futures Simulator’, whose front splash page features a giant blurb from the article author above. How convenient—or should we say, unethical and inappropriate—is it for the author to utilize a questionable program she appears to be involved in as grist for her propaganda to gullible taxpayers?


But after warming the oven, she drops the bombshell:

Without U.S. support, Russia would advance in 2025 as Kyiv runs out of weapons. By 2026, Ukraine would lose effective air defense, allowing Russia to conduct continuous large-scale bombings. Ukraine’s conventional forces would continue to courageously fight but would likely collapse by the end of that year, allowing Russia to seize Kyiv and then drive to the NATO border.

An emboldened Russia would reconstitute its combat units, use Ukraine’s resources to bolster its capabilities, station its forces along the NATO frontier, and be ready to attack beyond Ukraine by 2030


First of all: note the arrant contradiction of the above statement. She argues for emergency measures to save Ukraine because Russia could soon conquer Kiev and push all the way west to “NATO’s border”. So, the understanding is that Russia on NATO’s border is an existential threat to be avoided at all costs…right?

Then riddle me this: how is it possible to simultaneously push for Ukraine joining NATO as a solution, which would put NATO’s border right against Russia, or rather Russian forces “right on NATO’s border”. What’s the difference? A smart Ukrainian would note the subtly ingrained racism here: NATO mouthpieces appear to be fine with expendable cannon-fodder Ukrainians as “frontier meat-shields” stacked at the long end of Russian tank barrels. But the much more valuable “NATO-proper” countries further west are too ‘valuable’ to be risked sharing a border with Russia.

See how that logic works?

The important thing, though, is that Western narrative writers have now shed all final vestiges of pretense. Everywhere you look, top figures are openly evoking a total Ukrainian defeat, not a ‘stalemate’. Even Ukraine’s Budanov recently drew fire by admitting Ukraine faces “existential” collapse if negotiations are not pushed through in the next six months, as I wrote about in the last report.

Image
https://strana.today/news/479248-sbu-ra ... anova.html

They wouldn’t have done that if Budanov’s “highly sensitive” revelation wasn’t real, would they?

(Paywall with free option.)

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/kie ... ry-western

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The problem of legitimacy
February 2, 15:49

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The Legitimacy Problem

General Kellogg, who was tasked by Trump to end the war in Ukraine, said that the US wants Ukraine to hold parliamentary and presidential elections in 2025.
The reason for this poorly veiled demand is rooted in the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government, or rather the lack of legitimacy itself.

Putin recently said that he does not consider Zelensky to be the legitimate president of Ukraine.
From the point of view of Ukrainian law, Zelensky has trampled on the Constitution of Ukraine and has effectively seized power, holding it illegally. When the stake was solely on war, this was not a problem. When the issue of negotiations arose, this became a problem. Russia directly indicates that this is the Americans' problem, since it is their puppet. And the Americans understand that this is now their problem - how to create a legitimate government in Ukraine that can sign at least something that will be recognized by Russia.

Obviously, it makes no sense for Russia to sign anything with an illegitimate government in Ukraine (let's leave aside the fact that "legitimate" ones can also screw us, as with the Minsk agreements), since on the basis of this illegitimacy, any agreements with the Russian Federation can be subsequently cancelled even in the legal regime.

Therefore, in order to start negotiations and, even more so, to initial any agreements, a legitimate president and a legitimate parliament must appear in Ukraine. And this requires elections.
There are no military obstacles to this. The Russian Federation calmly held elections during the war, including in new regions, despite the shelling. Obviously, there is no point in deliberately shooting at Russian polling stations. Refusing to hold elections is an attempt to prolong the dictatorship and drag out the war. Now this position is beginning to collide with the demands of the United States, which wants to at least try to bargain with the Kremlin on the issue of Ukraine, for which Washington will need a legitimate puppet with the right to sign.

In fact, the issue of pushing through elections in Ukraine will clearly show how seriously the Trump administration is interested in ending the war in Ukraine. Washington has levers to influence the cocaine Fuhrer and his gang. If they are not used, then everything that is happening is nothing more than a diplomatic game.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9647771.html

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Tue Feb 04, 2025 12:55 pm

The peace mission and European autonomy
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 04/02/2025

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In his latest interview with a Western media outlet, Volodymyr Zelensky has again referred to the possibility of sending a peacekeeping mission from European countries to Ukraine as a deterrent to prevent a possible resumption of hostilities by Russia. In his attempt to defend NATO membership as the only viable security guarantee for Ukraine, the Ukrainian president has stated that this option would even be the cheapest for Western partners. Zelensky forgets to mention that Moscow will not accept a resolution that implies the arrival of NATO on its borders, so such membership is only possible with a militarily defeated Russia, something that Ukraine's suppliers currently consider unviable. The cheapest option promoted by Zelensky would be the most costly for his country, which would condemn it to the continuation of a war in which Ukraine suffers more and more.

Unlike the Zelensky government, some of Ukraine's allies understand the implications of NATO expansion in the country, and a gap has been created in the Western alliance between countries willing to take the risks involved and those who publicly or privately show their reluctance. Among the former are the Baltic countries and Poland, but above all the United Kingdom and France, powers with much more weight in the Alliance. Among the reluctant countries are Germany and the United States. In the case of Washington, Donald Trump's position, which has shown its understanding of Russia's position of strongly rejecting NATO expansion, does not represent a break with the previous administration. Although he flatly refused to commit to not including Ukraine in the alliance, Biden did not see NATO membership as a solution to the war either, and despite Zelensky's prayers, he did not offer Kiev the official invitation it so longed for.

Although it is not the preferred option of Ukraine or of the United States, whose president has already indicated that he would not participate, the idea of ​​a Western contingent as a peacekeeping mission remains the star proposal considered by several European countries. So much so that countries are already beginning to place themselves in the block of those in favour and those against. In practice, an armed mission by European countries would pose the same problem for Russia. The front is too wide and the war too complex for it to be credible that the mission was managed by European countries that are not part of NATO, so it would be seen by Moscow as an operation of the Alliance directly on its borders. Peace negotiations have not begun and may not even begin soon, so it is impossible to know the terms on which they would take place, but, for the moment, all the peace proposals that are being mentioned imply a de facto border between Russia and Ukraine on the contact line. In other words, these Western troops would be placed on what is currently the front line, which only Moscow would consider the official border between the two countries. This armed - or heavily armed - peace implies, by nature, an instability capable of causing situations of direct confrontation, a situation that at least some Western countries have tried to avoid at all costs. This is the case of the United States and also of the main continental power, Germany, which leads the group of countries that see the sending of troops to Ukraine as unfeasible.

“The UK and other European countries are divided over the feasibility of deploying a large-scale peacekeeping force in Ukraine, diplomats and officials have told The Times. Britain, France and the Nordic countries support the idea of ​​a European-led initiative to send tens of thousands of troops in the event of a ceasefire agreement. However, Germany and others are believed to be opposed,” said an article published by the London daily last weekend. “The Baltic states and Poland are believed to be concerned that the proposed mission could divert much-needed resources from NATO countries bordering Russia, leaving them exposed.” Interest in Ukraine’s victory wanes when it puts at risk NATO’s presence on its territory – the main priority of those countries whose opinion may be relevant, although it will not be as decisive as Germany’s position.

As a year ago, when Macron demanded that Berlin send the Taurus missiles to Ukraine that Olaf Scholz refused to send, France and Germany are at the head of opposing factions. At that time, the German chancellor's counterattack to the French ambush was tacit confirmation that Western soldiers are directly involved in the war in Ukraine, operating systems such as the Storm Shadow missiles. Neither the United Kingdom nor France denied the accusation, and Macron used it to officially put forward the possibility of sending troops. At a meeting with the leaders of the parliamentary factions, the French president again insisted on leaving the door open to sending soldiers in the event of a front break, for example, in the direction of Odessa.

Macron was disavowed by Scholz, but the idea had already been put on the agenda and has periodically resurfaced until it became the star proposal of European countries in recent months. This has been helped by the European feeling of being completely outside the negotiation process, in which the leading voice will correspond to the United States and Russia, the two countries with decision-making capacity. Moscow, which has to finance and manage the war economy, depends on itself and its resources. Ukraine's dependence on the United States to continue fighting under the conditions in which it is taking place makes kyiv vulnerable to the orders of those who finance its army and its State. And although the economic contribution of the European Union exceeds that of the United States, in war the main priority is weapons, whose main origin is on the other side of the Atlantic. When Washington decides that it is time for diplomacy, Zelensky will have no choice but to comply, just as Poroshenko sent Leonid Kuchma to sign the Minsk agreements that Angela Merkel had negotiated with Vladimir Putin.

The European attempt to make itself felt, to show that it is not without its own ideas and to assure Donald Trump that the EU and the UK are ready to increase their contribution to the collective effort to finance the war and to free the United States from part of its commitments, clashes with the possibilities of organizing an armed mission capable of countering Russian capabilities. “A senior British government source said that Europe could generate the necessary ground force on its own, but that ministers expect the United States to provide “air cover”. This could be in the form of Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries, capable of shooting down ballistic missiles, or aircraft with intelligence and surveillance capabilities, capabilities that Europe lacks,” admits The Times. For European countries, the United States has always been indispensable and everything indicates that it will continue to be so even now that presidents such as Emmanuel Macron announce their intention to double the military budget. Curiously, his declaration came on the same day that a motion of censure against the French government was presented, which is once again trying to approve the budget by decree and without going through Parliament, where it does not have the necessary support.

Beyond technical capabilities, European countries that believe in the idea of ​​a peacekeeping mission are once again dependent on the United States and Russia for their desired project. “If Russia doesn’t buy into the idea, it’s dead, and if the United States doesn’t put the hammer down, the idea is dead. Never say never, but I don’t think this albatross is going to take flight,” says one of The Times’ military sources. “The British army could, in theory, send a division-sized force of between 10,000 and 25,000 soldiers, according to one army source, although this may be an exaggeration given that there are already troops stationed in Estonia,” the newspaper continues, finally adding an idea considered more feasible: “a UN peacekeeping force made up of troops from countries such as India, Bangladesh or China.” In reality, this proposal would also clash with the stubborn reality that Russia would have to accept an armed mission on its borders or even on its own territory.

The idea proposed by several European countries, which wish to form part of a peacekeeping force that is European and has the support of the United States, is as uncertain as the position of Brussels or London in relation to the war, a conflict that they see close to their borders, but in which their own decisions have made them only privileged spectators and secondary providers always in the shadow of their American ally, to whom they try to offer ways to continue fighting Russia beyond the moment of the ceasefire. Europe is thus condemning itself to a kind of arms race that its main partner demands and intends to maintain an armed peace with serious possibilities of destabilization on the continent instead of seeking a security architecture that prevents future conflicts. Militarization is the way forward even if it implies cuts. In the Ukrainian case, this step would mean replacing an army prepared to fight in a war like the current one with troops from others who have not set foot in a trench for decades and whose security guarantee is simply the NATO umbrella. Despite Russia's constant statements about its intention to invade member countries of the Alliance, everyone is aware that it does not want to wage war against them. Apparently, only a part of the member countries of the Alliance agree that they do not want to risk a conflict between nuclear powers.

https://slavyangrad.es/2025/02/04/la-mi ... a-europea/

Google Translator

*****

From Cassad's telegram account:

Colonelcassad
⚡️Summary of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation (as of 4 February 2025)

— Units of the North force group in the Kharkov direction defeated formations of two territorial defence brigades in the area of ​​the settlement of Volchansk in the Kharkov region.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine lost up to 35 servicemen, an armoured combat vehicle and four cars. Four field artillery guns and an electronic warfare station were destroyed.

— Units of the West force group improved their tactical situation. They defeated the manpower and equipment of two mechanized, assault, airborne brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and two territorial defence brigades in the areas of the settlements of Kupyansk, Peschanoye, Novomlynsk, Novaya Kruglyakovka, Zapadnoye, Zagoruykovka, Zeleny Gai in the Kharkov region, Nevskoye in the Luhansk People's Republic, Yampolovka and Yampol in the Donetsk People's Republic.

The enemy lost over 290 servicemen, a tank, three combat armored vehicles, including two US-made M113 armored personnel carriers, and 14 cars. Nine field artillery pieces were destroyed, including three Western-made ones, and three ammunition depots.

— Units of the Southern Group of Forces occupied more advantageous lines and positions. They defeated formations of three mechanized and airmobile brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a Foreign Legion formation, and two territorial defense brigades in the areas of the settlements of Dyleevka, Konstantinovka, Zelenovka, Ivano-Daryevka, Orekhovo-Vasilevka, Yantarnoye, Chasov Yar, and Dachnoye of the Donetsk People's Republic. The

Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 260 servicemen, an armored combat vehicle, four cars, and four field artillery pieces, including three made by NATO countries. Two ammunition depots and three electronic warfare stations were destroyed.

— Units of the Center group of forces continued active offensive operations. They inflicted losses on the manpower and equipment of five mechanized, motorized infantry, and Jaeger brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a marine brigade, a national guard brigade, and the Lyut assault brigade of the Ukrainian National Police in the areas of the settlements of Krasnoarmeysk, Udachnoye, Sergeyevka, Dzerzhinsk, Druzhba, Novoaleksandrivka, Baranovka, Lysovka, Kotlino, Uspenovka, Andreyevka, and Yasenovoye of the Donetsk People's Republic.

The enemy lost up to 510 servicemen, a tank, two armored combat vehicles, including a US-made Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and ten pickups. Eight artillery pieces were destroyed, including a Polish-made 155-mm Krab self-propelled artillery mount.

— Units of the Vostok group of forces continued to advance deep into the enemy's defense. They defeated formations of a tank, two mechanized brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and two territorial defense brigades in the areas of the settlements of Bogatyr, Razliv, Burlatskoye, Razdolnoye and Novopol of the Donetsk People's Republic.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost over 140 servicemen, a tank, six armored combat vehicles, two cars and seven field artillery guns. An ammunition depot was destroyed.

— Units of the Dnepr group of forces defeated the manpower and equipment of a mechanized brigade and two coastal defense brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the areas of the settlements of Nesteryanka, Novodanilovka, Kamenskoye and Stepovoye of the Zaporizhia region.

The enemy lost up to 30 servicemen, three cars and two electronic warfare stations.

— Operational-tactical aviation, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, missile troops and artillery of the groups of troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation inflicted damage on the infrastructure of military airfields, production workshops, storage areas and preparation sites for the launch of unmanned aerial vehicles, ammunition depots and fuel and lubricants of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as concentrations of enemy manpower and equipment in 149 areas.

***

Colonelcassad
Ukraine's energy deadlock: infrastructure destruction, gas shortage and spring crisis

Ukraine has lost control over its own energy system and is now completely dependent on the decisions of its Western partners , who have redrew the energy map of the region. Poland closed northern supply routes (pink crosses) , Kiev refused part of its transit capacities in 2022 (red crosses) , and the last working corridor through the Sudzha GIS stopped working on New Year's Eve (orange cross) . As a result, Hungary and Slovakia are completely dependent on the Turkish Stream , which reduces their interest in supporting Ukraine.

Spring 2025 could be a turning point for the Ukrainian energy system , as the destruction of coal generation will lead to a full-scale collapse , forcing Kiev to urgently increase imports .

Loss of transit: the end of the Ukrainian GTS as a strategic asset

The Ukrainian gas transportation system has ceased to perform transit functions, having lost all key gas transportation routes .
• “Yamal – Europe” is blocked by Poland.
• “Soyuz” and “Urengoy – Pomary – Uzhgorod” stopped working “by decision” of Kiev.
• “Sudzha” (EGTS of Russia) was disconnected from January 1, 2025 , which finally severed the gas transportation network.

The loss of transit dealt a blow to the Ukrainian gas market, making the domestic system unstable . The drop in pressure in the main gas pipelines created hydraulic fractures , overloaded compressor stations and reduced the efficiency of the network. Hungary and Slovakia now depend exclusively on the “Turkish Stream” , which makes them neutral players.

Now the only possible import routes remain Poland and Romania (blue arrows) , but access to them is limited. Poland uses supplies as a tool for political bargaining , and the main powerful route via the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline (blue arrow) is blocked in Transnistria (red arc).

Thus, Ukraine has no reliable sources of gas and is completely dependent on the decisions of third countries.

Attacks on gas production infrastructure: the transition to imports is inevitable

Consistent attacks on Ukrainian depositsled to the destruction of critical gas production and transportation facilities. The final blow disabled gas gathering points (GSP) and gas distribution stations (GDS) , which made production unprofitable.

This led to three main consequences :
1. A drop in inlet pressure in the GTS - compressor stations are forced to operate at overloads, which accelerates their wear.
2. Growing dependence on imports - domestic gas volumes do not cover the needs.
3. Reduction of strategic reserves - underground gas storage facilities (UGS) are losing their meaning, since Kiev cannot replenish them.

Now Ukraine is completely dependent on imports , and any delay in deliveries leads to a cascading crisis in the energy system.

Spring crisis: instability of the energy system and vulnerability of coal-fired thermal power plants

With the end of the winter season, the energy system of Ukraine will not stabilize, but will enter a critical phase of instability .
• Gas shortage makes load redistribution impossible .
• Limited coal reserves threaten the operation of thermal power plants , which remain the last generation reserve.
• Fluctuations in the water level at hydroelectric power plants will reduce their output, reducing the overall stability of the power system .

In such conditions, the logical step would be to destroy coal generation , since strikes on gas thermal power plants no longer have a critical impact .
• Shutting down coal thermal power plants will cause a chain reaction of failures , paralyzing the power system.
• Electricity imports from the EU will not be able to compensate for the losses , since technical limitations of the networks do not allow for the supply of sufficient power.
• Dependence on coal supplies from Poland and Romania creates a new level of instability , since Kiev does not have guaranteed access to these resources.

Ukraine is entering a phase of a systemic energy crisis , in which any failure can lead to a complete collapse of the power system .

Spring 2025 may be a turning point when Ukraine finally loses its energy independence.

@don_partizan

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator



******

Brief report from the front, February 3, 2025
The threat of Preobrazhenka being taken over is looming for the AFU. Report by Marat Khairullin with illustrations by Mikhail Popov
Zinderneuf
Feb 03, 2025

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ЛБС 10.11.24=Line of Combat Contact November 10th, 2024. ЛБС 01.01.25=Line of Combat Contact January 1st, 2025. ЛБС 01.02.2025=Line of Combat Contact February 2nd, 2025.Участок Продвижения=Area of Advancement.

In the Kupyansk direction, the Russian Armed Forces continue to expand the bridgehead on the right bank of the Oskol in the Dvurechnaya (Dvorichna) area. The heights between the settlements of Dvurechnaya and Zapadnoe have been occupied. The advance of our units here reduces the defensive capability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and affects their logistics. All this is important, including for a possible subsequent offensive on Kupyansk.

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ЛБС 01.11.24=Line of Combat Contact November 1st, 2024. ЛБС 01.01.25=Line of Combat Contact January 1st, 2025. Зона активности=Zone of Activity.

In the Liman direction, our military is taking action to capture the heights west of Makeevka, expanding the bridgehead on the right bank of the Zherebets River, which will allow them to increase not only their personnel there, but also to saturate them with equipment. From the area of ​​the settlement of Ivanovka, assault operations are underway to the west and southwest. In front of the settlement of Kolodezi (Kolodyazi), located near a lowland, the enemy was driven out of the commanding heights.

The expansion of the control zone to the south along the river, where according to some information, our forces managed to gain a foothold on the settlement of Belogorovka (which is a small settlement between Yampolovka and Kolodezi), creates a threat to the enemy in the settlement of Yampolovka, which is under pressure from two (even three) sides. Throughout the area, attacks are being carried out on the enemy's rear areas.

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ЛБС 16.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 16th, 2025. Зона Продвижения=Zone of advancement.

In the Pokrovsk area, Russian units have advanced in the area of ​​Vozdvizhenka and Baranovka. From the latter, assault operations have begun on the settlement of Vodyanoe Vtoroe (Vodyanoe 2 on the map). According to operational information, the enemy was driven out of the settlement, forcing it to retreat to Tarasovka.

Image
ЛБС 01.10.2024=Line of Combat Contact October 1st, 2024. ЛБС 31.10.2024=Line of Combat Contact October 31st, 2024. ЛБС 01.01.2025=Line of Combat Contact January 1st, 2025. ЛБС 01.02.2025=Line of Combat Contact February 1st, 2025. Продвижение=Progress.

They have also advanced in the south of the Pokrovsk area, where the enemy was driven out of the settlement of Sribnoe, and attacks have begun on the settlement of Zaporozhye, located close to it. The occupation of these settlements will allow, due to their size, our forces to accumulate forces there for further offensive actions. There is also a threat of envelopment of the settlement of Preobrazhenka.

The heaviest fighting continues in the settlement of Andreevka. In its eastern part, our units have advanced, driving the enemy out of a number of positions.

In the settlement of Dachnoe, most of the settlement is in our control zone or in the combat zone. The enemy holds the western part of the village, being not only under direct pressure from our fighters, but also under the threat of operational encirclement, since the battles are going on not only for the settlement of Andreevka, but also near Konstantinopol, where the activity of Russian units continues to increase.

https://maratkhairullin.substack.com/p/ ... bruary-f23

*******

Territorial Concessions Might Precede A Ceasefire That Leads To New Ukrainian Elections
Andrew Korybko
Feb 02, 2025

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The path to peace will predictably be paved by a ceasefire, which will itself likely require some territorial concessions on Ukraine’s part in order for Putin to agree to compromise on his associated demands, then new elections can be held for legitimizing peace talks.

Trump’s Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg told Reuters that he’d like to see Zelensky hold parliamentary and presidential elections, though that outlet’s sources in Kiev claim that Washington has yet to formally request this of him. Ukrainian law stipulates that they can’t be conducted during times of marital law, ergo the need to first lift it. That won’t happen without a ceasefire, however, but therein lies the problem since Russia’s terms for such are unacceptable for Ukraine.

Putin said last June that Russia will freeze hostilities only after Ukraine withdraws from all the territory that his country claims as its own and declares that it no longer wants to join NATO. Negotiations can resume immediately afterwards, but he specified at the time that they’d have to be held with the parliamentary speaker instead of Zelensky, whose legal term expired at the end of May per Putin’s reading of the Ukrainian Constitution. He then reiterated this position last week but added a twist.

According to him, Zelensky could still hypothetically participate in negotiations, but he’d be powerless to sign anything. This followed Zelensky claiming that October 2022’s prohibition on talks with Russia applied to everyone but himself. He then told the Associated Press over the weekend around the same time as Kellogg’s interview with Reuters that he’s interested in resuming talks with Russia but doesn’t think that it wants a ceasefire. Amidst these statements from Kellogg, Putin, and Zelensky were Trump’s.

He claimed that “We’re having very serious discussions (with Russia) about that war, trying to get it ended”, but said that he hadn’t yet talked to Putin about it, thus implying that talks are only taking place at the embassy level. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Rybakov confirmed on the same day that “there is no progress” on organizing those leaders’ upcoming call. Nevertheless, their inevitable conversation will likely concern a ceasefire, and particularly the compromise that Trump hopes to broker.

This could see him proposing the following to Putin: 1) Ukraine withdraws from Kursk and Donbass, the latter of which is at the center of the territorial dispute with Russia, but stays where it’s at everywhere else; 2) Neither side rescinds their territorial claims to the other; 3) a carrot-and-stick approach is applied towards Russia and Ukraine for ensuring compliance with the ceasefire; 4) Ukraine then holds its next elections; and 5) the new government enters into peace talks with Russia after assuming office.

Ukraine can be coerced into agreeing to this by threatening to withhold military aid from it while threats of maximally disbursing such to Ukraine alongside the imposition of maximum secondary sanctions against Russia’s top energy clients (China and India) could coerce it into compliance as well. As an incentive to Russia, which has been steadily advancing for the past two years, the US might agree to demilitarize the “trans-Dnieper” region and place it under the control of non-Western peacekeepers.

That proposal forms one of the two dozen compromises that were shared at the end of this analysis here and was elaborated on in detail here. Its full implementation or some variation thereof might ultimately prove pivotal in terms of getting Russia to agree a ceasefire without Ukraine first completely complying with the terms that Putin shared last June as regards withdrawing from all the territory that his country claims as its own. Trump’s negotiators would therefore do well to seriously consider this proposal.

If they get Ukraine and Russia to agree to a ceasefire, then the previously mentioned threats could remain as sticks for encouraging compliance while the carrots could include more reconstruction aid to Ukraine and phased sanctions relief for Russia, thus increasing the odds that it holds. As part of the perks for Russian compliance, the US might even agree to let the EU resume pipeline gas imports from Russia, whether via the remaining undamaged part of Nord Stream and/or across Ukraine if it gets Kiev to agree.

As for the subsequent election step in this process, there US might prefer for Zelensky not to run for re-election otherwise it could back one of his potential opponents as part of a “phased leadership transition” for facilitating a peace deal, which is premised on Putin wanting him out of the way. Between the hypothetical ceasefire and the next elections, Zelensky might still participate in talks, but Russia wouldn’t allow him to sign anything so he’d only take part in them for self-serving political reasons.

In any case, the legal changes that Russia’s declared goals of restoring Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality and denazifying its society entail can only be advanced after the elections legitimize a new parliament, which could then bring these about under US pressure (the second goal perhaps only partially). Prior to that, the size of the armed forces could be curtailed in partial compliance with Russia’s demilitarization goal as a trust-building measure, but Russia’s spring 2022 demands might not ever be met in full.

As can be seen, Trump’s plan to broker a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia mostly depends on the second’s agreement since the first can be much more easily coerced into this, thus necessitating pragmatic compromises that satisfy some of Putin’s ceasefire demands from last June. This could take the form of forcing Ukraine into withdrawing from Donbass, seriously considering a demilitarized “Trans-Dnieper” region controlled by non-Western peacekeepers, and promising phased sanctions relief.

Putin might agree to these terms if they’re accompanied by threats of maximally disbursing military aid to Ukraine alongside the imposition of maximum secondary sanctions against Russia’s top energy clients (China and India). He’s continually proven his preference for avoiding escalations, notably reaffirmed last November through Russia’s unprecedented use of the hypersonic Oreshniks for de-escalation purposes vis the US, while a sizeable share of Russia’s budgetary revenue is dependent on Asian energy imports.

These factors would work in Trump’s favor if he proposes the ceasefire terms that were discussed together with the threatened consequences if Putin rejects them. The path to peace will predictably be paved by a ceasefire, which will itself likely require some territorial concessions on Ukraine’s part in order for Putin to agree to compromise on his associated demands, then new elections can be held for legitimizing peace talks. This is the most realistic sequence for diplomatically ending the conflict.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/territor ... ht-precede

Assuming that little Andy understands that any sort of 'peacekeepers' is a deal breaker as it negates the comprehensive deal that Russia is looking for then one must consider his motives. I doubt if Putin is afraid of the output of the US MIC, they have been found to be grossly oversold.

Time Magazine Is Wrong: Putin’s Nuke Threats Made The US Give Up On Restoring Ukraine’s Borders
Andrew Korybko
Feb 04, 2025

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The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service reports:

1. NATO headquarters is increasingly thinking about a change of power in Ukraine;
2. The Alliance plans to make public information about Zelensky's appropriation of $1.5 billion allocated for weapons to Kiev;
3. NATO leadership wants to expose the scheme by Zelensky and his entourage to withdraw abroad the salaries of 130 thousand dead Ukrainian soldiers who are still listed as alive;
4. The Alliance would like to get rid of him with the help of pseudo-democratic elections, which may take place in the fall;
5. NATO headquarters wants to publicize the fact of Kiev's involvement in the sale of weapons to various groups in Africa;
6. The Alliance considers it necessary to preserve the remnants of Ukraine as an anti-Russian springboard, it is supposed to freeze the conflict.


At the current stage, Zelensky's gang is an obvious obstacle to freezing the war, so the scenarios of physically eliminating Zelensky and replacing him through elections (with Zaluzhny) have been considered for quite some time. The US and NATO have enough leverage to completely destroy Zelensky publicly, simply by confirming the already known accusations of theft and corruption.

There is a problem with the legitimacy of power in Ukraine. And now this is a problem for the US and NATO.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9649754.html

Google Translator

******

Another Ukrainian UAV raid on oil and gas infrastructure
February 3, 2025
Rybar

Image

At night, Ukrainian forces again launched UAVs at Russian border and rear regions: according to the Russian Ministry of Defense , over 70 aircraft were intercepted in seven regions.

More about the raid
One of the most massive attacks occurred in the Volgograd region , where the target of the raid was an oil refinery belonging to the Lukoil company : a fire broke out on the territory of the facility, which was quickly extinguished by the services that arrived at the scene.

In the Astrakhan region, several drones hit installations on the territory of a local gas processing plant , one of the largest gas chemical complexes in Russia. A fire broke out at the landing site, and the facility's operations have been suspended. A gas pipeline was also damaged in the region.

A massive drone attack also hit the territory of the Rostov region : 29 drones were intercepted in seven districts overnight . According to preliminary information, there are no casualties or damage on the ground.

In the Belgorod region, residential buildings and cars came under fire in Grayvoron and the village of Kukuyevka in the Valuysky district.

In the Republic of Dagestan, air defense systems worked in Kaspiysk : according to the Russian Defense Ministry, a Ukrainian UAV was intercepted over the Caspian Sea. Russian anti-aircraft gunners also destroyed Ukrainian Armed Forces drones in the Voronezh and Kursk regions . In all cases, there were no consequences.

Following the introduction of the Carpet plan in the wake of the attack, eight airports in Astrakhan , Kazan , Nizhnekamsk , Saratov , Ulyanovsk , Vladikavkaz , Grozny and Makhachkala temporarily suspended or limited their operations .

Once again, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have targeted oil and gas infrastructure facilities. The Ukrainian formations are also helped by the actions of local residents, who are filming the aftermath of the raid en masse — footage that appears online allows the enemy to assess the results of the attack as quickly as possible .

Although a year has passed since the first attacks on the oil refineries, the problem of protecting such facilities has still not been solved.

Yes, there are objective difficulties here in the form of a large number of strategic facilities - there are not enough Pantsirs for each one, and the large area of ​​the European part of the country does not allow for the creation of the required density of air defense.

However, any creative approach to solving this problem - be it the use of small aircraft or "slowing down" mobile traffic coming out of the country during the raids - was also not particularly noticed. Apparently, some people still cannot understand that economically this is much cheaper than constant repairs of oil refineries and the losses from their shutdown.

https://rybar.ru/ocherednoj-nalet-ukrai ... strukturu/

Google Translator

******

The Real 'Mr. Jones'

Life and Afterlife of Gareth Jones feat. Philip Colley (Part 1)
Moss Robeson
Feb 03, 2025

So much for the ‘2024 Bandera Lobby Review’ that I said was forthcoming — I will try to get caught up soon. But I’m happy to announce that the ‘Bandera Lobby Show’ is back with a fascinating two-part interview of UK peace activist Philip Colley that we recorded toward the end of last year. Readers might recall that Colley—the great-nephew of the famous journalist Gareth Jones (1905-35) who exposed the 1930s Soviet famine—was behind two guest posts on this Substack:

Gareth Jones Society responds to British Banderites (March 2024) — Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain demands explanation about Nazi collaborators and the continued existence of the OUN.

Nation.Cymru or Nation.Coverup? (November 2024) — A year on from the debate in the Welsh Parliament on whether to deem the Ukrainian famine a genocide Philip Colley reflects on the use, and misuse, of his great uncle’s Soviet famine testimony.

Before we discuss the Orwellian afterlife of Gareth Jones, which saw the “Bandera Lobby” (or in this case, the “Holodomor Lobby”) co-opt his memory to push a nationalist agenda, in part one Phil tells us about the “real Mr. Jones,” as opposed to the “Indiana Jones” portrayed, for example, in the Hollywood film, Mr. Jones (2019). Last year, a clip of Phil confronting Andrea Chalupa, one of the producers of this film, went semi-viral on Twitter/X. Here we discuss the backstory, going back to the turn of the 20th century…



https://banderalobby.substack.com/p/the-real-mr-jones
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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