Russia today

[blindpig]

This is how Russia is perceived in Asia

Strategic Infographics

August 7, 2025

This infographic maps public opinion of Russia across Asia, revealing stark contrasts between nations with historical ties, strategic partnerships, or geopolitical tensions.



https://strategic-culture.su/news/2025/ ... d-in-asia/

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Putin and Trump to hold talks in Alaska on August 15
August 9, 5:57



Putin and Trump to hold talks in Alaska on August 15

The meeting between Trump and Putin will take place on August 15 in Alaska. Preparations for the meeting are already underway. Both sides + the Alaska governor confirmed preparations for the meeting. The next meeting is to take place in the Russian Federation. The Americans have already been invited. In fact, the parties are going to exchange direct visits without the participation of third parties. There is simply no place for Europe and Ukraine in this scheme, and Europe thus remains outside the negotiations, which is what Moscow was trying to achieve and which the Americans were also not against, having switched to a notification regime with respect to Europe and Ukraine.

Territorial issues will be discussed on August 15. The Russian Federation requires the withdrawal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from its territories in order to cease fire. Trump says that an exchange of territories will also be discussed - read the occupied territories of the Russian Armed Forces in the Kharkiv, Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk regions on the territory of the DPR, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions.

In Ukraine, they are already openly declaring that "it will not be possible to return what was lost by military means and we must prepare for difficult decisions," read for territorial concessions. There will be no simple freeze on the front line, since it is not in the interests of the Russian Federation. It was previously reported that the Russian Federation is ready to cease fire after the withdrawal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the occupied areas of the Russian Federation and the cessation of Western weapons supplies to Ukraine. They are not going to repeat the mistake of the Minsk agreements. The hostilities are parallel to diplomacy, so they continue with unabated force. The US interest in the negotiations is primarily due to the fact that if they are delayed, then in a few months Ukraine will lose even more territory and the terms of the deal will be even worse for it. Putin previously stated that if Ukraine is not ready for negotiations, then Russia is ready to wait, read take even more territory and make the conditions even worse for Ukraine.

In general, events are accelerating on the diplomatic front. Characteristic markers that may indicate an imminent cessation of hostilities are the conclusion of a deal on territories, the appointment of new elections in Ukraine, Trump's visit to China in early September.

In general, next week we will see one way or another in what direction the war in Ukraine will develop. Either towards a rollback in the event of successful negotiations in Alaska, or towards further and prolonged escalation in the event of their failure.
I will assume that the probability of successful negotiations is quite significant, otherwise there would be no point in meeting just to talk.
The main question here is who is trying to lead whom by the nose and whether Trump is ready/able to force Ukraine and Europe to implement it in the event of a bilateral deal.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/10003252.html

Criminals who stole from Chubais were jailed
August 7, 21:02



Criminals who stole from Chubais were jailed

The court has sentenced the defendants in the case of theft from Chubais' dacha
According to the investigation, in 2016, Chubais' former partner organized the theft of property from the dacha that was being built for his family. The damage exceeded 70 million rubles.
The Khamovnichesky District Court of Moscow announced the verdict in the case of the theft of property from the former head of Rusnano Anatoly Chubais. Judge Andrei Lutov sentenced the main defendant, Chubais' former business partner Ilya Suchkov, to 7 years of imprisonment in a general regime colony. Musa Sadaev, a former member of the political council of the Parnas party, was sentenced to 4.5 years. Security guard Alexei Ulyakhin and director of the private security company Argus Anton Polyakov received 3 years and 10 months and 4 years and 4 months, respectively, an RBC correspondent reports.

The court ruled that Ulyakhin and Polyakov's terms were considered served during the period of their pretrial detention appointed by the court. Suchkov and Sadaev were taken into custody in the courtroom.

The court found Suchkov guilty under two articles - Part 4 of Article 159 of the Criminal Code (fraud on an especially large scale) and paragraph "b" of Part 4 of Article 158 of the Criminal Code (theft on an especially large scale). Sadaev, Polyakov and Ulyakhin were charged with paragraph "b" of Part 4 of Article 158 of the Criminal Code - theft committed by an organized group on an especially large scale.

According to investigators, in 2016, property worth over 70 million rubles was stolen from a house in the village of Peredelkino in the Odintsovo District of the Moscow Region, which was being built for the family of Anatoly Chubais. The matter concerned smart home equipment, multimedia equipment, security systems and other devices purchased with funds from SFO Concept AG.

Ilya Suchkov, who headed the Swiss company participating in the project at the time, organized the removal of the equipment and gave instructions, which the executors carried out through a security structure, according to the investigation. The executors included Sadaev, Polyakov and Ulyakhin, who acted under a power of attorney or instructions from Suchkov.

The prosecution claimed that the actions of the defendants were aimed at illegally seizing property, while the owner of the house, Anatoly Chubais, did not consent to the removal of the equipment.

During the debate of the parties, a representative of the prosecutor's office asked to sentence Ilya Suchkov to 9 years in a general regime colony. For Musa Sadaev, the prosecutor requested 5 years of imprisonment. Alexey Ulyakhin and Anton Polyakov - 4.5 years each.

The prosecutor's office also asked to fully satisfy Chubais's claim for 65 million rubles and the claim of the Cypriot company Tilsoka Limited, which financed the construction, for $22 million in rubles.

Ilya Suchkov did not admit his guilt. In his final statement, he called the criminal case "fabricated" and claimed that the property was in the office of the Swiss company for safekeeping and was not stolen. He also reported serious health problems, stating that he became a second-group disabled person while in pretrial detention.

Musa Sadaev also did not admit guilt and claimed that he acted within the framework of a power of attorney issued by a foreign company. In court, he emphasized that the property from which the equipment was removed did not belong to Chubais, but was owned by a legal entity. He asked the court to take into account his state of health.

Anton Polyakov and Alexey Ulyakhin, in turn, agreed with the prosecution and admitted guilt. In court, they expressed remorse and asked for leniency. Their lawyers petitioned to reclassify the case to a less serious article, for which the statute of limitations had expired.

The conflict between Anatoly Chubais and Ilya Suchkov flared up after Chubais, who held the post of head of Rusnano, transferred management of a Swiss company, previously used to register real estate, to Suchkov. According to Chubais, Suchkov subsequently demanded that he buy out the house built in Peredelkino for $50 million, threatening to publish business correspondence in case of refusal. In 2016, the former head of Rusnano filed a complaint with the police.

https://www.rbc.ru/society/07/08/2025/6 ... 74e838e1e6 - zinc

Chubais himself has not yet been sentenced. Of course, he is not going to return the stolen money.
Those who robbed Chubais are mere lambs in the matter of theft compared to him. At the same time, unlike Chubais, they were not allowed to flee abroad.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/10001166.html

Trump-Zangezur corridor
August 9, 19:05



In the United States, an agreement was signed to create the "Zangezur Corridor" under the de facto protectorate of the United States.

In the current reality, this is a failure for the Russian Federation (with the subsequent option of squeezing out the base in Gyumri) and a direct threat to Iran. However, this was expected, since this is exactly why Pashinyan was brought to power in Armenia, who consistently surrendered Karabakh, part of Armenia's border territories, and then actually provided Turkey and Azerbaijan with an extraterritorial corridor.
Further attempts can be expected to change the leadership of the Armenian Church, Armenia's withdrawal from the CSTO and the CIS, raising the issue of withdrawing the base in Gyumri, limiting Armenia's ties with Iran, refusing to pedal the topic of the Armenian genocide by the Turks, etc., etc. The current lamentations of awakened observers on the topic of Pashinyan surrendering Armenian interests, including to the detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation, are a little funny. That this is exactly what will happen has been said since 2018. Pashinyan's role in Armenia is the role of Yushchenko in the 2000s.

For the Russian Federation, this is a problem on the level of the appearance of an American base at the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan in the mid-2000s. It took the Russian Federation and China 5 years to combat it. Let's see how the Russian Federation, together with Iran, will act with respect to American positions in the Caucasus. The Russian Federation is not yet seeking to force this issue, postponing active actions until the end of the war in Ukraine, when there will be extra resources for activation in other regions (hence the West's interest in prolonging the war in order to strengthen its positions in the disputed spheres of influence).

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/10004684.html

Friend Putin
August 8, 19:33



News of diplomatic isolation.

1. Putin held telephone talks today with the Chairman of the People's Republic of China, the Prime Minister of India, the Presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Behind-the-scenes diplomatic movements ahead of the talks between Trump and Putin are accelerating. Next week, the war in Ukraine will pass the bifurcation point.

2. In all cases, diplomatic talks on Ukraine were discussed, among other things, which will move into the format of direct talks between Putin and Trump next week.

3. Modi once again invited Putin to India today, calling him "friend Putin". It is very likely that Modi will meet with Putin during his visit to China, where Putin will be at the end of August. And where talks between Xi Jinping, Putin and Modi are expected. There was also talk that Trump would come, but so far everything has remained at the level of talk. Modi, after the introduction of American tariffs, has become much more active in fawning over Russia, which is objectively beneficial for the Russian Federation.

4. The rumors about Trump and Putin talks in Europe are coming from globalists. The Russian Federation is not interested in negotiations in Europe and in negotiations with participation in Europe. That is why the cocaine Fuhrer, twitching on strings, demands to let "Europeans to the negotiating table". But vassals and puppets have no place at this table.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/10002817.html

On youth patriotism and attitudes
August 8, 6:00 PM



On youth patriotism and attitudes

With the beginning of the Second World War, not only economic and political transformations, but also ideological ones, are taking place in Russian society. This is understandable, in a country at war and in a difficult confrontation with the superior forces of American and European imperialism, it cannot be otherwise. In the last year, a strong shift has been noted among young people towards patriotism. This raises questions.

The younger generation, as it turns out, reacts to rapidly changing social conditions with a strong delay. Well, the fact that this reaction takes the form of fashion is not at all surprising. Because this is not the result of some kind of state propaganda, policy or, for example, leftist propaganda, but a spontaneous reaction, a reflection of the new social situation in the minds of young people.

To understand what is happening to young people, it is necessary to trace the main stages of the evolution of public reaction to the war, because war, as an acute crisis, is a natural source of public perception.

So, let's go back to 2022, to the beginning of the Second World War.

It is now obvious that no one was preparing for a protracted war. Even Zelensky and the Ukrainian Armed Forces' patrons from NATO's military leadership at the first stages of the NVO relied more on guerrilla actions, or at most on the local defense of fortress cities. In keeping with this logic, light equipment and antitank missile systems were supplied, and Ukrainian soldiers were trained in ambush attacks and combat in dense urban areas. But the war in the trench form in which it had been fought since 2014 in Donbass quickly stretched out to a huge line of combat contact. After that very painful regrouping from central Ukraine and to this day, the trench, front-line nature of the fighting has become the face of this armed conflict.

It is clear that after the announcement of the NVO, all Western liberals and a small part of the intelligentsia, propagandized by them, came out with a sharp pro-Ukrainian position.

All these openly pro-American and pro-European views have traditionally nested in people's minds and been passed down from generation to generation since the so-called thaw. Dissidents (1960-1970s), perestroika supporters (1980s), democrats (1990s), liberals (2000-2020s) - all of these are representatives of the same ideological line serving the interests of Western imperialism. They used to be anti-Soviet, now they have become anti-Russian, anti-Putin, but they have never ceased and will never cease to be anti-communists.

After the collapse of the USSR, this gang had state support and included a significant part of the Russian leadership, since the bourgeoisie that took power itself was a comprador dreaming of squeezing into the narrow ranks of the bourgeois-aristocratic circles of England, the get-togethers of the rich in France and the closed clubs of American financial magnates. But, as they say, they did not make a good face.

After 2014, this liberal pseudo-intelligentsia fraternity completely relied on funding from the CIA and a couple of oligarchs dreaming of having fun in the Kremlin. They became direct agents of the US inside the Russian Federation, as did their naive and not very smart supporters. After the adoption of the corresponding law interpreting their position as anti-state (the so-called law on fakes about the army), they packed their bags and went to countries that are not at war with their neighbors.

Here it can be noted that the first wave of anti-war immigration lost touch with Russian society and degenerated into those very dissidents no one needs, telling about the horrors of totalitarianism on radio for sandwiches. True, now they have settled in Twitter and YouTube.

The second important point is their anti-war slogan. For some time, liberals pretended that they were all pacifists. But as the fighting expanded and became more brutal, especially in the situation with the Bandera garrison of Azovstal and after the start of the failed counter-offensive operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, pacifism was discarded, and the place of the doves was taken by the German-Bandera trident.

In that initial period of the SVO, the proletariat and the masses were disoriented, watching the events with their mouths open. The policy of the bourgeois state regarding the war corresponded to the basic pattern of the relationship between any bourgeois government and the people - fear of the masses of ordinary people. Let me remind you that the state forced the SVO to be called a war, and the state-controlled media made it clear that society was not involved in the hostilities. The message was as follows: all problems will be solved by the army and politicians.

The beginning of the SVO and the aggravation of the foreign policy situation had no effect on the youth. The kids only weakly laughed at the prohibitions, internet bans and the clumsiness of state propaganda. Even the exodus of popular brands and the mass hysteria of Western stars, on which the CIA experts in the secrets and nooks of the Russian soul were counting, did not receive a response from the youth environment.

The main masses of workers in large cities, office workers, engineering and technical workers, people of intelligentsia (teachers, doctors, scientists), being strongly impressed by the online broadcast of the war in Telegram, took a passive wait-and-see position, not wanting to indulge in political reflection: "I wish it would all end sooner."

The masses of the proletariat in the provinces expressed sympathy for the Russian army out of a sense of superficial patriotism, but still rather watched from the sidelines, like sports fans.

However, the situation, as V.V. Putin now likes to say, dictated its own terms on the ground. The operation to defeat the Kiev regime in the style of American political thrillers had reached a dead end, and it was necessary to move on to plan B. But neither the artistic heritage nor the well-known manuals on overthrowing banana tyrants contained a suitable plan B. Therefore, the situation itself quickly escalated into a confrontation of the military-political potentials of the Russian Federation and NATO countries on the territory of the former Soviet Ukraine in the direct form of military actions.

Hence the next turning point for Russian society - mobilization. Under pressure from circumstances, the state had to include society, the masses of people in the war in the most direct way - fill the armed forces with personnel, train and staff the fighting units in the most emergency mode. Here, the masses of people, who were directly or indirectly affected by mobilization, were forced to develop some kind of political position.

Who actually fell under mobilization? Mostly the rural and urban proletariat, the men who were not afraid of war. Those for whom self-esteem was more important than fear. They came to the recruiting stations, driven by the most general ideas about duty and trust in Putin as a more or less adequate leader, unlike many other politicians. Thanks to these people, the crisis of the shortage of soldiers was overcome and the miscalculation of the concept of a compact, mobile, professional army was compensated. They paid with sweat and blood.

Mobilization finally split society, including the led, unorganized proletarian masses, into three unequal parts.

The first was the second wave of anti-mobilization immigration: IT specialists, apartment rentiers and show business stars. They were joined in their position by the oligarchs Tinkov, Deripaska, Abramovich, Potanin and smaller bourgeois, who, relying on their capital, came out with soft but open criticism.

This part of society has a usual, bourgeois, selfish reaction: they do not like the SVO, the confrontation with the West, because they personally suffer from this geopolitics. IT specialists and rentiers do not want to end up in the trenches and die, stars and capitalists are losing income and the opportunity to lead a luxurious lifestyle in the places they dreamed of since childhood (London, Paris, Rome, Venice, New York, Nice, etc.) due to sanctions and restrictions. As you can see, the difference in class position did not prevent their synchronous reaction. They can also include that part of the corrupt top and not so top officials who cynically enrich themselves at the expense of the SVO.

The second part of society was made up of armchair patriots — workers, housewives, pensioners, who were imbued with deep sympathy for the Russian armed forces, often staffed by their mobilized relatives, friends, neighbors, acquaintances; and deep antipathy not so much to the Banderites, but to the Vsushniks in general. It was the armchair patriots who sincerely donated 50 billion rubles to the soldiers, wrote hundreds of thousands of comments of support and, in general, passively empathized in a variety of ways.

The logic of this part of society is described by the statement, “Our guys are there.” That is, if this is to be considered patriotism, then it is more like street patriotism (they are beating our guys!). There is something inappropriately condescending in this concept — “guys.” Front-line soldiers do hard combat work, and to consider them guys is even derogatory. Unless it is mothers who say this… Apparently, mothers, sisters, grandmothers set the tone in this conditional part of society. They are quite radical and often bear nationalistic views and kitchen chauvinism.

The third part of society is the most numerous - these are those who have no attitude towards the war and the situation in the country, they try not to know anything, not to have any opinion, not to read the news and so on. They are generally against any politics, against everyone and think only about the purely essential, about themselves, family, work. They say: "When will all this end already?"

The youth also belonged to this part of society.

However, after the first year of the SVO there was the first alarm bell - schoolchildren fell under the influence of the charisma of the Wagnerites. Pseudo-patriotic aesthetics, the romanticism of the fatalism of soldiers of fortune caused a short-lived fashion. The background for it was the ChVK propaganda inflated in the media, especially during the months of the storming of Artemovsk. This means that the war is beginning to break through in the information sphere of teenagers, displacing Hollywood superheroics, anime and other trash. The form, again, developed purely spontaneously - what was most striking, that caught the attention of children's eyes. After the Wagner mutiny, the death of Prigozhin and the liquidation of the PMC, the fashion quickly faded away.

The next shift in public consciousness occurred gradually, firstly, with getting used to the war, secondly, with the involvement of more and more people due to the fact that every month tens of thousands of people sign a contract and go to war, thirdly, with a steady increase in the advantage of the Russian army at the front. It can be said that after the repulsed offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the summer of 2023 and the liquidation of the so-called Kursk bridgehead at the end of April 2024, the situation at the front took its current form: the Russian army is advancing, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are retreating with battles, actively spending reserves, the depletion of enemy forces is increasing with each month.

The situation was reflected in the public consciousness again.

The first part of society fell into despondency and disappointment. Some IT specialists and apartment rentiers were drawn back to their homeland.

The second part of society, on the one hand, grew even larger, on the other hand, lost its enthusiasm and grew tired of the news of everyday life at the front and endless urgent meetings.

The third part gradually accepted the reality of at least not war, but confrontation with the West.

It should be noted that, despite all the gigantic hype in the media and the chatter of various loms about a deal in connection with the change in the European course of the United States, in general, neither the people nor the front believed in the possibility of ending the conflict by diplomatic means. After all, the crazy political dynamics of the events of the 2020s taught people to judge not by slogans, statements and chatter, but based on actions and facts.

In 2025, one could say, the most unexpected thing flared up - the youth fashion for patriotism. Moreover, this is not just some superficial popularity of Shaman, Kadysheva and Bulanova, but namely a slight love for their country, their culture, which includes support for the Russian Federation in the war with NATO. A number of objective (primarily the war itself) and subjective factors led to the formation of this fashion.

From the non-obvious - the myth of the civilization and high quality of the West was destroyed. A generation has grown up that does not believe in fairy tales about the greatness of America and Western Europe. From the very beginning of their growing up, they have observed the hypocrisy of Western imperialism and the technological power of China. These are the youth that appeared in the conditions of the fading hegemony of the United States, and it is more difficult for them to hang liberal noodles on their ears.

In general, I am inclined to believe that it will be very difficult for the oligarchs and bourgeois in power to digest the generations of 2005-2010 and later. These children and teenagers are very developed intellectually, brought up by machines, computers, the Internet, new technologies, and squeezing them into the narrow framework of hired labor will be difficult and problematic. They represent a powerful potential for the revolutionary transformation of society. This is a new proletariat growing up in terms of the quality of consciousness and psychological makeup, which is much more predisposed to everything communist. They lack the awareness of collectivity, they lack knowledge and theory, they lack discipline and will, but they are too smart for capitalism.

With their fashion for patriotism, these young people show that they are capable of independently reacting to external circumstances. Although with a significant delay, in a frivolous, humorous way.

One might think that the youth fashion for patriotism is the result of state propaganda and serves to strengthen the bourgeois system. But rather the opposite, it is more like a counterculture, a spontaneous mass reaction. Of course, it is bad that there is no place for the USSR, Bolshevism, and communism in this fashion. Of course, it is bad that the mass consciousness of young people is filled with nothing but irony and sarcasm. But, on the other hand, what can we expect from young people brought up on the most primitive cultural models and historical fakes?

As is known, many fatal mistakes have been made in combining contradictory tasks - patriotism and communism. And the idea of combining communism and fashion is even stranger. Therefore, youth fashion cannot directly influence our work. At the same time, fashion hides, at least in some cases, a desire for political knowledge. And this means that there is an opportunity to tread the road to Marxism. No matter how strange it may sound at first glance.

Thus, young people, joining the third, passively waiting part of society, with their fashion for patriotism demonstrated one of the options for accepting objective political reality. But behind this, as was said above, there is a certain perspective for the development of this generation itself. The generation that will live under communism.

(c) A. Redin

https://prorivists.org/107_fashion/ - zinc

I completely agree that for a significant part of the youth, the SVO has become a kind of patriotic vaccination, which has saved the future generation from groveling before the West and contempt for their own country. Well, as for the propaganda of communism, now it largely runs into the wall of moral bankruptcy of many ex-left LOMs (SVO in this regard has become a good marker revealing the views of many "pseudo-leftists") and a general decline in interest in reading, because approaching the average teenager with proposals in the spirit of "Well, read the complete works of Marx, Lenin, Stalin..." does not promise a large mass appeal. The propaganda of communism, if carried out seriously, should take into account social and technological changes in society, and not rely on often outdated organizational and technological solutions. The younger generation is by no means as stupid as it is commonly imagined.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/10002550.html

Google Translator

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Goodbye Armenia
August 7, 2025
Rybar

A "peace memorandum" between Baku and Yerevan may be signed in Washington tomorrow with American mediation. The US has officially confirmed a trilateral meeting between Donald Trump, Ilham Aliyev and Nikol Pashinyan.

Yerevan remained silent for a long time amid rumors about the signing of a certain document in the United States. The forced confirmation of Pashinyan's trip once again proves the thesis that the Armenian authorities are hiding information about fateful decisions from the public.

The plans of the parties became known after a leak to the media through an Azerbaijani journalist accredited by the State Department, which was confirmed by American and British media.

The Armenian press writes that Pashinyan will sign a document that will be presented as a "historic success" for PR before the 2026 elections . Personal security guarantees for Pashinyan himself and his family also play a major role , as in the future, after the final surrender of Armenia's sovereignty, he will be able to calmly settle in the United States.

Reuters claims that the Americans will still gain control over the "Zangezur Corridor" . Trump, against the backdrop of foreign policy failures, is trying to "reconcile" at least someone for the sake of the Nobel Peace Prize, so the White House will not take into account the interests of Armenia, despite the large Armenian diaspora in the United States.

Pashinyan consistently surrenders the national interests and sovereignty of Armenia for the sake of preserving his personal power and his own selfish interests. Everything will be presented to the Armenian society as a diplomatic victory: Washington will still think about the wording.

However, the global goals remain the same - to push Russia out of the region and weaken Iran. And for this, the Americans, the British and the EU are quite ready to sacrifice Armenia.

https://rybar.ru/gudbaj-armeniya/

Google Translator

[blindpig]

THE RUSSIA I DREAM OF FORGETTING; WHAT PEOPLE ARE DYING FOR IN UKRAINE

From Marat Khairullin's Book: "And to wash yourself with a clear teardrop."
Zinderneuf
Aug 09, 2025
Zinderneuf:

While editing the upcoming English translation of Marat’s book, I came upon this short essay that I believe is more timely than ever. Please read this.

Marat Khairullin:



I’m often asked: why exactly did I come to this war? Today, I’ll try to explain myself.

Many years ago now, back in the first half of the 90s, an ethnic gang chased me—at that time a correspondent for a central newspaper—through the streets of a small Ural town. I had come to write about the cemetery of nameless pensioners growing up around that very place.

During that short span of time, just a couple of years since Yeltsin’s sovereignty had been established, as many as 136 lonely pensioners had gone missing without a trace in this classic Stalin-era industrial town, while their apartments were seized by so-called black realtors[1].

They hid me away inside the enormous administrative building of some defunct Soviet industrial giant. We sat huddled in an abandoned director’s office, burning candles—since the whole town lay without electrical power— where we drank filthy vodka. Of the room’s furnishings, the only thing I remember clearly is a lavish oil painting of Lenin still hanging on the wall.

"They’ve got everyone accounted for, every last one. First, without fail, the local precinct officer comes round, then the person disappears, and the apartment’s snatched up that very same day. New owners move in come the next morning. The previous owner’s body isn’t even cold yet, but already they’re taking over. Oh, son… what a terrifying thing it’s become to live in this country of ours…"

These were the words spoken to me by Vladimir Mironych—a veteran of the Great Patriotic War who’d devoted the larger part of his life to that very industrial giant, the cooling corpse of which we were now using for our secret hiding place.

Even the precinct officer had already paid a visit to Vladimir Mironych[2], though the gang’s plans for him were reportedly scrambled by the arrival of this Moscow correspondent—yours truly—possibly saving his life.

Now, I can’t say for certain whether that was true, but right upon arriving I made a critical mistake—I marched straight off to the chief of the town’s police force clutching Vladimir Mironych’s letter. They received me with great demonstrative warmth, rolled their eyes, lamented the sorts of crazy old men who write nonsense to central newspapers, and solemnly promised to look into the matter.

And barely two hours later, there appeared outside my hotel these guys in a Mercedes—a pair of well-fed, calm, and disturbingly noticeable tough men. They were the absolute masters of this place—drinking tea from the receptionist’s cup right at the counter, joking amiably with prostitutes loitering in the hotel lobby, all while pretending not to so much as glance in my direction.

Vladimir Mironych sussed them out in an instant and orchestrated a whole rescue operation—first shook our tail off, then hid me away in the dark, empty carcass of his native factory, where, washing down his account with bitter vodka, he gave me the full rundown on the gang operating in the town:

Which notary was forging and processing the apartments of disappeared old folks?

Turns out it was the wife of that very police chief.

Who handled property registration at the city real estate department?

It emerged the documents were handled by the mayor’s wife.

And who exactly strangled the unfortunate old men (Mironych even knew they were specifically strangled) and buried their corpses in the suburban woods?

You won’t believe it—those same smiling soul-slayers who’d come to watch me at the hotel.

Mironych’s account was steeped in horrifying details, and yet, if you imagine that I, then still practically a kid, was shocked by all this, you’d be deeply mistaken. Into our editorial office came dozens, if not hundreds, of letters with similar soul-wrenching cries—back in those years, thousands upon thousands of people, despairing of finding truth from the authorities, wrote to journalists.

I wasn’t struck by horror at what was happening—I’d long since grown accustomed to it. But when Vladimir Mironych’s letter arrived, in my role as a reporter, I couldn’t just ignore it—what specifically intrigued me was the sheer brazen brutality of the local gang.

All across Russia, lonely old folks, veterans, front-line soldiers who could remember the Great Patriotic War were being forcibly evicted from their own apartments. I’d written so damn many pieces about it that the editorial office where I worked had simply stopped accepting such stories—they’d become something mundane, however ghastly that sounds, just another feature of daily life.

Things like this were happening in Moscow, Balashika, St. Petersburg, Ufa, Kazan Vladivostok. But whereas in big cities they at least spared the old folks—forcing them to sign over their cursed apartments and exiling them to languish out their days in godforsaken abandoned villages—well, in small provincial towns they just straight-up slaughtered pensioners.

Come early morning, Mironych got his acquaintance to drive me out of town stuffed in the trunk of his car.

"Y’know, in the war I never once cried, not a single time, but here… I cried from sheer helplessness," Vladimir Mironych told me as we parted ways. "Thank you, son… Write about everything you’ve seen here…,"

We embraced tightly, and then we never met again afterward.

So many years have passed since then, yet Mironych’s face—streaked with tears, eyes full of utter despair—remains vividly clear before me: at that precise moment, this fundamentally strong man was certain he was already doomed, and he was psychologically prepared for it—the old front-liner was getting ready to die proudly, without complaints. And the only thing he still asked of God was that his story might finally be heard by someone.

Only with the passing years, really just quite recently, came the slow dawning understanding that Vladimir Mironych’s generation—then not old at all, still full of vigor and vividly remembering the Great War—was beyond priceless, yet we failed to preserve it, didn’t let them live out their remaining days with dignity, bartering away our own national greatness for cheap beer and imported jeans.

As for me personally, this whole story ended anything but well. I never even bothered writing the article; my section editor just wearily waved his hand in dismissal:

"Forget it, you’ll prove nothing anyway, there are no documents, they’ll sue us to hell and back…"

Then some time later, my good friend, the American journalist Paul Khlebnikov, in his book alleged that Boris Yeltsin had to be personally held accountable for hundreds of thousands of murdered pensioners. He met with me several times specifically, we talked long and hard about this very topic, I handed over part of my archive to him. I recall joking grimly back then:

"Watch out—they’ll kill you for this eventually."

Pasha merely gave a wry smile in response.

And after his book came out, they did indeed kill him. And for some reason my very first thought was: precisely for those words—that he would never forgive Boris Yeltsin for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of old people abandoned to their fate.

That’s why, my dear ones, all who’ve perished in today’s war, they didn’t die for nothing. And not just so that our lonely old folks wouldn’t be killed by the thousands anymore for their miserable apartments. Because if Ukraine and the West standing behind it win and come here to our land, it’s us—you and me—they’ll be killing next. Believe me, it will all come flooding back, all that horror which we, having sunk into our comfortable oblivion, dared to forget.

Oh yes, we forgot how in the Russia of the 90s a million human beings died from samogon[3] and causes directly linked to alcohol—overwhelmingly men, somebody’s precious sons, fathers, husbands, brothers. We forgot that every single year 30 to 50 thousand perished in car crashes, and the majority of drivers—the ones actually causing the accidents—faced no legal consequences whatsoever.

Starting, it seems, from 1997 onward, a special report dedicated to torture within police stations (“militia at the time) regularly emerged under UN auspices—naturally, an unfriendly act by the USA, yet still, it spoke volumes about the true state of Russia’s law enforcement system, in whose capital during certain years over a thousand citizens were gunned down by hired killers right out on the streets of the capital city of my struggling country.

In the very year Putin became prime minister (1999), yet another monstrous study was published, coldly stating that every third girl in our vast country before reaching 18 years of age had experience with so-called "commercial sex." Thus did polite Western researchers term prostitution in our country.

By the twilight of the century, the black-market transplantology trade in Russia was valued at a figure monstrous for those times—a full billion US dollars. Approximately 20 thousand Russians were “dismantled for spare parts” annually; everything was harvested for use, even lymphatic fluid—snapped up eagerly by Western perfume giants. And again that chillingly polite formulation—"without donor consent."

And then too in Russia there existed an actual slave market—about 15 thousand Russians sold annually—and a parallel market for sexual slavery: in foreign brothels across the globe, by various expert estimates, held strictly "against their will" were up to half a million of our young girls. There was also the Chechen war, which I could endlessly write about. And so on and so forth.

For you, my dear readers, all this may well be merely abstract numbers, but I spent all those years traversing cities and remote villages writing article after article about crippled lives and broken fates… I looked these cold statistics directly in the eye, smiled back at them, drank vodka with them. Back then I was a very callous man, hardened, almost never shed tears. I remember only one solitary such instance.

It was also in some God-forgotten backwater town, an eternal polustanok[4] on one of Russia’s desolate outskirts.

Misha the geologist, you understand, was one of those genuinely bright and quiet Russian idealists—deeply conscientious folk who ache in their souls for their fellow human beings and turn up spontaneously in all corners of our holy country. He penned a letter to my editorial office; I came out to meet him, and together we went to see the local Aniskin[5]—an aging precinct officer named Kuzmich. He listened long and hard to my initial pitch, then somehow crookedly smiled and proposed:

“So you want to have a look, correspondent, well, let’s go and have a look…”

We walked on a clear, bitingly cold night between two frozen railway lines, upon which stood immobile freight trains. Suddenly Kuzmich darted sideways, squeezed himself through the narrow gap between wagons, and hauled out from some dark hole a violently kicking bundle of rags.

"Hey now, quit scratching me, little devil, you know perfectly well I won’t do anything bad to you," Kuzmich grunted heavily, firmly restraining a grimy boy of about 8-10 years.

"Move along now," he gave the boy a rough but not unkind shove in the back, and the kid obediently shuffled forward.

Down in a basement kaptyorka[6], Kuzmich growled out angrily:

"This here’s Aska. Go on, take your jacket off. And you, mister correspondent, best be careful—he’s crawling with lice."

Then he pulled out coarse bread, cheap sausage, and meticulously cut thick sandwiches.

"Eat up, boy."

He sat down on a chair and lit a cigarette, and told me:

“Wait, that’s not all…”

The boy began eating quietly and obediently, while we three grown men sat in heavy silence watching him.

Quite unexpectedly, the door creaked slightly ajar and through the narrow gap slipped silently a girl of about six years; she sat herself down right beside Aska and took his small hand firmly in hers.

"Well now, allow me to introduce—this here’s Sima," Kuzmich remarked with a grim half-smile.

"I’ve got maybe thirty of these street rats running around this station, but these two… what they’ve got is real love, see? They cling to each other for dear life—she works in the passing freight cars with the itinerant oil workers, and this little fool here tries to stand guard over her… Ain’t that the truth, little Serafima?"

Sima merely tilted her head downward and smiled a tender, private smile at the dirty floor. I noted immediately what a good, genuinely childish smile she possessed.

"That’s how things stand here, mister correspondent. Nearest state orphanage’s five hundred versts[7] off, and they’d just run away from there anyhow… Where to even put ’em… Not a soul in this world gives a damn about them."

The children finished eating, gulped down some lukewarm tea, and immediately curled up to sleep right there on the wooden chairs, while we adults talked on until the frost-laden dawn, which hung the chimney smoke from surrounding peasant huts like frozen veils against the scarlet-streaked sky. I departed on the very first morning train.

Several months later arrived a second letter from Misha. During one of her grim "work shifts" inside a railcar, Sima was forcibly dragged away by passing shift workers; Aska instantly rushed at them with his little knife trying to defend her. They were both thrown brutally from the moving train at full speed… The children’s cruelly broken little bodies were eventually discovered in a ditch thirty kilometers distant from that godforsaken whistle-stop, and predictably, no criminal case was ever opened. And Kuzmich? He was summarily thrown out of the police force for alleged chronic drunkenness. That precise moment—that’s when I finally broke down and wept. That singular letter remains, it seems, the only one over which I ever cried in my entire career.

If anyone dares tell me that a beloved son, a father, a husband, a brother died in vain in this foreign-seeming war—know this with absolute certainty: they did not perish for nothing. They died so that such monstrous numbers in our wounded country might become as vanishingly few as humanly possible. Because if the enemy ultimately takes the upper hand, that same cursed democracy will come crashing back upon us. And then, I swear to you, Mironych, Aska, Sima and all the other countless betrayed souls will most assuredly not forgive us.

Personally I, to the extent of my abilities, am fighting here precisely for this grim purpose, because I dream desperately of finally forgetting that accursed Russia of my youth, through which I wandered as if wading perpetually knee-deep in endless, suffocating human sorrow.

And you… you must each decide for yourselves where you stand…

[1] The term "black realtors" (чёрные риелторы in Russian) refers to criminal groups or unscrupulous real estate operators who illegally seize properties—often from vulnerable owners like elderly or isolated individuals—through coercion, fraud, or violence.

[2] “Mironych” is a shorter version of “Mironovich,” representing the name of a person’s father.

[3] "Samogon" (самогон) is a traditional Russian homemade distilled alcohol, similar to moonshine.

[4] “Polustanok” translates to “railway whistle-stop.”

[5] A reference to Fyodor Ivanovich Aniskin, a district police officer or “village detective” – and a fictional character by Vil Lipatov.

[6] “Kaptyorka” is a boiler room or a storage room.

[7] A verst (верста in Russian) is an old Russian unit of distance that was widely used before the metric system was adopted. One verst is about 3500 feet, or a little over a kilometer.

https://maratkhairullin.substack.com/p/ ... forgetting

******

As If ...

... anyone will be asking him.


Zelensky Rejects Ceding Territory to Russia After Trump Suggests a Land Swap. The Ukrainian leader’s blunt comments risk angering President Trump, who has made a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia one of his signature foreign policy goals.

Generally speaking, meeting in Alaska and later in Moscow IS NOT about Ukraine per se--it is about how the new world will be institutionalized. Putin will be talking on behalf of BRICS. Trump's desperate attempt to scare BRICS with sanctions and tariffs failed spectacularly.

WASHINGTON (AP) — U.S. and Chinese officials may be able to settle many of their differences to reach a trade deal and avert punishing tariffs, but they remain far apart on one issue: the U.S. demand that China stop purchasing oil from Iran and Russia. “China will always ensure its energy supply in ways that serve our national interests,” China's Foreign Ministry posted on X on Wednesday following two days of trade negotiations in Stockholm, responding to the U.S. threat of a 100% tariff.

Russia's "isolation" is complete, as you can see yourself. Responding to this clown show in D.C. with Aliev and Pashinyan, Pashiniyan ensured that eventually Armenia will cease to exist, BUT to those who lament interference with North-South Corridor, I repeat--Zangezur Corridor IS NOT about Russia-Iran trade, it is primarily about Iran. Iran already reacted today that it will not allow any kind of change of status of Zangezur Corridor, period. Morons from D.C. and Ankara are still playing 19th century "Geographic Pivot of History", failing to understand that it is 2025 and Iran has a damn impressive missile force capable to wipe out any kind of undesirable military presence. Here is how MAIN Caspian container ships look like and they are being built at Astrakhan as I type this. Anybody in Caucasus or Middle Asia wants to challenge Caspian Flotilla and 58th Army? I thought so.



Per Europe, as is the case with 404--Europe is a used condom and is being thrown out, as was told by me for more than 10 years, into the dumpster. It is energy-starved peninsula of the Eurasian land-mass, deindustrialized (and it only accelerates) and impotent. Russia has Oreshnik, apart from a shitload of other delivery systems, in serial production and there will be no repetition of WW II once (not if, but when) hungry and destitute European population will be whipped up into Russia-hatred and mobilized for yet another crusade to Russia. European military-political elite will simply be annihilated and Europe will cease to exist in any serious political and even physical senses.

http://smoothiex12.blogspot.com/2025/08/as-if.html

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MSU vs. Yeltsin Center
August 10, 21:02



MSU vs. Yeltsin Center


An entire expert commission of Moscow State University professors analyzed the Yeltsin Center exhibits and found not just mistakes in them, but a clearly structured system of anti-Russian propaganda, an attack on Russia's national sovereignty, and a rewriting of history to please the West.

A striking example is the comparison of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991:

"The Great Patriotic War is presented not as a national feat and triumph, but through the prism of "command errors" and losses, creating a sense of a senseless slaughter. At the same time, the context of global confrontation and Nazi aggression is completely absent.

The presentation of the events of 1991 grossly violates the principle of historical objectivity. The collapse of the USSR is presented not as a geopolitical catastrophe (in the words of V.V. Putin), but exclusively as a "triumph of democracy" and "liberation."

The most outrageous thing is the exhibit dedicated to privatization. Chubais and his team, who plundered the country, are presented as the saviors of Russia, while the millions of defrauded investors, according to the Yeltsin Center, are “enemies of progress”:

“The exhibition dedicated to privatization presents it as a “necessary measure” and “the creation of a class of owners,” practically ignoring the criminal nature of the process, the plundering of public property and the colossal social stratification. The figures of Gaidar and Chubais are surrounded by the aura of “saviors.”

This is not just a bad museum, it is an institute for the rehabilitation of a national catastrophe. The Center is trying to impose on society the idea that the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century — the collapse of the USSR — was a blessing, and the predatory privatization and destruction of the social sphere were “the inevitable costs of freedom.”

The official branch of the CIA in the very heart of Russia...

https://t.me/vika_tsyganova63/6435 - zinc

I support the message. The Yeltsin Center must be closed. The exhibition can be repurposed into a museum of the "holy 90s" and the horror that the perestroika people and privatizers did to the country and the people. Without a solution to the Yeltsin Center issue, the SVO in culture cannot be considered complete. They closed "Echo of Moscow." They closed "Novaya Gazeta." They closed "Memorial." They will close the Yeltsin Center too. Its time will come.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/10006862.html

Google Translator

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Why is Alaska Chosen as Venue for Trump-Putin Summit?


Vladimir Putin (L) and Donald Trump (R), 2019. X/ @GUASABARAeditor

August 11, 2025 Hour: 7:32 am

The choice of the location ‘does make sense,’ said Russian Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov.
U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin are set to meet on Friday in Alaska, marking the first visit by a Russian president to the United States since 2015.

WHY ALASKA?

The choice of the location “does make sense,” said Russian Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov, noting that the two countries are close border-sharing neighbors.

“So it does make sense if our delegation simply crosses the Bering Strait and if such an important and expected meeting between the two leaders takes place specifically in Alaska,” Ushakov said.

Alaska sits at the northwestern tip of the North American continent and is the largest U.S. state by area. Once part of the Russian Empire, it was discovered by a Russian expedition in 1732. In 1867, Russia sold it to the United States for 7.2 million U.S. dollars due to financial difficulties. The Bering Strait separates Alaska from Russia, with the nearest islands being only about 4 km apart.

Alaska Governor Mike Dunleavy also noted Alaska’s strategic location at the crossroads of North America and Asia, with the Arctic to the north and the Pacific to the south.

He said the state plays a “vital role” in U.S. national defense, energy security, and Arctic strategy, adding: “It’s fitting that discussions of global importance take place here.” Putin will be the first Russian president to visit Alaska, TASS reported.

The Russian past of Alaska, where Trump and Putin will meethttps://t.co/g8fbhHkcxV pic.twitter.com/ownPYs5Wea

— AFP News Agency (@AFP) August 11, 2025

WHAT MIGHT THE MEETING COVER?

Ushakov said discussions at the Alaska meeting will focus on discussing ways to reach a sustainable settlement to the Ukraine crisis.

Earlier on Friday, Trump told reporters at the White House that a security arrangement could involve “some swapping of territories.”

On Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told U.S. media that ending the Russia-Ukraine conflict requires a ceasefire and resolution of territorial issues, with compromises needed from both sides.

Analysts noted that, besides a settlement to the Ukraine crisis, easing the economic pressure caused by Western sanctions is a pressing concern for Russia, and Moscow hopes to leverage closer Russia-U.S. cooperation to find new drivers for its economy.

Ushakov said that the economic interests of Russia and the United States converge in Alaska and the Arctic, and “prospects for implementing large-scale mutually beneficial projects arise.”

Alaska and the adjacent Arctic are rich in oil, natural gas, gold and other resources, and home to strategic sea lanes such as the Arctic shipping routes.

Putin’s investment chief Kirill Dmitriev has called for Russia-U.S. cooperation on environment, infrastructure and energy in the Arctic and beyond.

'If Trump and Putin reach a deal, Zelensky not going along with peace gives Trump the perfect opportunity to just throw up his hands' — Steve Gill to RT

'Putin meeting with Trump may be a trap where they agree to a peaceful resolution, and perhaps a land swap' https://t.co/IMaotgrJrS pic.twitter.com/i4IQZLGpah

— RT (@RT_com) August 11, 2025

WILL ZELENSKY BE THERE?

NBC News quoted a senior U.S. official on Sunday as saying Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s participation is “absolutely” possible, but nothing has been finalized.

On Thursday, Trump told reporters in the Oval Office that a meeting between Russian and Ukrainian leaders is not a condition for him to meet with Putin. On the same day, Putin said he has nothing against a meeting with the Ukrainian president in general, but noted a lack of conditions for such talks.

Zelensky has rejected the idea of any peace agreement made without Ukraine’s participation. On Saturday, he stressed in a video address on social media platform Telegram that Ukraine will not concede territory to Russia.

“Any decisions made against us, any decisions made without Ukraine, are at the same time decisions against peace,” Zelensky noted. “They will bring nothing. These are dead decisions; they will never work.”

https://www.telesurenglish.net/why-is-a ... in-summit/

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Crazy Spin About Upcoming Summit by Collective West

And the Five Musts return as Four
Karl Sanchez
Aug 10, 2025



The players with no leverage are fomenting a storm of spin about the upcoming Summit. Most importantly is the fact that Trump made some concession/offer that was very powerful “bait” as some have called it to set this event in motion. Supplicants—Trump/EU/Zelensky—have no leverage. Nothing said by the Russians that I know of indicates the key topic is Ukraine. Given a slip by Zelensky last week, this is about Eurasian Security—the December 2021 proposals, which is the bottom-line goal of Russia’s SMO: The ultimate root of the problem. Okay, so now I’m on the record about what IMO the Summit is about. Trump has no legal standing to negotiate for Ukraine as I’ve pointed out a half-dozen times at minimum. IMO, something’s been happening via the backchannel silos. We must also look at this from the Russian citizen perspective. The steadfastness of the goals, their continued articulation and the many sacrifices are all very important politically, and there’s no reason for Russia to suddenly backtrack when it’s beginning to win rather handily. Recall the recent very frank talk by Putin and Lukashenko at Valaam and ponder. So, what motivation does Team Putin have to talk about Ukraine?

Yes, there are other events happening that are important, the Gaza Genocide being the most obvious followed by the chaos in Syria. The Turkish move with Azerbaijan and Pashinyan (Armenia) is Erdogan doing his thing. Sleboda’s recent chat with Nima dug into that chess move rather well. All BRICS are standing tall against Trump’s Trade War, and the stats don’t look good for Trump and the Collective West. IMO, G-7 genuine GDP shrinkage of several percent for 2025, while BRICS grows 3-4%.

Meanwhile, I see Xi Jinping’s “Five Musts” over Palestine from 2023 have resurfaced at the UNSC as the “Four Musts“. From a Global Times report:

Fu said Israel’s attempt to occupy Gaza must be firmly opposed; the fallacy of believing in the primacy of force must be abandoned; the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza must be alleviated; and the prospect of the two-state solution must be revived.

Readers are invited to compare the 4 and 5 musts. Here’s the latter from my 2023 report linked above:

The conflict in Gaza is raging on into its second month. China is gravely concerned that the conflict is causing enormous civilian casualties and a humanitarian disaster, and tends to expand and spill over. China believes that the following is urgent and imperative: First, the parties to the conflict must end hostilities and achieve a ceasefire immediately, stop all violence and attacks against civilians, release civilians held captive, and act to prevent loss of more lives and spare people from more miseries. Second, humanitarian corridors must be kept secure and unimpeded, and more humanitarian assistance should be provided to the population in Gaza. The collective punishment of people in Gaza in the form of forced transfer or water, electricity and fuel deprivation must stop. Third, the international community must act with practical measures to prevent the conflict from spilling over and endangering stability in the Middle East as a whole. China supports the resolution adopted at the emergency special session of the U.N. General Assembly on October 27. The U.N. Security Council under China's presidency has adopted Resolution 2712. All the parties must act to deliver on these resolutions through concrete measures on the ground.

It’s not just a comparison but a marker of the failure to stop the Zionist Crime. Unfortunately, I rather doubt Gaza will be on the Summit agenda.

Comment could be made about the crazy spin, but I’m sure others will make the inanity be known. Or you could watch FOX News or any of the Sunday MSM propaganda shows. It will be curious to see who Trump plays golf with before the Summit. As already predicted, I expect Putin to do an inspection trip to see how some of the many development projects are progressing in the Arctic and Far East. There’re new Sambo facilities at some of those locales which is Putin’s form of golf. No mention yet of who will man the two teams. Let’s see what leaks!

https://karlof1.substack.com/p/crazy-sp ... ing-summit

There is a lot of handwringing about this summit being an assassination set-up for Putin or him and Trump. Well, these times are making us all a little crazy...It would be crazy and stupid for the so-called 'Deep State' to make such a move: whoever would step into Putin's shoes after such an event will be a genuine hard-ass, the Putin mandate of low Russian losses would be shelved and the gloves would be off, Bankova would be a deep hole in the ground and mebbe Ramstein too. And that for a start. Not to mention MAGA gone rabid if it's a 'twofer'.

[blindpig]

Arctic Encirclement

Geopolitical thunder on the tundra: As the noose tightens on the battlefield, a proxy may be sacrificed—Ukraine’s fate hangs in the balance between Trump’s brinkmanship and Putin’s relentless advance.
Kevin Batcho
Aug 12, 2025


Love thy neighbour? Alaska will host the Trump-Putin Summit

Along the Ukraine war’s front lines, Russian advances have shed their glacial pace. As Ukraine builds strong defensive structures in the Donbass, their lack of manpower means these fortification lines are quickly seized by Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups, and once entrenched, Ukraine has no ability to dislodge them. As so often in war, the rampart erected for safety becomes, in the turn of a tide, the enemy’s throne.

After nearly a year of attritional pressure, Chasov Yar was finally prised away, becoming the pivot for a broader operational design: four emerging kotyols—cauldrons—taking shape around Kupyansk, Seversk, Konstantinovka, and the logistics hub of Pokrovsk. Each is being sealed not through frontal assaults, but by the patient tightening of artillery arcs and the interdiction of supply routes—a calculated geometry of collapse drawn in deliberate strokes.


Pokrovsk cauldron, the red lines represent Ukrainian defensive lines which may soon be captured by the Russians.

A kotyol—literally “boiler” in Russian military usage, often rendered in English as “cauldron”—carries the image of a kettle under heat: pressure mounting, steam building, escape possible only through the spout. On the battlefield, that “spout” may be slammed shut in Clausewitzian fashion, as at Stalingrad—an enemy fixed, surrounded, annihilated. Or it may be left ajar, creating a “semi-cauldron” in which a narrow corridor tempts the trapped into pre-sighted killing grounds. This is Sun Tzu’s counsel to leave an enemy an outlet—not from clemency, but to erode the desperation that fuels last stands. The illusion of escape breaks cohesion; retreat becomes rout.

At Korsun–Shevchenkovsky in February 1944, German forces west of the Dnieper were encircled but left a single corridor through frozen fields. Soviet artillery and aircraft turned that corridor into a slaughterhouse, annihilating men and materiel as they fled.

In the early phase of the Ukraine war, two brutal battles in the Donbas region—Ilovaisk in 2014 and Debaltseve in 2015—recreated the open-sided trap: the fiercest losses did not occur within the encirclement itself, but during the desperate flight through its narrow exit. These engagements were more than just military defeats; each semi-cauldron emptied directly into negotiation rooms in Minsk where Moscow leveraged battlefield gains for diplomatic concessions. The front’s geometry dictated the pace of diplomacy—the tighter the encirclement, the louder the calls for “peace.”


Aleksandr Lukachenko (Belarus), Vladimir Putin, Angela Merkel, François Hollande and Petro Porochenko in Minsk

The Minsk accords, brokered under German and French mediation, were nothing more than holding patterns from the outset—designed less to settle than to forestall collapse while Ukraine avoided concessions and rebuilt itself as a NATO proxy.

Minsk I, signed in September 2014 after the rout at Ilovaisk, promised ceasefires, prisoner exchanges, and autonomy for the Donbas. Kiev treated it as a breathing spell; hostilities resumed within weeks.

Minsk II was born of Debaltseve’s encirclement in February 2015. Ukrainian forces in the strategic rail hub, under relentless artillery fire, petitioned for withdrawal. As casualty reports mounted, Merkel abandoned her studied detachment, flying to Moscow to plead for a halt. The accord signed days later froze the front just long enough to extract what remained of Ukraine’s garrison. It was less a peace than an act of triage—a political tourniquet disguising a military defeat. Merkel’s dash to the Kremlin revealed the West’s real posture: when Russia advanced decisively, “peace” meant damage control.

Minsk II came with the imprimatur of UN Security Council Resolution 2202, prescribing special status for the Donbas—amnesty, local elections, language rights—before Ukraine regained control of the border. In private, Western leaders knew Kiev would never comply. Their candour surfaced years later: in December 2022, Merkel admitted Minsk had been a device to “give Ukraine time,” while Hollande confirmed it was used “to strengthen its army.” Seven years of Western training, ideological radicalization, and encrypted communications followed. By the eve of the 2022 invasion, Russia’s local advantages had been eroded. The ceasefires had done their work: NATO’s proxy was ready.

As pressure builds in the four cauldrons today, are we on the brink of a Minsk III in Alaska?

Trump Slips a Neocon Cauldron?

If the kotyol is a battlefield trap, its political analogue is no less constricting. The man circling inside it today is not a Ukrainian general but the president of the United States. Six months into his second term, Donald Trump harbours no illusions about Ukraine’s battlefield trajectory. The war’s end is not in doubt: Kiev is losing, and much of the Western hardware that reaches the front is destroyed by Russian strikes or wasted in doomed offensives. For Trump, Ukraine is a distraction from his real priorities. Israel’s air-defense stockpiles are running down; U.S. arsenals must be conserved for the possibility of confrontation with China. The sooner the war ends, the better—and the terms matter little to him.


War party stalwart, Senator Lindsey Graham

Others in Washington see profit in prolongation. Neoconservatives and their Republican auxiliaries, led by Lindsey Graham, are trying to lock Trump into a “political cauldron” of their own design: by forcing him to issue secondary tariffs on buyers of Russian oil. These would spike global energy prices, feed inflation, and erode Trump’s economic standing—costs his intraparty rivals would gladly pay. Trump answers with his familiar mixture of threat and hesitation, announcing sanctions or tariffs but often stopping short, and when he does act, he soon chickens out.

Hemmed in by a ring of Neocon pressure yet holding no real leverage over Russian President Putin, Trump in mid-July donned his familiar tough-man mask. He issued a theatrical “50-day ultimatum” for Russia to end the war—“or else.” The bluff was obvious. Moscow answered with silence. After two weeks of studied indifference by Putin, Trump halved the deadline to ten days, naming August 9th as “T-Day,” when “bone-crunching” sanctions would fall. The calendar advanced, the war ground on, and Russia not only ignored the threats but unveiled its first Oreshnik missile batteries—already rolling off the production line.

Trump’s attempts to pressure India and Brazil—two of the most pro-Western members of BRICS—ended in open defiance. Tariffs on Indian imports were justified as punishment for its purchase of Russian crude, often refined and resold to Europe. In reality, the measures were riddled with carve-outs, including one allowing Indian sales of Russian oil to the United States itself. Only India’s gem industry really felt the pinch.

Washington tried to turn the dispute into leverage over India’s agricultural market, demanding lower tariffs and entry for U.S. food exports. For India’s hundreds of millions of small farmers, such competition would be ruinous—echoing the collapse of Mexican agriculture under NAFTA, when peasants displaced by cheap Big Ag products, crossed into the United States in the millions. For Trump’s Big Tech backers, the result would be a boon: a new desperately poor migrant labour pool ready to be shipped to America’s gates.

Narendra Modi responded with calculated provocation. He invited Vladimir Putin to New Delhi, confirmed his attendance at a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in China—his first visit there in seven years—and publicly denounced the tariffs. In geopolitics, the aim is to split adversaries; Trump has managed the reverse. “Divide and rule” has become “unite and lose.”

The trade war has now bled into the strategic sphere. China has begun restricting exports of rare earth elements, the essential inputs of advanced weapons systems. A century ago, communists promised to sell capitalists the rope with which to hang themselves; today, communist China will not sell them the very metals that could be forged into weapons against it.

Nor is this Trump’s first recoil. Several times he has sought to cut Ukraine off entirely, only to back down under combined pressure from Europe and Washington’s hawks. Each time, the Neocon cauldron has tightened another notch.

Diplomatic Thunder on the Tundra
But in the blink of an eye, Trump flipped from hunted to hunter. First, he feigned victory, claiming the Kremlin had “begged” for talks to stem the tide of his tariff threats. In reality, it was his personal fixer, real estate magnate Steve Witkoff, who flew to Moscow to beg for a summit—and the Kremlin eventually granted it. On August 15th, in Anchorage, Trump will sit down with Putin.


Thunder storm over the Alaskan tundra.

Suddenly, Ukraine, Europe, and American hawks shifted from anticipating bone-crushing sanctions across the globe to fearing Trump will force Ukraine to surrender land and withdraw from key eastern oblasts. With one deft move, Trump slipped free from the Neocon cauldron, pivoting from besieged to initiator—for the time being.

Vice President Vance has already signalled to European leaders that they will be expected to endorse any deal that comes out of Alaska. Europe is attempting to draw the line at allowing Russia to maintain de facto control over the Ukrainian land they actually occupy. But with Ukrainian resistance collapsing, why would Russia stop today? Moscow are already calculating the potential land they will amass in say the next six months.

For Europe and the hawks, as in 2014 and 2015, today’s imperative for a ceasefire in Ukraine is less about securing peace than avoiding humiliation. The danger is that a Ukrainian withdrawal decided at the negotiating table will signify a military defeat too loudly for their Mighty Wurlitzers of propaganda to drown it out. A frozen front offers a narrative shield: not a loss, but a pause; not failure, but a “platform for further negotiations.”

In the end Europe will swallow whatever they are told to, for fear that their tariffs will be spiked. They all know that Trump’s tariff bluster targets America’s own allies more than its adversaries. Without firm American and European backing, Ukraine’s military effort risks slipping into palliative care, with a “Do Not Resuscitate” order ominously pinned to its bedside. But considering the the peace process on the Iranian nuclear issue was used to cover a surprise attack on Tehran, can the Russians really trust Trump?

Terms of Encirclement
NATO’s ideal Ukrainian intermission would lock the front along the current line of contact, leaving roughly 80% of Ukraine under Kiev’s control and Russia with the 20% it now holds. While in public the West may complain, in private this would be a stunning victory—Ukraine, bloodied but sovereign over most of its territory, with NATO arms and advisers flowing in to rebuild and rearm. NATO missile installations could be built in Kharkov, less than 700 kilometres from Moscow. Crimea and the Black Sea coast could wait for retrieval in the 2030s or 2040s, once time, training, and matériel had shifted the balance.

The Kremlin’s preferred ending is different in kind. What it seeks is not the cartographic freezing of a divided Ukraine but the submission of the whole—withdrawal from the four oblasts it claims, and binding assurances of perpetual NATO abstention. The model is not South Korea’s militarised stalemate, but Belarus’s docile alignment: a Ukraine with the form of sovereignty but none of its strategic substance.

For Zelensky, the constitutional bar on territorial concessions is a useful wartime flourish. But constitutions make poor shields against military realities imposed by force and ratified by exhaustion. If, after the Alaska summit, Trump instructs him to withdraw from specified regions, his generals do have the legal power to obey; the evacuation will hand Moscow de facto control, leaving the formalities—the de jure recognition of sovereignty—to be dressed up later in referenda.

Russian guns will fall silent once such withdrawals are announced, it would not make great optics for Russia to fire on retreating troops, despite the West not seeming to have a problem with starving civilians getting shot up in Gaza. But Putin would need to pre-empt an 80–20 NATO “victory” by warning that any post-ceasefire influx of Western arms or “volunteer” contingents—especially to Odessa—remains a legitimate target. Negotiations would then follow Ukraine’s pullback, by which point Kiev’s bargaining power will have ebbed still further, their political cohesion will be tested by the risk of nationalist militias rejecting retreat from “sacred” Ukrainian soil.


Russian demands have been clear for some time

Russia’s maximal aims remain fixed: Ukrainian withdrawal from Kherson and Zaporizhzhia; codified neutrality; demilitarisation; and the pliable yet potent label of “denazification.” With Ukraine’s forces stranded behind shattered Donbass lines, Moscow holds the upper hand. In Brussels and London, outrage is strangely muted—as if Europe’s polished diplomats have already penned Zelensky’s fate in a ledger of sacrifice. Their temperance is a cold Judas kiss upon Kiev’s brow, while Trump compulsively scrubs at the blood of Ukraine from his hands—an echo of Lady Macbeth’s tortured guilt—treating the war as a stain he desperately wishes to erase, yet cannot escape.

American hawks, steeped in a reflexive animus toward all things Russian, will not slip quietly into irrelevance. In Washington, Neoconservatives may gamble on sabotage at home—engineering scandal, launching kompromat offensives, even dredging up lurid, Epstein-adjacent rumours—to weaken Trump’s hand before any deal can be struck.

If the summit fails and Putin holds fast—no NATO personnel in Ukraine, no foreign arms—the worst-case scenario for Russia would be roughly six months of continued Russian advance against an already demoralised Ukraine, before a total collapse. But if he hesitates and agrees to a premature ceasefire—and releases Ukrainians trapped in the Donbass cauldrons—NATO could seize the opening, lock in its share of the country, and call it “strategic containment” of Russia. In this duel of closures and encirclements, the margin for error is slender, and the price of miscalculation—total.

If Putin falls for a “Minsk III” trap, his continued rule in Russia will be in peril. Three “Minsks” and you are out.

Putin’s Alaska Summit: Shattering the Moral Chiaroscuro

The West’s information war thrives on moral chiaroscuro—a Renaissance conceit where light and dark clash in stark, unblended contrasts. In this propaganda palette, Zelensky is rendered in saintly whites, Putin in demonic blacks, a cartoonish duality that tidies away the messy greys of geopolitics.


Will Putin and Trump pull off the magic trick of sawing Ukraine in half in Alaska?

Why would Putin risk a Minsk III deal with an America that is notoriously agreement incapable? By stepping onto American soil for the Alaska summit, Putin gains something subtler: the chance to swap this crude binary for moral pointillism, in which scattered dots of ambiguity erode the West’s rigid moral canvas. A handshake with Trump, the grey neutrality of the Alaskan backdrop, the optics of negotiation rather than isolation—each becomes a pixel in a more complicated portrait, one that blurs the edges of villainy and nudges the silhouette toward something recognisably human.

In Latin America there’s a word—malinchismo—for the fascination with the outsider, the reflexive privileging of the foreigner’s esteem. Some in Russia accuse Putin of a similar weakness, an overinvestment in how he is received in Western capitals. They see this as the flaw that led to the first two Minsk accords, where a lightweight like François Hollande walked away with the better hand.

The alternative reading is colder: in 2014, Putin simply lacked the economic insulation he now enjoys. Russia was then far more vulnerable to sanctions; today, with parallel trade routes and energy leverage in place, he can afford the luxury of a drawn-out game.

In either case, the Alaska summit offers rewards beyond the battlefield. It’s a chance to signal—to domestic elites and to a watching world—that Putin is not a pariah but a peer. It allows him to test Trump’s resolve in person and to deepen the fracture lines within the West. And, like a general loosening the lid on a kotyol just enough to let the pressure vent in the direction he chooses, Putin may see Alaska as a venue where US-Russian diplomatic steam can be released on his terms.

https://www.beyondwasteland.net/p/arctic-encirclement

*****

(Just for fun...)))



http://smoothiex12.blogspot.com/2025/08 ... ssage.html

*****

Putin-Trump Summit: Press and Collective West Political Hysteria Escalates as Russia Makes Large, Significant Advance Near Pokrovsk
Posted on August 13, 2025 by Yves Smith

It’s been painful to observe the wretched state of reporting in the runup to the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska this Friday. Admittedly, the Trump side gaslighted the press with talk of territory swaps, an idea which if it was voiced in the Putin-Witokff talk in Russia, was a US scheme. The Associated Press, early on, was one of the very few mainstream media venues to put paid to this blather. On August 10, from Russia and Ukraine hold fast to their demands ahead of a planned Putin-Trump summit.

The Associated Press pointed out that Russia offered two peace proposals to Ukraine in June, both of which had Russia controlling the four oblasts that it now recognizes as Russia, even though it has yet to secure all of that territory. It indicated that there was no signal that Russia intended to relent on these demands. Separately, many commentators have pointed out that since the expansion of Russia has been enshrined in the Russian constitution, Putin can’t trade that away even if he wanted to. Let us not forget that Putin and Russians generally are almost fetishistic about legal forms.

And if you still harbored doubts, from that article:

Asked Thursday whether Moscow has signaled any willingness to compromise to make a meeting with Trump possible, Putin’s foreign affairs adviser Yuri Ushakov responded that there haven’t been any shifts in the Russian position.

Nevertheless, this notion had become so widely accepted that Lavrov had to rouse himself to address it. Predictably, the interview starts out with a “When did you stop beating your wife?” line of questioning:



Even so, the mere prospect of Trump and Putin making nice to each other resulted in Zelensky rallying the Russia-hating leaders of Europe, which was not hard to do. Note that the summit may have the effect of extending Zelensky’s sell-by date; the press had abandoned its hagiography and quite a few outlets were calling out Zelensky’s plunging popularity and even his likely corruption.

Even if Trump had harbored the fantasy of a mano-a-mano with Putin that might allow him to claim some sort of progress in extricating the US from its Ukraine quagmire, Trump went into full TACO mode. From the Washington Post in White House sharply lowers expectations for Trump-Putin summit:

President Donald Trump expects his encounter with Russian President Vladimir Putin this week to be a “listening exercise,” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said Tuesday, sharply downplaying the possibility that a deal to end the war in Ukraine could be imminent despite a warning from the president last week that Kyiv needed to “get ready to sign something.”

“Listening exercise”? As if Putin has not been exhaustively explicit in his many long speeches and press conferences?

And the Trump team seems to have missed that “listening” meetings have negative connotations, witness Hillary Clinton’s 2015 branded and Kamala Harris’ de facto listening tours.

Note that the US is continuing to claim that Putin asked for this session, an idea that Alexander Mercouris and others have debunked.1

Mind you, it’s not as if Trump and Putin are short of topics to discuss, from nuclear arms control to Iran to the spectacle of Russia allowing Western businesses back in. However, the last idea to be more of a tease than serious. Russian businesses have done so well by weaning themselves from dependence on the West that it’s not as if there’s a clamor either from citizens or a big weight of commercial interests to get them back in. FroFrom BNE in March:

Russian President Vladimir Putin told the country’s leading oligarchs that Western companies that “slammed the door” on Russia when they left the country after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine will not be allowed to repurchase their assets cheaply or regain their former market positions.

Speaking at the annual Congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) in Moscow, he said that businesses would not be allowed to exercise option agreements with their partners to buy back companies. These agreements were widely signed as part of a raft of takeovers and MBOs.

“If the niche of a Western company is already filled by a Russian business, then … as we say, that train has left,” Putin said.

Of course, the elephant in the room in terms of not expecting much is the US lack of agreement-capableness. Russians had been grumbling about that for some time as a result of NATO expansion, but that predilection became undeniable due to Poroshenko’s and Merkel’s Holland’s smugness, even glee, over having snookered Putin with the Minsk Accords. Putin has engaged in public self-recrimination. He and Lavrov have also taken to making longer and longer speeches of the history of what a bunch of scheming deceivers Western leaders and negotiators have been.

The US under Trump has reached a new level of fecklessness. Trump changes tariff levels and range of application seemingly at the drop of a hat. He’s refused to commit his trade deals to writing. If the Russian want a faux-friendly cover for continuing to prosecute the war, all they need to do is demand a written instrument.2 Russia could be in Paris before one got done.

Remember that the US and Russia are already in negotiations, and the US has failed to deliver on basic, and not large, Russian requests, like returning Russian diplomatic property that the US seized and restoring flights to Russia.3

Of course, the Europeans have built up Putin into being a KGB mastermind who has Trump in his thrall and could thus extract concessions, even though, as we made clear, the US even before Trump didn’t believe in delivering on commitments. Trump’s increasingly addled state does give cause for pause. USA Today pointed out that Trump said, not once but twice, that he was meeting Putin in Russia:

During President Donald Trump’s announcement that he’s sending the National Guard to Washington, DC, to fight a crime wave that isn’t real, it became clear he has caught Sleepy Joe Biden’s much-ballyhooed cognitive decline…

But whatever the cause, hearing the president ramble incoherently during a nationally televised news conference on Monday, Aug. 11, left no doubt: The man’s brain has turned to oatmeal.

For starters, on two occasions Trump told reporters he will be meeting in days with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Russia. The meeting will be held in Alaska, which, unless Trump has given away one of America’s states to Putin, is very much not in Russia.

The Guardian gives a more traditional version of “ZOMG Trump talking to Putin” pearl-clutching, with the added bennie of reinforcing the falsehood of Russia having interfered in the 2016 election:

The lessons of Helsinki are clear: putting Donald Trump alone in a room with Vladimir Putin is an unpredictable – and often dangerous – affair.

It was 2018 when the two leaders met at the invitation of Sauli Niinistö, the Finnish president, to discuss a collapse in US-Russia relations, accusations of elections interference, and the grinding war in east Ukraine, among other topics.

By the time he came out of the room, Trump looked dazzled by the Kremlin leader. Asked at a press conference about the conclusions of the US intelligence community that Russia had interfered in the elections, Trump said: “President Putin says it’s not Russia. I don’t see any reason why it would be.”….

European leaders are fearful that Trump could once again emerge from a closed-door meeting preaching the Kremlin gospel.

In the meantime, there are rumors that Ukraine is scheming to sabotage the summit with a false flag attack:


A group of foreign journalists were transported into the city of Chuguev by Zelensky’s secret police – the SBU – yesterday

On the pretext of ‘preparing a series of reports about the residents of the city in the frontline zone’ pic.twitter.com/BAT3ENm26r

— RT (@RT_com) August 12, 2025


Mind you, even if Ukraine executes a dastardly deed like that (the fact that the Western press would repeat it uncritically is a given), Ukraine over-estimates the impact of its stunts, even the bloody ones. It was not Bucha that scuppered the Istanbul draft peace deal but Boris Johnson flying to Kiev and persuading Zelensky to ditch it, with promises of “as long as it takes” military support. And even though Russia had caught Ukraine by surprise, it was merely planning to get Ukraine to the negotiating table. It took some time for Russia even to straighten out its command structure, decide to commit to a bigger war, increase armament and manpower levels, and systematically seek to learn from its mistakes.

As the Trump theatrics and the Zelensky-EU negotiation sabotage operation dominate media coverage, Russia has made a major breakthrough in the critically important Pokrovsk area. Experts have stressed for the last month, and some much longer, that the loss of Povrosk would be a huge psychological and military blow. Even though there is one more defense line in the Donbass, at Slaviansk and Kramatorsk, it’s regularly been depicted as weaker than the ones Russia has already surmounted. And it’s possible that Russia will just flank it.

This video by Daniel Davis at Deep Dive, with Colonel Douglas Macgregor, starting at 18:30. Note that Davis points out there that his Russian journalist sources say the Russian forces are having to temper their pace of advance to keep from getting ahead of their supply lines. Davis and Macgregor then turn to maps and what this advance means:



<snip> - (MoA previously posted)

Ukrainian sources confirm the breakthrough (machine translation):

Yesterday, Ukrainian military telegram channels, as well as AFU fighters, began to write massively about the Russian breakthrough to the north of the Pokrovskaya agglomeration – in the direction of Dobropillia.As a result of an 11-kilometer (according to Ukrainian data) dash, the Russians came out to the northeast of Dobropillya, cutting the road to Kramatorsk and Konstantinovka.

Judging by the reports of Ukrainian publics, the problem is the lack of personnel and “false reports” to the top about the state of defense near Dobropillya. Russian military telegram channels write that this area was covered by [territorial forces] – since more experienced units are holding the front near Pokrovsk.

At the same time, the battles are already taking place in a fairly deep rear, where there is no organized line of defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It should actually be built “from the wheels”, transferring reserves. There are already predictions in the Ukrainian public that if the situation is not urgently corrected, the Russians will be able to break through the front and enter the operational space. And Ukraine will lose hundreds of square kilometers of territory a day, as it did in the first weeks of the invasion.

And from Simplicius:

Now let’s turn to the Ukrainian side to see what their experts are attributing the collapse to. Taras Chmut, head of the Come Back Alive charity for the AFU, says that Ukrainian forces first began to systemically fail at the platoon level, then the company level…and now he says the mass collapse of the battalion level has arrived.

Simplicius also highlighted this early August tweet, which describes how the new fortified lines that Ukraine was rushing to build will be ineffective:

Although there is great work done detailing Ukrainian fortifications, most of the observed positions are constructed in the open and will never be occupied by units. They are easily targeted and destroyed. Ukraine lacks infantry to man most of them in the first place. 16/

— Michael Kofman (@KofmanMichael) July 31, 2025

It is way over my pay grade to forecast what happens next, even before getting to the fact that the Ukraine conflict is now moving into “overly dynamic situation” terrain. But the accelerating disintegration of Ukraine forces and the loss of Pokrovsk will have a huge impact on the morale of the armed forces and Ukrainians generally, particularly those in positions of power. If Zelensky intends to hang on to a pretense of power, the time for him to set up his government in exile is approaching.

_____

1 Putin’s elaborate pretense that the idea somehow just came up was pinning the tail on the Wiktoff donkey. In addition, the Putin-Witkoff meeting took a full three hours, which suggested a lot of Witkoff arm-twisting and even groveling. The polite-seeming Witkoff was able to bark at Netanyahu in a way that got Netanyahu to reverse himself on refusing to meet Witkoff on Sabbath. I wonder if he has other registers in his repertoire that we have not seen yet, such as Mad Dog Beck-ery (see the bit on the biscuits).

2 One might point out that the US did manage to ink at least one pact, that of its “raw earths” agreement with Ukraine. But this was in Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant’s hands, and he allegedly came to Kiev with a contract he tried to get Zelensky to sign on the spot. There are many law firms that work on cross-border investments, so it should not have been hard for Treasury to get one of them to prepare a document. In addition, as it became clear, Ukraine was seen by the US as a terms-taker, and largely was, although Zelensky did appear to dig in his heels on some key points and got concessions. This is not at all what any process with Russia would look like.

3 This would be a big bennie to US carriers, since they now can’t overfly Russian airspace. That has hurt their business with flights to and from Asia, to the advantage of Middle Eastern and Asian operators. Russia would presumably restore transit rights, not just point-to-point rights. It will be amusing to see EU reactions were that to happen.

https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2025/08 ... vrosk.html

******

On the issue of territorial exchange
August 13, 17:00



Commentary by the Russian Foreign Ministry regarding the rumors that Russia will change its territories.

"The territorial structure of the Russian Federation is enshrined in the Constitution of our country. That says it all."

According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Zaporizhzhya and Kherson regions are also part of the Russian Federation. And according to the Constitution, they cannot be "exchanged" or "traded".

But the pieces of Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov and Sumy regions occupied by the Russian Armed Forces are not part of the Russian Federation according to the Constitution and are de facto options for exchanging territories, since the Constitution says nothing about them and their fate will be determined within the framework of military-political expediency.

P.S. To begin negotiations, the Ukrainian Armed Forces must surrender the remains of Donbass.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/10010671.html

The Zapad-2025 exercises will work on the use of nuclear weapons
August 13, 15:08



The Zapad-2025 exercises will practice planning for the use of nuclear weapons and Oreshnik (c) Belarus Ministry of Defense.

Victory in a nuclear war loves preparation.

P.S. We are waiting for the hysteria of the outlying limitrophes about Belarus's preparation for a nuclear war. Especially since there is a "country" nearby that claims to be a testing ground.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/10010623.html

Putin, send in the troops!
August 13, 12:59



The Julani regime, sitting in Damascus, called on the Russian military to return Russian military patrols to southwest Syria so that they could continue their patrols there as under Assad.

The point of this is that the militants cannot suppress Druze separatism in Suwayda and the occupation of part of southwestern Syria by Israel. The idea is that the Russian Armed Forces or the Russian National Guard will return to old strongholds and old patrol routes and thereby fence off the Julani regime from Israel, so that the regime in Damascus can strengthen its position without worrying about the constant Israeli aggression.

So far, there are no reasons why the Russian Federation should rush to do this. Yes, the militants have abandoned their demands for Assad's extradition and are not interfering with the work of the Khmeimim airbase. But at the same time, they have not yet given clear guarantees of preserving the bases in Latakia (as they had under Assad), and they have taken away the rights to develop the port of Tartus from the Russian Federation. Plus, they are carrying out ethnic cleansing in Suwayda and Latakia. Yes, the Russian Federation has to communicate with them in order to preserve important bases (important primarily for African events). That's why they hold their noses tightly and shake hands (as we know, the principle of "not negotiating with terrorists" is a fiction in real life).

The return of Russian troops to southwest Syria, IMHO, would be possible if the Julani regime officially confirmed Syria's commitments to the Russian military bases in Latakia, which would remove at least one serious problem. However, there is also the factor of Israeli Nazis, who have not at all abandoned the idea of creating a puppet Druze protectorate on their borders or even simply tearing off pieces of southwest Syria. Which the Russian military will only interfere with. Therefore, the approach of the Julani regime is understandable, but it is not necessary that it will lead to something significant.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/10010303.html

They will check everything
August 13, 3:34



The Ministry of Culture will be able to check previously released films and TV series for compliance with the norms on traditional values. This was reported to TASS by the chair of the State Duma Committee on Culture Olga Kazakova.

You can continue to erase alcohol and cigarettes in old films.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/10009564.html

Google Translator

[blindpig]

Sovereignty: The Name of the Geopolitical Match

UN Charter Article 2.1: "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members."
Karl Sanchez
Aug 13, 2025



The key principle voted on and agreed to by all UN members is stated in the subtitle and here again:

The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

This has never actually been the case and was already being violated when the UN Charter came into legal force on 24 October 1945. The main violator was the United States but also most European nations with many tomes documenting the facts. Today, little has changed with the Outlaw US Empire remaining the main violator. As the fourth Putin-Trump Summit approaches, the key point being discussed by BRICS and Union State heads is sovereignty, which was the main focus of the meeting between Putin and Lukashenko at Valaam not quite two weeks ago. Here’s the main discussion of that point, although the preceding context provided by Lukashenko is also important despite its omission:

V. Putin: You know, until recently, political scientists and the so-called political circles in general said that the European Union is an economic giant, but a political dwarf. These are not my words, I do not want to offend anyone–-so we have read this in Western sources ourselves? But, and I have always said this before, in the modern world–-it has always been important, and today especially–-sovereignty plays a key role, one might say, including for economic development.

It was clear that the European Union and Europe did not have much sovereignty. Today, it is evident that they have none at all. This is followed by economic losses in the current critical situation, and the loss of political sovereignty now leads to the loss of economic sovereignty and enormous losses.

Therefore, as I have always said, one of the key tasks, including the tasks of the special military operation, is to strengthen Russia's sovereignty.

Question: The topic of Ukraine is somehow raised in all questions. The recent scandals in Ukraine related to anti-corruption agencies, what do you think they are? How can you comment on what happened?

V. Putin: Alexander Grigorievich, can you comment on this?

A.Lukashenko: You know, I thought, thought, thought. Well, the West is now putting pressure on Zelensky. I'm watching this and thinking: well, what did Zelensky want? He took billions, billions, hundreds of billions of money. The West says: well, we want to see where this money will be spent. And they once proposed the creation of an anti-corruption bureau and an anti-corruption prosecutor's office–-this is exactly about [the issue of] sovereignty.

He took the money–who gave it, says: we want to see how. Agreed–-now woke up. Probably, or elections, or something else they want to organize–-this is on the people. Tried to do, the West quickly organized, said “no”. And after two days–-or there was how many–-he said: no. And after two hours the Rada cancelled everything. He signed the law.

What kind of sovereignty? There is no sovereignty. And there is no need to be indignant: you took the money, and the person who gave it to you wanted to control where you put the money as a non-sovereign state. And you know where you put it: during this time, people on the Côte d'Azur and beyond have built impressive palaces and are doing well, and some of them are even running for president of Ukraine. Therefore, this is a mess, and there is no other way to describe it.

The basis is the loss of sovereignty and independence.

V. Putin: In general, corruption is a negative phenomenon in society that is typical for very many, if not all, countries in the world. There is nothing unusual about this. The question is the degree of corruption and the ability of society, the willingness and ability to fight this phenomenon. And what is the willingness and ability of society to fight corruption? In other words, society itself must be willing and able to fight corruption.

And if society influences such processes, it is part of democracy. But democracy cannot be imposed from the outside, just as it is impossible to fight corruption from the outside. Especially if those who suffer from corruption themselves are doing it. Is there no corruption in Europe or the United States? In fact, it is legalized there, and there is an institution of lobbying. What is this? It means that people go around giving money to government officials at all levels. That is also corruption.

It is clear that Ukraine is a country where corruption is rampant. Is it possible to combat it from the outside? Alexander Grigoryevich said that these various bureaus were created, but they are not subordinate to the local authorities: neither the president, nor the parliament, nor anyone else. This is an external institution.

Listen, I just said, is it possible to bring democracy from outside, including anti-corruption institutions? When were these institutions established in Ukraine? In 2015. And what year is it today? 2025.

A. Lukashenko: We won, in short.

V. Putin: Of course! So what? It has been around for ten years, and everyone around the world is shouting at the top of their lungs: “Help! Corruption is sweeping Ukraine.” Yes, it is. But the effectiveness of the institutions brought in from outside is zero.

Instead of imposing external institutions of governance on the people, in this case the Ukrainian people, we need to help them stand on their own feet and create these institutions themselves.

It is impossible for people to elect a president and a parliament and not influence the processes that take place in society. This is a humiliating state. There is no sovereignty, no sovereignty at all.

Yes, that's right, they tried to change something, to regain at least some of their sovereignty. But when they didn't like it from above, they just whistled, clicked, and everything was returned to its original state. It would have been better if they hadn't done anything. If they had just stayed in one place, everything would have been hidden and smooth. But they only brought shame upon themselves.

But the idea that they need to regain at least some of their sovereignty is certainly correct.

Now we move to the recent conversation between Presidents Xi and Lula as reported by Global Times where the issue again is sovereignty:

China-Brazil ties are at their best in history, with the building of a China-Brazil community with a shared future and the alignment of the two countries' development strategies getting off to a good start and making smooth progress, Xi said.

The Chinese side stands ready to work with Brazil to seize opportunities, strengthen coordination and deliver more mutually beneficial cooperation outcomes, he added.

Xi also said that China backs the Brazilian people in defending their national sovereignty and supports Brazil in safeguarding its legitimate rights and interests, urging all countries to unite in resolutely fighting against unilateralism and protectionism.

Noting that the BRICS mechanism is a key platform for building consensus in the Global South, Xi congratulated Brazil on successfully hosting the recent BRICS Summit.

Xi called on Global South countries to jointly safeguard international fairness and justice, defend the basic norms governing international relations, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.

China and Brazil should continue to address global challenges, ensure the success of the upcoming UN Climate Change Conference in the Brazilian city of Belem, and promote the "Friends of Peace" group's role in facilitating the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, Xi said.

For his part, Lula said Brazil attaches great importance to its relations with China, and looks forward to strengthening cooperation with China, deepening strategic alignment and promoting greater development of bilateral ties.

He briefed Xi on the recent situation of Brazil's ties with the US, as well as Brazil's unwavering principled stance on safeguarding its own sovereignty.

Lula spoke highly of China's efforts to uphold multilateralism and safeguard free trade rules, as well as its responsible role in international affairs.

The Brazilian side, he said, stands ready to enhance communication and coordination with China in multilateral mechanisms such as BRICS, oppose unilateral bullying practices and safeguard the common interests of all countries.

Multilateralism against unilateralism

The US announced a 50 percent tariff on a range of Brazilian exports, including coffee, beef and petrochemicals in July, Xinhua reported.

Last week, Lula vowed to speak with representatives of BRICS countries about US tariffs on their products.

"I will try to discuss with them how each country is affected by the situation and what the implications are, so that we can make a decision," Lula said, noting that BRICS includes several members of the G20, the group that brings together the world's 20 largest economies, according to Agency Brazil.

Lula has also spoken with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi over the past few days, according to media reports.

As both are bellwethers of the Global South, Lula's call signals Brazil's effort in seeking further cooperation with China, particularly in defending national sovereignty, with both countries sharing similar objectives, Lü Xiang, a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times.

In response to the unjust tariffs imposed by the US, Brazil is not only resolutely defending its sovereignty but also actively pursuing policy coordination with China, Lü said, adding that such a collaborative approach of unity and self-reliance has the potential to serve as a model for Global South countries to fight for their national interests.

Last week, China's top diplomat Wang Yi also had a phone call with Celso Amorim, chief advisor to the president of Brazil.

He stressed that China firmly supports Brazil in defending its right to development and opposing the bullying practices of arbitrary tariffs. As the largest developing countries in the eastern and western hemispheres respectively, China and Brazil have always supported each other, closely coordinated, and firmly safeguarded the legitimate interests of their own as well as the common interests of the Global South countries, according to Xinhua.

The header image is from a week-old paper by Dr Amiya Chandra, “Tariffs, Trade and Trump: The Empire’s Mirage That Punishes Sovereignty,” that puts forth the view from India. Here are several excerpts:

India’s decisions to continue energy trade with Russia, develop independent semiconductor capacity, resist digital colonisation, and maintain neutrality on conflicts such as Ukraine and Gaza are no longer viewed as legitimate sovereign choices. They are being interpreted as non-compliance….

Today, India stands at a critical juncture. It’s economic and strategic profile is rising. Its voice is stronger. But its refusal to fully submit has triggered friction with a system that tolerates autonomy only when it serves its interests. The answers for India are not be simple or easy. But they are urgent. The era of pretending that neutrality comes without consequence is ending. Inaction is no longer neutral. And the price of inaction will not be paid by governments alone. It will be paid by the very sovereignty that India has spent seventy-five years trying to preserve….

India must not measure success by deal count, but by whether agreements preserve strategic space and sovereignty.

6.0 Conclusion: From Pressure to Principle — The Doctrine of Economic Sovereignty
India has long walked a tightrope, balancing its ties with the United States, Russia, China, and others without leaning too far in any one direction. But that rope is now shortening. What was once a space for careful neutrality is turning into a corridor of demands.

Western powers now expect alignment rather than equal partnership. Green mandates, tariffs, and diplomatic pressure are all part of a larger effort to throw India off balance and reorient its course.

India has to make a decision now. Maintaining strategic autonomy allows for greater scrutiny while maintaining flexibility. Security and economic benefits are promised by aligning with the US, but sovereignty is at risk. Leading a new Global South bloc offers vision but requires scale and long-term investment. The margin for ambiguity is narrowing.

What is needed is not reaction, but doctrine. India must adopt a clear and sovereign economic philosophy—rooted in system, not sentiment. This means articulating a Doctrine of Economic Sovereignty that can guide trade, diplomacy, investment, and regulation with consistency and clarity.

One Principle: India will not enter any agreement that compromises its sovereign control over data, infrastructure, standards, or development pathways.

One Policy Direction: Build a permanent Trade Sovereignty Stack: an independent, multidisciplinary institution to lead AI-powered negotiations, dynamic trade treaties, and digitally sovereign South-South trade corridors.

One Diplomatic Goal: Launch a Global South Compact: an alliance of nations committed to trade justice, resource equity, de-dollarised finance, and digital pluralism.

One Red Line: Any nation or institution that punishes India for its independence must face proportionate economic retaliation.

This is not withdrawal from the world. It is a demand for equity in it. India seeks not permission to rise but recognition of its arrival. It does not ask for compliance from others and will no longer accept it as a condition for cooperation.

The age of managed obedience is over. India’s choices now will define whether the coming era begins in silence or with sovereign assertion.

India has not just emerged. It has arrived.

Will Modi be as bold as the author? Clearly the conversations happening between the top BRICS and SCO nations all center on the subject of sovereignty—will nations stand up for themselves and demand that the equality promised by the UN Charter finally become a reality with the end of Western Hegemony? Ultimately, this question is the main issue at stake with the Trump-Putin Summit, although it won’t be framed in the above manner.

Today featured two doses of Pepe Escobar: First with Nima then with Judge Nap. The first is almost three times as long as the second; and while there's some duplication, both ought to be watched. Pepe has one article out, "Pepe Escobar: The Bear and the Eagle Face-Off in Alaska" and another “Bear, Dragon, Elephant, Toucan, Nightingale stare down Goldfinger,” all of which I suggest reading/viewing, particularly the end of his chat with Judge Nap where the issue of sovereignty is finally raised. The older and newer forms of multilateral associations like ASEAN, BRICS, SCO, EAEU, that have come into existence all work based upon the UN principle of sovereign equality and make decisions via consensus, not diktat or majority rule. It’s often difficult to comprehend foreign policy decisions by those nations because their doctrine is to not interfere but to provide aid when asked—completely opposite of the Western method of do what we say. The Indian paper spells that out very well. Howard Zinn had a rather unique saying: You can’t be neutral on a moving train. Ninety years ago, Charles Beard and George HE Smith wrote two very important volumes examining how national interests guide foreign policy, or ought to: The Idea of National Interest : An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy and The Open Door at Home : A Trial Philosophy of National Interest. Despite their continued relevance, they are not even on the reading lists for majors in International Relations; however, the concepts covered can be applied by any nation. We hear Putin, Lavrov and even Rubio say relations between nations ought to be governed by their national interests, which means knowing other nations interests, not continually attempting to get one’s own way as the West has done for centuries. For Humanity to progress, equality must become the norm, not the exception. Yes, national attributes and interests will be different until the planet and Humanity reach a point where steady-state political economic systems will need to become the norm at some undetermined future point.

As suggested in the conversations between Xi, Lula, Putin, Modi, and others, nations must stand up for their rights and demand respect from those few nations that deem themsleves exceptional and superior. Cuba perhaps stands out as the primary example of a nation that has refused to submit. And that’s the primary reason why Cuba continues to be targeted all these years after gaining its independence from the gangster empire of the 1950s and the preceding decades. And the reason why the Outlaw US Empire sees the BRICS as an opponent is because they’re collectively standing up for themselves and acting as models for all nations, even the Empire’s European colonies.

https://karlof1.substack.com/p/sovereig ... opolitical

********

LOL))

Sure, sure. (Video at link.)

In Russia it is called trying to intimidate the hedgehog with bare ass. Per this "trap" BS. In order to "trap" someone--one MUST have COFM in one's favor. I want to remind you, again, Larry's description, which many continue to ignore:

Good-bye romance. One important point that I neglected to address in my previous posts on this issue is the fact that Putin and Trump have met at least three times previously, and those meetings were friendly and relaxed. I’ve spoken to a couple of people who have had private meetings with Trump and, according to them, Trump is a completely different person in a private setting. He is terribly insecure and he wants desperately to be liked. Accordingly, he does not engage in the bullying and insults that are part of his public persona. This may be one reason that Vladimir Putin wants to talk to Donald Trump face-to-face.

Today's statement by Russian Foreign Ministry indicates clearly that Russia doesn't give a fuck, which she shouldn't. So, in this case statements from the American side are just hot air and a political theater which is strictly for internal consumption in desperate attempts to save Trump's presidency.

Now, retards, one from the vocational school granting useless degrees, and another from Center for Naval Analysis (of urine and stool) comment:

WASHINGTON, Aug 13 (Reuters) - Russia appears to be preparing to test its new nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered cruise missile, according to two U.S. researchers and a Western security source, even as Russian President Vladimir Putin readies for talks on Ukraine with U.S. President Donald Trump on Friday. Jeffrey Lewis of the California-based Middlebury Institute of International Studies, and Decker Eveleth of the CNA research and analysis organization, based in Virginia, reached their assessments separately by studying imagery taken in recent weeks until Tuesday by Planet Labs, a commercial satellite firm.

Yeah, it is not new, it is in serial production and tests are conducted regularly for any weapons systems to confirm characteristics. (Video at link.)

Sure, "Putin" may launch Burevestnik (Petrel) just as a reminder to Trump how far the US lags behind Russia in terms of delivery systems, but no--there are other things already in works which changed the balance from merely "hugely in favor of Russia" to "this is not even fair". And what is coming we may only guess, but it is a well established fact that the second generation of hypersonic weapons is ready. But you know, for this scum called "journos"--their jobs depend on "stories", so--whatever fits the so called news.

http://smoothiex12.blogspot.com/2025/08/lol.html

******

The FSB Thwarted One Of Ukraine’s Most Dangerous Escalation Plots Against Russia
Andrew Korybko
Aug 14, 2025



They might have saved the peace process and therefore literally changed the world.

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) announced on Thursday that it thwarted Ukraine’s long-range Sapsan ballistic missile program by passing along the coordinates of its production facilities and their air defense systems to the armed forces who then carried out successful precision strikes against them. A paper prepared by a Ukrainian government research center late last year revealed that Kiev was six months away from building such weapons according to a report from The Times back then.

This analysis here assessed that the program’s completion “would likely lead to Russia having to compromise on its goal of demilitarizing Ukraine, which was one of the main reasons behind the special operation, thus possibly leading to more compromises on other goals too.” Putting an end to it therefore naturally became one of Russia’s top priorities. This was later achieved as proven by the satellite imagery shared by RT in their report about this operation.

They also mentioned how an FSB source told TASS that “Germany’s financial support and the assistance of foreign specialists” played an important role in this program. RT then reminded their readers that “In May, Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced that Germany would fund Ukraine’s domestic production of long-range missiles…The German Defense Ministry also stated at the time that investing in Ukraine’s production would enable Kiev to have a ‘substantial’ number of long-range weapons this year.”

These details shed more light on the motivations behind this plot. Some of the Europeans like Germany fear escalating tensions with Russia by providing Ukraine with their own missiles while others like France and the UK that already sent them don’t want to further deplete their stockpiles. The decision was thus made to help Ukraine produce its own missiles. This would enable the Europeans to manage escalations with Russia, or so they assumed, at the same time as empowering Ukraine to escalate in their stead.

Giving Ukraine these capabilities, which would have still relied on Western satellites for hitting targets deep inside of Russia like Putin assessed last September, was also meant to help Zelensky advance their joint goal of derailing Russian-US talks. By Ukraine escalating through long-range missile strikes against civilian targets in Moscow, for example, Russia might have felt compelled to retaliate in ways that could have then been exploited to pressure Trump into escalating as well and thus sabotage the peace process.

Neither the Europeans (with the exception of Hungary and Slovakia) nor the Ukrainians want the proxy war on Russia to end, let alone via any concessions to Russia, ergo why the German-led EU (and perhaps the UK along with anti-Russian US “deep state” elements) sought to help Ukraine develop these missiles. This plot was being pursued in parallel with warmongers like Lindsey Graham manipulating Trump into mission creep in order to serve as a back-up plan in case he ultimately defied them and “went rogue”.

That’s precisely what he appears to have done with regard to his plans to host Putin on Friday, but with Ukraine’s missile program in shambles due to the FSB’s operation, the only escalation that Zelensky might now resort to is a false-flag attack. Even if he goes through with the plot that the Russian Ministry of Defense warned about, it might not suffice for derailing their talks like the missile scenario could have, so the FSB might have thus saved the peace process and therefore literally changed the world.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/the-fsb- ... f-ukraines

Saved the what? I sincerely doubt that this photo-op to placate Trump will have any meaningful effect. And when frustrated in his Nobel aspirations I'd expect him to scotch any vital bi-lateral considerations. Because it's all about him.

********

Bear, Dragon, Elephant, Toucan, Nightingale stare down Goldfinger

Pepe Escobar

August 13, 2025

Of course it’s all about Alaska. Here’s what’s in play. But it’s the shadowplay that’s even more exciting.

Across the world, for those who grew up in the Cold War Swingin’ Sixties, the temptation is irresistible to cast Donald Trump as Goldfinger (but who would play Oddjob? Hegseth?)

Goldfinger, after all, is a powerful, ruthless gambler. His 21st century motto would be “Obliterate & Plunder”. In fact, sequentially, an orgy of obliteratin’ and plunderin’ if the occasions present themselves. Everything subjected to the search for the Golden Deal. My way. The only way.

Yet now it’s possible that Goldfinger may have met its appropriate – collective – match.

This is what happened the last time a summit took place in Alaska, in this particular case US-China in a shabby hotel in Anchorage. That shook the geopolitical chessboard to the core. Trump-Putin might – but only under quite specific conditions.

There’s only one realistic, optimal endgame for Alaska: a joint declaration of intent, pointing to a follow-up, as in the next meeting to be held in Russian territory. A sort of starter for the long and winding road towards a real reset of US-Russia relations, including a possible settlement in the proxy war in Ukraine.

Essentially, they may agree to keep talking. Yet what really matters is what may be implied by the promise: Goldfinger refrains from imposing secondary sanctions on Russia’s partners.

That will constitute a tremendous BRICS victory (Iran excluded. Actually, two strategic allies of Russia would be excluded: Iran and the DPRK).

BRICS are actively building a coalition to stare down Goldfinger. The key players are Bear, Dragon, Toucan and Elephant – all four original founders of BRIC. Nightingale should be added later, as it is linked via geopolitical/geoeconomic strategic partnerships with Bear, Dragon and Elephant.

When it comes to the Alaska nitty gritty, the top Bear needs to consider all the ramifications of what is an imperative for the Russian General Staff and the vast intel apparatus in Moscow: unless Goldfinger minions stop weaponizing and providing precious intel to Ukraine is all its forms, the mythic “ceasefire” that Goldfinger and the pack of toothless chihuahuas in Europe desperately want will be just an intermission to allow Ukraine to rearm to the hilt.

That’s a tough call for the top Bear: he has to placate his domestic, radical critics who blast him for sitting down with the enemy, and at the same time he must deliver the goods to his under-siege BRICS allies.

BRICS counteract Goldfinger’s Plunder tactics

Bear, Dragon, Toucan and Elephant are involved in breathless telephone diplomacy to articulate their collective response to Goldfinger’s Tariff/Plunder drive.

Examples. Modi on Brazil: “A strong, people-centric partnership between Global South nations benefits everyone.”

Lula on India: “Brazil and India are, so far, the two most affected countries. We reaffirmed the importance of defending multilateralism and the need to address the challenges of the current situation.”

Xi to Lula: China backs Brazil to defend its national sovereignty; BRICS is “a key platform for building consensus in the Global South.”

Goldfinger’s Tariff Plunder works in several ways.

On India: because New Delhi refuses to open its vast agricultural market to tariff-free Made in USA imports (45% of India’s population directly depends on agriculture); and because India buys Russian oil at much-needed discount prices.

On Brazil: because the ultimate target is regime change and free reign to plunder Brazil’s natural wealth.

So far, Goldfinger’s Plunder antics have been stellar when it comes to engineering their own blowback: from allienating even allies – see abject European submission – to de facto burying multilateral trade, not to mention international law.

Example: just a few hours before the tariff “pause” on Made in China products was about to expire, Goldfinger signed an executive order extending the deadline for another 90 days. Translation: TACO, all over again. If the tariff “pause” went through, the economy of the $37 trillion-indebted “indispensable nation” would be in even more dire straits.

Then there’s Goldfinger’s possible Arctic gameplay, already examined here. There’s virtually no evidence Russia would allow the US to participate in the development of the Arctic-wide Northern Sea Route (NSR), or Arctic Silk Road in Chinese terminology.

The role of Russia’s Atomflot – 11 nuclear icebreakers, 9 of them in action, 2 being built, including Project 10510 Rossiya, a behemoth capable of navigating anywhere in the Arctic anytime – in parallel with Russia’s astonishing arsenal of new weapons systems, these are absolutely key variables on any serious discussion on any possible US-Russia partnership post-Alaska.

Goldfinger’s obsession to cage Nightingale

Now let’s look at Nightingale – an immensely complex case. Goldfinger has totally embarked on a multi-track maximum pressure/tension remix against Iran: forcing Hezbollah to disarm; forcing the collapse of Lebanon into factional war; legitimizing the “al-Qaeda R Us” dismemberment of Syria; forcing snapback UN-backed sanctions on Tehran.

Then came the Goldfinger-hailed “historic peace summit” with Azerbaijan’s Aliyev and Armenia’s Pashinyan.

Well, what Baku and Yerevan really signed under Goldfinger’s watchful eye is not a peace deal: it’s a mere memorandum of understanding (MOU).

Their Joint Declaration is extremely vague – and non-binding. What is promised is a “let’s keep talking” set up: “We acknowledged the need to continue further actions to achieve the signing and ultimate ratification of the [Peace] Agreement.”

It remains to be seen what happens with the much-ballyhooed 99-year American grip on the Zangezur corridor – trimphally named Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) – complete with grabbing 40% of its revenues (Armenia would get only 30%) and placing 1,000 American mercenaries to patrol Armenian territory, right south of Nightingale’s borders.

The big story is of course Goldfinger eager to snatch at least one connectivity corridor in southern Eurasia – in the strategic south Caucasus, using a gangster-minded MI6 asset (Aliyev) and a national traitor (meek Pashinyan), which will be discarded and/or sweetened in due time. Crucially, NATO membership was offered to both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The Deep State’s game plan is total control: what really matters is the opening to establish a NATO corridor all the way to the Caspian.

There’s no way Nightingale will let that happen, not to mention Bear and Dragon: it would mean a direct NATO threat not only to the International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC), which unites three BRICS (Russia, Iran, India) and crosses the Caspian, but also the Chinese Silk Roads, whose corridors traverse Iran with possible branch outs to the Caucasus.

Nightingale has already made it quite clear it will not allow any kind of change of status for the Zangezur corridor. And it has the necessary missile arsenal to back it up. IRGC Deputy Commander Yadollah Javani: Iran “will not allow an American corridor on its border.”

Wherever it comes from, Goldinger or the Deep State, the pressure by the Empire of Chaos is relentless. There will be no respite in the Hybrid – and otherwise – Wars on BRICS, especially on the new Primakov triangle (“RIC” as in Russia, Iran, China).

Alaska in principle should be about a reset of all US-Russia security matters – geopolitical, commercial, military, with Ukraine being just a subset. That will be a major stretch. It’s hard to imagine Putin being able to impress on Trump, on the same table, the finer points of NATO/US ceaseless plots to undermine, harass and destabilize Russia.

The most probable outcome is that the proxy war – and the SMO – will keep rollin’ on, but with the Deep State making extra bundles of euros by selling tons of weapons for NATO to dispatch to Kiev. But even without the promise of a new, serious, US-Russia security architecture, BRICS may still stand a chance to snatch a victory out of Goldfinger’s latest photo op.

https://strategic-culture.su/news/2025/ ... oldfinger/

[blindpig]

RAY McGOVERN: Applying the Lost Art of Kremlinology
August 14, 2025

ALASKA SUMMIT: If Moscow wants to avoid its own Vietnam in Ukraine, Putin may accept a “negotiated solution” that applies copious lipstick to the pig of actual defeat for the U.S., NATO and Ukraine.


Russian President Vladimir Putin with U.S. presidential envoy Steve Witkoff at the Kremlin on Aug. 6. Putin’s key aide Yuri Ushakov, in background. (Kremlin.ru/ Wikimedia Commons/CC BY 4.0)

By Ray McGovern
Special to Consortium News

How are the Russians approaching Friday’s summit with President Donald Trump? The short answer? With confidence, curiosity, some nervousness and a modicum of hope – despite the mercurial behavior of President Donald Trump.

This can be gleaned from applying the methodology of Kremlinology/media analysis – a discipline that seems to be an endangered species.

Trump had foolishly set a deadline of Aug. 8 for Russia to end the war in Ukraine, or else! It was a hollow threat, brandishing “bone-crushing” sanctions that were doomed to failure and embarrassment.

Two days before the latest deadline, Steve Witkoff, Trump’s envoy, arrived in Moscow to ask Russian President Vladimir Putin to help bail Trump out. Voila: There is to be an early summit — forget the sanctions!

It took Witkoff three hours to get Putin to agree to the summit. No doubt Witkoff had sweeteners for Putin; we may know more about that tomorrow.

But Trump’s climbdown on the misbegotten sanctions, and breakthrough of Ukrainian fortifications in Donetsk, may have been enough to prompt Putin to agree to meet – and size up – second-term Trump in person.

Would Trump, at long last, be able to understand and take into account the realities on the ground in Ukraine?


Trump at the White House last week. (White House /Joyce N. Boghosian)

Ukraine Must Take Back Seat to Rapprochement

The all-important backdrop, lost on many observers, is that Moscow’s fundamental, overriding aim is to improve relations with the U.S. I do not expect readers to take my word for it, but this might help. Here’s what Yuriy Ushakov, Putin’s right-hand man on Ukraine, gave pride of place to at the start of the readout from the Putin-Witkoff meeting:

“This meeting took place in a business-like atmosphere and was quite constructive. … The discussion focused on … resolving the Ukraine crisis. Once again, it was noted that Russia-US relations can be placed on a totally different, mutually beneficial footing, which would be in stark contrast with the way these relations have evolved in recent years.

Why should that surprise? Putin sees a possibly educable president who says he wants to deal; who keeps saying “this is Biden’s war;” who wants to claim credit for ending the killing; and, not least, is smart enough to realize he has been given a very poor hand to play.

Vladimir Putin

On March 27, while visiting a submarine in Murmansk, Putin was asked by a petty officer about talks between Russia and the U.S. Putin’s reply is typical of the attitude he has expressed on several occasions this year:

“The president of the United States sincerely wants to end this conflict for a number of reasons – I won’t even

• now, there are many. But, in my opinion, this is a sincere desire. … We are in favor of solving these issues by peaceful means, but also in the elimination of the root causes that led to today’s situation. We need to ensure security for Russia for a long historical perspective. Any step directed to solve this problem we will welcome, and we will work with any partner who aspires to do so.”
  
  Foreign Minister Lavrov
  
  
  Putin awarding Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov with the Order of St. Andrew in May. (Kremlin.ru/Wikimedia Commons/CC BY 4.0)
  
  Sergey Lavrov has said some more tantalizing things on prospects for better relations, but old-pro Lavrov does not negotiate via the media. On July 11, the Russian foreign minister was asked about his 50-minute talk with Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the sidelines of the just concluded Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in Malaysia.
  
  Question: “Yesterday, after a meeting with you, U.S. State Secretary Marco Rubio said a new plan for Ukraine had been discussed. Which side proposed new approaches, what are they about, and what makes them fundamentally different from the previous ones? Are U.S. weapon supplies also part of the plan?”
  
  Lavrov: “I will use President Trump’s words to answer your question ‘I’m not going to tell you. We are going to have a very big announcement to make.’ I’m not sure about a ‘big announcement,’ though, but you, as someone familiar with the diplomatic work and who often accompany us in our travels, know that there are things that are not commented on. Yes, we discussed Ukraine. …”
  
  
  Rubio during the East Asia foreign ministers’ Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on July 11. (State Department/Freddie Everett)
  
  Rubio was less tight-lipped. He said the U.S. and Russia exchanged new ideas for Ukraine peace talks after he met with his Russian counterpart in Malaysia. “I think it’s a new and a different approach,” Rubio told reporters after talks with Lavrov.
  
  “I wouldn’t characterize it as something that guarantees a peace, but it’s a concept that, you know, that I’ll take back to the president. We need to see a roadmap moving forward about how this conflict can conclude. And then we shared some ideas about what that might look like. We’re going to continue to stay involved where we see opportunities to make a difference.”
  
  Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov
  
  
  Sergey Ryabkov, Russian deputy minister of foreign affairs, addressing a disarmament conference in Geneva in March 2023. (UN Photo / Violaine Martin)
  
  On Aug. 10, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, in an interview with Rossiya-1 TV, noted that “some sprouts of common sense are appearing in the dialogue with the U.S., which have been sorely lacking in recent months and years.”
  
  Sprouts? This brought to mind what Putin said after his June 16, 2021, summit with former U.S. President Joe Biden in Geneva.
  
  Asked if he had reached “a new level of trust” with President Biden, Putin quoted Leo Tolstoy:
  
  “Tolstoy once said, there is no happiness in life, only lightening flashes of it — cherish them. I believe that in this situation some kind of family trust is not possible. However, it seems to me we have seen ‘lightening flashes’ of it.”
  
  Putin was only too aware that the Military-Industrial-Congressional-Intelligence-Media-Academia-Think-Tank complex (MICIMATT) and other domestic political forces, have amply demonstrated their ability to poor cold water on many a hopeful “lightening flash.” For those interested in a fledging U.S.-Russia rapprochement, one can but hope that — as in nature – sprouts prove to be more long lasting than sparks.
  
  
  Biden and Putin in Geneva, June 16, 2021, with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on left, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, right. (White House/ Adam Schultz)
  
  Flexibility
  
  I offer the above to suggest there is reason to expect some flexibility on the margins of the basic terms Putin set down in June 2024. If you believe, as I do, that Moscow wants to avoid creating its own Vietnam by going West of the Dnepr, you can foresee that Putin may eventually show enough flexibility to allow Trump to claim they “worked it out together.” It would be a “negotiated solution,” applying copious lipstick to the pig of actual defeat for U.S./NATO/Ukraine.
  
  That kind of flexibility could also set the stage for eventual Russian agreement to a limited ceasefire, perhaps in return for a definitive NO to NATO membership for Ukraine, together with a promise to cease all military and intelligence support for Kyiv once and for all.
  
  This was my best guess when TASS interviewed me several days ago. Guess is the key word. I would also guess that working groups on arms control issues may be created tomorrow.
  
  Trump: Paragon of Unpredictability
  
  Yogi Berra’s quip about how tough it is to make predictions — especially about the future — applies to Trump in spades. And in his case the future includes today and tomorrow. It is small solace that there does seem to be mutual agreement to meet again, next time in Russia.
  
  Sadly, media analysis cannot provide much help, because there is no discipline. Suffice it to add that I believe Putin is correct in thinking Trump is “sincere” in trying to put “Biden’s war” behind him.
  
  The Russians are also painfully aware of the formidable obstacles in his path toward rapprochement. If further fog were needed, State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce told the media yesterday that the Friday summit is “not a negotiation” (sic). (I pity the Russian intelligence briefer whom Putin asks to interpret that remark.)
  
  Is It Just Me?
  
  A comment beneath a comment I posted on X yesterday helped put things into better, wider perspective. “
  
  “@LastBloomer” asked: “Hey Ray: is it just me? I am getting the vibe that the Financial Times is pining for a Trump failure. It is a win when leaders of nations can meet &amp; discuss the cessation of war, is it not?”
  
  https://consortiumnews.com/2025/08/14/r ... mlinology/
  
  About 'Moscow's Vietnam'...Well, Odessa and the rest of the Black Sea coast are west of it but those regions are largely pro-Russian and I think necessary for Russia's security. The possibility of that exists only if Russia occupies Galatia, perhaps Kiev, which I believe they have no intention of doing.
  
  ******
  
  Brian McDonald: When the breadbasket boils: why Russia’s drought is the world’s problem
  August 14, 2025
  By Brian McDonald, Substack, 7/31/25
  
  By any measure that matters, agriculture in southern Russia is in trouble. The sort that sinks in like cracked clay and doesn’t let go.
  
  This summer, a brutal drought—the worst in decades—has scorched the Krasnodar and Rostov regions, an area long known as the grain heartland of Russia. The figures don’t lie. State of emergency declarations have now spread across 37 districts, with thousands of farms reporting yield collapses that are nothing short of catastrophic.
  
  Wheat yields in the Kuban are down from 64.7 to 48.8 centners per hectare; barley is off 21%; peas and maize are also flagging—and sugar beet losses are still being counted.
  
  According to Konstantin Yurov, deputy chairman of the People’s Farmer association, Krasnodar alone has lost 2.8 million tonnes of grain, translating to around ₽42 billion in damages. Rostov’s losses are expected to be similar. In total, Yurov told RBK, “Farmers in the Kuban and Don regions have missed out on 70–80 billion rubles.” That’s $855 to $978 million, gone with the heat.
  
  And this is no local misfortune. This is Russia—the world’s largest grain exporter. Southern Russia produces up to 20% of its grain, most of it passing through Novorossiysk and Azov ports to markets stretching from Cairo to Jakarta. When the Kuban stumbles, bread prices don’t just shift in Kursk or Kazan—they spike in Lagos, Damascus, Amman.
  
  We’ve seen this story before. In 2011, a surge in global food prices—driven in part by Dmitry Medvedev’s export restrictions following another severe drought—helped trigger unrest across the Arab world. Despite what some think tanks would try to have you believe, the Arab Spring wasn’t born in Twitter feeds. It was born in bakeries. When bread doubles in price and wages don’t, people don’t just complain. They revolt.
  
  So when Russian officials from the Ministry of Agriculture now claim that the 2025 grain harvest will hit 135 million tonnes, surpassing last year by 5 million—even projecting 55 million tonnes for export—the optimism feels brittle, like a harvest forecast written in chalk on a dry stone wall.
  
  The numbers from the ground tell another story. In some of the worst-hit districts—Kanevskoy, Pavlovsky, Yeysky—grain yields have plummeted to just 20–30 c/ha, two to three times lower than the usual regional average. Maize and sugar beet assessments aren’t even in yet. Livestock producers are already discussing cutting the cattle herd due to feed shortages.
  
  Equipment loans. Fertilizer bills. Warehousing costs. They don’t take a year off because the skies didn’t cooperate. And they certainly don’t pause for the slow gears of Moscow’s subsidy machine. “In what happened, the farmers bear no blame,” says Vyacheslav Legkodukh, the governor’s representative for farmer relations in Krasnodar. “We must do everything possible to ensure these farms survive to next season.”
  
  But survival in this new era can’t rely on last-century tools. Yes, subsidies, crop insurance, emergency lending—all of these help soften the blow. But none of them solve it. You don’t adapt to climate breakdown with forms and stamps.
  
  What’s needed now is strategic resilience: new drought-tolerant crop strains; smart irrigation systems that can stretch a dry season; data-driven yield modelling that sees past the next quarterly target.
  
  Russia’s grain heartland is shifting under its own boots, whether Moscow likes it or not. The Kuban and the Don—fields once fat with black earth—are drying out, while the better soil edges north toward Ryazan, Kursk, Tambov. Trouble is, up there you’ve got dirt but no silos, no rail spurs, no deep-water docks. Hard to ship a loaf out of a meadow.
  
  The real peril isn’t only in the cracked furrows. It’s in the comforting lie that last year’s export crown guarantees this year’s. The sky doesn’t read ministry memos. Weather tears up contracts for fun. If the planners don’t move with it, they’ll end up— as every old farmer knows— betting the harvest on a cloud that never breaks.
  
  And if that wager goes sour? Russia will still feed itself, just about. But the grain market’s strung tight as a fiddle string; miss one shipment out of Novorossiysk and bread jumps in Cairo, tempers boil in Khartoum. Wheat isn’t just food. It props up governments.
  
  So what’s happening down south isn’t a local mishap. It’s front-line climate news. In this new game, soil is strategy and a sack of grain can tip a cabinet.
  
  The breadbasket’s smouldering. Best notice before the wind changes.
  
  https://natyliesbaldwin.com/2025/08/bri ... s-problem/
  
  ******
  
  Armenia on its path to extinction
  
  Lucas Leiroz
  
  August 15, 2025
  
  Recent U.S.-mediated agreement sets the stage for the end of Armenia as a sovereign state.
  
  The recent signing of a “peace agreement” between Armenia and Azerbaijan, brokered by the United States, marks not only a new chapter in the Caucasus conflict but, above all, represents yet another historical humiliation for the Armenian people. More than a diplomatic defeat, the pact symbolizes the collapse of Armenian sovereignty and confirms its ongoing march toward extinction as a viable and independent state.
  
  The so-called “Zangezur Corridor,” officially ratified in Washington with great fanfare by the Trump administration, is a land route connecting Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhichevan through the southern part of Armenian territory. Technically, it is a logistical corridor. Politically and geostrategically, it is the imposition of an external order in defiance of the Armenian people’s will—an assault on the country’s territorial integrity and another step toward its total submission to the Atlanticist West.
  
  Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, by accepting the terms imposed by Washington and Baku, has demonstrated not only weakness but complete capitulation. His government, already marked by a string of failures—including the humiliating military defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh and the alienation of traditional allies like Russia and Iran—is now handing over yet another vital piece of national territory to the mercy of foreign powers. The so-called “peace” promoted under the name “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” is nothing more than a cynical euphemism for military and economic occupation.
  
  It’s important to underline that, even from a cold and pragmatic geopolitical perspective, the current scenario benefits everyone—except Armenia. Azerbaijan secures uninterrupted logistical access to Nakhichevan; the U.S. consolidates a direct military presence in the Caucasus under the guise of managing the route; Israel strengthens its partnership with Baku, further threatening Iranian security; and NATO, indirectly, expands its reach into one of the most strategic regions of Eurasia. Armenia, meanwhile, loses territory, displaces historical communities, and cements its international irrelevance.
  
  Pashinyan’s irresponsibility also breaks with a longstanding diplomatic tradition crucial to regional stability. By sidelining Russia and Iran—regional powers historically committed to peace and balance in the Caucasus—Yerevan is trading real security for empty Western promises. Moscow, though momentarily focused on the Ukrainian front, remains the only actor capable of ensuring Armenia’s survival as a state. Tehran, on the other hand, views the corridor as an existential threat—not only due to its proximity to Iranian borders but also because of the growing Israeli and American presence it brings.
  
  The refusal to pursue genuine peace under the mediation of regional actors reveals Pashinyan’s total alienation, as he seems to govern with his eyes fixed on Paris and Washington, while turning his back to the harsh reality faced by the Armenian people. His “Westernization” project has utterly failed: the promise of prosperity turned into isolation, and the European dream became a geopolitical nightmare.
  
  The grim truth is that under Pashinyan’s leadership, Armenia is ceasing to exist as a sovereign political entity. The state is being territorially fragmented, economically occupied, and politically manipulated. The Armenian people—heirs to one of the world’s oldest Christian civilizations—are now hostages to a puppet government that insists on choosing yesterday’s enemies as today’s allies.
  
  What remains for Armenia is to decide: will it continue its blind march toward total extinction, or will it awaken from its lethargy, remove the traitors who currently rule, and rebuild its sovereignty based on a genuine alliance with those who truly defend regional peace—rather than those seeking to replace it with NATO military bases?
  
  And it must also be understood that any lasting peace in the region will only be achievable through negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan mediated by the three relevant regional actors: Russia, Iran, and Turkey—not by faraway powers like the U.S. and France.
  
  Without a profound strategic shift, Armenia’s fate is already sealed: it will become a puppet state, without territory, without a people, and without a future.
  
  https://strategic-culture.su/news/2025/ ... xtinction/
  
  ******
  
  From Cassad's Telegram account:
  
  Colonelcassad
  The famous falsifier of Russian history Mark Solonin has been declared a foreign agent. Good news on Friday.
  
  In addition to him, the updated register of foreign agents also includes Hieromonk John Kurmoyarov, journalists Mark Krotov "Krutov" and Igor Rudnikov, as well as the Revolt-Center project.
  
  ***
  
  Colonelcassad
  0:32
  Vladimir Putin laid flowers in the rain at the "Heroes of AlSib" memorial in Magadan . The monument symbolizes the cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States during World War II.
  
  The president honored Soviet and American pilots. During the war, they transported almost eight thousand aircraft via AlSib.
  
  The monument is located near the airport terminal building at the 13th kilometer of the federal highway "Kolyma". It was opened on May 9, 2020.
  
  @zvezdanews
  
  ***
  
  Colonelcassad
  2:47
  The main points of D. Peskov's statements on the upcoming talks in Alaska:
  
  - Trump will meet V. Putin at the plane in Alaska, said D. Peskov
  
  - Putin's plane should land in Anchorage at exactly 11:00 local time, Peskov said
  
  - Putin's flight from Magadan to Anchorage, where he will meet with Trump, will be "punctual," he noted;
  
  - Economic cooperation projects between Russia and the United States, the topic of "mutual irritants" will be on the agenda of the talks between Putin and Trump
  
  - Putin will work with documents during the flight to Alaska, including on all the theses of the upcoming summit with Trump, Peskov said.
  
  ***
  
  Trump confirmed the conversation with the President of Belarus on his social network Truth:
  
  I had a wonderful conversation with the highly respected President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko. The purpose of the call was to thank him for the release of 16 prisoners. We are also discussing the possibility of releasing an additional 1,300 prisoners. Our conversation went very well. We discussed many topics, including President Putin's visit to Alaska.
  
  I look forward to meeting with President Lukashenko in the future. Thank you for your attention to this matter!
  
  Highly respected.
  
  ***
  
  Colonelcassad
  From the statements of Trump, heading to Alaska to meet with V. Putin:
  
  - Trump said that he sees Russia's interest in the economic potential of the United States
  
  - Trump said that he plans to discuss the issue of territories with Putin, believes that the decision on this matter should be made by Kiev
  
  - Trump said that he is ready to discuss business issues with Putin if progress can be achieved in the Ukrainian direction
  
  - Trump said that next week he intends to introduce duties on the import of steel and microchips
  
  - Trump claims that Russia will face "grave economic consequences" if the Alaska summit does not bring progress on the Ukrainian issue
  
  - Trump said that he would like to focus on the problems of his country, but is involved in resolving the Ukrainian conflict "to save lives"
  
  - Trump hopes that "something will come of the Alaska summit"
  
  - Trump, who is heading to the summit with Russia in Alaska, called Putin "smart"
  
  - Trump on the prospect of providing security guarantees to Ukraine: this is possible with the participation of Europe and other countries
  
  - Trump said that the possibility of providing security guarantees to Kiev in the NATO format will never exist. That won't happen, he said.
  
  - Trump on upcoming summit with Putin: "I'm not going to negotiate on behalf of Kiev, I'm here to bring everyone to the table."
  
  ***
  
  Colonelcassad
  A Russian Il-76 has landed at Elmendorf-Richardson Air Force Base, where Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump will hold a summit, according to Flightradar data.
  
  The composition of the US delegation has just been announced - it includes 16 people , including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, CIA Chief John Lee Ratcliffe, the White House pool reported.
  
  https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin
  
  Google Translator

[blindpig]

Larry Johnson: Putin-Trump Summit: Putin's Triumph, Neocons' Disaster

Source: https://sonar21.com/the-putin-trump-sum ... e-neocons/
Dr. Ignacy Nowopolski
Aug 16, 2025



If you watched American news channels (I italicized this word to emphasize sarcasm), the buildup to the press conference was like a virgin waiting for her first sexual experience. Man, what a disappointment, after hours of frantic waiting, when Putin and Trump finally spoke. I decided to watch Fox News and was not disappointed by the froth, fury, and lies spouted by a whole host of dullards, including General Jack Keane and Trey Gowdy. Before Trump and Putin appeared before the assembled press, commentators repeatedly slandered Putin, calling him a monster, a murderer, an evil authoritarian leader, and a child killer. And their insults were echoed by many so-called journalists and presenters . It was pathetic.

Everyone on Fox News was repeating the propaganda that Putin was in a desperate situation, that the Russian economy was on the verge of collapse, and that the Russian military couldn't defeat the brave Ukrainians. My wife thought I was having a stroke because I was screaming at the TV in response to this stupidity.

When Putin stepped up to the microphone and began speaking, the neoconservative world collapsed. Instead of a contrite Putin pleading with Trump for relief, the Russian president spoke calmly, initially focusing on Alaska's historical significance as an airlift that supplied Russia with vital supplies during World War II. Throughout his speech, Putin praised Trump for his integrity in the negotiations and for establishing a dialogue that promised normalization. Putin did not back down from any of the positions he had previously expressed regarding Russia's demands for an end to the war in Ukraine. He reiterated that the root cause , namely NATO's eastward expansion, was at the heart of the matter.

Trump drove a silver nail into the hearts of the neoconservative vampires , who salivated at the mere thought of Trump forcing Putin to accept a ceasefire because Putin, at least in their delusional world, desperately wanted an agreement. Nothing happened. Trump praised Putin and said their talks were productive, though some issues remained unresolved.

Here is a sample of the disappointed reactions of propagandists in the print media:

August 15, 2025, 7:12 PM ET 1 hour ago

David E. Sanger

Report from the Elmendorf-Richardson Joint Database

After three hours of talks, President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin told reporters they had made progress on unspecified issues, but they did not provide any details, answer any questions and, most importantly, did not declare any ceasefire.

August 15, 2025, 7:11 PM ET 1 hour ago

Katie Rogers

Traveling with President Trump. Both men cited the agreement but didn't provide details. Trump ignored vociferous questions about what had just happened and what the agreement entailed. Those of us traveling with him were simply whisked away to Air Force One. It was a long journey. Trump pulled out all the stops to make a splash on the red carpet, and he's returning home empty-handed.

August 15, 2025, 7:10 PM ET 1 hour ago

Maggie Haberman

White House reporter Putin took several cues from the meeting. He received a visit to the United States—at a military base, no less—and visuals of a warm welcome from Trump, as well as another delay in sanctions against Russia.

August 15, 2025, 7:07 PM ET 1 hour ago

Erica L. Green

While it's unclear what agreements have been reached, Putin is demonstrating that he's still committed to his position, saying that regardless of Trump's words, he's pursuing his own goals in this war. He stated that while Trump, who has emphasized the economic benefits of stopping Russia's invasion, is interested in America's well-being, Trump also understands that "Russia has its own national interests. These include annexing Ukrainian territory."

August 15, 2025, 7:03 PM ET 1 hour ago

Anatoly Kurmanajew

Speaking of the need to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, Putin uses his typical shorthand, listing demands that have been categorically rejected by Ukraine and Europe. This suggests he maintains his hardline stance.

August 15, 2025, 8:09 PM EST 6 minutes ago

Constant Méheut

Reporting from Kyiv, Ukraine. We now await word from Zelensky and other European leaders, whom Trump announced he would call to inform them of his meeting with Putin. However, the ambiguous nature of the meeting suggests to some in Ukraine that a peace agreement is still highly unlikely. "It seems Putin has bought himself more time," Ukrainian lawmaker Oleksiy Honcharenko wrote on social media. "No ceasefire or de-escalation has been agreed upon."

It's simply amusing to watch the press fidget and squirm. The sad truth is that the Western establishment is so infected with an intense hatred of Putin and Russia that it is incapable of listening to what Putin has to say. Kelly Anne Conway, for example, embarrassed herself by ridiculing President Putin for mentioning the importance of Orthodox Christianity as part of Russian culture.

The next meeting, if it happens at all, will take place in Moscow… probably in late September or early October. I predict the weekend news cycle will be filled with cries of outrage from most European leaders, including Zelensky and his team. This is nothing more than frustration fueled by impotence.

https://drignacynowopolski.substack.com ... utin-trump

Google Translator

(Be assured, Trump did not reach any sort of détente with Putin. Looks like Putin didn't budge, just more 'performative jaw-jaw'. Rather nonplussed he just put lipstick on the pig. Appearances are important, especially to those bereft of redeeming qualities.)

******

Russia seeks to comprehend fully the various constraints on Trump

Alastair Crooke

August 15, 2025

If Moscow previously relied on treaties and ‘playing normal’, now it relies on unpredictability, interconnected fronts, and a balance of threats.

Another round of negotiations between Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff and the Russian leadership? A meeting between Witkoff and President Putin is now imminent. At the same time, General Keith Kellogg has been in Kiev. This comes as Trump’s so-called ‘ultimatum’ is set to expire – although Trump himself casts doubt whether the sanctions that may follow might not ‘bother’ Putin at all.

Has anything changed – beyond Russia’s accelerating advances across the extent of the contact line?

In one sense, nothing has changed. The Russian position remains as set out by President Putin on 14 June 2024. Has the U.S. position changed? No.

Earlier this month, Trump ‘whisperer’ General Kellogg suggested that the U.S. deploy all of its ballistic-missile submarines to see whether Putin was “bluffing”. So there you have it: Kellogg continues to believe that Putin is ‘bluffing’. It seems that the Kellogg faction in Team Trump simply cannot either hear or assimilate what Putin has been telling them since June 2024 (‘root causes are what matters’).

For Kellogg, et al, pressure on Putin alone is what will bring the Kellogg ceasefire.

The Chair of Russia’s Federation Committee on International Affairs Grigory Karasin, a senior Russian negotiator, laid out the situation very clearly: “All the emotions now dominating the media space – with all these statements and references to big names, such as Trump – should be taken calmly“, Karasin told Izvestia:

“There will be contacts with him [Witkoff] that will reveal what the United States actually thinks, not for the public eye – about the absolutely destructive role currently played by the European Union countries, which tightly control the Zelensky regime. All of that will be discussed. I believe that following these contacts, we will at least know everything of substance. Therefore, we must remain patient, composed, and resist emotional responses”.

It seems that, from the Russian perspective, the purpose is to fully understand the U.S. framework of limitations within which Trump operates.

It is within this ‘limitations’ context that Trump’s comments about having two Ohio class nuclear submarines “cruise the coast” of Russia must be understood. He and his close adviser Kellogg’s statements on submarines reflect a miscasting of the role of second strike submarines –they must lie silently, and undetected, on the ocean floor, and absolutely not be flaunted in full view!.

But in Trump’s case, his silly comment was perhaps designed more for domestic effect. Trump is under multiple pressures. He is entrapped by metastasizing Epstein allegations (with more shoes set to drop reportedly). And like a number of past U.S. Presidents, he is trapped by Israel – whether by the web of donors and big money interests, or be it, like Clinton, by more salacious and damaging threats.

Sensing weakness, the Republican Old Guard led by Mitch McConnell and Senator Graham espy an opportunity to weaken the MAGA constituency, and return the GOP from its populist flowering to its traditional ‘Country Club’ uniparty leadership.

A powerful Senate committee has voted – with strong support from both Democrats and Trump’s fellow Republicans – to send a spending measure that includes $1 billion of support for Ukraine to a full vote in the Senate, despite the Administration having asked Congress to eliminate such funding in its defence budget request.

Separately, Republican Senator Murkowski and Democrat Shaheen, both members of the Appropriations Committee, have introduced a bill that would provide $54.6 billion in aid to Ukraine over the next two years. (The Murkowski-Shaheen bill faces a stiff struggle to become law).

Trump, of course, had campaigned on the platform of no further funding for the Ukraine war to his MAGA base. Should the $1 billion measure pass, his MAGA supporters – already infuriated by what they claim to be an Epstein cover up – will feel a further betrayal.

No President can afford to appear that he is being steamrollered by Congress, not least over a key campaign promise. He (or she) must seek to dominate Congress, and not become its cat-paw – especially as the Senate furore for sanctions is all about blocking Trump’s way to strategic normalisation with Russia.

It may be that Trump’s ‘sub-deployment’ statement therefore was made more for Congressional ‘effect’ – to foreground his ‘tough’ approach towards Russia, and to imply he has other tools, beyond sanctions, (on which he is a sceptic).

That – the Ukraine impasse – however, is not the end to Trump’s woes, and to his shackles. The Israeli ‘Judea’ (the Settler, Messianic) Establishment has rebuffed Witkoff’s attempts to stop the genocide and starvation of Gazans. The images of famine are hurting Trump, who according to Hebrew language Yedioth Ahronoth, citing sources close to Netanyahu, claims that Trump has given a green light for a strong military operation (as long as negotiations have reached a dead end). “Matters are heading towards complete occupation of the Strip – and, if this does not suit the Chief of Staff, let him resign” is the blunt advice from the Netanyahu entourage.

The Gaza war is recasting American politics, especially among young Americans (and Europeans). Trump recently warned a Jewish donor that his base are coming “to hate Israel”. Trump’s base is scattering away.

After a massive backlash to the Trump administration’s cutting of federal emergency funding to cities and states that boycott Israel, the DHS was obliged to update its memo to remove the Israel boycott prohibition. The order now only applies to DEI and immigration violations. The MAGA base increasingly see ‘Israel First’ policies as a betrayal of the ‘America First’ campaign pledge.

So, per Grigory Karasin’s analysis, “contacts with Steve Witkoff should reveal the true position of the U.S. [its constraints and limitations], in contrast to the loud statements coming from the White House on the run-up to the expiration of the “resolution deadline” for the Ukrainian conflict – and the introduction of new anti-Russian sanctions”.

Witkoff, on the other hand, is likely to be probing for any flexibility in Russia’s stated position, and to explore the possibility for the imposing of deadlines for reaching agreements with Kiev. Moscow supports a fourth round of Istanbul talks. The media frenzy, the missile sub flap, are all part to typical Trumpian pressure tactics ahead of negotiations.

The reality that the frenzy hides, however, is that Trump has few cards with which to escalate pressure on Russia (weapons inventories are exhausted) and resort to longer-range missiles would raise a clamour amongst the MAGA that Trump is taking America to WW3.

What Trump really needs is something to protect himself from Senate pressures that threaten to tie him into never-ending sanctions and Ukraine funding escalation – something that at least portends an end to conflict within a reasonable timeline.

Is that possible? Doubtful. Kiev seems to be on a slow fuse self-destruction. It is too early to see who might emerge from the turmoil.

Paradoxically, Trump’s Ohio Class ‘cruising of Russia’s coastline’ taunt – though absurd – has given Moscow the pretext to propose something that has long been on President Putin’s ‘Drawing Board’:

Russia officially announced its withdrawal from the self-imposed restrictions under the moratorium on the deployment of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty), justifying this by the actions of the U.S., which long ago deployed similar systems in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, thereby violating the status quo. For the first time, Russia officially points out that the threat of American INF missiles comes not only from Europe but also from the Asia-Pacific region.

At the level of formal logic, Moscow’s lifting of the moratorium on INF deployment is nothing more than a symmetrical response to prior escalation by Washington. But on a deeper level, Russia is not just ‘responding’– it is creating a new strategic architecture in the absence of international restrictions. And among other things, it has serial production of theOreshnik in its hands, as well as a direct ally, North Korea, in the Asia Pacific region.

This paradigm shift is intended to be strategic. Whereas Moscow previously relied on treaties and ‘playing normal’, now it relies on unpredictability, interconnected fronts, and a balance of threats.

https://strategic-culture.su/news/2025/ ... -on-trump/

******

Summarizing The Summit

The summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russia's President Vladimir Putin was shorter than had been planned. But it was mostly successful.

Trump had urgently needed the meeting. He had pushed for a ceasefire in Ukraine. He had threatened to impose secondary sanctions against buyers of Russia's oil to press Russia towards that.

But Russia did not budge. Its interest is to eliminate the root cause of the war in Ukraine - the expansion of NATO towards Russia's borders. A ceasefire would only have paused the war but would not have solved the underlying issue.

For Trump the threat of secondary sanctions had become a trap. Some rather mild addition of tariffs against India had led to a strong backlash. India did not stop buying Russian oil but turned away from the U.S. to endorse Brics, Russia and China. Imposing secondary sanctions against China would have escalated into a trade war with China which the U.S. has no way to win.

The summit created a win for each side.

Trump acknowledged that a ceasefire was not possible and that the war needs to end with an all-encompassing peace agreement:

Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump - Aug 16, 2025, 8:46 UTC
A great and very successful day in Alaska! The meeting with President Vladimir Putin of Russia went very well, as did a late night phone call with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine, and various European Leaders, including the highly respected Secretary General of NATO. It was determined by all that the best way to end the horrific war between Russia and Ukraine is to go directly to a Peace Agreement, which would end the war, and not a mere Ceasefire Agreement, which often times do not hold up. President Zelenskyy will be coming to D.C., the Oval Office, on Monday afternoon. If all works out, we will then schedule a meeting with President Putin. Potentially, millions of people’s lives will be saved. Thank you for your attention to this matter!

After he had given Putin that part of the cake Trump took his own piece.

In an interview (vid) with Foxnews after the summit Trump was asked about imposing sanctions. He responded: "Well, because the meeting went so well, we don’t have to think about that now.”

There will be no ceasefire to freeze the conflict and there will be no sanctions. Both sides can count that as wins.

The task of ending the conflict was tossed off to Zelensky and Europe:

Without hesitating, Trump said that his advice to Zelenskyy after Friday’s meeting with Putin would be "make a deal."

On Monday Zelenski will be told to give up and to make peace with Russia. European protests against that will be ignored.

Posted by b on August 16, 2025 at 13:02 UTC | Permalink

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2025/08/s ... l#comments

******

Putin Stops in Magadan Before Alaska to Talk Development
Karl Sanchez
Aug 15, 2025



“The monument is dedicated to the feat of the pilots of the Alaska-Siberia air route, along which during the Second World War, Soviet and American servicemen ferried fighters and bombers supplied from the United States to the USSR under Lend-Lease. Monument perpetuates the history of cooperation between the two countries by depicting the moment of shaking hands Soviet and American pilots against the background of a vertically mounted airplane wing.”

Putin visited the monument and laid the flowers seen in the photo. Note there were no other members of his entourage aside from security people and sentries at the monument, and Magadan regional governor Sergey Nosov, with whom he met just prior to visiting the monument. Magadan is primarily a mining district with gold, zinc, lead, tungsten, “the entire periodic table,” as Nosov told Putin. IMO, it’s clear business interests would like to see the Russian government foot the costs for prospecting the region since such an idea was voiced for the Arctic and Far east as a whole back in 2023 during Putin’s extensive tour here. With Nosov as host, Putin toured the Omega-C plant. The Kremlin informs us:

Omega-C, commissioned in 2023, is a unique fish oil processing and refining plant with further production of encapsulated products with a high omega-3 content. In Russia, this is the first enterprise producing reesterified triglycerides from white fish of the Sea of Okhotsk - sardines and herring.


Governor Norsov and Putin examine some products.

Fish oil is used by me to combat my metabolic syndrome and is becoming more widely used to deal with other associated medical issues.

Putin also found time to visit the new Magadan Sports Complex and to root on some adolescent hockey players who he had a short chat with that unfortunately wasn’t transcribed.



The main object of the visit is what I predicted—a discussion of the regional master development plans, and in this case the implementation of the master plan for Magadan:

V. Putin: Dear colleagues, good afternoon!

I am very glad to be here again, in Magadan. The city is changing, becoming more modern, attractive, and convenient, and it is being modernized. This is largely the result of the implementation of the city's master plan. For example, a new international airport terminal complex has already been put into operation, as we discussed and showed yesterday. Or was it today?

S. Nosov: In Moscow yesterday.

V. Putin: The Mayak Park is being actively developed, and the Nagayev Bay area is being cleared to create a maritime logistics center.

Today, we will discuss how the master plans for the cities of the Russian Far East are being implemented. We will examine what has been accomplished and the remaining challenges. We will then focus on the master plan for the development of Magadan.

I would like to note that a new stage of large-scale work on the qualitative and comprehensive renewal of the Far Eastern cities and the creation of a modern environment for living, studying, working, and doing business began in 2021. It was then that the task was given to prepare 22 master plans for the development of cities and urban agglomerations in the region, which are home to almost four and a half million people, which is more than half of the total population of the Far East.

All of these long-term, comprehensive, and strategic documents have been approved and are being implemented. This year, work on master plans has significantly accelerated, and a good pace has been set. Project documentation is being developed at full speed, construction sites are being opened, and new facilities are being put into operation. Additionally, 165 facilities in the Far Eastern cities have already been built or modernized.

I would like to emphasize that such work is extremely important for the socio-economic and spatial development of a particular city or urban agglomeration. Master plans are developed with the direct participation of citizens, entrepreneurs, and public organizations, taking into account their wishes and suggestions as much as possible. In any case, we have agreed to consider the wishes and plans of the people living in specific settlements.

The implementation of these documents allows for the harmonious and balanced development of territories, the more efficient use of their investment and human resources, the discovery of new points of economic growth, and, of course, the resolution of many long-standing social and infrastructure problems.

Thus, master plans help to effectively solve a key problem, namely, the creation of a modern, favorable, and comfortable environment, without which it is difficult to talk about economic development in the city.

Of course, all master plans must be provided with resources. I would like to note that a number of national projects already have separate sections for financing the activities of master plans for the cities of the Russian Far East. Additionally, according to the Finance Ministry's proposal, 5% of the budgets of sectoral government programs will be allocated for these purposes.

In short, there is a lot of work to be done, and it is almost ready to be launched, but we will continue to analyze what is happening here at the upcoming Eastern Economic Forum.

Let's get started. Please, Alexey Olegovich.

A. Chekunkov: Dear Vladimir Vladimirovich!

The Far East has become the first macro-region in Russia where master plans have been developed and implemented on your behalf. When developing the master plans, as you mentioned, we primarily relied on the residents' opinions about the facilities they needed. Currently, at the implementation stage, sociological data indicates that the Far Eastern residents are highly engaged in this work. 84% of the Far Eastern residents believe that master plans are beneficial for their city, and 65% have already observed positive changes over the past two years.

In total, the master plans envisage the creation of 875 new facilities and 165 that have already been completed, which is almost 20 percent of the total work planned for 2030. The total funding amount is 4.4 trillion rubles, of which half is from non-budgetary sources, half is from the federal budget, 1.7 trillion, and 500 billion is from regional sources. Almost half of the required budgetary funds have already been allocated. This work is carried out every budget cycle.

To ensure funding, separate sections have been created in five national projects, treasury loans have been used, and funds have been allocated from the write-off of regional debts. In addition to the already secured funding, it is important to allocate at least 5 percent of the relevant state programs.

Vladimir Vladimirovich, this work is currently being carried out with the Federal Executive Agencies, and by September 1, all Federal Executive Agencies must allocate the corresponding limits of 5 percent. We will report to you on the implementation of your instructions in our state programs.

Also, according to your decision, 100 billion rubles of treasury infrastructure loans have been allocated for the master plans of the Far East and the Arctic, which will be used to finance projects, primarily in the housing and public utilities sector, transport infrastructure, and infrastructure for investment projects. Here in Magadan, this includes the construction of a marine tourism center, a highway to the Gorokhovoye Pole residential complex, and infrastructure for a fish port.

Given the high level of interest and involvement of residents in the implementation of master plans, a number of regions in the Far East are working on issuing special people's bonds so that people can financially participate in urban development projects while also receiving market-rate returns.

In 2025, four regions are planning such issues with a total volume of 2.2 billion rubles. We have precedents, people invested, for example, in the creation of the Khabarovsk airport, and it is important that there is a sense of involvement, not only financial benefits.

The implementation of master plans is managed using a digital system specifically designed for this purpose by the Far East and Arctic Development Corporation. The system allows for project management throughout the entire lifecycle, from construction planning to commissioning. We have real-time access to the status of all activities related to master plans and the progress of all relevant government agencies, including funding allocations.

And there is an element of healthy competition in this work. You have instructed us to create a rating of regions based on the quality of master plan implementation. This rating is automatically generated in the system based on the quality of planning, budgeting, contracting, cash execution, and the timeliness of event implementation. Currently, the top three regions in the ranking are the Sakhalin Region, the Republic of Buryatia, and the Magadan Region.

Dear Vladimir Vladimirovich,

Summing up the interim results of the first three years of practical implementation of master plans, we see that significant risks arise due to poor-quality design documentation, which has to be finalized during the construction process, causing delays and, unfortunately, increased costs.

If you support us, we have agreed with the Russian Ministry of Construction, and we are ready to create a unified state design institute to improve the quality of design throughout the Far East.

Moving on to Magadan, which is one of the top three cities in terms of the quality of its master plans, it is worth noting that the city is home to the largest number of projects under the Far Eastern Concession, and it was a pioneer in using this mechanism. There are 10 projects in the city, and the average level of funding is higher than the average for the entire Far Eastern Federal District.

May I ask Sergey Konstantinovich to report on the progress of the Magadan Master Plan?

V. Putin: Please, I ask you.

S. Nosov: Dear Vladimir Vladimirovich!

Alexey Olegovich reported to you on the implementation of our city's long-term comprehensive development plan. And, as in other Far Eastern regions, its implementation began in 2023. However, I would like to point out that our master plan story began a little earlier, specifically after your Address to the Federal Assembly in 2018, where you proposed a large-scale program for Russia's spatial development to transform cities and towns and create a modern living environment.

In 2019, with the support of DOM.RF, we began developing a master plan for the city of Magadan, and in 2020, we began implementing it. Between 2020 and 2023, we have built and commissioned 14 facilities, including the ones you have visited today, the Omega-Si plant, the Presidential Sports Center, where we are currently located, and the Mayak Park, which we have already discussed. Following your direct instruction on November 7, 2023, the development of plans for the socioeconomic development of the Far Eastern cities under the leadership of Yuri Petrovich Trutnev in collaboration with Maxim Stanislavovich Oreshkin, the master plan for the city of Magadan was updated and linked to the economy, which is very important.

In total, the DCF provides for the implementation of 51 measures worth 186 billion rubles, of which 15 have already been completed and 19 are currently being implemented. Currently, the cost of the facilities under construction is approximately 97 billion rubles. This is a significant achievement for our region, which has not seen such extensive renovations for over 30 years.

For the first time in many years, a new engineering school with an engineering focus has been built in the city. The reconstruction of the Polytechnic College, which had been abandoned 40 years ago, has been completed. The construction of a new microdistrict called Gorokhovoye Pole has begun. The introduction of housing will help solve important problems, including providing rental apartments for specialists who are being attracted to the region, such as doctors, teachers, employees of federal agencies, and qualified personnel from the real economy. In the Gorokhovoye Pole microdistrict, socially significant facilities are being built as part of the Far Eastern Concession, which are currently absent in the region. These include an educational center for children with special needs and a rehabilitation center where participants in the Special Military Operation will be able to recover.

Another important area is the creation of an attractive city image. The city is coming to life, and people are drawn to new and beautiful public spaces. The Mayak Park has become a landmark of the region. Construction of the park began in 2018 on the site of an abandoned wasteland with garages. The first phase was completed in 2019. The people's initiative to expand the park's boundaries was heard, approved, and personally supported by Mikhail Vladimirovich Mishustin. Today, the park is the most visited urban space in the city.

Last year, a long-awaited event for all residents of Kolyma took place, as you have already mentioned, and that was the opening of a new railway station complex in the city. It was important for the residents of Magadan and Kolyma that the boarding gates were warm, especially during the winter months, and that the baggage claim area was well-equipped, as the previous airport terminal building was outdated both morally and physically.

V. Putin: Of course.

K. Nosov: We also pay special attention to creating conditions for sports activities. I think that within the framework of a concession, sports events or facilities occupy a very worthy and respectable place.

In 2025, we will complete the construction of a seasonal ski jump. We have a very good school, and our students are part of the national team. This is one of our favorite sports. Elena Vyalbe, our famous champion, is from Magadan.

Dear Vladimir Vladimirovich,

Due to the current situation and the emergence of new challenges, the regional budget is also carrying a significant burden in terms of implementing the master plan. The direct financing of the regional budget, taking into account the debt obligations, amounts to 72 billion rubles. Of the 56 extra-budgetary funds provided for in the plan, 22 billion are the debt obligations of the region. We are using various mechanisms from the infrastructure menu developed by the Government of the Russian Federation and various types of loans, including infrastructure and budget loans, special treasury loans, treasury infrastructure loans, DOM.RF bonds, and Far Eastern rental housing.

But we are especially grateful to you, Vladimir Vladimirovich, for your decision to restructure budget loans and allocate two-thirds of the regional budgets' capacity to the activities that we consider to be the most important. We understand the burden that the federal budget is currently facing, and we are grateful for the decision proposed by the Ministry of Finance to allocate at least 5 percent of the funds allocated for the state program to the master plans of the cities in the Far East.

Dear Vladimir Vladimirovich,

We have several problematic facilities, as you have asked us to mention, which are particularly important for the region and require priority funding within the framework of these 5 percent.

First. I would like to draw attention to the need for a second stage of coastal protection in Nagaev Bay. In 2017, Magadan faced an emergency situation that resulted in the partial destruction of the port highway connecting the city to the commercial port, the main gateway to the region.

The situation was resolved only thanks to the support or intervention of Yuri Petrovich Trutnev, who allocated funds as part of the Ministry of Eastern Development program. Now, the only road connecting the region with this commercial port is securely protected, and residents have a beautiful embankment overlooking the Nagaev Bay.

Due to the effects of the ebb and flow of the Sea of Okhotsk, a similar situation is occurring on the coastline from the Mayak Park to the infectious disease hospital. For example, since 1939, the coastline has retreated 56 meters inland. The infectious disease hospital, private sector, and industrial zones are now almost at the edge of the cliff.

The issue needs to be addressed now, especially given the situation in Kamchatka, where a massive earthquake has occurred. Magadan is located in the ninth seismic zone.

Dear Vladimir Vladimirovich,

At present, there is no Federal Executive Agency responsible for carrying out coastal protection works in the marine area within the city limits. I ask you to instruct the Government of the Russian Federation to identify a supervising agency that will work with us to solve this issue.

The next problematic issue that I would like to highlight here is the infectious disease hospital itself. The children's infectious disease hospital is located in a former boarding school building, while the adult infectious disease hospital is located in a former sanatorium building that is in a collapse-prone area. Both buildings are in a critical state of deterioration and do not meet the SanPiN standards.

The infectious disease hospital is included in the long-term comprehensive plan. We have already developed the design and estimate documentation, but we cannot submit it to the state expertise for verification of the estimated cost, as the source of funding has not been determined. At the same time, the federal budget cannot allocate funds for the project implementation because there is no state expertise. This creates a vicious cycle and a systemic problem that needs to be resolved.

In my opinion, Marat Shakirzyanovich Khusnullin and the Ministry of Construction of Russia have done a tremendous job in reducing administrative barriers and simplifying procedures in the construction industry. This has significantly accelerated the implementation of our plans. I am confident that we can solve the problem with the infectious hospital through joint efforts.

The last thing I would like to say is that we understand the tasks of implementing the master plan. Work is underway at all the facilities for 2025-2026 (for the near future). All of them are funded, except for the maternity hospital.

For the facilities scheduled for the 2027-2029 budget cycle, not all funding issues have been resolved, but we have an action plan and understand what needs to be done to successfully implement them together with the Government of the Russian Federation. In other words, we will be working.

The main thing is not to miss out on the opportunity to mobilize the construction complex in the Magadan Region. We do not intend to slow down, and all tasks will be completed.

V. Putin: Okay, thank you.

Larisa Olegovna, do you have anything to add to what the governor said?

L. Polikanova: Dear Vladimir Vladimirovich!

I just wanted to add that, for example, in 2018, the urban environment quality index was in the unfavorable category and had a score of 168. By 2024, we were already in the favorable category.

V. Putin: At the expense of what? At the expense of what events?

L. Polikanova: It's all about the improvement, the modern look, the environmental friendliness, the accessibility, and the safety. So, let's say, we've raised the bar legally. And the fact that people notice significant changes is certainly very important for us.

V. Putin: This is the most important thing.

Okay. Good.

Irek Envarovich, what Sergey Konstantinovich raised as problematic issues, how do you see a possible solution to the problem?

I.Faizullin: Vladimir Vladimirovich, hello!

I see it this way: if you give the order, we will replace it, make changes to the resolution, and submit it for review. However, in the next three years, we do not see any funds allocated by the Ministry of Health for this project in the construction program.

V. Putin: Well, if you want to make sure that nothing gets in the way, then really make these changes.

I. Faizullin: Okay.

V. Putin: Good. Okay.

I. Fayzullin: Accepted.

V. Putin: We will ask Mikhail Albertovich now.

Mikhail Albertovich, what about the hospital?

M.Murashko: Dear Vladimir Vladimirovich! Sergey Konstantinovich, colleagues!

As for the infectious disease hospital, there is a need for its construction. It has not yet been included in the plans, and therefore the basic allocations do not include it. We are currently working with the Ministry of Finance on the budget for the next three years, and we will review the situation together with Irek Envarovich and the Ministry of Finance.

But we also looked at the cost per square meter, because it's very expensive, more than 400,000 rubles. But this is either in the expert review, or we will also look at this object together with the Ministry of Construction. There are no doubts.

V. Putin: Mikhail Albertovich, if the object is needed, there is no doubt. Then you should say about it, because what will the Ministry of Finance tell you? “We allocate money to you, and you set your own priorities.”

Pavel Anatolyevich.

P. Kadochnikov: Dear Vladimir Vladimirovich!

Yes, that's right. We are currently focusing our resources on implementing the Magadan master plan, including write-offs and treasury loans. The Federal Executive Office has instructed us to allocate 5% of our state programs to master plans. We are currently finalizing the budget and will see how things progress.

By health facilities. There is indeed a problem in coordinating the parameters, and here, of course, after preliminary testing, we need to discuss the terms and scope of implementation of these projects with the Ministry of Health. And sources, respectively.

V. Putin: Yes.

Maxim Stanislavovich, I have a request for you. Please work with your colleagues and provide me with materials that will indicate that the decision has been made.

M. Oreshkin: Yes.

V. Putin: All right? How do you see the whole range of these issues? You were the one who dealt with this issue initially.

M. Oreshkin: What Sergey Konstantinovich said is that the problem is the erosion of the shore. This is definitely something that needs to be addressed, as it poses a threat to a number of existing buildings. It will be much more expensive to deal with the consequences than to implement emergency measures. I believe that this is an urgent need.

V. Putin: Yes.

Maxim Stanislavovich, since we are right here and, thank God, we are dealing with these issues, I ask you to prepare draft decisions so that this does not remain just at the level of conversations and some papers, but that it is actually done. Okay? We have agreed.

M. Oreshkin: Yes.

V. Putin: Thank you very much.

President Putin: Action Man. Crack the whip. Putin always says there are problems to solve and thus work to be done—they never end, and that’s why pro-active governance is required. Planning is one aspect with implementation being its crucial partner. Many impressive imaginative ways to finance all this work were mentioned and the local people are deeply involved in their own improvement, which IMO is a key factor. The chronology mentioned is also a key point as all development halted 35-40 years ago and many key public institutions were allowed to deteriorate or close which prompted people to leave and now need to be lured back. Russia’s challenge is not just getting people to return but to further grow the city and region. For that to happen in the long run, Russia needs to finish its conflict with the West; or perhaps it should be stated the other way, that the West needs to cease its attempts to destabilize and dismember Russia. And at bottom, that’s what the Summit that ought to be starting about now is all about from Russia’s point-of-view.

https://karlof1.substack.com/p/putin-st ... ore-alaska

******

Pan-Turkism from Yakutia
August 15, 2025
Rybar

" On the activities of the Yakut deputy "

Once again, separatist speeches are heard from the parliamentary rostrums of Russian cities. This time, a “legislator” from Yakutia spoke about promoting pan-Turkic ideas.

Aleksandr Ivanov, a regional parliament member from the New People party , openly talks about his participation in closed clubs of the Istanbul intelligentsia and declares plans to establish ties with the “brotherly peoples” of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.

Ivanov himself has a biography typical of the "internationalists" of the 90s: he studied in the USA and Great Britain , makes frequent trips to Turkey to find contacts, and his daughter lives in Istanbul . In November 2024, in an interview with a Turkish channel, he drew attention to the need to separate Yakutia from Russia , complaining only about the "immaturity" of the population.

It is also noteworthy that the deputy actively participates in protests in other regions. Recently, he actively supported protests against municipal reform in the Altai Republic , speaking about the awakening of the national identity of the Turkic peoples.

History in places repeats the case of the Khanty -Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug deputy Tagizade, only now in a pro-Turanian version. In both cases, we see a combination of Turkish narratives, hints at the "brotherhood of the Turks" and direct flirting with separatism.

The question of why such characters still hold their positions and are not included in the lists of extremists is becoming increasingly acute.

To ignore something like this means allowing pan-Turkism and separatism to take root in the country’s power structures , which, given the situation in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, is already a direct threat to the national security of the Russian Federation.

https://rybar.ru/pantyurkizm-iz-yakutii/

There is rejoicing in Baku
August 15, 2025
Rybar

"Trump Signs Section 907 Repeal"

The Americans have published a memorandum on the suspension of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, signed by US President Trump on August 8, 2025. This is the amendment that limited military-technical cooperation between the US and Azerbaijan.

The restrictive measure has been in place since 1992 and was actively fought for by pro-Armenian lobbyists in the US Congress, including convicted former New Jersey Senator Bob Menendez .

According to the text of the document, the Americans argued for the cancellation of the amendment for the following reasons:

Supporting US efforts in the fight against international terrorism
Ensuring combat readiness of the US and allied forces
Strengthening the security of Azerbaijan's borders
A negative impact on the negotiation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan is excluded, since it will not be used for offensive actions against Armenia.

The fact that Trump was going to cancel the amendment became known on the day of public disgrace for the Armenian authorities , when a trilateral agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia was signed in Trump’s presence.

If we evaluate this decision as a whole, it is purely political to demonstrate the American gesture of goodwill to Azerbaijan (one could say, they patted it on the shoulder, as they did to the so-called Ukraine at one time) . It will not have any practical effect, since the Azerbaijani authorities have no need to deepen military-technical cooperation with the United States.

The Azerbaijanis are quite capable of cooperating with Turkey and Israel, as well as Pakistan, which provide all the military needs of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. And the US has its own problems - a wagon and a small cart. It is definitely not appropriate for them to interfere with the supply of another country.

Therefore, the lifting of these restrictions will not particularly affect the situation as a whole. Yes, in the long term, this will simplify the American military presence in the Transcaucasus on the wave of intentions to control the Zangezur corridor Trump bridge , but for Azerbaijan this decision is simply an opportunity to shout in its media about the “great friendship with the USA”.

https://rybar.ru/v-baku-likuyut/

Google Translator

[blindpig]

Baked Alaska & Roasted Ukraine
Roger Boyd
Aug 16, 2025

Given the happenings both on the front line and in Alaska an interim update on Ukraine is in order.

Baked Alaska
So, the meeting between Trump and Putin happened in Alaska and lasted less time than it took the two heads of state to fly there. We must see this meeting in the context of what the two leaders would define as a success.

For Putin, a direct meeting between the two heads of state without the involvement of the Europeans or Zelensky reinforces the new dynamic of the US treating Russia as another great power and Europe and Ukraine as vassals that need to learn how to heel properly. Putin has also displayed to the world community that he is a reasonable man open to negotiations and discussions but always with the security interests of Russia at heart. This plays well both for the non-Western nations that refused to follow the Western anti-Russia sanctions and for his domestic audience. It also allows for an extension of “war, war”, which the Russian military is having increasing success with, under the cover of Putin’s “jaw, jaw”. Putin will have left the summit with a nice warm cozy feeling of success.

It has been obvious that Trump has been desperately looking for a way to deliver some kind of Ukrainian ceasefire that he can deem a win with respect to his campaign trail boasts. This face to face meeting, without the delusional and neocon intermediaries, will have allowed Trump to fully understand that that is a non-starter and that negotiations and a comprehensive security agreement will have to be a precursor to a ceasefire. Of course, that is a non-starter with the European elites who would face a huge political fallout from such a deal, which would be seen as a major defeat, and a Zelensky who quite probably would face his maker.

Trump can now position himself as wanting a peace but unable to gain one because of the intransigence of the Europeans and Ukrainians. This supports his position of no new US funding for Ukraine given Zelensky’s intransigence and also provides him with cover not to implement the secondary sanctions against those trading with Russia (e.g. China and India) which would throw a wrench into the global economy and Trump’s ongoing trade negotiations. Along with the warmonger Europeans and Zelensky, the other group that loses out is the Washington D.C. neocons which Trump has now bypassed. Overall, Trump gets the chance of a Ukrainian off-ramp for the US if he plays his cards right, while being happy for the Europeans to buy US weapons to supply to Ukraine and to build up their own militaries. He gets to dump the cold core of delusional warmongering European elites and Zelensky, while successfully starting the process of warming up relations with Russia; which will aided by the ongoing revelations about the “Russia, Russia, Russia” conspiracy.

Roasted Ukraine
Meanwhile “war, war” is going very nicely for the Russian military, with the breakthroughs around Pokrovsk forcing the Ukrainian military to strip some of their best units from other fronts to fill the holes around Pokrovsk. The Russian military immediately put pressure on these weakened areas and made advances. At the same time, the Russian military got the chance to significantly attrit much of the remaining elite and experienced units of the Ukrainian army, both during the transfer operations using drones and through the assaults that are being made on the Russian positions. Pokrovsk is now becoming another meat grinder for the Ukrainian army, with the Russians having a much more efficient and effective meat grinding process than before. Many of the soldiers in these Ukrainian units have been fighting pretty much none stop for three plus years, and even if they survive their combat capabilities will be further reduced. The Ukrainian casualty rate had already started to pick up last week, to about 45,000 a month, and we can expect that to rise further in the coming weeks.

Even as the transferred Ukrainian elements are for now stemming the Russian tide west of Kramatorsk, the Russians are still making progress around Pokrovsk itself with the cutting of the northern supply route and the storming of Rodynske. Together with progress west of Novoekonomichne. With respect to the Ukrainian counter-attacks, we should expect a relatively short period of success as the Russian cede ground while inflicting huge casualties, only to take the ground back later once the Ukrainians have been significantly depleted.

Away from Pokrovsk, the Russian military have made gains in the south east where they have taken Andrivka-Kletsove and Oleksandrohrad to be within 12km of the major transport hub of Pokrovs’k that sits on the critical T0401 road that supplies the southern front down to Hulyaipole. The Russians also moved to clear the pocket south of Kleban Byk (south of Kostyantynivka), made progress between Bakhmut and Kostyantynivka, advanced within a few km of the critical transport hub of Lyman, and made progress around Kupyansk. The Ukrainians are now in the position of not being able to fill all the holes that the Russians are opening up, facilitating localized collapses that could then snowball over time.

So “war, war” is going just fine for the Russians, while Putin keeps up the “jaw, jaw”.

https://rogerboyd.substack.com/p/baked- ... ed-ukraine

*****

The Summit and After
Karl Sanchez
Aug 16, 2025



I must confess that the two-hour discussion held by Danny Haiphong with Pepe Escobar then Marc Sleboda goes well beyond any synopsis I might personally provide. There’s no readout yet from the Kremlin about the talks, although there are a few comments made by those informed of them once Putin retrrned to Moscow after meeting with the Governor of Chukota. The optics were very important as was the observation made about the non-presser—Putin spoke first and took 67% of the time spent addressing the assembled media. Escobar and Sleboda comment further on the media’s behavior, which IMO is also important to note. Instead of posting a bunch of photos, here’s the link to those taken at Putin’s report to his Team where you’ll just need to look at the facial expressions. Numbers 1 & 3 are choice. One important point made from the start was the scrambling of the agenda as Putin rode with Trump in the latter’s limo and thus had their face-to-face without interpreters—Putin knows English quite well, which might surprise some. Again, the optics are key:


With US President Donald Trump before the start of a joint news conference.

You’ll note in the header photo of the non-presser scene that the usual national flags are missing from the background. There’s a video of the non-presser along with the transcript here. So, lets read what was said:

V. Putin: Dear Mr. President! Ladies and gentlemen!

Our negotiations were held in a constructive and mutually respectful atmosphere, and they were very detailed and useful.

I would like to thank my American colleague once again for the offer to come to Alaska. It is quite logical to meet here, because our countries, although we are separated by oceans, are actually close neighbors. And I, when we met, got off the planes, I said so: "Good afternoon, dear neighbor. It is very nice to see you in good health and alive." And it sounds very neighborly, in my opinion, kind. We are separated only by the Bering Strait, and there are only two islands between the Russian and American islands, which are only four kilometers apart. We are close neighbors, and this is a fact.

It is also important to note that Alaska is associated with a significant part of the shared history of Russia and the United States, as well as many positive events. To this day, there is a vast cultural heritage from the era of Russian America, including Orthodox churches and over 700 geographical names of Russian origin.

During the Second World War, it was in Alaska that the legendary air route for the supply of combat aircraft and other equipment under the Lend-Lease agreement began. It was a dangerous and challenging route over vast expanses of ice, but the pilots and specialists of both countries did everything they could to bring victory closer, taking risks and sacrificing their lives for the common cause.

I have just been in the city of Magadan in Russia, where there is a monument to Russian and American pilots, and the flag on the monument is both Russian and American. I know that there is also a similar monument here, in the military cemetery just a few kilometers away, where Soviet pilots who died during this heroic mission are buried. We are grateful to the American authorities and citizens for their respect for their memory. This is a dignified and noble gesture.

We will always remember other historical examples when our countries fought together against common enemies in the spirit of camaraderie and alliance, providing each other with assistance and support. I am confident that this legacy will help us to rebuild and establish mutually beneficial and equal ties at a new stage, even in the most difficult circumstances.

As you know, there have been no Russian-American summit meetings for more than four years. This is a long time. The past period has been very difficult for bilateral relations, and, frankly, they have reached their lowest point since the Cold War. This is not good for our countries or for the world as a whole.

It is obvious that sooner or later, it was necessary to rectify the situation and move from confrontation to dialogue. In this regard, a personal meeting between the heads of the two countries was really overdue, of course, with the condition of serious and painstaking preparation, and this work was generally carried out.

We have established very good direct contacts with President Trump. We have had many frank conversations on the phone. As you know, Mr. Whitcoff, the special representative of the President of the United States, has visited Russia several times. Our assistants and foreign ministers have also been in regular contact.

As you know and understand, one of the central issues is the situation in Ukraine. We see the desire of the US Administration and President Trump personally to help resolve the Ukrainian conflict, and their willingness to delve into its essence and understand its origins.

I have repeatedly said that for Russia, the events in Ukraine are associated with fundamental threats to our national security. Moreover, we have always considered the Ukrainian people to be our brothers, as I have said many times. We share the same roots, and what is happening to us is a tragedy and a great pain. Therefore, our country is genuinely interested in putting an end to this.

At the same time, we are convinced that in order for the Ukrainian settlement to be sustainable and long-term, all the root causes of the crisis that have been repeatedly mentioned must be eliminated, all legitimate concerns of Russia must be taken into account, and a fair balance in the field of security in Europe and in the world as a whole must be restored.

I agree with President Trump, who said today that Ukraine's security must be ensured. Of course, we are ready to work on this.

I hope that the understanding we have reached will bring us closer to that goal and pave the way for peace in Ukraine.

We expect that Kiev and the European capitals will take this in a constructive manner and will not put any obstacles in the way, nor will they attempt to disrupt the progress through provocations or behind-the-scenes intrigues.

By the way, with the new US administration, our bilateral trade turnover has started to increase. It's still symbolic, but it's a 20% increase. I'm saying that we have many interesting areas for joint work.

It is clear that the Russian-American business and investment partnership has enormous potential. Russia and the United States have much to offer each other in trade, energy, digital technologies, high-tech industries, and space exploration.

Cooperation in the Arctic and the resumption of interregional contacts, including between our Far East and the American West Coast, are also relevant.

In general, it is important and necessary for our countries to turn the page and return to cooperation.

It is symbolic that the so-called date line, which runs along the border between Russia and the United States, as I have already mentioned, is located nearby, where you can literally step from yesterday into tomorrow. I hope that we will be able to achieve the same in the political sphere.

I would like to thank Mr. Trump for our joint work and the friendly and trusting tone of our conversation. The most important thing is that both sides were focused on achieving results. We see that the President of the United States has a clear vision of what he wants to achieve, is genuinely concerned about the prosperity of his country, and at the same time understands that Russia has its own national interests.

I hope that today's agreements will serve as a foundation not only for resolving the Ukrainian issue, but also for restoring business-oriented and pragmatic relations between Russia and the United States.

In conclusion, I would like to add the following. I remember that in 2022, during my last contacts with the previous administration, I tried to convince my former American colleague that we should not allow the situation to escalate into a conflict that could have serious consequences. I told him that this would be a big mistake.

Today, we hear President Trump say, "If I were president, there would be no war." I think that's exactly what would happen. I can confirm this because I have a very good, business-like, and trusting relationship with President Trump. I have every reason to believe that by following this path, we can reach a resolution to the conflict in Ukraine, and the sooner the better.

Thank you for your attention.

: (as translated)D.Trump Thank you very much, Mr. President. This is a very profound speech.

I would like to say that we had a very productive meeting, and we discussed many issues. I believe that some of them were really significant.

We were unable to find a full understanding. Unfortunately, there is no deal yet. I will be in touch with NATO representatives, and I will be in touch and speak with the necessary leaders, with President Zelensky, and I will inform him about today's meeting.

I agree with Foreign Minister [Marco] Rubio, Special Envoy [of the US President Steven] Whitkoff, and their position. I thank you for your work and assistance, and you are doing an excellent job.

We also have some great business representatives and others here. If you want to cooperate with us, we look forward to it, we look forward to working together. We would like to end this conflict as soon as possible.

Today, we have made significant progress. I have a very good relationship with President Putin. We have had many difficult meetings with Vladimir Vladimirovich, as well as many good meetings. We know that the fake situation about Russia's "interference" in the American elections... He [V. Putin] understands this perfectly well, considering his career, and he knows that it is not true: "Russia, Russia, Russia." He understands that everything that has been done is a criminal effort.

Of course, we will have a good opportunity to work together. I would like to say very quickly that I will make a few phone calls and inform the European leaders about what has been discussed.

We had productive negotiations. And the first and most important thing, I think, is that we have a good chance of reaching a peaceful settlement. We haven't reached it yet, but I thank President Putin and his team for doing everything necessary to achieve this.

I see your faces in the papers. You are actually almost as well-known as your boss, especially this gentleman here. (Points to Lavrov)

We have had many productive meetings over the years. And indeed, we had a productive meeting today.

Thousands of people are dying every week, and President Putin would like to end this conflict as much as I do. I thank you, Mr. President, and we will be in touch with you very, very soon. I hope to see you soon.

Thank you.

: (in English) V. Putin Next time in Moscow.

: (as translated) D. Trump This is a very interesting proposal. I'm probably going to be criticized, but I think it's possible.

I thank you, Mr. President. I thank all of you.

: (in English) V. Putin Thank you very much.

A FOX “Bubbleheaded bleached-blond” commented that Putin “steamrolled” Trump. which you’ll see if you watch the Haiphong chat. As usual, Putin’s tact and command of history along with his matter-of-fact manner is hard to beat—it’s so Russian versus American bombast. Putin’s mention of bilateral trade probably surprised many in the room given the thousands of sanctions levied on Russia. Trump’s description of Russiagate as “criminal” will disturb some. IMO, the paragraph about global security was the most important one uttered by either, although I suspect it won’t be cited in full by Western media. Putin’s report to his team that we’re allowed to know is very short:

V. Putin: Dear colleagues, good afternoon!

I have asked you to come together in order to inform you about the results of the visit of our delegation to the United States, to Alaska.

I would like to say right away that the visit was timely and very useful. We talked about almost all aspects of our cooperation, but above all, of course, we talked about a possible resolution of the Ukrainian crisis on a fair basis. And of course, we had the opportunity, which we took advantage of, to talk about the genesis and causes of this crisis. It is the elimination of these root causes that should be the basis for a settlement.

It has been a long time since we have directly negotiated at this level. I repeat, we had the opportunity to calmly and in detail reiterate our position. Of course, we respect the position of the American administration, which recognizes the need for an early end to hostilities. We also want to resolve all issues through peaceful means.

The conversation was very frank and informative, and I believe it brings us closer to the right solutions.

I will tell you in detail about the entire conversation. If you have any questions, I will be happy to answer them.

It would be nice to know more and know the questions asked. We do have a report made by Medvedev on his Telegram that makes the following points:

Meeting in Alaska
First results

1. A full-fledged mechanism for meetings between Russia and the United States at the highest level has been restored. Calm, without ultimatums and threats.

2. The President of Russia personally and in detail outlined to the President of the United States our conditions for ending the conflict in Ukraine.

3. Following an almost three-hour conversation, the head of the White House refused to escalate pressure on Russia. At least for now.

4. Important: the meeting proved that negotiations are possible without preconditions and simultaneously with the continuation of the NWO.

5. The main thing is that both sides have directly placed the responsibility for achieving future results in the negotiations on the cessation of hostilities on Kyiv and Europe. [Format Original]

Before leaving Alaska, Putin visited the Fort Richardson cemetery where the remains of Soviet soldiers are buried—the counterpart to the Magadan memorial. Here’s what the Kremlin said about the event:

At the national cemetery on the plot "Allies during the Second World War" there are 14 Soviet burials. The names and military ranks of 11 servicemen have been established: nine pilots, who participated in the ferry of aircraft along the Alaska airway - Siberia, and two sailors who were in the United States to receive ships under Lend-Lease. One grave remains unknown, two more burials are considered civilian.

The Russian head of state also spoke with Archbishop Alexy of Sitka and Alaska. The President of Russia presented him with an image of St. Herman of Alaska – the Orthodox patron saint of America and the icon of the Dormition of the Most Holy Theotokos.

In addition, Vladimir Putin had a brief conversation with Fort Richardson National Cemetery Director Dwayne Mandenhall, thanked him for his preservation and kind attitude to memory Soviet soldiers.

Putin had one more stop on his way back to Moscow and that was at Chukotka where he met with Governor Vladislav Kuznetsov to follow-up on the region’s development.



As you see by the map on the wall behind them, Chukotka is a rather large region almost a quarter the size of European Russia. Here’s the discussion:

V. Kuznetsov: Good afternoon, dear Vladimir Vladimirovich!

If you don't mind, I'll start with a brief overview of the region's economy.

V. Putin: Please.

V. Kuznetsov: Vladimir Vladimirovich, the economic indicators look good in progression. We have the second place in the Far Eastern Federal District in terms of industrial production. We have the fourth place in the Far Eastern Federal District in terms of investments in fixed assets. The number of small and medium-sized enterprises is growing. We are actively working with them, and people trust us and start developing their businesses. We have the first place in the Far Eastern Federal District in terms of retail trade.

We also work actively with agriculture, because we believe that everything we can do ourselves, we should do ourselves.

V. Putin: The agricultural products have fallen a little, haven't they?

V. Kuznetsov: Yes, but we "got caught up" in the fact that we were renovating our greenhouses, which will allow us to produce 30 percent more vegetables this year than in 2023. There was a renovation, so we were partially "caught up" in that.

Our mineral extraction is also growing, and we are the fourth largest producer in the Far Eastern Federal District.

When it comes to social indicators, we are among the best: we are the first in the Far Eastern Federal District, and we are among the best in Russia in terms of poverty and unemployment rates.

In terms of our achievements, we can indirectly say that we have moved up to the 28th group in the National Rating of the Investment Climate in the Regions of the Russian Federation. We have been growing for two years in a row, and we have taken sixth place in the annual ranking of the investment attractiveness of the regions of Russia. In other words, we have moved up ten positions in two years.

We work with entrepreneurs and investors; people believe and come. But of course, this is largely due to the fact that the Far East has a unique investment climate. Chukotka has three preferential tax zones, and we are very competitive compared to other regions. This is a great support for creating an investment climate.

If we go further, we are actively participating in all national projects, and the number of facilities is growing. But I would like to stop here again and express my gratitude for the master plans of the reference points.

V. Putin: By city.

V. Kuznetsov: Yes.

We currently have master plans for the Anadyr agglomeration, Egvekinot, Pevek, and Bilibino, where 82 percent of the population lives. This means that a large number of people are affected, and these are crucial social infrastructure projects for us. In Anadyr, we have a sports center with a swimming pool, which has long been needed and is part of our plans; we also have a creative industries center, medical facilities, and wastewater treatment facilities that we previously lacked. We are already implementing a master plan, and several projects have already been completed, including the improvement of the main square.

Also, Vladimir Vladimirovich, the airboats that you ordered us to purchase last year to ensure our transport accessibility. They have been operating successfully this year, and I would like to express my gratitude. Additionally, we have purchased two more airboats to increase the number of passengers we transport. These airboats have proven to be highly effective. They are our good boats. [These were discussed during Putin’s 2024 visit which is available in the Gym archive.]

V. Putin: So it works?

V. Kuznetsov: It works, yes, literally.

In accordance with your order, we are increasing our logistical accessibility. You know, we have a difficult situation: there are no permanent roads, and there is no railway. Our transportation is primarily by air. We have four new helicopters in two years, and two more are expected to arrive in September. I have already mentioned the airboats.

And of course, infrastructure projects. I have already said that we are now trying to provide ourselves with as much as we can, because it is better to do it ourselves than to carry it in our short period of navigation. There are three poultry farms, and we are finally closing our own egg needs this year.

In terms of our communication issues, you have also mentioned them. We are actively working with the Ministry of Digital Development on the installation of cable internet.

V. Putin: It's expensive so far - everything goes through the satellite.

V. Kuznetsov: There is one here in the Anadyr agglomeration. We have a submarine cable laid along the seabed, and we plan to join Yakutia, which is building it. There will be a short chord, and we will join it in a few years.

V. Putin: Make sure to do this.

V. Kuznetsov: Vladimir Vladimirovich, absolutely, because there are large construction sites in that area, and it's simply impossible to do without the internet.

As for medicine, Vladimir Vladimirovich, you ordered that...

V. Putin: Non-depletable reserves.

V. Kuznetsov: And this, and the recruitment of doctors. We are actively working with Mikhail Albertovich Murashko. We currently have more than 85 percent of our doctors.

Of course, there are not enough specialists in the field, but we have more than 100 people studying outside the district, and they will come to us. We also work in so-called shifts, when doctors come to us, and they don't just come for a day in the village—they stay until the last person leaves. This is how we operate.

Vladimir Vladimirovich, one of the main goals, of course, is demography. And here, the support measures that we provide for the second and third child are really working well. It's a good indicator: we're gaining ground, and we're in second place in the Far Eastern Federal District.

Vladimir Vladimirovich, culture is very important, because we have a multi-ethnic region: we have Chukchi, Eskimos, and other ethnic groups, and it is very important to preserve our cultural heritage.

There was no drama theater. I believe that theater is very important, because it is a platform, a mouthpiece for both propaganda and the preservation of culture. They created the Oleg Kuvayev Drama Theater. Indeed, there was a great demand from the people, and now there are many premieres and tours in the villages.

By the way, we are currently hosting an interesting event. The Helikon Opera has arrived, which is unprecedented for us. I hope that most of the visitors will be able to attend.

Vladimir Vladimirovich, I would like to say a few more words about what we are doing in terms of patriotic education. We have officially become a pilot project of the Ministry of Education for patriotic, spiritual, and moral education, as well as for traditional values among preschool children, because, among other things, I am the head of the Commission for Preschool Patriotic Education at the State Council, and it is during the preschool years that a child's personality is largely formed. From the ages of three to six, a child's character and personality are shaped. After that, it becomes more about comparing and choosing models. But the main part, cognitive skills, are formed at this time. It is very important that children receive proper education at this time. Therefore, we are actively working on this, and all our kindergartens are involved. We will propose amendments to the legislation to ensure that this work is as systematic as possible.

A few words about investment projects. In fact, according to the economic indicators I mentioned, investments in fixed assets are being made, and people are coming to Chukotka, as I have already mentioned, thanks to the preferential regimes we have.

One of the largest projects is the Baim project. You know it, and it has now gained access to VEB's project factory. At the end of 2028, two power units will be built for it by Rosatom, and by 2030, two more will be added to support the project, which is one of the largest copper mines in the world and contributes to a quarter of the Russian Federation's copper production.

We also have a major tin project in the works – the Pyrkakaisky Stockworks, which will make our country an exporter of tin. We will also launch it in 2028.

Vladimir Vladimirovich, of course, I can't help but mention the special military operation. We are actively working on our sponsored territory in Novoluganskoye, Donetsk Republic.

Difficult territory. We see our goal as providing people with the necessary infrastructure. Unfortunately, everything there was destroyed by the enemy. This year there was light, now we are working to ensure that there is water, should appear this year. And of course, we repair buildings. Very close to the front line. Unfortunately, enemies interfere with your work.

Given its location, the results are impressive. Overall, the trip was a smashing success, not just the Summit results. As many will note, the degree of soft power on exhibition by Russia dwarfs that of the entire West. One question begged is why does Trump seek investment opportunities in the Russian Arctic when America’s Arctic is so underdeveloped. Is it because US Big Business doesn’t want or can’t afford to spend the money developing the required infrastructure and would rather piggyback on the investments Russia’s already made and the infrastructure it’s built?

There’s plenty to digest between the above and all the other commentary being made about the Summit now and over the next several days. Then discussion will turn to the Trump-Zelensky meeting and the chances for Trump going to Moscow. And perhaps the Zionists will try and attack Iran again to provide a distraction.

https://karlof1.substack.com/p/the-summit-and-after

******

Negotiations in Anchorage
August 16, 17:13



Negotiations in Anchorage

The Anchorage talks were an obvious success for Russia, which by the very fact of these talks finally destroyed the strategy of diplomatic isolation of Russia. The West had been pursuing this strategy towards it for years. Now it has become obvious to everyone that it has led the globalists into a dead end, since they were the ones who found themselves isolated from the talks.

Most of the agreements reached, as well as unresolved issues, remained outside the public sphere amid a sea of rumors and speculation. From the sparse statements of the parties, it is obvious that the parties reached certain agreements on a number of issues, but on a number of other issues (obviously related to Ukraine) they have not yet managed to come to a common denominator. Nevertheless, both sides interpret this result as their diplomatic success.

Notable is Trump's invitation to Minsk and Moscow, against the backdrop of the option of a trip to China in early September. Based on Lukashenko's statements, Trump has already agreed to travel to Minsk with his family, and based on Trump's statements, he is interested in the offer to come to Moscow. But Trump views these trips as a potential opportunity to organize a trilateral summit with the participation of the cocaine Fuhrer. For example, according to the scheme - the next round of negotiations takes place soon enough in Moscow, after which Trump and Putin go to Minsk, and there, with the mediation of Lukashenko, the cocaine Fuhrer signs some conditions (although his signature is obviously legally null and void and can be easily disavowed).

It is important to understand that Russia, when it agrees on something with the United States, is responsible only for itself, and the United States is actually conducting separate negotiations, since they formally represent not only themselves, but also the EU and Ukraine. To whom Trump must convey and impose the agreements reached. Because in addition to Trump's consent to something, the European satellites and Kiev puppets must do the same. The United States has the ability to force them. If for some reason they cannot/do not want to impose the agreements reached with the Russian Federation on them, then they can, of course, be easily sabotaged.

Well, as for the goals of the SVO, it is unclear from the public part of the negotiations whether there are already agreements reached that will allow the Russian Federation to achieve some goals by non-military means. At the same time, the official position remains unchanged - the goals of the SVO must be achieved, the Russian Federation will not change its constitutional territories, the conditions put forward by Putin in the summer of 2024 are still in force, if they are not accepted, the next conditions will be worse.
And at the same time, Russia is sending signals that it is not against peace, but if the enemy does not want it, then Russia is ready to continue fighting and achieve its goals by military means, which is well facilitated by the August tempo of operations, which will peak in 2025.

So, overall, the summit is truly historic on the one hand and reflects the advent of a new world, but it has not become a "new Yalta" or "new Malta". If the negotiations between Trump and Putin continue, it will be perceived as a kind of first formal step towards transforming the relationship between the US and Russia. If everything fades and fails, then Anchorage 2025 will be viewed as an unsuccessful attempt and a missed chance to de-escalate the current Cold War of the West against Russia with the risks of a nuclear war.

So far, events are developing rather according to a moderately optimistic scenario. Trump, in the public arena after negotiations with Putin, began to tilt the cocaine Fuhrer, declaring that he needs to make concessions (which are fatal for him). Whether this is really so - we will see from Trump's negotiations with vassals and satellites, as well as from a possible repeat meeting between Trump and Putin.

P.S. The photo shows 2 meetings with a difference of 7 years.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/10014040.html

On the issues of working with historical memory
August 16, 19:17



On issues of historical memory, the following seems necessary

Close and repurpose the Yeltsin Center
Return Dzerzhinsky to Lubyanka
Rename Volgograd to Stalingrad
Dismantle Polish memorials associated with Katyn.
Eliminate the remaining traces of the glorification of the Czechoslovak Corps.
To erect a monument to Ivan the Terrible, and not only in Vologda.
Eliminate the remnants of attempts to glorify collaborators.
Erect a monument in Moscow to the North Koreans who died in the North Korean War.
Create a single memorial to foreign volunteers who died in the North Military District.
Create a memorial in the Far East in honor of the victory over Japan.
Finally, erect a monument to Prince Potemkin in Sevastopol.
The idea with 3 flags (RI, USSR, RF) in St. Petersburg should be implemented in Sevastopol and Vladivostok, as a symbol of the unity of the country and its history.
To recognize at the state level the role of Lavrentiy Beria in the creation of the country's nuclear shield.
Create a central memorial dedicated to the militias and volunteers of Donbass from 2014-2021.

P.S. I won't write about new monuments to Stalin, since dozens of them will be erected in the coming years, of varying quality.

What would you add to this list?

(I would put the ROC back in the box they were in before the Great Patriotic War. And get Lenin out of that box the capitalists put him in: let Communists bury him in due time. And forget the reactionary notion of 'Russian Civilization': love Peter or hate him, it is History, read it and weep.)

I am Russian. And a little Korean.
August 16, 22:48



North Korea is trendy and mainstream these days.
You should go to the DPRK.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/10014906.html

Google Translator

[blindpig]

This is how Russia is perceived in the New World

Strategic Infographics

August 16, 2025

From the Americas to Australia and Oceania, public opinion on Russia reveals stark contrasts – ranging from cautious neutrality to deep skepticism.



https://strategic-culture.su/news/2025/ ... new-world/

******

Brian McDonald: Do Russians have toilets? Why that question tells us more about you than about them
August 17, 2025 natyliesb
By Brian McDonald, Substack, 6/9/25

Brian McDonald is an Irish journalist long based in Russia.

You see it all the time on X. Some blue-check warrior parroting a long-dead statistic, grinning to themselves as they jab out: “Russia doesn’t even have toilets.”

It was out in force again this weekend, stirred up by my Substack post, “Is Russia’s Economy Really Just Spain and Portugal? Let’s Do the Math.”

It’s the kind of smirk that aims to end debate before it begins—as if flushable porcelain were the final measure of geopolitical relevance. The reasoning, such as it is, runs like this: if some Russians use outhouses, then Russia is primitive, and therefore nothing it does can matter.

It’s rubbish. Lazy, brittle rubbish that should have been flushed long ago. But since the u-bend of discourse keeps spitting it back up, let’s deal with it properly.

Fresh from Rosstat—Russia’s state statistics agency—we now know that 91.8% of Russian residences have indoor toilets. That’s more than nine in ten homes, across a landmass that stretches from the Baltic to the Bering Sea, Arctic tundra to Caucasus ridge.

Of these: 77.1% are hooked up to centralized sewerage; 6.2% use septic tanks or the like; 13.7% rely on piped cesspits. Meanwhile, just 0.4% said they had no toilet at all.

These aren’t guesses pulled off a Reddit thread. They come from a rigorous, face-to-face survey of 60,000 households across every region of the Russian Federation in 2024.

So where does the myth come from?

Simple: Russia is vast. It contains some of the most remote, unforgiving terrain on the planet. In places like Yakutia, where the mercury dives to -50°C, laying sewer pipes is less public works and more madness. The same goes for highland hamlets in Dagestan or indigenous settlements hugging the Arctic rim. Infrastructure there isn’t about budget. It’s about thermodynamics.

And then there are the dachas—summer cabins, deliberately spartan, where urbanites escape the city and embrace simplicity. Plenty of Moscow professionals are content to use an outhouse for two weekends in July. That doesn’t make Russia a basket case any more than it makes Finns barbarians for loving a cabin sauna.

Still, the trope hangs around. Its chief propagator? A 2019 article from The Moscow Times (a Dutch outlet, despite the name) that wouldn’t pass inspection in any functioning bathroom.

There’s also a shift happening. More Russians are trading flats for homes, moving to the suburban edges. Many choose septic systems not because they’re forced to, but because they prefer autonomy. It’s the same setup you’ll find in most of rural Ireland.

We can have a serious debate about Russia—its politics, economy, war, or trajectory. But we cannot have that debate if the opening gambit is, “They don’t even have toilets.”

It’s not just false. It’s cowardly. A smirk in place of a thought. A meme instead of a fact. It says: Don’t analyse. Don’t map. Don’t think. Just laugh and move on.

To which the only proper response is: grow up. The world is more complicated than your favourite punchline.

Russia has toilets. Russia has sewerage. It also has oil, wheat, reactors, satellites, aircraft, and yes—some furiously cold villages.

If your best contribution is an outhouse gag, then maybe your whole worldview belongs in one.

https://natyliesbaldwin.com/2025/08/bri ... bout-them/

Interview: Richard Sakwa on Russia Since Perestroika
August 15, 2025

Natalyie Baldwin asks the British author about the Soviet collapse, the 1990s, Vladimir Putin’s governance, the rise of a new cold war and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.


Richard Sakwa in 2014. (Jwh, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0)

By Natylie Baldwin
Special to Consortium News

Richard Sakwa is a British academic expert who has been a prolific author of books and articles on the Soviet Union and Russia. He is known as one of the best and most fair-minded experts on Russia in the English-speaking world. In this wide-ranging interview, Sakwa discusses many topics, from the collapse of the Soviet Union; Russia during the 1990’s; the nature of VladimirPutin’s governance; the rise of a new cold war and the Russia-Ukraine War.

Natylie Baldwin: According to Vladislav Zubok in his book Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union, while there were definitely systemic problems, the flaws in Mikhail Gorbachev as a leader seemed to ultimately be responsible for driving the Soviet Union off the proverbial cliff. On page four of his book, he writes:

“It is axiomatic that the Soviet economic system was wasteful, ruinous, and could not deliver goods to people…[But] scholars who studied the Soviet economy concluded that the economic system was destroyed not by its structural faults, but by Gorbachev-era reforms. The purposeful as well as unintended destruction of the Soviet economy, along with its finances, may be considered the best candidate as a principal cause of Soviet disintegration.”

Do you agree with this assessment?

Richard Sakwa: In broad terms, I agree with Zubok’s assessment. His book on the subject is among the best studies so far of Gorbachev’s reforms, along with William Taubman’s biography of Gorbachev. Zubok is right to note the structural flaws of the Soviet economic system, but at the same time dispassionate economists (ie, those without anti-Soviet axes to grind) agree that prior to perestroika the economy could have muddled on indefinitely. It was perestroika and ill-thought-out reforms that terminally destabilised the economy.

Natylie Baldwin: Zubok implies that Gorbachev’s philosophical reliance on Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin was what destroyed the Soviet Union as he had romanticized Lenin since his days as a student, believing that Lenin was the good guy of the revolution as opposed to Joseph Stalin being the bad guy, and Gorbachev surrounded himself with others who shared his views. Do you think his over reliance on Lenin was a major contributor to his mistakes or is that aspect overblown in your opinion?

Richard Sakwa: Perestroika was launched in the belief that a return to Lenin would provide the antidote to Stalinist excesses. In this spirit Gorbachev revived the slogan “All Power to the Soviets” and made some moves towards reviving the power of legislatures.

He also spoke in terms of reviving “socialist legality,” and much else in the Leninist spirit. The neo-Leninist version of reform remained dominant until, roughly, the 19th Party Conference, held in June-July that year.

After that point, Gorbachev veered towards a more liberal vision of socialism, culminating in the presentation of the draft party programme “Towards a Humane, Democratic Socialism” at the proposed Party congress in July-August 1991. If Gorbachev’s adherence to neo-Leninism can be criticised, then so, too, is his continued belief in some form of democratic socialism.

A number of issues emerge. First, what sort of Leninism are we talking about? Stephen Cohen famously resurrected the Bukharinist model, which in his reading prefigured some of the aspects revived by Gorbachev.

This in turn raises the fundamental questions that were debated in the early years of Soviet power. The Democratic Centralists, for example, in 1919 precisely demanded a more balanced relationship between the Bolshevik Party and the Soviets. They of course were defeated.

No less important, the Workers’ Opposition in 1920 sought to ensure greater responsibility for the trade unions. Above all, there is the question of violence and coercion. Lenin accepted the New Economic Policy in 1921, but at the same time clamped down on inner-party discussions through his “ban on factions,” which allowed Stalin to consolidate his power, and then end the NEP in the late 1920s.

Second, to what degree did the neo-Leninist approach consciously model itself on Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in China from 1978? This in turn raises the question about the degree to which the Chinese reforms were applicable to a very different socio-economic context in the U.S.S.R. There is an extensive literature on this.

The way I conceptualise the debate is to distinguish between “reform communism,” of the sort practiced by Gorbachev, and the “communism of reform,” the Deng Xiaoping model implemented in China.

Reform communism drew on the Czechoslovak experience of “socialism with a human face” in 1968. Gorbachev met one of the future Czech reformers while at Moscow State University in the early 1950s and stayed in touch.

Reform communism is a very different model, in which the party stays in charge and implements market reforms. The bottom line ultimately is that Gorbachev tended towards the former, but never really had a clear idea of how to go about this and certainly was unable to enthuse the people to follow this model.

The problem was that Gorbachev’s reforms came 20 years too late. The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was the greatest self-invasion in history: blocking reform in the Soviet Union itself, and then when they came, they had lost their historical relevance.


Gorbachev with East Germany’s Erich Honecker in April 1986. (Bundesarchiv, CC-BY-SA 3.0, Wikimedia Commons)

In short, the question of Lenin is a fascinating one. In the end, Gorbachev even jettisoned the liberal Leninism (communism of reform) and entered into an intellectual dead zone, allowing all sorts of ideological entrepreneurs to fill the vacuum, usually with pre-digested ideas of the Soviet Union joining the main highway of civilisation — as if a “rectifying revolution” (to use Habermas’ term) solved all the problems and did away with the need for a genuinely political process of substantive debate, constrained in the first instance by the reformed power system. Instead, Gorbachev delegitimated that power system, then dismantled it, but was unable to provide coherent intellectual or institutional alternatives.

“Gorbachev even jettisoned liberal Leninism … and entered into an intellectual dead zone, allowing all sorts of ideological entrepreneurs to fill the vacuum.”

Natalyie Baldwin: My takeaway from the Zubok book is that Gorbachev had grandiose goals and ideas but no understanding of how to actually reform the economy. He likely meant well, but he was afflicted with a problem common with intellectuals who immerse themselves in abstractions but don’t have practical knowledge of how to get things done constructively in the real world. It also seems that he became more preoccupied in later years with getting approval from the West than getting a handle on concrete problems in his own country. What do you think?

Richard Sakwa: Some of this was covered in my previous response but let me add some comments on the West. On one level, the charge of excessive Westernism is a fair one. The New Political Thinking in foreign policy junked much of what was considered the excessively dogmatic Marxist-Leninist approach to foreign policy.

This was not Gorbachev’s choice alone. The NPT had long been maturing in the Institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (above all IMEMO) and rejected some of the fundamental postulates of earlier thinking: that the capitalist powers were inherently militaristic and aggressive and that an enduring rapprochement with them was possible. It turns out that the Soviet critique of the capitalist powers had more to it than some of the reformers believed, especially on the essential militarism and expansionism.

Nevertheless, it is important to stress that when Gorbachev brought the Cold War to an end, he was not capitulating to the “collective West’s” model of world order.

“It turns out that the Soviet critique of the capitalist powers had more to it than some of the reformers believed, especially on the essential militarism and expansionism.”

Instead, he returned to the Soviet aspirations at the end of the Second World War — that some sort of system of great-power comity could overcome the logic of cold war. In turn, this was based on a common vision of allowing the international system established at that time in the form of the United Nations to be allowed to work as its creators hoped in 1945.

Thus, Gorbachev was appealing to the Charter International System, and not to what I call the Political West’s model of world order. Alternative models of world order — the socialist and the capitalist — in his view could coexist amicably. This was naïve, but the issue remains on the agenda — in a far more tragic and polarised form – to this day.

Instead, it was Boris Yeltsin who hoped to join the Political West. He was soon disabused of this notion, with NATO expansion taking the place of the Partnership for Peace in 1994, although many in the Russian elite entertain the idea to this day.

Vladimir Putin in the early years of his leadership, although more cautiously, believed that Russia could join the Political West as an equal. When he understood that this was not possible, the long road to war began.

At the same time, the notion of “the West” needs to be disaggregated. There is the Political West created during the Cold War and shaped by cold war thinking. Today we are witnessing a gradual divorce between the two wings of this Atlantic power system, Brussels and Washington, but that is another question.

There is also the Civilisational West, the era of global expansion from 1492, which is also the backdrop to many debates today, with the anti-colonial motif part of the Russian repertoire, explicitly since September 2022.

Western countries are also still trying to come to terms with their imperial and colonialist pasts.

Finally, there is Cultural Europe, a distinctive representation of the West drawing on its Judaeo-Christian heritage and Greco-Roman-Byzantine legacy. Russia is an integral part of this West, and it is one that means that any “post-Western” Russia will always remain European in this form.

Natalyie Baldwin: In his book, Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives and in various writings and presentations, the late Stephen F. Cohen suggested that it was a combination of the personalities of Gorbachev (who had a major will for reform — including the tendency to derogate power away from himself) and Boris Yeltsin (who had a major will to power — on behalf of which he was able to exploit Gorbachev’s derogation of his own power) and the greed of the various Soviet elites for the country’s wealth.

He also seems to suggest that the Soviet Union could have been reformed as it had been several times in its past (Lenin’s NEP program and Khrushchev’s various reforms). What do you think of Cohen’s explanation for the end of the Soviet Union? Do you agree that it may have been reformable?

Richard Sakwa: One has to praise Stephen Cohen for the boldness and originality of his thinking, and the courage with which he pursued his ideas.

As for his core argument, that the Soviet Union was reformable – he was proved right. The country did reform. By 1988 the Soviet Union was no longer recognisably communist.

However, as noted earlier, although the society became more open, with “glasnost” in full flood, the back-handed pursuit of an anachronistic model of communism of reform while dismantling the “communism” part of the equation led to disaster. The “dissolution” of communism was one thing: but the “disintegration” of the institutions of state power, and ultimately the country itself, in another.

Cohen was also right about the destructive character of the Yeltsinite insurgency. While promoted through democratic rhetoric, the Yeltsinite attack on Gorbachev was populist to the core. However, its demagogic power came from identifying genuine problems with Gorbachev’s approach, above all his endless procrastination over the appropriate model of economic reform.


Yeltsin in Moscow, waving at reporters, August 1991. (Kremlin.ru /Wikimedia Commons /CC BY 4.0)

In the end, Yeltsin used the power of Russian nationalism to destroy the Soviet Union and to seize power from Gorbachev. He soon found that the under-institutionalisation of the new state rendered it susceptible to the plunderers and bootleggers of the “shock therapy” era.

In short, there are two questions here.

First, could Soviet communism be reformed? The answer is unequivocally yes, with wiser leadership and a clear strategic direction, with neo-Leninism giving way to liberal Leninism and then some sort of substantive post-Leninist equilibrium.

However, this intersects catastrophically with the second question: could the Soviet Union survive? Gorbachev certainly believed that some sort of confederated Union of Sovereign States could have been created.

With hindsight, we could argue that this would have been the best solution, without perhaps the Baltic and South Caucasus republics. Yeltsin wrenched history in another direction. We have still not found an adequate security framework and political order for North Eurasia.

Natalyie Baldwin: Last December, the National Security Archive published a 1994 memo by E. Wayne Merry, a U.S. diplomat in Moscow who provided an on-the-ground assessment of U.S. policies toward a Russia that was in chaos.

In his memo — sent by telegram — Merry criticized the U.S. tendency to prioritize experimental shock therapy rather than laying the foundation for the rule of law.

He also said that Russia’s historical and cultural experience was not conducive to the same lionization of unfettered free markets that Americans had.

What are your thoughts on Merry’s memo? Why do you think decision makers in Washington were not able to understand Merry’s critique of U.S. policy toward Russia at that time and act accordingly?

Richard Sakwa: Merry’s document is one of the most powerful critiques of the economic policies of the early 1990s. His arguments fell on deaf ears in Washington.

This was the heyday of the Clintonite vision of an expansive West, in the guise of “globalisation” and the unfettered dominance of capital, accompanied by the erosion of state capacity and the neoliberal de-legitimation of state activism in the economic sphere (except in saving capitalism — occasionally — from its excesses). The inability to understand the historical and cultural experience of other civilisations and states remains to this day.

“Merry’s document is one of the most powerful critiques of the economic policies of the early 1990s. His arguments fell on deaf ears in Washington.”

This was the era in which liberal globalism was radicalised by the fall of the alternative, Soviet-led, order, giving rise to hubristic notions that the experience of the Political West was of universal applicability. We are still coming to terms with the illusions of that era.

Liberal globalism combines a political project based on reified notions of “freedom;” an economic agenda demanding free markets, open trade and minimum state management of the economy; and a geopolitical ambition to maintain the primacy of the U.S.

These three elements were not always compatible but nevertheless created a powerful model of world order in the first eight postwar decades.

Liberal globalism, variously described as the liberal international order, liberal hegemony or the rules-based international order, entailed an entitlement, if not obligation, to interfere in the internal affairs of states if they are believed to have contravened elements of the normative order represented by the Political West.

Today, as liberal globalism gives way to Trumpian mercantile globalism, the imperial dynamic remains, but in a more fragmented and incoherent form.

Putin’s Governance


Putin at the Motherland Monument in St. Petersburg on Jan. 27, the 81st anniversary of the complete liberation of Leningrad from the Nazi siege. (Kremlin)

Natalyie Baldwin: You’ve written a series of political biographies of Vladimir Putin in which you cover different periods of his rule. Your most recent book on this is The Putin Paradox in which you describe in detail how Putin governs, why and what has influenced him.

You mention that the two historical events that have most influenced Putin are World War II and the collapse of the ’90s. We just discussed the collapse of the Soviet Union, can you explain how that shaped Putin’s thinking both in terms of his relations with the West and his domestic policy? How does the legacy of World War II affect Putin’s decision-making?

Richard Sakwa: The final point first. Russian society remains traumatised by the Second World War. The loss of 27 million people is never going to be forgotten. The war also brought the U.S.S.R. to its pinnacle as a great power.

This was semi-institutionalised in the form of permanent membership of the U.N. Security Council; but more than this, in 1945 Moscow believed that the great power comity forged in the war against Nazi Germany (and Japan) would continue.

“Russian society remains traumatized by the Second World War. The loss of 27 million people is never going to be forgotten.”

Instead, it was abruptly terminated. This is not the place to go into the origins of the Cold War, but the key point is that an alternative dynamic was possible, as outlined by, for example, Henry Wallace at the time; and of course, Roosevelt himself earlier.

The Soviet victory is plugged for all it is worth in the Russian media today, but the enduring legacy and memory of the war is also an autonomous feature of Russian society — exploited no doubt by the regime, but genuine in its own terms.

As for societal and economic collapse and disintegration in the “terrible nineties,” some Western commentators argue that Russia and Putin personally exaggerate the damage, and no doubt they do — but that does not take away the extent of the near societal collapse of the time: an economic collapse greater than in the Great Depression of the 1930s, the rise of criminality, high mortality etc. There is also the “Moscow is silent” syndrome; the collapse in state capacity and ability to defend Russia’s national interests. Already in the late 1990s Evgeny Primakov addressed these issues, hence the high standing he enjoys today.


In 1998 Russians protest the economic depression caused by the market reforms with the banner saying: “Jail the redhead!” a reference to Anatoly Chubais, Russian politician and economist responsible for the privatization program in Russia under President Boris Yeltsin. (Pereslavl Week, Yu. N. Chastov, Wikimedia Commons, CC-BY-SA 3.0)

Already in his Millennium Manifesto in the last days of 1999 Putin vowed to restore state capacity, and to do so in manner consonant with Russian traditions. And he has gone on to do so, in his own way. In the first instance he curbed the power of the “oligarchs,” thus preventing the development of an independent bourgeoisie; and no less important, he fought back against the development of semi-autonomous fiefdoms in the regions and republics. This has allowed a genuinely national market to be consolidated; but admittedly, at a high cost in terms of genuine federalism and a competitive democracy.

Natalyie Baldwin: We hear many people in the Western political and media class talk about Putin’s past as a KGB officer as though that is the single most important factor in shaping him. I’m sure that has had an influence on Putin, but I think there are other factors that are just as important such as the fact that he’s a trained lawyer. You state on page seven of The Putin Paradox that Putin’s legal training provides a check on his pragmatic inclination to get things done and achieve results:

“[S]o even if ends shape means, formal adherence to the law and regulations remain paramount in his statecraft. Although the foundations of a capitalist democracy were established in the 90s, the Putin years saw the development of the legal and regulatory framework for a market economy and a liberal democracy.”

There’s a lot to unpack there.

First, can you talk about how Putin’s legal training has influenced him in general as a leader?

Second, can you explain specifically what he did to provide a foundation for the legal/regulatory framework of a market economy and a liberal democracy?

When I bring these things up to people, they not only tend to be completely unaware of them, they are shocked at the idea that Putin has done anything to build democracy and the rule of law.

Richard Sakwa: The Putin system of governance is based on legal formalism: a positivist view of law, applied as an instrument of governance. This is apparent, for example, in the endless tinkering with laws regulating party formation and governing elections.

This is based on the dual state idea. In my view, this already emerged in the 1990s (and has much deeper historical roots). On the one hand, until 2020 at least, Putin assiduously developed the formal framework of the constitutional state, and on this based the legitimacy of his rule. Elections are held with punctilious (over) regulation, parliamentary procedures observed, and political parties formally contend.

However, all this was increasingly over-shadowed by the political regime (the administrative state), based in the Kremlin but cascading across the country.

This entails micro-management of politics on a grand scale. The constitutional “reform” of 2020, which allowed Putin to run for two more terms, represents a rupture in this model, with elements introduced into the 1993 constitution that are antithetical to the liberal and democratic spirit of that era; and perhaps worse from the perspective of the positivist pragmatism of high Putinism, introduced destabilizing elements, including making the instrumentalisation of rule by law more obvious than earlier.

However, focusing on your question, the economy has developed within a market framework. Even today the wartime “military Keynesianism” has so far only intensified dirigisme rather than replacing it with a fully-fledged planned or directed economy.

Natalyie Baldwin: I recall an academic expert on Russia — it may have been you — saying that there had been a steady move toward more democracy — or at least, not any backsliding on it — through about 2018 and then there started to be more repressive actions. Is that true and, if so, why do you think there was a change in 2018-2019? Obviously, there was more repression of free speech after February of 2022. Do you think there will be a relaxation of these measures after the war ends?

Richard Sakwa: It was not me. I have charted how competitive democracy has been on the retreat since 1991, and in a different way after 2000.

There was however a high degree of societal pluralism within the system, although eviscerated in the constitutional state. The form remains, but not the content, which requires a vibrant and independent media and public sphere.

Things became worse after 2018 and after the staging of the FIFA World Cup for one simple reason: the confrontation over Ukraine, and prospect of intensified conflict. The regime prepared for a preventive war once the impasse in relations with the Political West reached breaking point.

Natalyie Baldwin: In your book you describe how there is an administrative state that exists alongside the formal constitutional state in Russia.

Can you explain what the administrative state is in Russia, how it works and the tensions between it and the constitutional state? What are the consequences — both good and bad — of this dichotomy? Does the existence of the administrative state benefit or hinder Putin? What would need to happen to advance the constitutional state and lessen the influence of the administrative state?

Richard Sakwa: The administrative state works and is a viable form of public administration, but it inevitably suffers from intensifying internal contradictions: corruption, nepotism, removal of independent sources of innovation and initiative. In other words, it provides mechanical stability by endless manual interventions, just as in the Soviet Union — and we know how that ended. It prevents the emergence of more organic forms of stability, and stasis sets in.

However, there is one key point. Russia has a highly personal system of rule, focused on the top man himself, but I would hesitate to go so far as to call it “personalistic.” Procedures are followed, the institutions work according to their normative precepts, and the source of legitimacy remains the constitution and its forms, although flouted in spirit and ignored when necessary. However, the exception has not yet become the rule.

That is why, like Stephen Cohen about the Soviet Union, I believe that there remains the potential for an evolution towards a more open and competitive political order. A radical rupture in the form of a revolution would undermine the existing gains.

I have continued to visit Russia in recent years, and I have been struck by the continuing vibrancy of the political culture. In simple terms, a lot of people, within the political elite, the academic community and the business world, irrespective of whether supportive or critical of the present regime, understand that mechanical stability has to give way at a certain point to more organic forms. Otherwise, the Russia of today will suffer the same fate as that of the Soviet Union.

Natalyie Baldwin: You state in your book that, despite the fact that elections aren’t as competitive as they could be and the constitutional state competes with the administrative state, the Kremlin keeps a finger on the pulse of broad public opinion and doesn’t try to stray from that.

It reminded me a bit of China and how it has other means of being responsive to public opinion in the absence of elections. This admittedly reflects a more philosophical issue, but is it possible for a government to have popular legitimacy without all of the formal trappings of democracy that the West claims a government must have? If so, to what degree is that the case for Russia?

Richard Sakwa: That is exactly the point. There are many ways in which public goods can be delivered, and liberal democracy is from this perspective not always the most effective way of doing so. This is the argument that Daniel A. Bell Makes about China (The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy, 2015).

In addition, it’s clear that the democracy that we have in the U.K. and the U.S. is increasingly dysfunctional, condemning generations to marginalisation, poverty and subject to the whims of unaccountable political and economic power.

Further, as we see in the cancellation of the result of the November 2024 Romanian presidential election, democratism — the subordination of democratic outcomes to external manipulation – is rampant throughout the Political West. It is eroding the foundations and legitimacy of the Political West itself.

All that being said, these are not arguments to jettison democracy but to improve it; both at home and abroad. At home, the tide is turning against the neoliberal deconstruction of the democratic state. Abroad, we need to move away from liberal globalism towards greater respect for the sovereign internationalism at the heart of the Charter International System. This means engaging in a spirit of humility and pluralism vis-à-vis the way that other countries deal with these issues — as long as they remain constrained by the principles of the U.N. Charter. Democracy in the advanced capitalist countries is exhausted: out of ideas, and organisationally dysfunctional (as Colin Crouch argued two decades ago in his book Postdemocracy). The challenge is to revive it.

Natalyie Baldwin: In regards to what some still refer to in Russia as oligarchy, many have heard about the meeting Putin held with the Yeltsin-era oligarchs at the beginning of his rule in which he told them essentially that in order to keep their ill-gotten gains they had to pay taxes and stay out of politics. Can you explain the difference between how these rich tycoons operated in the Yeltsin era compared to the Putin era?

On page 93 of your book, you state:

“Although [Putin] changed the terms of the relationship between the state and top oligarchs, he inserted himself into the system and was unable or unwilling to challenge the underlying archaic culture of power and property driven by codes of loyalty and motives of personal profit.”

Can you explain what you meant by this?

Richard Sakwa: Putin’s famous meeting with leading oligarchs in July 2000 established the “rules of the road,” with business leaders told to stay out of state affairs and in return the authorities would allow business to get on with business. This effectively entailed the end of the oligarchs as a class, something that Putin vowed to achieve.

The definition of an oligarch is someone with economic clout seeking to exercise or shape political power, and after 2000 this no longer applied to the Russian business elite as a whole.

All business became vulnerable to the predatory behaviour of the regime and its officials. State capture gave way to business capture. Business leaders became part of a semi-corporatist flexible arrangement between the business elite and the Kremlin administration.

This fostered meta-corruption, favouring certain favoured business leaders over others, accompanied by kickbacks, rent skimming and uncompetitive tendering for major contracts.

This cannot be described as “crony state capitalism,” since Russia in the first two Putin decades was far from monolithic. Not everyone was a “Putin crony” or subordinated to the meta-corruption exercised by the regime. Russia retained elements of systemic pluralism, with macroeconomic policy in the hands of liberal economists.

A notable example is the career of the liberal economist Alexei Kudrin. He served as finance minister from 2000 to 2011, stabilising the rouble and finances. He opposed the diversion of scarce resources to military needs, and it was over this issue that he was sacked by President Dmitry Medvedev in September 2011.

Later that year he publicly supported more democratic and competitive elections, speaking at the protest rallies against electoral fraud. He later established the Centre for Strategic Research (CSR), an analytical group drafting economic reform ideas, and headed the Audit Chamber from 2018 to 2022.


Kudrin at his confirmation hearing in the State Duma on May 22, 2018. (Duma.gov.ru/Wikimedia Commons/ CC BY 4.0)

The economic liberals remain dominant, much to the chagrin of other factions. The economic liberals pursue an orthodox macroeconomic policy seeking to achieve balanced budgets and low inflation through tight credit and a reduced national debt, accompanied by a diversification strategy to reduce dependency on energy rents. Far from being governed by an omnipotent “vertical of power,” there was a relatively broad horizontal dispersion of authority. The liberal economic faction competed against the authoritarian political vertical.

This created space for autonomous companies to thrive (Tinkoff Bank, Yandex and many more), even if they had to be cognisant of the new conditions. And these conditions are what I mean by the archaic structures of power.

The term “autocracy” is often applied to describe Russia, but it is misleading. Despite many changes of system — Muscovy, Russian Empire, Soviet and “democratic” — Russia is an almost ungovernable country.

Excessive hierarchy seeks to counter irremediable centrifugal forces This gives rise to heterarchy — the horizontal dispersion of power and influence. Hence, as I have written elsewhere, there is a constant struggle between chaos and control — leading to the permanent reinvention of archaic methods to control the chaos.

“Despite many changes of system — Muscovy, Russian Empire, Soviet and ‘democratic’ — Russia is an almost ungovernable country.”

A positive gloss on this would be to argue that Russia’s intrinsic pluralism, strongly evident in the ideological sphere where no single idea dominates, remains the foundation for the democratic evolution of the polity.

Natalyie Baldwin: You point out that from 1999 to 2011, technocracy was the focus of the Putin government, but from 2012 on there was a shift to cultural issues that reflected moderate conservatism. Can you elaborate on this shift and why it happened?

Richard Sakwa: At the macro-level, the administrative regime stands above a divided society and a fragmented party-representative system. Four major ideational-factional blocs shape Russian political society, each with its perspective on how Russia should be governed. The four are internally divided, but they share interests, ideological perspectives and in some cases a professional commonality. The so-called ‘conservative turn’ focused on certain identity issues but did not fundamentally change the enduring factional character of Russian politics. At least four macro-factions can be identified.

First, the views of the liberal bloc are far more influential than the paltry proportion of votes won in recent elections. The bloc is divided between economic liberals, focusing on macroeconomic stability; legal constitutionalists, the inheritors of Boris Chicherin’s statism; and radicals, who look to the West for inspiration.

They are challenged by the second group, the okhraniteli–siloviki (those working in or affiliated with the security apparatus). They consider themselves responsible for ‘guarding’ Russia from domestic and foreign enemies, part of Russia’s long ‘guardianship’ (okhranitel’) tradition. They view Russia as a besieged fortress, and it is their sacred duty to defend the country from internal and external enemies. Pursuing a sacred duty to defend ‘fortress Russia’, they have also claimed certain privileges, including personal enrichment. The group is deeply factionalised, between and within its constituent institutions, generating complex mechanisms of internal control. Some have used their powers for personal enrichment and at the margins merge with the criminals. The military is naturally part of this bloc, but their concern is defending the country whereas the okhraniteli–siloviki focus on defending the regime. In his third term, particularly in his Crimea unification speech of 18 March 2014, Putin adopted some of the language of this faction.

Third, the diverse bloc of neo-traditionalists ranges from monarchists, neo-imperialists, neo-Stalinists to Russian nationalists to moderate conservates. The use of the term ‘traditionalist’ highlights the backward-looking character of this group, seeking the model of Russia’s future in representations of the past, while the “neo” prefix means that the traditionalism is adapted to present-day concerns.

Neo-traditionalists defend Russian exceptionalism (hence become nationalists, even when they reject the word) and assert statism at home and great power concerns abroad. The main platform for the bloc since 2012 has been the Izborsky Club, founded to preserve Russia’s “national and spiritual identity” and to provide an intellectual alternative to liberalism.

They felt that their moment had come with the onset of the so-called Russian Spring in early 2014, and some even dreamed of bringing the Donbas insurgency to Moscow to sweep out the liberals and even the endlessly temporising Putin.

Putin survived over two decades in power not for nothing and soon cut them back to size. The neo-traditionalist bid for hegemony was thwarted, but with the onset of war in Ukraine they have reasserted their dominance.

From 2012, with the notion of Russia as a civilisation state, the intensification of anti-liberal measures in the sphere of identity politics (restrictions on the LGBT+ community) and much else, Putin tilted towards the neo-traditionalists — but even then, characteristically, he kept his options open — as he has done to this day.

Eurasianists comprise the fourth category, in part overlapping in personnel and views with the neo-traditionalists, and many of them participate in the work of the Izborsky Club.

However, there is an important distinction. Neo-traditionalists are critical of the West, but the reference point for their modernisation agenda and cultural matrix remains essentially European. They wish to overcome the stigma of backwardness to make Russia a great power, but within the framework of a Western hierarchy of power and values.

By contrast, the ideology of the Eurasianists is rooted in a foundational anti-Westernism. They have devised a whole cosmology explaining why Russia and what they call “Romano-Germanic” civilisation are incompatible. Although torn by divisions, they are united in the view that there is a fundamental incompatibility between Russia and the West.

Thinkers such as Alexander Dugin maintain the earlier uncompromising hostility accompanied by much speculation on geopolitics, the coming apocalypse and Heideggerian notions of the existential exhaustion of Western civilisation. Dugin has never been an advisor to the Kremlin and he can only dream of the success of the Bannonite alt-right in America.

None of these four paradigms has become hegemonic and together they represent the character of contemporary Russian society. The Putin leadership draws on all of the blocs but is dependent on none (including the siloviki, despite his background in the security services). Competing groups and ideas are kept in permanent balance, drawing on them all but not dominated by any. Putin acts as the arbiter between the macro-factions, which involves mediating between elite groups and institutions. Each participates in policy making and the political process in general, but none has yet captured the state or set its own line as that of the regime. Macro-factional balancing ensures that intra-elite conflict is minimised, and Putin can rule with a minimum of coercion. Even today, in the middle of a dreadful war, there are some 2,000 political prisoners: that’s 2,000 too many, but it could obviously be far worse.

“Macro-factional balancing ensures that intra-elite conflict is minimised and Putin can rule with a minimum of coercion.”

Natalyie Baldwin: With respect to conservatism in Russia, can you talk about what that means compared to conservatism in the U.S./West? According to surveys I’m aware of, the majority of Russians are fine with women and men sharing the responsibilities of heading a household, there doesn’t seem to be a serious movement to place more restrictions on abortion, and Putin has declined in the past to bring back the death penalty. While Russians may have more religious sentiment than westerners, they also seem to still support keeping a formal separation of church and state. Is it accurate to say that Russians are mainly culturally conservative on gay and trans issues or is it more complicated?

Richard Sakwa: I think you have formulated it very well. There is strong pressure from the neo-traditionalists, okhraniteli and others to move from conservatism to obscurantism and full-scale revanchism against liberals, but this remains at the elite level. The society remains tolerant — in a paradoxical way, in part a legacy of the Enlightenment values proclaimed by Soviet-style socialism.

Natalyie Baldwin: I found your assertion that the Putin government views Russian ethnic nationalists as more threatening than liberals to be very interesting. Can you explain why you think that? Also, can you tell us the distinction you make between ethnic nationalism and your characterization of Putin as a civic nationalist or statist?

Richard Sakwa: Putin warned from the beginning that unleashing Russian (or any other) ethno-nationalism would destroy the foundations of the Russian state. According to official statistics, ethnic Russians comprise just under 80 percent of the total population of 144 million in the 83 core regions, but the rest are made up of at least 146 autochthonous peoples, and a total of some 200 different nationalities. In response, Putin stresses loyalty to the Russian state, its traditions and the formal institutions of the constitutional state. However, he did make a concession to the ethno-nationalists in the 2020 constitutional amendments, with the Russian language described as ‘state forming’. This is as far as he would go, disappointing those who wanted to see Russians as a group described as state forming. The regime is also under great pressure from neo-traditionalists, above all in the Russian Orthodox Church, severely to restrict abortion, but so far this has been largely resisted.

Natalyie Baldwin: What do you think will come after Putin — collapse of the current Putin system or will something similar to it carry on? It seems to me a lot depends on how wisely Putin chooses/grooms a successor.

Richard Sakwa: This is a question that will be raised with increasing urgency. As Putin enters his 70s, there is much speculation about a successor. One of the most frequent names mentioned, with all the appropriate characteristics — loyalty, experience and ideological commonality — is Alexei Dyumin.

For years he had been part of the security team protecting Putin and had then led the Special Operations Forces in the annexation of Crimea.

In May 2024 Putin appointed Dyumin secretary of the State Council, a body designed to provide Putin with a haven in the event of his retirement. From there Putin could act as a senior statesman, removed from current matters but overseeing the overall strategic direction of the country. This would follow the pattern set by Deng in China and Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore.

Above all, as argued above, an evolutionary outcome in my view is not only possible, but essential. A new “time of troubles” or another 1917 or 1991 has to be avoided at all reasonable costs.

Those calling for regime change and even the forceful removal of the “Putin regime,” however desirable change may be, should be aware that the disintegration of a country with some 6,000 nuclear weapons and a diverse population would be catastrophic for all concerned. Above all, as I have suggested earlier, there is an inherent pluralism in society, and there is no reason why this cannot be given more organic political expression, above all in the form of a more competitive party system, adjudicated by an impartial state. The outcome of free and fair elections may well not be to the liking of the West, since the alienation from the Political West runs very deep.

“The disintegration of a country with some 6,000 nuclear weapons and a diverse population would be catastrophic for all concerned.”

Natalyie Baldwin: The policy missteps that the Obama and Biden administrations in particular have made with respect to Putin and which have led to blowback (reinforcing Putin’s power and popularity as opposed to regime change, strengthening the Russian economy and weakening the EU’s, provoking the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, etc.) seem to reflect a profound incompetence in understanding the country and consequently counterproductive policies. Can you comment on this? Is it poor education of Western elites in the post-Soviet era of Russia studies, is it hubris, is it ideological blinders?

Richard Sakwa: It is a combination of all these factors. They can be combined under the rubric of cold war. In my recent book The Culture of the Second Cold War, I argue that the founding of the U.N. represented a moment when a positive peace order appeared in prospect — what can be called “the spirit of 1945.”


In a posed shot taken in April 1945, 2nd Lt. William Robertson of the U.S. Army and Lt. Alexander Silvashko of the Red Army commemorate the meeting of the Soviet and American armies. (Pfc. William E. Poulson, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Wikimedia Commons, Public Domain)

The meeting of Soviet and American forces on the Elbe in April 1945 demonstrated the possibility of cooperation between the great powers to achieve common goals. Coming out of the most catastrophic war in its history, in establishing the Charter International System humanity vowed that it could do better. “Never again” was the resounding anima of the time.

In the event, within two years Cold War I was in full flood. In a cold war, the practices of a negative peace predominate, where the potential for war is ever-present, but all parties strive to limit escalation under the shadow of the nuclear cloud.

The spirit of 1945 was revived at the end of the Cold War in 1989. The potential for a positive peace order was restored.

Once again, the opportunity was squandered (as described in my book The Lost Peace). The failure to build a European security order encompassing all of the states from Lisbon to Vladivostok generated tensions that ended in renewed cold war, and worse. Today, even a negative peace would be an achievement. The constraints and guardrails of the earlier cold war have not only been dismantled but the culture that generated them has been lost.

It remains a puzzle to me as to why this is the case. When I give talks, the most frequent question is why — why we have once again become embroiled in a cold war? Have we learned nothing from the past? I certainly do not have the definitive answer, but the following factors are involved.

First, the generation who participated in and then lived in the shadow of the Second World War is dying out, and with it the visceral horror of war. This is what gave impetus to the various anti-nuclear and peace movements from the 1950s to the 1980s, but the energy behind them has now dissipated — just when we need it the most. War as the continuation of policy, now armed by the moral certitude of having history on your side, has become normalised.

Second, following from the first point, the nuclear apocalypse seems to have lost some of its terror. A certain irresponsible recklessness has overtaken society, as if the earlier red lines no longer matter, in the belief that a nuclear war could be fought and won. There is even talk of the possibility of a ‘small’ and limited nuclear exchange. We are living through a slow-motion Cuban missile crisis, and if we survived by extraordinary chance the first-time round, we may not be so lucky this time.

“A certain irresponsible recklessness has overtaken society, as if the earlier red lines no longer matter, in the belief that a nuclear war could be fought and won.”

Third, the new generation of Western leaders has been socialised into accepting and policing the hyper-normality into which they were born.

Moral righteousness accompanied by ignorance and disdain for the “abnormality” outside of their garden of civilisation reinforces the recklessness and irresponsibility that their forebears would have considered contemptible. This point could — and should be — greatly developed, but I will leave it there for now.

Fourth, elements of the missionary zeal of 19th century liberal imperialism have been restored. This takes many forms, including a revival of the Russophobia that characterised that century, with a particular intensity during the Crimean War of 1853-56.

Fifth, there has been much talk over the years about the “strategic autonomy” of Europe. As we have seen in the recent period, this autonomy can take many forms, but without a genuine shift away from cold war thinking, that autonomy will be placed at the service of continued militarisation rather than developing a peace and security order for the whole continent.

Natalyie Baldwin: How do you think the Trump administration is performing with respect to its policy toward Russia and the Russia-Ukraine war?

Richard Sakwa: U.S. policy under Trump is inconsistent and contradictory. For a brief moment at the beginning of Trump’s second term there was a prospect of him fulfilling his purported first term programme — to seek rapprochement with Russia. Without that, there can be no basis for any lasting agreement. In the event, Trump unleashed has been a Trump even more untamed than before.

In brief, Trump in my view is undertaking four major defections (none complete, and some possibly reversible):

—from the Political West, with Washington and Brussels drifting apart, if not fully divorcing;

— from the Charter International System, including contempt for international law and Charter principles;

— from the U.S. Constitution, with law fare and executive orders taking the place of legislation;

— and from the American state, which is in one way or another being ‘deconstructed’, as per Bannon, leading to bad governance on an epic scale.

Natalyie Baldwin: How do you see the Russia-Ukraine war ending?

Richard Sakwa: There are many scenarios, and very few of them good. The bottom line is that the current Ukrainian leadership (whether in the form of Zelensky or some more amenable leader) will have to be coerced into making peace; but this reflects the overwhelming sentiments of the Ukrainian people, as reflected in recent surveys.

The EU/U.K. leaders actively oppose such a strategy, hence it will have to come from Washington, or it won’t come at all — apart from after even more severe battlefield defeats, if not a full-scale frontline collapse.

It is important to remember that the Russo-Ukrainian war is being fought in the foothills of the Third World war, and it will not take much to push it up that deadly hill. This could end very badly, and quite possibly with the extermination of the human race. I have been warning about the dangers for three decades – above all, the failure of the Political West to open up and move beyond Cold War trajectories.

“The Russo-Ukrainian war is being fought in the foothills of the Third World war, and it will not take much to push it up that deadly hill.”

A different question is how I would like to see the war end. I would like to see a North Eurasian confederation, from Lisbon to Vladivostok (at last), post-American (but not anti-American), in which existing institutions may fit (EU, NATO, EEU, CSTO and others), to provide a framework for European pan-continental rapprochement and security. This would transcend geopolitical dividing lines across North Eurasia, and above all allow Ukraine to rebuild as a multilingual, multi-confessional, pluralistic and genuinely multi-vector and inclusive polity, living in harmony with itself and its neighbours.

I have been calling for this for three decades, earlier in the idiom of the common European home, Greater Europe, de-Gaulle’s Europe from Lisbon to the Urals, and Francois Mitterrand’s European Confederation. It didn’t happen then, and I doubt that it will happen now. But it’s our only chance of avoiding a big war.

Natalyie Baldwin: The Grayzone reported a few months ago that you were the victim of a coordinated smear campaign by British intelligence in an attempt to silence voices who don’t parrot the establishment view on Russia. Can you briefly tell us what happened? How has this affected your work?

Richard Sakwa: So far it has not affected my work, but it may in the end affect far more than just my work. I need to look into this myself. In the last few months, I have focused on finishing my book The Russo-Ukrainian War: Follies of Empire and have not had time (or to be honest, the inclination) to look into the matter.

I can only add that on 13 June 2025 I was detained at Heathrow airport on my return from conferences in Tbilisi and Belgrade. Under the terms of the 2019 Counter-Terrorism Act, you can be kept for six hours, and silence is taken as an indication of having something to hide, leading to even worse consequences.

They questioned me for four hours and impounded my mobile phone and laptop (later returned, but with all contents downloaded), took fingerprints of fingers and palm, photographs from eight angles, and took my DNA.

All this without a predicate — evidence of wrongdoing. I was an academic going about lawful academic business. More than that, I am a professor of Russian politics (emeritus) and have been studying Russia and the Soviet Union for decades. That is my business, and it is now equated with subversion. This is an evident and obvious instance of political repression. It is as bad, if not worse, than anything during the first Cold War. McCarthyism has come home. The absurdity of the case is evident from the following, and I will let it speak for itself:

“We have reason to believe that you, Mr Sakwa, may be conducting hostile activity on behalf of the Russian state. Information indicates that you have been interviewed by individuals connected to the Russian state and Russian state media. The Russian state may therefore view you as a credible voice for propagating pro-Russian narratives seeking to undermine U.K. democracy. Should you maintain a relationship with individuals connected to the Russian state, these relationships may be connected with activity of national security concern.”

https://consortiumnews.com/2025/08/15/i ... restroika/

(Don't agree with all of Sakwa's analysis, nonetheless a worthwhile read.)

*****

Negotiations in Anchorage. Gigachad Edition
August 18, 15:04



Negotiations in Anchorage. Gigachad Edition

(Dunno how to get Russian gif to work.bp)

Author of the original drawing https://t.me/journal_joj/1428

Meanwhile:

Big meeting. Time for peace.
If Zelensky wants to act like a disrespectful clown again, we have the right team to deal with him (c) Steve Cortes, former senior adviser to US President Donald Trump

A transparent hint that if the cocaine Fuhrer arranges the same clown show as in February 2025 in the White House, this will have serious consequences.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/10017793.html

Google Translator

[blindpig]

Negotiations in Washington. 08/18/2025
August 19, 9:05



Negotiations in Washington. 08/18/2025

1. After the talks in Anchorage, Trump was faced with the task of selling the agreements with Putin to the cocaine Fuhrer and his European vassal, who, having gathered in a mighty group, tried to express their FE theses, which Trump voiced after the talks with Putin.

2. Based on the statements of Trump and Co. after the talks in Washington, Trump has already bent some of their demands (refusal of the dominant demand for a mandatory ceasefire on the LBS, refusal of NATO in exchange for guarantees outside NATO, readiness to discuss a "territory swap"). But not on all of them. Hence the throw-ins about the possible introduction of NATO troops into Ukraine, about which the Russian Federation immediately stated that this would not happen.

3. In general, despite the hype, there is no ready deal yet. Trump now says that it will take another 1-2 weeks to agree on the deal, during which a trilateral meeting of Putin, Trump and Zelensky, as well as a meeting of Putin and Zelensky, can take place. Russia has previously stated that it is not against such a meeting to finalize the agreements already reached and is currently talking about "raising the level of delegations" without specifying who might attend such a meeting.

4. Trump immediately called Putin after the talks in Washington and subsequently stated that he intends to continue calling him in the near future. Moscow has stated that it considers Trump's efforts constructive and making progress.

5. Overall, there is no deal yet, so the war continues. There will be no pauses for the duration of the talks. The processes will develop in parallel. The war separately, the talks separately.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/10019078.html

Trump invited to Russia
August 19, 17:09



Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed that Trump has received an official invitation to visit Russia. Trump has not yet officially confirmed that he will definitely come, limiting himself to a statement that this is an interesting offer. I would not be surprised if Trump really does appear in Russia before October.

Lavrov also commented on the topic of negotiations with Ukraine.

Russia does not refuse any formats of negotiations on Ukraine: neither bilateral nor trilateral.
Without respect for the security of Russia and the rights of Russians in Ukraine, there can be no talk of any long-term agreements.

The main message is that there will be no freezes without eliminating the root causes of the conflict.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/10020107.html

Google Translator

*******

Zelensky Drags Traveling Circus to Town for One Last Encore
Aug 18, 2025

The Trump admin is building a narrative critical mass that a truce and end to the war is getting closer and closer to being reached. Witkoff and Rubio went on a media offensive, for the first time describing various details of the claimed ceasefire agreements.

First, let us mention the most obvious thing, which is that Russia’s primary confirmed victory in the talks—as opposed to the various speculative parameters now floating about—was aligning the US with Putin’s demand of “agreement before ceasefire”, rather than Zelensky and Europe’s rival demand of “ceasefire before agreement”.

This alone was a big shift which Trump and co. immediately hopped-to as part of the ongoing strategy revision.

Now several mainstream outlets are reporting the contours of the deal and Russia’s claimed concessions as follows—from Reuters:

Reuters publishes Putin's proposals on Ukraine, presented to Trump at the summit:

- No ceasefire is planned before signing a full agreement.

- The Armed Forces of Ukraine will withdraw from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

- Russia will freeze the front lines in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions.

- Return control of areas in the Sumy and Kharkiv regions to Ukraine.

- Formal recognition of Russia's sovereignty over Crimea.

- Cancellation of at least part of the sanctions against Russia.

- Ukraine will be prohibited from joining NATO.

- Putin seems to have been open to Ukraine receiving certain security guarantees.

- Official status of the Russian language in some parts of Ukraine or throughout Ukraine, as well as the rights of the Russian Orthodox Church to operate freely.

The most buzz-generating claim is that Russia is allegedly ready to make concessions on giving up its pursuit of the remainder of uncaptured Zaporozhye and Kherson in exchange for getting all of Donetsk and Lugansk. The Zapo and Kherson frontline would be frozen where it is.

This, if true, would obviously be a huge departure from Russia’s earlier demands. It is difficult to believe, however, because Putin already signed both Zaporozhye and Kherson at their administrative borders into the Russian constitution, and thus there is no real mechanism of abandoning those uncaptured portions.

There are a variety of angles to this. Firstly, recall that media ‘reports’ about claimed Russian concessions have been proven fake every previous time. We went through it repeatedly: a media claim is made that Putin is ready to ‘concede’, and soon after a high ranking Russian official states that all previous ‘Istanbul plus’ demands are still in place.

But this time the claims are not from media and their ambiguous “sources”, but rather straight from Trump’s delegation. (Video at link.)

One possibility is that Witkoff and co. are being duplicitous for the sake of maintaining the aura of ‘success’ for Trump’s ongoing efforts. One theory is that Trump and Putin made a secret backdoor deal to pretend Russia is willing to make concessions in order to mutually entrap Zelensky for the sake of making him and Europe appear to be the opposers of peace, so that Trump can then exercise more political leeway in dumping the conflict on them.



Another possibility is that Russia knows these exchanges will be drawn out for such a long time, that Putin can pretend to be partial towards certain “concessions” in the understanding that their reality will never come to pass for various reasons: for one, Zelensky is considered by Russia to be legally illegitimate to even so much as sign anything, which would presume from Russia’s side any finalization of agreements would need to wait for a legally acceptable successor, anyway. And in such a case, Russia is perhaps confident it will have taken most of the disputed regions at the center of ‘concessions’.

With Putin being a highly ‘legalistic’ leader, it’s hard to imagine him abrogating two standing legal realities simultaneously, in the Zelensky legitimacy and the constitutionality of Kherson and Zaporozhye administrative regions. There are simply too many farfetched ‘stretches’ to imagine Russia conceding on them all, which includes things like demilitarization and deNazification which were not mentioned amongst the discussions. Lesser issues like the protection and codification of the Russian language in Ukrainian regions were mentioned by press outlets, which would imply the other issues were not brought up. This clearly seems a bridge too far.

So, if it is a bridge too far, what, precisely, is going on here?

The only logical explanation is the above: that Russia knows no agreement can ever be reached anyway, and is thus playing for time by pretending at concessions to affect the peacemaker and transfer responsibility on Ukraine and Europe. Why can’t it be reached? Zelensky himself again just stated no uncaptured land can be ceded, as it is enshrined in the Ukrainian constitution. Previously, he’s stated many times that demilitarization is definitely out, also. Now, European “partners” have again reiterated their intent to immediately station troops on Ukraine’s territory upon the cessation of hostilities.



"Coalition of the Willing" declared readiness to deploy troops to Ukraine after a ceasefire

"They (the coalition participants - Ed.) once again emphasized their readiness to deploy security forces after the cessation of hostilities, as well as to help ensure the security of Ukraine's air and sea space and restore the Armed Forces of Ukraine," the statement following the coalition meeting said.

The message also states that the deployment of troops will be part of the security guarantees promoted by the USA.

"The leaders also welcomed President Trump's commitment to providing Ukraine with security guarantees, in ensuring which the 'Coalition of the Willing' will play an important role through the Multinational Forces in Ukraine and other measures," the coalition reported.

RVvoenkor

That would mean offensive NATO troops directly on Russia’s border, which flies in the face of one of Russia’s main reasons for even fighting this existential conflict. So, clearly something is afoot here: either these reports and Witkoff’s statements are fabulations, or Russia and the US are playing at some kind of plan.

Note the very odd and unprecedented disparity between the seeming results of the Alaska meeting and the reactions and statements from both sides. On its face, the meeting appeared to be a dismal failure, yet both sides sang its praises as if mountains were moved in the dialogue; there is a strange dissonance there, which almost hints at some secret backdoor handshake between the US and Russia, particularly given how chummy the participants from both sides appeared to be.

Now Zelensky and European leaders are reportedly flying to DC for an emergency meeting. It’s become known that the European coven has expressly forbidden Zelensky from meeting Trump alone because they are terrified that Trump will strongarm and browbeat Zelensky into making concessions and accepting a peace deal that would be unfavorable to the European cabal.








Their job is to force Zelensky to not make a single concession. They believe the war can still be continued because they view the Ukrainian 18-25 potential as yet untapped—there is plenty more meat with which to bleed Russia and stave off the diseased EU’s collapse for a few more years; or so they think.

Zelensky has already begun giving way a bit—he now states that negotiations can start with the current frontline, which implies Russia would be able to keep everything it currently has, but that Ukraine simply won’t give up new territory that Russia has not yet liberated:



Recall my constant drum-beating of the improbability of Ukraine ever giving up both Kherson and Zaporozhye cities. But another aspect few have considered is that even to give up the administrative remainder of Donetsk “oblast” would require Ukraine to completely abandon both Slavyansk and Kramatorsk—nearly as unthinkable a leap.

These cities are symbolic to Ukraine and its nationalists as a bastion against Russia, where the kinetic portion of the conflict was essentially sparked when Strelkov’s men took over the Slavyansk administrative building. To lose these cities would be a major symbolic blow to Ukraine and its nationalists—particularly those who may not forgive Zelensky for the ‘betrayal’ of giving these cities to the enemy.

Ukrainian political expert Vladislav Olenchenko claims that Zelensky will be offered a way off the stage to commence the peace process: (Video at link.)

During Zelensky's visit to Washington, he will be offered to sign a peace agreement, announce elections in Ukraine, and leave the political scene.

This is claimed by Ukrainian political scientist Vladislav Olenchenko on the air with journalist Natalia Moseychuk.

"On Monday, Zelensky will be offered to sign a broad, comprehensive peace agreement and announce elections in Ukraine — because of peace.

Here is what they will promise him in return: full guarantees of personal security, security for his family members, preservation of capital, and the opportunity to become a director in Hollywood or a politician. They will try to 'buy' him, convincing him that he has no other way out."

Zelensky also will be discouraged from participating in new elections.

By the way, as further proof of the back and forth fake reports, there was another new report stating that Russia is ready to declare an air ceasefire, which Zelensky’s presidential advisor immediately shot down:



It’s clear the information field has been veritably saturated with noise—perhaps intentionally by certain parties seeking to foment mass ambiguity in order to conceal their failures or inability to make real headway with this whole political charade.

There are contradictions and confusion everywhere, even on the Russian side. For instance, Russia firmly holds the “agreement before ceasefire” line, but at the same time has openly promised to declare a full ceasefire if Ukraine so much as removes its troops from Donbass. This could be because Putin views this kind of temporary ceasefire for the sake of “negotiations” as low risk if hedged with the acquisition of new territory. ISW had the same idea:



That means Russia could bloodlessly win another vast stretch of land only to attempt further negotiations on the other major issues. If those break down, then Russia would be free to resume the conflict but this time with all of Donbass already at its rear—a kind of win-win scenario. The only wrench in the works would be the fact that, as stated earlier, NATO is ready to inject troops into Ukraine the moment hostilities cease—but we really don’t know Russian General Staff’s opinions on this. For all we know, they couldn’t care less and would be ready to resume hostilities even with European troops present because they assess the threat from European countries as being low. But the question is: would Russia even want to end up in such a complication?

—

WSJ now proposes there are two remaining scenarios for the end of the conflict, down from the five or more which these outlets so assuredly paraded about a few weeks back:


https://www.wsj.com/world/how-will-the- ... s-2bcc0d99

Ukraine could lose land but survive as a secure and sovereign, if shrunken, nation state.

Alternatively, it could lose both land and sovereignty, falling back into Moscow’s sphere of influence.

The first they dub “Partition With Protection”:

This would allow Russia to enjoy a ‘de facto’ control over already-won territories while Ukraine would get security guarantees.

The other they dub “Partition With Subordination”:

Here Ukraine still gets partitioned but even the remaining ‘rump state’ becomes a Russian ‘protectorate’. They’re intentionally scarce on details, but it’s assumed they mean Ukraine gets demilitarized and ruled by a Russian-installed puppet, allowing Ukraine to fall fully into Russia’s fold.

It’s interesting that the situation’s urgency has forced the realization upon these outlets that only such a dire binary of outcomes remains.

Either way, Zelensky still stands firm that a ceasefire must come first before anything else and has now announced his intentions to convince Trump of this during their meeting on Monday. That means, whatever happens, we’re sure to see some fireworks over this coming week between ringmaster, clown, and the desperate European hyenas of this bemusing traveling circus.

(Balance of post at link or our 'Ukraine thread.)

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/zel ... -circus-to

******

John Helmer: Russian Sources Say Trump Has Accepted Russia's Territorial Claims in Ukraine

Reason2Resist with Dimitri Lascaris



After meeting for less than three hours in Alaska on August 15, Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump held a joint press conference in which they fielded no questions.

During that press conference, Trump disclosed that no Ukraine peace-deal had been struck, but also claimed (without disclosing any details) that the U.S. and Russian governments had reached agreement on several key issues.

Trump then stated that he would speak with NATO and European leaders, as well as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, with a view to securing their support for the Trump administration's approach to resolving the Ukraine war.

On the day after the Putin-Trump press conference, Dimitri Lascaris spoke with John Helmer about what really happened behind closed doors in Alaska.

John revealed that, according to his Russian sources, the Trump administration has accepted Russia's claims to Crimea and four oblasts in southeastern Ukraine, and has also accepted that Ukraine will not become a member of NATO.

John Helmer is the longest continuously serving foreign correspondent in Russia, and the only Western journalist to direct his own bureau, independent of national or commercial ties. He is a frequent guest on Reason2Resist.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kDZyfKvYjCk

******

Putin-Zelensky Meeting Must Be Carefully Prepared: FM Lavrov


Russian FM Sergei Lavrov, Aug. 19, 2025. X/ @maxseddon

August 19, 2025 Hour: 8:55 am

It is impossible to talk about a long-term solution without considering Russia’s security interests, he reiterated.

On Tuesday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned that a meeting between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky “must be meticulously prepared.”

His remarks came after U.S. President Donald Trump said he has begun to organize their meeting. On Monday, Zelensky said he expected a possible unconditional meeting with Putin within the next two weeks. That meeting could be followed by another summit, with Trump participating.

In this regard, Lavrov said Russia “does not reject any format of work, whether bilateral or trilateral.” However, he emphasized that such formats must “begin at the expert level and then go through all necessary stages to prepare summits. This is the kind of serious approach we will always support.”

The Russian diplomat added that it is “impossible to talk about a long-term solution” without considering Russia’s security interests and the rights of Ukraine’s Russian-speaking population.

“Without respect for Russia’s security interests, without full respect for the rights of Russians and Russian-speaking people living in Ukraine, one cannot talk about long-term agreements, because these are the reasons that must be urgently addressed in the settlement process,” he said, stressing that before negotiating with Russia, Zelensky should repeal laws that “violate the rights of Russian speakers.”

“That is to say, they (Western representatives) believe this person should secure agreements with Russia as he sees fit, and no one says it would be a good idea for him to repeal these laws before starting negotiations,” he said.


Hours earlier, Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov said Putin and Trump had discussed in their phone conversation the night before the possibility of “raising the level of representation of the Ukrainian and Russian sides” in bilateral negotiations.

“In particular, the idea was discussed that the possibility of raising the level of representation of the Ukrainian and Russian sides, meaning those representatives who participate in direct talks, could be studied,” Ushakov said.

He mentioned that the conversation lasted 40 minutes but did not mention a future summit between Putin and Zelensky, whom the Kremlin has considered an illegitimate president since May 2024.

The Kremlin has consistently maintained that Putin has nothing to negotiate separately with Zelensky and would only meet him to seal a final peace agreement.

As in March 2022, the Russian delegation in the last three rounds of negotiations in Istanbul has been led by Vladimir Medinsky, Putin’s cultural affairs adviser. Medinsky’s appointment was heavily criticized by Ukraine, the European Union and NATO, which saw it as proof of the Kremlin’s lack of willingness to reach a peace deal.

The first three rounds resulted only in prisoners and body exchanges, but never addressed the political and military aspects of the conflict in depth. Putin, who continues to demand that Ukraine withdraws its troops from Donbas, had expressed confidence in holding his next summit with Trump in Moscow.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/putin-ze ... fm-lavrov/

*****

Ukraine - Trump Continues To Humiliate Europe

Nothing changed due to yesterday's meetings.

Ukraine offers $100bn weapons deal to Trump to win security guarantees (archived) - Financial Times, Aug 19 2025

Ukraine will promise to buy $100bn of American weapons financed by Europe in a bid to obtain US guarantees for its security after a peace settlement with Russia, according to a document seen by the Financial Times.
---
Alexander G. Rubio @AlexanderGRubi2 - 2:22 UTC · Aug 19, 2025
The plan is for the US to sell weapons to the Europeans, who will then provide them to Kiev. However, the US doesn’t have the weapons to sell, the Europeans don’t have the money to buy, and Kiev doesn’t have the soldiers to use them. Other than that it's a foolproof plan.

---
[Putin] noted that these individuals have “happily carried out any order from the president in Washington under Biden,” but “got confused when Trump suddenly won” the November election.
“They just don’t like Trump, they actively fought him, interfered in political life, in the US election… Trump has different ideas about what is good and what is bad, including in gender policy, in some other issues, and they don’t like it,” Putin said. [...]

“I assure you, Trump, with his character and persistence, will restore order quite quickly. And all of them, you’ll see, soon all of them will stand at the master’s feet and gently wag their tails,” Putin argued.

European leaders will ‘wag tails’ for Trump – Putin - RT, Feb 2 2025

---


---
Arnaud Bertrand @RnaudBertrand - 7:48 UTC · Aug 19, 2025
This is beyond parody: not only is the EU doing virtually nothing to escape the protection racket it's under with the US, it's now supposed to pay for Ukraine's...

All the more absurd when one considers that NATO expansion - the institutionalization of this protection racket - was the primary catalyst for this conflict.


Posted by b at 8:40 UTC | Comments (91)

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2025/08/u ... l#comments

******

State of the Union Interview: Witkoff on what Trump and Putin said to each other in meeting
August 18, 2025



***

Joint News Conference by Presidents of Russia and the United States

Kremlin website, 8/16/25

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr President, ladies and gentlemen,

We held our talks in a constructive and mutually respectful atmosphere, and they have proved substantive and productive.

I would like to once again thank my US counterpart for the proposal to come to Alaska. It is quite logical to meet here since our countries, albeit separated by oceans, are, in fact, close neighbours. When we stepped out of our planes and greeted each other, I said, “Good afternoon, dear neighbour. I am glad to see you alive and in good health.” I believe it sounds very friendly and neighbourly. Our countries are separated only by the Bering Strait — essentially, there are two islands, one Russian and one American, separated by a mere four kilometres. We are close neighbours, that’s a fact.

It is also important to note that our shared history and many positive events are largely related to Alaska. There is still an enormous cultural legacy preserved since the age of Russian America, with Russian Orthodox churches and more than 700 place-names of Russian origin.

During World War II, Alaska served as the starting point for the legendary air route that delivered lend-lease supplies, including military aircraft and other equipment. It was a dangerous and challenging route over enormous ice-covered territories. Nevertheless, the pilots and experts of both countries did everything they could to bring victory together. They risked and sacrificed their lives for our common victory.

I have just visited the Russian city of Magadan. A monument honouring Russian and American pilots stands there, adorned with the Russian and American flags. I know that here, too, there is a similar monument, and at a war cemetery a few kilometres away from here, there are graves of Soviet pilots who lost their lives in that heroic mission. We appreciate the efforts of US officials and citizens to preserve their memory. This is a dignified and noble undertaking.

We will always remember other examples from history when our countries stood together against common enemies in the spirit of combat camaraderie and alliance, rendering each other help and support. I am certain that this legacy will help us restore and develop mutually beneficial and equal ties at this new stage, even in the most challenging conditions.

As you know, Russian-American summit talks have not been held for over four years. That is a long time. This period has proved exceptionally difficult for bilateral relations, and, let’s face it, they have deteriorated to their lowest point since the Cold War. And this does not benefit either our countries or the world in general.

Obviously, sooner or later we had to remedy the situation, to move from confrontation to dialogue, and in this regard, an in-person meeting between the two heads of state was really overdue – of course, with serious and thorough preparations, and this work has been done.

President Trump and I have established very good direct contacts. We have had frank conversations on the phone multiple times. As you know, the US President’s Special Envoy, Mr Witkoff, has visited us in Russia several times. Our aides and heads of foreign ministries have maintained regular contacts.

As you are well aware, the situation around Ukraine is one of the key issues. We acknowledge the commitment of the US administration and President Trump personally to help resolve the Ukrainian conflict, and the President’s willingness to understand the root causes and its origins.

I have repeatedly said that the developments in Ukraine present fundamental threats to Russia’s national security. Moreover, we have always considered the Ukrainian people – and I have said this many times – a brotherly people, no matter how strange it may sound in today’s circumstances. We share the same roots, and the current situation is tragic and deeply painful to us. Therefore, our country is sincerely interested in ending this.

Yet, we are convinced that, for the conflict resolution in Ukraine to be long-term and lasting, all the root causes of the crisis, which have been repeatedly explained, must be eliminated; all of Russia’s legitimate concerns must be taken into account, and a fair security balance must be restored in Europe and the rest of the world.

I agree with President Trump. He said today that Ukraine’s security must be ensured by all means. Of course, we are ready to work on this.

Hopefully, the understanding we have reached will bring us closer to this goal and open up the road to peace in Ukraine.

We hope that Kiev and the European capitals will take the current developments constructively and will neither try to put up obstacles nor attempt to disrupt the emerging progress with provocative acts or behind-the-scenes plots.

By the way, under the new US administration, our bilateral trade has been on the rise. So far, it is a symbolic figure but still, the trade is 20 percent higher. What I am saying is that we have many interesting areas for cooperation.

It is obvious that the Russian-US business and investment partnership holds tremendous potential. Russia and the United States have much to offer each other in trade, energy, digital and high technologies, and space development.

Cooperation in the Arctic and the resumption of region-to-region contacts, including between the Russian Far East and the West Coast of the USA, also appear relevant.

Overall, it is crucial and necessary that our countries turn the page and get back to cooperation.

Symbolically, as I have already said, there is an international date line nearby, on the border between Russia and the United States, where you can literally step from one day into another. I hope that we can do the same in political affairs.

I would like to thank Mr Trump for our joint work and for the friendly and trust-based conversation. The main thing is that there was a commitment on both sides to produce a result. We see that the US President has a clear idea of what he wants to achieve, that he sincerely cares about his country’s prosperity while showing awareness of Russia’s national interests.

I hope that today’s agreements will become a reference point, not only for resolving the Ukrainian problem but also for resuming the pragmatic business relations between Russia and the United States.

To conclude, I would like to add the following. I remember that in 2022, during my last contacts with the former US administration, I tried to convince my former US counterpart that we should not bring the situation to a point fraught with serious repercussions in the form of hostilities, and I said directly at the time that it would be a big mistake.

Today, we hear President Trump saying: “If I had been president, there would have been no war.” I believe it would have been so. I confirm this because President Trump and I have established a generally very good, businesslike and trustworthy contact. And I have every reason to believe that, as we move along this path, we can reach – and the sooner the better – the end of the conflict in Ukraine.

Thank you for the attention.

President of the United States of America Donald Trump: Thank you very much, Mr President. That was very profound, and I will say that I believe we had a very productive meeting.

There were many-many points that we agreed on, most of them, I would say, a couple of big ones that we have not quite gotten there, but we have made some headway. So, there is no deal until there is a deal.

I will call up NATO in a little while. I will call up the various people that I think are appropriate, and I will, of course, call up President Zelensky and tell him about today’s meeting. It is ultimately up to them. They are going to have to agree with [what] Marco [Rubio] and Steve [Witkoff] and some of the great people from the Trump administration who have come here, Scott [Bessent] and John Ratcliffe. Thank you very much. But we have some of our really great leaders. They have been doing a phenomenal job.

We also have some tremendous Russian business representatives here, and I think, you know, everybody wants to deal with us. We have become the hottest country anywhere in the world in a very short period of time. We look forward to that, we look forward to dealing, we are going to try to get this over with.

We really made some great progress today. I have always had a fantastic relationship with President Putin, with Vladimir. We had many tough meetings, good meetings. We were interfered with by the Russia, Russia, Russia hoax. It made it a little bit tougher to deal with, but he understood it. I think he has probably seen things like that during the course of his career. He has seen it all. But we had to put up with the Russia, Russia, Russia hoax. He knew it was a hoax, and I knew it was a hoax, but what was done was very criminal, but it made it harder for us to deal as a country in terms of the business and all of the things that we would like to have dealt with. But we will have a good chance when this is over.

So just to put it very quickly, I am going to start making a few phone calls and tell them what happened. We had an extremely productive meeting, and many points were agreed to. There are just a very few that are left. Some are not that significant. One is probably the most significant, but we have a very good chance of getting there. We did not get here but we have a very good chance of getting there.

I would like to thank President Putin and his entire team, whose faces, who I know, in many cases, otherwise, other than that, whose faces I get to see all the time in the newspapers. You are almost as famous as the boss, but especially this one right over here.

But we had some good meetings over the years, right? Good, productive meetings over the years, and we hope to have that in the future. But let’s do the most productive one right now. We are going to stop, really, five, six, seven thousand, thousands of people a week from being killed, and President Putin wants to see that as much as I do.

So again, Mr President, I would like to thank you very much, and we will speak to you very soon, and probably see you again very soon. Thank you very much, Vladimir.

Vladimir Putin: Next time in Moscow.

Donald Trump: Oh, that is an interesting one. I do not know. I will get a little heat on that one, but I could see it possibly happening. Thank you very much, Vladimir. And thank you all. Thank you.

Vladimir Putin: Thank you so much.

***

“No blitzkrieg, no defeat”: What Russia’s commmentariat is saying after the Putin-Trump summit

RT, 8/16/25

The meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska marked their first face-to-face talks since Trump’s return to the White House. The summit began with a brief one-on-one exchange inside Trump’s presidential limousine, followed by extended negotiations involving both delegations. At a subsequent joint press conference, the two leaders described the talks as constructive and signaled an openness to a follow-up round of negotiations.

RT has gathered insights from leading Russian experts on how the outcome of the summit is being perceived in Moscow – highlighting the tone, symbolism, and potential global implications of this long-anticipated encounter.

Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs:

Analogies are always imperfect, but the Alaska summit inevitably brought to mind the first meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in Geneva nearly forty years ago. Not because of its substance – if anything, the content was the opposite – but because of its structure. Just like back then, no deal was struck, but the level of communication shifted dramatically.

Trump didn’t get the diplomatic blitz he was hoping for. But the meeting didn’t end in rupture either. The positional standoff continues. If we follow the logic of the 1980s, the next milestone might be a “Reykjavik moment” – like in 1986, when no agreement was reached, but the ideas floated were radical and far-reaching. The real breakthrough came later in Washington in 1987 with the signing of the INF Treaty – the same agreement that died in two stages, both under Trump’s presidency.

This time, the pace is faster. This isn’t a Cold War; it’s something hotter. There won’t be year-long pauses between summits. We’ll see follow-ups much sooner – of one kind or another. Critics will try to spin the Alaska meeting as a Trump defeat, arguing that Putin dictated the tempo and set the terms. There’s some truth to that. But if the goal is a sustainable outcome, there’s no alternative to tackling the full scope of issues head-on.

If the process launched in Alaska continues in the same spirit, we could see an outcome that’s the reverse of what followed Geneva. Back then, Reagan pushed to end the Cold War on Washington’s terms – and succeeded. Today, what’s on the table is the end of the post-Cold War era, a time defined by unchallenged US global dominance. That shift isn’t sudden – it’s been building for years – but it’s now reached a climax. And notably, much of the demand for this shift is coming from within the US itself – just as, back in the day, the Soviet push for change came largely from within its own society.

As before, the road is winding. There are plenty of actors – domestic and international – who will try to halt or reverse the momentum. Much will depend on whether both presidents truly believe they’re headed in the right direction.

One last, telling detail: Forty years ago in Geneva, the defining image of change was a joint press conference, where journalists from both sides got to question the leader of the opposing camp for the first time. Openness was seen as a necessary step toward solving deep-rooted problems. This time, the symbolism lies in the absence of questions – neither leader took any. Real diplomacy is trying to retreat into quiet, away from the performative and often destructive media spectacle that has consumed international politics in recent decades. In a way, secrecy is staging a comeback.

Dmitry Novikov, associate professor at the Higher School of Economics:

From the standpoint of Russian interests, the Anchorage summit can be seen as a relative success for Moscow. Two key aspects stand out.

Tactically, Russia managed once again to regain control over the pace of negotiations. The Kremlin defused Trump’s rising irritation – marked by threats and pressure tactics – that had begun to build dangerously. Had that escalation continued, it could have derailed both the Ukraine talks and the broader process of normalizing bilateral relations. From the outset, Moscow approached both tracks with deliberation and patience – partly because of its still-growing battlefield advantage, and partly because the complexity of the issues demands exactly that: no rush, no oversimplification.

Strategically, both sides came out ahead – if only because the existence of meaningful communication between nuclear superpowers is a net positive by definition. Judging by the signals out of Washington, the Trump administration seems to share that view.

The summit also confirmed something I’ve noted before: Trump is genuinely interested in resetting relations with Moscow. He sees negotiations with Russia as a cheaper, more efficient way to achieve his strategic goals in Europe. That’s why he’s open to serious dialogue – even if it doesn’t produce immediate media wins or flashy breakthroughs.

Going forward, the real test of the impact of Anchorage will be how the Trump administration engages with its European allies and with Ukraine. Both will undoubtedly try to pull Trump back into their strategic framework. The tone and substance of those next conversations will tell us a lot about what was really achieved in Alaska.

Vladimir Kornilov, political analyst:

“A Historic Handshake in Alaska” – that was the front-page headline splashed across many European newspapers this morning. To be fair, most of those editions went to press while the summit was still underway, which means their coverage lacked any meaningful analysis. As a result, much of what was published focused on optics – body language, symbolic gestures, red carpets, and so on.

But the real action has been unfolding online and on Western news channels, which have been flooded with hot takes and instant commentary. Many of them verge on panic – some, outright hysteria.

At the core of this reaction is a bitter truth: the West is coming to terms with the collapse of its long-running effort to isolate Russia and its president. That’s the underlying cause of all the wailing in the Western media swamps.

One theme dominates the Western analysis: Russia got what it wanted out of the Alaska summit. That’s the consensus across a wide spectrum of commentators and anchors. Many of them didn’t bother to hide their frustration that they weren’t allowed to ask a single question during the much-anticipated joint press conference between the US and Russian leaders.

Whatever the tangible policy outcomes of the summit may turn out to be, one thing is now beyond dispute: the meeting in Alaska has locked in a new reality on the global stage.

Valentin Bogdanov, VGTRK New York bureau chief:

“From the very first frames of the broadcast from Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, one thing was clear: isolation had failed. The red carpet, the honor guard flanked by fighter jets, the handshake, the smiles – it all looked far more like Russia’s return to the world stage than another attempt to shove it off.”

“Russian America” played host to a summit of neighbors – one neighbor applauding the other. On the runway, the two presidential planes were parked as close together as the Diomede Islands in the Bering Strait. The symbolism of convergence wasn’t lost – geographically or diplomatically.

It was a day of mourning for those who had bet on failure or scandal. Now they’re nitpicking anything they can get their hands on. Some latched onto the canceled working lunch as proof of a snub. Though, ironically, many of the same voices had just been criticizing Trump for agreeing to that lunch in the first place – calling it a sign of weakness.

Meanwhile, body language experts wasted no time analyzing the subtle choreography from the moment the two presidents appeared on camera – from eye contact to the timing of their handshake. Putin and Trump quickly settled into a shared rhythm. Of course, there will now be a concerted effort – by the usual suspects – to knock them out of sync.

But inside the White House, officials are already discussing a follow-up meeting. According to their thinking, it could be the breakthrough needed to untangle the Ukraine knot. The American end of that knot, it seems, has already started to loosen.

Elena Panina, Director of the Institute for International Political and Economic Strategies:

The three-hour meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson wasn’t just a diplomatic encounter – it was arguably the defining political event of 2025. It will shape not only the foreign policy agendas of the US, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine, but also their domestic political discourse. Every moment – from the ten-minute one-on-one in the US president’s limousine to the closing handshake – has already become fodder for interpretation in the Western press.

Just consider CNN’s reaction: their lead takeaway was that, contrary to standard protocol, the Russian leader – not the host – was the first to speak at the joint press conference. In diplomacy, such details are never trivial. They’re read as subtle signals of power dynamics – either gestures of politeness or expressions of parity.

And politeness, notably, was in abundant supply – something all observers picked up on. Compared to Trump’s meetings over the past six months, this was a dramatic shift. No shouting matches such as with Zelensky, no mocking jabs like those aimed at German Chancellor Merz, and none of the alpha posturing he’s shown with the likes of Ursula von der Leyen or Cyril Ramaphosa. Instead, the tone was marked by deliberate courtesy and mutual respect, with both leaders carefully sidestepping flashpoints.

So how should we interpret the abrupt press conference and the canceled lunch? In high-level diplomacy, a lack of formal agreements doesn’t necessarily mean the meeting was empty. On the contrary – it’s clear that on core issues like halting arms shipments to Kiev, easing sanctions on Russia, and opening new channels of sectoral cooperation, Trump simply can’t commit on the spot. Not without congressional approval – and not without running it past his NATO allies.

Of course, Anchorage was no “new Yalta” – no grand endgame like the one that concluded the defining geopolitical chess match of the 20th century. But it might just be something else: a strong, tempo-preserving opening in a new strategic game between Washington and Moscow. A game that could unfold in a series of calculated moves – perhaps not redrawing the global map, but at the very least cooling the hottest points of tension.

The opening move has been made. The real question now is whether Trump can push through the internal and external constraints he faces – so that this debut in Alaska evolves into a full-fledged game.

Timofey Bordachev, professor at the Higher School of Economics:

I personally never expected the summit to resolve the war in Ukraine. The conflict is simply the core of a much broader crisis – one that runs through the entire architecture of European security.

What struck me as most important was the spirit of the meeting itself. After 35 years of accumulated tension, the US-Russia confrontation is – at least under Donald Trump – being redirected into a more civilized framework. Each side still operates under its own set of constraints and domestic limitations. But critically, the US has now shelved the idea of pursuing Russia’s “strategic defeat” or attempting to isolate it completely. That shift is profound. Framing the conflict in such absolute, existential terms had made it unsolvable – it took it out of the realm of international relations toward something more akin to a crusade.

This change signals the emergence of a new reality: the conflict remains, and its military-technical phase will likely continue for now. But it’s no longer treated as a moral or existential struggle – it has become a normal, if deeply entrenched, dispute in the history of great power politics. And that makes it solvable.

There are no longer any metaphysical or ideological reasons for it to continue – only diverging interests and circumstantial pressures. In Washington’s case, that pressure stems from a surplus of global commitments and unsustainable strategic wagers. The sooner those burdens are recalibrated, the closer we get to meaningful outcomes.

Ilya Kramnik, military analyst, expert at the Russian International Affairs Council:

A ready-made peace deal is, unfortunately, out of reach right now – largely due to divisions within the West itself.

What comes next is the hardest part. No matter how productive the talks between the Russian and American presidents may have been, peace in Ukraine will require the involvement of European Union countries. That currently seems almost unthinkable, given the public positions of both the EU as a bloc and several key member states individually.

Trump’s own words – “no deal yet” – along with his stated intention to reach out to Zelensky and European leaders, suggest that he understands this reality.

At the same time, it’s clear that the US and Russia have more to discuss beyond the war in Ukraine. Both presidents acknowledged mutual interests across a range of areas, and the existence of ongoing bilateral contacts reinforces that.

So, yes, I expected the two sides to come to some level of understanding – including on issues unrelated to the ongoing conflict. As for ending the war itself, that will require a step-by-step process.

That’s essentially what happened in Anchorage. Now we wait to see how Europe responds – and, of course, what form a draft peace framework might eventually take.

Sergey Poletaev, political commentator:

The most likely outcome was exactly what we got: an agreement to keep talking.

There are two main problems. First, Trump doesn’t see himself as a party to the conflict and wants to remain above the fray. Putin – rightly, in my view – sees it differently. He believes, and continues to insist, that only Trump can make the kind of decisive choices needed to end the war. If some movement on that front occurred in Anchorage, then real progress might now be possible.

The second issue is Europe and Ukraine. For now, both remain committed to continuing the war. And I don’t believe that can be changed through diplomacy alone – it will be decided on the battlefield. Sooner or later, the facts on the ground will shape a new shared reality for all four players: Russia, the US, Europe, and Ukraine.

And based on how things are going, that reality will likely align more closely with Russia’s view than with the Euro-Ukrainian one. That’s when Trump will get his deal – but not before.

Ivan Timofeev, program director of the Valdai Club:

No one realistically expected any breakthrough agreements from this summit, but the overall tone was clearly positive. It ended on an optimistic note, with both sides expressing a willingness to keep moving toward de-escalation and to explore broader areas of cooperation in US-Russia relations. In short, this is a process that’s meant to continue.

I believe both leaders walked away with everything they reasonably could have hoped for. Russia stood firm on its core positions but remained engaged in dialogue. The US, for its part, moved a step closer to the kind of peace it wants – one that lets it stop pouring resources into a geopolitical asset that’s yielding no meaningful political return. In that sense, both sides can count the meeting as a win.

There won’t be any immediate sanctions. At the very least, we’re likely to see a few weeks of status quo. What happens after that will depend on whether the dialogue continues in a stable, productive fashion. If concrete discussions follow – especially around terms for a settlement – and those discussions begin to bear fruit, we might even see a modestly positive shift on the sanctions front.

But if the process stalls or collapses for any reason, the risk of renewed pressure will rise. In that case, we’re likely to see the so-called “secondary tariffs” that Trump has previously floated – higher duties on third countries that buy Russian raw materials. We could also see new sanctions targeting Russia’s energy sector to some degree.

That said, it’s worth noting that the US and its allies have already imposed a substantial range of restrictions on Russia. Moscow is not easily intimidated by new escalation measures. Still, that doesn’t mean further sanctions are off the table – they remain a real possibility.

Pavel Dubravsky, political commentator:

Russia came out of the summit looking stronger than the United States. Trump may have declared the meeting a “ten out of ten,” but in reality, he seemed tired – and frustrated.

That’s likely because he had two clear goals going into Anchorage. The first was to secure a hard “no” from Moscow and then walk away from the Ukraine peace track entirely, spinning it as a win for his base: “I’m cutting your taxes, I’m cutting your foreign entanglements – look, I didn’t waste time or money on this.” The second, far more ambitious goal was to clinch a deal – a ceasefire of some kind, even a temporary one. A one-month pause, a symbolic step, anything he could present as diplomatic momentum. But he left empty-handed.

In contrast, the Russian side struck a composed and strategic posture. They demonstrated an understanding of global diplomacy, but also sensitivity to US domestic politics. They even made gestures toward Ukraine’s internal dynamics, calling on Kiev and European allies not to derail the talks. That tone – measured and outward-looking – was a diplomatic win in itself.

One of the most notable developments was Putin’s language shift: for the first time, he openly spoke about Ukraine’s own security. It seems likely this was something Trump pushed for, and Putin agreed to engage on. That signals potential future discussions on issues like territorial arrangements and security guarantees – topics that were long considered off-limits.

Whether Trump is willing to travel to Moscow remains uncertain – it could carry political risks for him. But what’s already clear is that Russia has broken out of a narrow diplomatic box. For the past three years, Western powers insisted on speaking to Russia only about Ukraine. That principle guided both the EU and the previous US administration. Now, the agenda has widened.

Ukraine is no longer the sole topic on the table. That shift in itself is a major accomplishment for Russian diplomacy – reframing the dialogue and reshaping how Moscow is perceived in international politics today.

https://natyliesbaldwin.com/2025/08/sta ... n-meeting/

[blindpig]

Lavrov's Interview with the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company

Putin Interview snippet, result of dog club meeting at White House. and phone call readout.
Karl Sanchez
Aug 19, 2025



Before we get to the interview transcript, I want to inform readers that Putin gave an interview last Sunday to Russia-1 TV journalist Pavel Zarubin for which there’s no transcript provided by the Kremlin—Again!! However, the announcer of that event, RT, did publish an article with a few of its own chosen snippets from the interview. Here are the important passages, the rest is inconsequential as you’ll discover when reading the rest at the link:

It has been decades since Europe last had strong politicians capable of forming opinions independently from Washington, Putin said, referring to the era of former French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder. However, in recent years, the EU’s policies have been steered by “political small fries” who lack education and ability, Putin asserted. He noted that these individuals have “happily carried out any order from the president in Washington under Biden,” but “got confused when Trump suddenly won” the November election.[/i]

“They just don’t like Trump, they actively fought him, interfered in political life, in the US election… Trump has different ideas about what is good and what is bad, including in gender policy, in some other issues, and they don’t like it,” Putin said. He believes, however, it won’t be long until the EU once again follows orders from Washington.

“I assure you, Trump, with his character and persistence, will restore order quite quickly. And all of them, you’ll see, soon all of them will stand at the master’s feet and gently wag their tails,” Putin argued.

And as we saw with the European posse’s meeting with Trump yesterday, Putin’s imagery was close to being 100% correct. At Moon of Alabama, b cited one observer who provided an excellent review:

The plan is for the US to sell weapons to the Europeans, who will then provide them to Kiev. However, the US doesn’t have the weapons to sell, the Europeans don’t have the money to buy, and Kiev doesn’t have the soldiers to use them. Other than that it's a foolproof plan.

There’ve been some overt leaks that clearly don’t jibe with Russia’s position which were provided by Mr. Witkoff and others to the Sunday propaganda programs on US BigLie Media—leaks that have become a trademark of Team Trump’s throwing bones to his opposition as we’ve seen many times over his second term. The upshot appears to be another meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian negotiators before the end of August. Now for Lavrov’s twenty-two-minutes:

Question: It's a pity that you're not wearing a USSR sweatshirt today.

Sergey Lavrov: I think that this has made a sensation out of it. There is nothing unusual. We have a lot of products that reproduce Soviet symbols. I don't see anything shameful in this. This is part of our life, part of our history – this is our Motherland, which has now taken the form of the Russian Federation and is surrounded by former Soviet republics and friendly countries. Of course, there are various conflicts of interest. This is life.

I think it's fashion, if you will. I saw that after the summit in Anchorage, young people who study here at Moscow State University and other institutions demonstrated these sweaters. It seems to me that there is no question of any "imperialism" or any attempts to revive "imperial thinking" here. It's about what history is. This story should be kept, including with a sense of light humor.

Question: Did the American side note your appearance?

Sergey Lavrov: Yes, without any hysterics, they just said that they liked this "shirt," as US Secretary of State Marco Rubio put it.

Question: In general, what was the atmosphere like?

Sergey Lavrov: There was a very good atmosphere there. It is reflected in the statements made by Presidents Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump after the talks. Useful conversation.

It was unequivocally clear that the head of the United States and his team, firstly, sincerely want to achieve a result that will be long-term, sustainable and reliable. Unlike the Europeans, who at that time were repeating on every corner that they only accepted a ceasefire, and after that they would continue to supply Ukraine with weapons.

Second, both US President Donald Trump and his team clearly understand that there are reasons for this conflict and that the talks that some European presidents and prime ministers are having about Russia attacking Ukraine unprovoked are all childish talk. I can't find another word. The main thing is that they continue to say so to this day. As their meeting with US President Donald Trump in Washington, where Vladimir Zelensky was summoned showed, they continue to demand an immediate truce. At least some of them, such as German Chancellor Frank Merz, continue to say that it is necessary to "put pressure" on Russia with sanctions. None of these "gentlemen" even mentioned the phrase "human rights".

When they discuss any foreign policy topic regarding countries led by people who are not from their "camp", not from the "camp" of neoconservatives, neoliberals, be it Venezuela, China, Russia, even now Hungary, and many other countries, they necessarily put the demand to ensure human rights within the framework of the "rules-based world order" at the forefront.

If you look retrospectively at what they have said about Ukraine over all these years, you will never find the phrase "human rights." Although a complete ban on the Russian language in all spheres of human activity should probably cause indignation among these "guardians of democratic principles." Nothing of the kind. The fact that this is the only country in the world where any language is banned also does not bother anyone. When they say that they will probably have to agree to an exchange of territories (one of them said this). First, this should be decided by Vladimir Zelensky himself. Secondly, they say, they will deploy a peacekeeping operation, armed forces in the form of peacekeepers. What does this mean? The fact that they entrust the solution of the issue of ensuring human rights to the very "character" under whom laws were adopted that exterminate the rights of Russian speakers – language, education, access to the media in Russian, norms that exterminate the right to one's religion, when the law was adopted, in fact, banning the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

That is, they believe that it is this person who should ensure agreements with Russia as he pleases. No one says that it would be nice for this person to repeal these laws before going to negotiations. At least because there is a UN Charter that states that it is necessary to ensure respect for human rights regardless of race, gender, language or religion.

From the point of view of language and religion, the UN Charter is grossly violated in Ukraine. Let's not forget that Vladimir Zelensky said in Washington that he was ready to negotiate, but he would not even discuss any territories, because the Constitution forbids him. This is an interesting point, because, funny as it may seem, the Ukrainian Constitution, despite the adopted laws prohibiting the Russian language in all spheres of human life and activity, still retains the obligation of the state to fully ensure the rights of Russians (this is highlighted separately) and other national minorities. If he cares so much about his Constitution, then I would start with its first articles, which enshrine this very obligation.

But it has long been known that all these circumstances were swept under the rug by various figures (Ursula von der Leyen, Emmanuel Macron, Christopher Starmer, François Merz, and before him Olaf Scholz). Of course, Joe Biden and his administration were among the leaders in ignoring and distorting all the facts that lie at the heart of the Ukrainian crisis. It is indicative that these European delegates, who accompanied Vladimir Zelensky as a support group in Washington on August 18 of this year, spoke about the need to do something, to move forward, clearly reacting to the fact that US President Donald Trump and his team (especially after the meeting in Alaska) began to take a much deeper approach to the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis, realising that it is necessary to eliminate the root causes, which we, President of Russia Vladimir Putin, we have been talking about it all the time.

One of these root causes is Russia's security concerns. It is related to the fact that for decades they have consistently grossly violated their obligations to prevent NATO's eastward expansion. President of Russia Vladimir Putin has noted several times that after these promises there were five waves of the alliance's expansion. When they say that it was promised orally, then nothing of the kind. This was promised on paper in the form of political declarations signed at the highest level at the OSCE summits in Istanbul in 1999 and in Astana in 2010. It says that security is indivisible, no one has the right to strengthen his security at the expense of others. NATO did just that. No one, including any country, any organisation has the right to claim dominance in the OSCE area. They did exactly the opposite. This is from the devil when they say that they said something verbally. First of all, the word is not a sparrow. Secondly, there is not only documentary evidence of the negotiation facts, but also documents signed at the highest level.

When these delegates in Washington said that it was necessary to start with the development of security guarantees for Ukraine, but at the same time security guarantees for Europe (British Prime Minister Christopher Starmer and others spoke about this), no one once mentioned Russia's security. However, the OSCE document I quoted (universally drafted and adopted by consensus) requires security in a form that suits everyone.

To this day, an arrogant attitude towards international law, towards those promises that are often given falsely and fixed on paper, can be felt in the approaches of these citizens to the current Ukrainian crisis. Without respect for Russia's security interests, without full respect for the rights of Russians and Russian-speaking people living in Ukraine, there can be no talk of any long-term agreements, because these are the reasons that need to be urgently eliminated in the context of a settlement.

I repeat that the summit in Alaska allowed us to see that the American administration is sincerely interested in ensuring that this settlement is not for the sake of preparing Ukraine for war again, as was the case after the Minsk agreements, but that this crisis never happens again, so that the legitimate rights of all states that are located in this part of the world are ensured. and all the peoples who inhabit these states.

This understanding was confirmed during yesterday's telephone conversation between President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of the United States Donald Trump, who called our leader to tell him about his contacts with Vladimir Zelensky and with this European support group.

Question: One of the representatives of "European support", President of Finland Mr. Stubb, drew an analogy between the current situation in Ukraine and the 1944 war, when Finland gave up part of its territories. How do you understand this?

Sergey Lavrov: There are other parallels as well.

For many decades after World War II, Finland enjoyed the best conditions for economic growth, solving social problems, ensuring the well-being of the population largely due to the supply of Russian energy resources and in general due to cooperation with the USSR, and then with the Russian Federation, including in the context of a very profitable application of the efforts of Finnish business on our territory. The benefits that Finland received due to these special relations with our country (special due to the fact that it decided on neutrality) were simply thrown into the "garbage pit" overnight.

This makes you think about the following. In 1944, Finland, which fought on the side of Nazi Germany, on the side of the Nazi regime, whose military units participated in many war crimes, signed agreements with the Soviet Union.

President of Finland Alexander Stubb recently quoted this. I know him well; he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. They signed a treaty that stated eternal neutrality, that no one–-neither the Soviet Union nor Finland–-would ever join structures directed against the other contracting party. Where is all this?

Now they have joined the structure that considers Russia an enemy. Therefore, if he is referring to the territorial changes that took place as a result of World War II, yes, this is one of its results. Territorial changes are often an integral component of reaching agreements. There are many such examples.

In this case, I want to emphasize once again that we have never talked about the need to seize any territories. Neither Crimea, nor Donbass, nor Novorossiya as territories have ever been our goal. Our goal was to protect the Russian people who had lived on these lands for centuries, discovered these lands and shed blood for them. Both in Crimea and in Donbass, cities were created - Odessa, Nikolaev, many others, ports, plants, factories.

Everyone is well aware of the role played by Catherine II in the development of these lands. Everyone is well aware of how these lands eventually ended up first as part of the Ukrainian SSR, and then as part of independent Ukraine. They became part of independent Ukraine on the basis of the Declaration of National Sovereignty, which the Kiev leadership adopted in 1990, which clearly stated that Ukraine would forever be a nuclear-free, neutral, non-aligned state. It was this obligation that formed the basis for the international recognition of Ukraine as an independent state.

If now the Zelensky regime rejects all these characteristics, talks about nuclear weapons, joining NATO, and renouncing neutrality, then the provisions that underpinned the recognition of Ukraine as an independent state disappear. It is important to pay attention to this. Otherwise, it turns out that the decisive role will again be played not by the principles of international law, but by the very "rules" that the West has never formulated anywhere, but invents them from time to time, when it needs to admit something, it does it, when it needs to condemn in a similar situation, it also does it. It won't work that way anymore.

I would like to say again that we appreciate the understanding shown by the US administration, unlike the Europeans, which sincerely seeks to get to the heart of the problems and resolve the root causes of the crisis that the West, led by the previous Biden administration, created in Ukraine in order to use it as a tool to contain and suppress Russia and inflict, as they say, a "strategic defeat."

Question: Have you discussed the issue of sanctions with the US side? After all, for fuel, as the Americans said, they had to pay in cash.

Sergey Lavrov: You always have to pay for fuel. Cash or not; it doesn't matter. These are costs that are always borne by the country whose leadership with the relevant delegation visits another state.

We did not discuss sanctions. Not only many experts, but also politicians and officials have repeatedly said that the lifting of sanctions can play a negative role. Because this can again instill in some areas of our economy the illusion that now we will overcome all the problems by returning to the schemes that were developed and implemented in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Many believe that this will negate the achievements that we have now achieved and that we now have in the field of strengthening our technological sovereignty and the need for key issues on which military, economic and food security depends, relying on our technologies. Don't slam the door on cooperation, but don't become dependent when we don't have vital goods and technologies. On the whole, I think that the process is much more reliable and more promising than it was six months ago, when the Biden administration's term of office ended.

Question: What to expect next? Will it be bilateral or trilateral talks?

Sergey Lavrov: We are not rejecting any form of work, either bilateral or trilateral. President of Russia Vladimir Putin has repeatedly spoken about this. The main thing is that any formats–-1+1, 1+2, multilateral formats, of which there are also many, including within the framework of the UN–-all these formats should be included not so that someone would write in the newspapers in the morning, or show it on TV in the evening, or gossip on social networks, trying to tear off the "propaganda foam", but in order to step by step, gradually, starting from the expert level and then going through all the necessary stages, prepare summits. We will always support such a serious approach. Any contacts with the participation of top officials must be prepared extremely carefully.

Question: Can US President Donald Trump fly to Moscow this year?

Sergey Lavrov: As you know, he has an invitation. At a news conference in Alaska, President of Russia Vladimir Putin confirmed this invitation. If I remember correctly, US President Donald Trump said that this was very interesting.

It will be interesting for everyone.

Lavrov is quite correct to emphasize the destruction of the three (he only mentioned two) OSCE Treaties that guaranteed Indivisible Security that I’ve written about on several occasions related to the legalities of this conflict. The Europeans are lying just as the Outlaw US Empire has done about them prior to this version of Trump. The work of the “devil” as Lavrov correctly stated. The noting of the constitutional hypocrisy by Zelensky is yet another excellent point as was the treaty between Finland and USSR. Lavrov was keen to say this is the deathbed for the West’s rule-based order—well, the knives are being inserted but the heart continues to beat somewhat like The Murder on the Orient Express. Lavrov also added a bit of information not included in the readout of the Trump/Putin call which follows:

Y. Ushakov: Dear Colleagues!

Half an hour ago, at the initiative of the President of the United States, a telephone meeting was held Conversation Between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. Our President warmly thanked my American counterpart for the hospitality and good organization of the summit in Alaska and for the progress made during the meeting towards a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian crisis.

The US President, in turn, informed about the negotiations with Volodymyr Zelensky and the leaders of a number of European countries. During a further telephone conversation, Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump expressed support for the continuation of direct negotiations between the delegations of Russia and Ukraine.

In this regard, in particular, the idea was discussed that it would be necessary to study the possibility of raising the level of representatives of the Ukrainian and Russian parties, i.e. those representatives who participate in the above-mentioned direct Negotiations.

Characteristically, Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump agreed further to closely contact each other on Ukrainian and other topical issues international and bilateral agenda.

The President of Russia once again noted the importance of personal Donald Trump's efforts to find solutions leading to a long-term settlement in Ukraine.

The conversation was frank and very constructive.

Until Western BigLie Media deletes the narrative it’s followed slavishly for years during and before the War started by Obama, little will be done to restore security in Europe as all the facts are on Russia’s side, while Eurocrats refuse to admit to any of those truths—and that includes the Ukrainians, not just Zelensky but the rest including Zalushny, Zelensky’s presumed replacement.

The way things now stand, I doubt very much that there will be any tripartite meeting in Beijing on 3 September between Xi, Putin and Trump. However, over the seven days ending August and into September there will be lots of important happenings—SCO Summit, Celebration of Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and then the Far Eastern Economic Forum. Also happening now is a meeting in India between Wang Yi and Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar that also has key geopolitical implications. The resistance and rejection are both escalating, and although the progress seems slow it is very steady and will be very difficult for the Outlaw US Empire to halt.

https://karlof1.substack.com/p/lavrovs- ... ll-russian

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Ukraine - Trump Continues To Humiliate Europe

Nothing changed due to yesterday's meetings.

Ukraine offers $100bn weapons deal to Trump to win security guarantees (archived) - Financial Times, Aug 19 2025

Ukraine will promise to buy $100bn of American weapons financed by Europe in a bid to obtain US guarantees for its security after a peace settlement with Russia, according to a document seen by the Financial Times.
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Alexander G. Rubio @AlexanderGRubi2 - 2:22 UTC · Aug 19, 2025
The plan is for the US to sell weapons to the Europeans, who will then provide them to Kiev. However, the US doesn’t have the weapons to sell, the Europeans don’t have the money to buy, and Kiev doesn’t have the soldiers to use them. Other than that it's a foolproof plan.

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[Putin] noted that these individuals have “happily carried out any order from the president in Washington under Biden,” but “got confused when Trump suddenly won” the November election.
“They just don’t like Trump, they actively fought him, interfered in political life, in the US election… Trump has different ideas about what is good and what is bad, including in gender policy, in some other issues, and they don’t like it,” Putin said. [...]

“I assure you, Trump, with his character and persistence, will restore order quite quickly. And all of them, you’ll see, soon all of them will stand at the master’s feet and gently wag their tails,” Putin argued.

European leaders will ‘wag tails’ for Trump – Putin - RT, Feb 2 2025

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Arnaud Bertrand @RnaudBertrand - 7:48 UTC · Aug 19, 2025
This is beyond parody: not only is the EU doing virtually nothing to escape the protection racket it's under with the US, it's now supposed to pay for Ukraine's...

All the more absurd when one considers that NATO expansion - the institutionalization of this protection racket - was the primary catalyst for this conflict.

Posted by b on August 19, 2025 at 8:40 UTC | Permalink

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2025/08/u ... /#comments

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Can Putin Legally Stop The Conflict Without First Controlling All The Disputed Territory?
Andrew Korybko
Aug 19, 2025



The Constitutional Court would likely have to rule on this hypothetical scenario due to 2020’s constitutional amendment prohibiting the cession of Russian territory except in certain cases.

RT’s report on Steve Witkoff’s claim that Russia has made “some concessions” on territorial issues, which signal a “significant” shift towards “moderation”, prompted talk about whether Putin can legally stop the special operation without first controlling all the disputed territory that Moscow claims as its own. He himself demanded in June 2024 that the Ukrainian Armed Forces “must be withdrawn from the entire territory of these regions within their administrative borders at the time of their being part of Ukraine.”

Moreover, the agreements under which Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye, and Kherson joined Russia all describe their administrative boundaries as those that existed “on the day of [their] formation”, thus suggesting that the entirety of their regions are indeed legally considered by Russia to be its own. Putin also famously declared during the signing of those treaties in late September 2022 that “the people living [there] have become our citizens, forever” and that “Russia will not betray [their choice to join it]”.

Nevertheless, Putin could still hypothetically “moderate” this demand. Article 67.2.1 of the Russian Constitution, which entered into force after 2020’s constitutional referendum, stipulates that “Actions (except delimitation, demarcation, and re-demarcation of the state border of the Russian Federation with adjacent states) aimed at alienating part of the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as calls for such actions, are not permitted.” “Moderation” could thus hypothetically be an “exception”.

To be absolutely clear, no call is being made within this analysis for Russia to “cede” any territory that it considers to be its own, nor have any Russian officials lent any credence whatsoever to Witkoff’s claim. That said, if Putin concludes for whatever reason that Russia’s national interests are now best served by “moderating” its territorial claims after all that happened since September 2022’s referenda, then any proposed “re-demarcation of the state border” would likely require the Constitutional Court’s approval.

He's a lawyer by training so it would make sense for him to proactively ask them to rule on the legality of this hypothetical solution to the Ukrainian Conflict. Even if he instead hypothetically proposes retaining his country’s territorial claims but freezing the military phase of the conflict and only advancing those claims through political means, he’d still likely seek their judgement too. They’re the final authority on constitutional issues and these scenarios require their expertise per their connection to Article 67.2.1.

If they hypothetically rule in his favor, the question would then arise about the fate of those living in the Ukrainian-controlled parts of those regions who Putin said “have become our citizens, forever.” They might rule that those who didn’t take part in the referenda, such as the residents of Zaporozhye city, aren’t Russian citizens. Those that did but then fell under Ukrainian control, such as the residents of Kherson city, might be deemed citizens who could move to Russia if Ukraine lets them as part of a deal.

To remind the reader, no Russian officials at the time of this analysis’ publication have lent any credence whatsoever to Witkoff’s claim that Russia made “some concessions” on territorial issues, so it remains solely a hypothetical scenario for now. Even so, Putin might hypothetically conclude that such “moderation” is the best way to advance Russia’s national interests in the current context (such as part of a grand compromise), in which case the Constitutional Court would likely have to rule on its legality.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/can-puti ... e-conflict

******

Ukraine will not return Crimea. It is impossible (c) Trump
August 19, 19:02



Trump said:

1. Zelensky should show "flexibility" in negotiations with Putin.
2. Trump is working to organize negotiations between Putin and Zelensky.
3. Ukraine will not return Crimea. This is impossible.
4. Ukraine will not join NATO. This is also impossible.
5. As long as Trump is the US President, there will be no American troops in Ukraine.
6. Ukraine's accession to NATO was taboo for Russians. This was the case before Putin.
7. At a meeting in the White House, European leaders were understanding of the need for territorial concessions by Ukraine,
8. France, Germany and Great Britain want to station troops on Ukrainian territory
9. Security guarantees for Ukraine cannot include NATO, but the US will be ready to help Europe with this
10. Russia is a powerful military power, whether the West likes it or not.
11. Russia has the right to demand that its opponents not be on its borders.

Of this, the only thing that clearly does not suit Russia is the point about European troops in Ukraine.
However, Trump said a lot of other things. Including the deadlines for the end of the war, which have again been moved forward by 2 weeks.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/10020386.html

Google Translator

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New is well forgotten old
August 18, 2025
Rybar

" On the strike against the Voronezh ethnic organized crime group "

Yusif Khalilov , the head of the Azerbaijani diaspora and co-owner of the region's largest market, was arrested in Voronezh . According to investigators, he paid a doctor 330,000 rubles so that his son could avoid the army .

Khalilov was searched on July 1. The security forces seized a phone and found evidence of a bribe. The defendant himself refused to testify and did not admit guilt. Now he faces up to 12 years in prison and deportation.

The story goes beyond corruption. Khalilov supervised the largest market in Voronezh, where an ethno-criminal environment had long been entrenched. Security officials recently inspected the Alekseevsky Market and found widespread violations there.

Such points act as centers of influence for diasporas, where, along with trade, crime and criminal schemes are established .

A similar story happened in Yekaterinburg with the case of Shahin Shykhlinsky , the leader of the Azerbaijani diaspora and ethnic organized crime group. In his case, connections to shadow schemes and attempts to hide under the wing of the diaspora and diplomats also surfaced, and law enforcement officers made an arrest after the initial detention.

At a time when the Azerbaijani authorities are increasingly demonstrating support for the so-called Ukraine, the increased pressure on the Azerbaijani criminal world is evolving from a question of internal security into a fight against external threats.

And the consistent dismantling of ethno-criminal structures throughout the country is becoming a real way to deprive Russia’s opponents not only of influence within the country, but also of finances.

https://rybar.ru/novoe-horosho-zabytoe-staroe/

Google Translator

******

Yes, They Are That Serious ...

Swiss decided to get back into the game they lost long time ago, you know--the so called neutrality, LOL.

Switzerland has indicated it would allow Russian President Vladimir Putin to attend possible Ukraine peace talks on its soil without facing arrest under an International Criminal Court warrant, according to media reports. Following a weekend during which Putin was welcomed to the US by President Donald Trump, who days later hosted Vladimir Zelensky and his key Western European backers, Moscow confirmed its readiness to participate in further talks on a lasting resolution to the Ukraine conflict and indicated that its diplomatic presence at such talks would be raised. A possible venue for such talks has not been identified.

Yes, yes, they will allow. Russia responded in kind and indicated that Russia will allow Switzerland to be flattened last in case a bunch of Euromorons continue to "plan" all kinds of suicidal moves. In the same time, Russians reminded Swiss that reputations take many years to build and about 10 minutes to ruin. Switzerland managed to lose its public aura of "neutral country" (LOL)) in 10 seconds flat. In the end, as the tradition goes, Trump should visit Moscow now. As per any kinds of "meetings" between Ze and Putin, I stress non-stop--unplug yourself from Western MSM and BS originating from the WH. Read what Russians say and they say same thing over and over and over again.

Meanwhile the so called "Azov" corps(es) which was sent to "relieve" Krasnoarmeisk (aka Pokrovsk) has been decimated and that's pretty much it. I am planning to talk about it tomorrow in my new video, and about this:



Noncommittal means--NOT interested. The rest--is a usual PR and spin by morons in Western media and governments. SMO continues.

http://smoothiex12.blogspot.com/2025/08 ... rious.html

Lavrov ...

... verbatim.



http://smoothiex12.blogspot.com/2025/08/lavrov.html

*****

The War Was The Easy Bit.
Just wait until we get to the politics.
Aurelien
Aug 20, 2025

<snip>

You may recall that a couple of years ago, the talk was that if the war did not end soon in a Russian defeat, the US would have to “get directly involved.” What happened to that idea? It turned out that the US had nothing to get involved with. It had no forces in Europe capable of affecting the course of the fighting, and the very limited high-intensity forces it has in the US would have required months, if not years, of preparation, training and installation, and even then would have been incapable of making much of a difference. And yet the delusion continues, not just inside the government and the sycophant media, but among the US’s fiercest critics, who believe that Washington is trying to “provoke a war” with Russia for some reason, which it would certainly lose. Likewise, for all the bellicose political talk, it’s unlikely that the US military is quite so stupid to believe that it can “win” a naval and air war with China over some unspecified issue, at the cost of half its Navy and for no discernible purpose. Yet the delusions continue, and at some level they determine how people in Washington think and feel, since they have no real-world competition. The fundamental approaching crisis is less that the war in Ukraine has been “lost,” than that the US will have forfeited, unmistakably, unnecessarily and very publicly, much of its ability to influence events in the world. For their part, it’s clear that the Russians would prefer a less confrontational and more normal relationship with the US, but it’s equally clear that they are not prepared to sacrifice anything of importance to bring it about. I’m not sure that the US political system, disorganised, delusional and fragmented as it is, can cope with all this.

Which leads to consideration of Russia. Again, I don’t pretend to much specialised knowledge of the country, but there are certain things that political logic suggests are going to create problems in the near future. As I have pointed out, “victory” in this context is a very slippery idea, and may not be achievable in the full sense of the term. There can be no repetition of the 1945 scenario here, and even if the whole of Ukraine were brought under control it would simply give the Russians a new frontier with NATO, which would slightly defeat the point of the exercise. Above all, it’s not clear to me that something the Russians would legitimately regard as “victory,” and that could be marketed to the Russian people as such, could actually be practically agreed, let alone implemented. Above all, there is the question, addressed in my previous essay, of “how much is enough?” There is no rational, algorithmically-derived, answer to the question of how much land needs to be controlled, how far back NATO forces should ideally be pushed, what armaments a future Ukraine could be permitted, and many other things. There will certainly be a whole range of views and pressures, and the possibility of quite serious internal disputes, which will in turn make constructing a Russian negotiating position for the endgame much more difficult. And in any case, political systems and public opinion typically become more radical under the stress of war.

In effect, this problem is as much technical as political. Whilst a limited ceasefire agreement could be locally negotiated, anything else risks the involvement of national parliaments and attempts to find consensus in international organisations, both of which (not to mention their interrelationship) could make any attempts at formal agreements impossible. So it’s easy to see that the Russians could give a unilateral security guarantee to Ukraine, similar to the multilateral Budapest Memorandum of 1994. But the undertakings in that text were not legally binding and the Russians were clear in 2014 that they did not apply any more. So a unilateral political security guarantee, like all such guarantees in history, would only apply until it didn't, whereas a legally-binding security guarantee would be un-negotiable. And the complications of trying to negotiate a treaty which would have to be signed and ratified individually by NATO nations are of mind-numbing complexity. In other words, it may well be that for practical reasons the Russians simply cannot get diplomatically what they want politically, and we shall have to see what the consequences of that will be..

The risk here is that all that will ever be satisfactorily negotiated is an interim ceasefire agreement and perhaps an armistice. Now that may be fine as far as it goes: after all, there’s been an armistice in Korea for seventy years now. The problem is that the number of moving parts is infinitely greater than was the case in Korea, and almost everything of importance would be excluded from such an agreement. The result is likely to be chaos, as different attempts are made at different levels to try to sort out different problems, often temporary and limited, in isolation from each other and sometimes at cross-purposes. There are perhaps three dozen countries involved in the wider Ukraine dossier, and probably no two will have an identical position on any of the dozens of bilateral and multilateral issues that will be raised.

We may therefore see something like a repetition of the Minsk controversy, which turned a limited set of temporary ceasefire and disengagement agreements into a major source of aggravation between Russia and the West. Recall that the purpose of the agreements was to put an end to the fighting and create a zone of disengagement. This suited the Russians, because it wasn’t obvious that the separatists were winning, and politically Moscow would have been forced to intervene, which it didn’t at all want to do at that point. They probably pressurised the separatists to sign, with the bone of some unenforceable political reform commitments from Kiev. Political logic suggests that the French and Germans pressured the government into accepting the ceasefire and giving these political assurances in return for some vague promises of subsequent western support. Thus, a temporary lash-up job designed to freeze the conflict was acceptable because it gave each side a respite from fighting and the opportunity to build up its forces (and in the Russian case its economic strength) for the possible next round. But it was never intended to be a complete solution, or indeed any kind of solution, except to the immediate problem.

This situation now risks happening again on a larger scale. Whilst ceasefires and armistice agreements are relatively easy to negotiate, they are essentially pragmatic documents, and everything that looks difficult will be left out to be returned to later. But there may well be no later, and as the agreements drag on, they will become more and more the focus for disputes and even conflicts, brought about by frustration in being unable to deal with the underlying problems themselves. And in such circumstances, the agreements on a ceasefire and potentially an armistice may themselves start to break down, with unpredictable and dangerous consequences. All this could result in the Russians getting their fingers caught in the mangle, with unpredictable consequences.

I’ll finally touch on Europe because that is where I think the most dangerous and unpredictable consequences may come, and these need to be outlined simply and calmly, without the tone of sneering dismissal that has become the norm. The problem of the Europeans is simple enough: they have never fully trusted the good faith of the United States, and it’s beginning to look as though they were right. To understand why this is so we need to loop back to the late 1940s and the condition of Europe at that point, avoiding currently-fashionable Gnostic interpretations of the beginning of the Cold War (“I’ve had a revelation!” “I know!”) and basing ourselves just on what we do know.

Whilst it’s true that much of Europe was physically destroyed in 1945, the real damage was elsewhere. The Germans had looted everything from the territories they had conquered, from apples to artworks, and the continent was effectively bankrupt and starving, its economy destroyed. Something between 4-5 million Western Europeans had been sent off to Germany as forced labour. Socially and politically the devastation was even worse. Whole systems of government and administration were discredited by the Occupation, an entire European political class was in question, political parties had disappeared and social trust had frequently broken down. Collaboration, which took different forms in each country, had created gaping political wounds that in some cases have yet to heal.

Political differences seemed unbridgeable, and some countries saw widespread political violence. In the powerful Communist Parties of France and Italy, voices argued that the struggle would not be complete until they had taken control of the country in the name of the working class. The memory of the Spanish Civil War was still painfully fresh, and new civil war was in progress in Greece. Few doubted that another widespread conflict would mean the end of European civilisation, already looking pretty shaky.

To the East, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia had been completely absorbed into the Soviet system, not through military action but through intimidation. Could the same thing happen elsewhere? Was that what Stalin wanted? Did anyone have any idea what Stalin wanted? The fear was less of Soviet power as such (though as General Montgomery said all the Red Army had to reach the Channel Ports was “walk”) so much as of political weakness and possible disintegration of Western Europe, and what that might lead to.

The only possible counterweight in the circumstances was the United States, but that country was largely demobilised, and turning inwards on itself in a frenzy of anti-communism. Its main foreign policy preoccupation was China. Whilst the US would scarcely welcome Europe falling under Soviet influence, it wasn’t obvious that the US political system was prepared to fight another war to stop it. Indeed, the big fear was that the US might simply decide to let the Soviets do as they liked, without Europe being able to influence its own destiny. This is, of course, the world of Orwell’s 1984, which sums up the exhaustion and fears of the time better than any other work I know. Orwell utilised a then-influential theory of the American political scientist James Burnham, that the age of the small nation was over, and that the future would belong to largely-indistinguishable mega-states run by a caste that we would now call the PMC. 1984 is partly a satire on this hypothesis, but it depicts, nonetheless, a world entirely dominated by the US, Russia in some form, and China. Europe has disappeared as an independent entity. Airstrip One, as Britain is known, is part of Oceania, dominated by the United States, whereas the rest of Europe is part of Eurasia, dominated by Russia. Orwell’s work expresses exactly the preoccupations about the end of Europe (his original working title was The Last Man in Europe) that agitated the European proponents of the Washington Treaty.

That Treaty was, of course, imperfect, in that for political reasons the US was not prepared to give a real security guarantee to Europe, and has never done so. The stationing of US troops in Europe did provide some reasons for guarded optimism, but they could always be withdrawn. Thus the unofficial motto of NATO commanders during the Cold War: make sure the first man to die is an American. So whilst on the surface all was sweetness and light, the Europeans could never be sure that the US would actually do what it had promised, and its control of the NATO command system meant that if it walked away, there could be no resistance to a Soviet attack or intimidation in crisis. As nuclear weapons became more powerful, more and more people began to wonder if it was actually realistic to imagine that the US would risk its own population in a nuclear confrontation with Moscow. It was not about “being protected,” (the vast majority of NATO forces were European anyway) but trying to make sure that a country with an enormous capacity to affect Europe for good or ill behaved as responsibly as possible, and took European interests into account. The method adopted was rather like that of tying down Gulliver in Lilliput, with many small ropes.

And to be fair, this was largely successful. The temptation to ignore European interests was mostly resisted in Washington, because in the end they were just too significant. But in what seems to be a new level of chaos in Washington policy-making today, this is becoming a real concern again. The possibility that a US President may do something that Europe will regret has always existed, but with someone as impulsive and unreflective as Trump in charge that is becoming a very real risk. Orwell’s political geography may turn out to be right after all.

Ironically, there were many in Europe who saw an escape from this dilemma in 2022. The Russian invasion would surely fail, it was thought, there would be a crisis, Putin would fall from power, the country would develop into a Liberal democracy or maybe even just break up. The threat from the East, the anti-Europe, would at last be no more. Oh dear. It’s doubtful whether any set of expectations in modern history has ever been so brutally and quickly strangled. And this creates a special problem for the kind of economic and socially-liberal society Europe has hurtled towards in the last forty years. As Guy Debord remarked a few years before the end of the Cold War, a Liberal society prefers to be judged “more on its enemies than its results.” This is observably true today: it’s decades since western politicians promised anything to the electorate except suffering, or expected to be rewarded for any achievements. The all-purpose slogan of Liberal politicians, with no real political programme except mindless managerialism, is: if you think we’re bad, look at the other guy. This creates the continued demand for enemies whom you can boss around, dictate to and if necessary attack with impunity, because they are inferior. But this will no longer be possible with Russia, the transcendent Enemy, the negation of every tenet of Liberalism, the society of the Past doomed to disappear. And where will all this surplus antagonism go then, when prudence dictates trying to make friends with Russia again? It isn’t hard to imagine some worrying possibilities.

But this is only one aspect of the problem. The levers of power don’t work any more. No-one answers when we call. The servants have rebelled and are leaving. A western political class drunk for thirty years on illusions of omnipotence and moral superiority is about to be slapped around the face by the large wet fish of reality. Will it survive the experience?

(More at link.)

https://aurelien2022.substack.com/p/the ... e-easy-bit